Why do things exist and why is there something rather than nothing?

Abstract

Why is there something rather than nothing? This question has been asked for

hundreds or thousands of years. Many solutions have been suggested, including that the

question is non-sensical; God or a necessary being created something; something is

necessary; and it can't be explained, so accept it. If any of these answers had been truly

satisfying, however, humans would have accepted it and moved on. Yet philosophers

still write papers on the subject, and they and everyday people still people ask

themselves the question. Why? Because there seems to be a suspicion in the back of

humanity's head that "Yeah, but there's got to be a reason, or a physical mechanism, for

why there isn't just nothing." Therefore, if we ever want to provide a satisfying answer,

it seems we must tackle the possibility that there could have been absolute nothing and

then provide a mechanism for why there is now something. This paper explores the idea

that starting with nothing can still give an end result of something. It does this by first

proposing a physical-mechanical-type reason why ordinary, non-nothing things (books,

for example) exist and then using this reason to show that what we usually consider to

be and visualize as “nothing” also exists. It is a something. This conclusion isn't new,

but providing a mechanism for it is.

1 Introduction and brief summary

The question Why is there something rather than nothing? has been asked since at

least since 1714 when Leibniz first formally raised it [1]. It has likely been thought of

more informally for hundreds or thousands of years longer than that. Many solutions

have been suggested over the years including the following:

1. Existence just is. Its a brute fact [2].

2. The universe has been here forever [3], so there is no cause. Again, it just is.

3. Nothing can't exist, so something must exist. Something is necessary.

4. A necessary existent being, or God, caused it [1]

5. A necessary existent construct such as the laws of physics [4], mathematics [5],

or a set of competing possible worlds [6] caused it or is it.

6. There was nothing, but its unstable and becomes something.

7. The question is non-sensical. Stop asking and worrying about it.

All of these, and other, arguments are based on the idea that there is some necessary

existent entity, or something, that either is the universe or causes the universe to exist.

But, none of them give a reason or mechanism for why this entity exists. Even answer 6

, while sounding different on the surface, still requires nothing to have a property that

causes it to be unstable towards some, also required, perturbing force or circumstance.

Answer 7 seems to me to take the easy way out. Also, the arguments presented in this

paper show that the question isn't non-sensical and that it only seems non-sensical

because of an incorrect assumption. If any of these or other answers had been truly

satisfying, humans would have accepted it and moved on. Yet philosophers still write

papers on the subject, and they and everyday people still ask themselves the question.

Why? Because there seems to be a suspicion in the back of humanity's head that "Yeah,

but theres got to be a reason, or a physical mechanism, for why there is “something” and

there isn't just nothing. " Therefore, to get a truly satisfying answer, it seems as if we

must face up to the elephant in the room: the possibility that there was absolute nothing

and yet now there is something. Of course, we can stick with "the question isn't

rational", "we don't have the knowledge to explain it", "it just is", etc., but this brings us

right back to the above-mentioned suspicion of “Yeah, but why?” The rest of this paper

will try to answer the "Yeah, but why?" question by exploring the idea that there was

nothing and now there is something. The objection that "was" and "now" imply a

temporal transition when there wouldn't have been time in nothing is discussed below.

First, nothing is defined here as the lack of all matter, energy, space/volume, time,

abstract concepts and Platonic realms, possibilities, laws of physics/math/logic, anything

else, and the lack of all minds and consciousness to consider this lack of all. If, as stated

above, we assume this “nothing” as a starting point, and also assume that there would be

no mechanism present in this nothing to turn it into a something, and then finally assume

that we have something now, the only possible way for this to happen is if that nothing
that we were considering was not in fact the lack of all existent entities, or somethings.

