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AIR NSPORT OPER

JAN. FEB.
1943
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EVALUATION R
 AIR EVALUATION BOARD
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
APO 925

10 June 1945

The Air Evaluation Board was established by

the War Department for the purpose of evaluating

the conduct and effectiveness of air attack in

the Southwest Pacific Theater.

The Battle of Wau was selected for evaluation

because it presented Air Transport with its first

opportunity to prove its potential value to future

operations in the Southwest Pacific Area.

Wi. E. L
Maj Gen, USA,
Director.
 BRIEF

The significance of the battle for the Wau

air strip commencing 27 Jan 1943 was twofold. In

the first place, the airfield was a strategic prize,

upon control of which depended to a considerable ex-

tent the immediate success of the Allied effort to

continue its march northwestward up the New Guinea

coast. Second. and the reason for this report, Air

Transport provided the most dramatic instance up to

that time in this Theater of its potentialities as

an effective arm of the armed forces. The surprise

reinforcement by air saved the beleaguered Australian

garrison from possible elimination and preserved this

indispensable strip for future operations. Altho

there had been some experience in reinforcement of

ground troops by air previously, the risk, calculated

and assumed in this operation, demonstrated that

such employment of air transport provided a mature

and potent weapon.

 EVALUATION

1. The reinforcement of troops and supplies by air

was the major factor in the successful defense of Wau.

2. Due to the rugged terrain, air transport was the

only method for movement of troops and supplies by which
the mission could be accomplished.

5. The element of surprise was obtained by the

employment of air transport.

4. The isolation of the battlefield was accomplished

by air attacks on the enemy supply lines and troop concen-
trations.

5. Allied fighters maintained sufficient control-of

the air to permit the air transports to accomplish their
mission.

6. Efficiency of the air operations was impaired by

poor communications and weather reporting facilities,
insufficient trained mechanics, lack of maintenance fac-
ilities and spare parts, and lack of standardization of
aircraft types.

7. Difficulties of maintenance were reduced by

ingenious improvisation.

8. Adverse effects of unfavorable weather, poor

terrain, lack of weather reporting and efficient commun-
ications were reduced by superior pilot technique and
determined effort.

9. The techniques and lessons learned in air transport

operations during the Wau Campaign provided valuable data
for the employment of air transport in subseq.ient operations.

10. The Wau Campaign, conclusively demonstrated that

air transport had ripened into a cogent weapon of the
armed forces.
An unimpressive looking strip with
no apparent value. In allied hands
it constituted a threat to nearby
enemy Lae and Salamaua. The Japs
needed it to protect their operations
against Port Moresby. A battle for
the strip was inevitable.
The Australians had occupied Wau in
March 19142 shortly following Jap
invasion of Lae and Salamaua to the
northwest. In the suimer, however,
the enemy moved below it down the
coast, taking Buna and nearby Gonae.
The Allied garrison was isolated,

5
 THE SITUATION

In 1942 the tide eastward of Japanese victory in

New Guinea had continued. The enemy had landed at Lae and

Salamaua on 8 March, giving them an excellent foothold from

which to launch their further advance down the New Guinea

coast. Buna and Gona followed on 22 July. Although temp-

orarily set back by the desperate action of the Australians

at Milne Bay on 26 August, the stream flowed on in another

direction via Kokoda and over the Owen Stanley Mountains

with the object of engulfing all-important Port Moresby.

The fingers of this advance had been pruned on the Kokoda

trail, at Kokoda itself and by Allied recapture of Buna and

Gona in September. In January 1945, however, the enemy

succeeded in reinforcing its garrison at Lae, even tho the

convoy had been under attack by Allied Air Power. From this

successful reinforcement the enemy started his advance toward

Wau.

Wau strip lay like a diamond set in from the New

Guinea coastline, small but a glittering reward for those

who would control it. Regarded as an outpost in the defense

of Port Moresby, it likewise constituted a potential threat.

to the Japanese positions at Lae and Salamaua. Conversely,

it could be used by the enemy as an additional base in con-

tinuing its operations against Moresby, only 150 miles to

the southeast. In fact, in September 19 142 he had made a

Port Moresby area spring board for Allied
operations north westward in 19h2.
Fighters and bombers based on its several
dromes (Ward's drome upper right corner)
was the greatest stumbling block to Jap
efforts to complete their occupation of
New Guinea. Wau found its significance
as an outpost in the defense of Moresby.
substantial raid with 21 bombers in an attempt to knock

out the Ward and Jackson dromes at Port Moresby, and sub-

sequently sent over nuisance raids at frequent intervals.

