Karel Dobbelaere

TESTING SECULARIZATION THEORY IN

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

In order to test secularization theory on the individual level in a comparative perspective, the
author argues that this cannot be done without linking levels of individual secularization to levels
of societal secularization. This implies that we should be able to comparatively measure the level
of societal secularization in the countries under study. In this article the author discusses indica-
tors to measure the functional differentiation of the religious sub-system and other sub-systems
of society (the political, juridical, educational, medical and family sub-systems). Finally, he sug-
gests ways in which Rational Choice Theory can indirectly be integrated in a comparative study
of secularization by analysing the competing groups that are implied in manifest conflicts con-
cerning the secularization of society, what is called lacisation in French.

Key words: secularization, laicization, compartmentalization, functional differentiation, rational

choice theory.

One of the purposes of the International Network on Religious Studies (INORS)1, to

test the secularization theory in a comparative perspective, may be understood in two
ways. On the one hand, that we want to test its validity by studying several countries,
including the USA, a modern society that is presented as not secularized (Berger
2001:194), and, on the other hand, it may also mean to test its explanatory power by
confronting it with a conflicting theory, i.e. the rational choice theory (Stark and Ian-
naccone 1994). Since I have suggested that both theories are complementary and may
be integrated in the study of religion (Dobbelaere 2002:193195), I will see to what
extent this is possible in view of the study that we want to do
In a working paper, defining the purpose of the INORS-workshop, the initiators of
the research project stated that secularization has three components: individual secu-
larization, societal and organizational secularization (referring to Dobbelaere 2002).
They went on, specifying that this workshop has to focus on individual seculariza-
tion. This suggests to me three questions: First, what is meant by secularization?
Second, what is meant by individual secularization? And finally, can we study individ-
ual secularization neglecting both societal and organizational secularization in our
design?

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The theoretical background of secularization theory

The concept of secularization refers to a process by which the overarching and tran-
scendent religious system of old is reduced in modern functionally differentiated soci-
eties to a sub-system alongside other sub-systems, losing in this process its overarching
claims over them. This definition refers of course to the societal or macro level and
points out that the religious authorities of institutionalized religion have lost control
over the other sub-systems like polity, economy, family, education, law, etc. Further-
more, secularization is seen as a consequence of functional differentiation and is con-
sequently nothing more than a descriptive concept. In other words, secularization
describes the effect of functional differentiation for the religious sub-system and
expresses the interpretation of this experience that religious personnel had, a point
already made by Luhmann (1977: 225232): they felt that they had lost influence in
worldly affairs and that a segregation was institutionalized between the so-called
sacred and secular.
The functional differentiation of the sub-systems and their autonomization allows
for the rationalization of the procedures and the establishment of rational organiza-
tions, like the public administration of the state and economic concerns, in which the
interactions are primarily secondary, hierarchical and role oriented. The consequence
of such human actions may latently produce secularizing effects. However, seculariza-
tion may also be a manifest function. In the latter case, it is called in French lacisation
in reference to la lacisation of France, a manifestly enforced process of seculariza-
tion during at least two centuries by the republicans against the reactionaries with
whom the Catholic Church allied. This conflict produced a profound split over religion
per se in the country, on the national level as well as on the local and family level:
republicans versus intgristes, schoolmaster against cur, father against mother
(Martin 1978: 3641). And the republicans created their own symbols, e.g. Marianne,
which was intended to replace the catholic symbol of the Virgin Mary, and it is today
in all city halls of France (Hilaire 2005:48). The laicization extended to other European
countries: the changes of the laws on divorce, abortion, euthanasia and the legal mar-
riage of homosexuals attest to that.
This allows us to emphasize that secularization is not a mechanical, evolutionary
process. It is quite often the result of conflicts over particular issues in which opposing
movements with religious, a-religious or anti-religious ideologies are involved. How-
ever, the changes, in one or the other direction, are not always the result of manifest
actions, as I have already suggested. They may also come about as the result of certain
actions which latently produce a secularizing effect. A good example of this is the
introduction of the clock. The development of science, industry and the expanding
trade, from the 12th century on, could not be regulated anymore by the time sequence
of the monasteries which was being indicated by bell ringing. One needed a more accu-
rate measure of time which was ultimately achieved by the invention of the clock, at
the turn of the 14th century, which imposed a secular time order from the highest tower
in the city so that it could be seen by every one. Canonical time lost its significance and
time was also dissociated from God-given nature, which it had through, for example,
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the sundial. Once the clock started regulating time it became controlled by men and
dissociated from the religious time cycle. In the 19th century, the railroads would
impose a strict coordination of time and later on it was done by the radio.
Having discussed the elements of the theoretical background of secularization
theory which we need to develop our arguments, let us now turn to the micro level.