It must have somehow been a something. However, because we assumed that all

possible somethings within the situation nothing were gone, the only thing that could be

a something is the overall nothing situation itself. Another way to think about this is

using arithmetic. Suppose one has 0 (e.g., nothing) on one side of an equation and 1

(e.g., something) on the other. Because 0 cannot be changed into a 1, but somehow one

must get it to equal 1, then the 0 one starts with must be a 1 in disguise, even though it

looks like 0 on the surface. One could also say that the 1 must somehow be a 0 in

disguise even though it looks like 1 on the surface. Both are equivalent in that both 0

(nothing) and 1 (something) must be two words for describing the same situation. It's

just an arithmetic fact. In sum, if we assume a starting point of nothing, and now have

something, that nothing that we were thinking of was in fact a something in disguise.

Right off the bat, one might raise the following objection. First, the words “was” and

“now” in the statement “there was absolute nothing and yet now there is something

imply a temporal change, but there would be no time in nothing, so how can this be? In

response, I don't use these words in a time sense. Instead, I use them to indicate that the

two different words, nothing and something, can describe the same situation, and that

the human mind, after the fact, can view the switching between the two different

perspectives of nothing and something as a temporal change.

Another objection is that some might say that just by using the word nothing, I'm

reifying, or giving existence to, something that's not really there. However, in order to
even discuss the topic, we have to talk about nothing as if it's a thing. That doesn't make

nothing itself a thing because the mind's conception of nothing (and therefore our

speaking about nothing) and nothing itself are two different things. As Holt describes it

[7], there is a difference between "nothing", which he calls "mere shorthand for 'not

anything.' " and "nothingness," which "designates an ontological option, a possible

reality, a conceivable state of affairs: that in which nothing exists". In nothing itself,

neither the mind nor our talking about nothing are present. So, our talking about nothing

is independent of and will have no effect on whether or not “nothing” itself exists. It

won't reify it and instead just allows us to talk about it.

A third objection might be that nothing can't exist except as the lack of something.

But, while human minds exist and are somethings, which means we are stuck with

defining “nothing” as the absence of something, nothing itself doesn't have this

restriction. Nothing itself (not our mind's conception of nothing), within which no

somethings are present, would be independent of being defined as the lack of something,

which means that whether or not “nothing” itself exists is independent of something. As

mentioned above, the mind's conception of nothing and nothing itself are two different

things.

So how could nothing be the same as a something? That is, how can nothing exist?

To answer this, I next explore why any normal, non-nothing thing, like a book or a pile

of dirt, exists.
2 Why is a something a something?

To answer the question “How can nothing be a something?” I first start by exploring

why any normal, non-nothing thing exists, or is a something. I will state the proposed

reason first and then provide evidence for it. I propose that a thing exists if it is a

grouping defining what is contained within. Such a grouping or definition is equivalent

to an edge, boundary, or enclosing surface defining what is contained within and giving

substance and existence to the thing as a new unit whole thats a different existent entity

than whatever is contained within. What is the rationale for this argument? To illustrate,

I use the example of a pile of dirt. Why does a pile of dirt exist? Three things that might

give it existence are:

1.) The individual molecules of dirt inside the pile.

2.) The surface of the pile.

3.) Something outside the pile.

Discussing the last choice first, if the reason for existence of the pile were something,

A, external to the pile, one would then have to ask why that external thing A exists?

Using the same logic as choice 3, it would be because of something called B external to

it. Then, one would have to ask why B exists. To avoid an infinite regress, there would

eventually have to be some thing that exists for reasons intrinsic, and not external, to it.

Because that would be equivalent to asking the original question of why the pile of dirt
exists without considering the external option, I will no longer pursue the external

option.

So, that leaves two choices for why a thing, like a pile of dirt, exists: the stuff inside

the pile (e.g., the individual molecules of dirt and the bonds between them), and the

surface of the pile. Evidence supporting the grouping/surface argument and against the

stuff inside argument is as follows.

