No.

2596
August 15, 2011

Before the Lights Go Out: A Survey of EMP

Preparedness Reveals Significant Shortfalls
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Baker Spring, and Richard Weitz, Ph.D.

Abstract: An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) over the

United States could end modern life in America overnight.
Whether caused by an enemy attack (a nuclear device det- Talking Points
onated above the atmosphere) or by a natural phenomenon • While the ability of an electromagnetic pulse
(a geomagnetic storm), an EMP can cause entire regions of (EMP) to inflict catastrophic damage on U.S.
the country to lose electricity—permanently. Despite the infrastructure has been a known fact for
EMP Commission’s recommendations in 2004 and 2008, decades, a survey of congressional, federal,
state, local, and international measures to
hardly any progress has been made in protecting the coun- deal with the threat reveals more compla-
try from an EMP attack and its catastrophic results. The cency than action.
U.S. must prepare to deal with an EMP—now. • America—at all levels of governance—is
unprepared for an EMP attack. Despite the
clear recommendations of both the 2004 and
While the ability of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 2008 EMP Commissions, as well as an official
to inflict catastrophic damage on U.S. infrastructure consensus among experts, U.S. government
has been a known fact for decades, insufficient efforts agencies have not moved their EMP-response
have been taken to mitigate the threat. A survey of planning beyond the theoretical stages.
congressional, federal, state, local, and international • Initiatives are needed at all levels—from bilat-
measures to deal with the threat reveals more compla- eral partnerships that focus on shared infra-
structure to national leadership to state and
cency than action. local action.
In order to prevent the catastrophic destruction • An EMP disaster is the catastrophe that
that could result from either a nuclear missile deto- should never happen. The means to address
nated at high altitudes or intense solar eruptions that and mitigate the dangers to critical infrastruc-
send blasts of radiation towards the Earth, initiatives ture are at hand. The United States needs a
are needed at all levels—from bilateral partnerships greater understanding of the danger—and
the determination to act.
that focus on shared infrastructure to national leader-
ship to state and local action. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
http://report.heritage.org/bg2596
Why Worry? Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies
In July 1962, a high-altitude nuclear test dubbed of the
Operation Starfish, conducted 400 kilometers above Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies
Johnson Island in the Pacific Ocean, first raised wide- Published by The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002–4999
(202) 546-4400 • heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting
the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to
aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
No. 2596 August 15, 2011

spread concerns over electromagnetic pulses. Dur- Congressional Action. Shortly before 9/11,
ing the course of the test, the recording instruments Congress established the Commission to Assess the
continually malfunctioned and affected electrical Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic
equipment more than 1,400 kilometers away in Pulse (EMP) Attack. The EMP Commission’s charter
Hawaii.1 The root cause of the problem? An electro- required the commission to assess:
magnetic pulse. This discovery led the U.S. military • the nature and magnitude of potential high-
to harden many of the country’s strategic defense altitude EMP threats to the United States from
systems, such as missile silos, against EMP effects, all potentially hostile states and non-state actors
but little was done to implement measures to protect that have or could acquire nuclear weapons and
civilian infrastructure. That practice has remained ballistic missiles, enabling them to perform a
virtually unchanged despite the ever-increasing pro- high-altitude EMP attack against the U.S. within
liferation of nuclear weapons and ever-increasing the next 15 years;
U.S. military and civilian dependence on electricity-
based infrastructure. • the vulnerability of the United States military
and especially civilian systems to an EMP attack,
An EMP is a high-intensity burst of electromag- giving special attention to vulnerability of the
netic energy caused by the rapid acceleration of civilian infrastructure as a matter of emergency
charged particles. Nuclear weapons, non-nuclear preparedness;
weapons (radio-frequency weapons), or geomag-
netic storms (often called space weather) can power • the capability of the United States to repair and
an EMP, and the resultant changing magnetic field recover from damage inflicted on U.S. military
in the Earth’s atmosphere can disrupt electrical sys- and civilian systems by an EMP attack; and
tems.2 An EMP has three main components: (1) An • the feasibility and cost of hardening select mili-
electromagnetic shock disrupts electronics, such tary and civilian systems against EMP attacks.4
as communication systems; (2) an effect similar to Members of the EMP Commission testified
lightning rapidly follows and compounds the first before the House Armed Services Committee in
component; and (3) the pulse flows through elec- July 2002, releasing a partially classified five-vol-
tricity transmission lines, overloading and damag- ume report on the United States’ vulnerability to a
ing transmission distribution centers, fuses, and potential EMP attack.5 The EMP Commission con-
power lines.3 cluded that the United States was extremely vul-
nerable to a catastrophic EMP attack, finding “[o]
The State of Play ur increasing dependence on advanced electronics
The U.S. government has made some efforts to systems results in the potential for an increased
address these threats. Current initiatives span pre- EMP vulnerability of our technologically advanced
vention, protection, and recovery:

1. William R. Graham, “Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,” testimony of Dr. William R. Graham before the House
Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, July 10, 2008, at http://www.empcommission.org/docs/
GRAHAMtestimony10JULY2008.pdf (August 4, 2011).
2. Dan Vergano, “One EMP Burst and the World Goes Dark,” USA Today, October 27, 2010, at http://www.usatoday.com/
tech/science/2010-10-26-emp_N.htm (August 4, 2011), and Jena Baker McNeill and Richard Weitz, “Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP) Attack: A Preventable Homeland Security Catastrophe,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2199, October
20, 2008, at http://origin.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/10/Electromagnetic-Pulse-EMP-Attack-A-Preventable-Homeland-
Security-Catastrophe#_ftn5.
3. McNeill and Weitz, “Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: A Preventable Homeland Security Catastrophe.”
4. Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, “Home,” at
http://www.empcommission.org/ (August 4, 2011).
5. Clay Wilson, “High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat
Assessment,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, July 21, 2008, p. 2, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL32544.pdf (August 4, 2011).

