THE ART AND SCIENCE

OF TACTICS
by

MAJOR ROBERT A. DOUGHTY, US ARMY

stablishing the nature of tactics has "fog" of war. Clausewitz had described this

E been a pastime of professional soldiers

for centuries. Analyses of tactics have
delved into the question of the exact
nature of tactics; they have included
complexity:

Everything in war is very simple, but the

simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties
examinations of historical experience or accumulate and end by producing a
events in war; and they have sought to find friction that is inconceivable unless one
the best possible tactics for the future has experienced war .... Friction is the
battlefield. In recent decades, studies of only concept that more or less
tactics in the US Army have implicitly begun corresponds to the facts that distinguish
to assume that tactics is more an exact science real war from war on paper. 4
than an "art and science." As one recent
military writer explained, tactics is nothing Another characteristic of war which
more than the "specific plans and actions supposedly made it an art was its human
required to activate a concept."l In fact, participants. Clausewitz explained, "In war
tactics remains rooted in concepts that the will is directed at an animate object that
demand the scientific approach, but the reacts."5 According to many early military
application of these concepts requires an observers, it was this friction and these human
intuitive art for the successful disposition and participants which made war more an art than
concentration of force on the field of battle. a science, for events on the battlefield could
Despite the improving capabilities of modern not be predicted or studied in isolation.
weapomy, the success of a tactician remains Military writers continued to emphasize
dependent upon a variety of factors which these characteristics through the 20th
cannot be ordered or approached strictly as if century, and in 1947 Lieutenant Colonel
war were a technical trade. Alfred H. Burne wrote, "War is an art rather
than a science; it is waged between human
VIEWS FROM THE PAST beings, and involves the interplay of their
respective characters. Science does not
Military writers of the 18th and 19th recognize sentient beings as such."6 Thus, the
centuries generally agreed that tactics was friction of war and the animate nature of the
more an art than it was a science. Many participants made war more an art than a
agreed with the terse definition given by science.
Antoine Hemi Jomini: "Tactics is the art of Many military observers, however,
fighting on the ground."2 Early 19th century recognized that war demanded increasingly
writers also often used the concepts of Karl greater scientific expertise and that therefore
von Clausewitz to support their arguments, war was not solely an art. For example, the
even though he believed war was neither an science of ballistics, the logic of military
art nor a science) They often referred to the organizations, and the systems for procuring
complexity and uncertainty of war, which and delivering supplies required long training
was sometimes called the "friction" or the and detailed study. Success on the battlefield

Vol. VII, No.3 39

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was increasingly as dependent upon the meticulous planning. Under his intellectual
knowledge acquired before the battle as it was and personal guidance, the German General
dependent upon actions in the battle. Early Staff system became the model for every
military observers acknowledged this. In the Western state.
mid-18th century Maurice de Saxe used an
allegory to explain the need for detailed he principles of war, as they were
knowledge:

A man who has a talent for architecture

T articulated in the early 20th century,
were an attempt to bridge this gap
between war as an art and war as a science.
and can design, will draw the plan and According to J. F. C. Fuller, the major
perspective of a palace with great skill. architect of the modern principles of war, the
But ... if he does not know how to shape great value of principles came in teaching the
his stones, to lay his foundation, the art of war and in rendering order to seemingly
whole edifice will soon crash'? disparate actions on the battlefield. Only the
most extreme supporters of the scientific
As the 19th century progressed, an approach argued that principles must be
increasing number of military men came to followed on the battlefield and that violating
believe that science could serve the needs of them would invariably result in defeat. More
the tactician. One of the major reasons for reflective officers recognized that principles
this was the scientific revolution which were a tool for understanding the dynamics of
accelerated in the latter half of that century. the battlefield but that they could not be
Another was the military revolution which indiscriminately applied. At the same time,
occurred in the same period. Armies vastly they could be used to train officers to think,
increased in size; progressively more complex since they were a useful mechanism for
weaponry was introduced; and logistics trains keeping basic ideas fresh in one's mind. The
became massive. As warfare became more principles were thus scientific in nature, and
complex, a more systematic approach became Fuller explained, "Lack of science leads to
necessary. chaos in art."9
One of the most important innovators In the 1920's and 1930's, Western observers
during this period was Field Marshal Helmuth stressed the scientific aspects of war, but they
von Moltke, Chief of the German General did not abandon the belief that war was
Staff from 1857 to 1888. He recognized that ultimately an art. In his book, The
war was not an exact science and argued: Foundations of the Science of War, Fuller
passionately argued:
It is a matter of understanding a
constantly changing situation at every To deny a science of war and then to
moment, and then doing the simplest and theorize on war as an art is pure military
most natural thing with energy and alchemy, a process of reasoning which for
determination. This is what makes war an thousands of years has blinded the soldier
art, an art that is served by many to the realities of war, and will continue
sciences, 8 to blind him until he creates a science of
War upon which to base his art. 10
Von Moltke's great contribution to military
thought was his recognition that war could be Fuller believed that even though soldiers
"served by many sciences," and the were "artists of war," they should spend most
development of this idea made him virtually of their lives systematically preparing for war.
the father of the modern staff system. Von A scientific approach to preparation would be
Moltke believed that even though war was a rational process in which the tactician
ultimately an art, the military commander would train his mind for the eventualities of
could be served by the systematic application the battlefield. In the same sense, B. H.
of general principles, rigorous research, and Liddell Hart wrote articles on "A Science of

