PHILIPPINE DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2010

(Republic Act No. 10121)

Submitted by:

Submitted to:

Assistant Solicitor General

November 22, 2017

I. Philippine Disaster Risk Profile

Over the past decades, Philippines has always been among the most disaster-prone
countries in the World. Whereas according to the 2016 World Risk index,
Philippines is in the 3rd Place among the top 15 most exposed to natural disaster
countries and most at risk worldwide, whereby the first spot belongs to Vanuatu
and second to Tonga. In the World Risk Index, Philippines along with Japan, Brunei,
Bangladesh and Cambodia are the top Asian countries most exposed to natural
disaster.1 Also, in the 2016 study of the Geneva-based United nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and the Centre on the Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED) in Belgium, Philippines is 4th along with US as most disastrous, China and
India.

Philippines exposure to natural disaster could be attributable to its geographical

attributes and location. The country lies within the Pacific Ring of Fire which is an
rea of frequent earthquakes and volcanic eruptions due to the movement and
collision of tectonic plates in the Pacific Region which resulted to numerous active
and inactive fault lines2. There are at least forty (40) active faults in the Philippines
where frequent seismic activity occurs every day. Philippines has 37 volcanoes
wherein 22 are active; the most disastrous volcanic eruption in the country
occurred on June 15, 1991 when the Mt. Pinatubo erupted.

Aside from the dangers coming from the ground, Philippines is also susceptible to
strong and destructive typhoons. The country also lies in the so-called Western
Pacific Basin or the “Typhoon Belt Region”. Each year there are at least 22 typhoons
entering the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR). The most recent destructive
typhoon which entered the country is Yolanda in 2013 damaging the Eastern
Visayas amounting to P571Billion loss and damages.

Aside from these natural disasters, there are also human-induced disasters in the
Philippines which were mostly brought by political and socio-economic activities
and misuse of technology. These human-induced disasters may be due to the
negligence of man such as the recent oil spill in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro and some
are due to the intentional acts of men like in engaging to war against rebels.

Disaster as defined in Section 3 (h) of R.A. No. 10121, “a serious disruption of the
functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material,
economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the
affected community or society to cope using its own resources.” Disaster often results

1
2016 World Risk Index Chart
2
(National Geographic)
 to loss of life, injury, disease and other negative effects on the physical, mental and
social well-being of any human.

II. Background of the Law

Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 10121, there were already government
activities established to minimize the damages caused by disasters and creation of
new approach on mitigating such damages by implementing rules on disaster
preparedness and response in the 20th Century. One of the acts by the government is
the creation of the National Disaster Coordinating Council or NDCC in the year 1978
through the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1566 as signed by President
Ferdinand Marcos. Following its creation is the establishment of regional, provincial,
city/municipal and barangay coordinating councils which were formed primarily for
the supervision of disaster risk management.

In 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the NDCC Four Point Plan of
Action for Preparedness which intends to increase the public awareness and
involvement of the government on reducing the impact of disasters.

Finally, on May 27, 2010 the Republic Act No. 10121 also known as the “ Philippine
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010” was signed into law. The act
provides for a framework and plan on disaster risk reduction and management
which the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) is
the primary organization in charge of its implementation along with the Office of
Civil Defense and other pertinent government agencies.

III. Republic Act No. 10121

Declaration of Policy

The root of this law is the protection of the constitutional right to life and property of every
Filipino as provided for in Section 2(a):

“Uphold the people’s constitutional right to life and property by

addressing the root causes of vulnerabilities to disasters, strengthening
the country's institutional capacity for disaster risk reduction and
management and building the resilience of local communities to disasters
including climate change impacts;”
The law safeguards the protection of human life, liberty and property against natural or
human-induced disasters by reducing the risk through preventive measures and managing
our response against disasters up to our recovery. The law provides fund for this activities
and thus offering support to every Filipino in times of calamities.

The law incorporates also the creation and integration of national, regional, local and
barangay disaster risk programs which includes as well sustainable development and
poverty reduction strategies.

More so, in its declaration of policy it provides for the importance of gender responsive,
sensitive to indigenous and respectful to human rights measures and activities. It also
recognized the international measures, universal norms and standard humanitarian
assistance. The law promotes the principles of good governance such as transparency and
accountability.

Scope

As provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 10121, the scope of the law is the development of
policies and plans and the implementation of actions and measures pertaining to all aspects
of disaster risk reduction and management including:

• Good governance

• Risk assessment and early warning

• Knowledge building and awareness raising

• Reducing underlying risk factors

• Preparedness for effective response and early recovery

Governance

A. National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

The NDRRMC shall be compose of the Department of National Defense as Chairperson, the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) as Vice
Chairperson for Disaster Preparedness, the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Response, the Secretary of the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Prevention
and Mitigation, and the Director-General of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Rehabilitation and Recovery.
The NDRRMC also known as the National Council shall also be composed of 14
Departments, 11 other Government Agencies, 2 Government Financial Institutions, 4
accredited Leagues and 1 LGU Union, 4 Civil Society Organizations, 1 Private Organization,
the Director General of the Office of Civil Defense. These organizations shall be represented
by its highest official.

The Council is empowered with the policy-making, coordination, integration, supervision,

monitoring and evaluation of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan
(NDRRMP) and the development of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Framework (NDRRMF).

B. Office of Civil Defense

In Section 8 of R.A. No. 101212, the Office of Civil Defense or the OCD shall have the
primary mission of administering a comprehensive national civil defense and disaster risk
reduction and management program. The OCD is also tasked to provide a manual for the
criteria and procedure for the enlistment of accredited community disaster volunteers
(ACDVs).

The OCD shall serve as the Secretariat of the NDRRMC. The Administrator of the OCD shall
be the Executive Director of the NDRRMC and shall have the same duties and privileges of a
department undersecretary.

C. Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

The RDRRMC shall be responsible for the coordination, integration, supervision and
evaluation of the activities of the LDRRMC. It shall be responsible for the ensuring that
there is regional development plans and in case of emergency, it shall convene to the
different regional lines of agencies.

The Chairperson shall be a civil defense officer or who may be designated Regional Director
of the OCD. The Vice Chairperson shall be the Regional Directors of DILG, DSWD, DOST and
NEDA.

D. Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

LDRRMC shall be composed of the Provincial, City and Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Council and the Barangay Coordinating Councils.
Functions:
1) Approve, monitor and evaluate the implementation of the LDRRMPs and regularly
review and test the plan consistent with other national and local planning programs;
(2) Ensure the integration of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into
local development plans, programs and budgets as a strategy in sustainable development
and poverty reduction;
(3) Recommend the implementation of forced or preemptive evacuation of local residents,
if necessary; and
(4) Convene the local council once every three (3) months or as necessary

Accreditation, Mobilization, and Protection of Disaster Volunteers and National

Service Reserve Corps, CSOs and the Private Sector

The government agencies, civil Society organizations, private sectors and LGUs may
mobilize individuals and organize volunteers for the performance of activities related to
risk reduction and management up to the disaster responsiveness and recovery. The OCD
and LDRRMC shall maintain a national roster of accredited community disaster volunteers,
National Service Reserve Corps, Civil Society Organizations and private sectors.
Mobilization of volunteers shall be in accordance to the guidelines provided by the
NDRRMC.

Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction Education into the School Curricula and
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Program and Mandatory Training for the Public Sector
Employees.

DepEd, CHED, TESDA, in coordination with the OCD, the National Youth Commission, DOST,
DENR, DILG, DOH, DSWD and other relevant govt. agencies shall integrate the disaster risk
reduction and management education in the secondary and tertiary level of education
including the National Service Training Program.

Moreover, public employees shall be trained in emergency response and preparedness.

Coordination

The LDRRMCs shall take the lead in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from the
effects of any disaster based on the following criteria:

(a) The BDC, if a barangay is affected;

(b) The city/municipal DRRMCs, If two (2) or more barangays areaffected;

(c) The provincial DRRMC, if two (2) or more cities/municipalitiesare affected;

 (d) The regional DRRMC, if two (2) or more provinces areaffected; and

(e) The NDRRMC, if two (2) or more regions are affected.

The NDRRMC and intermediary LDRRMCs shall always act as support to LGUs which have
the primary responsibility as first disaster responders. Private sector and civil society
groups shall work in accordance with the coordination mechanism and policies set by the
NDRRMC and concerned LDRRMCs.

Rules on the Declaration of State of Calamity

Section 3 of Republic Act 10121, known as the “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Act of 2010,” defines a State of Calamity as “a condition involving mass
casualty and/or major damages to property, disruption of means of livelihoods, roads and
normal way of life of people in the affected areas as a result of the occurrence of natural or
human-induced hazard.”

Prior to 2013, the last time a State of National Calamity was declared was on December 7,
2012 by virtue of Proclamation No. 522 signed by President Benigno S. Aquino III in the
wake of the devastation caused by typhoon Pablo in Compostela Valley, Davao Oriental, and
Davao del Norte in Region XI; Surigao del Sur in Caraga Region; Lanao del Norte, Misamis
Oriental and Cagayan de Oro City in Region X; Siquijor in Region VII; and, Palawan in
Region IV-B.

A year before, a State of National Calamity was declared on December 20, 2011, by virtue of
Proclamation No. 303, signed by President Benigno S. Aquino III in the wake of the
devastation caused by tropical storm Sendong in Regions VII, IX, X, XI, and Caraga.

Prior to this, the Philippines was last put under a State of National Calamity through
Proclamation 1898on October 2, 2009 after the onslaught of typhoon Ondoy and during the
rage of typhoon Pepeng. According to a spokesperson of then President Arroyo, the
purpose of the declaration was to make the calamity funds available for the local
governments and control the prices of basic commodities.

It is common practice for the local government in a disaster-stricken area to declare its
own “State of Calamity.” In 2011, the local government of Negros Oriental declared
Dumaguete City and Valencia under a State of Calamity on December 18, 2011, after the
onslaught of Sendong. During the floods caused by monsoon rains on August of 2012
several areas in the National Capital Region and Region IV were placed under a State of
Calamity.

Declaration

 RA 10121, Section 16: “Declaration of State of Calamity – The National Council shall
recommend to the President of the Philippines the declaration of a cluster of barangays,
municipalities, cities, provinces, and regions under a state of calamity, and the lifting
 thereof, based on the criteria set by the National Council. The President’s declaration may
warrant international humanitarian assistance as deemed necessary.”
 “The declaration and lifting of the state of calamity may also be issued by the local
sanggunian, upon the recommendation of the LDRRMC, based on the results of the damage
assessment and needs analysis.” If a State of Calamity is declared by the National
Government the following will be implemented: appropriation for calamity funds; Price
freeze for basic necessities; and the granting of no-interest loans.
 A State of National Calamity when declared will remain until lifted by the President.

Effects

A. Price Control for Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities

 RA 7581, Section 6(1): “Price freeze for basic necessities is implemented for 60 days unless
lifted… Prices of basic necessities in areas under a state of calamity shall automatically be
frozen at their prevailing prices or placed under automatic price control whenever.”
 RA 10121 Section 17(a): “Imposition of price ceiling on basic necessities and prime
commodities by the President upon the recommendation of the implementing agency as
provided for under Republic Act No. 7581, otherwise known as the ‘Price Act,’ or the
National Price Coordinating Council.”
 RA 10121 Section 17(b): “Monitoring, prevention and control by the Local Price
Coordination Council of overpricing/profiteering and hoarding of prime commodities,
medicines and petroleum products.”