Individual secularization
Applying on the individual level the definition given to societal secularization, we
arrive at the following one: individual secularization means that the religious authori-
ties have lost control over the beliefs, practices and moral principles of individual per-
sons. It refers to a partial or total abandonment of institutionalized religion. If one
accepts this, then individual secularization does not mean religious decline per se or
the decay of individual piety and practices, since central in the definition is the refer-
ence to the loss of power of the religious authorities of institutionalized religions to
control individual religiousness. Consequently, the continuing individual religious sen-
sitivity is not a falsification of secularization theory, it confirms it and so does religious
bricolage.
This means that in a questionnaire measuring secularization, we need questions
about institutionalized religious beliefs, practices and moral principles which will
allow us to study the normative integration of the individual in institutionalized reli-
gion. Furthermore, we need questions about spirituality and religious piety, and about
popular religion. More technically now, a question do you believe in God? can only
point out a certain belief in a transcendence, but it should be combined with an other
question where interviewees are able to specify their conception of God with the help
of indicators such as: a god with whom I can have a personal relationship, a spirit
or life force or a supernatural power, the God within, I dont believe and I do
not know what to believe. This allows us to see to what extent their beliefs are in con-
formity with institutionalized religion. I give these only to specify my thoughts, as an
example without having the pretension to have formulated a good question. And in that
vision we could not only ask if they believe in a life hereafter (yes, no, I do not know);
but we must allow the interviewee to specify this belief. We should not only have ques-
tions about churchly practices, but also about popular religious practices, like the use
of the bible (opening it by chance to know what God expects of us), lighting candles,
the use of holy water or water from holy sources at pilgrimage sites, etc. And the same
is true for moral questions. However, as far as morality is concerned, we should not
limit ourselves to questions about sex, but introduce questions about important moral
issues of our times. The problem we will meet is to find equivalent questions for people
of different religions. Thus in a comparative study of countries with a pluralist religious
population, we will have to specify the population we want to interview and to look for
equivalent questions.
If we want to do a study of individual secularization with such a questionnaire,
what is the point in suggesting that we are studying secularization? We could also call

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it a study of religious change in comparative perspective and try to explain the change
from institutionalized religiosity to spirituality by looking for an explanation of the
decline of institutionalized religiosity and the rising trend towards spirituality.
In a recent paper, Inglehart (2006) has proposed a revised version of secularization
theory that emphasizes the extent to which people have a sense of existential security
that is, the feeling that survival can be taken for granted (the same theory is elabo-
rated in Norris and Inglehart 2004). He explains the systematic erosion of the institu-
tionalized religious practices, values and beliefs in post-industrial nations by pointing
towards the diminished need for existential security, since for the vast majority of the
population, the prime appeal of religion was that it helped them to cope with existential
insecurity (Inglehart 2006:1). Such an explanation could be tested in a comparative
perspective, but, why call this a revision of the secularization theory? The terms secu-
larization thesis and theory are used interchangeably in his paper suggesting that
secularization is used in a very broad sense, i.e. meaning the decline of religion. I have
nothing against revisions of the secularization theory, but then it should be carefully
linked to the propositions of the secularization theory if we want to call it a revision of
the secularization theory. More, Ingleharts explanation of the religious decline in post-
industrial societies could be tested in a comparative design, and we could do so,
although I am afraid that research data from post-industrial nations do not reveal that
the most insecure social strata represent the lowest religious decline.
All this suggests that we should be very careful with the use of the term seculariza-
tion and that we have to ask ourselves how to make sure that our study will be a test of
secularization theory, to the extent that we want that of course. In order to do that, I
suggest that we link the levels of individual secularization to the levels of societal sec-
ularization and do this in two ways: is there a positive relationship between the level
of secularization in the societies under study and (1) the levels of individual secular-
ization as defined above, and (2) compartmentalization on the individual level. If we
want to do that, then we should have a sample of countries with different levels of soci-
etal secularization.

