XI.

The Relation between Mathematics and Physics

B y Professor P A M Dirac, F R S
Communicated to the
Royal Society of Edinburgh on presentation of the James Scott Prize, February 6,
1939
(MS received February 25, 1939)
The physicist, in his study of natural phenomena, has two methods of making progress:
(1) the method of experiment and observation, and (2) the method of mathematical
reasoning. The former is just the collection of selected data; the latter enables one to
infer results about experiments that have not been performed. There is no logical reason
why the second method should be possible at all, but one has found in practice that it
does work and meets with remarkable success. This must be ascribed to some math-

ematical quality in Nature, a quality which the casual observer of Nature would not
suspect, but which nevertheless plays an important role in Nature's scheme.
One might describe the mathematical quality in Nature by saying that the universe is
so constituted that mathematics is a useful tool in its description. However, recent
advances in physical science show that this statement of the case is too trivial. The
connection between mathematics and the description of the universe goes far deeper
than this, and one can get an appreciation of it only from a thorough examination of the
various factors that make it up. The main aim of my talk to you will be to give you such
an appreciation. ! propose to deal with how the physicist's views on this subject have
been gradually modified by the succession of recent developments in physics, and then
I would like to make a little speculation about the future.
Let us take as our starting-point that scheme of physical science which was generally
accepted in the last century - the mechanistic scheme. This considers the whole
universe to be a dynamical system (of course an extremely complicated dynamical

Reproduced from Proceedings of/he I?oyo/Socie/y (Edinburgh), Vol.59, pp.122-129 (1938-39).

102

RESONANCE J Augusl 2003

system), subject to laws of motion which are essentially of the Newtonian type. The role
of mathematics in this scheme is to represent the laws of motion by equations, and to
obtain solutions of the equations referring to observed conditions.
T h e dominating idea in this application of mathematics to physics is that the equations
representing the laws of motion should be of a simple form. The whole success of the
scheme is due to the fact that equations of simple form do seem to work. The physicist
is thus provided with a principle of simplicity, which he can use as an instrument of
research. If he obtains, from some rough experiments, data which fit in roughly with
certain simple equations, he infers that if he performed the experiments more accurately he would obtain data fitting in more accurately with the equations. The method
is much restricted, however, since the principle of simplicity applies only to fundamental laws of motion, not to natural phenomena in general. For example, rough experiments about the relation between the pressure and volume of a gas at a fixed temperature give results fitting in with a law of inverse proportionality, but it would be wrong
to infer that more accurate experiments would confirm this law with greater accuracy,
as one is here dealing with a phenomenon which is not connected in any very direct way
with the fundamental laws of motion.
The discovery of the theory of relativity made it necessary to modify the principle of
simplicity. Presumably one of the fundamental laws of motion is the law of gravitation
which, according to Newton, is represented by a very simple equation, but, according
to Einstein, needs the development of an elaborate technique before its equation can
even be written down. It is true that, from the standpoint of higher mathematics, one
can give reasons in favour of the view that Einstein's law of gravitation is actually
simpler than Newton's, but this involves assigning a rather subtle meaning to simplicity, which largely spoils the practical value of the principle of simplicity as an instrument of research into the foundations of physics.
What makes the theory of relativity so acceptable to physicists in spite of its going
against the principle of simplicity is its great mathematical beauty. This is a quality which
cannot be defined, any more than beauty in art can be defined, but which people who
study mathematics usually have no difficulty in appreciating. The theory of relativity
introduced mathematical beauty to an unprecedented extent into the description of
Nature. The restricted theory changed our ideas of space and time in a way that may be
summarised by stating that the group of transformations to which the space-time
continuum is subject must be changed from the Galilean group to the Lorentz group.