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

forces, and if unaddressed makes EMP employment tical steps are taken to provide protection for
by an adversary an attractive asymmetric option.”6 critical elements of the electric system and
The commission proposed a five-year plan aimed for rapid restoration of electric power, par-
at protecting critical infrastructure from potential ticularly to essential services.8
EMP attack. The commission offered recommendations to
The National Defense Authorization Act for fis- improve U.S. preparedness for an EMP attack or a
cal year 2006 reestablished the EMP Commission geomagnetic storm in 10 critical areas of national
to continue its efforts “to monitor, investigate, and infrastructure including the electrical grid, food
make recommendations, and report to Congress on infrastructure, and U.S. space systems. The com-
the evolving threat to the United States from electro- mission strongly urged the Department of Home-
magnetic pulse attack resulting from the detonation land Security (DHS) to “make clear its authority
of a nuclear weapon or weapons at high altitude.”7 and responsibility to respond to an EMP attack” by
developing contingency plans in cooperation with
appropriate federal, state and local agencies, and
Numerous bills have been introduced, but industry.9 Furthermore, the commission recom-
Congress has not yet passed comprehensive mended that DHS develop response protocols for
legislation addressing EMP vulnerabilities.
an EMP attack and regularly practice this response
through exercises with relevant government agen-
The goals of the renewed commission were to cies and industry groups. The commission urged
assess the threats to U.S. critical infrastructure and DHS to work with the Department of Energy and
provide recommendations to address vulnerabili- industry groups to identify and address vulner-
ties. This new commission released its final find- abilities in the U.S. electrical infrastructure. The
ings in 2008 through the publication of the Critical commission advised that the cost of critical infra-
National Infrastructure Report, as well as testimony structure improvement should be split between
before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. government and industry.10
The commission concluded that an EMP attack on Congress has not yet passed comprehensive leg-
the United States would be devastating: islation addressing EMP vulnerabilities. Numerous
Should significant parts of the electrical bills have been introduced, but none were passed
power infrastructure be lost for any substan- out of committee.
tial period of time, the Commission believes Following the 2008 EMP Commission report,
that the consequences are likely to be cata- legislation was introduced to address the threat of
strophic, and many people may ultimately an EMP attack on the United States. In April 2009,
die for lack of the basic elements necessary H.R. 2195, “A Bill to Amend the Federal Power Act
to sustain life in dense urban and suburban to Provide Additional Authorities to Adequately
communities. In fact, the Commission is Protect the Critical Electric Infrastructure Against
deeply concerned that such impacts are like- Cyber Attack, and for Other Purposes,” was intro-
ly in the event of an EMP attack unless prac- duced in the House, sponsored by Representative

6. William Graham et al., “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic
Pulse (EMP) Attack,” Vol. 1, Executive Report, 2004, p. 47, at http://www.empcommission.org/docs/empc_exec_rpt.pdf
(August 4, 2011).
7. Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, “Home.”
8. Graham et al., “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastructures,” April 2008, p. vii, at http://www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_
Commission-7MB.pdf (August 4, 2011).
9. Ibid., p. 54.
10. Ibid., pp. 61, 173.

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

Bennie G. Thompson (D–MS).11 The bill cites the event of a malicious act using electronic commu-
2008 commission report on critical national infra- nication or an electromagnetic pulse, would pose
structures, notes the vulnerabilities of Supervisory a substantial risk of disruption of those electronic
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) compo- devices or communications networks”; an EMP is
nents, and calls for the EMP Commission to consult identified as a “grid security threat.”16 The Secre-
with the Secretary of Homeland Security to iden- tary of Homeland Security is called upon to work
tify such systems in the United States and “issue… with other agencies in order to “develop technical
such rules or orders as are necessary to protect expertise in the protection of systems for the gen-
critical electric infrastructure against vulnerabilities
or threats.”12 H.R. 2195 was referred to the House
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, While Congress has established a decade-long
and Science and Technology, but never made it past record of studying the EMP issue, clearly there
that committee.13 remains a lack of consensus on the severity of the
threat and on an appropriate course of action.
H.R. 4842, the Homeland Security Science and
Technology Act of 2010, included provisions for the
establishment of a commission on the Protection eration, transmission, and distribution of electric
of Critical Electric and Electronic Infrastructures, energy against geomagnetic storms or malicious
which would continue the work of the EMP Com- acts using electronic communications or electro-
mission. Although approved by the House, the Sen- magnetic pulse.”17 The President is to compile a
ate did not vote on H.R. 4842.14 list of defense-critical facilities not exceeding 100
In June 2010, H.R. 5026, the Grid Reliability in number that are vulnerable to electrical disrup-
and Infrastructure Defense (GRID) Act, sponsored tion.18 Finally, the owners or operators of large
by Representative Edward Markey (D–MA), was transformers are required to ensure the availability
received in the Senate after passing the House in a of replacements to restore the operation of the bulk-
voice vote.15 The GRID Act would amend the Fed- power system in the event that a given transformer
eral Power Act to allow the Federal Energy Regu- is destroyed or disabled.19 The GRID Act was never
latory Commission (FERC) to issue new industry put to a vote in the Senate.
standards to protect critical infrastructure from During the final days of the 111th Congress,
cyber or EMP attacks. It defines “defense critical Representative Doug Lamborn (R–CO) spon-
electric infrastructure vulnerability” as “a weakness sored H.R. 6471, “A Bill to Require the Director
in defense critical electric infrastructure that, in the of National Intelligence to Submit a Report on the

11. U.S. House of Representatives, 111th Congress, 1st Session, “H.R. 2195, A Bill to Amend the Federal Power Act to
Provide Additional Authorities to Adequately Protect the Critical Electric Infrastructure Against Cyber Attack, and for
Other Purposes,” introduced in the House April 30, 2009.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. The Library of Congress, “Bill Summary and Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 4842 CRS Summary,” at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04842:@@@D&summl& (August 4, 2011).
15. U.S. Senate, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, “H.R. 5026, An Act to Amend the Federal Power Act to Protect the Bulk-Power
System and Electric Infrastructure Critical to the Defense of the United States against Cybersecurity and other Threats
and Vulnerabilities,” reported in the Senate September 27, 2010, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr5026rs/pdf/
BILLS-111hr5026rs.pdf (August 4, 2011).
16. Ibid., p. 3.
17. Ibid., p. 19.
18. Ibid., p. 13.
19. Ibid., p. 12.

