a AL Ly otTHE LUFTWAFFE BOMBER FORCE 1933-1945 so far Peltz has never learned from his mistakes. He seen s brave personally, having been a Stuka pilot before the days of Allied air superiori ince going off ops, the prospect of other men — his crews — facing murderous odds certainly has not caused bim to quail... He is the ideal leader if rapid wastage of an air force is desired... By the time the oil cr s set in, the German long-range bomber force was $0 ineffective that it was decided not to waste fuel on it, and it is now almost invisible.”190 @ Kampfflieger Introduction vulnerable and aireraft were few. Technic novelties such as ere This extremely weathered Jus As of an badly worn by the weather and eneral continous Sperational usage Probably RLM 65 {inderneath There Isak evidenceThe Eastern Front @ 291 The Eastern Front: Summer 1943 Nae i Mlnendincr ‘rappes Kommandeur of 2 June 1945 10 March 1945 Operation Citadel he last great German offensive in the Soviet Union, Unternetmen Zitadelle was launched in the early hours of 6 July 1943, The Kamptfieger could operate the way thelr arm had been designed to, in daylight, in support of advancing armies and with few losses. It could have been 1940 all over ‘again and certainly the bombers themselves (the He 111 H-6 and H-14, the Ju 88 At and A-14) were itle diferent from three years earlier (On the frst day, KG 3, KG 27, KG 65 and I./KG 100 (all under Genmaj. Hans Seldemann’s Vil Flegerkorps) flew 536 sorties, concentrated in front of ll. $SPanzerkorps. Only four He 114s and a Ju 88 were lost in exchange for nine ammunition and fuel dumps claimed destroyed. Two days later, serviceability had sunk so far that close fighter escort was not available for the Korps’ 498 bomber sorties (178 of them flown by KG 58's Heinkels) but even so, only one He 1.11 and a Ju 88 were lost Night bombing was on a far smaller scale (57 aircrat) and directed in part against ral links behind the Soviet front. Next ay, the Luftwaffe dropped 1,000 tonnes of bombs in support of the German 2. Armee. |A week into the German assault, the Red Army ‘counterattacked. The Lufwatfe's nocturnal fiying intensified with 206 sorties dispatched on the night of 16/17 July, 88 of The Grave of Ob holder ofthe Ree thom by IL/KG 4. Three quarters of the missions were against fee nk tc traffic and installations in the Ulyanove-Krapivne area, the mae pects Femainder against ralways with returning ctews reporting ee ee ‘major ammunition explosions, petro res and the sencing of sreobuck 0 numerous AA positions. Attacks on rail targets brought claims tea Cf multiple hits on five transport trains and destruction of @ locomotive while four large sheds and 10 wagons in sidings were set on fire. Milestones were passed next day when L/KG 53 flew its 10,000th sortie and KG 4 its 30,000th Targets were troop concentrations, trucks, tanks, artillery and AA. During the night of 18/19 July, Lt. Hasselbach of the specialised rail attack Staffel, 14. (ls.)/KG 27 carried out a low-level attack on the station at Jasnaja Paljana, destroying three trains. He 111 ws hit by apparently caught ‘on the wal nse hl bang out292_@ KampffliegerThe Eastern Front, @ 293294 @ Kampfflieger ind steer it The He 11H at eae sprayed over its Upper suraces wagers) On the first day of August, 574 bomber sorties contributed toward the 1,290 tons of bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe. The 70 Ju 88s committed by Il./KG 3 found what would nowadays be called a targetrich environment. Twenty-five machines made five attacks on an armoured train in the station at Katerinovka, reporting about 10 wagons destroyed and the rest derailed into bomb craters. Four Ju 88s on armed reconnaissance set a fuel store on fire with a direct hit and 14 more attacked a wood: another 14 bombed an ammunition store, two of them being damaged by infantry fire, Kussakovo station was covered by haze however and the 13 Ju 88s on this mission were unable to observe the effects of their bombs. Next day, the seme Gruppe was supporting the 2. Panzer Armoe, claiming 21 Soviet tanks destroyed and 12 damaged as well as the destruction of 88 trucks. Over the succeeding days, rallways were a frequent target, especially the station at Lgov. On 5 August, Il/KG 3 was transferred from Konotop to Poltava. On the 8th, ttle over @ month after the Zitadetle offensive had begun, the situation Feports speak of 72 bombers supporting the defence of 4. Armee while 89 He 114s flew “army support’ missions north east of Karat active artillery batteries. On 14 August, KG 27 flew its 40,000th sortie of the war the 35,000 mark on the 19th. ev. Targets were vehicles, armour, troops assembly areas and 1d KG 53 passed IL/KG 3 report on operations for 29 July 1943 35 Ju 88 committed: 4 of these on wea Armeckorps, 2 about 25 single-engine aircraft, Very good fire further effects not observed, Railway the open track, about 10 wagons derailed, Bombs on 4 fighters taking off from the Bombs dropped 25 tonnes. Defence: repeated attack by 10 fighters Flak and ground defence Losses: 1 Ju 88 set on fi landing nea Seredinainda, crew unhurt wher reconnaissance on the front of XIIL and XX. f which dropped bombs on Lgow racks, Derjugino occupied by placement of hits amongst dispersed aircraft: 5 aircraft definitely destroyed, 10 probably damaged. 8 Ju 88: armed reconnaissance in front of XL Armeekorps. Attack on dispersed lorries on the eastern outskirts of Sutschkinos one lorry set on Saualscha-Lgov: several hits scored on a train on Dimitsievskaya 1 aircraft probably damaged, e by fighters. EmengencyNorthwest Europe-and the North Atlantic @ 295 Northwest Europe and the North Atlantic: summer-autumn 1943 KG 10 heads out the Alani the arr hs the ‘it emblem "Wold in Ring scar AF 200 64 from Stab IIKG 40 eas out on patrol Posen smatscatenoring war was being waged against England the rest of Britain was untouched) by IX. Fieserkorps from bases in France, Holland, Belgium and Northwest Germany. The Korps commander, Genmaj. Dietrich Peltz, had the imposing ttle of Angritfsfinrer England (Attack Leader England). In Western and Southwestern France wes X. F7LKps commanding elements of KG 40 and KG 100 in the maritime attack role over both the Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean, as the occasion demanded, These two Korps were subordinated to Luftfiote 3 while 2 Fliegerdivision in the South of France, was part of Luftflotte 2 and solely concered with the Mediterranean at this stage. The Bay of Biscay As detailed in Volume 3 of this series, quided antiship weapons entered Luftwaffe service during the summer of 1943. This new threat had led to a temporary withdrawal of Alle warships from the Bay making it litle less dangerous for Uboats on passage to and from thei operational areas. He 177 end Do 217 missile operations were switched to the Mediterranean but the veteran Fw 200 C was also ‘adapted as a missile carrier and fitted with FuG 200 Hohentwiel 1 search radar. Mter training over the Batic, I./AG 40 undertook a smell umber of missions with the tye, beginning in late December 1943 ot aforvees ona rock above Singen in Southwest Germany, wth » command ABOVE: Two Merignac.The machine furthest296 _@. Kampfflieger Stab KG 2 LK 2 L/KG 2 V/KG 2 The British Isles The main burden of attacks on England during this period was borne by KG 2, joined by elements of KG 6, |./KG 66 and the Fw 190 Jabos of |./SKG 10 (for the operations of the latter, see Jagdwatfe Vol. 4, Section 2). Nuisance raids were a staple activity, especially against London and often In conjunction with @ main force raid on another target. The harassment operation against the British capital on 9 July by eight Do 2178 of KG 2 was unusual in taking place in daylight. The east coast por of Grimsby was raided on the 12/13th and Hull Docks the next night, over 50 fires being started. Whi his was going on, ten Me 410s of ¥./KG 2 took up the intruder role and these missions continued for he next three months, bombing airfields and picking ff the occasional heavy bomber as 2 counterpoint Bomber Command's assault on Germany's cities. Meanwhile, British intruders harried the Germans’ uppe tied to attack London on the 15/16th, they lost their Kommandeur, Hptm. Friedrich Wilhelm Methner. The remainder of the mo and Brighton and a mining operation by KG 2 while an attack on Hull was thwarted by thick mist. nd week of August, V./KG 2 resumed its opera bombers as t Germany, The main force raids that month were on Plymouth, Portsmouth (si bases in their turn, When the saw harassment of London From the st tions against RA ey feturned from Kampffiieger Vol. 3) and Lincoln. The second of these was flown in two waves, totaling 91 alrorat but rought KG 2 the worst casualties since Dieppe in 1942, ten machines lost or damaged. The Lincoln sid suffered an early setback when the target marker, @ Do 217 of 1./KG 66, was shot down. During Septomber, IL/KG 6 was deployed to the Aegean, while I./KG 6 and Il./KG 2 began converting to the Ju 188, Much of the month's fying was elven over to mining of Britain's seaways such as the Thames. Estuary and the River Humber. Yet again, London was bombed (sometimes as a diversionary tactio) and the Me 410s maintained their pressure on Bomber Command Luftwaffe Bomber Force, 30 September 1943 Do 217 Stab KG 6 Ju 188 = -2,/KG.40 He 177 /KG.66 LiKe Ju 188 7.&9./KG.40 Fw 200 L7KG 6 Wu 188 Me 410 Do 217Italy and the Balkans @ 297 Italy and the Balkans September-December 1943 pee ree rere eres Sen mn a lace bomber force had made: ‘a serious attempt ... to oppose Allied operations ... by weighty night attacks against Shipping, chiety Peri evel tater arte Gales lrodio y in Sicilian harbours. In spite of the comparatively Its were negligible 2d, the res aircraft were high, Salerno When Alied troops reached the italian mainland on 3 September 1943, Luftiotte 2's bombs based around Foggia. They did not oppose these first invaders but tree nights later, 79 Ju 889 and force was BELOW He 1111s raided the Tunisian port of Bizerta in three waves, In an effort to cripple the ships assembling ,/KG 100i for the imminent landings at Salerno, This attack saw the first use of Dippel (German 'Window’) in the the lan count: Mediterranean end although it ‘saturated’ Allied radar, AA gunners claimed four aicraft shot down and sie on their way Beaufignters another five while ‘not a ship was hit” For ten nights after the landings of 8 September 1" hich took place just 110km from the German bomber airfields) ‘a last despairing attempt’ was made view iscoded to dislodge the Alies but was blunted by the defence rgot itself and by attacks on Luftwaffe 6N¥GK, with she isoners were taken from 6./KG 30, 5./KG 54, 8./KG 54, IL/KG 76 and 5./KG 100 ater being iter GK being shot down by night fighters over Salerno. On 18 September, the Kalianbased Kampfgruppen withdrew to Whites ye He 177 ‘over the t airfields in Northern ttaly, the I. and I./KG 4 continuing to Germany for corwersion to t On 30 September, Free French Spitfires intercepted ten of KG 100's Do 217s, 12 miles off Ajaccio, Corsica shooting down three. The survivors attacked the harbour from about 3,000m and set on fire an LST (Landing Ship, Tank) which was a total loss as well as scoring a near miss on a French destroyer. The one relative success amonast these setbacks was the employment of ‘a weapon whose novelty came as a surprise to the Allies’, FitzX, whose successes against Allied warshins are described in Kampfflieger Vol. 3. These attacks had all but ceased by the end of the month, however. In October the Allies were remarking on an unprecedented disinclination on the part of the Germans to use their bombers. There were just three raids, all at dusk. Ajaccio, was bombed by a small force on the 12th and Naples harbour on the 24st and 23rd but ‘none of these attacks was conspicuous by its great success.” Returning from last of these raids, the Ju 88s encountered the perennial hazard of thick fog over their bases in the Po Valley and were forced to divert to other airfields as far apart as Min 20 October were: hen and Grosetto. fotte 2 bomber bases and strengths on298 _@. Kampfflieger Luftflotte 2 bomber force, 20 October 1943 BeLow, Tis Stab KG 30) 2 2 ‘colour photograph L/KG 30 29, (aa) Ghedi ofan 6 1L/KG 30 33 (25) \illafranca di Verona Kalama, Greece In 1943 and Stab KG 54 3 (2) belonged L/KG 54 35 (29) Cameri di Novara seo IL/KG 84 36 ey Bergamo Stab KG 76 eB 2 L/KG 76 25 (11) Vilaorba front of te MG 151 gon WLM 76 33 (22) ‘Aviano The operations mounted in November were a combined attack ‘against the Corsican harbours of Bastia and La Maddalena and four raids on either Naples or shipping in the area. previous month's lull had allowed the Gruppen to rebuild their strength and the scale of effort increased appreciably though atrocious weather over northern Italy grounded them from the 10th to the 23rd. In each rai, it was estimated that 25-40 aircraft were over the target, maintaining complete throughout. According to Allied Signals Inteligence, ‘the W/T security of the bombers was impeccable’: all that could be heard were weather reports, broadcast to the returning raiders by their home bases, By the end of 1943, 1,/KG 76 was in Wemeuchen with Fue 200 (one Staffel verting to blind torpedo:bombi specialising in pathfinding and illumination) but the events of, January dictated their reversion to corwentional bombing. A ‘small detachment remained in Italy without aireraft until mic January 1944 when it was able to muster six Ju 885 and ten, Crews. The rest of the Gruppe rejoined them early in March, Yugoslavia and Greece pores One of the Luftware's lesserknown bomber units is the Finsatzkamptgruppe Ju 88, General der Gat yen with rational 1u 88 Bomber Group, General of ying Training” pointing to ale Bue oF hohe oer Fiegerausbildung, its name ‘Op combat formation assembled from fying school aircraft and personnel. It had its own unit code "KS: » and three Staffeln. In September 1943, British troops landed on islands in th ruppe seems to have been deployed in the German campaign to retake them. Two Ju 88 Ads, from the Einsatzkampfgruppe's Stab and 3. Staffel, were lost to fighters west of Castelrosso (an Italian possession off the Turkish coast) on 30 October, for example. On 15 November, nandeur, Hptm. Karl von der Fecht was injured during an Allied air raid on Eleusis airfield, near Athens. Allied Signals Intelligence overheard aircraft of the 2. Staffel over Yugoslavia, where it was fying anti-partisan missions from Nisch, during December 1943 and again the following e Dodecanese and the @ the GruppenkonSummer 1943-Muy" T9435 March. Another scratch formation, Gefechtsverband Sig, operated Ju 88s against Marshal to's forces. _anowr a from Udine, north east Italy from August-October 1943 with crews drawn from the = See Verbandstnrerschule (oxmation leaders’ schoo) at Tours, France ae Other than this, atthe end of 1943 the bomber