B. Granting of No-Interest Loans

 RA 10121 Section 17(d): “Granting of no-interest loans by government financing or lending

institutions to the most affected section of the population through their cooperatives or
people’s organizations.”

C. Appropriation for Calamity Funds

 RA 10121 Section 17(c): “Programming/reprogramming of funds for the repair and safety
upgrading of public infrastructures and facilities.”
 RA 7160: “Automatic appropriation is available for unforeseen expenditures arising from
the occurrence of calamities in areas declared to be in a state of calamity.”
 RA 7160: “Local government units may enact a supplemental budget for supplies and
materials or payment of services to prevent danger to or loss of life or property.”
o Section 321: “A supplemental budget may also be enacted in times of public calamity by
way of budgetary realignment to set aside appropriations for the purchase of supplies and
 materials or the payment of services which are exceptionally urgent or absolutely
indispensable to prevent imminent danger to, or loss of, life or property, in the jurisdiction
of the local government unit or in other areas declared by the President in a state of
calamity.”
o Section 324(d): “Five percent (5%) of the estimated revenue from regular sources shall be
set aside as an annual lump sum appropriation for unforeseen expenditures arising from
the occurrence of calamities: Provided, however, that such appropriation shall be used only
in the area, or a portion thereof, of the local government unit or other areas declared by the
President in a state of calamity.”

D. Importations and foreign donations

 RA 10121 Section 18 (a): “The importation and donation of food, clothing, medicine and
equipment for relief and recovery and other disaster management and recovery-related
supplies is hereby authorized in accordance with Section 105 of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, as amended, and the prevailing provisions of the General
Appropriations Act covering national internal revenue taxes and import duties of national
and local government agencies”
 RA 10121 Section 18 (b): “Importations and donations under this section shall be
considered as importation by and/or donation to the NDRRMC, subject to the approval of
the Office of the President.”

E. Others

 Authorization for the importation of rice under Section 6 of RA 8178, the Agricultural
Tariffication Act;
 Entitlement to hazard allowance for Public Health Workers (under Section 21 of RA 7305,
Magna Carta for Public Health Workers).
 Entitlement to hazard allowance for science and technological personnel of the government
under Section 7-c of RA 8439.

basic necessities; noodles; onions; garlic; vinegar; patis; soy sauce; toilet soap; fertilizer;
pesticides; herbicides; poultry; swine and cattle feeds; veterinary products for poultry,
swine and cattle; paper; school supplies; nipa shingles; sawali; cement; clinker; GI sheets;
hollow blocks; plywood; plyboard; construction nails; batteries; electrical supplies; light
bulbs; steel wire; and all drugs not classified as essential drugs by the Department of
Health.

Prohibited Acts
In Section 19 of RA 10121, the law enumerates below those prohibited acts which any
person, group or corporation if committed shall be held liable and be subjected to the
penalties as prescribed in succeeding section:

(a) Dereliction of duties which leads to destruction, loss of lives, critical

damage of facilities and misuse of funds;

(b) Preventing the entry and distribution of relief goods in disaster-stricken

areas, including appropriate technology, tools, equipment, accessories,
disaster teams/experts;

(c) Buying, for consumption or resale, from disaster relief agencies any relief
goods, equipment or other and commodities which are intended for
distribution to disaster affected communities;

(d) Buying, for consumption or resale, from the recipient disaster affected
persons any relief goods, equipment or other aid commodities received by
them;

(e) Selling of relief goods, equipment or other aid commodities which are
intended for distribution to disaster victims;

(f) Forcibly seizing relief goods, equipment or other aid commodities

intended for or consigned to a specific group of victims or relief agency;

(g) Diverting or misdelivery of relief goods, equipment or other aid

commodities to persons other than the rightful recipient or consignee;

(h) Accepting, possessing, using or disposing relief goods, equipment or

other aid commodities not intended for nor consigned to him/her;

(i) Misrepresenting the source of relief goods, equipment or other aid

commodities by:

(1) Either covering, replacing or defacing the labels of the containers

to make it appear that the goods, equipment or other aid commodities
came from another agency or persons;

(2) Repacking the! goods, equipment or other aid commodities into

containers with different markings to make it appear that the goods
came from another agency or persons or was released upon the
instance of a particular agency or persons;

(3) Making false verbal claim that the goods, equipment or other and
commodity m its untampered original containers actually came from
 another agency or persons or was released upon the instance of a
particular agency or persons;

(j) Substituting or replacing relief goods, equipment or other aid

commodities with the same items or inferior/cheaper quality;

(k) Illegal solicitations by persons or organizations representing others as

defined in the standards and guidelines set by the NDRRMC;

(l) Deliberate use of false at inflated data in support of the request for
funding, relief goods, equipment or other aid commodities for emergency
assistance or livelihood projects; and

(m) Tampering with or stealing hazard monitoring and disaster

preparedness equipment and paraphernalia.

Penalties

Any individual, corporation, partnership, association, or other juridical entity that commits
any of the prohibited acts provided for in Section 19 of this Act shall be prosecuted and
upon conviction shall suffer a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (Php50,000.00) or
any amount not to exceed Five hundred thousand pesos (php500,000.00) or imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day or more than twelve (12) years, or both, at the
discretion of the court, including perpetual disqualification from public office if the
offender IS a public officer, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the government of the
objects and the instrumentalities used in committing any of herein prohibited acts.

If the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, or other juridical entity, the

penalty shall be imposed upon the officer or officers of the corporation, partnership,
association or entity responsible for the violation without prejudice to the cancellation or
revocation of these entities license or accreditation issued to them by any licensing or
accredited body of the government. If such offender is an alien, he or she shall, in addition
to the penalties prescribed in this Act, be deported without further proceedings after
service of the sentence.