Wau's importance had been anticipated by the Allies,

for in March 1942, Australian troops had been sent boldly

into the area. The intention was to prepare for and fore-

stall Jap seizure of it as well as to reconnoitre the

surrounding area. This garrison had been isolated for

months as the enemy had long since established bases below

it down the north side of the New Guinea coast. Neverthe-

less, during the subsequent eleven months it had ambushed

Jap patrols and on one occasion, early January 1943, had

badly mauled the Jap outpost at nearby Mubo.

As far as the Japanese were concerned, they were

confident they could take Wau at their leisure. It was

obvious early in January that preparations were being made.

Air reconnaissance activities were observed and an increase

in barge 'traffic along the coast was apparent. On 27 Jan-

uary an attack was made by a relatively strong force of

ground troops which had proceeded over the extremely rugged

mountain section separating the Lae and Wau areas. The

Australians were compelled to retreat and the enemy actually

reached the perimeter defense of the air strip in a com-

paratively short time.

It had long been realized that overland supply to

the garrison was an impossibility due to the New Guinea

terrain in the area - dense jungles, high mountains and

many rivers. An attempt had been made to utilize native

bearers as a human freight line but had failed. Supplying

these troops via the sea route, moreover, was impossible

with the Japs at Lae and Salamaua only 30 miles up the

coast. The job would be done by air or not at all. Indeed,

preparations had been taken shortly previous to the battle,

little realizing that a desperate need for reinforcements

would arise so soon.

Terrain between Port Moresby and Wau
over which our Transports operated
in reinforcing the garrison. The
bald spot in the center of the picture
illustrates the type of targets used
in dropping of supplies. In many
cases these Targets were only 25 to
50 yards long and 10 to 20 yards wide.

10
 FACTORS IN THE OPERATION

General lessons had been learned from the transport

and free dropping operations on the mainland of Australia

and in New Guinea which were to bear fruit. Shortage of

transport. planes and consequent disregard of pay loads were

an old story. Altho present in Australia after December

19L2, radio ranges were not available in New Guinea until

April 1943. Short, rough strips surrounded by mountains,

tricky wind currents, and the compulsion of sideslipping

at low speeds to make landings, were prevailing conditions.

Flights from Port Moresby over the Owen Stanley Mountains

to forward units had been subjected to attack from enemy

aircraft. Pilots were forced to resort to every possible

trick - extensive use of camouflage to blend the planes

with the terrain, flying in clouds despite the extreme dang-

er of mountain peaks common to the area, and tree top level

approaches.

Engineering and maintenance had long presented an

acute problem. There were few transport planes, most of

them of the Douglas type. Many had been taken over from

Australian and Dutch commercial lines, mostly DC-2s, DC-3s

and DC-5s. The instrument readings of the Dutch planes

were in liters and kilometers, and all instructions natural-

ly in that tongue. A good percentage of tools were almost

primitive. Spare parts were barely obtainable and had to

One of the worst landing strips in
Pauua - only 3,600 feet long, with
a grass surface easily softened by
constant rains. The mountains com-
pelled an approach from only one
direction on a field with a fantastic
gradient of 1 to 10 feet.

12
be salvaged from crashed planes and from dumps. Miracles
of improvisation had been performed by the understaffed

force of mechanics. Epics of recorded ingenuity are the

instances of filed Aussie sixpences being used as magneto

points and Kotex employed as filters. By February, 1943

the pressure was partly relieved by the arrival of some

new C-47s and consequent standardization of parts.

New Guinea weather had a dynamic quality presenting

a constant problem. This condition was due first to the

Doldrum or Bad Weather Belt, which for seven months of the

year covers the Island and severely affects its weather;

and, second, to the extremes of New Guinea local fogs and

rain, turbulence, and rapid build-ups over the mountains.

Weather reports were either unreliable or out of date, and

conditions changed so rapidly that only planes which had

recently returned were capable of reporting on any given

area. For the most part, pilots took off from Port Moresby

or advanced bases trusting to luck and their own flying

skill and convinced that weather over the Owen Stanleys

was as serious a hazard as enemy fighters.