force inthe eastern Mediterranean consisted of tiamagi |./LG 4 at Eleusis and Ill,/UG 1 at Heraklion, Crete. Both Gruppen had taken part in the autumn —1/4G I, and coded campaign inthe Dodecanese, as had Il/KG 51 (hasty reéepioyed to Salonika fom the southern LeKK cnr Soviet Union), I/KG 6 from France and elements of I./KG 100, some of whose crews were absorbea "mi Into LG 4 in November. According to prisoner, when the Americans bombed Eleusis LG 1 lost 24 Metiterancan on aircraft on te ground. On 3 December, Lt. Georg Sattler of of L/LG 4 acted as a patifinder fora SS Nata unt 3488 fore attacking a raco station on Casterosso. Ten days ate, around 15 of LG 1's airrat staged "Tus ‘ut of Tirana, Albania for an attack on Bari and against Catania and Augusta on the 3ist 8.196) armour ering on Bari dcr he nove The JU.88 units based in Northern Italy, which for some months had been eminently unsuccessful in their enterprises ... suddenly justified their existence in a sharp attack on ‘BARI on the 2nd when — admittedly more by luck than good judgement — seventeen Allied vessels were sunk. But this was their swan song.” No. 329 Wing RAF: Monthly Report No. 1.4, December 1943 The Bari attack followed the template of previous raids on Italian harbours: 105 bombers set out crossed the coast over Ravenna and flew at low level down the Adriatic in complete radio silence. Turning west, they climbed and began dropping Oppel and 88 aircraft arrived over Bari from 19.00 (the rest had aborted). The 6./KG 54 was among the vanguard, laying a line of white flares to mark the edges of the harbour. Next, roups of green flares were dropped at candom to mislead the defences before three reds marked the transport vessels which were the main targets. A convoy had recently arrived in the already crowded harbour and ships were moored all along the East Jetty. Unloading was urgent and the harbour lignts had been turned on as darkness fell. Aside from the 417 ships sunk, another eight were damaged but catastrophic as the bombing itself had been — with 2 ruptured pipeline spreading burning fuel across the water and hits on the town — matters were made worse by the seeret cargo of one of the metchantmen. The John Harvey had been cerrying 100 tons of mustard gas bombs for retaliation if the Germans resorted to chemical warfare. When the Harvey was hit and blew up, no one aboard survived to warn of the corrosive poison now spreading in the oil slicks covering the harbour and the smoke of the numerous fires. The human consequences were appalling: ‘service and civilian dead and injured ran into many hundreds and it was some time before the nature of the their often lethal chemical burns was identified and proper treatment could be devised Despite this success, with only two Ju 88s lost, Hitler had other plans for Luftotte 2's bombers force and during December the greater part of it was withdrawn from Italy to Germany and France. The Strongest indication of this was, ironically ‘overindulgence in spurious W/T bomber activity’ deviating {rom normal procedures and not coinciding with actual operations.300 _@_ Kampfflieger The Eastern Front Late 1943-Early 1944 Ithough the Red Army kept advancing throughout the remainder of 1943, between August and wove: This December the bomber strengths of Luftfatien 4 and 6 were run down by around a third. The He 111i October 1943 reorga! Ind attck oe could be seen a8 watershed forthe bomber HRA East om the ngined aircraft and close support on the battlefield. The re seen Front as n was destined to revolve more and more around single not be felt days but close support Peeled in 6 ‘sine pay Its of strategie bombing mi an the front ine for weeks or months, those of tactical bombing perhaps not f operations promised immediate relief a that, increasingly, was what the troo many and her KG 51 was operating over the southern sector when, in September the Stab andl Gruppe were $PPicc withdrawn to llesheim to convert to the Me 410 in the home defence role, After a 10.week deployment aatra 0 Greece, Il,/KG 61 returned in late November. Two m itwas supporting the German forces it hasbeen we In the Gherkassy pocket and subsequently operated against Soviet Gruppe transferred to Poland for rest and refit es in the Vinnitsa area. The «xtensielyin on 31 January, before being withdrawn to Germany in the spring and becoming the new lll /KG 3, The original II /KG 3 had been withdrawn in January take part in the night defence of the homeland. Redesignated |. (Beleuc! f2r//KG 7 and equipped with t, sowing lines of parachute flares to guide the watfe's pursuit night fighters into RAF bomber streams; in March, the Le juppe was, renamed It seems that by early 1944 there was a move underway to concentrate the Ju 88 units in the west and the He 111s in the east whete the limited Russian night defences offered them a better ‘On 49 March came Unternenme Germany's occupation ofits aly, Hungary, to prevent Admiral Horthy’s régime concluding a separate peace with the Alies, Presumably because it could nothing closer to hand, the Luftwarfe brought in three Kampfgruppen tro y 1944 was heavily engaged in trying to shore up the German position in the Crimea until the peninsula was lost in May and the Geschwader moved back to the West to support what saw a fourmonth Soviet offensive in proved to be as the south and KG 2 and bloodless sei Central sector of the front. It haalso been intended to bring A group of Hein torpedoes had arrives nd a tenth crippled by strafing Mu: were drafted in to Foesani, Roma troops from the Crimea, One Recon force took off but their quarry turned for home, leaving the Ju 88s to bring their torpedoes b Focsani. This deployment continued until mid May. IGT, Wearing thick ploves a protection against 6 atch Staffel of He 111s to keep the Soviet jseence next morring confirmed this e© coneicing of seven Soviet wa The Eastern Front @ 301 hen undergoing conversion hhad been assembled at Flensburg under Obit. Reimer Voss but no and the blast pens were too small for bombers. Waiting in the open, nine were ‘sequently, the Ju 88s of Hotm. Rudi Schmitt's il, From there they fle ht armed German hips and an attacking,302_@. KampffliegerWestern Europe andthe Home Front @) 303 Western Europe and the Home Front Late 1943-Early 1944 Regrouping anc sanpeingy mne |,/KG 51. had been withdrawn from the Eastern Front in May 1943 to convert to the Me 410 Sey ney ‘and went into action in the bomber destroyer role from lesheim and Linz-Horsching during wait by the September and October. Both the Me 410 and its WGr, 21 mortars proved disappointing, the “Teckage of Gruppenkommandeur, Major Klaus Haberlen, was relieved of command and |,/KG 51 retrained for jyenuer ne 111 H, night bombing. As we have seen, the ll. Gruppe had also been brought back for conversion but was ALs#t of disbanded at the end of the yeer. 1O/KG 58:The Behind the front lines of the Luftwaffe bombers’ war were the IV. Gruppen of LG 1 and KG 1, 2, N-Gruppe ofa 3, 4, 26, 27, 30, 40, 51, 53, 54, 76, 77 and 100. These formations were functionally equivalent to Geschwaer the RAF's Operational Training Units but reflected the German philosophy that replacement crews Prd ‘should be brought up to combat status within the Geschwader they would see action with fisctge band The ULTRA decrypt VL 5736 Camowagstin Standen! 70771765 On 5 February 1944, IAG 1 fat Wiener nt pci Neuse had 31 Ju 88s and 4 He 111s of ve te evar Which 11 ju 86 and 4 He 111s were in SIME tine workshops: 5 Ju ss and 1 He 11 were Syne wnat bn siserveeabe fr more than 8 hours thet War ABOVE: Members of 3/KG 77 celebrate with a drink om the occasion of the Sikh operation: mission flown by the Staffel The spinner of the Ju 8 appears304 @ Kampfflieger homing attacks ‘over the ish Isles in 1944, These March 1944.This varan had been llader Bb G10 ‘fic cnght fre the He 177 with Harassment Cctober saw 1,/KG 6 complete its transition to the Ju 188 but 2. and 3./KG 66 were stil not fully operational. A complex operation was mounted on the night of 7/8 October when two waves attacked London and 39 aircraft attempted a raid on Norwich, stewing high explosive and incendiaries across East Anglia and using Diippe over Britain forthe fest time, On the 9th, Vi/KG 2 was sent up in the daylight against American heavy bombers and was active during the Schweinfurt raid on the 14th which cost the Bin Air Force so heaviy. On the night of the 16/16th, a small force of Ju 2885 from |,/AG 6 lost thee of their number in an operation against London and two nights later a mixed force of Me 410s, Fw 190s and Do 217s attacked the capital — operations by the light forces were now gtting pathfinder support from 1,/KG 66. The Hull Docks were attacked by 49 arraft on the 20/2st and Greet Yermouth thee nights later. Operations on the last two nights of the month cost I /KG 6 a total of four Ju 1888. Experience of GAF Long Range Bomber Pilots In 1942 there were fewer pilots shot down with only a small number of sorties to their ered than might have been expected ithe flow of tained pilots had followed a normal course:The number of experienced pilots was, Jn 1943 there were many new pilots shot down with ttle experience and their number was perhaps h to be expected. The natural explanations are that in 1942 there was a shortage of of replicement pilots with a consequent loss of many highly experienced! pilots i) that in 1945 the Now of new pilots into the GAF [German Air Force} started again;and since perhaps the number of these shot down was higher than might have been expected, the inference is that new pilots coming nto LRW Hong range bomber} units in 1943 are not so well wey should b ‘The above conclusions confirm the sequence of events known from other sources ank! show that the readjustment of the training programme has perhaps so far proved inadequate RAF Air Intelligence Branch 34E) Report, 19 Qetober 1943Western Europe andthe Home Front @/305306 @_ Kampfflieger sgerkorps had flown 431 bomber sorties during October but, charged with building up a feared Allied invasion, put up just 235 in November. During the month, orders were issued for Il, /KG 76 to transfer from France to Linz-Hérsching: I/KG 6 retuned from a rest period and 4./KG 66 was newly established. KG 6 made nuisance raids on south coast towns on the of the 1st/2nd; a week later, KG 2 sent 40 bombers to Ipswich. A week after that, 36 Do 217s of KG 2 with six Ju 88s and four Ju 488s drawn from KG 6 and KG. attack on Plymouth. The He 1775 of ./KG 100 augmented IX. sorties, Kling 10 British civlians and injuring 41. Bad weather ensured that bombing of a ball-bearing factory in Chelmsford on the 10/11th was not concentrated. On 4 December, Typhoons of Nos. 198 {609 Squadrons RAF were marauding over Holland when they surprised eight Do 247s of 3./KG 2 on a daylight Gruppe formation practice, shooting dawn five. Exactly a month later, the same squadrons, aught IIL/KG 2, accounting for three ofits aircraft as wel lost five of thelr number in an ikps. in December but it lew only 118 er Uf Has Fond. StafelkapiinSttfelkapitin Hptm Hans Schacke Heinkel He 177 A-3 coded GN+DN of 5./KG 100, spring 1944 This machine carried the standard factory splinter pattern of 70/74 and 65 with 71/02 mottling on the fuselage sides. The ground crew have overpainted the whole upper surface and fuselage sides with in a continuous wave pattern using RLM 76. It was found that this particular finish was especially effective when flying over water.308 @ KampffliegerThe Mediterranean Convoys @ 309 A new Kampfgeschwader February 1944 brought the establishment of KG 200, an odd amalgam of unis for dropping agents behind Aled tines (./KG 200) and experimental formations (W,/KG 200); conspicuous by thelr absence were any conventional bombers. The 1. Staffel of the ll. Gruppe 2 was to develop the Kochgerat, a slider deployed explosive boat for use against ships at anchor, a concept which came to nothing. The 2, Staffel had orginally been conceived as an antiship suicide unit using ‘manned glide bombs’ — a then nonexistent weapon — and would, after months of delusion and indecision, emerge as ‘Sonderverband Einhorn ‘Special Foree Unicorn’) a Sttfe/of Fw 190s adapted to carty unusually heavy bombs which operated ever Holand, tay and Germany. The 3. taffet consisted of airborne troops who went into action against the French Maquis on the Vercors Plateau in July 1944, The agent dropping Kommandos were typically two or three aircraft strong and with operatic codenames lke Carmen and Toska. They were active from bases in Greeee, italy, Western Germany and Eastern Europe, using a selection of Gecman and captured bomber and transport aircraft — Whatever was available ond had the necessary range ond capacity The Mediterranean Convoys August-December 1943 eterna, (Bac in his | BEBAGoF hve by Ald crs and ding Icscape hick to Iistoxe in Tes lw so ones bes ‘pine but hey steed ‘et ain ep ring nd reaged to return Ti 22012" 2: Hlogoraision moved o Montin, ner Avignon ftowing the German occupation fof Southern France in late 1942, Until mid-1943 its only striking power consisted of two Erganzungsgruppen, IV./KG 3 and IV./KG 76. Airfields were developed to support bombers and in June, |. and Il/KG 26 came to Salon and Montpellier respectively, to rest and refit. The Division's Job then became the engagement of Allied convoys along the North African coast (where, incidentally, they enjoyed land-based fighter cover). These missions entailed round trips of between 1,300 and 2,400 km. Targets were tracked by two Ju 88 reconnaissance Staffeln and by signals intelligence. Attacks averaged 60 torpedo aircraft in loose waves, crossing a check point on the French coast at 2 precise time, turning near the Balearics and running in from a designated Initial Point, all at £60 m to evade Allied radar. A system evolved of attacking at dusk from several directions, the alreratt heading home singlySuhittér"1943-May 1945 ABOVE: An converted to carry torpedoes helonaing 1 (KG 26 sands ready fora mission coed HBP i the indivi crake Painted yellow | Ivan The embl painted on the On Friday 13 August, convoy MKS 21 was attacked off Albordn Island, between Spain and Morocco. This. operation, codenamed Paukenschlag (drumbeat) was directed by KG 26's Kommodore Major Werner Kiumper. According to an 8, Staffel pilot, Kldmper let three convoys pass before he judged conditions ideal. Forty He 1118 of |L/KG 26 formed the first wave, followed by 28 Ju 88s of the Il. Gruppe, the latter carrying only one torpedo each in view of the extreme range involved. A huge success was claimed with many ships reported burning. Klimper got the Ritterkreuz but the only merchantman lost was the Francis W. Pettygrove, towed to Gibraltar and later scrapped. Contact Keepers and leading strike aircraft were fitted with FuG 200 search radar, cutting the speed of |./KG 26's He 111s by 25 km/h and that ofthe Il. Gruppe's Ju 88 