U.S.

Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board ofImmigration Appeals

Office ofthe Clerk
5107 leesburg Pike. Suite 2000
Falls Church, Virginia 22041

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Blender, Brian OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - OAK
Blender Law Office 1010 East Whatley Road
300 W. Myrtle Street Oakdale, LA 71463-1128
Suite 200
Boise, ID 83702

Name: CORRAL-TREVIZO, JESUS ROB... A 034-979-405

Date of this notice: 6/2/2017

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.

Sincerely,

//]
h J J j
u A_, 1JUJ- o
,

....
i.

Cynthia L. Crosby
Acting Chief Clerk

Enclosure

Panel Members:
Pauley, Roger
Cole, Patricia A.
Wendtland, Linda S.

Userteam: Docket

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

www.irac.net/unpublished/index/

Cite as: Jesus Roberto Corral Trevizo, A034 979 405 (BIA June 2, 2017)
U.S. Department of Justice Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Executive Office for Immigration Review

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: A034 979 405 - Oakdale, LA Date:

JUN - 2 2017
In re: JESUS ROBERTO CORRAL TREVIZO

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IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Brian Blender, Esquire

ON BEHALF OF OHS: Lorraine L. Griffin

Assistant District Counsel

CHARGE:

Notice: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] -

Convicted of aggravated felony

A PPLICATION: Termination

The respondent is a lawful permanent resident who is a native and citizen of Mexico. t This
case was last before the Board on February 11, 2015, pmsuant to a remand from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court vacated our decision affirming the Immigration
Judge's November 10, 2011, conclusion that the respondent was removable as an aggravated felon
under section 10l(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
l10l(a)(43)(M)(i), based on his conviction for failure to collect or pay over a tax under section
7202 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 7202.2 The court declined to address whether the
respondent's conviction fell within the purview of section 10l(a)(43)(M)(ii) of the Act because
the Board did not address that issue. In light of the evolving case law since the Immigration
Judge's 2011 decision, including the issuance of Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276
(2013), we determined in our February 11, 2015, decision that it was appropriate to remand the
record for the Immigration Judge to reassess the respondent's removability in the first instance.

1 The record reflects that the respondent has been removed to Mexico (l.J. at 2 n.2).

2 The court found that 26 U.S.C. 7202 was not a categorical aggravated felony under section
10l(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act because there was at least one way to commit the crime that did not
involve fraud or deceit. The Court also found that under the modified categorical approach, the
conviction records did not reflect that the respondent pleaded guilty to an offense necessarily
involving fraud or deceit. See Corral-Trevizo v. Holder, 560 F. App'x 421 (5th Cir. 2014).

Cite as: Jesus Roberto Corral Trevizo, A034 979 405 (BIA June 2, 2017)
,
'

A034 979 405

On March 15, 2016,3 the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent was convicted of
an aggravated felony under section 10 l(a)(43)(M)(ii) of the Act under the categorical approach.
Thus, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") had met its burden of establishing
removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act. The respondent now appeals. The appeal
will be sustained.

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We review an Immigration Judge's findings of fact, including findings regarding witness
credibility and what is likely to happen to the respondent, under a "clearly erroneous" standard. 8
C. F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(i); Matter of Z-Z-0-, 26 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2015) . We review all other
issues, including questions of law, discretion, and judgment, under a de novo standard. 8 C.F.R.
1003.l(d)(3)(ii).

To determine whether a crime is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, we apply the
categorical approach. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990);
Descamps v. United States, supra; Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2014) . Pursuant to
the categorical approach, only the "fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior
offense" can be examined. See Matter of Ibarra , 26 I&N Dec. 809, 810-11 (BIA 2016) (citing

Taylor v. United States, supra, at 602); see also Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) .

If the criminal statute contains elements similar to or narrower than the generic offense
described in the removability charge, the respondent is removable based on the offense of
conviction. If, however, the criminal statute is broader, the offense of conviction does not fall
within the ground ofremovability. See Descamps v. United States, supra, at 2283.

Section 10l(a)(43)(M)(ii) of the Act provides that an offense is an aggravated felony if it is

"described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to tax evasion) in which
the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000." Section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code,
26 U. S.C. 7201, in turn provides-

Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation) , or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.

Therespondent's offense of conviction, section 7202 of the Internal Revenue Code, provides-

Any person required under this title to collect, account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay
over such tax shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a
felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.