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

Foreign Development of Electromagnetic Pulse the findings with owners, operators, and users of
Weapons.”20 Each country with an EMP weap- the systems.24 Several provisions of the GRID Act
ons program was to be identified and its program appear word-for-word, including the definition of
assessed in detail, specifically focusing on whether “defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerabil-
a country’s incorporation of EMP weapons into its ity,” the list of no more than 100 defense-critical
national security and military strategies “assume[s] vulnerable facilities, and the measure requiring
that an EMP weapons attack can achieve effects the availability of spare large transformers.25 The
similar to a direct nuclear attack, but not be sub- SHIELD Act has been referred to the Committee
ject to the deterrence calculations normally applied on Energy and Commerce, as well as to the Com-
to nuclear weapons.”21 Instructions for classify- mittee on the Budget.
ing potential hostile EMP delivery platforms and A full committee hearing of the Senate Committee
assessing vulnerability of identified countries to an on Energy and Natural Resources on May 5, 2011,
EMP attack are also outlined.22 The bill was intro- discussed the issue of the vulnerability of U.S. criti-
duced in the House on December 1, 2010, but cal infrastructure to cyber and EMP attacks. Some
never made it past the Intelligence Committee to witnesses testified before this committee against
which it had been reported. legislation to mandate increased EMP preparedness
On February 11, 2011, Representative Trent standards. Yet, these witnesses are in the minority
Franks (R–AZ) introduced H.R. 668, the Secure and do not represent the consensus view of various
High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from congressional and government commissions, nor
Lethal Damage (SHIELD) Act.23 The act essential- the overwhelming bulk of the expert community
ly allows the FERC to enable emergency measures on the subject.
to protect the reliability of bulk-power systems The purpose of congressional commissions, like
and defense-critical electric infrastructure via the EMP Commission, is to establish official con-
directive of the President amid an imminent grid sensus on  the severity of threats and appropriate
security threat. The act prescribes implementa- solutions—which the EMP Commission did.  The
tion procedures and cost-recovery measures. It EMP Commission’s report represents the consensus
also directs FERC to order the Electric Reliabil- view of the defense and intelligence communities as
ity Organization to submit reliability standards well as the nuclear weapon labs. 
regarding these bulk-power systems from geo-
magnetic storms or EMPs. Furthermore, it dir- Moreover, the Congressional Commission on the
ects the Secretary of the Department of Energy to Strategic Posture of the United States independently
establish a program to develop expertise on the re-examined the EMP threat, and concurred with
protection of electric energy systems and to share the assessment and recommendations of the EMP
Commission.26 So, too, did the National Academy

20. U.S. House of Representatives, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, “H.R. 6471, A Bill to Require the Director of National
Intelligence to Submit a Report on the Foreign Development of Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons,” introduced to the House
December 1, 2010.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Congress, 1st Session, “H.R. 668, A Bill to Amend the Federal Power Act to Protect
the Bulk-Power System and Electric Infrastructure Critical to the Defense and Well-Being of the United States Against
Natural and Manmade Electromagnetic Pulse (‘EMP’) Threats and Vulnerabilities,” introduced to the House February 11,
2011, at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.112hr668 (August 4, 2011).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. See the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “America’s Strategic Posture,”
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009, at http://media.usip.org/reports/strat_posture_report.pdf (August 5, 2011).

page 5
No. 2596 August 15, 2011

of Sciences, the DOE–NERC report,27 and the FERC The U.S. Air Force’s Nuclear Criteria Group Sec-
interagency report.28  In all,  five commissions and retariat was inactivated in 1994, and it currently
major independent U.S. government studies  have does not have a designated group that is responsible
independently  concurred with the EMP Commis- for creating and implementing nuclear survivability
sion’s threat assessment and recommendations. Not requirements.31 However, the strategic platforms
one official commission or U.S. government study within the U.S. Air Force still assess nuclear surviv-
dissents from this consensus. ability; likewise with the U.S. Navy. The Department
of Defense recognized the necessity of transitioning
Providing for an Uncommon Defense from requirements to capabilities-based acquisition
In April 2005, the Defense Science Board Task in the protection of America against EMP threats
Force published a report on Nuclear Weapon Effects in 2003. The implementation of an evolutionary
Test, Evaluation, and Simulation that describes how acquisition strategy would increase the nation’s pre-
the armed forces formed requirements based on paredness against EMP attacks. The Department of
nuclear threats, such as EMP. It concluded that the Defense and the Department of Energy maintain
U.S. Army has strongly considered nuclear surviv- facilities that support EMP simulators that calcu-
ability during the development of its new programs. late the impact of an EMP wave on an electrical
The U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency system.32 Data from EMP simulators and nuclear
(USANCA) is the agency that makes recommenda- tests gathered over 50 years led to the conclusion
tions for the nuclear survivability requirements for that any nuclear weapon can pose an EMP threat to
the new systems in the U.S. Army.29 The U.S. Army the United States because the electric grid is frag-
War College hosted a workshop in September 2010 ile.33 The conclusion can be helpful for considering
to explore the threats, vulnerabilities, and prepared- which efforts should be undertaken against EMP at
ness related to an EMP attack.30 all levels of government.
In contrast, the U.S. Navy has had outdated The House Committee on Armed Services
directives and instructions pertaining to nuclear issued a report on H.R. 5136, the National Defense
survivability since the early 1990s. However, the Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, in which
Navy’s critical systems do maintain nuclear surviv- it expressed “concern about the vulnerability of
ability and nuclear hardening requirements, which Department of Defense critical infrastructure to
protect against EMP threats. electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack.”34 Section 225

27. National Academy of Sciences, “Severe Space Weather Events—Understanding Societal and Economic Impacts:
A Workshop Report,” 2008, National Academies Press, at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?booksearch=1&term=
emp&record_id=12507&Search+This+Book.x=29&Search+This+Book.y=12 (August 8, 2011), and North American Electric
Reliability Corporation and the U.S. Department of Energy, “High-Impact, Low-Frequency Event Risk to the North
American Bulk Power System,” 2009, at http://www.nerc.com/files/HILF.pdf (August 5, 2011).
28. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Electromagnetic Pulse: Effects on the U.S. Power Grid,” 2010, at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/cybersecurity/ferc_executive_summary.pdf (August 8, 2011).
29. Defense Science Board Task Force, “Nuclear Weapons Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation,” April 2005, at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA434656.pdf (August 5, 2011).
30. Kevin Cogan, “In the Dark: Military Planning for a Catastrophic Critical Infrastructure Event,” U.S. Army War College,
May 2011,at http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/InTheDark.pdf (August 5, 2011).
31. Defense Science Board Task Force, “Nuclear Weapons Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation.”
32. Ibid.
33. Peter Vincent Pry, “What America Needs to Know About EMPs,” Foreign Policy, March 17, 2010, at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/17/the_truth_about_emps (August 5, 2011).
34. U.S. House of Representatives, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, “H.R. 5136: National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011, Report of the Committee on Armed Services,” May 21, 2010, p. 513, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-111hrpt491/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt491.pdf (August 9, 2011).

