YU CON, Plaintiff-Appellee, GLICERIO IPIL, NARCISO LAURON, and JUSTO SOLAMO, Defendants-Appellants. (1916) Facts
YU CON, Plaintiff-Appellee, GLICERIO IPIL, NARCISO LAURON, and JUSTO SOLAMO, Defendants-Appellants. (1916) Facts
vs.
GLICERIO IPIL, NARCISO LAURON, and JUSTO SOLAMO, defendants-appellants. (1916)
FACTS:
1) The purpose of the action brought in these proceedings is to enable the plaintiff to recover from
the defendants jointly and severally the sum of P450, which had been delivered by the plaintiff to
the first and third of the above-named defendants, master and supercargo, respectively, of a
banca named Maria belonging to the second defendant, to be carried, together with various
merchandise belonging to the plaintiff, from the port of Cebu to the town of Catmon of the
Province of Cebu
2) Plaintiff Yu Con is engaged in the sale of cloth and domestic articles in town of Catmon, City of
Cebu had several times chartered from defendant Lauron, a banca name Maria w/c Ipil was
master and Solamo was supercargo, for the transportation of merchandise and some money to
and from the said town and port of Cebu.
3) Yu Con chartered the said banca for transportation of various merchandise from Cebu port to
Catmon. The ff day, he delivered to the other two defendants, Ipil and Solamo, sum of P450
which was in a trunk belonging to Yu Con.
4) While the money was still in said trunk aboard the vessel, the said master Ipil and supercargo
Solamo TRANSFERRED the P450 from the plaintiffs trunk, where it was, to theirs, which was in
a stateroom of the banca, from which stateroom both the trunk and the money disappeared
during the same night, and that the investigations made to ascertain their whereabouts, produced
no result.
5) The plaintiff based his action on the charge that the disappearance of said sum was due to the
abandonment, negligence, or voluntary breach, on the part of the defendants, of the duty they
had in respect to the safe-keeping of the aforementioned sum.
6) The defendants, besides denying the allegations of the complaint, pleaded in special defense that
the plaintiff, at his own expense and under his exclusive responsibility, chartered the said banca,
the property of the defendant Lauron, for the fixed period of three days, at the price of P10 per
diem, and that, through the misfortune, negligence, or abandonment of the plaintiff himself, the
loss complained of occurred, while said banca was at anchor in the port of Cebu, and was caused
by theft committed by unknown thieves.
a. They further alleged that said defendant Lauron, the owner of the banca merely placed
this craft at the disposal of the plaintiff for the price and period agreed upon, and did not
go with the banca on its voyage from Catmon to Cebu
7) TC there was no room to doubt that the sole cause of the disappearance of the money from the
said banca was the negligence of the master and the supercargo, Ipil and Solamo, respectively,
and that defendant Lauron was responsible for the negligence as owner of the banca, pursuant to
Arts 589, 587, and 618 of the Code of Commerce, the plaintiff being entitled to recover the
amount lost.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendants are liable in this case? YES!
Whether the banca is considered as a vessel in accordance to Code of Commerce? YES!
RATIO:
According to the testimony of the master Ipil himself he slept outside the stateroom that night, but a cabin-
boy named Gabriel slept inside. The latter, however, was not presented by the defendants to be examined
in regard to this point, nor does it appear that he testified in respect thereto in his affidavit.
The master Ipil and the supercargo Solamo also testified that they left the cabin-boy Simeon Solamo on
guard that night; but this affirmation was not corroborated by Solamo at the trial, for he was not introduced
as a witness, and only his affidavit, Exhibit 2, taken before the fiscal of Cebu on the day following the
commission of the crime, was presented by the defendants.
Finally, said two defendants, the master and the supercargo, gave no satisfactory explanation in regard to
the disappearance of the trunk and the money therein contained, from the stateroom in which the trunk
was, nor as to who stole or might have stolen it.
The master of the banca merely testified that they, he and the supercargo, did to know who the robbers
were, for, when the robbery was committed, they were sound asleep, as they were tired, and that he
believed that the guard Simeon also fell asleep because he, too, was tired. The second defendant gave
the same testimony.
Both of them testified that the small window of the stateroom had been broken, and the first of them, i.e.,
the master, stated that all the window-blinds had been removed from the windows, as well as part of the
partition in which they were, and that the trunk in which the money was contained could have been
passed through said small window, because, as this witness himself had verified, the Chinaman's trunk,
which differed but a little from the one stolen, could be passed through the same opening.
