SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 110571 March 10, 1994

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA
MANUFACTURING, INC., Respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library

De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction is the
novel question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI)
should be filed. A thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226, also known as the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called
for.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Briefly, this question of law arose when BOI, in its decision dated December 10, 1992 in BOI Case No.
92-005 granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of
registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."
Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor
Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in
its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant
to Circular 1-91.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Acting on the petition, respondent court required the BOI and petitioner to comment on Mariwasa's
petition and to show cause why no injunction should issue. On February 17, 1993, respondent court
temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order lapsed by
its own terms on March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any
preliminary injunction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the
ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being
exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion to dismiss the petition is hereby DENIED, for lack of
merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Private respondent is hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof within
which to file its comment to the petition. 1chanrobles virtual law library

Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution on June 4, 1993, petitioner decided not to file any motion
for reconsideration as the question involved is essentially legal in nature and immediately filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner posits the view that respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned resolution of May 25, 1993, for the following reasons:

I. Respondent court has no jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's appeal from the BOI's decision in BOI
Case No. 92-005, which has become final.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute upon this Honorable Court cannot be amended or
superseded by Circular No. 1-91. 2chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner then concludes that:

III. Mariwasa has lost it right to appeal . . . in this case. 3chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and
Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's
appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82
of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with
this Court, to wit:

Judicial relief. - All orders or decisions of the Board

On the other hand, Mariwasa maintains that whatever "obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable
repugnancy" there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue
for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on
February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Circular 1-91, is herein quoted below:

1. Scope. - These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals.
They shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an
appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Among these agencies
are the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Secretary of
Agrarian Reform and Special Agrarian Courts under RA 6657, Government Service Insurance System,
Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission and
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2. Cases not covered. - These rules shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders of the National
Labor Relations Commission or the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, and other quasi-judicial agencies from which no
appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

3. Who may appeal and where to appeal. - The appeal of a party affected by a final order, decision, or
judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals or of a quasi-judicial agency shall be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact or of
law or mixed questions of fact and law. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the
aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of Appeals, to wit:

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, awards of
Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the
Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of B.P. 129 is the laudable objective of providing a uniform
procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the bench and the bar.
Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P. 129 of unclogging the docket of this Court to enable it to
attend to more important tasks, which in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as quoted in our decision in
Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4is "less concerned with the decisions of cases that begin and end
with the transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction
of national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority
and its impact upon fundamental rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 5this Court noted that B.P. 129 did not deal
only with "changes in the rules on procedures" and that not only was the Court of Appeals reorganized,
but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened by Section 9 thereof. Explaining the changes, this
Court said:

. . . Its original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and habeas corpus, which
theretofore could be exercised only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, was expanded by (1) extending it so
as to include the writ of quo warranto, and also (2) empowering it to issue all said extraordinary writs
"whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." Its appellate jurisdiction was also extended to cover not
only final judgments of Regional Trial Courts, but also "all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders
or awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948," it being noteworthy in this connection that the text of the law is
broad and comprehensive, and the explicitly stated exceptions have no reference whatever to the Court
of Tax Appeals. Indeed, the intention to expand the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, is further stressed by the
last paragraph of Section 9 which excludes from its provisions, only the "decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals."
6
chanrobles virtual law library

However, it cannot be denied that the lawmaking system of the country is far from perfect. During the
transitional period after the country emerged from the Marcos regime, the lawmaking power was lodged
on the Executive Department. The obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps
explain the deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to
promote.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 provides that all
appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court entertains ordinary appeals only from decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on
certiorari within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the
provision of the Interim Rules that "(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari
which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Thus, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision is clearly not in consonance with the present
procedure before this Court. Only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional Commission (Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission on Audit), may be brought to the Supreme
Court on original petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days form
receipt of a copy thereof. 7chanrobles virtual law library

Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing
appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-
judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of
procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the
force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. 8In Inciong v. de Guia, 9a circular of this Court
was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a
judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated
September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated
October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating Judge,
brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases instead of raffling is a common
practice and holding that respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until it is repealed or
otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary." 10chanrobles virtual
law library

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former
grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by
this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent
correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the
BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought.
These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by
virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The case of Bustos v. Lucero 11distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and those
arising from procedural law:

Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J., 980).
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, as oppossed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their invasion. 12chanrobles virtual law
library

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought
pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226.
In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and
continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this
agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days
from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence
of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders
or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also
apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now
allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides,
the enumeration is preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there
are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly
listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2
of the circular. Only the following final decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the
circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-judicial agencies from
which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. Since in DBP v. CA 13we upheld the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same
is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and
comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from
Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and
method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions
of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should
now be brought to the Court of Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 19, 1993 is hereby
LIFTED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ. concur.