However, the prosecution for offenses set forth in Section 19 of this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of Republic Act No. 3185, as amended, otherwise
known as the Revised Penal Code, and other civil liabilities.
Jurisprudence

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2004.]

MANUEL E. ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. GOVERNOR JOSE R. CABALLERO,

ANESIO M. RANARIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator,
MARIANO KINTANAR, in his capacity as Provincial Auditor, CARMEN R.
RASUL, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, ROLANDO L. OSORIO,
BELINDA G. APAWAN, ARMANDO L. SERAS, RUWEL PETER S.
GONZAGA, ARMANDO C. CODILLA, RAUL B. BASAÑES, GRACIANO C.
ARAFOL, JR., respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J p:

Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela

Valley (the Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all acts executed and resolutions issued by the
Sanggunian during its sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum.
It appears that on February 6, 2001, Vice-Governor Reynaldo Navarro sent a written notice
of a special session on February 7, 2001. 1Upon the request of Governor Jose R. Caballero,
however, the scheduled special session was reset to February 8, 2001 without the benefit
of a written notice. 2
On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special session to, among other things,
allow the Governor to deliver his State of the Province Address. As only seven members of
the fourteen-member Sanggunian were present, 3 no resolution was considered.
On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it issued
Resolution No. 05 4declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of
calamity and Resolution No. 07 5authorizing the Governor to, on behalf of the province,
enter into a construction contract (Contract) with Allado Construction Company, Inc. (the
Allado Company) for the completion of Phase II of the construction of the capitol building.
During the same session, the Sanggunian accepted the letter of irrevocable resignation
submitted by Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto. 6
While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the commencement of the
session on February 26, 2001, the Journal of the Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution Nos.
05 and 07 showed that a total of thirteen members attended it. 7
Petitioner thus filed a petition 8before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nabunturan,
Compostela Valley against the Governor, et al., challenging the validity of the acts of the
Sanggunian on February 26, 2001, alleging that while the Journal and Resolutions indicated
the presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian nonetheless "conducted official business
without a quorum" 9as only seven of its fourteen members were actually present when the
irrevocable letter of resignation of Board Member Sotto was noted, 10and the motions to
declare the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity 11and to
authorize the Governor to enter into the Contract with the Allado Company 12were
approved. 13
Petitioner additionally alleged that when the vote respecting Resolution No. 05 was taken,
only the remaining six members voted for the adoption thereof, the then presiding officer
Board Member Rolando Osorio not having cast his vote; 14that when Resolution No. 07
was taken up, however, then presiding officer Osorio, 15relinquished his seat to Board
Member Graciano Arafol after the six members present unanimously voted on the said
resolution in the affirmative, following which Osorio cast his vote as a member also in the
affirmative, thereby authorizing the Governor to enter into the Contract with Allado
Company; and that Board Member Arafol thereafter relinquished his seat as presiding
officer to Board Member Osorio who once again assumed the duties of a presiding officer.
16
Petitioner furthermore challenged the validity of the special session of February 8, 2001 for
lack of quorum, there being only seven members of the Sanggunian in attendance, and for
lack of written notice sent to all members at least 24 hours before the holding of the special
session in accordance with Section 52 (d) 17 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
18
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that since Board Member Sotto was in the
United States 19at the time the questioned acts were executed and resolutions adopted, the
actual number of Board Members then in the country was thirteen which should be the
basis of the determination of a quorum.
Branch 3 of the RTC of Nabunturan, at Compostela Valley, by Order 20of April 24, 2001,
dismissed the petition upon the following ratiocination:
. . . Gemma Theresa M. Sotto should not be counted as member for the
purpose of determining the number to constitute a quorum because she is
in the United States of America. However, sub-paragraph (b) [of section 53
of the Local Government Code] states and provides for compulsion of any
member absent without any justifiable cause.
This is interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Jose Avelino,
petitioner vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, respondent, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4,
1949.
 Gemma Theresa M. Sotto is beyond the reach of the legal processes of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and could not be arrested to compel her to
attend its session. Quorum should be determined on the basis of the actual
number of members of the body concerned rather than upon its full
membership which is fourteen (14). Therefore, in this case, with seven (7)
members of the thirteen (13) members present in constitutive of a quorum.
...
Moreover, Presidential Decree 181821prohibits the issuance of a
restraining order or injunction in any case involving government
infrastructure projects. 22(Emphases omitted)
Hence, the present petition for Certiorari under Rule 45, faulting the trial court for
erroneously (1) applying the case of Avelino v. Cuenco23to a controversy involving a local
government unit; (2) taking judicial notice of Board Member Sotto's being in the United
States without proof thereof; and (3) ruling that to grant a Temporary Restraining Order
would be in violation of P.D. 1818. 24
Respondents question the authority of the Court to look beyond the Journal and
Resolutions of the Sanggunian 25and assert that the construction of the capitol building
26cannot be enjoined. And they too assert that the presence of thirteen members at the
February 26, 2001 session should be conclusive on the strength of Arroyo v. De
Venecia27and U.S. v. Pons. 28Citation of these cases is misplaced, however.
In Arroyo v. De Venecia, this Court refused to inquire into allegations that the House of
Representatives failed to comply with the rules of procedures which the House itself
promulgated absent any showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or
of the rights of private individuals.
In U.S. v. Pons, this Court did not go beyond the legislative journals which it found clear and
explicit, it holding that to disprove the entries in the journals, evidence must be adduced
based merely upon the memory or recollection of witnesses in contrast to journals which
are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. 29
In the instant case, this Court is not called upon to inquire into the Sanggunian's
compliance with its own rules. Rather, it is called upon to determine whether the
Sanggunian complied with the LGC, a law enacted by Congress, and its Implementing Rules.
Moreover, the Journal of the Sanggunian is far from clear and explicit as to the presence of a
quorum when the questioned acts were taken. It does not indicate how many members
were actually present when the body voted on the motions leading to the adoption of
Resolution Nos. 05 and 07. While the Journal and the Resolutions show that 13 members
attended the session, 30the Journal shows that only six members were called by the
presiding officer to vote on the motions. 31Six members whose names appear in attendance,
namely: Vice Governor Navarro and Board Members Zamora, Yanong, Castillo, Andres and
Gentugaya, were not called and, save for the absent Vice Governor, 32no explanation was
given therefor.
Coincidentally, in Resolutions 05 and 07, the names of the Board Members who were not
called upon to vote, including petitioner as he had in the meantime left, are followed by two
asterisks (**).
Additionally, it was clearly noted by petitioner, when he asked permission to leave the
session, that only seven members were left:
SP Member ZAMORA:
Mr. President, I move to adjourn, Mr. President.
SP Member ARAFOL:
Objection Mr. President.
SP Member ZAMORA:
Mr. President, before the objection, before objection Mr. President, I would
like to invite everybody to go at my service I have a patient nga gi-
pagawas na sa hospital nga i-uli na sa Awao, it's been there for one
hour so I really have to go I have to carry that patient to Awao Mr.
President.
SP Member OSORIO:
You are excused Honorable. . .
SP Member ZAMORA:
Okay, then remember that you're only seven Mr. President.
SP Member ARAFOL:
No problem.
SP Member ZAMORA:
Okay so it's alright for you to decide. The seven of you. I would like to
manifest in the record that before further discussion that. . .
SP Member GONZAGA:
Mr. President he is already excused Mr. President.
SP Member ZAMORA:
Yes but I would like to make statement first for the record, for the record.
That I do not want Mr. President that the incident of the of the State
of the Province Address will be repeated Mr. President, wherein
there are only seven members present and the quorum was
declared Mr. President. . . .
SP Member GONZAGA:
That's only your opinion . . . 33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents themselves admit that there were only seven members present when the
motions were voted upon:
26. Nevertheless, even if that remark constituted a proper question on
quorum, it is a matter of fact that there were still seven (7) members present.
. . [T]here is a quorum since seven is a majority of thirteen (13). . . .
34(Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, this Court is constrained to look into the proceedings of the Sanggunian as
recorded in the Journal and not just rely on Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 to determine who
and how many participated in the consideration thereof. The placing of the asterisks after
the names of five members in the Resolutions is highly irregular and suspicious especially
since both resolutions indicate that petitioner, whose name is also followed by asterisks,
was present even if it is clear from the Journal that he had already left the session before
the Sanggunian took note of the resignation of Board Member Sotto and voted on the
motions.
Respondents' other contention that the construction of the capitol building cannot be
enjoined in light of Malaga v. Penachos, Jr.35fails to convince. In Malaga, this Court
declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the
issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this
dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be
prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. 36
Respondents maintain that the exception in Malaga as indicated above should not be
applied in the instant case because there was therein a defect in the compliance with
procedural rules on bidding. In contrast, respondents stress, the bidding for the
construction of the capitol building in which the winner was the Allado Company was not
defective, they adding that Resolution 07 simply authorized the Governor to formalize the
Contract necessary for the full implementation of the project. 37
This Court fails to see the essential difference between Malaga and the instant case.
In both cases, the defect in the Contract relates to the non-compliance with the mandate of
a law respecting requirements before validly entering into a contract. In Malaga, the defect
pertained to bidding. In the present case, the alleged defect pertains to the required
number of votes necessary to authorize the Governor to enter into a construction contract.
Clearly then, what is at issue in this case is not the propriety or the wisdom of entering into
the Contract for the construction of the capitol building, which is beyond the power of this
Court to enjoin, but the Sanggunian's compliance with the requirements prescribed under
the LGC before it may grant the Governor authority to enter into the Contract, which issue
falls under the exception to the proscription against injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects, as held in Malaga.
On the applicability of Avelino38to the present case: The issue in said case was whether
there was a quorum in a meeting attended by only 12 of 24 senators, one having been in
the hospital while another was out of the country. This Court held that although the total
membership of the Senate was 24, the presence of 12 members already constituted a
quorum since the 24th member was outside the country and beyond the coercive power of
the Senate. 39
In the instant case, there is nothing on record, save for respondents' allegation, to show
that Board Member Sotto was out of the country and to thereby conclude that she was
outside the coercive power of the Sanggunian when the February 8 and 26, 2001 sessions
were held. In fact it is undisputed that the leave form filed by said Board Member before
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) did not mention that she was
going out of the country. 40Petitioner's contention that the trial court cannot take judicial
notice of Board Member Sotto's whereabouts is thus well taken. On this score, the instant
case is outside the application of the doctrine in Avelino.
A court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or those which are capable
of unquestionable determination or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. 41 With respect to disputed facts, however, the court must receive evidence
thereof, with notice to the parties. 42
Also, in Avelino, the legislative body involved was the Senate and the applicable rule on
quorum was that embodied in Article VI, Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution which reads:
Section 10. . . .
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such
penalties as such House may provide. 43(Emphasis supplied)
The present case, however, involves a local legislative body, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley Province, and the applicable rule respecting quorum
is found in Section 53(a) of the LGC which provides:
Section 53. Quorum. —
(a) A majority of all members of the sanggunian who have been elected and
qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business.
Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the
presiding officer shall immediately proceed to call the roll of the
members and thereafter announce the results. (Emphasis supplied)
"Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled
in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business or that number
which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any
valid act. 44"Majority," when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater
than half or more than half of any total. 45In fine, the entire membership must be taken into
account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the
constitution merely states that "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum," Section
53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the "majority of all members of the
sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute a quorum.
The difference in the wordings of the Constitution and the LGC is not merely "a matter of
style and writing" as respondents would argue, but is actually a matter of "meaning and
intention." 46The qualification in the LGC that the majority be based on those "elected and
qualified" was meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof
have been proclaimed. 47 And, while the intent of the legislature in qualifying the quorum
requirement was to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof have
been proclaimed and have assumed office, the provision necessarily applies when, after all
the members of the sanggunian have assumed office, one or some of its members file for
leave. What should be important then is the concurrence of election to and qualification for
the office. And election to, and qualification as member of, a local legislative body are not
altered by the simple expedient of filing a leave of absence.
The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence of a quorum on
the total number of members of the Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave of
absence by Board Member Sotto. The fear that a majority may, for reasons of political
affiliation, file leaves of absence in order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is
already addressed by the grant of coercive power to a mere majority of sanggunian
members present when there is no quorum. 48
A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and duty of the
sanggunian, requires the participation of all its members so that they may not only
represent the interests of their respective constituents but also help in the making of
decisions by voting upon every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of the
Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned are legally
infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null and void. And all such acts
cannot be given binding force and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during
an unauthorized session.
Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was no quorum when her
letter of irrevocable resignation was noted by the Sanggunian. For the same reason,
Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 are of no legal effect.
Even assuming arguendo that there were indeed thirteen members present during the
questioned February 26, 2001 session, Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of
Compostela Valley under state of calamity is still null and void because the motion for its
approval was approved by only six members. 49 When there are thirteen members present
at a session, the vote of only six members can not, at any instance, be deemed to be in
compliance with Section 107(g) 50 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC
which requires the concurrence of the approval by the majority of the members present
and the existence of a quorum in order to validly enact a resolution.
The motion to grant the Governor authority to enter into the construction contract is also
deemed not approved in accordance with the law even if it received seven affirmative
votes, which is already the majority of thirteen, due to the defect in the seventh vote. For as
priorly stated, as the Journal confirms, after all six members voted in the affirmative, Board
Member Osorio, as acting presiding officer, relinquished his seat to Board Member Arafol
and thereafter cast his vote as a member in favor of granting authority to the Governor. 51
This Court is faced with an act clearly intended to circumvent an express prohibition under
the law — a situation that will not be condoned. 52The LGC clearly limits the power of
presiding officers to vote only in case of a tie, to wit:
Section 49. Presiding Officer. — (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding
officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan . . . . The presiding officer shall vote
only to break a tie.

