[G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.

]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
respondent.
Facts:
A Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate was filed by respondent before
RTC Laguna praying that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
Respondent alleged that she was born and registered as a female in the Certificate
of Live Birth but while growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where a person thus afflcted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy and
her ovarian structures had minimized. She has stopped growing and has no breast or
menstrual development. For all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion,
she has become a male person.
Said petition was published in a nespaper of general circulation and was posted in
conspicuous palces by the sheriff of the court.
Respondent presented testimony of DR. Sionzon of UP-PGH who recommended the
change of gender since respondent made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male,
and that the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC Laguna granted the petition, finding respondent satisfactorily shown that
he is entitled to the reliefs prayed for. Hence, this petition filed by the SolGen.
The SolGen contends that the petition of respondent is fatally defective based on the
following grounds: non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the ROC because said
petition did not implead the local registrar who is an indispensable party in a Petition for
Cancellation/Correction of Entries under sec. 3, Rule 108 of the ROC; it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition ws filed for at least
three years prior to the date of filing as mandated under sec. 2 (b) of Rule 103 of ROC; and
that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex/gender in the birth certificate and that his
claimed medical condition does not make her a male.
Respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrat of Pakil Laguna was not
formally named a party in the said petition, said officer was furnished a copy of the petition,
the order to publish, and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of proceedings; that
he is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected so as to
reflect his gender; and that change of gender is allowed under Rule 108 and that he
substantially complied with the the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of ROC.
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Answer: No.
Held:

The Court found that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The Court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondentnt, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.

In so ruling the Court do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his
unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in
this case.
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, the Court held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow and that the trial court's grant of
respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, the Court found merit in respondent's change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female
to male.

[G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000.]

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
Facts:
As a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty, private respondent
contended that he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for his
extradition and its supporting documents even while he is still under evaluation by petitioner
Secretary of Justice.
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Court dismissed the petition at bar and
ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment
with supporting evidence. Hence, an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
petitioner which was opposed by responedent. Petitioner contends, among others, that there
is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of an
extradition petition in court a nd a preliminary investigation;and that absence of notice and
hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of fundamental fairness.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Jimenez is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Answer: No
Held:
The Court holds that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process bacause there is no provision in the
RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand
from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. Further,P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty

provides taht an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well
as its supporting papers after filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court.
The Court also adds that a court cannot alter, amend or add to a treaty
clause, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice and that an
extradition proceeding is sui generis, not a criminal proceeding which call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
The Court granted the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and reversed its
decision ordering the Secretay of Justice to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers.

[G.R. No. 211362. February 24, 2015.]

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy,
represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and
BERTENI CATALUA CAUSING, petitioners, vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF
THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB),
respondents.

Facts:
Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa class of 2014 of PMA who belonged to
the A Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class.
A Delinquency Report(DR) was issued against Cudia for being late in their English 412
class. When made to explain, he stated that he came directly from OR 432 class and they
were dismissed late by the instructor. He was meted out a penalty of 11 demerits and 13
touring hours, hence, clarified about his violation. Maj. Hundiang replied that the basis of
the punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who reported that she
never dismissed her class late. When he requested for a reconsideration of the meted
punishment, said punishment was just sustained.
Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed that he was reported to the PMAs Honor Committee
(HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when
he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class. He
submitted an explanation to the HC.
Upon recommendation that the case be formalized, the formal investigation ensued.
When he was informed of the case against him, he pleaded not guilty. The result of the
initial was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Upon further deliberation, it was announced that
the result was 9-0 for a guity verdict. Hence, Cudia who has already served nine touring
hours, was informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code
and was immediately placed in the PMA Holding Center until resolution of his appeal.
An appeal was filed by him. However, the Comamndant of Cadets affirmed the HC
findings and recommended his separation from the PMA for violation of the First Tenet of the
Honor Code. Special Order No. 26 was issued placing him on indefinite leave of absence
without pay and allowances pending approval of his separation, barring him from future

appontment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance
requirements to the PMA.
Claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC, Cudia and his
family requested for a reinvestigation. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was
referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB) which ruled against Cudia.
The ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff.
Meanwhile, Cudias family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) where it was alleged that PMAs sham investigation violated Cudias rights to due
process, education, and privacy of communication. CHRs ruling favored Cudia.
However, PMA averred that CHRs findings are at best recommendatory.
The Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and the
CRAB.
Cudia filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme
Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of
policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters.

