ALFREDO CHING, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO
FACTS:
Spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan registered a parcel of
land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal. In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property
was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina, Perfects,
Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente. By virtue of a sale to
Ching Leng the reconveyance with the Nofuentes were cancelled. On
October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (a petition for administration of
the estate of deceased Ching Leng. Notice of hearing on the petition was
duly published. No oppositors appeared at the hearing, consequently
after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed
administrator of Ching Leng's estate. Thirteen (13) years after Ching
Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on by private
respondent Pedro Asedillo for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and
it was given to Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street,
Pasay City (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private
respondent's complaint). An amended complaint was filed by private
respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng alleging
"That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad
up to the present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive
or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other processes
only by publication;" Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his
estate was directed by the trial court. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60)
day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive
pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court,
allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring Pedro Asedillo to be the true
and absolute owner of the property covered.
ISSUES:
1 .Whether or not a dead man Ching Leng and/or his estate may be
validly served with summons and decision by publication. And 2.
Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of
title is in personam, and if so, would a dead man and/or his estate be
bound by service of summons and decision by publication.
HELD:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property
is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land

registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in

personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former
are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while
the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person
and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An
action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns
the right to a tangible thing. Private respondent's action for reconveyance
and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13)
years after the latter's death.The decision of the lower court insofar as
the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons.
He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness
to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42
Civil Code).The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land
and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land A Torrens title is generally a conclusive
evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act
496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued
and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any
"information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof
not annotated on the title

Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Heirs of Cornelio Glor

G.R. No. 104813, 21 October 1993
Facts: In 1950, then twelve-year-old Eutiquio Pureza and his father
cleared and cultivated Lot 13, Pls-84 of Guinayangan Public Land
Subdivision which measured more or less 54,406 sq.m. They introduced
in 1954 improvements such as trees of coconut, jackfruit, mangoes,
avocado and bananas. Upon the land's release for disposition, the
Bureau of Lands surveyed it in Eutiquio Pureza's name.
Godofredo (Jose Olviga's son and brother of petitioners Virgilio and Lolita
Olviga-Olila) protested the survey but without respect to the half-ahectare portion "sa dakong panulukan ng Amihanan-Silanganan" which
he claimed. Godofredo's protest is of public record in the Bureau of
Lands and it stated that he admitted the lot belonged to Eutiquio except
for the half-a-hectare portion included in the survey.
Eutiquio filed a homestead application in 1960 for Lot 13, but since no
action was done on his application, he transferred his rights to the lot in
1961 to Cornelio Glor, Sr.. The Bureau of Lands' records did not disclose
why there was no action for Eutiquio's homestead application and the
proposed transfer of rights to the land to Cornelio, Sr. The elder Cornelio
was sickly and since his wife Angelita was unschooled, she and her
children failed to follow up Eutiquio's homestead application in the
cadastral proceedings held at the Municipal Court of Guinayangan Public
Land Subdivision. Angelita testified that she was never notified about the
outcome of said proceedings. The non-posting of the hearing of cadastral
proceedings was confirmed by Virgilio.
The Olvigas were Glors' neighbors. Jose claimed on the other hand
adjoining lands Lot 12 and 13 in the cadastral proceeding. He falsely
omitted that there were persons claiming possession and adverse

interests in Lot 13 and Eutiquio's sale of rights to Cornelio Sr. in 1961.

Thus in 1967, the lands were awarded without contest to Jose Olviga and
subsequently registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12713.
Jose requested later in 1971 that the land be splitted into two separate
lots with separate titles. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T-103824 were
subsequently issued to Lots 12 and 13 respectively, and he later on
transferred Lot 13 to his daughter Lolita and her husband Jaime Olila.
Cornelio's widow Angelita filed in the Regional Trial Court of Calauag,
Quezon an action against the heirs of Jose Olviga to reconvey that parcel
of land to her and her heirs. The RTC rendered judgment in Angelita's
favor after due trial, and it ordered the Olvigas' to reconvey the land and
pay attorney's fees.
Jose Olviga's heirs appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of
Appeals, but it affirmed the trial court's judgment in its 13 January
1992 decision (CA-G.R. CV No. 30542). It also found that spouses Jaime
and Lolita Olviga-Olila were not in possession of the disputed land nor
innocent purchasers for value and that the Glors and their predecessorin-interest Eutiquio Pureza were the possessors.
Issues addressed by the Supreme Court: The Olviga heirs asked for
petition for review of the CA's decision and the following issues were
raised,
1 Whether or not plaintiffs' action is for quieting of title that does not
prescribe, and assuming their demand is for reconveyance of the
land being based on implied trust, prescribes in ten (10) years?
The Supreme Court held that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of
land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years,
the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed of the date
of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. But this rule
applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since
if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet
title to the property, does not prescribe.
1. Whether the Glors' cause of action accrued not in 1967 but in
1988, and as mere homestead transferees, cannot maintain an
action for reconveyance?
It was also held that the Glors and their predecessors-in-interest
Cornelio Glor, Sr. and Eutiquio Pureza were in actual possession of the
property since 1950. Their undisturbed possession gave them continuing
right to seek aid of a court of equity to determine nature of Olviga's