To begin, you might say that its not the surface that gives existence to the pile because

you can remove the surface (the outer layer of dirt molecules) and still see a pile of dirt

that exists inside. But, first off, what you're seeing is the surface of a different pile

because when you remove some of the dirt from the surface, you're creating a new,

smaller pile. Second, can you really visualize a thing like a pile of dirt existing that does

not have an outermost edge or surface? That's debatable, but personally, I can't. And

third, suppose you remove the surface of the smaller pile and visualize whats underneath

it; that stuff underneath also has a surface. You could keep removing more and more

outer surfaces and visualizing whats inside, but eventually, to avoid an infinite regress

and to still have anything exist at all, there must be some smallest, most fundamental

surface with no smaller surfaces (e.g., no smaller components) inside. So, this suggests

that the reason this fundamental thing exists is not because of the stuff inside it but

because of its surface. One might argue that there's nothing wrong with an infinite

regress of smaller surfaces, but this is basically the same as saying there is no reason for

why a thing exists. That's possible, but it won't be dealt with here because the whole
point of this paper is to explore the idea that there needs to be a reason for things

existing in order to provide a truly satisfying conclusion to questions about existence.

Second, if we suppose that it's not the surface that gives existence to the pile but,

instead, is just the individual dirt molecules inside the pile, one might then ask: "why

does a dirt molecule exist?" The stuff-inside reasoning would say that it exists because

of the stuff inside it, e.g., the atoms making up the dirt molecule and the forces that hold

the atoms together. Then, one might ask why does an atom inside a dirt molecule or an

inter-atom force exist? The stuff-inside reasoning would say that they exist because of

the stuff inside them, e.g., the neutrons, protons, and electrons making up the atom and

the force particles and fields holding these particles together. Just as above, this process

could obviously go on forever. At some point, to avoid an infinite regress of explaining

that things exist because of smaller and smaller stuff inside and in order to have

anything exist at all, there must be some smallest, most fundamental thing that exists

that has absolutely no smaller components contained within. An existent entity with no

smaller

components inside would seem to be just a surface. That is, there's nothing inside, but it

still exists. What else would it be besides the surface? And, this brings us back again to

the idea that its the surface, grouping or relationship defining what is contained within

that causes a thing to exist.

Third, one might say that it's all the bonds between the dirt molecules in a pile of dirt

that cause the pile to exist, and these bonds exist inside the pile, so its not the surface of
the pile that makes it exist. This is a fair point, but two arguments against it are:

A. Bonds between molecules might explain why a thing of many components

might exist, but they don't explain why a thing that has no smaller components

inside, and therefore no bonds between the components, exists. As explained

above, a smallest entity with no further components inside is required to avoid an

infinite regress of smaller and smaller things inside but still allow anything to

exist at all. So, at this level, it can't be the bonds inside that cause a thing to exist

because there is no inside. All that's left to cause the thing to exist is the surface.

B. It's not the bonds (between dirt molecules) considered individually that cause

the pile to exist. It's the grouping or collection of all these bonds in the pile

considered together. A grouping together of all the bonds inside is the same as a

surface, or boundary, defining what bonds are contained within and that we can

see and touch as the surface of the pile. So, this again supports the idea that it's

the grouping, as represented by the surface, that ties together and defines what is

contained within that causes a thing to exist.

A fourth argument, that's similar to argument 3B, above, supporting the surface

argument and against the stuff inside argument is as follows. A thing like a pile of dirt is

not just millions of dirt molecules considered individually. It's the grouping together of

these individual molecules into a new unit whole called a pile. The pile is a different
existent entity than the individual dirt molecules considered on their own. All the

individual dirt molecules could be spread out individually over a section of land, and

they wouldn't be considered a pile; they'd just be called dirt molecules on a section of

land. But, group them together into a little hill, and a new unit whole called a pile is

created. So, the grouping together of dirt molecules is what causes the pile to exist. A

grouping together of dirt molecules is equivalent to a boundary or surface defining what

dirt molecules are contained within the pile. So, once again, the boundary or surface of

the pile groups together the dirt molecules and gives substance and existence to the pile.

Another example of this is that of a hole in a block of wood. Before a hole is cut in a

block of wood, the stuff inside the future hole is just a bunch of unrelated, individual

locations in the block of wood. There is nothing grouping them together into a separate

unit whole. But, cutting the hole in the wood creates a surface that groups these

locations together into a new unit whole called a hole. The surface, or wall, of the hole

defines what locations are contained within and creates the new unit whole called the

hole.