40 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

Infantry Tactics" in which he did not envision always recognized that tactics demands a
an exact science of tactics but sought to rigorous study of the facts, the systematic
identify the "essential principles of tactics" arrangement of knowledge, and the reaching
which could be applied to the conduct of war. of responses through reasoning rather than
He sought to provide a "flexible framework" conjecture. The reasoning process which
that could provide the tactician a base upon emphasizes logical deduction and the study of
which to build his "practical knowledge of precedents was an inherent and integral part
ground and weapons."!! Neither Fuller nor of the intellectual preparation of any officer,
Liddell Hart believed that military science but "military science" was not a field in
encompassed immutable, inviolable laws which there were formulas such as those
which had to be applied automatically; provided for the engineer or mathematician.
however, a thorough scientific preparation The American philosophy of tactics has
would enhance chances of success amidst the never- been more succinctly expressed than
turmoil of battle. when General John J. Pershing, Commander
The American Army has long sought to use of the American Expeditionary Forces in
scientific methods for solving tactical World War I, spoke to the officers of the 1st
pro blems, but its methods have often been Division just before they entered combat for
more "quasi-scientific" than scientific. As the first time:
with Liddell Hart, the flexible framework has
usually been balanced by practical knowledge. Whatever your previous instruction
For example, the five-paragraph field order may have been, you must learn in the
was introduced into the Army at Fort actual experience of war, the practical
Leavenworth in 1894-95 by Captain Eben application of the tactical principles that
Swift, who was seeking a more systematic you have been taught during your
method to examine tactical problems.!2 pre Ii m inary training.... When
Previously, commanders had either prescribed confronted with a new situation, do not
missions in voluminous detail, or they had try to recall examples given in any
merely pointed out the objective, leaving the particular book on the subject; do not try
execution entirely to the judgment of the to remember what your instructor has
subordinate. The new operations order said in discussing some special problem;
permitted the orderly arrangement of do not try to carry in your minds
information and instructions, and it enabled patterns of particular exercises or battles,
the commanders of all units to understand thinking they will fit new cases, because
clearly their mission, force composition, and
responsibilities. The operations order was thus
introduced to permit a more systematic Major Robert A. Doughty graduated from the US
Military Academy in 1965, received his M.A. in
approach to tactical pro blems. History from the University of California at Los
Angeles in 1972, and graduated from the US Army
ystematic methods and thinking have
S
Command and General Staff College in 1976. He
remained an important part of the commanded a tank company and was a battalion
operations officer in Germany, and he served in
American military officer's preparation Vietnam as an advisor to a Vietnamese armored
for war. Since the latter part of the 19th cavalry troop. Major Doughty has served in the
century, Army schools have consistently Department of History at the
US Military Academy and is
pushed the student officer toward a presently an instructor in the
recognition of the capabilities and Department of Unified and
composition of military organizations, a grasp Combined Operations at the
Command and General Staff
of the fundamentals of employing the widely College, Fort Leavenworth,
varying types of modern military units, and Kansas. Previous articles by
Major Doughty have appeared
an understanding of tactical techniques and in Parameters, Military Review,
procedures. The schools have never supported Infantry, and Armor.
haphazard planning or guesswork. They have

