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Glaveanu - Rewriting The Language of Creativity

Glaveanu_Rewriting the Language of Creativity

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Review of General Psychology © 2012 American Psychological Association

2013, Vol. 17, No. 1, 69 – 81 1089-2680/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0029528

Rewriting the Language of Creativity: The Five A’s Framework

Vlad Petre Glăveanu


Aalborg University

For the past 5 decades the psychology of creativity has been influenced by what is known as the 4 P’s
of creative expression: person, process, product, and press. This conceptual schema, initially proposed by
Rhodes (1961), helped researchers structure their thinking about the phenomenon. However, it also
supported an individualistic, static, and oftentimes disjointed vision of creativity. The present article aims
to rewrite this fundamental language of the discipline by using terms that explicitly endorse a systemic,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

contextual, and dynamic approach. The 5 A’s framework—actor, action, artifact, audience, affor-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

dances—is grounded in current literature from sociocultural and ecological psychology as well as
theories of the distributed mind and tries to achieve a more comprehensive and unitary perspective on
creativity. Several theoretical, methodological, and practical implications are considered.

Keywords: creativity, the four P’s, cultural psychology, distributed cognition, ecological psychology

The language of creativity or, better said, the language of My answer to the question, “What is creativity?”, is this: The word
creativity theory and research in psychology is a language written creativity is a noun naming the phenomenon in which a person
largely from the perspective of the individual and, within individ- communicates a new concept (which is the product). Mental activity
uals, from the perspective of cognitive functioning. Key terms that (or mental process) is implicit in the definition, and of course no one
could conceive of a person living or operating in a vacuum, so the
help us, to this day, organize the growing literature in the field
term press is also implicit. (Rhodes, 1961, p. 305)
reflect not only an inherent individualism and cognitivism (spe-
cific, to some extent, to the modern construction of psychology; It is important to notice that for Rhodes the four resulting
Gergen & Gigerenzer, 1991) but also a rather static, disjointed, and strands emerged out of conceptualizations that were not always
acontextual approach to creativity. There is however a pressing mutually exclusive. As such, “each strand has unique identity
need to expand our language and consequently our thinking about academically, but only in unity do the four strands operate func-
this phenomenon, to do justice to its true complexity and relational tionally” (Rhodes, 1961, p. 307). Indeed, coming out of a survey
nature and be able, ultimately, to understand and cultivate creativ- of definitions, the idea of the four P’s stimulated further develop-
ity in a variety of domains. ments and helped researchers “locate” their efforts and make links
The notion of creativity, most probably deriving from the Indo- between the different categories. Thus, the four P’s of creativity—
European root ker or kere (to grow) via the Latin creatio or creatus improperly referred to as a “model” and more akin to a framework
(to make grow), means ultimately to “bring something new into or conceptual organizer— became, in time, part of the canonical
being” (Weiner, 2000, p. 8). This basic understanding has led to a body of theories in the creativity literature alongside other conse-
surprisingly high number of conceptions accumulating from the crated models such as Wallas’s (1926) four stages of the creative
second half of the last century onward. About five decades ago, an process and Guilford’s (1967) distinction between convergent and
educational researcher, Mel Rhodes, already perplexed by the divergent thinking. However, being placed at the level of
multitude of descriptions of creativity in his time, set out to find a metatheory, Rhodes’s formulation provided in a sense more than
unitary definition of the phenomenon (Rickards, 1999). In an other attempts that consequently were located within one or an-
article first published in 1961, the only known outcome of his other of the four P’s; it offered the backbone of creativity theory
dissertation, Rhodes collected more than 40 definitions of creativ- and research for the decades to come.
ity and analyzed their content. He concluded that creativity theory Rightfully compared by some with the periodic table of ele-
reflects four distinct (and yet overlapping at times) strands labeled ments (Isaksen, Dorval, & Treffinger, 2011, p. 6), this simple
the person, the process, the product, and the press (roughly asso- alliterative schema became very influential in shaping creativity as
ciated with environmental influences). That article and the partic- an emerging academic discipline (i.e., international conferences
ular classification Rhodes proposed had a great impact on the were structured around its elements; Rickards, 1999). It is no
creativity literature ever since and became referred to as the “four surprise then that, in 2004, Runco’s Annual Review presentation
P’s of creativity.” In the words of the author, of creativity recognized it as “probably the most often-used struc-
ture for creativity studies” (p. 661). Undeniably, a quick exami-
nation of existing literature confirms this claim, and today one can
This article was published Online First September 3, 2012.
find a multitude of articles and books using the person, process,
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Vlad product, press framework to structure literature reviews if not
Petre Glăveanu, Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg pieces of empirical research. Contributions using the “model”
University, Kroghstræde 3, 9220 Aalborg Ø, Denmark. E-mail: range from general theoretical presentations (Feldhusen & Goh,
[email protected] 1995; Kozbelt, Beghetto, & Runco, 2010; Moran, 2009; Richards,

