FIRST DIVISION

Laguna,

Philippines

and

within

the

jurisdiction of this [honorable] [c]ourt,

[G.R. No. 182694. August 13, 2008.]

the said accused during and within the

election period from January 11 to June

IGMIDIO

MADRIGAL, petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

10, 1998 did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and criminally have in his
possession,

custody

and

control

caliber .38 Smith & Wesson [r]evolver

with no serial number containing live
RESOLUTION

ammunition, without first securing from

the [COMELEC] the required permit to
carry

CORONA, J p:

the

same

outside

his

residence. STaAcC

For possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver

during the 1998 election period, petitioner Igmidio
Madrigal was charged in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

Contrary to law.
while that in Criminal Case No. 1026-SPL stated:

of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93 with two separate

That on or about March 31, 1998, in the

crimes: (1) violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A.

Municipality of San Pedro, Province of

8294 1 and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election Code,

Laguna,

as

jurisdiction of this [honorable] [c]ourt,

amended

by R.A.

7166 (Gun

Ban). 2 The

information in Criminal Case No. 1025-SPL read:

That on or about March 31, 1998, in the
Municipality of San Pedro, Province of

Philippines

and

within

the

the said accused, without the required

license/permit from lawful authorities
did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession,

custody and control a caliber .38 Smith

[nine]

&

twenty (20) days of prision

Wesson

[r]evolver

with

live

(4)

months

and

ammunition and a split [(sic)] shell

correccional as

without any number.

and to pay a fine of Fifteen

Thousand

Contrary to law.

on the merits, the RTC ruled:

view

thereof,

2. [2.]

In

Criminal

the

Court

hereby

Igmidio

accused

Igmidio

guilty

beyond reasonable doubt

(Gun

of the crime of [v]iolation

sentencing

ofP.D.

suffer

amended

8294 and

sentencing

hereby

accused

to

beyond

crime of [v]iolation of the

Omnibus

1866 as

penalty

Election
Ban)

Code
hereby

accused

to

the

indeterminate

of

imprisonment

from one year as minimum

the

indeterminate

to

of

imprisonment

maximum

from two (2) years, eleven

accessory

(11) months and ten (10)

provided for by law.

penalty

reasonable doubt of the

Madrigal y Macaraig guilty

suffer

No.

Madrigal

Macaraig

1. In Criminal Case No. 1026-SPL,

by R.A.

[C]ase

1025-SPL, finding accused

renders judgment:

finding

(P15,000.00)

Pesos; DSHTaC

Petitioner pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial

In

maximum

three

(3)

years
with

as
the

penalties

days

of prision

Petitioner appealed the RTC decision. The CA affirmed

correccional as

minimum

petitioner's conviction in both offenses but reduced the

to [f]ive (5) years, [f]our

penalty imposed on him in Criminal Case No. 1026-SPL

convicted for illegal possession of firearm if another

(illegal possession of firearm). 3

crime was committed:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner seeks

SEC. 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree

his acquittal from the charges against him. He

No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further

questions the findings of the RTC, as upheld by the CA,

amended to read as follows:

of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of

illegal possession of firearm and violation of the
election gun ban. He also questions his conviction for
both offenses on the ground that R.A. 8294 proscribes
conviction

under

it

if

another

crime

has

been

committed.

finding of the RTC, as upheld by the CA, that petitioner

was in possession of an unlicensed firearm with live
ammunition during the election period in 1998. This is
entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be
disturbed on review by us, in the absence of any clear
showing that the lower courts overlooked certain facts
and circumstances which would substantially affect the
disposition of the case. 4 EHSIcT
petitioner
for

both

is

correct

offenses.

Manufacture,

Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or

Possession

of

Firearms

or

Ammunition or Instruments Used

or Intended to be Used in the
of

Ammunition.

At the outset, we see no reason to disturb the factual

conviction

1. Unlawful

Manufacture

We partially grant the petition.

However,

SEC.

of prision

Firearms
The

or

penalty

correccional in

its

maximum period and a fine of not

less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon
any

person

who

shall

unlawfully . . . possess any low

powered
firepower,

firearm
part

of
of

similar
firearm,

ammunition, or machinery, tool or

instrument used or intended to

in

assailing

Section

his

of R.A.