adverse claim, who in 1988, disturbed their possession. Thus, the right
to quiet the property's title which seeks reconveyance and annulment of
any certificate of title, accrues only from the time the possessor was
made aware of the adverse claim and it is only from that time that the
statutory period of prescription commences to run against him/her. It
also stated that the actual possessor of a piece of land claiming to be its
owner may wait until disturbance of his/her possession or the attack of
his/her title before taking steps in vindication of his/her right because
his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid
of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be
claimed only by one who is in possession.

PINGOL V. COURT OF APPEALS

A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment
thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements
thereon is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who
had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the
vendee should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to
clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.

FACTS:
In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City,
executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN
UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of Donasco
(private respondent), payable in 6 years.
In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000
downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs of Donasco

remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle the balance with
Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger
amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific
performance (with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol
were encroaching upon Donascos lot). Pingol averred that the sale and
transfer of title was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco
(contract to sell, not contract of sale). With Donascos breach of the
contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and
the heirs continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco
(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title

RULING:
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and
not a contract to sell. The acts of the parties, contemporaneous and
subsequent to the contract, clearly show that the parties intended an
absolute deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to the
Donasco upon its actual (upon Donascos possession and construction of
the house) and constructive delivery (upon execution of the contract).
The delivery of the lot divested Pingol of his ownership and he cannot
recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded under Art.
1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the expiration
of the period stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been
made upon him either judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so.
Hence, Donasco has equitable title over the property.
(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for
specific performance, it was actually an action to quiet title. A cloud has
been cast on the title, since despite the fact that the title had been
transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery
of the object of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the
payment by Donascos and insisted that they no longer had the obligation
to transfer the title.
Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the
property, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against Pingol who
refused to transfer title to him. It is not necessary that Donasco should
have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him
with personality to bring an action to quiet title.
Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an
action to quiet title to property in ONEs POSSESSION is imprescriptible.

TITONG v. CA
For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land, the requisites in Art
476 of the NCC must be complied with meaning there should be an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance setting forth the cloud or doubt
over the title. Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be ejectment,
forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion reivindicatoria or accion
publiciana.

FACTS:

A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titiong, Masbate

is the subject property being disputed in this case. The property is being
claimed by 2 contestants, however legal title over the property can only
be given to one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner
Mario Titong. The RTC of Masbate decided in favor of private
respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles Laurio as the true and lawful
owners of the disputed land. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with
an area of 3.2800 hectares and declared for taxation purposes. He claims
that on three separate occasions, private resps, with their hired laborers,
forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an approximate area of 2
hectares and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. On the
other hand, private resps denied the claim and said that the subject land
formed part of the 5.5 hectare agricultural land which they had
purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa.
Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting that no
controversy had sprouted between them for 20 years until the latter sold
lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa
and what remained of Titongs property was the old Bugsayon river.
When Titong employed Lerit as his tenant, he instructed the latter to
change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the
lowland at the southern portion of Titongs property, thus converting the
old river into a Riceland.
Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titongs, saying that the
area and boundaries of disputed land remained unaltered during the
series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. Accdg to him,
Titong first declared land for taxation purposes which showed that the
land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the north by the
B. River; on the east by property under ownership by Zaragoza, and on
the west by property owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong
sold property to Verano. The latter reacquired the property pursuant to
mutual agreement to repurchase the same.
However, the property remained in Titongs hands only for 4 days
because he sold it to Espinosa. It then became a part of the estate of
Espinosas wife, late Segundina Espinosa. Later on, her heirs executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale whereby
the 5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In all these
conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly
the same as those appearing in the name of Titongs.
The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the property. First
survey was made by Titong, while the second was the relocation survey