69
70 GLĂVEANU

1999; Runco, 2004); materials focused on methodology, assess- assumed for instance by research concerned with the “press” factor
ment, or idea generation techniques (Isaksen & Puccio, 1993; of creativity). This is particularly relevant for understanding a
Kaufman, Plucker, & Baer, 2008; Lin, Hong, Hwang, & Ling, phenomenon like creativity in which the person is embedded
2006; Murdock, Isaksen, Vosburg, & Lugo, 1993); or problem in/acts from within a system of social relations and the activity of
solving and decision making (Garfield, 2008; Hasirci & Demirkan, creation produces meaning by integrating and transforming types
2007; Isaksen et al., 2011; Isaksen, Puccio, & Treffinger, 1993; of knowledge that, although individual in expression, are social in
Jablokow, Jablokow, & Seasock, 2010; Santanen, Briggs, & De origin. Being an eclectic endeavor, sociocultural psychology is a
Vreede, 2004); to studies in more applied fields such as children diverse field bringing together theories that can shed light on
and education (Beattie, 2000; Cropley & Cropley, 2008; Glăveanu, different aspects of creativity. Under this broad theoretical um-
2011a; Hunsaker, 2005; Smith & Smith, 2010) and organizational brella we can group Vygotskian perspectives on development and
research, human resources, and marketing (Couger, Higgins, & the Russian cultural– historical school, activity theory, evolution-
McIntyre, 1993; Higgins, 1999; Horn & Salvendy, 2006; Horng, ary approaches, the study of dialogicality, theories of social knowl-
Hu, Hong, & Lin, 2011; Klein & Dologite, 2000; Mandico & edge and social representations, and so forth. In the end, what
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Higgins, 1997; Watson, 2007). connects these diverse strands is a strong commitment to the
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Several authors did not only start from the given framework but assertion that “mind emerges in the joint mediated activity of
tried to extend or elaborate it further (see Cropley & Cropley, people. Mind, then, is in an important sense, ‘coconstructed’ and
2009; Runco, 2003, 2007; Simonton, 1988), showing the centrality distributed” (Cole, 1996, p. 104).
of this model and also the numerous debates surrounding it, In this regard, sociocultural psychology is in dialogue with the
especially in recent years, debates that are fruitful for stimulating most recent advances in cognitive science, namely the idea of an
a series of conceptual clarifications. In this article, I aim to con- embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended mind (see Rowlands,
tribute further to such efforts by “rewriting” and expanding the 2010). Mental processes are gradually seen as not taking place
initial set of four elements in a way that draws inspiration from exclusively “in the head” but being situated and distributed be-
current developments in the psychology of creativity, namely the tween brain and body, person and environment. Such a perspective
growing importance of social, systemic, ecological, and cultural is extremely important for our discussion of creativity, a function
models of the phenomenon. In light of these sources, I propose a traditionally grounded “inside” the person, the elusive mind of the
five A’s framework including the following elements: actor, ac- creator and its functioning. This new, emerging science of the
tion, artifact, audience, and affordances. Advocating for this new mind is still in its infancy, but empirical evidence is starting to
“model” of creativity involves not only renewing existing typolo- accumulate from the fields of perceptual and developmental psy-
gies but also radically changing the lenses through which we chology to the study of robotics and human– computer interaction.
theorize and study creative acts. A major contribution in this context is Edwin Hutchins’s (1995a,
1995b, 2000) proposal of distributed cognition. As a theory draw-
Toward New Theoretical Frameworks ing inspiration from cognitive science and sociocultural sources,
its view of cognition and human knowledge is not restricted to
To look beyond traditional theories of the person, process, representations built in the isolation of an individual’s information
product, and press, we need to incorporate insights from a series of processing mechanisms but distributed across people, across peo-
emerging inter- or multidisciplinary areas—the most recent devel- ple and objects, and also distributed in time. This reflection is
opments in the field of social and cognitive psychology. These shared by other authors interested in what is called the extended
“new” theoretical perspectives, which are the basis for my pro- mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). In a similar vein, they claim the
posal of a five A’s framework of creativity, are represented by important role of the environment for driving cognitive processes
cultural or sociocultural psychology, models of the distributed and and argue that such processes extend into the world beyond indi-
extended mind, and ecological psychology. I argue that adopting vidual actors. The characteristic feature of the human mind, ac-
these lenses can help researchers go beyond a focus on isolated cording to these sources, is its dependence on and interaction with
components because all the approaches listed above take as a basic mediating tools and artifacts, something that prompted Keno
unit of analysis the interaction between elements (e.g., between (2010) to call the extended mind an ecological approach to hu-
people, people and objects, etc.) rather than the elements them- manized environments.
selves (e.g., person, product, etc.). This brings us to the third pillar of ecological psychology, also
Cultural or sociocultural psychology is an eclectic field that has a developing discipline that has benefited greatly from the pio-
developed since the 1980s, a branch situated at the intersection neering works of James and Eleanor Gibson. The theory of per-
between psychology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, history, ception and the notion of affordance brought into the field of
and the natural sciences (Valsiner & Rosa, 2007), and today is one psychology fundamentally changed our conception of the environ-
of the rapidly expanding areas within the discipline. In a basic and ment, particularly the physical world, and we can also find today
well-known definition, “cultural psychology is the study of the some promising practical applications of the Gibsons’ thought in
way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, trans- research that deals with how people navigate their environment
form, and permute the human psyche” (Shweder, 1990, p. 1). What (e.g., Marcilly & Luyat, 2008; Sandseter, 2009). Here we can note
is implied by this formulation is the fact that cultural psychologists strong connections between the ecological movement in psychol-
are interested in the “cultured” constitution and expression of the ogy in the 1960s and the subsequent expansion of sociocultural
human mind (Rogoff, 2003) and consider self and other, psyche psychology and distributed cognition. James Gibson’s proposal
and culture, person and context to be interdependent and not to that meaning exists in the environment and is not constructed by
exist as two separate and simply interacting units (something mind alone was radical for his time. The qualities we perceive in
THE FIVE A’S FRAMEWORK 71

the world do not “belong” to the perceiver or the world alone but leads the attention of the researcher from one factor to the next.
are a function of both (Chemero, 2003). What this new ontogeny Those studying features of the person can do so without necessar-
offered psychologists was a renewed interest for the material ily thinking about products, the process can be researched sepa-
environment. Trying to overcome the Cartesian dualism that sep- rately from press factors, and there is almost no connection be-
arates mind and matter and confines psychology to an exclusive tween products and the environment. This goes against the
study of the former, Gibson fought against the “alienation” of the intentions of Rhodes (1961) and it certainly does not offer us a
material (Costall, 2006). His struggle unfortunately did not reso- realistic understanding of creativity (Runco, 2004). And yet, this
nate in the mainstream psychology of creativity, which largely was too often the case despite the fact that “many products are
remains, to this day, ignorant of creative processes “outside” the processes, and many processes are products. And a person is both
mind of individual creators (with some exceptions within the more a product and a process” (Barron, 1995, p. 32). Such interrelations
applied literature on organizational, educational, and social cre- need to be made explicit, and this is one of the first aims of the five
ativity). There is however great scope in recovering the role of the A’s model to be presented next. Second, the four P’s, notwith-
physical especially because creativity ultimately represents the act standing the fact that they include a “press” element, have been
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of engaging with existing artifacts to create new artifacts most studied in ways that decontextualize creativity and do not engage
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