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

of the bill would require the Secretary of Defense sion, and Subsystems received increased allocation
to contract with an independent entity to “conduct between FYs 2010 and 2011, from $18.810 million
an assessment of Department of Defense plans for to $22.109 million, respectively.41 This Materials
defending the territory of the United States against project “Develops novel materials for electromag-
the threat of attack by ballistic missiles, including netic interactions with matter for electromagnetic
electromagnetic pulse attacks.”35 An entire section pulse (EMP), high power microwave, and lightning
is devoted to the vulnerability of defense critical strike protection” for aircraft, spacecraft, launch
infrastructure to EMP, in which the Comptroller systems, and missiles.42 Funding was transferred to
General is directed to review assessments of the this program in FY 2011 from Project 2100, an EMP
threat of EMP attack, taking into consideration the suitcase developed for testing systems vulnerabili-
findings of the EMP Commission.36 ties by Applied Physical Electronics (APE); the EMP
The Army’s Research, Development, Test and suitcase’s production was “driven by input from
Evaluation Justification Book for FY 2012 includes DoD groups,” according to APE’s Web site.43
a project justification for a Mobile Tower System
(MOTS) for use by Air Traffic Control.37 The comple- The U.S. military has increasingly incorporated
tion of developmental testing, “including high alti- civilian technology not designed to resist EMP
tude electromagnetic pulse testing,” is listed under attack into its systems.
FY 2010 Accomplishments for MOTS.38 A special
congressional addendum to the Defense Logistics
Agency’s Microelectronics Technology Development Other Air Force systems whose electronic protec-
and Support Project lists electromagnetic shielding tion functions are being actively improved are aero-
as a “critical enabler” for 3-D electronics arrays, and space sensors, including advanced sensor arrays.44
increased the allocation for that project from $2.394 The Radio-Frequency Warning and Countermea-
million in FY 2009 to $4.775 million for FY 2010.39 sures Technology Project “conducted research on
The Air Force’s Physics project in Defense the synergy between electronic protection and
Research Sciences “increased research into the sus- electronic attack technologies to realize more effec-
ceptibility to upset of various electronic circuits tive jamming” in FY 2010, and seeks to “provide
when exposed to suitable electromagnetic wave- active electronic protection architecture concepts”
forms,” and received an additional $5 million for FY in the coming years.45 Electromagnetic interference
2011, for a total allocation of $50.47 million.40 An testing was part of FY 2010’s B-52 Modernization
Air Force Materials Project for Structures, Propul- Project, and one of the planned upgrades for B-2

35. Ibid., p. 218.

36. Ibid., p. 513.
37. U.S. Army, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year FY 2012 Budget Estimates,” Justification Book, Volume 5A, February 2011,
p. 229, at http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/BudgetMaterials/FY12/rforms//vol5a.pdf (August 5, 2011).
38. Ibid.
39. Defense Logistics Agency, “Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2011: R-1 Line Item #47,” February 2010,
p. 4, at http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2011/Other/0603720S_PB_2011.pdf (August 5, 2011).
40. U.S. Air Force, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates,” Justification Book, Volume 1, February
2011, p. 33, at http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110211-028.pdf (August 5, 2011).
41. Ibid., p. 92.
42. Ibid.
43. Applied Physical Electronics, “EMP Suitcase: Compact 2100 Series,” 2009, at http://www.apelc.com/applications.html
(August 5, 2011).
44. U.S. Air Force, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates,” pp. 211, 307.
45. Ibid., p. 359.

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

squadrons is EMP Hardening Testing.46 The F-22 EMP Mitigation document was updated in Sep-
Modernization Project, whose budget was nearly tember 2009 for the first time since 1996.53 The
doubled for FY 2012, includes improvements to document gives EMP protection requirements pre-
electronics protection, as does the justification for cedence over standard electromagnetic interference
F-16 squadrons.47 The E-4B Airborne National Ops protocol.54 On December 1, 2010, the DOD updat-
Center will be subjected to EMP testing “to validate ed the Interface Standard for Electromagnetic Envi-
the E-4B fleet compliance with updated EMP pro- ronmental Effects Requirements for Systems, which
tection Military Standards.”48 “establishes interface requirements and verification
New F-15 radar enhancements will emphasize criteria for airborne, sea, space, and ground sys-
electronic protection, a new project for FY 2012.49 tems, including associated ordnance.”55 The docu-
The FY 2011 Plans for the Airborne Warning ment states that a system “shall meet its operational
and Control System (AWACS) will “incorporate performance requirements after being subjected
classified Electronic Protection measures.”50 The to the EMP environment.”56 This EMP environ-
integrated Command and Control Intelligence, Sur- ment is detailed in the classified document “MIL-
veillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) capability for STD-2169: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
the Global Hawk aircraft is provided by the Multi (HEMP) Environment.”57
Platform-Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP- In October 2010, the Defense Science Board
RTIP) sensor, whose future studies and development (DSB) Task Force on the Survivability of DOD Sys-
include the implementation of electronic protec- tems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
tion.51 Finally, the space segment of the Nuclear and Other Nuclear Weapons Effects held a meeting
Detonation Detection System (NUDET NDS) incor- closed to the public.58 The stated purpose of the
porates an EMP sensor into GPS systems.52 meeting was “To obtain, review and evaluate infor-
Department of Defense (DOD) standards regard- mation related to the Task Force’s mission focus
ing EMP preparedness have been robustly updated to assess implementation of the DoD Instruction
in recent years. A Standard Practice for Shipboard covering nuclear survivability including EMP.”59

