Analysis Terminable and Interminable
Analysis Terminable and Interminable
INTERMINABLE
In response to Ranks proposal of providing shorter
cures, Freud, using the example of the Wolf Man, makes
the central theme of this article the duration of the treatment
and the part of the transference which had not
been resolved (p. 218). The problem of the slow progress
of an analysis leads us to another, more deeply
interesting question: is there such a thing as a natural
end to an analysis? (p. 219). A terminated analysis supposes
that two conditions are fulfilled: first, the patient
must be relieved of symptoms, inhibitions, and anxieties,
and second, enough of the repressed must be
made conscious and elucidated, and enough of the resistance
conquered, so as to banish the risk of repetition.
Three factors affect the length of a treatment: the
constitutional strength of the drive, traumas, and the
alteration of the ego (pp. 220221). Freud indicated
that if the traumatic factor is preponderant, the situation
favors progress towards a definitively terminated
analysis (p. 220). Two factors are responsible for interminable
analyses: the constitutional strength of the
drive and an unfavorable alteration of the ego
acquired in the defensive struggle (pp. 220221) that
results in a kind of dissociation or restriction of the ego.
To follow dialectical reasoning by opposing a terminated
analysis to an interminable one might not
be of use for theoretical research on the end of analysis.
Too much stubbornness on this point could reinforce
a somewhat ideological position consisting, as Freud
wrote in Remembering, Repeating and WorkingThrough, in resolving every one of the patients
repressions and in filling all the gaps in his memory
(1914g, p. 220). A failure to achieve this end could
result from the constitutional strength of the drive
being rooted in biology.
In 1937, the metapsychological model explained
most closely the economic and dynamic aspects of
clinical experience, aspects that had previously eluded
explanations using the notion of opposition of forces.
Thus the end of analysis was described by means of a
much more complex psychic apparatus involving both
the first and second topographies, as well as two classes
of drives that place the psychic conflict at the center
of mental functioning.
When drive is mentioned in this late work, it must
be understood in the context of a two-drive model,
whether in its relation to the object or to the ego. The
pressure of the drives is countered by the ego, which
sets up a resistance using various defenses, some of
which, as reaction-formations, constitute the louder
aspects of neurosis. Though Freud used the term
transference-love, Eros is not the only component in
the dynamics of the transference. Various obstacles
face the analysis, with the risk of a negative therapeutic
reaction always on the horizon. These negative developments