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of Cudia is in utter disregard of his right to due process.
Answer: No

Held:
It is within PMAs right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still
worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case, the
investigation of Cadet Cudia's Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and
existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report and was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was also informed about his options and
the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the
investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor
case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the
hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him
and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the
witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the
HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty
verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level from the OIC of the HC, to the
SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation

was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate
the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation
Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to
conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to
the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
The Court denied the petition and affirmed the dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin
Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy.
Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1)
authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may be delegated
to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the
cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic
freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it
determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case,
based on its findings, Cudia lied which is a violation of the Honor Code.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petiton and affirmed the dismissal of Cadet Cudia.

[G.R. No. 169391. October 10, 2012.]

SPS. EUGENE C. GO and ANGELITA GO, and Minor EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO,
petitioners, vs. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, REV. FR. EDWIN LAO, REV. FR.
JOSE RHOMMEL HERNANDEZ, ALBERT ROSARDA and MA. TERESA SURATOS,
respondents.
Facts:

Mr. Isleta, an employee of Letran received an information that certain fraternities

were recruiting new members among Letrans High School students. He also received a list
of those who are allegedly involved. Hence, an investigation and medical examination of
alleged members were conducted.
The school physician reported six students who bore injuries, probable signs of blaunt
trauma on the posterior positions of their thighs. They were asked for their explanations in
writing.
The four students who admitted that they were neophytes and were present in a
hazing rite in a house in Tondo, Manila identified one of their senior members which included
petitioner Kim. Hence, Mr. Rosarda, an employee of Letran, informed Mrs. Angelita Go that
Kim had been identified by students as frat members. However, she expressed disbelief.
Through an explanation letter, Kim denied membership to the said fraternity claiming
that at that time, he was at Dulces house to pick up a gift and did not attend the hazing rite.
In a conference requested by the school authority to dicuss his frat memebership, his
parents did not attend. The school later found out that 29 of their students including Kim
were frat members. Based on their disciplinary rules, respondent Fr. Hernandez
recommended their dismissal from the HS Department rolls. Said recommendation was
stated in a letter to Kims parents. However, Letrans president rejected
said
recommendation to allow 4th year students to graduate others were allowed to finish the
current school year.
Sice Mr. Go was absent during the next sheduled conference, Mrs. Go conveyed to
him Kims suspension from Jan. 16, 2001 to Feb. 18, 2002. Said supension was requested by
Mrs. Go to be deferred so that Kim will be able to take the scheduled exam. The school
authority granted her request.
When parents of the sanctioned students were asked to
sign a proforma agreement to signify their conformity with the suspension, Mr. And Mrs. Go
refused to sign claiming that Kim was not a frat member. They insisted that due process had
not been observed.
In a petition filed before RTC, thay claim that respondents unlawfully dismissed Kim.
Said court ruled in their favor holding that Letran failed to observe the basic requirement of
due process and that Letran had no authority to dismiss students for their frat membership.
In an appeal before CA, it held that petitioners were not denied due process as the
petitioners had been given ample opportunity to be heard in Kims disciplinary case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Kim was denied due process when he was dismissed by
respondent.
Answer: No
Held:

The Court was not convinced that Kims right to explain his side as exercised in his
written denial had been violated or diminished. The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard and Kim had been heard. His written explanation was received,
indeed even solicited by respondents. Thus he cannot claim that he was denied the right to
adduce evidence in his behalf.
The Court also held that Guzman v National University and not Ang Tibay is the
authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases. Due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
thiose prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Said proceedings may be
summary; and cross- examination is not an essential part thereof.
The minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process are: 1) The students must be informed in writing of tha nature and cause of any
accusation against them; 2) They shall have the right to answer the charges against them;

3)They shall be informed of the evidence against them; 4)Thay shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; 5)The evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case.
The Court denied the petition and affirmed CAs decision.

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-New Bataan,

Compostela Valley Province, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
respondent.
Facts:
In September 2012, Petitioner was appointed Presiding Judge of MuCTC in
Compostela Valley, which is a first level court. After a year, he applied for a vacant position
of Presiding Judge in RTC Davao and Agusan Del Sur.
However, JBCs Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination informed petitioner that he
was not included in the list of candidates for said stations. Hence, he sent a letter through
electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in te list of considered
applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination.
Petitioners protest and request for reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en
Banc but its decision not to include his name in the list was upheld dur to JBCs longstanding policy of opening the chance for promotion to 2nd-level courts, to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least 5 years, and since he
has been a judge for more than a year, he was excluded.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Cetiorari and Declaratoty
Relief with a prayer for isuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He contends
that the JBCs five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution. Respondent contends that there is no violation of due process as he policy
is merely internal in nature.
Issue:
Whether or not JBCs policy violates due process for lack of publication. Answer: Yes
Held:

The Court held that the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have
been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or mplement existing laws, attain
binding force and effect. There are however, several exceptions to the requirement of
publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which
regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is
publication required of the so called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations exempted
from the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall
determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would
regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call
to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to
these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of
the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.