46. U.S. Air Force, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates,” Justification Book, Volume 3, Part 1,
February 2011, pp. 63, 96, at http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110211-032.pdf (August 5, 2011) .
47. Ibid., p. 272, 227.
48. Ibid., p. 699.
49. Ibid., p. 251.
50. Ibid., p. 459.
51. U.S. Air Force, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates,” Justification Book, Volume 3, Part 2,
February 2011, p. 315, at http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110211-041.pdf (August 5, 2011).
52. Ibid., p. 389.
53. U.S. Department of Defense Standard Practice, “Shipboard Bonding, Grounding, and Other Techniques for
Electromagnetic Compatibility, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Mitigation, and Safety,” September 17, 2009, at
http://www.uscg.mil/petaluma/TPF/ET_SMS/Mil-STDs/MILSTD1310.pdf (August 5, 2011).
54. Ibid., p. 13.
55. U.S. Department of Defense, “Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems,” December 1, 2010, at
http://www.assistdocs.com/search/document_details.cfm?ident_number=35794&StartRow=1&PaginatorPageNumber=1&doc_
id=MIL-STD-464&search_method=BASIC (August 5, 2011).
56. Ibid., p. 21.
57. Ibid.
58. “Office of the Secretary: Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on the Survivability of DoD Systems and Assets to
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Other Nuclear Weapons Effects,” Federal Register Vol. 75, No. 176, September 13, 2010,
p. 55577, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-09-13/pdf/2010-22753.pdf (August 5, 2011).
59. Ibid.

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

The Task Force received, reviewed, and discussed DOD continues to invest in hardening these crit-
“presentations from the military services and other ical strategic assets. For example, the FY 2012 bud-
Defense Department agencies and organizations get includes $22.1 million in additional funding to
on the implementation to the meeting’s date of harden Minuteman missiles against EMP attacks.66
DoD Instruction 3150.09.”60 This Instruction is The military’s general purpose forces, however,
the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear remain vulnerable to the effects of an EMP attack.
(CBRN) Survivability Policy, last updated in August Those forces’ increasing reliance on high technolo-
2009.61 The document directs the Secretaries of gy in fact makes an EMP attack an attractive option
the military departments and the chairman of the for potential enemies.
Joint Chiefs of Staff to “ensure that doctrine and The U.S. military has increasingly incorporated
training to support the DoD CBRN Survivability civilian technology not designed to resist EMP attack
Policy (including electromagnetic pulse (EMP)) into its systems. The 2004 EMP Commission con-
are reflected in force-on-force simulations” and, in cluded that although the U.S. military possesses
the case of the latter, in war games.62 The chair- many EMP-hardened assets, an EMP attack would
man of the Joint Chiefs is also directed to “establish still severely degrade the ability of fielded forces to
mandatory key performance parameters (KPP) for operate effectively.67 The Defense Science Board Task
nuclear survivability (including EMP hardening)” Force on Nuclear Weapon Effects Test, Evaluation
for CBRN mission-critical systems.63 and Simulation supported these conclusions in a
Michael J. Frankel, executive director of the 2005 report. The task force concluded that “The bot-
EMP Commission, testified before the Senate tom line is that commanders and planners cannot be
Judiciary Committee in August 2010.64 In that assured that today’s weapons platforms, command
testimony, Frankel noted that the commission’s and control (C2), intelligence, surveillance and recon-
final report presented 19 findings and made 17 naissance (ISR), and associated support systems will
recommendations to the DOD, all of which were be available should a nuclear detonation occur.”68
classified, but that “the reaction of the Depart- DOD has also published “Mil-Standard 188-125,”
ment may be characterized as positive…much of which describes methods for protecting against a
this positive effort redounds to the great credit of high-altitude electromagnetic pulse for ground-
DoD management, the Office of the ATSD (Nucle- based command and control facilities.69 However,
ar Matters), and the proactive leadership of US not all military systems are currently hardened
Strategic Command.”65 against EMP. In addition, some DOD systems rely

60. Ibid.
61. U.S. Department of Defense, “Instruction: The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability
Policy,” No. 3150.09, September 17, 2008 (Incorporating Change 1, August 17, 2009), at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/315009p.pdf (August 5, 2011).
62. Ibid., p. 14.
63. Ibid., p. 15.
64. Michael J. Frankel, testimony before the Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate, “Government Preparedness and Response to a
Terrorist Attack Using Weapons of Mass Destruction,” August 4, 2010, at http://kyl.senate.gov/legis_center/subdocs/080410_
Frankel.pdf (August 5, 2010).
65. Ibid.
66. U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation and Maintenance Overview Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimates,” February 2011,
p. 131, at http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/fy2012_OM_Overview.pdf (August 5, 2011).
67. Graham et al., “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack,
Volume 1: Executive Report,” p. 48.
68. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation, quoted in
Wilson, “High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat Assessment,”
p. 15.

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

on commercial facilities, such as communications Russia, which imposes sweeping restrictions on U.S.
satellites and ground-based stations, to support mil- missile defense options.71
itary operations.
Not Protecting the Homeland
In April 2005, the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Nuclear Weapon Effects (NWE) Test, The Department of Homeland Security has a set
Evaluation and Simulation published a report of 15 National Planning Scenarios as an element of
for DOD describing current and emerging threat its risk analysis mission.72 The scenarios describe
environments. This included a CRS-15 comprehen- possible high-consequence threat scenarios, such
sive evaluation of future DOD capabilities for suc- as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, but an EMP
cessful operation in nuclear environments. The DSB attack is not included. The EMP Commission has
findings were independent, “but are highly consist- tried to convince the Department of Homeland
ent with, the findings and recommendations of the Security to add it.
Congressionally mandated Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP) Commission.”70 Despite the grave dangers posed by an
In protecting against a high-altitude EMP EMP attack, an EMP threat scenario has
(HEMP) from a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, the yet to be incorporated into the National
most important resources that DOD provides are Planning Scenarios.
missile defenses. The importance of these programs,
however, has been downgraded in recent years. The
Obama Administration made large-scale cuts to the In 2008, under the National Defense Authoriza-
missile defense program in FY 2010, and its pro- tion Act for FY 2008, the Department of Homeland
posed budgets for FY 2011 and FY 2012 will not Security was required “to coordinate efforts with the
make up the lost ground. Similarly, the Adminis- [EMP] Commission for work related to electromag-
tration has cancelled or sharply curtailed promising netic pulse attack on electricity infrastructure, and
missile defense programs and joint projects with U.S. protect against such an attack.”73 Therefore, efforts
allies, including the Airborne Laser (ABL) and the were made to create inter-agency cooperation on
“third site” missile defense system in Poland and the such a critical threat to U.S. homeland security.
Czech Republic. Furthermore, the President signed, Despite the grave dangers posed by an EMP attack,
and the Senate consented to ratification of, the New an EMP threat scenario has yet to be incorporated
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with into the National Planning Scenarios.74