often through the combined physical and mental labor of the with societal and cultural elements sufficiently. Person, process,
creator. and product are repeatedly considered in atomistic ways (Mon-
In our effort to advance a sociocultural, distributed, and ecolog- tuori, 2011) and the press associated with external influences that,
ical framework for the psychology of creativity, we are also at best, are always included in the equation of creativity, and at
building on a growing body of existing work that challenges the worst, should be silenced and marginalized in order to allow the
mainstream and formulates a more contextual and situated con- creative process to proceed “undisturbed.” The notion of material
ception of the phenomenon. Increasingly since the 1980s and or physical press was almost completely ignored.
1990s, the influence of sociocultural psychology began to be felt The five A’s framework tries to address these limitations by
and a shift started to take place from naturalism, person-centered, rewriting our current language of creativity—from person to actor,
univariate, and positivistic research paradigms to social under- from process to action, from product to artifact, from press to
standings, dynamic conceptions of creative cognition, and audiences and affordances (see Figure 1). As a discussion of each
systems-oriented research models (Friedman & Rogers, 1998; new term will soon come to show, this is more than a change of
John-Steiner, 1992; Jones, 2009; Montuori & Purser, 1995; Saw- terminology but a fundamental change of epistemological position.
yer, 2012). The “cultural model of creativity” (see Sefton-Green, In light of sociocultural sources, the actor exists only in relation to
2000, p. 220) and a We-paradigm type of approach (Glăveanu, an audience, action cannot take place outside of interactions with
2010) were formulated and emphasized the necessity of consider- a social and material world, and artifacts embody the cultural
ing creators and creations in relation to a series of audiences and traditions of different communities. This is captured by Figure 2 in
a cultural background of accumulated artifacts, norms, and beliefs. which the five “terms” of creativity are presented in their
Moreover, the notion of “distributed creativity” emerged in the interrelation.
work of several scholars (see Miettinen, 2006; Sawyer & DeZutter, This visual depiction builds on previous work (Glăveanu,
2009), although it was concerned more with social factors rather 2011b) that discussed creativity as a simultaneously psychological,
than the relation between actors and a material, physical environ- social, and cultural process and adds to it a material dimension
ment. Timid attempts were made also to relate embodied processes represented here by the creative use of affordances. It is a frame-
to the generation of novelty (Slutskaya, 2006). These recent de- work that is in line with old sociocultural models taking mediation
velopments continue a consistent body of work often described as as a fundamental process for human existence in the world and for
the systems models of creativity (see Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; psychological functioning (see Cole, 1996; Jovchelovitch, 2007;
Gardner, 1994). Vygotsky, 1997). In Figure 2, creative action emerges out of
Where does this leave the four P’s approach? In itself consid- actor–audience relations that both produce and are mediated by the
ered a systemic model because of including elements outside of the generation and use of new artifacts (objects, signs, symbols, etc.)
individual creator (Isaksen et al., 2011), it nevertheless does little
to specify any clear relations between categories. However, Moran
(2009) sketched a rapprochement between Rhodes and Csikszent- The four P’s of creativity The five A’s of creativity
mihalyi when she associated the notion of field with that of press
and the domain with the process of symbolic creation. Despite Focus on: Focus on:
these elaborations, some pressing questions remain about the four Internal attributes of the Person Actor Personal attributes in relation
P’s; in Moran’s (2009) formulation, “How can these dimensions be person to a societal context

studied interactively? That is, what lens might support scholars to Primarily cognitive Process Action Coordinated psychological and
focus not on the elements themselves but on the dynamics among mechanisms behavioral manifestation

elements?” (p. 294). A tentative answer is offered as follows. Features of products or Product Artifact Cultural context of artifact
consensus around them production and evaluation

The social as an external Press Audience The interdependence between


A Change of Perspective: The Five A’s Model
set of variables creators and a social and
conditioning creativity
Affordances material world
One inherent limitation of the four P’s framework resides in the
fact that person, process, product, and press can well be studied in
isolation and there is little, within this conception, that necessarily Figure 1. Comparing the four P’s and the five A’s frameworks.
72 GLĂVEANU

measuring and comparing personality, intelligence, and creativity


NEW ARTIFACT
scores, completely abstracts the person from his or her context
(Amabile, 1996). The participant undergoing psychometric testing
is considered to be the “average”, rather “universal” subject, and
CREATIVE ACTION this takes away both individuality and recognition of particular life
situations. The rise of the individual and its prominence over
ACTOR AUDIENCE
context has in any case a longer history in psychology and even
MATERIAL AND SOCIO- beyond it. The study of creativity embodied this concern through
CULTURAL AFFORDANCES a persistent fascination with the image of the genius or the ex-
traordinary person. Both strands of Romanticism and Enlighten-
ment contributed to the “elevation of the individual self” (Weiner,
Figure 2. Integrating the five A’s of creativity.
2000, p. 78), but the origins of the eminent creator are found in
earlier times, from the Renaissance onward (Montuori & Purser,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

within a physical, social, and cultural environment. In the end, this 1995). A genius is traditionally the prototype of the exceptional
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