The petition was dismissed by the Court.However, it directed that the JBC comply with the
publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that
the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.

ELENA P. DYCAICO, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION, respondents
Facts:
Bonifacio Dycaico became an SSS member on Jan. 24, 1980. In his self-employed
data record, he named petitioner and their eight children as beneficiaries. That time, they
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
In june 1989, he was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension
from SSS. He continued to receive said pension until death. Few months before his death,
Bonifacio married petitioner on January 6, 1997.
When petitoner filed with SSS an application for survivors pension, it was denied on
the ground that under sec. 12 B(d) of RA 8282 or the SSS Law, she could not be considered a
primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. Hence, petitioner filed with
SSCommission a petition alleging that the denaial of her survivors pension was unjustified
since Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form
RS-1 and that it aws not indicated therein that only legitimate family members can be made
beneficiaries.
SSC affirmed the denial of petitioners claim. In their resolution, they cited definitions
of primary beneficiaries and dependents in sec. 8 of RA 8282. According to them,
entitlement to survivors pension in ones capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the
legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for support upon a the deceased SSS
member during his lifetime. Under sec 12 B(d) of said law, primary beneficiaries who are
entitled to survivors pension are those who qualify as such as of the date of retirement of
the deceased member.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before CA which was dismissed citing the same
provisions in the SSS Law. It declared that the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of
Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989 and that his designation of the petitioner as
one of his beneficiaries is void.
Hence, this petition before SC claiming that regardless of whether the primary
beneficiary designated by the member as such is legitimate or not, he or she is entitled to
survivors pension. However, respondent contends that sec. 12B(d) of RA 8282 should be
read in conjunction with the definition of the terms dependents and primary
beneficiaries in sec. 8 hereof. Since she was not yet the legal spouse of Bonifacio at that
time of his retirement, she is not entitled to the claim.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec.12B(d) of RA 8282 violates due process clause of the
Constitution. Answer: Yes
Held:
The Court held that the proviso infringes due process clause of the Constitution as it
outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respectives marriages to the retired SSS
members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is
outrigt confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an
opportunity to be heard.
The Court added that in this instant case, petitioner was not given any opportunity to
prove her claim that she was Bonifacios bonafide legal spouse as she was automatically
disqualified from being considered as his primary beneficiary.

Standards of due process require that petitioner be allowed to present evidence to

prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his bonafide
spouse, she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his death.
The SC granted the petition and reversed and set aside CAs decision. It also declared
the assailed proviso VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution. It added that the Social Security System cannot deny the claim of
petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivor's pension on the basis of the invalid proviso.

SOUTHERN
COUNCIL

HEMISPHERE

ENGAGEMENT

NETWORK,

INC.

ANTI-TERRORISM

Facts:
Following the enactment of RA 9372(Human Security Act of 2007), six petitions
challenging its constitutionality were filed before the SC.
Petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government
organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. They
contend
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9372 is unconstitutional for being violative of due process.
Held:

A facial invalidation of a
statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted

JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and
VICENTE ANGELES, respondents
Facts:

Private respondent is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental

and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as

gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 2 until February 23, 1999 when they
were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims before
the Labor Arbiter whorendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private
respondent to pay the monetary claims.
Respondents appealed before NLRCwhich reversed the LAs decision citing that the
petitioners had abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation
pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of
evidence. An MR was filed by petitioners but was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals which ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not
illegal because they had abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money
claims.
In a Pettition for Review before the Court, petitioners claim that they were dismissed
because the private respondent refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to
work on a "pakyaw" basis when they reported for duty . They also claim that private
respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Private
respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had
abandoned their work. In fact, private respondent sent two letters to the last known
addresses of the petitioners advising them to report for work.
Issue:

Whether or not due process was granted to petitioners when thaey were dismissed.
Answer: NO
Held: The Court ruled that private respondent did not follow the notice requirements and
instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless
because they did not reside there anymore. this is not a valid excuse because the law
mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it
should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
However, the Court held thatt the dismissal should be upheld because it was
established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. While
the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal.
Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of
rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire
history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right
and just. It is a constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and
judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of Rights.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects:
substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the
Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process
requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended
by Department Order Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the
Labor Code. Therefore statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply
with constitutional due process. Constitutional due process protects the individual from the
government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;
while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects
employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
The Court denied the petition and affirmed CAs decision.