Compartmentalization
Societal secularization may indeed have had an impact on the way individuals them-
selves view the relationship between religion and the other spheres of life: the educa-
tional, the economical, the juridical, the familial, the medical, the political and the sci-
entific. The question here is: do people think that institutional religion should inform
these so-called profane sub-systems, or consider that the latter are autonomous and that
any interference of religion in these sub-systems should be rendered void and disal-
lowed? The secularization-in-mind I am pointing at, I call, compartmentalization.
In a survey of 12 342 interviewees in eleven Western and Eastern European coun-
tries the measurement of compartmentalization was based on the views of the inter-
viewees about the relationship between church and state, law and religion, religion and
education, and on their acceptance of financial support for religious schools and reli-

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gious bodies (Billiet et al. 2003:141142). The major result from the multi regression
analysis was that people with a high commitment to their church think less in terms of
secularization and are much less opposed to the impact of religion on the other sub-
systems than persons with none or a low degree of commitment to a church. The latter
had the highest degree of compartmentalization and were more prone to prevent
secular institutions from being affected by religious influences. The relationship was
not perfect and there are examples that make that clear. Members of the Catholic
Church initiated functional differentiation between the Church and the political sub-
system in Spain, since they considered the alliance of the Church with the Franco
regime as detrimental to the Church and its mission. In Belgium, France and the Neth-
erlands, individuals not or only minimally integrated in the Church choose Catholic
schools for their children since studies have indicated and/or public opinion suggests
that the discipline, the level of the studies and the supervision are better in Catholic
than in State schools.
Returning to the study I was referring to, the researchers did not find differences
between members of the different traditional Churches as far as compartmentalization
is concerned (Billiet et al. 2003:152153), except that, in a study restricting this sample
to Catholics and former Catholics, Dobbelaere and Billiet (forthcoming) found that in
the religiously pluralistic countries, Catholics wanted the positions of their Church
institutionalized on the societal level so that Catholic religion has an impact on the
other sub-systems. They want financial support for their Church and Catholic schools,
and want religious symbols in State schools. They think that religion should influence
politics and that legislation on moral questions e.g. abortion, euthanasia, marriage of
homosexuals and experiments on embryos should be informed by religious leaders.
In that publication, I hypothesized that they defend their Churches position, con-
fronted as they are with the standpoints of other religions, which informs them that reli-
gions do not have a uniform view on moral issues and that Protestant churches, for
example, lay more stress on individual responsibility rather than seeking to impose
their views on the total society. Catholics in these pluralistic countries, in contrast
stress the societal level and want the position of their Church institutionalized on the
societal level so that Catholic religion has an impact on the other sub-systems.
J. Billiet and colleagues (2003:142) reported that the measurement model resulting
from the indicators we had used was largely factorial invariant for all countries, but that
there were some substantial deviations in three countries (Finland, the Netherlands and
Sweden). They suggested that country specific effects on compartmentalization might
be the cause. And the measurement quality for compartmentalization we used was
rather low (Cronbachs a.56).
I report on this study to make clear what I mean by compartmentalization. Further-
more, by referring to the hypothesis formulated about Catholics in pluralistic countries,
I want to point out the importance of testing the impact of religious pluralism in a
country and the different impact that it may have on people from different religions.
Finally, evaluating the measurement model, Billiet and colleagues also referred to
country specific effects and on the difficulty of selecting equivalent indicators for all
countries and religions.

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How to measure societal secularization