A-14s by 20 km/h as well {a rendering onemotor fight almost impossible. The provision of flame dampers just compounded the problem and some aircraft also received FuG 216 tailwarning sets. Experimentally, 21. em rockets were provided to suppress AA fire but the only He 1.11 to take these weapons into action was shot down before it could launch them. With the Allies established in Sardinia and Corsica, the torpedebombers became tiable to interception throughout their missions and 2G 1’s Ju 88Cs were brought in, the C6s flying close escort, the C38 sweeping ahead ofthe attack formation. Losses were substantially reduced but ZG 1 had prior commitments over the Bay of Biscay and was not always available. To split defensive fire, IIL/KG 100's Do 217s were employed, going in with guided weapons 5-6 minutes ahead of the main force, since they needed good visibility to launch. Dusk attacks in fair weather were all too predictable ‘and 0 night attacks were essayed, using the moon path to light the target. This however limited ‘opportunities to about 10 nights a month and made the job of the defending fighters easier while the strong shadows impeded aiming, Next, a Staffel of KG 76 was brought in from Italy to lend its expertise in route marking (with Lux buoys) and target illumination. When right fighters then concentrated over the visual sea markers, Schwan radio transmitters were tvied instead but not enough were ever available to develop the technique ful (n the night before the Salerno landings, ./KG 26 had staged out of Grosseto against a convoy about 160 km soutn west of Naples (see Kampffieger Vol. 3). In October 1943, two convoys were attacked off Cape Tenez: the shadower for the second of these missions was shot down and so the bombers hit the wrong convoy, an empty one leaving the Mediterranean. The effort in November was ‘greater and assessed by the Allies as more threatening to their supplies than attacks on harbours. Of the four operations mounted, three made contact but on the 12th, the operation against convoy ‘Dunnock’ resulted in the complete failure of the bombers to locate the target. At 1900 when the attacking force was well on its outward fight, the position of ‘Dunnack’ was broadcast by the bomber control as ‘over land (!], 10 miles southwest of CAPE TENEZ. This mistake was repeated at 1917 and not corrected unt! 1928 when the true position of the convoy at 1550, as reported by the last ‘reconnaissance aircraft of 1.F33, was substituted. The attack on ‘Annex’ on 26 November was notable in that KG 26's torpedo bombers and the missile carrying Dorniers of I./KG 100 were reinforced forthe first time by He 177s and Fw 200s from KG 40. One prisoner related that Il./KG 26 arrived late and in bad weather, $0 took its torpedoes home, five Ju 88s crashing at base. The convoy was protected by USAAF, RAF and French fighters and 1,/KG 40 lost six He 1778 in return for sinking the troopship Rohna with over 1,000 deaths among her crew and the American soldiers and Red Cross personnel she carried. In December, to the Allies’ mystiication, there were no convoy attacks at all in the Western Mediterranean but |, and I,/LG 1 operated from Greek bases against a convoy midway between Malta ‘and Benghazi on the 16tn. These Eastem Mediterranean operations took LG 1 as far afield as Tobruk and reportedly aircraft were frequently lost through running out of fuel. When not attacking hostile conveys, these Gruppen escorted German ones in the Aegean.ccedent on the furthest He 111 where the cabem, with background Colour of yellow representing the 2 Gruppe jst discernible om the hve abo thie engine eowlings and riers painted inthe sume coloue An addioa interesting feature ofthe lea irra she white walled tyres Many Laftwafe aicraft were seen with white-walled tyres and these are particuity common on BE 109 tawhees The white coating, which contained an antatac age, was applied atthe tie of Heinkel He 111 H-6 coded 1H+GP of 6./KG 26, Italy, summer 1943, This aircraft carried the standard factory finish of 70/74 with 65 underneath. It would appear that aircraft from this Staffel were painted with some special recognition features. As well as carrying. an extra wide white painted fuselage band for the Meditteranean Theatre they also had the front of the engine cowlings and rudder painted white .312_@. Kampfflieger Operation Capricorn RIGHT: This uly eae Ju 8844 had been called to a conference where Géring ils pose in At the end of November 1943, Genma. Peltz informed him that he was to lead a renewed large ie name ‘Capricom they could urn their hand to the c articular. The enterprise was gh Hopes of getting operations underway during December proved unrealistic but by the third week oaching 600 aircraft had been an Units already in the West rerecnis by stripping five Gruppen from th htalian front and completing the rebuild Operation Capricorn Units StabKG2 Do 217 Stab KG 54 Ju 88 1/KG 2 Do 217 L/KG 54 Ju 88 WMG 2 ju 188 LK 54 Ju 88 uL/KG 2 Do 217 V./KG 2 Me 410 L/KG 66 u 88, ju 188 StabKG6 Ju 88 Stab KG 76 Ju88 1/KG 6 ju 188 L/KG 76 Ju 88 WL/KG 6 ju 88 KG 6 ju 88 1/KG100 He 177 Ju 88 /3KG10 Fw 190 ju 88. L/KG 40 He 17pinted in this colour representing the State White is als the Gruppe colour which probably small KG 40 emblem has been pte very smal jst below the ‘eae gluing ofthe cockpit Note ako that corrsion resistant paint as heen applied to some ofthe pane! ots, x Heinkel He 177 A-3 coded F8+FH of 1./KG 40, Bordeaux-Merignac, summer 1943 ke 40 This machine still retains its standard factory finish and in common with many bombers at this time the unit code has been applied one ‘World in a Ring’ sixth of the normal standard letter height. The aircraft also appears to have suffered from some corrosion along some of the fuselage ‘emblem ioints which have been cleaned and fresh preservative paint applied. An unusual feature on this aircraft Is of the KG 40 emblem painted ‘beclaasiie BiblaateccasSthimer'1943-May 1945 RIGHT: Ao 8 Inteligence dexving of one ofthe antennae for ve FG 217th swarming radar cried by Tufwatfe bombers and reconnaissance ‘rat Gn ths case 27889 in 1014-45, Unlike carer FuG 211 and 216 radars in che erie, these ‘mounted above ch wing about feo this ofthe sway toward the dp. Rather than mount an alLout assault, the pace of operations was to he dictated by the balance of losses and replacements, maintaining strength to counter the expected Allied invasion. The small He 177 force gave the Luftwaffe the beginnings of the heavy bomber capability it had lacked for so long but the inventory still consisted primarily of twinrengined medium bombers. The Ju 188 was a comparatively new aircraft while the Do 217 was older but had been progressively improved. Although the cleaned-up and boosted $-model was now in service in small numbers (and treated in reports as a distinct aircraft type), the great majority of the Ju 88s were As, a variant in service since 1941 when the original Blitz had wound down. Making up the numbers, the Me 410s and Fw 190s were fast but carried only a limited payload. To confuse the British radars, the ventral gondolas of some Ju 88s were fitted with the Kettenfrund (watchdog) active jammer. In addition, there were bigger bombs, more Powerful explosives and the FuG 216 tallwarning radar. Oberfanrich Meyer, an Me 410 radio ‘operator trom 1.(F)/121 described his experiences with this equipment: ... the pilot didn’t know how it worked, The fist time | switched it on he said: “the damned thing is so bright. Switch it off again.” . Then he had a look at it, but he couldn't make it out." KG 66's pathfinders would use the Y-Gerdt beam system (ammed by the British as long ago fs February 1941); recovered British Gee sets and their German copy, Truhe, to exploit the RAF's ANTENME AI 277- fe. 08 own navigational aids; and EGON. The latter entaled two Freya radars inierogating the Qherfihnrich Meyer, 1.(F)/121 acrat’s FuG 25 IFF transponder to trangulate : its position so that a ground contoller coule «Nd Leutnant Schréder, 5./KG 2 signal the moment to release bombs or fares The flare pattems lad down to mark waypoints and the target itself would, it was hoped, ensure that the many inexperienced crews of the main force covla sil delver concentrates Pino eee attacks, The British defences had become ss ieee: Schroder, They brought me down on my fifteenth sortie Meyer ‘in my case it was the second one, the second vastly more sophisticated, especially the radars now guiding the searchlights, guns and night fighters. A Mosquito with centimetric radar was ‘world away from the Blenheims and A.|. Mk. I that had begun the nocturnal fight in 1940, Nor did the defenders Just walt in the target area: the Luftwaffe’s navigational aids were jammed land spoofed, intruders prowled around the bombers’ aerodromes when they took off and pursued them back home again. Many of the Schrikler: The Ad over LONDON és terrific; 's almost impossible to get through. Meyer ‘These prestige air raids on LONDON should never bave been made. They were only to sugar the pil ofthe delay in the reprisals. PoWs ‘bugged? by Combined Services Detailed Interrogation CentreBomber Operations against Great Britain @ 315 Gruppen involwed in these 4 remained on Dutch and Germai staging through forward airf Belgium and France either to vary their apy to London or, later, when fiying against more westerly targets such as Bristol Mars ne frst attack on London, U Mars, came on the ne had previously bombed London, just attended lectu ding at Anzio, this new emer it was bad weather rather than event 4108 and 3k part but the next night, a 285-strong mission was mounted, starting the in Phe major fire in the Surrey Commercial Docks.316 _@_ KampffliegerSumm?" Toss May TFS ‘The composition of Peltz’ frontline was never static. In February, elements of 1./KG 2 were pulled ‘out for conversion to the Ju 188 and V,/KG 2 to become the new IL/KG 51, returning to action late in March. Stab and 1./KG 51 were brought in and 4./KG 40 was withdrawn to Germany to refit. The first major attack of the month came on the night of 4/5 February, failing to achieve concentration but costing 15 aircraft. Things went little better with the next operation but on 18/19 and 20/24 February, the 200 bomibers dispatched each night caused damage assessed by the British authorities as the Worst since 1941: a total of almost 400 dead, over 1,000 fires started and widespread damage to the rail network. There were three more large attacks on London before the end of the month. Although ‘more destruction was naw being achieved, the first of the big February raids had involved 237 aircraft while for the last two, totals had sunk to 161 and 170 respectively: the force, which was supposed to have been conserved was dwindling The main force's operations were interspersed with continual harassing of the capital by the Me 410s and Fw 190s, rather as Bomber Command's Mosquito force was doing over Germany's cities. In fact Steinbock coincided with some of the biggest and most costly RAF area attacks on the Reich, each side crisscrossing the sky on diversionary routes, emitting and jamming navigational signals, sowing route markers and target indicators and sending intruders to disrupt their adversaries’ efforts. ‘The RAF however could deliver massively greater tonnages of bombs and its capabilities had improved enormously since its first ventures over Germany whereas the Luftwatfe's bombers could no longer produce a consistent performance. Perhaps this was because, as an RAF intelligence report of 9 March noted, *..many of the bomber aircraft which have operated over London in recent raids have not been fitted with bomb sights Prisoners explained that those with a sight usually aimed at the target indicator flares, those without ‘by rule of thumb,’ The Kemoffiieger were prone, lke their RAF counterparts, to ‘creepback’ as Successive crews bombed the nearest edge of the fires started by thelr predecessors and (understandably) turned for home as soon as possible. For Londoners, this was “The Little Blitz’ hundreds died, thousands were injured and thousands of homes were wrecked. Wearied by over four years of war, they were said to be more nervous, less defiant and not so selfreliant as in 1940-41 but all the Germans got was the satisfaction of hitting back. The British people did not rise up and ‘demand peace, and the war effort was scarcely impeded. New targets During March, 3./KG 2 was withdrawn for conversion to the Ju 188 and 3./KG 66 disbanded; Stab, 1. and t,/KG 30 were brought in but the last of these was soon pulled out again along with I and IIL/KG 6, t0 support the occupation of Hungary. By the middle of the month, Peltz had 232 ‘serviceable atcrat in his operational units. For the London raid an the 4st/2nd, KG 2's aircraft took {an indirect route from bases in Britany and over Guemsey to approach their target from the Southwest, For almost two weeks afterward, only nuisance raids were mounted while the main force's strength was rebult somewhat, 187 Bombers returning tothe Btish capital on the night of 14/25 March. Five nights later, the target was Hul, missed completely with bombs scattered over Norfolk and Lincolnshire. The Kapitin of 2./KG G6, Hptm. Schmidt was lost on this mission. A yoy further attack on London on 21/22 March started a SO-pump fire in Islington; four nights later, 70 uals rev un Dumps were needed to fight the fires in West Norwood, anther 56 in Fleet Street and 28 more in tsengines Croydon. Not only bombs were deadly: in the early hours of 25 March, a Ju 88 A-4 of 9./KG 6 “mewhere in France under the crashed on No. 199 Redbridge Road, liford, setting the house on fie and killing three occupants a5 atchul eyes well as its own crew of four. The last raid of the month, on the 27/28th, missed Bristol Docks the round enw. entirely but cost Peltz another 13 aircraft. [As March ended, I,K 54 arrived from Manching in Bavaria while the Ml, Gruppe was pulled out of the tine, On 25 April, orders were issued that the Staffein ofthe latter would become the new 3., 4. and 5./KG 66. Meanwhile, the old 3. and 4./KG 66 wore renamed 6.