environment and its affordances are also gradually transformed by person who does not only override mundane social relations and
creative action because the schema presents a dynamic integration realities but unavoidably fights against them and against society’s
of the five A’s: actors, audiences, and affordances in interaction, drive toward uniformity and stability (Glăveanu, 2010). The ge-
dependent on properties of local settings that are themselves part nius might be a major actor of creative production, but it is an actor
of the creative cycle. Before discussing each of the five elements, standing alone on stage, a misleading image that transformed our
it is important to mention finally that they are not meant to revise imaginary of the “truly” creative person for centuries.
the history of the discipline. We are not, for instance, to call In contrast to the description above, the actor I am referring to
“actor” what we called “person” before. The present framework here is necessarily defined by a system of social relations and
aims to offer an alternative position for writing and thinking about cultural traditions regulating these relations (see Figure 2). No
creativity, one that could transform creativity research and lead it creator was ever born outside such an environment given that the
toward a truly systemic and situated theoretical model. existence of other actors is essential for the mere recognition of a
creative act (we can be reminded at this point about consensual
definitions of creativity; Amabile, 1996). Furthermore, individuals
From Person to Actor
are socialized to create and need a considerable amount of time to
The actor is a person embedded in the field of social relations learn and practice the actions expected of them before making
specific for any human community and society. Referring to actors clear contributions to the knowledge and practices of the group. In
acknowledges people as socialized selves, as beings that are the words of Csikszentmihalyi (1999), “one must internalize the
shaped by a sociocultural context and act from within it, in rules of the domain and the opinions of the field, so that one can
coordination with others, to change and mold this context in choose the most promising ideas to work on, and do so in a way
suitable ways. Therefore, an actor is simultaneously learning and that will be acceptable to one’s peers” (p. 332). This also resonates
performing societal scripts and being an agent, active in relation to with the 10 years’ rule postulated for any major creative achieve-
these scripts and in relation to other actors. Such are the insights ment (Gardner, 1993). We should consider as well the fact that
afforded by sociocultural psychology regarding the development “scripts,” norms, and practices are changed in more or less minor
and functioning of the person. Following Markus and Hamedani’s ways while being learned or internalized. The constant generative
(2007) formulation, “people exist everywhere in social networks, power of social actors rests in their capacity to be selective and
in groups, in communities, and in relationships” (p. 4). This reality constructive in engaging with any cultural material (Valsiner,
either escaped or was stubbornly ignored by creativity researchers 1997). Choices and personal preferences are certainly not excluded
interested in the personality or cognitive profile of the creative from the paradigm of sociocultural psychology and the individual
person. Making a list of traits or cognitive factors, for as compre- self “using its capacity for reflection and for envisaging alterna-
hensive as it may be, tells us nothing about how people come to tives, escapes or reevaluates or reformulates what the culture has
acquire those traits, how they might employ them in relation with on offer” (Bruner, 1999, p. 110).
other people, what happens when the social environment is favor- To conclude, “switching” from person to actor is consequential
able or adverse to a certain set of personal characteristics, and so for the way in which we come to understand and study this actor
forth. Above all, this research is usually silent about how these and his or her life and work. It reminds us of the fact that personal
features help people perform their roles in their respective groups. structures cannot exist outside of social structures and the latter
Moreover, it is often forgotten that “the act of a man creating is the owe their dynamic transformation to the former. The actor ap-
act of a whole man” (Bruner, 1962, p. 18) and not of a certain proach has other implications as well. It makes creators much more
personality constellation or cognitive style. active and responsible for promoting their creations (Kasof, 1999),
Unfortunately, in the psychology of creativity, research on the thus integrating the persuasion factor referred to by Simonton
creative person has worked to the exclusion of the social context (1988). This is also in line with the investment view according to
surrounding the person. By focusing on the individual, any back- which creative persons buy low and sell high, meaning they adopt
ground element became secondary and so did the many ties con- unusual ideas, then actively try to convince others of their value,
necting people with their specific situations and ways of living. and afterward move on to a new “investment” (Sternberg, 2006).
Although the study of biographies or autobiographies prevents this A focus on actors’ roles in relation to particular fields of cultural
to a certain extent, current practices of testing large samples, production can thus enrich our understanding of individuals and
THE FIVE A’S FRAMEWORK 73

their behavior (Moran, 2009). Finally, it is to be mentioned that from here that understanding an action does not stop at inferring
although a contextual framework tries to correct our bias of fo- goal X as a means of explanation but also uncovering the “mean-
cusing exclusively on the person, it does so without being anti- ing” it has for the actor in a particular situation. This symbolic
individual (see Montuori & Purser, 1997). Creativity relies on the aspect relates to the cognitive dynamic of the creative process, and
individual, but “individuals are also ineluctably social and cultural it is here that we can observe the tight connection between a study
phenomena. The option of being asocial or acultural, that is, living of creativity as action and as a psychological process.
as a neutral being who is not bound to particular practices and Unfortunately, this interest rarely comes to the forefront of
socioculturally structured ways of being, is not available” (Markus creativity research despite its obvious benefits particularly for
& Hamedani, 2007, p. 5). analyzing creative acts with a very rich behavioral dynamic such
as artistic work. To illustrate these benefits, I take a classic
From Process to Action example, namely Dewey’s (1934) series of lectures on “art as
experience.” Pragmatism is a well-known and influential psycho-
“To create is to act in the world, or on the world, in a new and logical and philosophical school whose representatives developed
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

significant way” (Mason, 2003, p. 7). The focus on psychological a keen interest in human action and activity (Joas, 1996; Miettinen,
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

and more specifically cognitive processes in the case of creativity 2006). John Dewey captured this creative quality in art in his astute
helps us capture an essential part of its manifestation but never- description of artistic work: “As we manipulate, we touch and feel,
theless one single aspect of it, leaving it unconnected to the whole: as we look, we see; as we listen, we hear. The hand moves with
the act or action of creation. Embedding the creative process etching needle or with brush. The eye attends and reports the
within the broader concept of action means acknowledging the consequence of what is done” (p. 51). Action in art reveals itself as
double nature of creativity: an internal, psychological dimension an intimate coordination between hand and eye, movement and
and an external, behavioral one. What the notion of human action perception, doing and undergoing what has been done. For Dewey,
signifies is the interconnected aspect of these two facets and the art is a “developing process” (p. 116) and a vision (the goal)
fact that one cannot be reduced or properly understood without the perfected not in a mechanical way but through trial and error,
other. The psychology of creativity, by adopting the language of through observation and adjustments made to one’s course of
the creative process, chose to emphasize an internal dynamic, a action. He stressed the reciprocal relationship between ends and
cognitive one (and not in the sense of the distributed or extended means in activity and the fact that goals can be shaped by the
cognition referred to before). This is what Sawyer (1998) also means available to the artist while means are discovered in accor-
noticed when saying that “psychologists who study creativity have dance to desired ends in a moment-to-moment dynamic (Joas &
usually separated ideation, divergent thought, and insight on the Kilpinen, 2006). Most important, his description from the first half
one hand and execution, implementation, and performance on the of the last century resonates widely with more recent scholarship
other” (p. 11). The related sociocultural notions of action and both from within creativity and cognitive theory. The continuous
activity are meant to integrate and study the coordination between cycle between doing and undergoing in action postulated by
these dimensions and locate creative action between actors, audi- Dewey reminds us of the action–perception loops studied by
ences, and artifacts (see Figure 2). Action is both psychological subsequent generations. It also argues for the notion of distributed
and material, internal and external, goal directed, structured, and cognition by proposing that information exists neither “inside” nor
symbolic or meaningful. Above all, “human action necessarily is “outside” the person but “in between” perceiver and environment.
situated; it occurs in a context” (Ginsburg, 1980, p. 333). Unlike Moreover, the action and perception, doing and undergoing
previous conclusions about the creative process that often postu- phases have an uncanny resemblance with processes of generation
late its almost “universal” nature, a study of creative action re- and exploration considered to compose creative production (Finke,
quires us to pay increased attention to the domain of the creation, Ward, & Smith, 1992). Reformulating the latter in light of the
the characteristics of the creator, and features of the situation. former would achieve a broader framework of creativity and open
Applying this conception of action to an understanding of the it up to elements beyond the person of the creator. What both
creative process would enrich not only the psychology of creativity conceptions are in any case keen to emphasize is the dynamic and
but also the theory of action itself. There are many possible bridges cyclical nature of these stages in the act of creation. Unlike more
between creativity and action and perhaps the most obvious one linear formulations of the creative process, action-inspired theories
has to do with the goal-directed nature of activity and the “inten- are in perfect agreement with findings from a series of studies of
tional” definition of creativity. In their study of creative achieve- artistic creativity. Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976) clearly
ments, Gruber and Wallace (1999) emphasized the importance of stated that art does not proceed through an organized forward
purposeful behavior as a criterion for creativity, alongside novelty, movement but through an interrelation of finding, constructing and
value, and duration. Indeed, creativity came to be described by solving problems. Similarly, for Mace and Ward (2002), artwork
some as a form of goal-directed activity (Weisberg, 1993) in a way conception, idea development, making the artwork, and finishing it
that resembles definitions of human action. This postulate of is a complex process with continuous feedback loops between
intentionality is not in any case meant to exclude moments of stages and under the influence of numerous external and material
subconscious incubation of ideas or habitual action (see Glăveanu, constraints. Other recent empirical studies (see Botella, Zenasni, &
2012a), but integrate them into a broader context of acting in the Lubart, 2011; Kozbelt, 2008; Yokochi & Okada, 2005) sediment
world in order to achieve particular goals. In the words of Boesch this view and come to confirm Dewey’s (1934) original intuition.
(2001), “goals are overdetermined, that is, they spring from dif- These accounts can also be taken as a starting point for what, in the
ferent motivations, and therefore they are also polyvalent, that is, future, could become a systematic description of creative action or
they promise to satisfy different expectations” (p. 480). It derives activity.
74 GLĂVEANU

