0% found this document useful (0 votes)
91 views5 pages

Leus v. SSCW

The petitioner was employed by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic educational institution. She became pregnant out of wedlock, and SSCW sought to dismiss her, arguing it constituted serious misconduct. The labor tribunals sided with SSCW, but the Supreme Court disagreed. It found that being pregnant out of wedlock did not necessarily amount to disgraceful or immoral conduct without more evidence. To be a valid basis for dismissal, the conduct must contravene prevailing secular social norms, not just religious beliefs. As the father was also unmarried, petitioner's actions did conform to secular morality and law. Thus, her dismissal was invalid.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
91 views5 pages

Leus v. SSCW

The petitioner was employed by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic educational institution. She became pregnant out of wedlock, and SSCW sought to dismiss her, arguing it constituted serious misconduct. The labor tribunals sided with SSCW, but the Supreme Court disagreed. It found that being pregnant out of wedlock did not necessarily amount to disgraceful or immoral conduct without more evidence. To be a valid basis for dismissal, the conduct must contravene prevailing secular social norms, not just religious beliefs. As the father was also unmarried, petitioner's actions did conform to secular morality and law. Thus, her dismissal was invalid.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 5

G.R. No.

187226, January 28, 2015

CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, v. ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE


WESTGROVE AND/OR SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB, Respondents.

FACTS:

SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang Cavite. In May 2001, SSCW
hired petitioner as an Assistant to SSCWs Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community
Outreach Directorate.

Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When
SSCW learned of the petitioners pregnancy, the Directress advised her to file a resignation letter.
In response, petitioner informed her that she would not resign from her employment just because
she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage.

Petitioner was formally directed to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for
engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts
to serious misconduct of unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic School. In letter, petitioner
explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct
unbecoming of an employee. She averred that she is unaware of any school policy stating that
being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a serious misconduct and, thus, a ground for
dismissal. Further, the petitioner requested a copy of SSCWs policy and guidelines so that she
may better respond to the charge against her.

On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the promulgation of a
Support Staff Handbook, SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
(1992 MRPS) on the causes for termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of the 1992
MRPS cites disgraceful or immoral conduct as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just
causes for termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Through
counsel, petitioner reiterated that it does not fall within the contemplation of disgraceful or
immoral conduct and serious misconduct of the MRPS and the Labor Code. Still, SSCW
maintained their stand that such act is serious misconduct and thus, ground for termination.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with NLRC.

The LA found that there was a valid ground for the petitioners dismissal; that her
pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a disgraceful and immoral conduct. The LA
pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic educational institution, the petitioner is expected
to live up to the Catholic values taught by SSCW to its students. NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiters decision. CA upheld NLRC decision and ruled in favor of SSCW making the
dismissal of petitioner a valid exercise of SSCWs management prerogative to discipline
and impose penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations.
.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a valid ground to terminate
her employment

HELD:

No. SC finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned conclusion arrived at by the
labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not
enough to characterize the petitioners conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must be
substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy
out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.

In Chua-Qua v. Clave, the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of
each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing
norms of conduct and applicable laws. Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct per se that determines whether the same is
disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society as respectable
or moral. If the conduct does not conform to what society generally views as respectable or
moral, then the conduct is considered as disgraceful or immoral. Tersely put, substantial evidence
must be presented, which would establish that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the
prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral.

Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step


process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct;
and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis--vis the prevailing norms of
conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not absolutely
determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral. There is still a
necessity to determine whether the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock is considered
disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct.

In Estrada, an administrative case against a court interpreter charged with disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the Court stressed that in determining whether a particular conduct can be
considered as disgraceful and immoral, the distinction between public and secular morality on
the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. That the distinction
between public and secular morality and religious morality is important because the jurisdiction
of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further explained that:
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious x x x.
Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but
public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms. Otherwise,
if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the
resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in


criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.

Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an unmarried woman gives
birth out of wedlock:

(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct. It may be a not-so-ideal
situation and may cause complications for both mother and child but it does not give cause
for administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under
those circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual
activity between two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation contravene any
fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution, a document that
accommodates various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other than
the mother, then there is a cause for administrative sanction against either the father or
the mother. In such a case, the disgraceful and immoral conduct consists of having
extramarital relations with a married person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally
recognized and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union.
Accordingly, judicial employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married
persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.

In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child was
unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct simply because she gave birth to the child Christian Jeon out of wedlock.

Both Estrada and Radam are administrative cases against employees in the civil service. The
Court, however, sees no reason not to apply the doctrines enunciated in Estrada and Radam in
the instant case. Estrada and Radam also required the Court to delineate what conducts are
considered disgraceful and/or immoral as would constitute a ground for dismissal. More
importantly, as in the said administrative cases, the instant case involves an employees security
of tenure; this case likewise concerns employment, which is not merely a specie of property
right, but also the means by which the employee and those who depend on him
live.45chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It bears stressing that the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the
Constitution. Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not be dismissed unless for cause provided
under the Labor Code and other relevant laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS. As stated above,
when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not
religious morality. Thus, the proscription against disgraceful or immoral conduct under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily
refer to public and secular morality. Accordingly, in order for a conduct to be considered as
disgraceful or immoral, it must be detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.

The Court does not find any circumstance in this case which would lead the Court to
conclude that the petitioner committed a disgraceful or immoral conduct. It bears stressing
that the petitioner and her boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no legal
impediment to marry. Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married her
boyfriend, the father of her child. As the Court held in Radam, there is no law which
penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the
consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons; that neither does such situation
contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution.

To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to
marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely
public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

The Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that the petitioners
indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students. Other than the SSCWs bare
allegation, the records are bereft of any evidence that would convincingly prove that the
petitioners conduct indeed adversely affected SSCWs integrity in teaching the moral doctrines,
which it stands for. The petitioner is only a non-teaching personnel; her interaction with SSCWs
students is very limited. It is thus quite impossible that her pregnancy out of wedlock caused
such a grave scandal, as claimed by SSCW, as to warrant her dismissal.

The SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and, if need be,
dismiss them if there is a valid cause to do so. However, as already explained, there is no cause
to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as disgraceful or immoral.
Further, the respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the controversy,
does not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital sexual relations
and conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no valid basis in law or even in SSCWs
policy and rules, SSCWs dismissal of the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a
valid exercise of management prerogative.

You might also like