(F)/123 and Ergéinzungsstaffe! L/KG 66. On 8 April, the USAAF bombed KG 2's airfields, destroying 14 aircraft and damaging seven wile next dey fighter bombers burned out another four Ju 188s. The main force did not retuin to London until the 18/19tn and if this operation was at best a partial success, attempts to bomb Hull (20/21 Apel) and Bristol Docks (23/24 April) were complete failures.Sthitér"1943-May 1945 Ports and sea lanes Revenge attacks now gave way to disruption of the impending Aled invasion of France. It has often been asserted that the Luftwaffe could get no photographie coverage of Britain in the run-up to DDay but an Me 410 of 1.F)/121 flew over Portsmouth photographing 200 ships and a mass of landing craft, resulting in @ sequence of four attacks starting on the 25/26th when two waves totalling 233 aircraft were dispatched, On the next three nights, tne forces withered to 78, 60 and 58 oircraft respectively. Shipping proved a dificult target and so the final mission sowed BM 1000 mines rather than bombs. The Do 27s of Il,/KG 100 joined a 101-strong attack on Plymouth on 29/30 Apri steering their FritzX bombs toward warships in the Devonport Dockyard. This was the last rad on the shattered city, the one use of the guides weapon against the British Isles and rare attempt to employ it by the light of flares, rather than at dusk. The attack was thwarted by smoke screens and the Groppenkommandeur, Hptm. Pfetter, was among those lost. in May there were further changes to the force's composition with the return of ,/KG 6 and L/KG 2 while 4. and 2,/KG 40 (He 477) and 6./KG 76 (Ju 8B) were brought in. On the debit side, IL/KG 6 and |./KG 100 were withdrawn for rest and re-equip; Il/KG 30 was disbanded and trom the 24th, L/KG 51. was witharawn from Dreux and St, André to Souther Germany. The fist IX FLKps. operation was on the night of the 14/15th with 91 aircraft sent to raid Bristol. The force's strength was feduced by 15 early on when RAF intruders ettacked the bases of KG 2, KG 54 and KG 51. The resulting delay prompted Lufifiotte 3 to order a 15-strong nuisance operation against coastal towns between Portland and Bournemouth. The first wave — eight Fw 190s of L./SKG 210, feach with 2 500 kg bomb — took off at 20.20, Shortly after 24.00 hrs, three aircraft hit Bournemouth, one Weymouth, one Poole, enother an arfeld between Portland and Poole while one aborted, Three Fw 190s of the second wave struck Bournemouth at 22.00 hrs and an hour later the third wave set off — two Ju 888 with three 500 kg bombs apiece. At 00.35 hrs, Bournemouth was bombed yet again despite a decoy fre to the west of the town while the other Junkers attacked a lighted airfield 10-20 km northeast of Dorchester. There were no losses. Five Ju 88 S and two Ju 188 pathfinders were over the primary target from 23.52-00.52 at £8,000-6,000 m. From 23.50-00.08 hrs, five Me 440s flew over at similar altitude to conceal the pathfinder operation, The main attack consisted of 86 aircraft: seven Do 217s, 22 Ju BBs and 27 Js 188s, Two Ju 188s which failed to find the primary attacked an airfield west of Bristol and a Do 217 with engine damage bomived Portland while two more that had encountered night fighters attacked “not clea identified targets’ on the south coast. Searchlight sites were bombed by two Ju 188s and two Ju 88s, three of which had suffered engine damage, technical problems or been dazzled by searchights: the fourth had been attacked by night fighters. All the attackers used Dppe! to spoot British radars but the RAF"s fighters had been encountered over Vannes airfield as the bombers took off, between the English coast and the target and on the homeward leg as far as Guernsey. Searchlights had been very active from the coast tothe target but AA fie over Bristol was judged only moderate. Eleven aircraft were missing: a Ju 188 of |/KG 2, three Do 217s of IL/KG 2, four Ju 488s from 1./KG 6, including thet of the Kapitan of 1. Staffel, two Ju 88s from 1L,/KG 30 and a Ju 88 of 1./KG 54. In addition, the crew of a |./KG 6 Ju 88 had baled out near Vaiognes after being shot up by 2 night fighter and another Ju 88 had been destroyed near Avranches after aborting with engine failure, On top of that, four Ju 1885 had broken off with engine damage plus three Ju 188s, four Ju 88s, a | 88 S and an Me 410 with technical trouble. Not ony had the loss rate been 16.5% of the aicraft dispatched but the raid itself had failed: British jamming of navigational aids Luftflotte 3 appreciation of had made the pathfinders late, their flares cropping about —- @perations on 14/15 May 1944 415 km north of the target and leaving the main force to bomb by straight navigation. ‘Dark night attacks can only be sucessful if faultless From 20.20 hrs the next night, 106 bombers took off Pathfinder operations are guaranteed, Present ‘against Portsmouth, A Ju 88 S and a Ju 188 each dropped procedure can no longer be used with certainty owing ‘extensive and effective Allied jamming. Further attacks ‘hc flare buoys to mark the coast crossing point. With five Gn Bristol Channel targets; which are difficult from, ‘more Ju 88 S's and two Ju 1885, they were over the target _weather point of view, only promise success insofar as from 22,30-22.48 hs, dropping 68 target indicators as well Allied jamming can be overcome in adequate light ‘as bombs. Nine Me 410s and 12 Fw 190s also bombed the conditions, that is in moonlight, in which cases sil town as cover for the pathfinders’ activities. The main attack _higher losses: must be borne, ‘was carried out by three Do 217s, 34 Ju 88s and 32 Ju 188s,Bomber Operations)against Great Britain @/319 from only 3,500-1,000 m and all used Dippel IX. Fliegerkorps assessment of They dropped six SC 100 29x50 1000 0 x SC 50 bombs as ions on 15/16 May 1944 29 So eo ipioniane well as 69 x EM 1000 mines. Thick cloud made damage report ssigned reconnaissance Ju 188 from getting operat Weather conditions worse than expected 9/10ths cloud over tanget Stetoly kend preene aa ‘dou ase varied reatly, 2400~4,500 f, Fist target illumination as six minutes late Jamming .. made i impossible to give timely PROXOEF@pHS, aners to pathfinder. Sea marking was correct (Gime and place) but The bombers reported pumerous night Meer seen only by a few crews flying below cloud. Until first markers __Sttacksi off the coast, heavy AA came up from went down, formations bombed main concentration oF AA over Ships and over the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth angst, being guided mainly by AA ia the Isle of Wight and Itself there was strong AA of all calibres. Crews Southampron.Main concentration of defensive [sic] was recognised ‘eported that the guns were supplemented by ith certain From report ofa few crews of KG 2and KG 6 flying antiaircraft rockets, ‘deterrent devices below cloud.also one pathfinder about 50% of bombs considered to _—_bartage balloons and decoy fires, Two Ju 188s, hine fallen in target area. This was established by wireless and 2 Do 217 and a Fw 190 aborted with engine stnight navigation and in part by observation. Concentrated damage; a Ju 188 and two Fw 190s broke off bombing could not be established. with technical trouble and a Ju 88 after being shot up by a rigt Ju 188 of |./KG 2, a Do 217 from Il Ju 188s of 1,/KG 6 and two Ju 88s from Ill. /KG were posted missing The indivi After a sequence of nuisance raids, 104 bombers returned to Portsmouth on 22/23 May, losing “ral letter K's KG 2's Kommodore, Maj. Wilhelm Rath, Five nights later, a smalle operation was mounted against Weymouth and to mine the adjacent effort was made against Torquay while the next night's target was Falmouth with a diversionary assault on Portsmouth by 1./SKG 10, By 24 May, | /KG ten of their number, inc Leper faters; on the 28/29th a similar The irra stil had 42 crews (ten of them operationally ready but was down to just five Ju 88s, two of which were serviceable nish320. @. Kampfflieger leans on the ble ied fusclage of tn Me 410 ight fourer, 9K CP of G/KG 51.The ‘aractr inthe ‘oe. This tye of marking was citi 0 previous have been marked appears to bea heavy motle of sreys 74 and 75, stent has been Intruders Since 31 March, the Me 410s of Il/KG 51 had again been active over the bomber bases of eastem England, iflels wore strafed and bombed, individual bombers, often with erews under training, were surprised and shot down. On the night of 11/12 Apri, ten Me 410s came in on the coattails of RAF bombers returning from a raid, and brought down a B-17, a Spitfire, a Siting and a Mosquito. A similar operation was mounted on the 48th but IL/KG 51's best known intruder mission came four nights later. The US Eighth Air Force bombed the marshaling yards at Hamm, Northwest Germany on the evening of the 22nd and returned in darkness. The 2nd Bomb Division's 6-24s were followed home by the Gruppe's Me 420s which wrought havoc over East Anglia, shooting down oF forcing to crash land 4 Lierators and an RAF Albemarle. The I./KG 51 suffered its frst two intruder losses, one being Gruppenkommandeur, Ma Dietrich Putfarken. Over the coming nights, there were mote successes, on a smaller scale, and more losses (On the night of 12/13 May, seven Me 4108 were up intruding South of the Wash and north of the Humber after midnight. One attacked two aircraft, near Kettering and Wyton respectively. Another fred on a machine near Bury St Edmunds and dropped 34 x 10 kx bombs on an ‘unidentitied target’, while other Messerschmitts bombed Norfolk and the Cambridge area. In te first minutes of the 22nd, ten Me 410s took off from Soesterberg for East Anglia. Luffiotte 3 reported that nine had attacked, claiming three LLaneasters, all of which were seen to catch fre on crashing. Another eight fourengined aircraft nad been ‘effectively shot up.’ Subsequently, Fi. Trenke of 6./KG 51 was credited with the three Lancasters ‘and Urfz. Baier of the same Staffel with destruction of two Liberators. In addition, eight ‘SD 70 canisters had been dropped from 400 m on an illuminated airfield and two AB 250s, each filed with 47 x SD 10 bomblets, on another airfield where landings were in progress. In nether case had any results been observed. The next night, eight Me 410s retumed to the same area, claiming four fourengined aircraft shot up. Bombs were dropped on an airfield east of Cambridge; on lights nearby; on an AA position between March and Litleport and on three further runways. The IX. Plegerkorps’ verdict was that the operation was ‘correct in time and place but hindered by bad visibility, low cloud May 1944 Lufiflotte 3 appreciation of operations on 14/15 base and local showers. Nevertheless, harassing effect achieved, Twelve machines were assigned to intruder patrols over East Anglia during the night of 28/29 May but two collided during take off. Others went on to bomb airfields and a 6./KG 51 erew claimed a Stirling, Missions over England continued until the end of July but increasingly 1l./KG 51's efforts came to be directed against Allied troops, traffic and supplies in France. Among the casualties were 9K+FN and OK8P, both of which belly landed at St. André in the early hours of 16 June. On 14 August, with the German position in Normandy disintegrating, the Gruppe was ordered to transfer to ‘Schwabisch Hall where it would convert to the Me 2 Dark night attacks ean only be suecessfil i faultless pathfinder guaranteed. Present procedure can no ‘operations are longer be used with certainty owing extensive and effective Allied jamming. Further attacks on Bristol Channel tage which are difficult from weather point of view, only promise success insofar as Allied jamming can be overcome in adequate light conditions, that is in moonlight, in which cases sill higher losses must be borneItaly @9321 Italy: January-June 1944 BELOW: Theee ‘operation over Hay The nearest alcraf ENP caries fll complement of Ite war cones in white outline form The densely applic! meander overaps the ‘Grosses, but no atempe has been made to obscure them entirely No unt code isle und s0"EM cou belong 0 I /KG30,1/KG 54, 1LJRG 76 0 1/16 ll ‘Of which served in tly eirng this period. Interesting the rear guns do not ‘Seem to have been insaled in thee fens motintings Soon i woul Be rire 0 ‘ind an intact hangar sue as dhe one pnt sible Bersscen the tw Hearst lrcraftom a Lute base in ly Anzio-Nettuno An AngloAmericen force came ashore at Anzio and Nettuno, south of Rome on 22 January 1944 and groups of Luftwaffe bombers estimated at 50-60 strong attacked (n 23, 24, 26 and 28 January, On the 26th, USAAF fighters from Corsica intercepted an incoming raid, claiming 6041 end forcing most of the others to jettison ther glide bombs and turn back. Only three got through to Anzio, where one sank a cruiser. The other successes in this phase of operations, which ceased after the 29th, were a destroyer, wo Liberty Ships and a hospital ship sunk ABOVE: This computerenhanced ‘while the M of the 4 Staffel is Black The pale luc or prey meander crosses oth letters, ANOWE: FourJu 8A, bombed and taxiing out for pile ue or ey meander pattern fey applied over thelr upper surfaces and dark rey or black meander ‘er ter he 65 undersides. National marking on fasclage an in have been blacked out anno unis cove Sisle The fuselage and ofthe aire n the foreground has also been painted black it may orginally wove Inve heen white 1 denote service in the Mediterranean. Only the Black cere of the underwing eros photograph et shows hw the dark meiner ans pattem avoids the allback underwing balenkreu. yeraton guns lied forces in aly They haveSthiméer'1943-May 1945 From 22-31 January, the Allies noted that the following Bomber Gruppen transferred to Italy 22-31. January 1944 bomber Gruppen were transferred to Italy in response From Units Alireratt to the landings. Greece |. and i.7LG 4 45 Twenty Ju 88s of 1. and Western Front I and II. /KG 30 40, IIL/LG 4 arrived in Aviano on the L/KG 76 15 morning of the 23rd; en route Southern France: 1L/KG 400 5 they had landed at Belgrade. Refit, 1/KG 30, 15 Semlin, against orders. That L/KG 76 15, afternoon, Spitfires of the US uring the following week 2nd FS were on their way to “another Gruppe” returned to Italy 5 bomb the Viaregglo E-Boat base Total 150 ‘when they met KG 26 headed for Anzio, Lieutenant Robert H. Llebl downed a Ju 88 “painted dark gray with dark wavy streaks’ and saw four more aircraft burning on the water whereas the Luftwaffe station at Lucca reported that a mixed formation of He 1.118 and Ju 88s had been attacked by “four British fighters’ with two Heinkels end Junkers lost. At 15.14 hs next day, British codebreakers issued a maximum priority signa ‘German Navy gave warning at 12 hrs [GMT] 24th that fairy large formations various types would fly low that afternoon and towards evening {on} route Marseille - Livorno and on to Nettuno. if cloudless, via Siena, if overcast via Elba and Chitavecchia, Just 80 minutes later, six 2nd FS Spitfires intercepted two Ketter of Do 217s heading south on the deck and a mile offshore. Their camoutage was described as ‘blue gray similar to Spite’ and mazowraxp ‘twottoned gray.’ The Dorniers held formation and returned fire, forcing Lt. Clyde Cleveland to bale out OPPOSITE Tor. but not before he hae shot one of them down pees (On oth the 23rd and 24th January, He 177s of Il/KG 40 had eft Bordeaux Mérignac during the Wen eden afternoon on a fourhour fight to AnzioNettuno, Cruising at 200 km/h, their route took them over with the Auignon tothe Gui of Gena and then overland down te alan peninsula. On the fst evening, wo MEAT7ASan ‘were shot down by Beaufighters off Corsica while returning home; on the next an He 177 loaded with xt Bordeaux. flares was ony a few miles from its target when ts port engines were seton fre by anther Beautighter skrgnc Ths and the crew baled out. Although the He 177 had a troubled development history and has received a 'W Views show bad press from historians, prisoners ftom these particular machines spoke highly of them. High STs RPMs aude performance was good, with speeds of 600-650 km/h ‘easily attained’ the He 177 A wos _sitough nn rated ‘more manoeuvrable than any other GAF bomber’ and: spunebare under the wings ‘Both crews are most enthusiastic about the engines, which appear to function smoothly “These alert and efficiently over incredibly long journeys. The disengaging [to save fuel] and re-engaging of ee eer the motors now takes place without any risk of fire, a tendeney known to have been nfe when yume However, 2 mubero 4, Stal rows were sai to have been ke by the stucral weatness eon in the wing roots, leaving the wings liable to fold up in a 40-50 degree dive. surice miseItaly @)323Sthitéy"1943-May 1945 ULTRA decrypt VL 4999 According 10 Flegerfiheer Luflotte 2, evening 27 January: the landing fleet and unloading operations were attacked during the night of the 26/27th by 107 heavy bombers. Effect of attck assumed 10 be considerably ia excess of claims as details not observed owing t0 darkness, dazzling by scarchlights and defence Dy AA and nigh fighters Intelligence on LG 1: February 1944 By 2nd, Kommodore of LG 1 had ordered that living quarters of an ‘unspecified Gruppe could be retained as retuen could be counted ‘on asa certainty after elimination of beach head, Crews of IL/1G 1 on 2nd: 5 fully eeady out of 41 Luttfotte 2 orders. for night 8/9th ... LG 1: harassing attacks ‘with single aireraft, according to weather conditions, on Allied ‘concentrations in beach head. Bomb load: small splinter bombs, 1M, Il.and IV/LG 1 warned on 9th to beware of fighters east and south east of Aviano during mild Fighter Fights possibly by L/IG 53, period, Comment Crews of LAG fon 131h:3 fully ready out of 0. ULTRA decrypts VL 5462, 6233, 5844,5965 & 6245 ‘The |. and I. KG 30 were operating on the night of 24/25 January, Ju 885 4D+ML and 40+GM crashing around 04.00 his on the 26th near their base at Villafranca, The next night, 12 Ju 888 of ML/KG 26, led by Obie. Werner Konrad, Staffelfihrer of 9./KG 26, launched their torpedoes against ships off AnzioNettuno, Konrad’ aircraft fell to light AA and he told his captors that the Gescfuader had lost at least ten Crews in operations against the landings but hit only one destroyer and a merchant vessel. During the evening of 29 January, a Beaufighter ‘of No. 600 Squadron intercepted a group of four Do 217s off Anzio and, despite one of them getting on ts tail, managed to damage one Dornier and destroy a second. On 30 January, German bomber airfields in Northern Italy were faided and the occupants took off to avoid being destroyed on the ground, one group getting Caught at low level by P-47s which claimed 36 for two losses. The Allles believed that in all they destroyed 68 German aircraft that day; the Germans reported ‘numerous aircraft’ damaged by splinters at_Villaorba, Coincidentally or otherwise, |,/KG 76 had been ordered by Ob.0.L to transfer to this airfield with key personnel and was expected to have moved in by the 30th During February, the bomber units from France would sometimes stage through airfields in north ltaly. On the 5th, a Do 217 of §./KG 100 crashed in transit between Bergamo and Toulouse- Francazal; three days later, nine Dorniers arrived In Bergamo from Bordeaux and aitcraft from I and lIL/KG 26 were active between Salone Jasse and Piacenza over a period of several days, Off Anzio on 45 February, the MV Elinu Yale was bombed, set afire and beached. On the night of the 17/18th, 39 Ju 88s attacked ‘clearly distinguished ground targets’ south of Campo di Carne, losing three of their number. Bombing next morning by three He 11.18 near Caporetto in Northeast Italy was possibly anti-partisan activity by Flugbereitschaft Luftfotte 2. bomber ommodres in the Mediterranean Obersleutnant dott on fro autun 1946 Gefochtsverband fo homing and ightatack units tin the Westem ‘Obentewtnane Joachim Helbig eho commanded LG 1 and, in 1945 3 Getechtsverand ‘operating aginst Soviet eld bridges loser the Oder and bother vers on the Eastern Front.Unit Stab LG 4 Lae 1 ig 4 AG a Stab KG 76 KG 76 N/K 76 5./KG 76 L/KG 76 Italy @/ 325 It was around this period that all the bombers in Italy were put under the tactical command of Gofechtsverband Helbig, a staff led by LG 1's Kommodore, Obst. Joachim Helbig who addressed his ‘assembled aircrews at Piacenza on 17 February. During March, captured (and evidenty disenchanted) bomber crews led their interrogators to conclude that Helbig: ...applies threats in the same manner ‘as ... Galland and Goering in Juy, 1943, threatening with Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry, all pilots who return without accomplishing the mission they embark on, and also those wo return without {a very good reason, Engine failure is accepted ... icing is not... Due to these harsh regulations pilots, ‘are continually reporting sick, and itis also stated that of those who do take off, hardly more than 40% reach their targets. Bomber Units of Luftflotte 2 7 March 1944 110 May 1944 Aireraft Crows, Aircraft jase 110) 2 14) Ghedi 19 (11) 27 (20) 23 (18) Ghedi 29 (23) 40 (8) 27 (24) Vilafranca 16 (13) 614) = = 310) 1) Ronchi 26 (16) a 32(7) = - = 916) ‘Aviano - - 26 (18) ‘Aviano Corsica The night after the disastrous attack on Convoy UGS 40, the Luftwaffe in Italy chalked up what General der Fieger Max von Pobl recalled 2s: *.. one of its last genuine successes [when] bombers, led by Oberst Helbig, caused havoc among closely parked Allied mediums during a surprise night attack on Corsican airfields [AL 21.05 GMT on 12 May, British codebreakers issued Z22Z2 (maximum priory) sia: between ‘Bomber formation taking off Udine 18 hrs [GMT]/12th via Bologna. Return Mig Genoa and Spezia to Udine 21.30. Bomber formation taking off Udine 00.20 his via (strong, indications Forl). Return via Arezzo to Udine 04,20 hrs/12th this Ju BAG ‘operate by LG 1 sctory all in PNeMT although 4 whic deste bund Instbees applied serie as used effectivelySuhimter"1943-May 1945 ‘Some 115 bombers carried out ‘two concentrated attacks’ on the Corsican airfields of Borgo Poreito and Alesani. The US 488th Bomb Squadron 3 was among those on the receiving end: about 2300 hours, there was quite a bit of fireworks up Bastia way... About 0300 there vas a new alarm and those who bothered to get out oftheir sacks saw and heard plenty of display. The noise and illumination rose to a peak and seemed to move down the coast toward us, then died out. A few minutes later without a bit of warning, three chandelier flares. burst right over our heads. Simultaneousiy, all the guns ... put up a curtain barrage. The flares blossomed right over the dispersal area and could not have been more perfectly placed. The place was lighted bright as midday. From then on thing happened fast and furiously... The Jerry planes... had a field day since one of their first hits had been the ‘command post of the radar and gun control ...[they] jazzed back and forth ... right over our ‘heads — we could see them in the faint moonlight. They'd come over the hill n a fast dive practically on the deck, rake the areas with antipersonnel bombs and machine gun fire sauthe ground shook as their bombs hit our loaded ships and fuel drums and ... Bomb dumps went up. One ship ... fully loaded for the morning's mission simply disappeared leaving nothing but a blackened circle and an occasional wrench or screwdriver to show where it had been. Other ships lost sections of wings, fuselage or stabilizers burned or riddled with shrapnel. n ail, about 80 ships were put out of commission either partially or permanently. By 0415 the Jerries made the last of their passes and departed from the scene of death and destruction. The fuel dump and other fires were still buming fiercely ... punctuated by ‘occasional explosions. Group Operations had suffered direct hits and ... only smouldering ‘embers remained as day began to break.” AJu 88 crew of ,/LG 4, shot down at Cisterna on 29/30 May, nad flown as pathfinders on this reid; Obit. Behrens’ 5./KG 76 had also taken part, as an observer shot down south of Cassino, five nights, later revealed. His Ju 88 had carried fragmentation bombs and four flares to Corsica and Lux buoys had bbeen dropped en route to the target to draw attention from the main foree. The I,/LG 1 contributed 23 aircraft to the first wave and 24 from Il/KG 76 were among the second. A small diversionary strike on Bastia harbour did no damage but by Allied accounts the attack on Alesani destroyed eight 8-25s and damaged 12; at Poretta 14 Spitfires and a B-24 were wrecked and 50 Spitfires damaged. At both airfields there was damage to runways, buildings, vehicles, fuel and ammunition dumps. Estimates of the human cost vary considerably: the RAF Air Historical Branch’s campaign narrative gives 24 killed and 550 wounded wile S/L Archie Wilson of No. 238 Sqn. RAF noted in his logbook: “Bob Lount killed during Hun A. aid on ‘drome, 229 (Sqn. lost 44 men killed + 1 wounded. 452 = 7 killed — 9 wounded, 287 — 33 wounded.’ The 488th BS history records 219 injured and 22 dead, the brunt ofthe attack being borne by ground personnel quartered on the flight line. ‘Not only does the food come infor severe criticism but their destiny Is apparently in the hands of a small clique of officers who are generally hated. It includes Onerstit. Hallensleben [Geschwaderkommadore] ... and Obit. Scnaftrath [Operations Officer, ,/KG 76] ... Medals were their main interest and the Staffel's joy knew no bounds when one ofthe clique ... was promised the EK !if he did one operational trip. [This he duly did but] the aireraft was forced to ditch. The whole crew was rescued with the exception of our hero, who, handicapped by his abnormal girth, was unable to get through the escape hatch, By now, the Allied armies were breaking through the German defences south of Rome and bombing was aimed at troop concentrations or demolishing towns to block the roads. On 27 May, 52 Ju BBs attacked Cistema and traffic on the Appian Way; on the 29/30th, two Ju 88s were shot down while harassing traffic on the coast road through Terracina. The Il,/LG 1 lost its last Ju 88 over Italy in the early hours of 4 June, the day the Allies entered Rome; in a last raid on Anzio on 9/10 June, two warships were nearmissed and a pair of landing vessels superficially damaged Within days of the invasion of Normandy, |. and lL/LG 1 were transferred to Belgium while IIL7KG 76 retuned to Germany where the pilots learned that they were to fly the Arado Ar 234 — there would no longer be any place for the other aircrew. ‘SW GWSE, we weran of he BI, JOcoph Hele, pUDIBRGG Na Dovel CAIPZD, wih eos OTs ad Ws epOo whore TS ‘rerio Nendetnderconroets withthe eran to Domb own sqvacionJunkers Ju 88 4 coded LLSAA of the Geschwader Stab LO 2, taly ‘The aireratt has been overpainted in the tropical sand colour o the undersides being left in RLM 65. The indiviual aircraft Stak ‘There is also evidence that the usual white Mediterranean theatre i fuselage sides with painted in blue. nd has also been overpainted.328 _@_ Kampfflieger ms during Operon Steinbok was The Eastern Front Spring-Summer 1944 Heavy bombers 1 the late spring of 1944, KG 1 began operating from East Prussia with three Gruppen of He 1778. They bombed in formation from high altitudes where Soviet fighters were not at their best and cartied heavy defensive ‘armament but these attibutes were not exploited for deep-penetration raids. In practice the Geschwader was used primarily to deliver heavier payloads of explosive against the Luftwatfe’s customary targets on the Eastern Front, troop concentrations and rail centves. Poltava nen Hotm. Fister, Stafekkaptan of 8/K.G.55, was shot cown and killed over Tanopol in June, his pilot, Ofw. Kramer, managed to evade capture and regsined German lines three weeks later, Tat month, Stain overcame his distrust of the Americans enough to allow Eighth Air Force B-17s to land in Ukraine alter a rad on the Rubland synthetic ol plant, south of Berlin, From Ukraine, they were to bomb another target and land in ay. The shuttle mission tok place on the 21st and after 12 hours inthe air, the 45th Bomb Wir landed at Poltava, the 13th BW at Mirgofod. The Luftwaffe had shadowed them to ther destinations and that night a force of He 1118 from HG 4 (whose |. Gruppe was to mark the targets), KG 27, KG 53 and KG 55 sot off to catch the Boeings on te ground. Bad weather meant that the entire weight ofthe rai fell on Pltave, destoying or damaging but two of the 72 Fortresses present and igniting over 400,000 gallons of aviavon fuel. The Americans git Mirgorod next morning for a more cstant airfield, det avoiding the German attack that night which nad been Intended to finish the job begun at Pltava, Even though the USAAF escaped this second blow, the raids had been a tremendous success for the Kampffieger and, indirect, forthe defence ofthe Reich Hungary In April 1944, 1V/KG 2 had left France to continue its traning programme in the relative safety of Hungary, In late August, withthe Red Army attacking through the Carpathian mountain passes, it and 1L/KG 4 were the only bomber formations available to Luffotte 4. The 1V./KG 2's 14 trainee crews flew individual armed reconnaissance sorties but by 12 September the situation had so deteriorated that the Gruppe was pulled back to NeuburganderDonau in Germany. Meanwhile, seven crews were subordinated to |./KG 4 in Debrecen and on 14 September, they carried out a lowievel daylight mission with SC 500 bombs to the major rai junction at Simeria, They retumed to the same target next day with the only munitions now availabe, AB 70 canisters unsuited to wrecking rail infrastructure, Two more missions were flown — one against a station and the other to disrupt the line through the Iron Gate Pass — before the detachment was withdrawn from operations on the 26th, passing its Do 217s to (P)/Nachtauthlrungsaruppe which operated the type unt the end ofthe war. ABOVE: Grown have blackThe Eastern Front @ 329 Poland and East Prus: The Red Amy's summer offensive began on 23 J So dramatic was the Soviet advance that by July Il/KG.53 had been driven from the USSR to bases in Poland and around Knigsberg, its He 111s bombing troop concentrations and communication porting petrol. 