From Product to Artifact our contemporary cultures and societies? Finally, there is another
sense in which adopting the notion of artifact over that of product
One traditional perspective on human activity, originating from reveals its theoretical benefits. An artifact has a double nature,
the work of Lev Vygotsky (1997), considers the developmental both material and ideal or conceptual (Cole, 1996). As such,
and microgenetic dynamic of internalization and externalization artifacts do not exist only because of their physical presence but
(see Engeström, 1999, p. 33). The child as well as the adult primarily because they carry meaning and are the object of
proceeds in interacting with the world by adopting and learning a meaning-making activities that require interpersonal interactions.
series of cultural models and behavioral patterns and then express- Continuing with the example of artistic productions, they have
ing the outcomes of this internalization in an ever advancing cycle. more than a visible, material nature - they also “demand interpre-
As observed by Moran and John-Steiner (2003), what Western tation” (Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003, p.
psychology takes to be creativity is largely the externalization 429). The mainstream literature on creativity, notwithstanding the
process in a Vygotskian framework. “Externalization is the con- consensual assessment technique, regularly pays little attention to
struction and synthesis of emotion-based meanings and cognitive what the creative product actually means, what it is meant to
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symbols. Once expressed, these meanings and symbols are em- achieve, what kind of conception about creativity informs our
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bodied in cultural artifacts— creative products—that endure over judgments about it, and so forth. The efforts to understand, to interpret
time to be used by future generations” (Moran & John-Steiner, novel works goes a long way in real-life contexts beyond assigning
2003, p. 63). What the two authors do not emphasize above is the them a simple score for originality, utility, creativity, and so forth.
conceptual distance between cultural artifacts and creative prod- Every work of art, we are reminded by Eco (1989), “is effectively
ucts. In my brief presentation of the four P’s of creativity, I argued open to a virtually unlimited range of possible readings, each of which
that products are often considered in isolation not only from the causes the work to acquire new vitality in terms of one particular taste,
processes leading up to them and the sociocultural context foster- or perspective, or personal performance” (p. 21).
ing their creation but from the person of the creator as well. When In conclusion, the present material supports Lubart’s (2003)
we analyze a product, we can measure its physical properties assertion that every cultural object is a product of creativity.
and/or notice whether it is considered creative or not by a group of Furthermore, it states the reverse is also true. If creativity generates
(expert) judges, but this will not tell us anything about the origin artifacts and these are “the fundamental constituents of culture”
and functions of the product in question. It is only when adopting (Cole, 1996, p. 144), then the study of this phenomenon represents
a sociocultural epistemology that we are compelled to conclude a key concern not only for psychologists but social scientists at
about each and every creative outcome, for as minor as it may be, large. In forging these interdisciplinary links, I advance the pro-
that it is equally a product of cultural participation and thus an posal of referring to creative products as artifacts, a relational
artifact or cultural “object” (Glăveanu, 2011b). Object is used here notion able to connect creators and audiences, creative outcomes
in quotation marks because artifacts are not only material but can and creative actions. When Vygotsky’s insight that “existing tools
also be conceptual and, at times, can even take the appearance of and symbols are the fossilized thought and ideas of people who
an action or performance (Sawyer, 1997; also Cropley, 2006). have come before in history” (Moran & John-Steiner, 2003, p. 79)
Referring to products as artifacts draws attention to their “cul- is taken to its last consequences, a new image of historical conti-
tured” nature and the cumulative character of creation in human nuity emerges, one in which creativity plays a central, determining
groups and societies. Indeed, unlike products, artifacts can never role in the course of cultural evolution.
stand alone. In a sociocultural conception of creativity, “each
creation comes into being, is understood, and is valued as part of From Social “Press” to Audience
a larger web of relations of people, things, institutions, and beliefs
beyond that particular creation” (Weiner, 2000, p. 254). We exist The fourth and last P in Rhodes’s (1961) framework addresses
in a world of accumulated artifacts and their use reveals the the relation between person and environment understood predom-
mediated quality of action discussed in the previous section and inantly as a social environment. The term itself is quite difficult to
reflected in Figure 2. It is interesting to observe that even when grasp and suggests the “pressing” influence of others and society
physical objects are not used in one particular stage of a creative over the creator and his or her work. In the five A’s framework,
act, this does not imply the acultural nature of that stage: Our press is “divided” between audience and affordances (see Figure 1)
conceptual thinking is grounded in the use of words and notions, to deal better with the complexities of creating in a simultaneously
and language itself is a classic example of an artifactual product in social and material world and relating creative actors to both other
the history of civilization. The act of creativity therefore is never people and objects from their environment. The concept of audi-
one of complete breaking with the past but is necessarily contin- ence is preferred to deal with social forms of press because it turns
uous with what existed before in more or less obvious ways the notion from abstract and less intuitive into a vivid image of
(Weisberg, 1993). This transpires from established definitions of multiple others assisting, contributing, judging, criticizing, or us-
creativity. In the words of Barron (1995), “the human act of ing the creative act and/or resulting artifact(s). Audiences are
creation, basically, is a personal reshaping of given materials, numerous for each and every creator, they range from potential
whether physical or mental. What is new is form transformed; a collaborators and family members to opponents and colleagues
new form, generated from an old one” (p. 313). and finally, in some cases, to the wider public that will ultimately
This observation is by no means inconsequential. “The artifacts receive, adopt, or reject the creation. At any rate, as my discussion
of creative work are available to the person who desires to make of actors, actions, and artifacts has revealed already, others play a
further changes in the world” (Feldman, 1988, p. 288). What key role in the process of creativity being very often a determinant
would creation be outside the objects, models, and technologies of as important as the creator him- or herself. This role is so vital that
THE FIVE A’S FRAMEWORK 75