3 Also on March 15, 2016, the Immigration Judge reopened proceedings sua sponte for the limited
purpose of reissuing her July 21, 2015, decision to allow the respondent to file an appeal.

2
Cite as: Jesus Roberto Corral Trevizo, A034 979 405 (BIA June 2, 2017)
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A034 979 405

The respondent argues on appeal that Congress intended to exclude section 7202 of the Internal
Revenue Code as an aggravated felony as "described in section 720l " because it referenced only
section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code in section 10l(a)(43)(M)(ii) of the Act (Respondent's
Br. at 4-6) . We agree and hold that section 10l(a)(43)(M)(ii) of the Act does not include offenses
covered by section 7202 of the Internal Revenue Code.4

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The plain language of section 10l(a)(43)(M)(ii) provides that the offense must be "described
in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986" (emphasis added) (Respondent's
Br. at 4-5) . The "relating to tax evasion" language contained in the parenthetical is descriptive
only, i.e., it provides a short hand reference to the types of offenses that are described in section
7201 (Respondent's Br. at 7) . See Matter of Oppedisano, 26 l&N Dec. 202, 203-06 (BIA 2013)
(referencing Matter of Ruiz-Romero, 22 l&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1999) , affirmed
Oppedisano v. Holder, 769 F.3d 147 (2d Cir 2014) , cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2 1 1 (2015) , and
indicating that generally the parentheticals in section 10l(a)(43) of the Act are descriptive and
intended as an illustration of the referenced criminal statutes) . The parenthetical does not operate
independently of the first part of the sentence; if it did, the parenthetical would render the specific
reference to section 7201 largely meaningless. Thus, the Immigration Judge erred in giving the
"relating to tax evasion" language of the parenthetical an overly expansive interpretation to reach
offense conduct not described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code. Cf Matter of
Gruenangerl, 25 l&N Dec. 35 1, 355 (BIA 2010) (recognizing that the Fifth Circuit and the Board
have consistently ruled that the phrase "relating to" has an expansive meaning when it is used in
correction with a general terin like "counterfeiting" or "controlled substance," "rather than with a
specific statutory reference ) (emphasis added).
"

Our ruling is consistent with our prior case law. For example, in Matter ofOppedisano, supra,
we rejected the alien's argument that the parenthetical phrase "relating to firearms offenses" in
section 101(a)( 43)(E)(ii) of the Act excluded his conviction for possession of ammunition by a
convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)( l ) , because the parenthetical specified "firearms
offenses." Reading the parenthetical in context of the criminal provisions referenced in section
10l(a)(43)(E)(ii) , and giving the parenthetical a commonsense reading, we concluded that an
offense involving ammunition is one ''related to firearms offenses." Id. at 206. We also
specifically noted that many of the referenced criminal statutes covered both firearms and
ammunition offenses. Id. at 205-06.
The Immigration Judge relied on United States v. Monjaras-Castaneda, 190 F.3d 326,
329-3 1 (5th Cir. 1999) (l.J. at 4) . In that case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the alien's argument that
his offense of illegal transportation of aliens under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)( l ) was not an aggravated

4 In Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012) , the Court held that a conviction under section
7206 of the Internal Revenue Code was not precluded from being an aggravated felony under
section 10l(a)(43)(M)(i) as an offense that "involves deceit." We note that the (M)(i) provision is
of a general, descriptive nature and does not, as does the (M)(ii) provision at issue here, refer to a
specific statute. We also observe that the Court addressed the phrase "described in" in section
10l(a)(48) in Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1019(2016) , but in a different context namely whether it
incoiporated the federal jurisdictional element for arson.

3
Cite as: Jesus Roberto Corral Trevizo, A034 979 405 (BIA June 2, 2017)
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A034 979 405

felony under section l0l(a)(43)(N) of the Act because his offense did not fall within the scope of
the parenthetical phrase "relating to alien smuggling." The court found that the parenthetical was
descriptive and an "aid to identification" of the sorts of offenses covered by 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(l},
which is referenced in section 101(a)(43)(N) of the Act and precedes the parenthetical phrase. Id.
at 329-30. The court also noted that transporting aliens was often related to alien smuggling. Id.
at 330. According to the Immigration Judge the rationale of the United States v. Monjaras

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Castaneda, meant that the phrase "relating to tax evasion" identified the type of offense described
in section 7201, "which involves any manner of attempting to evade or defeat a tax" (l.J. at 4)
(emphasis added).