RESONANCE J August 2003

103

T h e latter group is a much more beautiful thing than the former - in fact, the former
would be called mathematically a degenerate special case of the latter. The general
theory of relativity involved another step of a rather similar character, although the
increase in beauty this time is usually considered to be not quite so great as with the
restricted theory, which results in the general theory being not quite so firmly believed
in as the restricted theory.
We now see that we have to change the principle of simplicity into a principle of
mathematical beauty. The research worker, in his efforts to express the fundamental laws
of Nature in mathematical form, should strive mainly for mathematical beauty. He
should still take simplicity into consideration in a subordinate way to beauty. (For
example Einstein, in choosing a law of gravitation, took the simplest one compatible
with his space-time continuum, and was successful.) It often happens that the requirements of simplicity and of beauty are the same, but where they clash the latter must take
precedence.
Let us pass on to the second revolution in physical thought of the present century - the
quantum theory. This is a theory of atomic phenomena based on a mechanics of an
essentially different type from Newton's. The difference may be expressed concisely,
but in a rather abstract way, by saying that dynamical variables in quantum mechanics
are subject to an algebra in which the commutative axiom of multiplication does not
hold. Apart from this, there is an extremely close formal analogy between quantum
mechanics and the old mechanics. In fact, it is remarkable how adaptable the old
mechanics is to the generalization of non-commutative algebra. All the elegant features
of the old mechanics can be carried over to the new mechanics, where they reappear
with an enhanced beauty.
Quantum mechanics requires the introduction into physical theory of a vast new
domain of pure mathematics - the whole domain connected with non-commutative
multiplication. This, coming on top of the introduction of new geometries by the
theory of relativity, indicates a trend which we may expect to continue. We may expect
that in the future further big domains of pure mathematics will have to be brought in
to deal with the advances in fundamental physics.
Pure mathematics and physics are becoming ever more closely connected, though their
methods remain different. One may describe the situation by saying that the mathematician plays a game in which he himself invents the rules while the physicist plays a

104

RESONANCE I August 2003

Cs
game in which the rules are provided by Nature, but as time goes on it becomes
increasingly evident that the rules which the mathematician finds interesting are the
same as those which Nature has chosen. It is difficult to predict what the result of all this
will be. Possibly, the two subjects will ultimately unify, every branch of pure mathematics then having its physical application, its importance in physics being proportional to
its interest in mathematics. At present we are, of course, very far from this stage, even
with regard to some of the most elementary questions. For example, only fourdimensional space is of importance in physics, while spaces with other numbers of
dimensions are of about equal interest in mathematics.
It may well be, however, that this discrepancy is due to the incompleteness of presentday knowledge, and that future developments will show four-dimensional space to be of
far greater mathematical interest than all the others.
T h e trend of mathematics and physics towards unification provides the physicist with
a powerful new method of research into the foundations of his subject, a method which
has not yet heen applied successfully, but which I feel confident will prove its value in
the future. The method is to begin by choosing that branch of mathematics which one
thinks will form the basis of the new theory. One should be influenced very much in this
choice by considerations of mathematical beauty. It would probably be a good thing
also to give a preference to those branches of mathematics that have an interesting
group of transformations underlying them, since transformations play an important
role in modern physical theory, both relativity and quantum theory seeming to show
that transformations are of more fundamental importance than equations. Having
decided on the branch of mathematics, one should proceed to develop it along suitable
lines, at the same time looking for that way in which it appears to lend itself naturally
to physical interpretation.
This method was used by Jordan in an attempt to get an improved quantum theory on
the basis of an algebra with non-associative multiplication. The attempt was not
successful, as one would rather expect, if one considers that non-associative algebra is
not a specially beautiful branch of mathematics, and is not connected with an interesting transformation theory. I would suggest, as a more hopeful-looking idea for getting
an improved quantum theory, that one take as basis the theory of functions of a complex
variable. This branch of mathematics is of exceptional beauty, and further, the group of
transformations with which it is connected, namely, the group of transformations in the
complex plane, is the same as the Lorentz group governing the space-time of restricted