(b) In the event of inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a

sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall
elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. . . . (Italics in
the original. Emphasis supplied.)
While acting as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio may not, at the same time, be
allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board member including that of voting even
when there is no tie to break. A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the
shoes of the presiding officer could not have greater power than that possessed by the
latter 53who can vote only in case of a tie.
Lastly, for a resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a construction contract to be
valid, the vote of the majority of all members of the Sanggunian, and not only of those
present during the session, is required in accordance with Section 468 54 of the LGC in
relation to Article 107 55 of its Implementing Rules.
Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was then the Acting Presiding
Officer, Resolution No. 07 is still invalid. Applying Section 468 of the LGC and Article 107 of
its Implementing Rules, there being fourteen members in the Sanggunian, the approval of
eight members is required to authorize the governor to enter into the Contract with the
Allado Company since it involves the creation of liability for payment on the part of the
local government unit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley dated April 24, 2001 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley approved
on February 26, 2001, declaring the entire Province of Compostela Valley under a state of
calamity and granting authority to the Provincial Governor to enter into a general
construction agreement, respectively, are hereby declared null and void. AIDTHC
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.
||| (Zamora v. Caballero, G.R. No. 147767, [January 14, 2004], 464 PHIL 471-493)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 185954. February 16, 2010.]

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. MAXIMO D. SISON,

respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J p:

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing and
seeking to set aside the Resolution 1 dated December 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96611, entitled Maximo D. Sison v. Fr. Noel Labendia for Himself
and in Representation of Isog Han Samar Movement, Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan,
Samar. The CA Resolution denied petitioner Office of the Ombudsman's Omnibus
Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration of the CA's
June 26, 2008 Decision. 2
The Facts
On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel
Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint
addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo, accusing Governor Milagrosa T.
Tan and other local public officials 3 of the Province of Samar, including respondent
Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to
several millions of pesos. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13,
2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit
(COA), which found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP29.34 million
went without proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds
were expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and
that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially
overpriced.
 The Special Audit Team, which was created under LAO Office Order No. 2003-
059 dated July 7, 2003, summarized the corresponding COA audit findings and
observations, to wit:
1. Rules and regulations pertaining to procurement of supplies and
materials were consciously and continually violated as disclosed in
the verification of selected purchases of the Province. Below were
the findings and observations:
a. Purchases of various items, totaling at least PhP29.34 million and
allegedly procured through public bidding, were found highly
irregular for lack of proper bidding procedures and
documentation;
b. At least PhP28.165 million worth of purchases through repeat
orders were made by the Province without observing the
pertinent law, rules and regulations governing this mode of
procurement; and
c. Emergency purchases of medicines and assorted goods totaling
PhP14.67 million were found not complying with the
requirements set forth under the Rules and Regulations on
Supplies and Property Management in Local Governments
(RRSPMLG). Moreover, the purchases were charged against
the calamity fund, despite absence of any declaration from
the President that Samar was under a state of calamity, in
violation of Sec. 324(d) of R.A. 7160.
2. Inconsistencies in the dates of supporting documents relating to the
purchases discussed in finding No. 1 were so glaring that they raised
doubts on the validity of the transactions per se;
3. The use of the 5% budgetary reserves for calamity as funding source of
emergency purchases was not legally established, there being no
declaration from the Office of the President that Samar was under a
state of calamity, as required under Sec. 324(d) of R.A. 7160;
4. Splitting of requisitions and purchase orders was resorted to in violation
of COA Circular No. 76-41 dated July 30, 1976;
5. There was overpricing in the purchase of rice, medicines, electric fans
and cement in the amount of PhP580,000.00, PhP322,760.00,
PhP341,040.00, and PhP3.6 million, respectively. An overpayment
was also committed in the payments of cement in the amount of
PhP96,364.09;
6. Other observations gathered corollary to the purchases made are the
following:
 a. Purchase Orders were not duly accomplished to include a
complete description of the items to be purchased, the
delivery date and the terms of payment, in violation of the
provisions of Section 74 and other corollary provisions of
RRSPMLG. Some were even acknowledged by suppliers;
cTEICD
b. At least 36 vouchers/claims were not supported with an official
receipt, in violation of the provisions of Section 4 of PD 1445
that all disbursements must be supported with complete
documentation; and
c. Advanced deliveries of medicines and assorted goods were made
on some purchases even before the purchase orders were
prepared and before the public biddings were conducted.
7. The necessity and veracity of the distribution of t-shirts/caps, medicines,
assorted goods and cement purchased by the Province of Samar
could not be established due to rampant inconsistencies in dates,
quantities, as well as the signatures of the alleged recipients in the
Requisition and Issue Slip; and,
8. Financial Assistance (FA)/Assistance to Individuals in Crisis Situation
(AICS) totaling at least PhP5.4 million in 2002 and PhP2.78 million
as of April 2003 were granted to various applicant-recipients
without subjecting them to the guidelines set forth by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). 4 . . .
On January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T. De
Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded
provincial officials of Samar, docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. The latter were then
required to file their counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the
complaint.
In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained in
the letter-complaint and claimed his innocence on the charges. He asserted that his
function is limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the
requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds are
available. He did not, in any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the certification issued by
the requesting parties. In addition, he averred that he never participated in the alleged
irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding.
Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached in
the letter-complaint bore his signature and that he was neither factually connected nor
directly implicated in the complaint.
On May 6, 2005, Sison submitted his Position Paper to the Office of the
Ombudsman and reiterated that he had not participated in the alleged anomalous
purchases and use of public funds by the Province of Samar.
 On August 22, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding
Sison and several other local officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
dismissing him from service. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
VIEWED IN THE FOREGOING LIGHT, DECISION is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Respondents ROLANDO B. MONTEJO, DAMIANO Z. CONDE, JR.,
ROMEO C. REALES, MAXIMO D. SISON, AURELIO A. BARDAJE
and NUMERIANO C. LEGASPI are FOUND GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, and are METED the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE, and shall carry with it
the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-
employment in the government service. ISTHED
Accordingly, Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and Executive Director
Presentacion R. Montesa of the Bureau of Local Government Finance,
Department of Finance, are respectfully directed to implement this Order
upon receipt hereof and to forthwith inform the Office of compliance
herewith.
2. The administrative complaint against respondents MILAGROSA T.
TAN, FE ORTEGA TAN ARCALES, SUSANO DIMAKILING
SALURIO, BARTOLOME P. FIGUEROA, ANTONIO DE LEON
BOLASTIG, III, ROSENAIDA A. ROSALES and BARTOLOME R.
CASTILLO III is DISMISSED in view of their re-election in May
2004;
3. The administrative complaint against ERNESTO CARCILLAR
ARCALES, FELIX T. BABALCON, JR., JIMMY R. DY, JUAN
COLINARES LATORRE, JR., MARIA LOURDES CORTEZ UY,
BIENVENIDA P. REPOL and RAMON P. DEAN, JR., who are no
longer public officials, is DISMISSED.
4. For insufficiency of evidence, the administrative complaint
against ANAMIE P. MANATAD-NUNEZ and ROSIE AMARO
VILLACORTE is DISMISSED.
5. The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Office is DIRECTED to conduct
further fact-finding investigations on the following:
a. On DV Nos. 221-2002-12-083 and 221-2002-11-065: (a) to
DETERMINE the other public officials who may be
held administratively liable; and (b) to FILE, if
necessary, the corresponding Complaint;
 b. On Bid Nos. 079-2002, 442-2002, 554-2002, 861-2002,
937-2002, 947-2002, 1221-2002, 1375-2002, 1411-
2002, 007-2003, 014-2003, 023-2003, 047-2003 and
082-2002: (a) to VERIFY whether actual public
biddings took place relative to the transactions
covered by these bids; (b) to CHECK the veracity of
the documents relative to the repeat orders made; (c)
to DETERMINE the other public officials who may
appear to be administratively liable therefor; and (d)
to FILE, if warranted, the corresponding Complaint;
and
c. On Bid Nos. 078-2002, 448-2002, 931-2002, 1230-2001,
411-2002, 944-2002, 1244-2002, 1407-2001, 198-
2002, 316-2002 and 431-2002: (a) to DETERMINE
whether actual public biddings were held relative to
the above-mentioned transactions; (b) to CHECK the
veracity of the documents relative to the repeat
orders made; (c) to ASCERTAIN the other public
officials who may be held administratively liable
therefor; and (d) to FILE the corresponding
Complaint, if warranted.
Accordingly, let a copy of this Memorandum be furnished the Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Office for its appropriate action.
SO ORDERED. 5 (Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96611.
On June 26, 2008, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman against Sison. The fallo of the CA decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Ombudsman dated 22 August 2006 in
OMB-C-A-05-0051-B in so far as it finds the herein petitioner MAXIMO D.
SISON administratively liable for grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, he is absolved from
administrative liability as charged.
SO ORDERED. 6
In ruling thus, the CA held that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to adduce
substantial evidence in order to convict Sison. Moreover, it reasoned that Sison's
responsibility as Provincial Budget Officer was to ensure that appropriations exist in
relation to the emergency purchase being made and that he had no hand or discretion
in characterizing a particular purchase as emergency in nature. Hence, he cannot be
 held administratively liable for simply attesting to the existence of appropriations for a
certain purpose, save if such certification is proved to be false.
On July 22, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for
Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed resolution of December 18, 2008.
Hence, we have this petition.