The Immigration Judge, however, inappropriately expanded the reasoning of

United States v. Monjaras-Castaneda, supra. The aggravated felony provision at issue in
United States v. Monjaras-Castaneda, section 1Ol(a)(43)(N) of the Act, specifically references the
alien's statute of conviction, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(l)(A). The same is true of the aggravated felony
provision at issue in Matter of Oppedisano, supra; section l0l(a)(43)(E)(ii) of the Act references
the alien's offense of conviction, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(l). In contrast, section l0l(a)(43)(M)(ii) of
the Act references only offenses "described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code." The
Immigration Judge reached well beyond the scope of the statutory language of section
l0l(a)(43)(M)(ii) to include the respondent's offense of conviction under section 7202 of the
Internal Revenue Code, as under no ordinary and natural reading can section 7202 be deemed
"described in" section 7201.

For these reasons we conclude that the OHS did not meet its burden to show that the respondent
is removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act. We reverse the Immigration Judge's
removability determination. Inasmuch as section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act was the only charge
against the respondent, we will terminate these proceedings.

Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained.

FURTIIER ORDER: The removal proceedings are terminated.

FOR TIIE BOARD c::::::

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Cite as: Jesus Roberto Corral Trevizo, A034 979 405 (BIA June 2, 2017)
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
IMMIGRATION COURT
OAKDALE, LOUISIANA

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IN THE MATTER OF ) IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
)
Jesus Roberto CORRAL-TREVIZO ) File No.:A034-979-40S
)
Respondent )
- )

CHARGE: Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as an alien,

who at any time after admission, was convicted of an aggravated felony as
defined in section 10l(a)(43)(M) of the Act, an offense that (i) involves fraud or
deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000 or (ii) is
described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to tax
evasion) in which the loss to the government exceeds $10,000.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF THE DEPARTMENT:

Brian Blender, Esq. Assistant Chief Counsel
Blender Law Office, P.C. OHS/ICE/Litigation Unit
300 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 200 1010 East Whatley Road
Boise, ID 83702 Oakdale, LA 71463

DECISION AND ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

I. PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL HISTORY

On August 23, 2011, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("OHS") personally served Respondent with a Notice to Appear ("NTA"},
alleging that he is a native and citizen of Mexico who was admitted to the United States at El
Paso, Texas on March 12, 1975 as a SA-1 immigrant. The OHS further alleged that Respondent
was convicted on September 21, 2010 in the U.S. District Court, District of Idaho for Failure to
Collect or Pay Over Tax in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7202. Based on these allegations, the DHS
charged Respondent as removable pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), as defined in section
101(a)(43)(M), of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("Act").

At the hearing on October 13, 2011, Respondent, through counsel, admitted the factual
allegations contained in the NTA but contested removability. On November 8, 2011 the Court
issued a written decision, finding that Respondents conviction oonstilutes an aggravated felony
under subsections {i) .and (ii) of 101{a)(43')(M}. At the hearing .on November 10, 201 l, the Court

.

.sustained the removability charge contained in the NTA and ordered Respondent removed from
1he United '.States 10 Mexico. 'Respondent'.s ,attorney expressed a desire :to .app.eal, A1ut he w.anted
,t-0 appeal after he was deported and outside .Of the united 'States. The Court advised
Res.pondenf-s .att.Qrney that if he .a.ccd the -decisimi .ordering .Responliient remaed and
:the

government also accei:>ted, the .decision would be final. Respondent's attorney and the DHS

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 ,..
'

attorney accepted the decision.

Respondent, through counsel, filed an appeal of the final order. The Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA'') accepted the appeal on certification, finding that the record was
"equivocal" as to whether Respondent knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal.
Though Respondent's attorney was reluctant to accept the order as final, he was clearly advised
that if he accepted it on Respondent's behalf the Court's decision would be final. There was
1
nothing equivocal in the acceptance of the final order.

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On April 18, 2013, the BIA affinned the Court's decision that Respondent's conviction is
an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i). Thereafter, he filed a petition for review
with the Fifth Circuit. On May 14, 2014, the Fifth Circuit issued a written decision, vacating the
decision that his conviction is an aggravated felony under section 10l(a)(43)(M)(i). The court
did not reach the question whether his offense is an aggravated felony under section
101(a)(43)(M)(ii) and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. On February 11,
2015, the BIA remanded the case to the Court to further reassess removability.