most complete definitions of the phenomenon do not forget to of the perceiver while he works” (p. 50) and, during creative
mention the “inherently communal” nature of creativity judgments activity, “the artist has to become vicariously the receiving audi-
(Gardner, 1994, p. 145). In the words of Negus and Pickering ence” (p. 111). Even when working in solitude, the audience is
(2004), an action “is never realized as a creative act until it is ever-present and a creator necessarily learns to observe and un-
achieved within some social encounter” (p. 23). This strong con- derstand emerging outcomes as a third party would. Missing this
structionist perspective was championed in the psychology of form of detachment and social sensitivity would make creative
creativity by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1999), who formulated the action impossible or, in any case, less successful.
radical argument, supported here by my proposed model, that Creativity is thus a dialogical process (Grossen, 2008), one that
“what we call creativity is a phenomenon that is constructed occurs within the context of relationships (Barrett, 1999). In the
through an interaction between producer and audience” (p. 314). words of Collins (2007), “the intensely focused thinker (. . .), is
Audiences play the vital role of evaluators and thus come to oblivious to the immediate surrounding world because he or she is
constitute what is called creative in our communities and societies, entrained in the internalized conversations of the network; creativ-
but this is not the single contribution audience members make to ity is a process of making coalitions in one’s mind” (p. 162). This
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the phenomenon of creativity. is obvious both in the case of scientific (Collins, 2007; Schaffer,
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Audiences in a sociocultural understanding are both active and 1994) and artistic creative work (Becker, 2008).
multiple. This means on the one hand that creators interact with a
diversity of people in performing their activity and, on the other,
that these people are always involved in the emergence of new From Material “Press” to Affordances
artifacts (see Figure 2). It is easy to argue that all actors who
contribute to the creation in one way or another (for instance, the The existence of a material or physical press was rarely ac-
collaborators of the creator) become part of the creative activity, knowledged by creativity researchers and psychologists at large.
but what about the seemingly passive general public? Are people This is quite surprising considering the fact that creation is not
simply observing or being introduced to a creation just as active in only a psychological function but also a form of action deeply
their engagement with it? To answer this, I rely on authors such as embedded in the material world (something also captured by
Umberto Eco and John Dewey, two thinkers who carefully con- Figure 2). The assertion above is valid not only for art and design
sidered the relation between creations and audience members. but also for the most seemingly “mental” activities; even poets rely
“Each ‘reading,’ ‘contemplation,’ or ‘enjoyment’ of a work of art on a physical environment to be stimulated, inspired and capable
represents a tacit or private form of ‘performance,’” said Eco to write, edit, and publish their work. Material objects both con-
(1989, p. 251), suggesting the similarity between acts of creation strain and allow creative action in ways that deserve further
and perception. In a similar vein, Dewey (1934) noted that “to investigation. This influence is not specific for only the initial and
perceive, a beholder must create his own experience. And his final stages of the creative process (preparation and verification),
creation must include relations comparable to those which the but it is key to the actual shaping of a novel idea. We are reminded
original producer underwent” (p. 56). Although he was quick to here of Bruner’s (1962) discussion of objects and their significance
clarify that such relations are not in any sense literal, there is a for creative work. He coined the paradoxical expression of “free-
reasonable parallel to be made between the initial construction of dom to be dominated” while creating, by the object being created,
meaning embodied in a creative artifact and subsequent meaning- and considered that “it is at this point that we get our creative
making processes around it. There is “work to be done” on the part second wind, at the point when the object takes over” (p. 25). With
of both perceiver and producer, as Dewey concluded. this, Bruner argued against a mechanical vision of creativity in
This assertion about the active nature of audiences can be taken which the author simply reproduces a preconceived idea in work-
further if we consider that creative actors are also audience mem- ing on an object and does not allow the material support to guide
bers for the creations of others and vice versa (Glăveanu, 2011b). his or her action.
In fact, as previously argued, creative work requires (sometimes Sociocultural psychology is particularly sensitive to these ideas
lengthy) periods of internalization, of learning or appropriating the and several authors within the discipline addressed the various
artifacts, beliefs, and norms of one’s cultural environment. The ways in which objects “channel” our action: “Spatially they de-
influence of others is so pervasive that creators internalize their termine where and how we can move; instrumentally they deter-
position as audience members and use this knowledge and expe- mine what we can do” (Boesch, 2007, p. 162). According to this
rience when generating further artifacts. Through adopting these perspective, objects structure our world and action within it. They
theoretical lenses, we can gain a critical understanding of the thus serve a variety of purposes, for example, material–
popular image of solitary creation. Storr (1988) made an argument, instrumental, functional, communicative, and symbolic (Boesch,
for instance, that thinking is a predominantly solitary activity and 2007, p. 164), and these come into play at different moments
the majority of creative pursuits do not actually involve relation- during creative production. Objects are equally important for the
ships; on the contrary, they require isolation in the same way as conception of Richard Shweder (1990) and his notion of inten-
meditation and prayer do. Although solitude can be indeed favor- tional worlds. For this author, “a sociocultural environment is an
able for some, I contend based on the above that solitude itself intentional world” (p. 2) and “cultural psychology is the study of
does not equate with an asocial or antisocial situation. The most intentional worlds” (p. 3). Within it all, objects have a culturally
secluded creator still exists in a world of others and needs the constructed meaning and gain their “existence” by responding to
interaction with different audiences for inspiration, for support, for certain human needs and being integrated in certain activities. The
appreciation and use of resulting artifacts. Dewey (1934) plainly intentional world is a world arranged as such to provide people
stated in this regard that “the artist embodies in himself the attitude with meanings and resources ready to be seized and used in
76 GLĂVEANU