Communication between Port Moresby and Wau were es-

tablished at the time of the operation. In 1942 an

Australian mobile signal unit had been flown into Wau with

radio facilities. This equipment was powerful and reliable.

Contact over thc intervening mountains was on occasion

13
The difficulties of landing C-.7s on
Wau strip are apparent in this picture
and that on page 12. The strip was
located in the Wau Valley 3,300 feet
above sea level, some 30 miles in from
the coast, and surrounded by high mountains.

14
frequently interfered with, however, for a period of as

much as three hours, due to the action of the Heaviside

layer and other physical phenomena.

The Wau air strip was located 30 miles southwest of

Salamaua, about 3,5300 feet above sea level but deep in a

valley. Mountains surround it with particularly high and

rugged ones to the northwest towards Salamaua. The strip

was 3,600 feet long, 450 feet wide at the northeast end,

narrowing to 220 feet on the southwest, and had a gradient

of 1 to 10. Landings were made uphill and takeoffs downhill.

Because of the location of the surroundi'ng mountains, there

was only one approach, from the northeast low end to the

southwest high end. The strip was marked by the use of

painted fuel drums set on either side of it. The grass

surface had bumps and depressions traversing it, causing

rough landings. Drainage was only fair and during the wet

weather transports would cut into the slippery surface 8

to 12 inches. Wau air strip was not a field subject to

normal operations.
Jap ground forces had reached the
perimeter of the strip on 27 Jan. '[3
and practically surrounded the beleaguered
Australian garrison. In the course of
four days Air Transport made 214 landings,
shuttling troops and material from Port
Moresby. Only these reinforcements by air
saved the day.
 THE OPERATION

The Allies, as previously indicated, had made prepar-

ations to reinforce the Australian garrison. In fact, on

25 January, loaded C-47s were waiting on the air strip at

Port Moresby, held there on account of uncertain weather

over Wau. There was no immediate sense of urgency. It was

not until noon of the 27th that the gravity of the situation

was realized. Information forwarded by air reconnaissance

and ground patrols indicated that the enemy meant business.

Ground contact shortly developed and for the following 36

hours Company A of the 6th Australian Battalion, although

forced back to the perimeter defense of the strip, managed

to avoid being wiped out.

The night of the 28th almost four inches of rain fell

and there was little promise of any break. Altho at 0700

the next morning Wau Valley was dense with clouds, they

suddenly and unexpectedly rolled back. At 0900 high flying

Allied fighters sent over to observe the weather radioed

back-to Port Moresby that the field was open. During that

day 57 transport landings were made upon the strip, subject

both in landing and in taking off to enemy rifle and machine

gun fire. Many of the Australian troops were wounded so

soon following their landing that they were evacuated on

the same planes which had transported them to Wau. The

reinforcements by air enabled strong patrols to drive the

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Wau was not hospitable territory,

but the enemy wanted the strip.
The illustration shows the rugged
nature of the terrain around the
perimeter of the field, which Jap
troops reached after crossing the
almost impassable mountain range
between Wau and Lae.
Japs back. The pressure was relieved.

Victory was assured, however, when at 0925 of the 30th

air transports delivered 25 pounder field guns and addition-

al troops. By 1330 of that day shells from these guns were

scattering enemy troops back up into the rugged mountains

between WVau and Lae, and to all intents and purposes the

battle was over. The strip had been saved.

Air Transport demonstrated its versatility during this

four day period. It shuttled between Port Moresby and Wau

244 times, landed on one of the most difficult strips in

Papua, and supplied both personnel and materiel to a sore-

ly pressed command.

The price paid (five C-47s), particularly in view of

the circumstances of the operations, was a cheap one for

the objectives obtained. The first day of air participation

(29 Jan), the 57 landings were made with no losses and only

minor damage. The following day 3 C-47s were lost when one

pilot in landing crashed into 2 parked planes. On 31 Jan-

uary another C-47 was lost due to mechanical failure in

taking off at Port Moresby, and on 7 February one plane

never arrived, presumably due to the activity of Zeros in

the vicinity.