On March 10, 2015, the Court held a hearing on remand. Respondent was not present at
2
the hearing, but his attorney appeared telephonically. Both parties agreed that the only issue is
whether Respondent is removable pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), as defined in section
10l(a)(43)(M)(ii), of the Act. The Court granted the parties an opportunity to submit legal briefs
on the issue and reset the case to April 30, 2015. The Court infonned Respondent's attorney that
he should be prepared to designate relief should it be determined that he is removable. On March
31, 2015, the DHS submitted a brief on the removability issue; Respondent submitted a brief on
April 13, 2015.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Section 101(a)(43)(M)(ii)of the Act defines an aggravated felony as an offense described

in 26 U.S.C. 7201 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the government
exceeds $10,000. To determine whether an offense constitutes an aggravated felony, the Court
must conduct a categorical approach. See Taylor v. United States. 495 U.S. 575 (1990);
Descamps v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013); see also U.S. v. Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 177
(5th Cir. 2014) (adopting the rules set out in Descamps). This categorical inquiry looks to the
criminal statute, rather than the specific underlying facts of the particular case. Descamps, 133
S.Ct. at 2283 (citing to Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). If the criminal statute contains elements similar
to or narrower than the generic offense described in the removability charge, the criminal offense
renders the alien removable. Id. On the other hand, if the criminal statute sweeps more broadly,
the conviction does not fall within the ground of removability. Id.

When a statute is divisible, the Court may employ the modified categorical approach. Id.
at 2284-85. A statute is divisible when it sets out one or more elements of the offense in the
alternative, and .at least one alternative offense matches the generic offense and another does oot.

1 The BIA -has h.eld that those who understand the meaning ,of.. the .short hand press ion .accpting.a .decision as

. .

final," such -as aliens represemed:by attorneys, may e.ffectiv.ely waive appeal in response to the qtJe.stion .ukingthe

fl!rt.tes whether they.acce,pt .a decision as ..finaL" Matter of Rodriguez-Dia 22 l&N Dec. 1320, 1322 (BIA 2000).
1'9e DHS a1t0mey :inmcatea that .iR.Bndent w.as J\at in lCE .oustec:ly. Respondent's attorney indksted that 'he was
.rem&ved 1t0 :f9foXiico .and -ilad .not yet been retume.d .> :the :wnned States. He :also.stated :that Respondent's presence
was not necessary because the only issue before the Court was a matter of law.

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Id. Under the modified categorical approach, the Court may go beyond the statutory elements
and consult a limited class of documents to determine which alternative offense formed the basis
of the conviction. Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281 (referring to the documents outlined in Shepard
v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005)). These documents include the charging document, written
plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to
which the defendant assented. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16. Other documents, including police
reports and complaint applications, may not be considered. Id.

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Ill. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

Respondent pleaded guilty to Failure to Collect or Pay Over Tax in violation of 26 U.S.C.
7202. See Exh. 3; Exh. 4, Tabs A-B. The statute is violated when "[a]ny person required under
[Title 26] to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by [Title 26] .. . willfully fails to
collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax." See 26 U.S.C. 7202. The Court finds
that the offense described in section 7202 is categorically an aggravated felony because: (1) it is
substantially similar to the offense described in 26 U.S.C. 7201; and (2) it is an offense that
"relates to" tax evasion.

Section 10l(a)(43)(M){ii) of the Act defines an aggravated felony as an offense described

in 26 U.S.C. 7201. See INA 10l(a)(43)(M)(ii) (emphasis added). Section 7201 is violated
when a person "willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by [Title
26] or the payment thereof. See 26 U.S.C. 7201. The BIA has reasoned that an offense is
"described in" a statutory provision if the offense has the same substantive elements as that
statutory provision. See Matter of Vasguez-Muniz, 23 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2007) (discussing
whether a state offense for felony firearm possession is an offense described in 18 U.S.C.
922(g)( 1)). The Fifth Circuit adopted this statutory interpretation, reasoning that the phrase
"described in" should not be read to limit the offenses constituting aggravated felonies because
Congress used the looser standard "described in" rather than the more precise phrase "defined
in" as used elsewhere in the Act. Hernandez v. Holder, 592 F.3d 681, 685-86 (5th Cir. 2009).