0 pve moved back from Grojec in Poland to SeerappenHelligenbel, East Prussia and on the 16th left for France. The |/KG 53 tiansforred to Nancy and Il. Gruppe to Ochey, near Toul. For moves like this, each Staffel had a Go 242 glider to 1, crushing German Army Group Centre centres besides , the Gr hat summer was the gerschuldivisfon, operating bombers as well as close support and tr t Prussia. At least one of its He 114s, 28+06, w: an Air Force and was used by a group defecting to sential spares. Anather unit attempting to shore up the eastern Front gruppe der 2 carry Ein types from Borisov before withdrawing t ‘among @ batch of Heinkels passed to the the Western Allies in December 1944. fyi The officer the ag of the ere probably orHerbert Korablum's Te 111 1-20, Note that mame has330_@. KampffliegerMediterranean Convoys @ 331 The Mediterranean Convoys January-August 1944 Losses of KG attack on 4. February. Off the Baleares, three Beaufighters attacked stragglers, the Helnkels arrived later than planned and had ta drop their torpedoes hurriedly and in darkness but the Ecard Bates was hit, sinking while under tow. The Ju 88s of |. and IIL/KG 77 were brought in from the Baltic as reinforcements while Il,/KG 77 remained behind for FuG 200 training. The Ill. Gruppe arrived in Istres- Le Tube from 16-22 March with 21. Ju 88s and completed a move to OrangeCaritat on 1 May. Crew: had been trained to use their radar for simultaneous blind torpedo launches at 4 km range but the [Normandy invasion supervened. In April |./KG 26 was withdrawn to Grove, Denmark for conversion t the Ju 88, 36's obsolescent He 111s had mounted steadily and only 15 were available for a convoy The most successful Torpedoflieger operation of the period was that against Convoy UGS 38 on April with two merchantmen and the destroyer USS Landsdale (equipped to jam Hs 293s) sunk plus two merchantmen damaged by torpedoes, All SO men aboard the Paul J. Hamittan died when its cargo of munitions detonated. On 11 May, 62 Ju 88 A torpedo-crriers of KG 77 and KG 26, escorted by 24 Ju 88 Cs of 1./26 1, took off from France to attack the 82-ship UGS 40 off the Algerian coast. The original intention to go in by moonlight or artificial ilumination had been frustrated by the weather and 0 a dusk attack with Zerstérer escort was substituted. Of the 13 reconnaissance aircraft sent out ‘only two daylight photographie sorties and a nocturnal radar mission had brought back useful information The attack force rendezvoused over two points on the French coast but a 1./KG the misfortune to be shot down by a German fighter near Berre. There were two formations, the first consisting of four closely-spaced waves, the second made up of three. The escort was ploked up acoording to plan, two groups of nine Zerstérer flying low between the bombers and the sun while others flew level with the leaders, screening to the east. Eight torpedo aitcraft returned early, cutting the attacking force to 53. After a three-hour fight they found the convoy three and a half nautical miles further east than estimated by dead reckoning. The element of surprise achieved on on 20 April was absent this time: the ships proved to be shrouded in smoke, there was strong AA defence, including naval artery, anc RAF fighters ov332_@. KampffliegerThis Ju B¥A4 carrying an external bomb load of 9/56 and coded 32K. ying ‘ver the Mediterranean a Allied shipping. Ju 88 A-4 coded 3Z+KT of 9./KG 77 summer 1944 ‘The aircraft has been painted in a tropical sand colour on the uppersurtaces and fuselage sides with the standard RLM 65 underneath. The individual aircraft letter ‘Kis painted yellow in the Staffel colour. The position of the white Mediterranean theatre band is unusual as the more common position would have been ‘Stiles Cie eins 0h Gen Miata334_@ Kampfflieger Tooded He 111 6 of 5 /KG 26, coded THSDX. hes ot ‘shige Band around the fuselage inating the ‘The first group of Ju 88s, 15:strong, released 30 torpedoes within seven minutes, claiming a freighter and a destroyer severely damaged. Accompanied by the Zerstérer, the second element went In just one minute later, 14 airratt dropping two torpedoes each and reporting three freighters sunk with two more and a destroyer severely damaged. The outcome of attacks on two destroyers and one escort vessel was not observed. Next, 24 aircraft attacked with 33 torpedoes, claiming three cargo vessels sunk plus two probables and a transport, a tanker, a cargo vessel and alight cruiser damaged, Another six freighters and two destroyers were attacked with unknown results, Despite these reported successes, the British Official History of the wer in the Mediterranean, asserts that the 91 torpedoes expended ‘scored not a single hit’ while German losses were severe, French Airacobras of GC 1/4 had shot down a Ju 88 shadower earlier on 14 May; the ships" gunners, claimed two of the attacking force; Mosquitoes of No. 256 San. RAF ‘intercepted the German force and dolayed their attack’, claiming 2-2-0 and 153 Sqn. Beaufighters also claimed 2-2-0. A single Beaufighter of 272 Sqn. was lost while covering the convoy. Three I./KG 77 aircraft were missing from the frst attacking group; from the second, I,/KG 77 emerged minus five of its Ju 88S and I,/ZG 1 also lost a Ju 88 C. In the third element, no fewer than seven aircraft of Il/KG 26 were lost, five them flown by crews on their first operation. Seven Ju 88s broke off their runs owing to technical problems. tompedocs while the machine was Inthe ai Very few Ju BAIT variants ost were used by KG 28 and KG 77,Mediterranean Convoys @ 335Shimer 19 Mediterranean convoys: losses of merchant vessels to Luftwaffe air attack, February-May 1944 Date Convoy ‘Ship Fate 01.02.44 as 30 Richmond P. Hobson damaged, no casuaities, reached port 01.02.44 cs 30 Edward Bates torpedoed, sank while under tow 01.04.44 Gs 36 Jared Ingersoll damaged by torpedo, towed to Algiers 20.04.44 CAF 31 1 Biar sunk by torpedo 20.04.44 Ugs 38 Paul J. Hamilton sunk by torpedo 20.04.44 Ucs 38 Samite damaged by torpedo, towed to Algiers 20.04.44 UGS 38 Royal Star sunk by torpedo 20.04.44 Ucs 38 ‘Stephen F Austin damaged by torpedo, towed to Algiers 31.08.44 KMS 51. Nordelfinge dive bombed (or torpedoed”) and sunk The 2. FLDWv, assessed the overall results as good but thelr own losses as ‘excessive... due exceptionally strong defence and lack of experience of new crews.’ Surprise had been forfeited, so it was thought, because the Allies had deduced that any attack could only come at dusk. The Germans. also believed ‘camouflaged aircraft reporting boats’ were operating between Menorca and Sardinia, By chance, the groups had arrived over the convoy at same time, restricting freedom of manoeuwe ‘and impeding attack runs. In close formation, the waves of aircraft had been broken up by naval artillery but the night fighters nad engaged only one wave of one formation effectively. Unsurprisingly, {a Second attack planned for the night of 12/23 May did not take place. Oberteutnant Kramprich's 6./KG 77 moved from Heiligenbeil on 5 June after receiving 12 new Ju 88 A4s, only three or four of which had FuG 200. They left the 4. and 5. Staffein behind, taining, as antishipping pathfinders, although they apparently lay idle most of the summer due to fuel shortages. The 6. Staffel spent much of the summer flying night overwater reconnaissance with FuG 200 and the FuG 102 radio altimeter but was active against the Normandy invasion fleet on the. rights of 14/15 and 22/23 June. The Staffel's losses included 3Z+BP and 3Z+NP destrayed when Istres was strafed on 16 June; 32+LP missing on 2 August and Uffz. Pabst's 3Z+DP was shot down, off Corsica by a Beaufighter on the 6th France, Biscay and the English Channel: summer 1944 The Normandy invasion provided the bombers with a wealth of targets on land and sea, reachable with only @ short exposure in enemy skies. Navigational help came from a chain of searchlights stretching from Brussels to the River Seine. Fv. Kurt Wuttge, an observer with 11./KG 2, recounted in captivity how he flew: ‘from Laon (attacking) AA positions and troop concentrations. We had lots of losses over that, We also laid mines between the battleships (in the Ju) 188. | have flown on ‘tremendous number af minelaying missions...’ In his memoir The Big Show (Corgi, 1965}, French pilot Pierre Clostermann described the nightly routine on an Advanced Landing Ground in Normandy, as the Germans: ‘... came over in groups of about a dazen every five minutes or so... letting their bombs: g0 more or less anywhere, It didn’t really matter where, as the beachhead was so full of troops, ‘ammunition dumps, convoys of lorties, concentration of tanks and planes that they could scarcely fail 10 score a bull every time. The nightmare went on until 3 a.m. From 8 June, RAF Mosquitoes were claiming multiple kills practically every night against Luftwaffe bombers aiming for the beach head, a pattern that would continue throughout the ‘campaign. Taken together with the successes of the massed land-based and ships’ AA, attrition of the already limited bomber strength was severe. Although historians commonly speak of the Luftwaffe as locked in a hopeless struggle over Normandy, morale among the Kampfflieger seems actually to have improved.France, Biscay and the English Channel @)337 German searchlight chain stretching ‘rom Brussels to the River Seine ‘Summer 1944. In England, Mosquitoes of 219 Squadron were scrambled on the night of 7/8 June to intercept enemy aircraft ‘raiding the east coast’ and shot @ Ju 188 down into the sea off Harwich. The next night, the frigate HMS Lawford was bombed and sunk off Juno Beach with 37 of her crew killed, On 42 June, a day after leaving Italy, six 1./LG 4 Ju 88s were in action against the landing fleet from Brussels Melsbroek, ‘The next night, only four aircraft were sent up and one of those was Jost to AA fire over the beach head but torpedo bombers did sink the destroyer HMS Boadicea off Portland Bil, On the night of 14/15 June, {an aircraft of 6./LG 1 was shot down by AA, apparently while trying to drop supplies to German troops: cut off ina radar installation at Douvees. At 21.55 GMT on 16 June, Ju 8B FL+SN of IL/KG 76 was shot down, its Bordfunker and Bordschitze finding refuge with the German 353, Inf.Di. Less fortunate was, 3./LG 1's Staffelkapitan , Obit. Schulte whose body was recovered from the sea on the 23rd, Mistletoe Eight Ju 88s of Einsatestael KG 101 arrived at Tours inthe early hous of 12 June. These were the lower components of anew weapon, the Mist! Mistletoe) composite aircraft. Designed for use against capital ships and concrete fortifications, Misto! mated a 3,500 kg hollow charge warhead to a Ju 88 whose cockpit had been dismounted. This was flan tothe target area by the pilot of a Bf 109 or (later) Fu 190 mounted above it on struts. He aimed the whole assembly atthe objective, engaged the gyro-stabised ‘utopilt aboard the Ju 88 and blew explosive bots, leaving the bomber to continue (in theory) unerringly to its goal wile the fighter tured for nome, In practice, Morale in the Normandy campaign Bomber crews interrogated have shown higher morale and the system was cumbersome on the ground, vulnerable in the air, technically complex and prone to breakdowns. — not least from the overburdened undercarriage — ‘and at this stage very few were available, The first mission was flown from St. Dizier on 24 June: four ‘Miste! led by Obit. Horst Rudat. Target illumination was provided by ./KG 68 and escort by I./JG 301. Off Gold Beach, a near miss inflicted serious damage on the frigate HMS ith. The supply of Mistein constrained ‘operations, the next known one coming on 18 July when a hit was claimed on a battleship (probably a Mulberry harbour blockship in fact) while an abortive sortie on 10/14 August cratered a field in Wiltshire. more resistance to interrogation than those captured in ind atic in the year... Fighting sprit is good. and crews are apparently still going for theie targets in spite ‘of night-ighters and of A.A, which is described as being more Powerful and concentrated than that formerly encountered over London GAR crews were never enthusiastic about ids on England, which they regarded! as a waste of effore, Now they feel that they are doing their army: They also feel that they are ot being sent on attacks on Fn real job to help thei country and serificial missions, but that their strength is being nurse! and used against worthwhile targets.338_@ Kampfflieger BELOW: The ‘operational around This aircraft as us een delivered! fom the fctory an til ‘evidently landed on 2 very mioddy grass dic asthe ‘whole of he lunge proportion of theses have been completely covered inmud, concealing the code, Mining The Germans appear quickly to have concluded that it was better to attack troops, equipment and ‘supplies while they were still aboard ship and that direct attacks on shipping were less productive than. ‘mining the seaways. Mines exacted a steady tll throughout the summer. On the last night of June, the ‘bombers flew only minelaying sorties, 66 in al. Two nights later, the effort was divided between mining (62 sorties), attacks on ships (14) and on airfields (ust five sorties) [At the end of June, |./SKG 10 was redesignated as Ill,/KG 51 with no change to its night harassment tasks and later in the summer, K@ 51 would operate three types of fighter bomber: 1./KG 5:1 with the Me 262, 1L/KG 51 with the Me 410 and Il,/KG 81 with the Me 262. The sortie rate escalated on the night of 4/5 July: there were 66 minelaying sorties, three against roads in the Caen-Bayeux area and 67 against ships. KG 100 weighed in with FritzX and Hs 293 and some 7,000 tons of merchant shipping were claimed destroyed, as well as a destroyer. Damage was said to have been inflicted on a vessel of 4,500t and on a light cruiser. A further 38,000 t, two cruisers and two destroyers were attacked without effects being observed. On the Sth, an He 177 was shot down over Cognac airfield and that night, 30 aircraft of Ix, FI.Aps. attacked Allied-occupied villages. On the 7/Sth, 94 machines flew mining operations and there were 24 sorties against occupied villages west of the Orne and airfields in the Caen-Bayeux area. A new phase began that night when He 114s of Maj. Martin Vetter's INL/KG 3 flew out from their Dutch bases at low level over the North Sea, climbed to 500 m and launched eight Fi 103 flying bombs (better known as the V-1) against London aiming to outflank the defences south of the city. An He 177 of KG 100 was destroyed in an air ald on Chateaudun fon the 9th and on the night of the 11/12th, four Do 217s of 11./KG 100 operated against Resistance forces. The tempo of operations was clearly taking its toll: on the 15th, orders were given that eight Do 217 erews ready for night fying should be sent 1o Minster Handort where they would receive final training for operations with Il/KG 2. Five days later, 7./KG 2 at Achmer was requesting an allocation of 37 tof petrol each month, despite Géring's warning on the 6th of the ‘deep inroads’ already made. Into stocks of aircraft fuel. The Einsatestab of KG 2 was at Laon-Couwron, France during this period. On the 16/17th, Luftfote 3 recorded that units of IX. FLAps. hitherto engaged in minetaying operationsSumméF T943"May T1945 2. Fliegerdivision orders for the night of 