Vol. VII, No.3 41

 no two sets of circumstances are is [often] not recognized that the object of
alike .... The main reliance after ali must regulations and rules is to produce order in
be upon your determination, upon the the fighting machine, and not to strangle the
aggressiveness of your men, upon their mind of the man who controls it."lS The
stamina, upon their character, and upon officer must, above all, be a leader and a
their will to win.1 3 problem-solver, and the application of theory
to practice on the modern battlefield requires
In subsequent decades, the American Army him to treat tactics as if it were a science and
did not abandon its belief that being a an art, not as if it were a technical skill.
successful tactician was also an art. The The unpredictable nature of battle compels
theory of tactical operations could be based the military officer to remain flexible and to
upon scientific methods encompassing develop his mental capabilities to their
principles, concepts, and techniques, but utmost. The American experience in war in
military execution was undoubtedly an art the 20th century supports this need for the
relying upon the commander's insight and flexible, mentally creative military officer,
leadership. The execution of tactical since in this century the Army has not used
operations required an intuitive synthesis of its peacetime tactical doctrine in war. When
all factors that might impact upon the battle. World War I began, we were not prepared for
Doctrine provided the flexible framework for the machineguns, the barbed wire, or the
the commander's concept; scientific methods reality of the trenches. When France fell in
were used to examine and order information; June 1940, the United States had only 18
but, the decision would depend upon his medium tanks. When the Korean incident
practical knowledge of the ongoing battle. erupted in 1950, we were woefully
Thus, to borrow von Moltke's idea, tactics unprepared and had done absolutely no
was an art, served by many sciences. planning for the sort of war we found in
Korea. And in Vietnam, we were immersed in
THE NEED FOR THE our experience on the European continent
CREATIVE OFFICER and sought to apply conventional methods to
When one examines the evidence of the unconventional war. In each case, the Army
past, it becomes clear that while technology was forced to adapt its tactical doctrine or
has always acted to transform the nature of theory to the reality of the existing war.
war, it has never altered the one unchanging These observations are not intended as an
fundamental of war-its variety and indictment of the US Army; they are an
complexity. The theoretical impact of this attempt to illustrate the complexity of the
was indicated in the book, Infantry in Battle: problem. If historical experience proves
correct, the tactical doctrine that exists in
The art of war has no traffic with rules, peacetime will probably be radically altered if
for the infinitely varied circumstances the real battle of the future arrives.
and conditions of combat never produce Neither can doctrine be simply
exactly the same situation twice .... In extrapolated from one theater to another.
battle, each situation is unique and must During World War II, for example, the tactical
be solved on its own merit. 14 concepts that were applied to Europe were
often not transferable to the Pacific theater,
Tactical success will come to the and when American units were moved from
commander who displays the greatest one theater to the other, they had to undergo
resourcefulness, initiative, and creativity when a rigorous period of retraining. The Germans
he carries out a combat mission, not to the also recognized the problem of projecting
commander who slavishly applies rigid doctrine from one theater to another.
theories and rules memorized in some Following World War II, General von Thoma,
classroom. J. F. C. Fuller once remarked, "It former head of the Afrika Korps said:

42 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

 France had been ideal country for is another aspect of tactics which is more
armored forces, but Russia was the closely related to tactics as an art and science
worst-because of its immense tracts of rather than a technical trade. Military leaders
country that were either swamp or have long recognized that it is superfluous to
sand. . .. Africa was paradise in fill the mind of the military officer with tiny
comparison. Tank troops who had been details and fragments of knowledge. Although
in Russia found it easy to adapt the officer must have technical competence,
themselves to the African conditions. It is he must also be trained to evaluate, to
a mistake to draw lessons from the analyze, and to be able to dissect information
African campaign and apply them to that is given to him. Without this capability,
quite different conditions.16 he can make little of the practical experience
of others, much less evolve new concepts or
While tactical doctrine may be derived by new battlefield techniques. Frederick the
scientific methods, it should never become Great once caustically remarked that there
dogma, and its application should never be were two mules in his army which had served
automatic but should always require careful through some twenty campaigns, but he
adaptation and consideration. added an important qualification: "They are
mules still."! 7 To draw the best out of
ome military observers have sought to personal or vicarious experience, a great deal
S transcend the difficulty of automatically
applying tactical doctrine by simply
labelling that problem as one ofjeaderslllp.
of reflection and comparison is essential, but
fef1ection and comparison are impossible if
the brain has not been trained to think
This view seems to hold that courage, critically.
charisma, endurance, and technical skills are
more important than intellectual capacity, TACTICS AND THE
but this view is similar to the popular myth MODERN BATTLEFIELD
that war is nothing more than a matter of
brute force, a matter of many heroic In the 1970's the American Army seems to
individuals doing their best against an enemy. have come to the verge of abandoning the
It seems to suggest that the military idea that tactics is ultimately an art. One of
commander's role is similar to that of the the most important reasons for this changing
heroic literary figure and that some mystical perception of tactics is the immensely
personal quality surrounding his presence will complex technology which is rapidly changing
give order where there would otherwise be the composition of the arsenals of the world.
chaos. Such views, in a real sense, belong The revolutionary effect of the transistor has
more to the world of the theater than they do touched every aspect of the
to the reality of the battlefield, and they view ba ttIefield-communications, guidance
war solely as an art. Within the Army, there systems, computers, and fire controls, to
are clearly many subordinate levels where name bu t a few. Other technological advances
endurance and technical akills are more have also acted to increase mobility or
important than intellectual capacity, but the firepower on the battlefield, and are included,
officer's responsibilities require a scientific for example, in improved helicopters and
understanding of his profession and a mental precision guided munitions systems. With
flexibility for adapting doctrinal concepts to remarkably accurate weapons,
the reality of the moment. The officer must computer-assisted intelligence gathering
spend a lifetime developing the judgment and systems, vast communications networks, and
depth of thought that will be essential to so forth, a battlefield of the future may only
success on the modern battlefield. Personal remotely resemble that of the past.
presence is not enough. Rigorous intellectual In 1969 General William C. Westmoreland,
preparation is absolutely necessary. then the Army's Chief of Staff, predicted that
The need for the officer to think critically the "automated battlefield" could become a

Vol. VII, No.3 43

reality within a decade. He suggested that combining actions on the battlefield. The
with "the use of data links, computer-assisted combat officer's function continues to be
intelligence evaluation, and automated fire leading his unit and gaining its maximum
control," coupled "with first-round kill performance. If he becomes totally immersed
probabilities approaching certainty, and with in the technical performance of every
surveillance devices that can continually track weapon, he will lose sight of his essential
the enemy,"18 a dramatically different mission-coordinating, combining, and
approach to battle would be needed. As for controlling that unit.
tactics, the automated battlefield would In short, while tactics may be more
apparently be one dominated by technical technical, a concentration on technical skills
thinking. Where the battlefield had previously should not result in our viewing war as a
been dominated by men, it would in the mechanistic science. The successful tactician
fu ture supposedly be dominated by must rise above technical details; he must use
technology . his creative intellect to devise the best
The plethora of new weaponry has concept for defeating the enemy.
apparently convinced some military thinkers On a battlefield of the future, a faster pace
that even if the automated battlefield has not of war may make the commander's decisions
arrived, at least every soldier now needs more difficult, rather than easier. While there
greater technical expertise. The fact that have been recent advances in information
technology dominates military weaponry retrieval and intelligence gathering systems,
seems to be prima facie evidence that there have also been advances in the
approaches to all aspects of the battlefield capabilities for maneuver and for disrupting
mu st be technical. If there is any criticism to intelligence and communication systems.
be made of this approach, it is that there is These will markedly reduce the commander's
too great an emphasis on the technical nature time and ability to react. In even the most
of war. That is, some military officers seem to favorable circumstances, troop leaders and
believe that the battlefield can be dissected, staff members will have to make up their
categorized, and prepared as if it were isolated minds quickly. Given comparatively
in the laboratory. Once the proper equipment more-yet relatively sketchy-information, a
has been obtained and the correct ingredients commander who insists upon every piece of
added, only the killing remains to be done. information before he acts, or who thinks he
Such antiseptic and theoretical models, has time for long consultation and reflection,
however, ignore the "friction" and "animate misunderstands how the battlefield has
nature" of the participants which distinguish changed in recent years. The difficulties
the laboratory battle from the real battle. facing the military officer have been neither
eased nor eliminated. And they are also by no
n 1932 J. F. C. Fuller wrote, "The more means purely technical.
I mechanical become the weapons with
which we fight, the less mechanical must be
the spirit which controls them."19 Today,
Despite the new technological advances,
success on the battlefield continues to depend
upon an ability to do or to reply to the
greater technical competence is undoubtedly unexpected. Rote procedures, such as
required of the officer, for as military decision matrices or a multi-stepped process
weapons and tools become more complex, he for terrain analysis, can assist in the making of
must possess enough technical skill to use and tactical decisions; however, when they
maintain military equipment. That need, become stereotyped or suppress innovation,
however, does not erase or eclipse the they are more dangerous than helpful. If an
requirement to be skilled in the less enemy is able to identify predictable results,
mechanistic aspects of tactics, since the he possesses a great advantage. As has always
introduction of new arms has compounded been true, there is no substitute for an active
the officer's problem of coordinating or mind on the battlefield.