ordered by the lower court. Because of which, certain discrepancies

surfaced. Contrary to Titongs allegation, he was actually claiming
5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot nos 3918, 3918-A and 3606. The
lot 3479 pertaining to Espinosas was left with only an area of 4.1841
hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by Titong to him.
Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest before Bureau of
Lands against 1st survey, and filing a case for alteration of boundaries
before the MTC, proceedings of which were suspended because of instant
case.
Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of his mother,
Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of
late Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6 hectares
property of the deceased. The property was bounded by the north by
Verano, on the east by Bernardo Titong, on the south by the Bugsayon
River and on the west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful share in the
extrajud settlement, Titongs share bloated to 2.4 hectares. It then
appeared to Laurio that Titong encroached upon his property and
declared it as part of his inheritance.
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the
north by Verano, on the east by B. Titong, on the south by Espinosa and
on the west by Adolfo Titong. Laurio also denied that Titong diverted
course of the B. river after he had repurchased the land from Verano
because land was immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property
RULING: NO
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the
circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC wherein it says that
action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or preventive measure.
Under 476, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a cloud, doubt, question
or shadow upon owners title to or interest in real property. The ground
for filing a complaint for quieting title must be instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding.
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an instrument,
claim etc be clouded over his property. Through his allegations, what
Titong imagined as clouds cast on his title were Laurios alleged acts of
physical intrusion into his purported property. The grounds mentioned
are for action for forcible entry and not quieting title.

In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary dispute. The RTC

and CA correctly held that when Titong sold the 5.5 hectare land to
Espinosa, his rights and possession ceased and were transferred to
Laurio upon its sale to the latter.
Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract transferring
dominion and other real rights in the thing sold. Titong also cannot rely
on the claim of prescription as ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.

Spouses Ricardo and Ferma Portic vs Anastacia Cristobal

456 SCRA 577 Civil Law Law on Sales Contract to Sell vs Contract of
Sale
In 1968, spouses Ricardo and Ferma Portic acquired a parcel of land
with a 3 door apartment from spouses Alcantara even though theyre
aware that the land was mortgaged to the SSS. Portic defaulted in paying
SSS. The Portics then executed a contract with Anastacia Cristobal and
the latter agreed to buy the said property for P200k. Cristobals down
payment was P45k and she also agreed to pay SSS. The contract between
them states:
That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the
FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the ownership of the above described
parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND PARTY
BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly rentals due on the first
door (13-A) of the said apartment; (payment is due 22 May 1985, if
Cristobal will not be able to pay Portic will reimburse)
A transfer certificate was executed in favor of Cristobal. Cristobal was not
able to pay on the due date. A suit ensued to lift the cloud on the title.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the parcel of land?
HELD: The Portics insofar as there was no contract of sale. What
transpired between the parties was a contract to sell. The provision of the
contract characterizes the agreement between the parties as a contract to
sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the vendors, the
Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the Cristobals, until the full
payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive
condition, and failure to comply with it is not a breach of obligation; it is
merely an event that prevents the effectivity of the obligation of the
vendor to convey the title. In short, until the full price is paid, the
vendor retains ownership.
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not
vest ownership in her. Neither did it validate the alleged absolute
purchase of the lot. Registration does not vest, but merely serves as
evidence of, title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders any
better title than that which they actually have prior to registration.
Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to
acquire a new title. Good faith must concur. Clearly, Cristobal has not
yet fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid,
she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded from asserting
ownership against the Portics. The CAs finding that she had a valid title
to the property must be set aside.

VDA. DE AVILES v. CA

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the
purpose of settling a boundary dispute.

FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the bother of
defendant Camilo. They inherited their lands from their parents and have
agreed to subdivide the same amongst themselves. The area alloted (sic)
to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio
Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or less, while the area alloted to
defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less.

Defendants land composed of the riceland portion of his land is 13,290

square meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square meters and the
residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470 square
meters.

The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which
they claim is within their area. Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color
of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of
approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence
(thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and
disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.

Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly encroach to their
property but the defendant said that he merely reconstructed the same.
Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied thus this
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action
RULING:
No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a boundary
dispute and as such the action must fail.

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any

interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is,
in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such
cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a
title to real property or any interest therein.
Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that could been a cloud to their title. In
fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the
agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith,
a fixed area was allotted to them and that the only controversy is whether
these lands were properly measured.
A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for
settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted
an ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever
warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of
possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of
by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be
fully threshed out.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) V. FERNANDEZ

FACTS:
Lot 4673 was registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino
Cuizon among others covered by an OCT. Sometime thereafter, Jorgea
Igot-Soro o et al executed an Extra-judicial Partition claiming to be the
only surviving heirs of the registered owners, through which they were
issued a TCT
Said lot was among the object of an expropriation proceeding before the
RTC. Said RTC approved the compromise Agreement b/w the Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and Igot-Soroo et al wherein EPZA
would pay a certain amount in exchange for the subject property.
EPZA acquired title to said land by virtue of the RTC decision and was
issued a corresponding TCT.
The Heirs of the Florentina Rapaya and Juan Cuizon filed a complaint to
nullify several documents including the TCT issued to EPZA for they were
excluded from the extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
EPZA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription and was
denied thus elevated the case to the CA wherein the CA ruled that the
heirs of Igot-Soroo defrauded the other heirs by falsely representing that
they were the only heirs enabling them to appropriate the land in favor of
EPZA. This method of acquiring property created a constructive trust in
favor of the defrauded party and grants them the right to vindicate
regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, the case at bar.

ISSUE/S:

1) Whether or not private respondents claim over the expropriated land

has prescribed
2) Whether or not reconveyance lies against expropriated property

HELD:
1) YES. As provided in the Rules of Court, persons unduly deprived of
their lawful participation in a settlement may assert their claim only
w/in the 2-year period after the settlement and distribution of the estate.
However, this prescriptive period will not apply to those who had not
been notified of the settlement.
The Private respondents are deemed to have been notified of the
extrajudicial settlement since it was registered and annotated on the
certificate of title over the lot.
The only exception to this rule is when the title still remains in the hands
of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of the said
property. In the case at bar, the title has already passed to an innocent
purchaser for value, the govt through EPZA.
Their remedies of action for reconveyance resulting from fraud, and
action for reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust has
already prescribed as well the former having prescribed 4 years from the
discovery and the latter prescribing 10 years from the alleged fraudulent
registration.

2) NO. Reconveyance is a remedy for those whose property has been

wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name. However, this
cannot be availed once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser
for value. Since the property has already passed to the govt in an
expropriation proceeding, EPZA is entitled to enjoy the security afforded
innocent 3rd persons and their title to the property must be preserved.
However, the private respondents are not w/o remedy. They can sue for
damages their co-heirs.

CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6,

1906
MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land
Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land
hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The
State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US
military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State
appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him
by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case
Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue
of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government.
The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine).
Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character
as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for
many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals,
except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against
Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed
if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State
remained the absolute owner.

Facts:

NPC vs. Ibrahim

Sunday, June 22, 2014

Ibrahim owns a parcel of land located in Lanao del Norte.

In 1978, NAPOCOR took possession of the sub-terrain area of the

land and constructed underground tunnels on the said property.

The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning

the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCORs Agus
projects.

In 1991, Maruhom (one of the co-heirs of Ibrahim) requested

Marawi City Water District for a permit to construct or install a motorized
deep well on the parcel of land but it was rejected on the grounds that
the construction would cause danger to lives and property by reason of
the presence of the underground tunnels.

Maruhom demanded NAPOCOR to pay damages and to vacate the

sub-terrain portion of the land.
Issue: WON Ibrahim is the rightful owner of the sub-terrain area of the
land.
If yes, are they entitled to the payment of just compensation.
Held: YES. The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to Ibrahim.
The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides
that: The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make
any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. xxx
Hence, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the
subsoil under it. Therefore, Ibrahim owns the property as well as the
sub-terrain area of the land where the underground tunnels were
constructed.
On the issue of just compensation, the Supreme Court also said that
Ibrahim should be paid a just compensation.
Ibrahim could have dug upon their property and built motorized deep
wells but was prevented from doing so by the authorities because of the
construction of the tunnels underneath the surface of the land.
Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as
they could have excavated the same for the construction of the deep
wells. It has been shown that the underground tunnels have deprived
the plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land and considerably reduced its
value.
It was held that: If the government takes property without expropriation
and devotes the property to public use, after many years, the property
owner may demand payment of just compensation in the event
restoration of possession is neither convenient nor feasible. This is in
accordance with the principle that persons shall not be deprived of their
property except by competent authority and for public use and always
upon payment of just compensation.

SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO S. BABASANTA, SPS. MIGUEL LU and
PACITA ZAVALLA LU, respondents
G.R. No. 124242

January 21, 2005

FACTS

On 20 August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly sold two parcels

of land to respondent Pablo Babasanta, for the price of fifteen
pesos (P15.00) per square meter. Babasanta made a downpayment
of (P50,000.00) as evidenced by a memorandum receipt issued by
Pacita Lu of the same date.

Babasanta wrote a letter to Pacita Lu to demand the execution of a

final deed of sale in his favor so that he could effect full payment of
the purchase price. In response, Pacita Lu wrote a letter to
Babasanta wherein she reminded Babasanta that when the
balance of the purchase price became due, he requested for a
reduction of the price and when she refused, Babasanta backed
out of the sale

herein petitioner San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC)

filed a Motion for Intervention. SLDC alleged that it had legal
interest in the subject matter under litigation because on 3 May
1989, the two parcels of land involved had been sold to it in a Deed
of Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It alleged that it was a buyer in
good faith and for value and therefore it had a better right over the
property in litigation

Respondent Babasanta, however, argued that SLDC could not have

acquired ownership of the property because it failed to comply with
the requirement of registration of the sale in good faith. He
emphasized that at the time SLDC registered the sale in its favor
on 30 June 1990, there was already a notice of lis pendens
annotated on the titles of the property made as early as 2 June
1989. Hence, petitioners registration of the sale did not confer
upon it any right.

ISSUE:
Did the registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens obliterate the effects of delivery and possession in good faith
which admittedly had occurred prior to SLDCs knowledge of the
transaction in favor of Babasanta?

HELD:NO
It must be stressed that as early as 11 February 1989, the
Spouses Lu executed the Option to Buy in favor of SLDC upon
receiving P316,160.00 as option money from SLDC. After SLDC
had paid more than one half of the agreed purchase price, the
Spouses Lu subsequently executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor or SLDC. At the time both deeds were
executed, SLDC had no knowledge of the prior transaction of
the Spouses Lu with Babasanta. Simply stated, from the time of
execution of the first deed up to the moment of transfer and
delivery of possession of the lands to SLDC, it had acted in
good faith and the subsequent annotation of lis pendens has
no effect at all on the consummated sale between SLDC and
the Spouses Lu.

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another

without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.

We rule that SLDC qualifies as a buyer in good faith since there is

no evidence extant in the records that it had knowledge of the prior
transaction in favor of Babasanta. At the time of the sale of the
property to SLDC, the vendors were still the registered owners of
the property and were in fact in possession of the lands.

In assailing knowledge of the transaction between him and the

Spouses Lu, Babasanta apparently relies on the principle of
constructive notice incorporated in Section 52 of the Property
Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) which reads, thus:

Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance,

mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry
affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed, or entered in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it
relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing, or entering.

However, the constructive notice operates as such by the express

wording of Section 52 from the time of the registration of the notice
of lis pendens which in this case was effected only on 2 June 1989,
at which time the sale in favor of SLDC had long been

consummated insofar as the obligation of the Spouses Lu to

transfer ownership over the property to SLDC is concerned.

Mindanao Bus Company v. City Assessor

G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962
FACTS:
Respondent (City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed the
following properties of the Petitioner (Mindanao Bus Company -a public
utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks): (a) HobartElectric Welder Machine, (b) Storm Boring Machine; (c)
Lathe machine with motor; (d)Black and Decker Grinder; (e) PEMCO
Hydraulic Press; (f) Battery charger (Tungarcharge machine) and (g) DEngine Waukesha-M-Fuel. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the
respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not
realty. On the other hand Respondents contend that said equipments,
though movable, are immobilized bydestination, in accordance with
paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed equipments are immovable and thus
subject to realty tax.
RULING:

NO, the disputed equipments are movable and therefore petitioner

is not liable to the payment of the realty tax. So that movable equipments
to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and
principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry
or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose
for which it was established." In the instant case, the tools and
equipments are not essential and principal municipal elements of
petitioners business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks. They are merely incidentals acquired as movables and used
only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without
such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner
has carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The
transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service
shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop
belonging to another.
Aside from the element of essentiality Art. 415 requires that the
industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. But in
the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to repair or
service the transportation business, which is not carried on in a building
or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by the law. Said
equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property.
Serg's v. PCI Leasing
Sergs Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000
FACTS:
PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money, with an
application for a writ of replevin.
Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver
the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the
payment of the necessary expenses.
The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery, with
word that he would return for other machineries.
Petitioner (Sergs Products) filed a motion for special protective order to
defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the properties were
still personal and therefore can still be subjected to seizure and writ of
replevin.
Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were immovable as
defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code.
Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries
In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the Petitioner,
the appellate court, Citing the Agreement of the parties, held that the
subject machines were personal property, and that they had only been
leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the "words of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the
contracting
parties."

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by virtue of

immobilization.
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were
not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in
fact
real
property.
Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of
replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only.
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of
Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own
land.They were essential and principal elements of their chocolatemaking industry.Hence, although each of them was movable or personal
property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.
However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.Under the principle of
estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the
truth
of
any
material
fact
found
therein.
Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides The
PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property
notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or
hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in,
or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or
attached
in
any
manner
to
what
is
permanent.
The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects of the
Writ of Replevin
FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN G.R. No. 158407
January 17, 2005 (CASE DIGEST)
FACTS:
Petitioner FilomenaDomagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC alleging that the respondent
by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioners
property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing a

fence thereon depriving the petitioner of a 68-square meter portion of her

property along the boundary line.
The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent
because the latter was apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the
summons and complaint with Oscar Layno (respondent's brother), who
received the same.
The court rendered judgment against the respondent.The respondent
failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was
issued.
The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before the
RTC for the annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that
due to the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and summons on her
because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction
over her person. Respondent claimed she was a resident of Oslo, Norway
and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the
summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo
Gonzales. She avers further that Oscar Layno was never authorized to
receive the summons and the complaint for and in her behalf.
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent
was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the
owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff
served the summons and complaint; that the service of the complaint
and summons by substituted service on the respondent was proper since
her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay.
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for
and in her behalf.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent. The trial court declared that there was no valid service of
the complaint and summons on the respondent considering that she left
the Philippines for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar Layno was never
authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in her
behalf.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the
appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint
was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate
court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the
country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via
extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court.
Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the modes
of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner,
the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and
complaint upon the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint
on the respondent. Whether or not the action of the petitioner in the
MTC against the respondent herein is an action in personam or quasi in
rem.

RULING:
The ruling of the CA that the petitioners complaint for forcible entry of
the petitioner against the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is
erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action
and one in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal
obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil
Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore
physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by
way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the
property.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in
rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by
these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The
purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment
of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the
defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to
specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on
him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against
the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such
action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief
are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam.
In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce
personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are
rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected
parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in
personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against
persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge
of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named

as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests

therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in
rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property
but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the
particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the
rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are
binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the
summons and complaint by the Sheriff:
In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to
state:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction
over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear
in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided
under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may
be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily
out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted
to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service
outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also
with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is null and void.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and
after his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a
resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that
the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on
February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879
may only be validly served on her through substituted service under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the
court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The
statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully

and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by
the statute is rendered ineffective. As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in
character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was
made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.
In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or
"residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is
not sufficient to leave the summons at the formers dwelling house,
residence or place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or
residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is
living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the
summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of
suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant.
Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
As gleaned from the service return, there is no showing that the house
where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of
the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried
to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date.
It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo
Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the
rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place
where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence
or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily
stays and to which he intends to return.
The Voters Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that
he was a resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, as
well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and OrlandoMacasalda
cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in
favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and
occupied the house of the respondent as lessee since November 24,
1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not
residing in the said house.
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and
the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted
service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of

the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is
null and void.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. No costs.