particular ways. This readiness has been conceptualized best The “So What?” Question
within the related strand of ecological psychology.
The theory of affordances offers a fruitful theoretical lens when The five A’s framework of actor, action, artifact, audience, and
it comes to appreciating the relationship between a subject and the affordances has been proposed here as a conceptual alternative for
surrounding objects of the material environment. In Gibson’s the classic four P’s of creativity, namely person, process, product,
(1986) formulation, “the affordances of the environment are what and press. There are many similarities but also marked differences
it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good between the two frameworks. To begin, they consider almost the
or ill” (p. 127). Gibson invented this notion to designate a reality same set of elements (except for affordances, an addition meant to
that does not “belong” to the animal or the environment alone but focus our attention on the role of the physical environment) and
to their interconnection. He argued that what is afforded by an therefore propose a multidimensional, multifaceted vision of cre-
object in terms of human action is a relational feature. As such, ativity. However, as I am trying to argue here, using the five A’s
what we perceive in our environment are affordances and not framework would be the equivalent of a symbolic “rewriting” of
qualities, we pay attention first to what can be done with an object our language when it comes to creativity. The new language
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rather than how the object is. “Affordances are opportunities for suggested above draws inspiration from sociocultural sources,
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action” (Stoffregen, 2003, p. 124), “the actions permitted an ani- recent developments in cognitive science, and the legacy of eco-
mal by environmental objects” (Michaels, 2003, p. 146), and a logical psychology to resituate the creator—the actor in our for-
study of one is impossible in the absence of the other. Moreover, mulation—in a broader context of material, social, and cultural
the same set of affordances will not become apparent for all people phenomena and relations.
at all times. To discover and fully exploit existing environmental The language of the five A’s framework is one that provides, in
potentials, an actor needs to possess certain knowledge and set of my opinion, more conceptual unity to the study of creativity and a
abilities. For instance, a piece of heavy iron has the affordance of better integration of its fundamental elements. Indeed, as repeat-
edly emphasized, the five elements “require” each other and can-
being lifted but only by people who are strong enough to perform
not be understood in isolation. Figure 2 depicted this interdepen-
such action. These observations reveal some intriguing perspec-
dence between the five A’s outlined above. Actors “need” the
tives for the study of creativity. A creative actor is arguably one
conceptual pair of audiences, action results in artifacts and exploits
able to exploit the affordances of his or her surroundings in an
environmental affordances, and so forth. This is already an impor-
innovative way, to discover new affordances, and even “create”
tant step forward compared with the four P’s and the rather
the ones needed to fulfill a specific action (Glăveanu, in press).
disjointed scheme they postulate. Also important to notice is the
Following the same logic, an object is open to a great number of
fact that whereas Rhodes (1961) derived his conception from a
uses ranging from conventional to highly creative. In the words of
study of definitions (and therefore his original aim was to organize
Gibson, “the fact that a stone is a missile does not imply that it
the diversity of formulations), the five A’s aim is not to structure
cannot be other things as well. It can be a paperweight, a bookend,
an existing body of theoretical and empirical work so much as to
a hammer, or a pendulum blob” (p. 134). This, in the end, is the
inspire its development. It has been repeatedly noticed in the
principle behind the Unusual Uses Test so popular in the psychol-
psychology of creativity that only systemic models can save the
ogy of creativity. field from fragmentation and excessive specialization (Hennessey
What is less obvious from Gibson’s (1986) discussion of affor- & Amabile, 2010) and return it to the greater concerns about the
dances but comes to the fore in a sociocultural presentation of the nature of creativity. Although this in itself can be for many a
concept is the fact that both affordances and the abilities needed to sufficient reason to look for alternative frameworks, I am com-
exploit them are culturally selected and “evolve” over phyloge- pelled, at the end, to address the “so what?” question in relation to
netic and ontogenetic time. The potential for creative use of objects my specific proposal and will do so with reference to theoretical,
therefore is not a preset reality but a transforming one, changing as methodological, and practical considerations.
actors discover new potentialities in their environment and shape it At a theoretical level, the five A’s model is associated with a
in desired ways. At the same time, the use of objects shapes the relatively novel understanding of creativity. Although the elements
developing capacities of human beings as they grow and become of this framework did not emerge out of a study of definitions, they
competent users of their environment. Ernest Boesch (1993) dem- nevertheless can be used to formulate a tentative, sociocultural
onstrates these deep, evolving connections between objects and description as follows: Creativity is concerned with the action of
people in his essay “The Sound of the Violin.” In this short piece, an actor or group of actors, in its constant interaction with multiple
he invites readers to consider the “phylogenesis” of the violin, its audiences and the affordances of the material world, leading to the
evolution as a species of musical instruments, as well as the generation of new and useful artifacts. This definition builds on
“ontogenesis” of the violin or how it becomes from a mere object, existing formulations (see, for instance, Plucker, Beghetto, &
one that is intimately connected to the person of the violinist, an Dow, 2004, p. 90) in ways that “translate” and enrich their mean-
instrument to be played. While phylogenetically the object is made ing for those researchers interested in the sociocultural and sys-
to “fit” human needs and desires, ontogenetically the individual temic qualities of the phenomenon. Discussing creativity in terms
necessarily starts by trying to “fit” the characteristics of the object. of actors, actions, artifacts, audiences, and affordances is different
This describes also the developmental trajectory of creativity: first from focusing on aptitudes, processes, products, and the environ-
becoming able to observe and make use of affordances in the ment: The former set clearly emphasizes the distributed nature of
surrounding environment and then mastering this use and altering creativity and its articulation in concrete sociocultural settings; the
affordances, adapting what already exists and creating new arti- latter focuses on rather disparate personal and social aspects of the
facts with new affordances. phenomenon. Moreover, each of the five terms presented in this
THE FIVE A’S FRAMEWORK 77