Allied fighter cover of air transport flights had been

improving in New Guinea in the fall of 19)2. In this

operation the cooperation was excellent. The supply runs

19
Not only indispensable troop reinforce-
ments were landed by air but also 25 pounder
field guns. The enemy was forced back into
the surrounding hills where shells from these
guns decimated him.

20
were made unopposed. Allied planes, moreover, made persistent

attacks upon enemy supply lines and troop concentrations. So

far as the Jap was concerned, the Wau battlefield was isolated.

It was not until 6 February that the enemy made a determined,

albeit tardy aireffort. On that day 18 medium bombers and some

55fighters came over the Wau area, achieved little damage and

found it to be an unprofitable venture. Thirtyeight planes

were lost, distributed as follows;

Destroyed Probably Damaged

Destroyed
Jap Allied Jap. Allied Jap. Allied

Fighters 20 0 8 0 2 0

Bombers 3 o o o 5 o
Unidentified 2 0 0 0 0 0

In addition to the movement of troops and supplies into

Wau, air transport operations were used effectively in dropping

supplies to front line troops in that area. The difficulties of

transporting supplies from the Wau airstrip to the front line,

often resulted in troops being in urgent need of ammunition and

food. The difficulty of locating front linetroops in the dense

jungles on the seaward slopes on the densely wooded mountains;

was almost unsurmountable. Despite the jungle, fire fromf ront

line units, and poor weather, air transport planes dropped many

much needed supplies to our advance elements, a good percentage

of ihich were recovered.

21
 CONCLUSION

The enemy raid of 6 February marked the end of its

attempts to interrupt the Allied supply run from Port

Moresby to Wau, and, in effect, the conclusion of the

Wau Campaign. There is little doubt that but for the

success of the Air Transport operations the Wau battle

would have terminated by Jap occupation of the strip.

The Campaign was marked in that the principle of surprise

was employed by both parties: first by the Japanese in

surmounting the rugged terrain and attacking with ground

troops; and subsequently by the Allies in their unexpect-

ed air reinforcement of the garrison. The action mater-

ially contributed to the subsequent Allied campaign in

the Huon Gulf whereby the vital enemy bases of Lae and

Salamaua were destroyed.

22
w

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*,*"C^ ^ rtLirty
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Symbolic of the Wau Campaign Aussie

troops backed up by a C-17.
 AIR UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE WAU OPERATION

Unit pe of Operaton

8th Photo Squadron . . . . . Photo Reconnaissance

7th Fighter Squadron . . . . . . Fighter Escort
49th Fighter Group
9th Fighter Squadron . . . . .. Fighter Escort
49th Fighter Group
59th Fighter Squadron . . ... Interception of enemy
49th Fighter Group aircraft
40th Fighter Squadron S. .. . Fighter Escort
35th Fighter Group
30th Fighter Squadron Ground Strafing
55th Fighter Group
71st Bomb Squadron . . Photo Reconnaissance
38th Bomb Group
38th Bomb Squadron . . Photo Reconnaissance
3rd Bomb Group
374th Troop Carrier Group )
6th Squadron )
21st Squadron )
22nd Squadron )
33rd Squadron Transporting troops
517th Troop Carrier Group ) and supplies
h9th Squadron
0th Squadron )
41st Squadron
16th Squadron
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Battle of Wau, Official Army Australian Publication

Daily Situation Reports
History of 374th Troop Carrier Group
Meteorological Data, Meteorological Bureau, Brisbane
Chronology of Air Force Activities in Pacific War
Papuan Campaign, US War Department
Allied Geographical Section, SWPA, No. 6
RAAF Weather and Communications
Intelligence Situation Report, Allied Air Forces and
RAAF Command, July 19)2 to Latest Current Date
Daily Intelligence Report, Hq FEAF, Sep 43 to Latest
Current Date
ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section)
Enemy Information and Data, June 4 to December 44
ATIS Interrogation Report, October to Latest Current
Date.
Objective Folders, Allied Air Forces, 23 June 35 to
23 March 44.
Objective Folders, CIU, 19)2 to Present Date.
History of 22nd Troop Carrier Squadron
Mission Reports, D. of I. Summary, February 42 to
Current Date
Mission Summaries, Allied Air Forces, 1 December 42
to 31 March 43.
SVB8 09900 9691L

MCLARENS, MELBOURNE