German Management and Services, Inc. vs Court of Appeals

177 SCRA 495 Civil Law Property Doctrine of Self-Help
In February 1982, the spouses Manuel and Cynthia Jose contracted
with German Management and Services, Inc. for the latter to develop
their landholdings into a residential subdivision. The spouses also
executed a special power of attorney to that effect.
German Management started the project in February 1983, however,
German Management discovered that the land was being possessed by
Ernest0 Villeza et al who were the farmers tilling the said land at that
time. German Management spoke with Villeza et al but the farmers
refused to vacate the land as the farmers claimed that they have been
occupying the land for twelve years.
Nevertheless, German Management went on to develop the property and
demolished the properties of the farmers without acquiring a court order.
In turn, Villeza et al filed a case of forcible entry against German
Management. In its defense, German Management invoked the Doctrine
of Self-help which provides that:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent

an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his

property. (Article 429, Civil Code)
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of self-help is applicable in this case.
HELD: No. The Doctrine of Self-help is not applicable because at the time
when German Management excluded the farmers, theres no longer an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation. That
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion by the farmers have
already lapsed 12 years ago when they began occupying the said land. In
fact, they were already peaceably farming the land.
What should have been the remedy by German Management?
German
Management
should
have
filed
either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria to lawfully eject the farmers.
But the farmers are not the real owners and in fact, the spouses Jose
have a lawful title over the land?
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Further, there is now a presumption of ownership in
favor of the farmers since they are the ones occupying the said property.
They can only be ejected either by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria through which the spouses Joses better right may be
proven.

LIWANAG v. CA
G.R. No. 114398; October 24, 1997
Ponente: J. Romero
FACTS:
Petitioner Carmen Liwanag and a certain Thelma Tabligan went to
the house of complainant Isidora Rosales (Rosales) and asked her to join
them in the business of buying and selling cigarettes. Convinced of the
feasibility of the venture, Rosales readily agreed. Under their agreement,
Rosales would give the money needed to buy the cigarettes while Liwanag
and Tabligan would act as her agents, with a corresponding 40%
commission to her if the goods are sold; otherwise the money would be

returned to Rosales. Consequently, Rosales gave several cash advances to

Liwanag and Tabligan amounting to P633,650.00
Alarmed that Liwanag was no longer visiting her regarding their business
and believing that the amounts she advanced were being
misappropriated, Rosales filed a case of estafa against Liwanag.
Liwanag advances the theory that the intention of the parties was to
enter into a contract of partnership, wherein Rosales would contribute
the funds while she would buy and sell the cigarettes, and later divide
the profits between them. She also argues that the transaction can also
be interpreted as a simple loan, with Rosales lending to her the amount
stated on an installment basis.
RTC found Liwanag guilty for the
crime of estafa. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision
ISSUE:
Whether Liwanag can be acquitted from the crime of estafa
because she and Rosales formed a partnership
HELD:
No, Liwanag could not be acquitted from the crime of estafa.
The Supreme Court held that Estafa is a crime committed by a
person who defrauds another causing him to suffer damages, by means
of unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, or of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts.
In the case at hand, even assuming that a contract of partnership
was indeed entered into by and between the parties, we have ruled that
when money or property have been received by a partner for a specific
purpose (such as that obtaining in the instant case) and he later
misappropriated it, such partner is guilty of estafa.

GRANDE VS. CA - Art. 457

FACTS:Ignacio Grande, et al were the owners of a parcel of land by
inheritance from their deceased mother.
When it was surveyed for purposes of registration, sometime in 1930, its
northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many

years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place,

by action of the current of the Cagayan River. So much so, that by 1958,
the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its
original site and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters, more or
less, had been added to the registered area.
Grande, et al, instituted an action against Domingo and Esteban
Calalung, to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion alleging that
they and their predecessors-in-interest were formerly in peaceful and
continuous possession thereof until Sept. 1948, when the Calalung
entered upon the land under claim of ownership. The Calalung, on the
other hand, claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have
been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion,
since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
ISSUE: WON the alluvial property in question can be acquired through
prescription.
HELD: YES! There can be no dispute that under Art. 457 of the CC,
Grande et al, are the lawful owners of said alluvial property as they are
the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. However, the accretion
does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which
receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial
property imprescriptible. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens System of that ownership is quite another.
The fact remain, however, that Grande et al never sought registration of
said alluvial property up to the time they instituted an action in the CFI
in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and
hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility
enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently,
it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.