69. MIL–STD-188/125-1 (NOTICE 1), “Military Standard Sheet: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection
for Ground-Based C4I Facilities Performing Critical, Time-Urgent MISSIONS (Part 1–Fixed Facilities) (updated
April 7, 2005),” July 17, 1998, at http://www.everyspec.com/MIL-STD/MIL-STD+(0100+-+0299)/MIL-STD-188_125-1_
NOTICE-1_24888/ (August 8, 2011).
70. Cheryl B. Olson, Valerie A. Stander, and Lex L. Merril, “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear
Weapon Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 2005, at http://dodreports.com/pdf/
ada434656.pdf (August 8, 2011).
71. Baker Spring, “Sixteen Steps to Comprehensive Missile Defense: What the FY 2012 Budget Should Fund,” Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 2552, May 3, 2011, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Sixteen-Steps-to-
Comprehensive-Missile-Defense-What-the-FY-2012-Budget-Should-Fund.
72. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Preparedness Guidelines,” September 2007, at http://www.dhs.gov/files/
publications/gc_1189788256647.shtm (August 8, 2011).
73. Wilson, “High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat Assessments,”
p. 22.
74. Department of Homeland Security, “National Preparedness Guidelines,” March 14, 2011, at http://www.dhs.gov/
files/publications/gc_1189788256647.shtm (August 5, 2011), and Homeland Security Council, “National Planning
Scenarios,” April 2005, at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/earlywarning/
NationalPlanningScenariosApril2005.pdf (August 5, 2011).

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

In an August 2010 testimony, Michael Frankel, the North American Electric Reliability Corpora-
who served as executive director of the EMP Commis- tion (NERC), the DOE-designated industry group
sion from its 2001 inception until its final 2009 clas- responsible for enforcing reliability standards for
sified report before the oversight committees, pointed the U.S. bulk-power system, to host a workshop on
out that the commission provided 75 unclassified rec- high-impact low-frequency events. The workshop
ommendations, most of which were aimed at DHS, included approximately 110 attendees representing
“intended to mitigate vulnerability and increase resil- NERC, DOE, DHS, DOD, the Department of Health
ience of the nation’s critical infrastructures.”75 Said and Human Services, the EMP Commission, and
Frankel: “Unlike the response of the DoD, there has the FERC. The workshop focused on three threats:
been no detectable resonance as yet out of the DHS.… (1) a coordinated cyber attack on the energy infra-
As a result, the Commission’s recommendations structure, (2) a pandemic, (3) and natural geomag-
seem to have simply languished.”76 Indeed, the only netic disturbances and electromagnetic pulses.79
recent DHS activity in which EMP was addressed The members of the workshop explored the threat
was at a Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory of an EMP attack in depth. The workshop members
Council Joint Sector Meeting held June 8, 2010, in concluded that
which there was a 10-minute “Electromagnetic Pulse An E1 HEMP [the first blast of energy from
Update” from 2:40 p.m. to 2:50 p.m.77 a high-altitude magnetic pulse] event could
DHS inactivity regarding the threat of EMP attack simultaneously (within one power cycle)
is surprising, given that many provisions within the create malfunctions of electronic control
EMP Commission reports and proposed relevant equipment over thousands of kilometers.
congressional legislation are aimed at DHS in some Traditional probabilistic planning and operat-
capacity. Indeed, Washington State’s Department of ing criteria do not provide sufficient protec-
Health Office of Radiation Protection offers more tion from such a widespread, simultaneous
information to the public on EMP than does the impact. Restoration may also be complicat-
DHS Web site, which merely contains a link to a ed by the amount of equipment available to
2004 Federal Emergency Management Agency pre- replace damaged assets.80
paredness manual.78 The members of the workshop recommend-
No Energy at the Department of Energy ed that the efforts to mitigate the risks of an EMP
attack should focus on the recommendations of the
The Department of Energy (DOE) has tentatively EMP Commission. Namely, given the infeasibility of
begun to identify and take appropriate corrective hardening the whole system to EMP attack, prepara-
action to protect the U.S. bulk-power system from tions for an EMP attack should focus on minimizing
EMP attacks or other electromagnetic disturbance. the net impact of an attack. That is that government
Like DHS, DOE has not moved past the theoreti- and industry should create plans to reduce the time
cal stages to protect the bulk-power system of the needed to restore power after a crippling attack.81
United States. In July 2009, DOE collaborated with
75. Frankel, “Government Preparedness and Response to a Terrorist Attack using Weapons of Mass Destruction.”
76. Ibid.
77. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council—Oil and Natural
Gas SCC/Energy GCC Joint Sector Meeting: Agenda,” June 8, 2010, at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cipac/
cipac-energy-06082010.pdf (August 5, 2011).
78. Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection, “Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP),” October 6, 2010,
at http://www.doh.wa.gov/ehp/rp/factsheets/factsheets-htm/fs41elecpuls.htm (August 5, 2011).
79. U.S. Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “High-Impact, Low-Frequency Event
Risk to the North American Bulk Power System,” June 2010, p. 2, at http://www.nerc.com/files/HILF.pdf (August 5, 2011).
80. Ibid., p. 89.
81. Ibid., p. 96.