The statute under which Respondent was convicted, 26 U.S.C. 7202, is substantially
similar to section 7201 because they have the same substantive elements. Section 7201 involves:
(1) willful conduct; (2) an attempt to evade or defeat; and (3) a tax imposed by Title 26. Section
7202 involves: (1) willful conduct: (2) a failure to collect or account for and pay over; and (3) a
tax imposed by Title 26. Although section 7202 does not include the specific language "the
attempt to evade or defeat a tax," willfully failing to collect or truthfully account for and pay
over a tax is a form of willfully attempting to evade or defeat a tax. In his brief, Respondent
argues that his offense is not an attempt to evade or defeat a tax because there was no attempt to
hide anything, defraud anyone, or misrepresent anything. See Respondent's Brief at 5. While
these actions are all of the character of attempting to evade or defeat a tax, they are not the sole
methods by which a person may evade or defeat a tax. As stated by the Supreme Court,

Congress did not '.define .m limit the methods by which a w.iUful attemptto defeat
and evade might be accomplished and perhaps did not define lest its effort to do
-so :result :in some .W'l.expected :limitation. Nor -would we -y :definition ,cmnstdct :the
- .of 'the congressioi.:ral pr-0vision that it may be accomPiished 'in any
'
manner.

Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. "492, 499 (1943) (emphasis added).

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I t

Although section 7202 appears to describe an act of omission, the statute is violated by an
affirmative act, i.e., the willful failure to collect or truthfully account for and pay over a tax
where Title 26 imposes a duty to do so. To note, the term "willful" is defined as "voluntary and
intentional." BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY 1737 (9th ed. 2009). As such, the voluntary and
intentional failure to collect or truthfully account for and pay over a tax is a manner by which a
person attempts to evade or defeat a tax or payment therefore. The failure to pay over a tax, in
and of itself, is evading. the payment of the tax. Thus, the Court finds that a violation of section

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7202 is an offense "described in" section 7201.

In addition, section 101(a)(43)(M)(ii) of the Act defines an aggravated felony as an

offense described in 26 U.S.C. 7201 (relating to tax evasion). See INA 10l(a)(43)(M)(ii)
(emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit has held that the parenthetical phrase "relating to . .. " is
descriptive, not limiting. See United States v. Monjaras-Castan 190 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1999)
(discussing whether illegally transporting aliens constitutes an offense described in section
1324(a) of the Act (relating to alien smuggling)). The court reasoned that the context in which
the parenthetical appears directly after a statutory provision rather than directly after the term
"offense" suggests that the parenthetical phrase is descriptive in nature and only provides an aid
to identifying the type of offense descried in the specific statutory provision. Id. at 329-30.

Under the Fifth Circuit's rationale, the phrase "relating to tax evasion" identifies the type
of offense described in section 7201, which involves any manner of attempting to evade or defeat
a tax. As previously discussed, the willful failure to collect or truthfully account for and pay over
a tax is a manner by which a person attempts to evade or defeat a tax or payment therefore.
Moreover, failing to collect or truthfully account for a tax is quite often "related to" tax evasion
because it is a step in the process, and the failure to pay over the tax, in and of itself, is tax
evasion. Consequently, the Court finds that a violation of section 7202 is an offense described in
section 7201 "relating to tax evasion."

Lastly, the conviction records indicate that the revenue loss to the government exceeded
$10,000. The plea agreement indicates that Respondent failed to pay over $113,709.12 in trust
fund taxes and $112,638.53 for FICA taxes for the tax year 2002. See Exh. 4, Tab A. For the tax
year 2003, he failed to pay over $149,140.25 in trust fund taxes and $34,663.25 for FICA taxes.
Id. For the tax year 2004, he failed to pay over $214,258.10 in trust fund taxes and $44,843.45
for FICA taxes. Id. For the tax year 2005, he failed to pay over $101,699.42 in trust fund taxes.
Id. As these amounts exceed $10,000, the Court finds that Respondent's conviction is an
aggravated felony under section 10l(a)(43)(M)(ii) of the Act and he is removable pursuant to
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).

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Accordingly, the following orders shall be issued:

ORDERS: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the removability charge under section
237(a)(2)(A)(iii) as defined in 10l(a)(43)(M) of the Act is SUSTAINED.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent is REMOVED

from the United States to Mexico.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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THIS DOCUMENT WAS SERVED BY: MA il@ PERSONAL SERVICE (P)

TO: { ] ALIEN {.....-]ALIEN c/o Custodial Officer { ) ALIEN'S ATTY/REP {'-"fDHS

DATE: 3-')"j-f {p BY: COURT STAFF -J
. r- <..____

Attacbments: ( ] 'EOIR33 ' ( ].EOIR-28 I lLegal 'Services List .( .] Other

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