6/7 August 1944: (@ KG 26 with 11/26 and KG 77: concentrated aitack utilising moonlight on shipping NE Barfleur ‘with aircraft not used on night of 5/6th, /KG 26 10 {ake off from Tavaux; KG 77 [from] Dijon, Return 10: KG 26, Plan de Dieu; KG 77 at base. Alternates: Avord, Dijon, Tivaux... (b) Height, weather permitting, 300.9004 High tide at time of attack 1,33 to Hy reece with one Ju 88 S, crossing coast 3 20,50hrs. [GMT] hhad operated for the first time against land targets including {troop concentrations, airfields and villages. Some 84 aircraft had strafed while another 24 had used both bombs and guns. Four X. F.Kps. machines had attacked shipping, The 21st of July saw six Il./KG 100 crews hurriedly briefed to attack a group of warships sighted off Brest. Armed with single Hs 293s, they were to search in twos at sea level but the last pair — one of them flown by the Staffelitrer of 9./KG 100 — was bounced by Mosquitoes and shot down, seven of the eight airmen being rescued by the very ships they had planned to attack. On the 24th, Fw. Krag’s crew claimed a FriteX hit from 6,000 m on the quarter deck of a warship west of Brest. After confirmation by a reconnaissance aircraft, they were awarded a certificate marking their success, Otherwise, this had been a bad day for the bomber force: @ daylight Allied raid rendered Valence (6./KG 26's base) unserviceable and destroyed or severely damaged 24 aircraft on the ground while 1V./KG 40 lost aircraft when Lechfeld was strafed. Two days later five Ju 88s and two Do 217s were. lost there in anther ral Units from Southern France also operated over the Channel. At dusk on the 26th, 2. ALDiv. sent 24 aircraft to attack shipping in the Baie de la Seine, claiming 4,000 t sunk, 7,000 t probably destroyed and 18,000 t damaged. On the next night, IX. FL.Kps. made a major effort against ‘occupied villages, again leaving the ships (off Barfleur this time) to 24 Ju 88s of 2. FLDIu. but 12 aircraft broke off due to bad weather and five for technical reasons. On the 29/30th, F/Lt. Charles ‘and F/0 Jameson of No. 488 Sqn. RAF claimed no fewer than three Ju 88 and a Do 217 shot down between Caen and Lisieux. For the month of July, Luftotte 3 reported the following bomber losses: IX. Flegerkorps 129 aircraft; X. Flegerkops 23 aircraft; 2. Fliegerdivision 19 aircraft. Bridges and partisans In the first days of August, the American breakout from Normandy was threatening the Breton Peninsula To stop this, Il./KG 100s guided bombs were directed against land targets for the fst time: the road and railway bridges at Pontaubault and Pontorson, south of Avranches. The fst mission was set for 2 August, with nine Do 217s heading out over St. Mao from 21,00-21.10 at low level to Pontaubault and returning over Alied tersitory. Atleast one of the Domiers carted 8 pair of SSC 500 ‘dumb’ bombs which were dropped from 2,700 m to no effect. Two Do 217 were lost. Six of IL/KG 100's aircraft returned just before midnight on the 4th, claiming a hit on the Pontaubautt rail bridge with an SC 250. Oberfelaiebel John's crew planned to direct their Hs 293 at the bridge's abutments but, emering nto clear skies over the target, were shot down by an RAF night, fighter before they could launch. On the Sth, Il /KG 100 reported just eight machines serviceable, making that night's mission a maximum effort. Each aivoraft carted a single glide bomb, intending to cross the coast west of Avranches and make a north-south attack run. Before they could launch, Leutnant Aired Schlecht (personal callsign, Schlachter, ‘Butcher’ of the Gruppenstab and his crew were forced to bale out when a night fighter set their port engine on fie. On landing, Schlecht was shot in the leg by the Resistance and his gunner, Uz Friedrich Hoefelmeier, was held freight days before being turned over to Allies tops. In the early hours of the 7th, ten Do 217s were dispatched, six of them to Pontavbault They lew direct from Toulouse, taking continual evasive action and maintening sufficient helght to avoid Resistance small arms fire. Haze covered the target when GNSGR arves and Lt, Hans Kieffer was about to take his Hs 293 back to base when a night fighter explodes his Do 227's fuselage tank and the crew baled out. Leutnant Engelmann’s 6N+A0 suffered the same fate but another aicrat reported a probable FritzX hit on a railway bridge trom 6,000m. The final mission against the bridges, on 7/8 August, saw a Do 217 of 8./KG 100 shat down by AA fre. Meanwhile in Valance on the Ath, I. /KG 26's Kommandeur had requested permission to operate {three Ju 88s in an attempt to relieve liaison staff at a hospital surounded by partisans at Privas and {wo of the Gruppe's aicraft subsequently dropped bombs nearby.340 _@ Kampfflieger Ships (nthe night of 5/6 August, three Ju 88s from Il,/KG 26, staging out of Djon, located a target despite jamming on their FuG 200 sets; two of ther torpedoes were brought back but the other four exploded The Brish Admiralty reported that two gates, HMS Thomborough and Retalck had been attacked by torpede-bombers while proceeding to patrol off Cap o'Antifer and that: “The enemy made elght attacks: cone torpedo missed five yards astern of the Thotnborough.. our shios suffered no casualties or damage in these actions.’ One ofthe returning bombers was shot down by night fighter 20 km north of Orlea The 12 Ju BBs detalied by iL/KG 26 t0 engage shipping off the Isle of Wight on the night of 6/7 August encountered bad weather and only one attacked, the remainder bringing back their torpedoes. The successful aircraft set down at Dijon, eastern France, claiming one hit on a destroyer, while another Ju 88 landed in Tavaux with engine damage, Valence, 1./KG 26's home base, duly during the right. [though eftorts centred on the Channel, the Atlantic front was stil active and on 9 August 1X, FLAGS. signaled Il /KG 100 that it was sending officers to La Rochelle to liaise with the Navy so ups between Lorient and St. Nazaire could be engaged. Thnee days later, 3 reported that in the Gironde Estuary-Lorient area, Hs 293s had achieved near misses on reported the expenditure of two torp fa destroyer and a 2,000 t landing vessel, with an explosion and a patch of oll near the stern of the latter. On the 14th, it was announced that the Gruppe’s missions over Biscay would continue until the Allies landed in the South of France, then it would operate exclusively in the Mediterranean, By the night of 14/15 August, He 177s of 2./KG 40 were operating from Schwabisch Hall W.Nr, 550077, FE-+AN) was attacked by a P-61. Tail gunner Ute, Fabinger returned f ‘and other Heinkels of the Staffel saw it fall, burning. In fact, the P61 of the 422nd Night Fighter Squadron was able to regain its French base Germany. North of Barfleur, Hptm. Stolle’s aircraft e, reporting that he had shot the attacker dow with one engine on fire but nosed over on landing and never flew again. Stolle’s ory bar on their Heinkel’s talFrance, Biscay and the/English Channel @) 341 Supplies and Cities The IIL/KG 53 was based at Rowres in Eastern France from 17-20 August, dropping ammunition and ‘supplies to German troops fighting to escape encirclement. On the latter date, 20 ofits Heinkels took off from Tou for Celi where each was loaded with ammunition containers: four internally and the Ath externally. These were dropped to German troops cutoff on Hill 262 near Chambois. After this mission, the Gruppe moved back to Germany but other units continued similar operations for the next three rights. On the 22nd, some 250 kg of motor fuel, 18 x 250 kg and thvee x 1,000 kg ammunition Containers and one with 1,000 kg of provisions were dropped near Broglie; in addition there was a “concentated raid’ on Mantes and an attack on a target near Dex. Te I /L. 1. fst atleast ten Ju 88 $.3s between 18 and 24 August alone, none of them surviving more than a month after its manufacture. Lost to light AA during the month, Ju 88 S3 W.Nr. 330413 (coded +CP) had mottled grey-green top and sides and black lower surfaces while the tips of its spinners were yell, the 6, Stffet colour On the night of 26/27 August, 1X. FLKps. was ordered to attack crossroads and supply routes ‘around Sceaux onthe south easter outskirts of Paris. A mixed bomb load would be caried and the city centre was to be ‘avoided at ll costs’ except by KG 30, yng from Le Cue, which was to crop leaflets Some 11:1 bombers took part, reporting heavy concentrations of AA inthe target area plus explosions, slow spreading fires and secondary explosions of fuel or ammunition dumps: tivee machines broke off and two were lost. Lutotte 3's situation report omits the bombs fll in several central districts ofthe newly liberated French capital Next day, the Lutfotte reported tha fighter ans Bomber formations have already found themselves unable to participate in operations due to lack of ful The following night's targets were ridges and arterial roads in Mélun: two airraft aborted but 116 reached the objective, where: “Bombs fell in the target area... Several large fires and heavy explosions with sheets of flame — presumably an ammunition dump — were observed.” Just one Ju 88 was lost, shot down by a night fighter over Chiewes airfield. On 29/30 August, IX. F.KpS. bombed Chalons sur Marne. On the 30th, with Allied troops uncomfortably lose, 2./LG 1 was pulled out of Brussels Melsbroek, the evacuation being marred by the crash of their Kapitan’s Ju 88 $3, ‘Overteutnant Satter and ‘ive others crammed into the three seat bomber were killed. Satter had Joined LG 4 four years earlier, his succession of honours culminating inthe posthumous award of the Oakleaves to his Ritterkreuz.Sthimer"1943-May 1945 The Riviera Landings: august 1944 Over the summer, I/KG 26, part of 2. FLDIv, had gradually converted from torpedo to conventional bombing. Adapters to carry bombs had been slow to arrive and the aircraft lacked both bombsights and oxygen gear — items ‘unnecessary on torpedo operations — so neither accuracy nor safer operating heights were attainable. On 14 August, orders were given that with immediate effect II./KG 26 with Its Stab, 8, and 9. Staffein was to transfer to Grossenbrode for conversion to the Ju 188. No alt transport was available and so ground personnel were to 0 by road or public transport. The Gruppe's Ju 88s were to be ferried by their crews to Valence and/or Tavaux to bring 1I./KG 26 up to strength. Disbanded elements of KG 77 had also been used to boost KG 26's numbers. The 6./KG 77 remained at Istres but had apparently become 6.(Beleuchter)/KG 26 by 13 August, albeit without altering its unit markings, 62+P (the individual letter being in black with a yellow outine) KG 100 had been converting by stages to the He 177 in Germany and all ts remaining Dornier Staffein were Concentrated into the Ill Gruppe under Hptm. Heinrich Schmetz. Sinee May, 7. and 9./KG 100 had been training with the Hs 293 at Toulouse, with the 6. Staffel attached Since 8./KG 100 was away on the He 177 conversion course, this arrangement had been made permanent in June and the 6. had been renamed as the new 8./KG 100, Severe losses over Normandy led to the disbandment of 9. Staffel, its crews and aircraft going to bolster the other two Staffeln, and Dorniers with overpainted 9. Staffel codes wore found the lies reached Toulouse (e.g WY, 4832, EN‘BS, former 6NHT). On 30 July; the Stab ANT Frm ad I. Gruppe had 25 (14 aera between them feporing hes In midmugust, the Geschvedertommedore, Ma. BermherdJope, left for a unit commanders’ °f4D027361L course in Germary; en the 45th, the alles landed on the French Rivera. The Luftwate had sasrSiTigua intended that in the event of a landing, all available aircraft would bomb the invasion fleet at first oem light but the troops came estore completely unitcubled by alr ettack. Tht evening however, ‘tou Do 2178 approsched Cemel Beach end wNrianh, released glide bombs, LST 282 was 200 m off S¥ra of Obergefreiter Gerds, IIL/KG 100 St Raphael and heading for shore when she 7756 10 an is was ht end caught fre. though beached, she Sry cai Meme ese rtes rics) wns cian nas gam oot toer ote ecard ee eee ME MNairele nero | tad: comer duncucoontaanonege covenant Toulouse to the afield and 45 solders were Riled. After tat an Yast ship of the war and MI/KG 100 had lost SEs a ee eet tae orto wean pees Toe eon een a the we oocyte many ee sea ange avskwtbon etek tomb tthe SS ceaed up lterione no tea ow hinge rut A nt our om ./AG 26 opereted: ont Pom wh ‘are seetbing down there. They bled a German General in #OK® Off, two did not attack on account of the sn is 299 al darkness and one bombed French Commandos Toulouse too, sianed by Hpi at Cap Négre. KG 26 concluded that white acd) Jipim Yow-buggetby Combined Services Deed 2.000 m was not low enough for clear Gruppen Tmerogation centee entiation of small targets inte halign AA Kemmandcr of fire compelled the bombers to stay high: the targets were hard to see yet the bombers were ceasily visible from the ground,The Riviera Landings @ 343 roop transport with the weapon. attack, this time from a lowfiying Ju KG 26 posted four airmen missing344_@. Kampfflieger Dn the 18th, 2. FLD wa: ubordinated to Luftfotte 2 with immediate effect and fying units were Dusk saw what the RAF's Air Historical Branch characterised as the old how Il KG 4100's Doriers were their evening mission when w © that the alrfleld was to be evacuated jermany. A Ju 88 attempted to torpedo Fighter Direction Tender 13 off Delta Beach but the weapon exploded 250 m short. Another Junkers dropped antipersonnel bombs fon the same beach from 2,000 m Eleven J) 88s attacked around St. Tropez while five passed over Camel and Delta Beaches. 21,08 hrs, one of these came as close ta seriously impeding the Allied effort as ary Luftwaffe aircraft ordered to prep: last serious effort’ by the C for trans jsion’s bombers. A prisoner lat bombed up and re and the Gruppe would retur would, straddling USS Catoctin, flagship ofthe Allied Naval Commander hit, kiling six and wounding 42, At 23.00 hrs, 2. F.DIv, reported that 11 airoraft had taken off and: attacked thelr d th antipersonnel bombs: two ted targets. Of three setting down at Va 2, two had belly landed after being shot up; three more landed at Montélimar; and five at Orange-Plan de Dieu. There were no more bomber missions against the landings since the Luftwaffe was leaving Souther France, 36 Ju 88s of I. and ./KG 26 having artived in Memmingen and MUnchen Rie by midday on 21. August. 