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

The members offered this specific recommendation Telescope Network. The U.S. Geological Survey
for future action: provides ground-based data on the effects of solar
Specifically, NERC should create a task force electro-magnetic emissions.
to continue these efforts and build consen- Information from the Space Weather Prediction
sus around appropriate mitigation options Center is provided to electric power grid operators,
for industry. The task force could consider space-system managers, telecommunications oper-
developing a full “defense plan” for these ators, aviation and navigational systems operators,
risks—covering all considerations from sys- and surveying and drilling operations. Given suf-
tem design implications to hardening existing ficient warning, many of these users can implement
assets to system restoration. The task force mitigation measures to limit the effects of adverse
should also consider the need for mandatory space weather on their operations. Improving the
standards on its findings, whether related means to develop and disseminate reliable long-
to equipment specifications or Reliability term weather forecasts and minimize “false alarms”
Standards.82 would greatly facilitate the implementation of cost-
Along with urging the creation of a “defense plan” effective mitigation measures.
for the bulk-power system, the members of the State and Local Efforts
workshop repeatedly urged DOE and DHS to work
with their Canadian counterparts on the interlinked State and local governments have also made
U.S. and Canadian infrastructure.83 Although DOE efforts to defend the United States against EMP
in partnership with NERC has identified the threat threats. An EMP does not only pose a threat to
posed by EMP attacks, the agency has not taken computers and electronics, but also to critical infra-
any further steps. Like DHS, DOE’s planning for the structures, such as communications, transportation,
threat of an EMP attack remains modest. banking and finance, and food and water supply,
because they depend on electronics or electricity.84
National Space Weather Infrastructure Therefore, an EMP event could cause great damage
The National Weather Service provides space within a county or state. A few enlightened state
weather alerts and warnings. Assessments are made and local governments have formulated plans in the
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin- case of an EMP event.
istration’s (NOAA) Space Weather Prediction Cen-
ter. NOAA maintains a space weather scale for each Overall, state and local governments remain
type of event. The ratings on the scale range from poorly prepared for an EMP attack.
minor to extreme. Hazards are described in terms
of potential effects on humans, space-based assets
(such as satellites), and terrestrial infrastructure. An example is Alaska. The Alaska State Emergen-
Accurately predicting space weather is still an evolv- cy Response Commission added preparation for an
ing science. EMP attack involving integration, implementation,
Other federal agencies also provide essential and survivability measures to the state’s emergency
support for predicting space weather. NASA pro- response plan in 2007.85 Additionally, many coun-
vides science data from its research satellites. The ty-wide and state-wide municipal organizations in
U.S. Air Force provides observational data from the New York have passed resolutions to request imme-
Solar Optical Observing Network and Radio Solar diate action to protect the citizens against threats

82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 101.
84. Pry, “What America Needs to Know About EMPs.”
85. Missilethreat.com, “Alaska to Revise Emergency Response Plan to Include Preparation for EMP Attack,” May 29, 2007,
at http://www.missilethreat.com/archives/id.16/subject_detail.asp (August 5, 2011).

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

of EMP. The state has passed a bill to create the found that although 96 percent of adjutant gener-
New York State EMP Critical Infrastructure Pro- als surveyed indicated that they were concerned
tection Commission. The commission has several with the threat posed by an EMP attack, few had
duties including: educating itself about EMP and analyzed the actual impact details of an EMP attack.
EMP threats to the state’s infrastructures; gathering Furthermore, few of the adjutant generals surveyed
facts; making recommendations to state authorities indicated that they had made preparations, such as
informing local agencies and governments about training, EMP hardening of systems, and the cre-
the hazards of natural EMP events and man-made ation of formal emergency response plans for an
EMP events; analyzing the dangers of EMPs; and EMP attack.89 Overall, most states have not taken
developing a plan to protect the state from an EMP action to address vulnerabilities to EMP attacks.
event, respond to the aftermath, and recovery after
the event.86 International Efforts
Within the New York State Assembly, bill There has not been much international cooper-
A4303-2011 was introduced by State Assembly ation related to EMP attack preparedness. NATO
Member for the 142nd District Jane Corwin and did release an EMP response report in 2009, but
four co-sponsors. This act is currently attempting to it contained few recommendations or proposals,
establish a commission on EMP infrastructure pro- largely focusing on providing a description of vari-
tection within the State Assembly. The act intends ous EMP applications and attacks, with little to no
for the commission to study findings and recom- mention of defense or countermeasures. Beyond
mendations from national commissions regarding NATO, it seems there will be little cooperation
EMP defense with respect to New York’s critical between the U.S. and other countries, some of
infrastructure systems and develop and recommend which (Iran, Russia, and China) have likely con-
preparation and protection plans.87 As it stands sidered the military application of EMP against the
currently, the act has been referred to the Govern- United States and its allies.
mental Operations Committee. In addition, both At the same time, national and international
the Erie County Association of Governments and advocacy groups have emerged, focusing on EMP
the State of New York Association of Towns have defense. One such group is EMPact America, a
drafted resolutions recommending this commis- non-partisan and non-profit group devoted to
sion (Erie County’s resolution also calls for support implementing the EMP Commission’s recommen-
for EMP-related action from New York’s federal dations to protect infrastructure and educate the
representatives.).88 American people on the threat of EMP attacks and
Overall, however, state and local governments the potential solutions.90 Another group, more
remain poorly prepared for an EMP attack. A international in scope, is the Electric Infrastructure
2007 survey of state adjutant generals, the officials Society (EIS) Council. The council’s proclaimed
responsible for overseeing National Guard units, role is to examine the future destructive potential
found that few states were prepared for an EMP of geomagnetic storms and EMP attacks from a
attack. The survey, conducted by the Institute of the global perspective. It aims to establish itself as an
North in conjunction with the Claremont Institute, effective government-NGO partnership by enhan-
cing education and international planning on these
86. EMPact America, “Learn About–Government Action,” 2011, at http://www.empactamerica.org/legislation.php (August 5, 2011).
87. New York State Assembly, 2011-2012 Regular Sessions, “A4303-2011: Establishes the NYS EMP Critical Infrastructure
Protection Commission,” February 3, 2011.
88. EMPact America, “Learn About–Government Action: Legislation,” 2011.
89. Press release, “Survey Finds Nation Vulnerable to EMP Attack: States Not Preparing,” Institute of the North and the
Claremont Institute, March 7, 2007, at https://www.claremont.org/repository/docLib/20070306_EMPrelease_final.pdf
(August 5, 2011).
90. EMPact America, “About Us,” 2011.