The Issues
I
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in denying petitioner's right to intervene in
the proceedings, considering that (a) the Office of the Ombudsman has
sufficient legal interest warranting its intervention in the proceedings
before the [CA] since it rendered the subject decision pursuant to its
administrative authority over public officials and employees; and (b)
contrary to the appellate court a quo's ruling, petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman filed its Omnibus Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Motion for Reconsideration on a patently erroneous decision of the [CA]
which has not yet attained finality.
II
Whether the [CA] erred in ruling that the finding of the Office of the
Ombudsman was not supported by substantial evidence.
III
Whether the [CA] erred in giving due course to respondent's petition for
review when this was prematurely filed as it disregarded the well-
entrenched jurisprudential doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Intervention is Discretionary upon the Court
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be
allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the
CA.
In its Decision, the CA did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene,
because (1) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in
the administrative case against petitioner; (2) the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was
filed after the CA rendered its Decision; and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the
quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decision.
In its Petition, however, the Office of the Ombudsman asserts that it has
sufficient legal interest to warrant its intervention in the proceedings, since it rendered
the subject decision pursuant to its administrative authority over public officials and
employees. Further, it contends that the Omnibus Motion to Intervene was timely filed,
since, at the time of its filing, the decision of the CA had not yet attained finality.
We are not persuaded.
It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 7 The permissive tenor of the rules
shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the intervention, 8 thus:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties. 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties
to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to
protect their right or interpose their claim. 10 Its main purpose is to settle in one action
and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the
persons involved. 11
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must
concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2)
intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the
matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. 12
In support of its argument that it has legal interest, the Office of the Ombudsman
citesPhilippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr.(Garcia). 13In the said case, the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) imposed upon its employee, Garcia, the penalty of forced
resignation for gross neglect of duty. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges against him. In accordance with the
ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 14this Court affirmed the standing of the
PNB to appeal to the CA the CSC resolution exonerating Garcia. After all, PNB was the
aggrieved party which complained of Garcia's acts of dishonesty. Should Garcia be
finally exonerated, it might then be incumbent upon PNB to take him back into its fold.
PNB should, therefore, be allowed to appeal a decision that, in its view, hampered its
right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its
name as a premier banking institution in the country. DcCIAa
Based on the facts above, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Garcia to
support its intervention in the appellate court for the following reasons:
First, Sison was not exonerated from the administrative charges against him, and
was, in fact, dismissed for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case,
OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. Thus, it was Sison who appealed to the CA being, unquestionably,
the party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal.
Second, the issue here is the right of the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in
the appeal of its decision, not its right to appeal.
And third, Garcia should be read along withMathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals15
andNational Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag
(Mamauag),16 in which this Court qualified and clarified the exercise of the right of a
government agency to actively participate in the appeal of decisions in administrative
cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a
decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975
authorize 'either party' to appeal in the instances that the law allows
appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining
authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service.
The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes
the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from
the service is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining
authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the
penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party
appealing must be the one that is prosecuting the administrative case
against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result
where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of
being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting
the respondent. Thus, inMathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after
Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
To be sure when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
were brought to the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission
was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the
 Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should
"detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a
higher court for review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission
dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an
advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions
and actions of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in
the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be
mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.
It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases
where their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for
such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and
must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate
court to decide the issues without the judges' active participation. 17 When judges
actively participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial
and have become adversarial instead. 18
InPleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(PNP-CIDG),19 the Court applied this doctrine when it held that the CA erred in
granting the Motion to Intervene filed by the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit:
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not
only when hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its
judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court. The judge of a court
or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an
adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in
accordance with the evidence and applicable laws, regulations and/or
jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and completely state
his findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify
further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the
court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the
appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and
his interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is no
longer only to settle the controversy between the original parties (which he
had already accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more
significantly, to refute the appellant's assignment of errors, defend his
judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.
Likewise, the facts reveal that this case was elevated to the CA via a verified
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995, which govern appeals to the CA
from judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.
 Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1-95, provides that the petition
for review shall state the full names of the parties to the case without impleading the
court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents. 20 Thus, the only parties in
such an appeal are the appellant as petitioner and appellee as respondent. The court or,
in this case, the administrative agency that rendered the judgment appealed from, is not
a party in the said appeal.
Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not have the legal interest to
intervene. As the CA held correctly:
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in
the administrative case against the petitioner such that it would be directly
affected by the judgment that this Court had rendered. It must be
remembered that the legal interest required for an intervention must be
direct and immediate in character. Lest it be forgotten, what was brought
on appeal before this Court is the very Decision by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Plainly, the Office of the Ombudsman, as an adjudicator, and
not an advocate, has no legal interest at stake in the outcome of this Rule 43
Petition. 21
Motion for Intervention was not Filed on Time
Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus
Motion for Intervention was filed only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was
promulgated on June 26, 2008.
In support of its position, petitioner cites Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego.22 That
case, however, is not applicable here, since the Office of the Ombudsman filed the motion
for intervention during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA.
It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed by Sison.
The Rules of Court provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for
review with the CA, with proof of service of a copy on the court or agency a quo. 23
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file a motion to
intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not now be countenanced. The Office of the
Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive onlooker. 24
ETHCDS
In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly
filed. As we held in Rockland Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no intervention is
permitted after a decision has already been rendered. 25
In light of the foregoing considerations, all other issues raised in the petition are rendered
moot and academic and no further discussion is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The CA Resolution dated December 18, 2008 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 96611 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Nachura, Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, G.R. No. 185954, [February 16, 2010], 626 PHIL 598-
614)