In sum, I propose that a thing exists if it is a grouping defining what is contained

within. This grouping/relationship provides a surface, edge or boundary defining what is

contained within and that gives substance and existence to the thing.

Some additional examples of existent entities and their groupings defining what is

contained within are as follows. First, consider a set of elements. If it were unknown

what elements are contained in a set, would that set exist? No. Even for the null set, it's
known exactly what is contained within: the lack of all elements. The grouping defining

what elements are contained within is essential for a set to exist. The grouping is

visually represented by the curly braces, or surface/edge, around the elements of the set

and is what gives existence to the set. A second example is that of a book. In this case,

the grouping together of all the individual atoms and the bonds between individual

atoms creates a new and unique existent entity called a book, which is a different

existent entity than the atoms and bonds inside considered individually. This grouping

provides the surface that we see and can touch and that we call the book. Try to imagine

a book that has no surface defining what is contained within. Even if you remove the

cover, the collection of pages that’s left still has a surface. How do you even touch or see

something without a surface? You can’t. Additional examples are as follows. A

grouping together of chalk molecules with adjacent positions on a board creates a new

existent entity called a chalk circle. The grouping of molecules is visually seen as the the

edge of the chalk circle. A cloud exists because there is a grouping together of water

molecules in the sky whose bonds with each other are stronger than the force of the wind

trying to blow them apart. This grouping provides a surface which can be visually seen

as the cloud. A photon is a grouping together of oscillating electric and magnetic fields,

and this grouping makes the photon an existent thing thats different than the electric and

magnetic fields considered on their own without this grouping.

The argument that a thing exists if it is a grouping defining what is contained within

also applies to abstract objects. In the mind, an abstract concept labeled “love” is a
grouping saying what other ideas and concepts (trust, intimacy, memories of related

physiological feelings, etc.) are contained within it. If you remove the grouping together

of these other ideas, then you no longer have the concept called “love”, you just have a

bunch of unrelated, individual ideas and concepts like trust and intimacy, but they're not

grouped together into a new concept labeled “love”. A second example is that of the

property redness. Redness is the construct that the mind labels red which groups together

other neural constructs such as the concept for the sound of the word red and the

memories of the physiological sensations, visual images, and emotions felt in the past

when red wavelengths of light entered the eye and were processed by the brain. Every

sighted person has his or her own neural construct called red, or redness. These

individual redness constructs are all somewhat similar, but not identical, because we all

have similar, but not identical, physiologies and experiences with the color red. So,

even properties are existent entities that are located in the mind and are linked to other

existent entities like the neural construct called the visual image of an apple. By being

linked, one associates the existent entity/property red with the apple. Some feel that the

property redness is an abstract entity that doesn't exist in the mind, but I would ask

where does this abstract entity exist if not inside the mind? Where is this Platonic realm

where abstract concepts exist? Until someone can point out where this realm exists, this

is purely a faith-based argument, which while possible, can't be argued rationally. In

general, for non-mind existent entities, the grouping or relationship defining what is

contained within is equivalent to the surface of the entity. For existent entities in the
mind, like abstract concepts, the grouping defining what is contained within is still

equivalent to a surface or boundary but can be better visualized as the label, or name, the

mind gives to the concept. That is, the mental label of “love” is the surface or boundary

defining what other mental constructs like trust, intimacy, etc. are contained within the

concept labeled “love”.

Some have questioned the role of the edge, or periphery, in defining an existent entity.

For instance, Goldstick [8] writes

“There is no more basis for identifying a hole with its periphery than for doing

the same with a bump. Rather, a hole and a bump are what are contained within

those spatial bounds.”