44 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

 ORCHESTRATING THE BATTLEFIELD com bines their effects into something
original, powerful, and effective.
The mature tactician knows he must In the same sense, the successful
understand current tactical techniques and orchestration of forces on the modern
procedures of combining and employing battlefield remains an art, served by many
personnel and equipment on the battlefield, sciences.
but he does not search for fixed rules or
inflexible formulas. He understands that
tactical problems must be approached in a NOTES
rational manner. He uses a systematic method
to collect, order, and analyze evidence, but 1. Edward B. Atkeson, "The Dimensions of Military
Strategy," Parameters-Journal of the US Army War College,
his final decision will be affected by VII, No.1 (1977), 41.
nonquantifiable factors which will be weighed 2. Antoine Henri Jammi, Tableau analytique des
as much by artistic or intuitive judgment as principales combinaisons de la guerre (St. Petersbourg: Chez
Bellizard, 1830), p. 50.
by scientific methods. The successful tactician 3. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael
recognizes the "friction" of war and Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University
understands that the tactical concepts he Press, 1976), p. 149.
4. Ibid., p. 119.
learns in the classroom may be applied in a 5. Ibid., p. 149.
dramatically different fashion when he faces 6. Alfred H. Burne, The Art of War on Land (Harrisburg,
the same problem on the battlefield. When he Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1947), p. 3.
7. Maurice de Saxe, Reveries on the Art of War, trans.
is faced with a different situation, he is able Thomas R. Philips (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service
to create new techniques which are derived Publishing Company, 1944), p. 19.
from the existing tactical concept. Thus, the 8. Crossen Generalstabe, Moltke's Kriegslehren (Berlin:
Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1912), p. 1.
successful tactician must possess a flexible 9. J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War
mind, a creative intellect, and an ability to (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1925), p. 33.
respond to a changing tactical environment. 10. Ibid., p. 21.
11. B. H. Liddell Hart, "A Science of Infantry Tactics,"
The future commander may eventually sit The MUitary Engineer, xm, No. 70 (July-August 1921),
before a console, but he will never be a 315-20; and XlJl, No. 71 (September·October 1921),409·14.
technician, and his profession will never be a Reprinted from The Royal Engineers Journal.
12. Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Fort Leavenworth
trade. Schools: Post Graduate Military Education and
In many modern writings, one often Professionalization in the U.S. Army, 1880~1920"
encounters the analogy of orchestrating the (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin,
1974), p. 73.
battlefield. The symbology is one of a group 13. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, I
of symphony musicians who are properly (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931),393.
playing their instruments, their performance 14. US Army Infantry School, Infantry in Battle
(Washington: The Infantry Journal, Inc., 1939), 2d ed., p. 1.
based upon long scientific preparation. Yet, 15. J. F. C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their
the orchestration of these instruments and the Cure (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1932), p. 71.
interpretation of the symphony itself remain 16. B, H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill
(London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1951), p. 129.
as much an art as they are a science. There is a 17. G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War (London:
distinct difference between the obedient Longmans, Green, and Co., 1919), p. 184.
musicians in the orchestra and the imaginative 18. Trevor Cliffe, Military Technology and the European
Balance (London: The International Institute for Strategic
genius of the conductor, who, knowing the Studies, 1972), p. 11.
mechanics of each instrument himself, 19. Fuller, Generalship, p.13.

Vo!. VII, No.3 45