As I suggested, we should link changes of institutionalized religiosity and also com-
partmentalization to societal secularization to see the effect of the latter on individuals.
Consequently, if that is accepted, we should select the European countries to be studied
on the basis of their level of societal secularization. And, as far as the USA is con-
cerned, I think that some states in the USA should be selected on the same basis.
Indeed, the contrasts as far as societal secularization is concerned between the states of
the USA might be as great as in Europe.
This implies that we should agree how to measure secularization on the societal
level. However, well informed representative specialists from the states, who may be
included in the research, are needed to evaluate the indicators we select. On that basis,
a final set of indicators should be selected and tested in the different countries under
study. Let me make a proposal which will be heavily coloured by the Belgian
situation2, but, at some points, references are made to other countries too. This exercise
will also allow me to specify what I understand by measuring secularization on the
societal level.
Since secularization refers to a process by which the overarching and transcendent
religious system of old is reduced in modern functionally differentiated societies to a
sub-system alongside other sub-systems, losing in this process its overarching claims
over them, I will discuss some of the sub-systems:
1) The separation of State and Church, is this constitutionally institutionalized? Are
religious functionaries paid by the state? Does the state pay for the maintenance of reli-
gious buildings and is this depending on the uses that can be made of them? May civil
authorities display religious symbols in public places like mangers at Christmas. Are
national holidays celebrated with religious rites in which the representatives of the leg-
islative and juridical bodies are present or are there public national rites and are reli-
gious rituals taking place at such occasions considered to be purely private (recent
change in Belgium)? What is the place of the heads of the churches required by proto-
col? Humanist Associations in Belgium want to change the protocol since, up to now,
the Roman Catholic Cardinal is the first in rank, a protocol that goes back to
Napoleon3. Some political parties have proposed to change the law at the end of the
mandate of the actual cardinal. Are official ceremonies religious or non-religious; and
if religious: ecumenical or not, and what is the place for representatives of the Human-
ist Associations; and where do they take place: in a church or not (there is quite an evo-
lution in Belgium in this area)? Are the legal holidays related to religious holidays, e.g.
Good Friday in Great Britain or All Saints Day in Belgium? However, in Great Britain,
there are so-called bank holidays which suggest a kind of separation between church
and state. School vacations are more and more dissociated from religious holidays
(France and Belgium). Does the King, the Queen or the President pronounce the oath
of office on the bible or with the words so help me God. Does the President, the
Queen or the King refer to God in their addresses to the nation (The Queen of Great
Britain does it in her Christmas address, the Belgian King not, the President of the USA
usually finishes his addresses with May God bless you all). It is a difficult problem
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to find valid indicators when we state that secularization is related to institutional reli-
gion. Which are related to institutional religion and which ones are religious in general
and not related to institutional religion? Take for example, the reference to God on the
currency (USA), and prayers said at the start of a parliamentary session.
2) The juridical sub-system: Do people have to swear an oath with reference to God,
or to the bible or not; or is this optional? Are religious symbols banished by law from
the court rooms?
3) The educational sub-system: do denominational schools exist and are they sub-
sidized by the state? Are religious symbols forbidden in state schools? Are there reli-
gious classes in the official curriculum of state schools or not, or are there alternative
classes of which one should be taken (e.g. in Belgium religious classes or lay ethics)?
Are prayers said at the opening of the school day in state schools? Are prayers said at
the commencement in state schools? Are the names of the school vacations changed
dropping the religious references, e.g. the carnival recess becoming crocus vacation
in Belgium? And are ostentatious religious symbols (crosses, veils, etc.) forbidden in
public schools (e.g. in France and in some state schools in Belgium)?
4) The medical sub-system: Is abortion legally allowed under certain conditions? Is
euthanasia legally allowed under certain conditions (Belgium and the Netherlands)?
Are experiments with embryos legally allowed? Is the cultivation of stem cells legally
allowed?
5) The family sub-system: Is divorce possible by law? Are homosexual marriages
legal? Does a religious marriage have legal consequences (USA), or does a religious
marriage have to be preceded by a legal marriage (Belgium)?
6) The religious sub-system: Are there legal restrictions imposed on sects and
NRMs (Belgium and France)?
It is clear that the elaboration of such lists should be made with the help of jurists
and professionals of the sub-systems and that we have to maintain our definition that
in the case of secularization the reference is institutional religion, i.e. churches, and not
religiousness, at least if one accepts my definition of secularization.

Organizational secularization
We have discussed societal and individual secularization, what about organizational
secularization, or what Luckmann called internal secularization? Berger and Luck-
mann have suggested that the higher church attendance in America compared to
Europe might be explained by the mundane orientation of religion in America. Luck-
mann (1967:3637) called it internal secularization; a radical inner change in Amer-
ican church religion today the secular ideas of the American Dream pervade church
religion. In asserting that American churches were becoming highly secularized
themselves (Berger 1967:108) these authors sought to reconcile empirical findings at
the individual level, i.e. church attendance, which appeared to conflict with seculariza-
tion theories, by pointing out changes at the organizational level, i.e. within the
churches. This suggests to me that in our comparison between church commitment in

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Europe and the USA, we will have to evaluate the organizational secularization when
we want to explain differences between church commitment in the USA and Europe.
These differences should be worked out in collaboration with Americans. However, I
want to stress another point taking the organizational or institutional level into account,
i.e. the introduction of the rational choice approach.