This statement is flawed for the following reason. First, of course, the stuff contained

within is necessary for a thing to exist (even if that stuff is nothing as for the null set),

but it's not sufficient. Without the grouping together of that stuff into a new unit whole

called a hole or a bump that is visually seen as the edge or periphery of the hole or

bump, the stuff inside is just a bunch of unrelated stuff. Goldstick's own use of the

phrase "what are contained within" seems to say as much. Without the edge or periphery,

there would be no "within" in the phrase "what are contained within". "Within" means

within the edge or periphery. This edge or periphery is the visual and physical

representation of the grouping together of stuff into a new unit whole or existent entity.
Said another way, without those spatial bounds defining what components are contained

within, the air particles within a hole or the matter particles within a bump would be just

a bunch of air or matter particles with no relationship tying them together into a new unit

whole called a hole or bump. For the hole, the spatial bound is the surface/edge of the

material in which the hole is located. Can you imagine a hole without its enclosing

surface that defines it? I can't. For the bump, just like the pile of dirt described above,

the grouping together of all the individual molecules of matter and the bonds and forces

between them that are inside the bump creates a new unit whole called the bump that's a

different existent entity than the molecules and bonds inside considered individually.

The visual representation, or the "spatial bound", of this grouping together is the surface

of the bump. Without those "spatial bounds", there would be no hole or bump to talk

about.

One may argue against the materialist view and say that some abstract objects can

exist neither in the mind/head nor in the physical world outside the mind/head but,

instead, in some sort of abstract, mind-independent Platonic realm. One example that

was discussed above would be the property of redness. While this mythical realm can

neither be observed nor rationally defended, even if some objects did exist in it, they

would need to exist for some reason. This reason, even in that Platonic realm, would be

because they're groupings defining what is contained within.

A direct consequence of the idea that a thing, such as a set, exists if it is a grouping, or

collection, defining what is contained within is that until after the definition of what's
contained within is complete, so that what iss contained within is exactly known, there is

no grouping, and the thing does not exist. Only after the contents are fully defined,

which means that the definition of the contents is present, does the grouping and,

therefore, the thing itself exist. If 9 out of 10 of the elements of a set are defined, the set

still does not exist. A different set with just 9 elements could be defined as existing, but

the set with 10 elements does not yet exist. This is basically a mereological essentialism-

type approach [9,10]. One benefit of this approach is that one can use this idea to resolve

the Russell Paradox [11].

Another consequence of the idea that a thing exists if it is a grouping, or collection,

defining what is contained within is that a thing exists only where and when its grouping

defining what is contained within exists. That is, any thing that exists only exists within

a certain location, time, or domain/reference frame. This grouping/existent entity can be

located either inside or outside the mind. Note that by “mind”, I mean the materialistic

view of the mind as being composed of physical things contained within the physical

brain, but the following examples still apply even if the mind is an immaterial thing. An

example is that of a physical bag of groceries. This exists only outside the mind. Other

things like the concept of a bag of groceries exist only inside a mind. Each different

mind contains its own different existent grouping called the concept of a bag of

groceries. Another example of an existent entity that only exists within the mind is that

of the mental construct labeled unicorn. This grouping, or mental construct has real

existence, but this real existence is only as a grouping, or construct within a mind. There
is no instantiation of it outside-the-mind, as far as we know. So, whenever a thing is said

to exist, its very important to say within what location, domain or reference frame it

exists and at what time it exists. As with the unicorn, a thing can exist in one reference

frame but not another. A corollary of this is that two seemingly identical things like the

concept of the number one can exist in two different places and be two different existent

entities. For instance, the existent entity that is the concept of the number one in Joe's

head is a distinct existent entity than the concept of the number one in Jane's head

because these are two distinct groupings in two distinct locations. These groupings may

look the same and have the same properties, but they're distinct existent entities in two

different locations.

Another consequence of the above is that the mind's conception of a thing and the

thing itself are two different existent entities that exist in two different locations. For

instance, the mind's conception of nothing is different than nothing itself. This will be

discussed again in the next section.