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

OF 2010, respondent.
Facts:
On July 30, 2010 and subsequent to the May 2010 election, then newly-elected
President Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 which is a special body under the Office of the President to investigate reported cases
of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Consequently, Petitioners Biraogo and Rep. Lagman, et al. in separate petitions for certiorari
and prohibition assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said EO No. 1.
In in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, Petitioner Biraogo contended that the
subject EO violates the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public
office and to appropriate funds therefor.
On the other hand, Rep. Lagman, et al. filed the special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition in their capacity as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. Rep.
Lagmans group argued, among others, that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause
as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of
the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Petitioners contend that EO No. 1 does not apply equally to all members of the same
class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object
makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with
validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all
administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. They assail the classification
formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because
first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for
investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public
office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the
purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.
Respondents, asserted that the Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes. They said that while
EO No. 1 identifies the "previous administration" as the initial subject of the investigation,
following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and
corruption solely during the said administration. Assuming arguendo that the commission
would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners
argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for the segregation
of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects
of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to
the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct.
Issue
Yes

Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause. Answer:

Held:
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Compliance does not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction but the equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. While it permits classification, it must pass the test of
reasonableness to be valid:(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and(4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
Applying the said test on Executive Order No. 1, the Supreme Court held that it
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
The Supreme Court resolved to grant the petition and declared EO No. 1 as
unconstitutional insofar as it violates the equal protection clause of the Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution.

[G.R. No. 221318. December 16, 2015.]

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:

RA 10367 was enacted which mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory

biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent, and updated list of voters through the adopton of biometricvtechnology. Said RA
was duly published. Consequently COMELEC issued Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863 and 10013
in furtherance of said law.
Petitioners filed before SC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with application for
TRO and/or writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction assailing the constitutionality of the
biometrics validation requirement under siad law and COMELEC resolutions.
Petitioners contend that biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason
for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 10367 and COMELEC Resoltion Nos. 9721, 9863and 10013 violate
the equal protection clause. Answer: No
Held:

The petition is bereft of merit.

The Court held that contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation passes the strict
scrutiny test.

Strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of
governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications
to equal protection.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
The Court said that in this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics
validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It
was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by
containing if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead
and multiple registrants. It added that according to the sponsorship speech of Senator
Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to cleanse the national voter registry so
as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were truly
reflective of the genuine will of the people. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a
compelling state interest.
Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving the
above-said interest. Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics
validation, whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the
Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his
photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a manner of updating one's
registration for those already registered under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new
registrants.
The re-registration process is amply justified by the fact that the government is
adopting a novel technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud
that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this country.
To make the validation process as convenient as possible, the COMELEC even went to
the extent of setting up off-site and satellite biometrics registration in shopping malls and
conducted the same on Sundays. Moreover, it deserves mentioning that RA 10367 and
Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves to validation
every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the validation
process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he
remains an active voter. To add, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters
from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they
could still apply for reactivation following the procedure laid down in Section 28 100 of RA
8189.
The SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit and the TRO issued as dissolved.

JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON

Facts:
Pursuant to RA 9262, VAWC Law, respondent filed before RTC for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband petitioner Jesus.
RTC found reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, hence, it issued the requested TPO.
Said TPO was modified per request of petitioner granting him visitation rights to their
children. Said TPO was also extended since petitioner failed to explain why the TPO should
not be extended.
Instead, petitioner filed before CA a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Injunction
and TRO challenging the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the due process

and equal protection clauses. CA dismissed the petition for failure to raise constitutional
issues in his pleadings.
Issue:

Wheteher or not RA 9262 violates the equal protection clause. Answer: NO.

Held: R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. The Court
found that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification and as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the State extends its protection.
The Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner, vs.
MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.
Facts:

Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros married Milagros Orbiso on 10 July

1983. Nicolas was a 72-year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years
old. Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros then filed with the GSIS a claim for survivorship
pension under PD 1146.
Petitioner GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving
spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage
with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on "17 February 1984."
Respondent filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief
questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving
survivorship pension. The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including interest.
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence,
the present petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not sec. 18 of PD 1146 violates the equal protection clause. Answer: Yes
Held:

The Court held that the Proviso in section 18 of P.D. 1146 discriminates a dependent
spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for pension and that a classification does not rest on substantial distinctions and

lumps all marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension
as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one
class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso
discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the
dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioner's
death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage
took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a
prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent "deathbed marriages," then we do not
see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified
for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on
substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within
three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily
for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
The classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress
deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 ("RA 8291"), otherwise known as the
"Government Service Insurance Act of 1997," the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD
1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the
member immediately before the member's death is still qualified to receive survivorship
pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to
receive the benefit.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and declared Section 18 of Presidential
Decree No. 1146 void for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the law. The GSIS cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for
survivorship benefits based on the said invalid proviso.
TERESITA TABLARIN vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ
Facts:
Petitioners sought admission into colleges/schools of medicine for school year 19871988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Examination (BME).
Petitioners filed before RTC a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a
Prayer for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction. They sought to enjoin the DECS Secretary, the
BME and CEM from enforcing sec. 5(a) and (f) of RA 2382(Medical Act of 1959)and MECS
Order No. 52, series of 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of NMAT as a
condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT on April 26, 1986 and in the future. After hearing
on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition and
the NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Court to set
aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Petitioners contend MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. They assert that portion of the MECS Order which

provides that "the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the
NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation
with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges" infringes the requirements of equal
protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission during a given
school year. e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established
for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS
Order "arbitrary and capricious."
Issue:
Whether or not the MECS Order violates the equal protection clause. Answer: No

Held:
Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing
conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year
may be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff
score established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools
during the current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of
difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent
and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may
well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from
being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of
flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.
The Court held that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute
an unconstitutional imposition. Hence, it dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of the
trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.

ANTONIO M. SERRANO, vs. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW

NAVIGATION CO., INC
Facts:
Pettitioner is a seafarer who was hired by respondents under a POEA-approved contract of
employment. However, before his departure, he was constrained to accept a downgraded emplyment
contract on the assurance that he will be promoted to a Chief Officer which did not happen. He was
retriated to the Philippines since he refused to stay as a Second Officer.
He filed before the Labor Arbiter a compalint against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims. The LA ruled in is favor declaring his dismissal illegal and
awarding him monetary benefits representing his salary for three months of unexpired portion of his
contract.
Respondents appealed before the NLRC to question the LAs decision. Petitioner also appealed
claiming that the LA erred in not applying the ruling in the case Triple Integrated Services v NLRC that
in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contract. NLRC modified LAs decision.
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly
impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment
contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package. It also impinges on
the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local
workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in
case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers
when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not reasonable as
there is no substantial distinction between the two groups; and that it defeats Section 18, 34
Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all
Filipino workers, whether deployed locally or overseas.
Issue: Whether or not the subject clause violates equal protection clause. Answer: Yes
Held: The Court held that the present case employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny,
for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory
intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels: First, OFWs with employment
contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or
more; Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment.
the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The first category
includes OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year; in case of
illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their
contract. The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of
one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent
to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.
The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted.
The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account jurisprudence
that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July 14, 1995, illegally dismissed OFWs, no
matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were entitled to their salaries for
the entire unexpired portions of their contracts.
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the
unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary

benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule
of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion
of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their
monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof,
whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply
because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
The Court granted the petition and it declared Unconstitutional the subject clause "or
for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042.
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. HON. PETE PRADO
Facts:
Philippine Postal Corporation implemented R.A. No. 7354 through its Circular No.
9228. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
Petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as
judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. They alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is
discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains
the same for the President of the Philippines; the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former
Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public
offices or officers.
Respondents countered that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a
valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. The franking privilege
has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, among others.
Issue:
wheteher or not RA 7354 violates the equal protection clause. Answer: Yes
Held:

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in
other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on
all persons or things without distinction. What the clause requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars.
The Court held that it cannot understand why of all the departments of the
government, it was the Judiciary that was denied the franking privilege. Court pointed out
that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial
Department, as the respondents themselves point out.
The Court said that If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the
franking privilege, the remedy, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for

some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which
definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The Court granted
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

the

petition

and

declared

sec.

35

of

R.A.

No.

7354

CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG

PILIPINAS
Facts:
RA 7653 or the New Central Bank Act took effect and created a new BSP. After 8
years, petitioners filed
apetition for Prohibiton to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last provido in sec. 15 (c), Article II of RA7653 on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not said proviso violates equal protection. Answer: Yes
Held:

Under the present standards of equal protection, Section 15(C), Article II Of

R.A. No. 7653 Is Valid.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the
classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent
the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class.
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The

classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of
officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not
intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a
disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and
benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and
entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or
officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with
the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades.
Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the
industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the
SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank possessing higher and better
education and opportunities for career advancement are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they and not the officers who have the real economic
and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to
free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent
standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all