RESONANCE J August 2003

105

relativity. One is thus led to suspect the existence of some deep-lying connection
between the theory of functions of a complex variable and the space-time of restricted
relativity, the working out of which will be a difficult task for the future.
Let us now discuss the extent of the mathematical quality in Nature. According to the
mechanistic scheme of physics or to its relativistic modification, one needs for the
complete description of the universe not merely a complete system of equations of
motion, but also a complete set of initial conditions, and it is only to the former of these
that mathematical theories apply. The latter are considered to be not amenable to
theoretical treatment and to be determinable only from observation. The enormous
complexity of the universe is ascribed to an enormous complexity in the initial
conditions, which removes them beyond the range of mathematical discussion.
I find this position very unsatisfactory philosophically, as it goes against all ideas of the
unity of Nature. Anyhow, if it is only to a part of the description of the universe that
mathematical theory applies, this part ought certainly to be sharply distinguished from
the remainder. But in fact there does not seem to be any natural place in which to draw
the line. Are such things as the properties of the elementary particles of physics, their
masses and the numerical coefficients occurring in their laws of force, subject to
mathematical theory? According to the narrow mechanistic view, they should b e
counted as initial conditions and outside mathematical theory. However, since the
elementary particles all belong to one or other of a number of definite types, the
members of one type being all exactly similar, they must be governed by mathematical
law to some extent, and most physicists now consider it to be quite a large extent. For
example, Eddington has been building up a theory to account for the masses. But even
if one supposed all the properties of the elementary particles to be determinable by
theory, one would still not know where to draw the line, as one would be faced by the
next question - Are the relative abundances of the various chemical elements determinable by theory? One would pass gradually from atomic to astronomic questions.
This unsatisfactory situation gets changed for the worse by the new quantum mechanics. In spite of the great analogy between quantum mechanics and the older mechanics
with regard to their mathematical formalism, they differ drastically with regard to the
nature of their physical consequences. According to the older mechanics, the result of
any observation is determinate and can be calculated theoretically from given initial
conditions; but with quantum mechanics there is usually an indeterminacy in the

106

RESONANCE I August

2003

C ,YSrY3C$
result of an observation, connected with the possibility of occurrence of a quantum
jump, and' the most that can be calculated theoretically is the probability of any
particular result being obtained. The question, which particular result will be obtained
in some particular case, lies outside the theory. This must not be attributed to an
incompleteness of the theory, but is essential for the application of a formalism of the
kind used by quantum mechanics.
Thus according to quantum mechanics we need, for a complete description of the
Universe, not only the laws of motion and the initial conditions, but also information
about which quantum jump occurs in each case when a quantum jump does occur. The
latter information must be included, together with the initial conditions, in that part of
the description of the universe outside mathematical theory.
The increase thus arising in the non-mathematical part of the description of the
universe provides a philosophical objection to quantum mechanics, and is, I believe,
the underlying reason why some physicists still find it difficult to accept this mechanics. Quantum mechanics should not be abandoned, however, firstly, because of its very
widespread and detailed agreement with experiment, and secondly, because the indeterminacy it introduces into the results of observations is of a kind which is philosophically satisfying, being readily ascribable to an inescapable crudeness in the means of
observation available for small-scale experiments. The objection does show, all the
same, that the foundations of physics are still far from their final form.
We come now to the third great development of physical science of the present century
- the new cosmology. This will probably turn out to be philosophically even more
revolutionary than relativity or the quantum theory, although at present one can hardly
realize its full implications. The starting-point is the observed red-shift in the spectra
of distant heavenly bodies, indicating that they are receding from us with velocities
proportional to their distances.* The velocities of the more distant ones are so enormous that it is evident we have here a fact of the utmost importance, not a temporary or
local condition, but something fundamental for our picture of the universe.

* The recession velocities are not strictly proved, since one may postulate some other cause for the spectral
red-shift. However, the new cause would presumably be equally drastic in its effect on cosmological theory
and would still need the introduction of a parameter of the order 2 x 109 years for its mathematical discussion,
so it would probably not disturb the essential ideas of the argument in the text.

RESONANCE I August 2003

107

t2,h//' e52"C
If we go backwards into the past we come to a time, about 2

10 9

years ago, when all the

matter in the universe was concentrated in a very small volume. It seems as though
something like an explosion then took place, the fragments of which we now observe
still scattering outwards. This picture has been elaborated by Lemaitre, who considers
the universe to t~ave started as a single very heavy atom, which underwent violent
radioactive disintegrations and so broke up into the present collection of astronomical
bodies, at the same time giving off the cosmic rays.
With this kind of cosmological picture one is led to suppose that there was a beginning
of time, and that it is meaningless to inquire into what happened before then. One can
get a rough idea of the geometrical relationships this involves by imagining the present
to be the surface of a sphere, going into the past to be going in towards the centre of the
sphere, and going into the future to be going outwards. There is then no limit to how far
one may go into the future, but there is a limit to how far one can go into the past,
corresponding to when one has reached the centre of the sphere. The beginning of time
provides a natural origin from which to measure the time of any event. The result is
usually called the epoch of that event. Thus the present epoch is 2 109 years.
Let us now return to dynamical questions. With the new cosmology the universe must
have been started off in some very simple way. What, then, becomes of the initial
conditions required by dynamical theory? Plainly there cannot be any, or they must be
trivial. We are left in a situation which would be untenable with the old mechanics. If
the universe were simply the motion which follows from a given scheme of equations of
motion with trivial initial conditions, it could not contain the complexity we observe.
Quantum mechanics provides an escape from the difficulty. It enables us to ascribe the
complexity to the quantum jumps, lying outside the scheme of equations of motion. The