A grouping defining what is contained within, e.g., an existent entity, may or may not

contain within its boundary other groupings, or existent entities. These internal existent

things exist on their own because of their own groupings, but where they exist is only

within the confines, or domain, of the external existent thing. Using the bag of groceries

example, a bag may or may not contain individually existing grocery items within it. If it

does contain grocery items, then these items exist on their own because of their own

groupings (e.g., surfaces), but the enclosing surface of the bag gives existence to the
entire grouping of these things as a separate, existent whole thing called a bag of

groceries. Additionally, because the groupings, or surfaces, of the individual grocery

items are located inside the bag, then as long as they stay inside the bag, these items

exist only inside the bag, and one cannot say that they exist outside the bag. The

concept in ones head of one of these grocery items might exist outside the bag, but the

grocery item itself does not. If one takes out one of the items, then it exists outside the

bag and no longer exists inside the bag. Indeed, if one takes out one of the items, then

the original bag of groceries no longer exists either because the definition of what is

contained within has changed. Instead, a new bag of groceries exists with one fewer

item. While this may be technically correct, in every day life, as described above, one

can collapse this technical difference down to just saying they're the same bag of

groceries. Taken together, a grouping, or existent entity, may contain other groupings

within it, but these internal groupings, or existent entities, only exist within the confines

of the external grouping.

3 Absolute nothing meets the above definition of an existent entity, or a

something

Finally, how is it that nothing can be a something? The proposed answer makes use of

the above definition of an existent thing as a grouping or relationship defining what is

contained within. When we get rid of all existent entities including matter, energy,

space/volume, time, abstract concepts/Platonic realms, possibilities, laws of

physics/math/logic, anything else we can think of, and all minds and consciousness to

consider this lack of all, we think what is left is the lack of all existent entities, or

absolute nothing. Admittedly, this situation is very hard to visualize because the mind is

trying to imagine a situation in which it doesn't exist. But, once everything, and the

mind, is gone, this situation, this no-volume absolute lack-of-all, would be it; it would be

the everything. It would be the entirety, or whole amount, of all that is present. Is there

anything else besides that absolute nothing? No. It is nothing, and it is the all. An

entirety/whole amount/everything/"the all" is a grouping defining what is contained

within (e.g., everything) and is therefore an existent entity. That is, this supposed lack of

all is itself an existent entity. Because the absolute lack-of-all is the entirety of all that is

present, it functions not only as a grouping defining what is contained within but also as

what is contained within. As a grouping defining what is contained within, it defines

itself and is, therefore, the beginning point in the chain of being able to define existent

entities in terms of other existent entities. The grouping/surface/edge of the absolute

lack-of-all is not some separate thing; it is just the entirety, the all relationship inherent

in this absolute lack-of-all.

This reasoning for why the absolute lack-of-all is actually an existent entity is

complementary to the above-mentioned remove-the-outermost-layer argument for why a

thing exists that showed that to avoid an infinite regress of removing outermost layers

and to still have anything exist at all, there must be some smallest, most fundamental

existent entity that has an outermost surface and absolutely nothing further inside. That
argument started from the assumption of an existent entity, a pile of dirt, which had

surface layers removed from it. The current argument starts from the assumption of the

absolute lack-of-all or non-existence. Both arguments come to the same conclusion but

from different directions: that there is a most fundamental existent entity that is a surface

with absolutely nothing inside.

If nothing, or non-existence, is actually an existent entity, why is so hard to visualize it

as such? One reason is that we visualize non-existence within our minds, which exist.

Because we can't get rid of our existent minds (which is a good thing!), we can't

visualize the true lack of all existent entities, including the mind. Next to our existent

minds, nothing as defined here (e.g., the lack of all matter, energy, space/volume, time,

abstract concepts, laws or constructs of physics and math, and minds) just looks like

nothing. But, it is important to remember that our mind’s conception of nothing is

different than nothing itself. Because we exist, our minds think of non-existence as

being dependent on and defined as the lack of what is traditionally thought to exist. But,

non-existence itself does not have this requirement; whether or not it exists is

independent of our mind (minds would not be present in non-existence) and of what is

traditionally thought to exist. If we could somehow see non-existence itself and not just

our mind’s conception of it, we would see that only once all, including the mind, is gone,

does non-existence become the entirety and, therefore, an existent entity. Visualizing this

is similar to how one might visualize a set of elements from the perspective of one of the

elements inside the set and then removing ones mind and jumping to the outside to see
the set as a grouping defining what is contained within, or an existent entity. One can

only see the set as a whole and as an existent entity from a perspective outside the set.