The contribution of the rational choice approach to secularization

theory?
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) makes three important points. It postulates a latent reli-
giosity on the demand side (Stark 1997:8), that should become manifest by active com-
petition between religious firms on the supply side (Stark 1997:17). However, this is
only possible in a pluralistic religious situation where religious firms compete for cus-
tomers and to the extent that the supply-side is not limited by state regulations, sup-
pressing or subsidizing religions (Iannaccone 1997:4041; Finke: 1997:5051). State
and religion should be de-regulated, in my terms secularized, to allow competition
between religious firms; in the opposite case, religious firms are lazy (Stark and Ian-
naccone 1994) since there is no need for competition. Consequently, there is no oppo-
sition between secularization theory and RCT.
The problem in applying RCT in Europe is that competition between Christian
churches is limited by an agreement between the representatives of the Anglican,
Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant Churches to renounce all competitive evangeliza-
tion which might express a spirit of competition between them (Willaime 2004:32).
Consequently, the competition between so-called religious firms is limited to sects and
New Religious Movements (NRM) themselves and between them and the Christian
churches. However, due to state regulations, for example in Belgium and France, and
the anti-sect witch hunt in the media (also in Belgium and especially France), there is
no fair competition. Do we have to conclude then that the RCT is not applicable in
Europe? I do not think so, we should extend the notion of religion on the supply side
of the RCT.
In fact religion is only a sub-category of the more general concept meaning sys-
tem. It is a particular meaning system since it has a supra-empirical referent. There
are alongside religion other meaning systems, among others hedonism, materialism,
and individualism. The competition in Europe is more between religious meaning
systems and other meaning systems, more particularly, between religious and a- or
anti-religious meaning systems. The laicization or manifest process of societal secular-
ization attests to that. In Spain, the proposal to eliminate religion as a study subject in
state schools; in Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, the legalization of homo-mar-
riages; in Belgium and the Netherlands, the legalization of euthanasia, and so on. These
laws or legal propositions are opposed by the Catholic Church and in Belgium, the
extension of the law on euthanasia to children also by the Orthodox Church and Islam.

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All these laws are motivated in reference to religious and moral pluralism which
should allow, under certain conditions, to permit individuals to follow their own con-
science. It is clear that the rationale of these laws has changed compared with the
rationales given 100 years ago. Then its intention was to break the moral impact of the
Catholic church. However, these laws are still promoted by Humanist Associations and
by political parties that are strongly influenced by members of Atheistic Lodges. Do
we have a possibility on the basis of other studies to calculate the heterogeneity in
meaning systems taking religious, humanist and atheist firms into account? We have to
think about it and study ways in which to define the different meaning systems and how
to evaluate their respective strength. However, measuring pluralism does not measure
competition, a critique addressed to supply studies. And, a last question, does it add to
what we might measure in a different way: societal secularization in different countries
as a consequence of laicization, a manifest process of societal secularization result-
ing from political action opposed by the several religious firms?

Epilogue
I have presented my vision on a comparative research design that we intend to do. It is
made in the suggestive mode. I hope that these reflections will be helpful in developing
an international comparative study design for a survey about religiousness and spiritu-
ality in selected European countries and States of the USA from the perspective of sec-
ularization theory.
However, I do not think that one can make a comparative study between Europe and
the USA solely on the basis of secularization theory. The differences between Europe
and the USA go back in time. Immigrants notably went to the States for religious rea-
sons, i.e. the religious persecutions in Europe. Many more immigrated for economic
reasons; however, religion was on their side: denominations and sects played an impor-
tant role in supporting the immigrants and in socializing them in the values and norms
of their new social environment. On the contrary, religion was not, as in Europe, on one
side, i.e. the higher, dominant, social strata. In fact, due to religious pluralism, different
denominations and sects appealed to different social strata in the USA. Religion was
never in the centre of conflicts; if there were conflicts, religion was on both sides. Even
now, denominations and sects are an important basis for social life in the States. This
may be one of the important reasons that religion adapted to the American culture, the
so-called internal or organizational secularization.
In such a situation, the Enlightenment did not have an impact in the States as it had
in some European, especially in Catholic countries, where some lodges became anti-
religious and stimulated laws against NRMs. American lodges do not play the same
anti-religious role as for example in Belgium and France. In such an atmosphere, the
mass media are also totally different: in Europe they are critical of religion and reli-
gious bodies; in the USA, they are supportive. In the USA a vision of Intelligent Design
is present; in Europe it is critically rejected. We will have to think which indicators we

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should employ to measure such and other differences in attitudes towards religion and
how to incorporate them in our comparative design.

Notes
1 The aim of the project Religion in Europe and the United States: Different Responses to Moder-
nities initiated by the International Network on Religious Studies (INORS) is to provide system-
atic quantitative evidence of the role of religion in a comparative study between the United States
and Europe. A first Workshop on secularization was organized at the University of Copenhagen
(Denmark), May 31st to June 2nd 2006 (Homepage: http://www.staff.hum.ku.dk//pluchau/inors/).
This article is based on the introductory paper presented at this seminar.
2 This list has been established with the help of Liliane Voy
3 I do not want to suggest that societal secularization may only result from actions by Humanist
Associations; religious pluralization due to the growing number of nonconformist religious
movements has also had an impact on the separation of State and Church, like in Great Britain
and the USA. The unchurching of a large part of the population may also stimulate governments
to change certain laws to adapt them to a growing religious and moral pluralism in the population
(I come back to this in section 6).

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