article can introduce novel avenues for creativity theory and re- Moreover, from a methodological perspective, the study of
search and even open entirely new fields of study (e.g., the role of actors, actions, artifacts, audiences, and affordances, both separate
affordances in creativity). and in conjunction, requires innovations at a design and research
This framework has another theoretical advantage in that it is technology level. Two examples are discussed here: action and
well equipped to capture different levels of creative expression, artifacts. For the former, the greatest difficulty is to be able to
from celebrated achievements to everyday experiences. The dis- capture and articulate the “inner,” psychological, and “outer,”
tinction between “high” and “mundane” levels of creativity is behavioral dynamic of creative action, something that cannot be
pervasive in the existing literature (see Boden, 1994; Cohen & achieved by traditional methodologies such as individual self-
Ambrose, 1999; Craft, 2001). Such distinctions are valuable at an reports or product analysis. Observation is certainly a privileged
analytical level and can help differentiate extreme cases of the method, but it is costly in terms of time and often problematic
phenomenon but fail to do justice to a whole world of “in- when it comes to capturing microgenetic changes and work on
between” instances. The five A’s framework is able to capture this small objects. These issues can be addressed by methodological
diversity by being sensitive to such differences while working with innovations such as the use of subjective cameras within a Sub-
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a unitary terminological and conceptual model. Everybody is a jective Evidence-Based Ethnography (for details see Lahlou,
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potential actor in the field of creativity, from people who cook a 2011). A subjective camera is a miniature device worn at eye level
sophisticated meal at home to world-class scientists ready to make to record activity (both audio and video) from the perspective of
a new discovery, both artifactual productions in their own right. the actor and thus offers a situated account of what the person does
There is creative action taking place in both cases and an analysis and perceives while creating. This technique has been applied
of its structure and characteristics would certainly reveal many recently for the first time in the field of creativity research
differences but also potential areas of similarity (e.g., the cook and (Glăveanu & Lahlou, 2012) and promises to advance our under-
scientist may equally adopt a trial-and-error, experimental strat- standing of creative work in its moment-to-moment development
egy, etc.). Finally, the sets of audiences and affordances every by being able to document, in detail, everyday life practices within
actor interacts with are different (the cook will present his or her their material and social context. Second, when referring to a study
work to family and friends, the scientist to a community of peers, of creative artifacts, it has been noted that current techniques are
etc.), but both place the creator under a series of constraints and overconcerned with the measurement of properties and evaluation
privilege certain actions over alternatives. This capacity to theorize of creativity and fail to consider artifacts in the broader context of
each of the five A elements at different levels is a quality that meaning-making processes taking place between actors and audi-
systems models of creativity, for instance, do not seem to have. In ences in particular sociocultural settings. For instance, Ivinson’s
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988, 1999) view, for example, the field and (2004) research showed how artistic outcomes made by students
domain are socially constituted and refer strictly to institutionally gain different meanings as they pass from one environment to
recognized forums (e.g., museum curators, art critics, scientific another (e.g., school to home) and are presented to different
committees, etc.). This excludes more “modest” forms of creative audiences. The consensual assessment technique (Amabile, 1996)
expression such as children’s drawings by not acknowledging the can mask this diversity through an excessive emphasis placed on
fact that audiences are multiple and range from gatekeepers of a consensus and homogeneity. A multiple feedback approach
domain to parents and teachers (see Glăveanu, 2011a). (Glăveanu, 2012b) is, on the contrary, designed to uncover the
The five A’s framework, just as the four P’s, can also be a useful multiplicity of conceptions around novel artifacts specific for
methodological tool. Murdock and Puccio (1993) used Rhodes’s different cultural groups and communities.
conception and particularly his intuition about the overlap between Finally, the five A’s framework has a number of practical
elements to propose the contextual organizer. This methodological advantages, and the most important of all here is the fact that it can
instrument, aiming “to assist researchers in designing and conduct- be directly applied to a series of domains such as art, science,
ing integrated research” (p. 250), stresses the importance of study- organizations, education, and so forth. Many of the examples given
ing person, process, product, and press in conjunction rather than in this article cover artistic and scientific creativity and demon-
in isolation. This, according to the two authors, generates a “con- strate how a discussion of these traditional fields can be (re)for-
textual” understanding whenever we are able to interrelate the four mulated in terms of actors, actions, artifacts, audiences, and affor-
facets of the phenomenon (Isaksen & Puccio, 1993, refer to it in dances. They equally apply to a business environment in which
terms of “profiling” creativity). A difficulty, of course, rests in creative actors interact with a series of audiences at different levels
how to operationalize the four P’s in research in order to be able of the organization, produce numerous artifacts, both tangible and
then to relate findings about each of the four elements. This intangible—from written reports to novel solutions—and, in doing
challenge is partially resolved in the five A’s framework because so, exploit the affordances of the physical environment—from the
of the interrelated meaning of actors and audiences, actions, arti- latest technology to conference rooms and office buildings. An
facts, and affordances, made reference to above. The fact that a educational environment (e.g., a school) shows interrelations be-
study of actors necessarily invites a reflection on the role of tween the same key elements: actors and audiences (students,
audiences or that action only takes place in relation to both teachers, administrative staff, parents, etc.), actions (teaching,
audiences and the affordances of material objects is certainly learning, extracurricular activities, etc.), artifacts, and their affor-
aiding the development of “contextual organizers.” The aim for- dances (educational resources, student work, etc.).
mulated by Murdock and Puccio is equally valid for the five A’s Moreover, the five A’s and the sociocultural, systemic perspec-
model: “Using a 4 Ps framework with a contextual focus provides tive they endorse is helpful in clarifying theoretical arguments of
definition and direction, yet allows for in-depth focus on any one, great practical importance. One of these is the debate over the
all, or any combination of the major strands” (p. 266). domain-specificity versus domain-generality of creativity (see
78 GLĂVEANU

Baer, 1998; Plucker, 2005; Silvia, Kaufman, & Pretz, 2009). An same phenomenon. There is research on creativity outside of
advocate of the situated nature of creative expression, the model psychology, and making connections with these growing fields
proposed here is well equipped to capture the local and specific from sociology, anthropology, or the natural sciences is long
manifestation of creativity in different domains and, more than overdue. Sociocultural psychology started as a multidisciplinary
this, in microlevel contexts and situations. Actors are developing project and can thus constitute a solid base on which to build a
individuals, action is necessarily connected to the here and now of model of creativity that is in dialogue with advances in cognitive
relations to audiences, and physical objects or artifacts gain mean- sciences, evolutionary perspectives, and the social sciences at
ing locally and contextually. And yet there is also scope for large. In forging a new language of creativity, we must consider
observing generalities among different concrete instances. To take not only how well this language can help us integrate past and
the example of creative action, it is clearly situated and inseparable present findings in our discipline or inspire future developments
from the context of its production, but it also reveals regularities but also how it could help us speak to a broader audience.
due to an internal organization of elements (e.g., operations, ac-
tions, activities, goals and motifs, mental representations, etc.) that References
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

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