HOWEVER, The chief pilot of the harbor of Cebu, Placido Sepeda, who officially visited the said banca,
also stated that the small wooden window of the stateroom was broken, and that he believed that in
breaking it much noise must have been produced. Also, no evidence whatever was offered by counsel for
the defendants to prove that it might have been possible to remove the trunk from the stateroom through
the opening made by the breaking of the small window
DEFENDANTS as DEPOSITARIES - It is unquestionable that the defendants Glicerio Ipil and Justo
Solamo were the carriers of the said P450 belonging to the plaintiff, and that they received this sum from
the latter for the purpose of delivering it to the store of the town of Catmon, to which it had been
consigned. Under such circumstances, said defendants were the depositaries of the money
Liability of carrier from the time thing is delivered to carrier to the time the thing is delivered to the
consignee.
The said two defendants being the depositaries of the sum in question, and they having failed to exercise
for its safe-keeping the diligence required by the nature of the obligation assumed by them and by the
circumstances of the time and the place,
LAURON LIABLE AS SHIPOWNER - With respect to the other defendant, Narciso Lauron, as he was the
owner of the vessel in which the loss or misplacement of the P450 occurred, of which vessel, as
aforestated, Glicerio Ipil was master and Justo Solamo, supercargo, both of whom were appointed to, or
chosen for, the positions they held, by the defendant himself, and, as the aforementioned sum was
delivered to the said master, Ipil,
VESSEL - Said vessel was engaged in the transportation of merchandise by sea and made voyages to
and from the port of Cebu to Catmon, and had been equipped and victualed for this purpose by its owner,
Narciso Lauron, with whom, as aforesaid, the plaintiff contracted for the transportation of the merchandise
which was to be carried, on the date hereinabove mentioned, from the port of Cebu to the town of Catmon
For legal purposes, that is, for the determination of the nature and effect of the relations created between
the plaintiff, as owner of the merchandise laden on said craft and of the money that was delivered to the
master, Ipil, and the defendant Lauron, as owner of the craft, the latter was a vessel, according to the
meaning and construction given to the word vessel in the Mercantile Code, in treating of maritime
commerce, under Title 1,
The word vessel serves to designate every kind of craft by whatever particular or technical name it may
now be known or which nautical advancements may give it in the future (Commentaries on the Code of
Commerce, in the General Review of Legislation and Jurisprudence, founded by D. Jose Reus y Garcia,
Vol., 2 p. 136.)
According to the Dictionary of Legislation and Jurisprudence by Escriche, a vessel is any kind of craft,
considering solely the hull.
Blanco, the commentator on mercantile law, in referring to the grammatical meaning of the word "ship"
and "vessels," says, in his work aforecited, that these terms designate every kind of craft, large or small,
whether belonging to the merchant marine or to the navy. And referring to their juridical meaning, he adds:
"This does not differ essentially from the grammatical meaning; the words "ship" and "vessel" also
designate every craft, large or small, so long as it be not an accessory of another, such as the small boat
of a vessel, of greater or less tonnage. This definition comprises both the craft intended for ocean or for
coastwise navigation, as well as the floating docks, mud lighters, dredges, dumpscows or any other
floating apparatus used in the service of an industry or in that of maritime commerce. . . ." (Vol. 1, p. 389.)
According to the foregoing definitions, then, we should that the banca called Maria, chartered by
the plaintiff Yu Con from the defendant Narciso Lauron, was a "vessel", pursuant to the meaning
this word has in mercantile law, that is, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of
Commerce in force.
Glicerio Ipil, the master of the said banca Maria, must also be considered as its captain, in the legal
acceptation of this word.
It is therefore evident that, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in force, which are
applicable to the instance case, the defendant Narciso Lauron, as the proprietor and owner of the craft of
which Glicerio Ipil was the master and in which, through the fault and negligence of the latter and of the
supercago Justo Solamo, there occurred the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to the
plaintiff and were delivered to said master and supercargo, a theft which, on the other hand, as shown by
the evidence, does not appear to have been committed by a person not belonging to the craft,
should, for said loss or theft, be held civilly liable to the plaintiff, who executed with said defendant Lauron
the contract for the transportation of the merchandise and money aforementioned between the port of
Cebu and the town of Catmon, by means of the said craft.