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

issues. Its board of advisers features various experts Schurr went on to declare that potential damage
in the energy field, as well as current and retired of a severe EMP strike was too significant to ignore
U.S. policymakers.91 preventive measures, but that thanks to recent U.S.
NATO has been updating key EMP-related docu- studies the threat is now better understood as pre-
ments of late. In January 2011, NATO revised its ventable—so long as the upgrading and protection
Allied Environmental Conditions and Tests Publi- of the national electric grids ensues.98 The summary
cation on Electrical and Electromagnetic Environ- of the presentation described a recently increased
mental Conditions.92 Contained in this publication awareness of electric infrastructure security on a
is “Leaflet 256—Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse,” political level, and in September 2010 an inaugural
which describes EMP origin and effects on military summit was held “to set up a new security frame-
platforms and systems.93 A 2009 May report of the work for the U.S. and Europe.”99
Applied Vehicle Technology Panel Hybrid Vehicle Where We Are—Where We Need to Be
Rating Criteria Task Group listed nuclear EMP as a
threat for which vehicle vulnerability must be tested America—at all levels of governance—is
for survivability.94 unprepared for an EMP attack. Despite the clear
recommendations of both the 2004 and 2008
EMP Commissions, U.S. government agen-
“Electricity could be out for months or years cies have not taken planning for their response
because the grid would need to be assembled to an EMP attack out of the theoretical stages.
completely anew since its components would melt.” This is especially alarming considering the offi-
cial consensus on the severity of the threat and
on appropriate solutions as articulated by the
On November 14, 2010, Avi Schurr, the president EMP Commission, the other aforementioned
of the EIS Council, made a presentation before the commissions, and the overwhelming majority
NATO Parliamentary Assembly on EMP and related of the expert community. DHS and DOE have
risks to critical infrastructures.95 In the presentation, both independently identified the United States’
Schurr described the threat posed by nuclear EMP vulnerability to an EMP attack, but have neither
strikes above the earth’s atmosphere as “potentially created emergency management plans nor taken
immense, but not yet sufficiently acknowledged.”96 action to better protect critical U.S. infrastruc-
Schurr echoed the EMP Commission’s 2008 report ture from attack. DOD has begun to adopt the
when he warned that “electricity could be out for recommendations of the 2004 EMP Commission,
months or years because the grid would need to be but U.S. forces still remain vulnerable. State and
assembled completely anew since its components local governments remain unaware and unpre-
would melt.”97 pared for the threat of an EMP attack.

91. EIS Council, “About Us,” 2011, at http://www.eiscouncil.com/ (August 5, 2011).

92. NATO, “Electrical and Electromagnetic Environmental Conditions,” AECTP-250, 2nd Edition. January 2011, at
http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aectp/aectp-250-2.pdf (August 5, 2011).
93. Ibid., p. 88.
94. NATO, “Report of the Applied Vehicle Technology Panel Hybrid Vehicle Rating Criteria Task Group AVT-106,” Hybrid
Vehicle Rating Criteria, May 2009, at http://www.rta.nato.int/Pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-TR-AVT-106.(August 5, 2011).
95. NATO, Parliamentary Assembly, “Summary of the Meeting of the Technology and Science Committee,” November 14,
2010, at http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2311 (August 5, 2011).
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.

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No. 2596 August 15, 2011

Current priorities for the U.S. are: Department of Homeland Security apparently
• Build Comprehensive Missile Defenses. Main- sitting idle. Congressional inaction has contrib-
taining the capacity to interdict nuclear-tipped uted to this uneven response.
missiles is the most effective measure to guard • Establish bilateral partnerships with other
against a HEMP attack. The U.S. missile defenses nations. If the unthinkable happens, the U.S.
are not keeping pace with the proliferation of and other developed nations must be able to
threats. It is time to reverse course. Establish- accept foreign aid in the event of catastrophes.
ing a robust ballistic missile defense is the most The U.S. should consider hosting international
effective means of addressing the future threats to disaster exercises to increase the ability of coun-
the U.S. and its allies resulting from the prolifera- tries friendly with the United States to read-
tion of missile technology and weapons of mass ily accept aid from one another when disaster
destruction. The U.S. must pursue missile defense strikes. For some critical infrastructure the U.S.
programs that can intercept missiles in the boost should promote establishing an industry-led,
and ascent portions of flight. Among these pro- multinational rapid-response capability. Such
grams are the Airborne Laser, which is a modi- a capability should be able to respond world-
fied air-to-air interceptor missile, future versions wide. Further, this could provide an effective
of the Navy’s Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) intercep- mechanism to share best practices and integrate
tor, and, above all, reviving the development and responses. This capability should be funded and
deployment of space-based interceptors. controlled by the private sector to respond to
• Develop a national plan to respond to space threats to shared international critical infrastruc-
weather emergencies. As a 2008 report by the ture, such as telecommunications and the West-
National Academies, “Severe Space Weather ern Hemisphere electrical grid.
Events—Understanding Societal and Economic An EMP disaster is the catastrophe that should
Impacts,” makes clear, “Modern society depends never happen. The means to address and mitigate
heavily on a variety of technologies that are sus- the dangers to critical infrastructure are at hand.
ceptible to the extremes of space weather—severe The United States needs a greater understanding of
disturbances…driven by the magnetic activity of the danger—and the determination to act.
the sun.” The first step in addressing this issue —James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Deputy Director
must be educating the public and policy com- of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
munities at the federal, state, and local levels International Studies and Director of the Douglas and
about the risks and response options. Addition- Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a divi-
ally, any effective plan will require enhanced, sion of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation.
reliable long-range space weather forecasts. Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National
• Forge a bipartisan consensus in Congress Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center
to act on this issue. The response to the EMP for Foreign Policy Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
Commission’s findings has been uneven within Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow and Director of
the United States government, with the Depart- the Center for Political–Military Analysis at the Hudson
ment of Defense taking the initiative and the Institute.

page 15