Lonzanida vs COMELEC [311 SCRA 602]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit

rule)

Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two

consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to
the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He
assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in
1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The
court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election
last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a
failure of election.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior
proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him
from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms
in the same post.

The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of

his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before
the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full
term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the
Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the
petition for disqualification

Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC

resolutions maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two
consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be
counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three
term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.

The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of

office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term
because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until
March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral
elections.

Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio

Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one
full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials.

Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the

term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such
officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the
same rule, that: No local elective official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.

The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to

1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term.

Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation

of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the
three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his
post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.

Disqualification (Sec 40, LGC; Moral Turpitude)

FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were

rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District
of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber
filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February
19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of COMELEC Davao del Sur, a consolidated
petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters
certificate of candidacy due to the fact that Villaber was
convicted by the RTC for violation of BP22 and was sentenced to
suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum
of P100,000.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves
moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with
this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CAs
Decision. However, in its Resolution of October 26, 1992, this
Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2,
1993, our Resolution became final and executory. Cagas also
asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in
his certificate of candidacy that he is Eligible for the office
I seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to deny
due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered
mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory
because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court
for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the
judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot
be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position
papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for
resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in Cagas petition,
issued the challenged Resolution declaring Villaber disqualified
as a candidate for and from holding any elective public office
and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled
that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the
administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en
banc in a Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.

HELD:
In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for
Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared
by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
grantedamnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.
As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently
adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
In In re Vinzon, the term moral turpitude is considered as
encompassing everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, or good morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections
that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that
as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme
Court to determine. We further pronounced therein that:
in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the Court
admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as
malum in se or as malum prohibitum. In the final analysis,
whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on the circumstances
surrounding the case.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect,
he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime
involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its
elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime
of fencing punishable by a special law.
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the
following Information:
That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D.
Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands
(Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13,
1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said
notice. (Emphasis ours)

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to

account or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she

does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for

insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[19]

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. We

held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports
deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person.Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a
drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his
private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.