quantum jumps now form the uncalculable part of natural phenomena, to replace the initial
conditions of the old mechanistic view.
One further point in connection with the new cosmology is worthy of note. At the
beginning of time the laws of Nature were probably very different from what they are
now. Thus we should consider the laws of Nature as continually changing with the
epoch, instead of as holding uniformly throughout space-time. This idea was first put
forward by Milne, who worked it out on the assumptions that the universe at a given
epoch is roughly everywhere uniform and spherically symmetrical. I find these assumptions not very satisfying, because the local departures from uniformity are so great and

108

RESONANCE J Augusl 2003

C //' eS"JCe.5"
are of such essential importance for our world of life that it seems unlikely there should
be a principle of uniformity overlying them. Further, as we already have the laws of
Nature depending on the epoch, we should expect them also to depend on position in
space, in order to preserve the beautiful idea of the theory of relativity that there is
fundamental similarity between space and time. This goes more drastically against
Milne's assumptions than a mere lack of uniformity in the distribution of matter.
We have followed through the main course of the development of the relation between
mathematics and physics up to the present time, and have reached a stage where it
becomes interesting to indulge in speculations about the future. There has always been
an unsatisfactory feature in the relation, namely, the limitation in the extent to which
mathematical theory applies to a description of the physical universe. The part to which
it does not apply has suffered an increase with the arrival of quantum mechanics and a
decrease with the arrival of the new cosmology, but has always remained.
This feature is so unsatisfactory that I think it safe to predict it will disappear in the
future, in spite of the startling changes in our ordinary ideas to which we should then
be led. It would mean the existence of a scheme in which the whole of the description
of the universe has its mathematical counterpart, and we must suppose that a person
with a complete knowledge of mathematics could deduce, not only astronomical data,
but also all the historical events that take place in the world, even the most trivial ones.
Of course, it must be beyond human power actually to make these deductions, since life
as we know it would be impossible if one could calculate future events, but the methods
of making them would have to he well defined. The scheme could not be subject to the
principle of simplicity since it would have to be extremely complicated, but it may well
be subject to the principle of mathematical beauty.
I would like to put forward a suggestion a s to how such a scheme might be realized. If
we express the present epoch, 2 x 10 9 years, in terms of a unit of time defined by the
atomic constants, we get a number of the order 10 39, which characterizes the present in
an absolute sense. Might it not be that all present events correspond to properties of this
large number, and, more generally, that the whole history of the universe corresponds
to properties of the whole sequence of natural numbers? At first sight it would seem that
the universe is far too complex for such a correspondence to be possible. But 1 think this
objection cannot be maintained, since a number of the order 1039 is excessively complicated, just because it is so enormous. We have a brief way of writing it down, but this
should not blind us to the fact that it must have excesgively complicated properties.

RESONANCE J August 2003

109

There is thus a possibility that the ancient dream of philosophers to connect all Nature
with the properties of whole numbers will some day be realized. To do so physics will
have to develop a long way to establish the details of how the correspondence is to be
made. One hint for this development seems pretty obvious, namely, the study of whole
numbers in modern mathematics is inextricably bound up with the theory of functions
of a complex variable, which theory we have already seen has a good chance of forming
the basis of the physics of the future. The working out of this idea would lead to a
connection between atomic theory and cosmology.
(Issued separately May 20, 1939.)
P.R.S.E.-VOL LIX, 1938-39, PART 11.

"The methods oftheoreticalphysics have undergone a vast

change during the present century. The classical tradition
has been to consider the world to be an association of
observable objects (particles. fluids, fields, etc.) moving
about according to definite laws offorce, so that one could
f o r m a mental picture in space and time o f the whole
scheme. This led to a physics whose aim was to make
assumptions about the mechanism and forces connecting
these observable objects, to account f o r their behaviour in
the simplest possible way. It has become increasingly
evident in recent times, however, that nature works on a
different plan. Her fundamental laws do not govern the
w o r m as it appears in our mental picture in any very direct
way, but instead they control a substratum o f which we
cannot f o r m a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies. "

Dirac
From Preface t o ' The Principles o f Quantum Mechanics',
1930.
-

110

RESONANCE J August 2003