Moving from the inside to the outside perspective might be considered as analogous to

moving from one dimension to another.

While some objections to this argument were discussed in the Introduction, I repeat

them here because their discussion is important. One objection is that just by using the

word nothing, I'm reifying, or giving existence to, something that's not there at all. But,

not only does that ignore the whole point about our mind's conception of nothing (and,

therefore, the use of the word nothing) being different than nothing itself , it also ignores

the fact that in order to even discuss the topic, we have to talk about nothing as if its a

thing. It's okay to do this; our talking about it won't affect whether or not nothing itself,

and not our mind's conception of nothing, exists. That is, we're not reifying nothing itself

by talking about it because our talking wouldn't even be there in the case of nothing.

A second objection that has been raised [12,13] is that saying that the “lack of all

existent states”, or what is traditionally called non-existence, is equal to the existence of

another entity is a contradiction. However, this is only a contradiction if what we've

traditionally called non-existence really is the lack of all existent entities. Instead, what

is being suggested here is that the situation we've traditionally called the lack of all

existent entities is itself an existent entity. Its just a different entity than the ones we've

considered as existing in the past.

Another objection could be:

 How can a grouping/relationship defining what is contained within (e.g., the

entirety/everything/"the all" grouping) be a "real", existent thing? Its just an

abstract or mental construct, not a real thing.,

But, remember the following. First, in nothing, neither abstract and mental constructs

nor the minds to consider them would be present. The grouping defining what is

contained within that is being discussed here is “nothing” itself and not the mind's

abstract conception of nothing. Second, if mind-independent abstract objects are

defined as being without a spatiotemporal location and causal efficacy [14, 15], this

means they can't cause anything to happen within space and time. Because our universe

seems to exist within space-time, there is apparently no relevance of these objects to our

universe. Third, what exactly is a "real", not abstract, thing? For instance, what is an

electron? What's inside an electron? What is its surface? No one knows. All we really

know is that an electron is an existent thing. As such, it is really no different than the

existent entity that has been previously referred to as nothing. An existent entity is an

existent entity. Whether or not this state is called an electron or the entity previously

called nothing, or non-existence, doesn't matter. Its purely a nomenclature issue.

Finally, two abstract existent entities, or two existent entities previously referred to as

nothing would look as real to each other as two supposedly "real" existent entities called

electrons. It's all relative.

4 Conclusions

Taken together, the above suggests that a thing exists because it is a grouping defining

what is contained within. Such a definition or grouping is equivalent to an edge,

boundary, or enclosing surface defining what is contained within and giving substance

and existence to the thing. Using this argument, one can show that the absolute lack-of-

all, or nothing, and not our mind's conception of nothing, is a grouping or relationship

defining what is contained within and is, therefore, an existent entity, or a something.

That is, what has traditionally been thought of as nothing, or non-existence, is, when

seen from this different perspective, an existent entity or something. This means that the

same situation can appear totally different depending on the perspective of the observer.

This also means that it's impossible to have a true lack of all existent entities, or nothing,

and, therefore, that something is necessary, or non-contingent. While this is not a novel

idea, a mechanism describing how this can be, as suggested here, is.

Based on what is suggested here, if one could pull back the curtain and see what's

really at the base of reality, one would find absolute nothing. But, this nothing is, when

seen from a different perspective, an existent entity. Nothing and something are yin and

yang, but with the mechanism presented here, one can see that both are correct.

Like all proposed solutions to the question "Why is there something rather than

nothing?", the above hypothesis can never be proved because no one can ever actually

directly see whether the absolute lack-of-all is an existent entity. But what can be done

is to use the above thinking about existence to develop a model of the universe (which
exists) and eventually make testable predictions. If these predictions are confirmed by

repeatable experimental evidence, this provides support for the proposed solution. I

refer to this type of thinking as a metaphysics-to-physics approach and suggest that it

can lead to faster progress towards a deeper understanding of the universe than the

methods currently in use by physicists and philosophers. This is currently being pursued

by the author.

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