2. Fliegerdivision bomber units, Ke afternoon of 18 August 1944 ih anaes eae unit Aircraft Base ae Stab KG 26 1 Valenee eee Lyk 26 23 8) Cece | TSoeNe2s I/KG 26 36 (23) Valence the nose with dhe on Stab KG 100 2 0) bet pated whe mL/KG 4100 13 8) Toulouse Sane “strength for 47th; by 19 August the Gruppe reported only 23 (14)Flying Bombs) @/345 Flying Bombs July 1944-January 1945 Arthe he I,/KG 3 had spent May and June 1944 at the Karlshagen experimental establishment, eee oe ‘converting to the airlaunching of V-ls. As we have seen, operations against London began on the Viivimtonis night of 7/8 July, just over three weeks after the first ground firings. On 10, 13 and erefound stored 41.4 July, attention had switched to Southampton —a principal supply port for the forces in Normandy fine Kanes _ witha total of 63 bombs launched and barely a hit scored. In German signals, London was often ei'shchwee. feferred to simply as ‘Main Target’ and the nine subsequent operational nights in July were devoted fataded 0 be to the British capital After the opening, tentative mission, between 14 and 34. bombs were launched ssctby KG 5319 each night, limited strength sometimes being offset by repeat sorties as on 29/30 July when 13 ‘cationsaginse —_Heinkels released 30 V-As, the ih es In early September, as the Dutch airfields appeared thweatened, the Gruppe withdrew to Hesepe, |AhInorn and Varrelbusch on home soil. On the 17th, Varrelbusch was informed that an aircraft of ‘9./KG 3 had been shot up and ditched in Lake Blassemer near Leyden, Holland that morning. This may have been ‘friendly fie’ for three days later an investigation was ordered into no fewer than nine instances over two nights of He 11.45 fling at 50-150 m being fred upon by German light Flak, with ‘one brought down in flames. Losses to all causes were such that on the 25th, a report to Luftfitte Reich cited a ‘sharp drop’ in Il, /KG 3 serviceability, the unit possessing ‘not even a quarter’ of its, aircraft establishment. The fying bombs were aimed at specific co-ordinates but the weapon's inherent inaccuracy was compounded by inadequate data for forecasting winds and difficulties in finding the correct launch point. The Heinkels were aided by a network of radio beacons but these were jammed by the Allies and an alternative was for I./KG 66 pathfinders to place sea markers on the desired spot While He 1118 converted to the airlaunch role (by the Deutsche Lufthansa workshops at ‘Stuttgart B6blingen) are commonly referted to as H-22 models, their operators thought otherwise. On 6 October, Il,/KG 3 reported a strength of 24 (10) aircraft; one He 111 4.20 was missing, an He 1.11 H-16 was damaged on landing and an H-14 through being shot up. That evening, a fourengined aircraft crashed on the power line supplying Varrelbusch, the lighting system failed and the Heinkels were forced to land elsewhere. Electricity was restored in time for 14 aircraft to operate on the evening of the 7th, although a planned second mission was prevented by ground mist and one machine was, reported overdue next morning,346 @_ Kampfflieger IA, Ops to Gefechtsverband Hallensleben (1A, Ops) IC: Report on results of night operation of 28/29 September: 1 Target: London, ©) Emergency releases: none 2 Areas of release: Squares 4325 and 4364, D) Not observed: 2 crews missing, 4 Times of release: 04.00 t0 04.32 hours 6 Defence: none i Aircraft employed: 9 7 Losses: 2 crews, 2 aiecrat 5 Releases: 9, including including 1 Statfetkapitin’s crew), 8) Released at range: 6. 8 Special events 1B) Pailures: 1 (not on full boost), ©) ALOF.19 hours 1 aircraft crashed in Square 2365, lames at point of impact being observed by 2 crews, followed by firing of red distress signals thought to be the missing Staffetkapitin’s crew), (8) A 04.02 hours in Square 335, 3 red Verey lights observed (thought to be 2nd missing crew), (© A 03.15 hours in square 5344 red Verey lights were observed. () —_A¢03.48 hours in square 5487 a fire was observed (cought to be the scene of an a/c crash). (&) 1 erew- reported as missing in the report of 26 September, crashed at Hankenberge, about 15km south Aircraft completely destroyed, crew killed. (© —_aireraft did not take part in the operation owing wo engine trouble at akeof night fighter patrals over the North Sea, intruder sorties over the ington to the world's first Airborne RAF countermeasures included Heinkels’ airfields and the conversion of @ Coastal Command Warning and Control (AWACS) platform. For the Mosquito crews, the strain of low-level night fying ove water was such that they were restricted to a threemonth tour on this particular duty. The Il. /KG losses over just t in Octobe 07.1044 © 8/KG3 fone missing from operations 2.40.84 7./KG3 fone orashed on takeff at Varrelbuseh 14.1044 7./KG3 one crashed at Telgte, 15 km from Minster, cause unknown 9./KG 3 lone crashed on takeoff at Varrelbusch ster Handort KG 3 one crashed on landing at Mi O44 8,/KG3 tone crashed on landing at MinsterHandorfFlying Bombs) @/347 By October preparations were well advanced to expand the force to a full Geschwader. KG 53 was to take over, with Ill /KG 3 becoming its new |. Gruppe. KG 53 began oper ast week of the month: the Staffeln of |./KG 53 were split between Hesepe, Ahihorn and Varrelbusch; tho I, Gruppe was at Marx and the Ill at Schleswig (On 9 November, the Kommodore was planning to test the range of Zyklop (Cyclops) radio beacons in low altitude flight, in the hope that favourable results would allow crews to calculate and ‘compensate for wind between their intial and launch points (about 120-150 km apart). By the middle fof the month, the fuel situation had become so bad that KG 53 was ordered to restrict operations to a maximum of 20 aircraft as in short supply that November: on the 11th, the Geschwader was ordered to experiment with Dijppe! on operations, sparingly fr it was no longer ‘a time. Not only fuel being manufactured. A week later, Ill. Gruppe requested an extra meat ration for aircrew operating against the Allles and on the 29th, |./KG 53 sought 20 mountings for 2em Oerlikon guns, “urgently required’ to develop Flak defences on the three airfields occupied by its Staffein. After the summer, only once was a target other than London selected: on 24 December, around 50 Heinkels launched their V-1s from over the North Sea again Manchester, j ‘one bomb hitting the city. Sporadic operations against London were resumed but i fuel shortages. 14. FL.Div, reported 58 pilots of KG 8 available for conversion to the Me 262. ceased altogether after 14 January 1945 in the face of worser (On 25 Ma348_@_ Kampfflieger The Western Front September-December 1944 Ti itiatena beencrven om France's sol but ot yet ts shies and on 2/2 September, 73 of IX, Fiegerk aircrat orps bomived Verdun. Most of the bombs were reported as falling in the built. Lp area and there were heavy explosions and a large mushroom of smoke west of the target. Another ten machines raided Ste. Menehould and even at this late stage 15 attacked ships in the Orne Estuary ne following night, 23 machines flew a second mission against Verdun and on the night of 3/4 September, 43 On 7 September, Luftfiotte 3 ordered IX. F.Kps. and the follawing subordinated units to withdraw to airfields in the Reich with immediate effect: Stab, |. and IL/KG 2; Stab, I. Il. and IIL/KG 6; Stab, | ‘and I./KG 30; Stab, |. and II./LG 4; and 1./KG 66, The II,/KG 3 was ordered to Hesepe and Stab UG 1 was subordinated to Luftfotte 3, styled Gefechtsverband Helbig (after LG 1's Kommodore,) and. gen command of: ll/KG §1, 2, Einsatzkommando |,/KG 51 and the remaining units of nsatzzruppe KG 101, A week later, |./KG 66 was asking for all stragglers to be sent to Dedelstorf where they were urgently required at the Gruppe's new operational station Lufthotte 3's orders for the night of 13/14 September included: “1./KG 101 ... attack with 2 available composite aircraft on Albert Canal bridge at Beeringen. Il/KG 51 on Meuse road bridge 4 km north west of Ni sorties were dispatched to Tou pelt.’ On the 17th, the Allies launched Operation Market-Garden, the ground ‘and airborne offensive to capture the Rhine bridge at Amhem. Next day, OKL decreed that:The Western Front @ 349 "K. Flegerkorps wit as battle unit cons @ 4, and W/LG 4; KG 26 with | ig of I. /KG 51, IL/KG 26 and 7./KG 2 as we Se NSG 2 and Spe achmen West to combat wings trom thea pba xtc The 7./KG 26, converting tothe Ju 488 in Grossenbrode, was also assigned to IX. FL.Kps. for use me “aenn oetssas against the landings. On the night of the 48th — alongside elements of LG 1, KG 30 and KG 66 — and upper gun Ha 7G 2 sent 12 Do 217s from MinsterHandor to ettack the British bridgehead over the Meuse Escaut {wrt Comp Canal at Neerpelt. Four crews did not locate ee target, the remainder dropped 32 x AB 250 and AB 500 canisters. The bombing was scattered RIM 76and but greater success was achieved the following ANE NRDET night when 78 aireraf, from LG 1, KG 30, KG 54 yh mate of 6 and L/KG 2, set out to make a “concentrated attack’ on Eindhoven. A Do 217 crashed soon after takeott and its erew were killed but 75 ‘machines bombed the objective, one attacked ry target and another broke off. Th ‘bombers hit an ammunition convoy, shattering the city centre and kiling or injuring people. KG 2's Dorniers had carried 4x SD 250 and 7 x AB 500 concentrated and the over 1,000 28 x SC 500, A, bombing had been uking fies were still Visible to German fighters next day. This was to be 1X. Fllegerkorps’ swansong, for its disbar ment ‘and KG 2's — had already been ordered. On the evening of the 18th the command structure yet again: Stab KG 6 was to replace Stab L@ 4 in control of the tsverband. which would now take the name (of KG 6 Kommodore, Obstit. Hermann Hogeback Two days later, Lut ‘successor to Luftfotte 3) nmando West ted to substitute b KG 2 and the resulting Gefechtsver n would remain in being until 15 March 1946.350_@. Kampfflieger dropping aircraft of 4/KG 200s Kommando ‘Oj an ws found hy the lis at Rin Main This is almost certainly the same AS#MD which was belly ned there mi January 1945 by Obgtr Hein Hack and pt ple meander pattern and the underside pate bie with a dark meander. (Another of te Komando’ 1888 was recorded by Aled Intligence 3s having Blick undersides and a lighe green meander over “blve/gey/mauve Markings are unusual tit code in all white characters the individual letter MC appears as a white ouiline andi somewhat lager although far from the norma ize The Dtwhich in KG 200 denoxed the # Stale) is ao white and sir in size tothe internal ditensons ofthe MLA female civilian is ctrieving something tom beneath Disbandment KG 2's assets were distributed around the Luftwaffe, wth most ofits pilots destined forthe fighter arm but not all would end up there. Fw Kurt Wutge lone day, word went round that the Geschwader was to be disbanded; entire Staffeln were to go to the Paratroops, SS, infantry, every possible place. One fine day, all the pilots [were] off to Beri operators and gunners. Al! the ground echelon went to Kénigsberg, they were s of a Jagdgruppe. We came to Quedlinburg [Aierew Assembly there were sill the observers, wireless ypposed to take over as ground crew Depot thin a week, Wuttge was part of @ new crew collecting a Ju 188 from Rangsdorf and was posted to RheinMain, trading ‘that rather dreary Geschwader KG 2° (as their interrogator later described it) for 2, a detachment of 4./KG 200 parachuting agents behind Allied lines In the west. Wuttge’s pilot Ober. Heinz Hauck recalled iando | ical [spy dropping] mission. | thought, “they'l ecy, don’t worry about it." I sat myself in my plane and my mates climbed in, We flew there, hhave a reason for 3 did our u it didn't work. Turned back, landed. We'd never heard anything about it .. no one told us anything. 1 didn't even get told [the drop zone]; only the navigator got 1 dian’t know where we were. Their ne ssignment had Its compensations however: ‘Right up to the last, whether we flew or not, we got a daily ration of half a litre of milk, an egg, biscuits, chocolate, 60 grams of butter as flying rations and anather 100 grams of butter at night... and 200 grams of sausage ULTRA decrypts HP 2583 Strength return from ML/KG 66. Aieraft: 14 (0) (Comment type unknown) and 7 (4) crews; 10.66) Ju ‘88s and 14 (10) crews evening 5 [October] MP 3875 Lftwaffenkommando West orders late 18 [October]... TWo Stafeln of L/KG 66 to Handorf. One Staffel to remain in Dedelsdor for supplementary equipping paratus (Nachtlee), Comment. fist Gruppe KG 66 at Dedelsdorf 14 September... specialises in pathfinding HP 4667 evening 26 [October], Lufowaffenkommando West ordered preparation by Land IIL/KG 66 of fed operation with all serviceable aircraft on Kruisschans Sluice Antwerp (comment: at entry from Scheldt to new docks about 5 mies north west of Antwerp) in such a way that attack could Keeuzzug in the first suitable weather in the bright moonlight period. Loading: only heaviest bombs... except for target indicatorts) 3th, ML/KG 66 had 11 (4) Ju 88 and 15 of unknown type take place on cover word and composite aireratt”.,. onThe Western Front, @ 351 6 to attack: On the night of 26/27 September, 42 Fw 1908 of Il./KG. bridges leading into Eindhoven: five aborted and one went missing. were four Mistein and eight Ju 88s of KG 101: one MisteY and two Ju 88s broke off for technical reasons and a Ju 88 $ went missing. On the 28th, seven Sonderverband Einhorn Fw 190s dropped KG 200s first bombs in anger in a dawn attack on the bridges, claiming a direct hit on each but Spitfires of No. 41:1 Squadron RCAF shot down Lr. Herbert Leschanz's Fu 190 F8, killing the 30 yearold Austrian pilot. On 3 Gefechtsverband Hallensleben requested visual reconnaissance of Eindhoven aerodrome and its dispersals and ordered a twowave a night by Ill /KG 51. and NSG 2, aimed at aircraft parked on the runway. In addition, II. /KG 3 was to attack the ‘main target’, London. A\ s 2.,/KG 101 had just become) would launch its Mistein at the Nimegen bridg set out in two gro Attacking the same bridges dusk, IIL /KG 66 ( Me 262.423 of Schenck ised a The Me 262 The Me 262 had entered service as a Blitzbomber over France in the last days of July, too late to catch the invaders coming ashore and too few in numbers to make any real difference. The first Unit to see action was a Kommande of |./KG 51 led by Maj. Wolfgang Schenck, from whom it took its name. Deployed initially to Chateaudun, its strength was minimal (usually about six serviceable machines). To reduce the chances of their being hit by ground fire and falling into Allied hands, the jets were forbidden to descend below 4,000 m over enemy territory, leaving this supposed fast attack bomber marooned at medium bomber altitude with no means of accurate aiming. As early as 8 September, Lufifiotte 3 was urgently requesting OKL Operations Staff to countermand the order ‘as it usually excludes operations by this aircraft in present weather conditions.” Little wonder then that the loads most often carried seem to have been AB canisters, to strew bomblets ‘across area targets such as Allied airfields. The Kommando was in action against the attempt to seize the bridge at Arnhem, attacking Dutch and Belgian towns, British crossings over the Albert Canal at Beeringen and gliders on the dropzones, while INI./KG 51°s Fw 190s raided the same targets by night