8294 expressly provides that a person may not be

be used in the manufacture of

any

firearm

or

ammunition: Provided, That no

SET ASIDE insofar as petitioner was found guilty of

other

illegal possession of firearm. Criminal Case No. 1026-

crime

was

committed. (emphasis supplied)

SPL is DISMISSED and petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED

Whether there can be a separate offense of illegal

possession of firearm and ammunition if there is
another crime committed was already addressed
inAgote v. Lorenzo. 5 Agote, like petitioner herein, was
convicted of separate charges of (1) illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition and (2) violation of the

therein.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro,
JJ., concur.
||| (Madrigal v. People, G.R. No. 182694, [August 13,
2008], 584 PHIL 241-245)

election gun ban by the RTC and the CA. However,

applying Section 1 of R.A. 8294, we set aside Agote's
conviction for illegal possession of firearm since
FIRST DIVISION

another crime was committed at the same time

(violation of the election gun ban). HSEcTC
WHEREFORE,

the

petition

is

hereby

PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The January 21, 2008 decision and April 24,

2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26869 are AFFIRMED insofar as petitioner was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
No.

1025-SPL

and

sentenced

to

suffer

the

indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from one year

as minimum to three years as maximum with the
accessory penalties provided for by law. The said
decision and resolution are, however, REVERSED and

[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997.]

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

EMILIANO

CATANTAN

TAYONG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

that to sustain the defense and convert the case of

piracy to grave coercion would be to ignore the fact

Accused-appellant, together with one Jose Macver

that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was

Ursal, were charged with violation of PD 532, otherwise

seized by the accused by means of violence against or

known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of

intimidation of persons, the very act punished by PD

1974. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial,

532.

found both accused guilty of the crime charged and

sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. Only accusedappellant appealed. In his appeal, accused-appellant
contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of
piracy as the facts proved only constitute the crime of
grave coercion, and not piracy. Accused-appellant
argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is
essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a
vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not
attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers
by using force and intimidation but merely boarded the
boat, and it was only when they were already on board
that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take
them to some other place. LLpr

Judgment of conviction affirmed. SCDaET

SYLLABUS
CRIMINAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 532; CASE
AT BAR FALLS SQUARELY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF
PIRACY, NOT GRAVE COERCION. Under the definition
of piracy in P.D. No. 532 as well as grave coercion as
penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this
case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While
it may be true that Eugene and Juan, Jr. were
compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of
destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the
act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one

The Supreme Court ruled that the case at bar falls

of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized

squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be

the vessel through force and intimidation. To sustain

true that the Pilapils were compelled to go elsewhere

the defense and convert this case of piracy into one

other than their place of destination, such compulsion

of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a

was obviously part of seizing their boat. The Court said

fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized

by the accused by means of violence against or

EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias

intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the

"Bimbo"

accused suddenly approached them and boarded their

532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway

pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as

Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while

he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to

armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in

"dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then

conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and

struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower

intimidation,

portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his

assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene

victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.

Pilapil and Juan Pilapil, Jr. who were then fishing in the

The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning.

seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing

The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with

boat, to their damage and prejudice. 1

four

passengers,

all

strangers

to

them,

easily

intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled

to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The
moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he
had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn
revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence

were

charged

wilfully

with

and

violation

feloniously

of PD

No.

attacked,

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both

accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven
Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. 2 Of the duo
only Emiliano Catantan appealed. cdtai

avert

In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial

situations like the case at bar and discourage and

court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts

prevent piracy in Philippine waters. LLphil

proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art.

the

issuance

of PD

No.

532 designed

to

286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD

No. 532.
DECISION

The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock

in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers

BELLOSILLO, J p:

Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea

some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon,

stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist

Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them.

his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs

One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano

were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres

Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and

cantos 4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.

leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan

struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him
and Juan Jr. to "dapa." 3 Then Catantan told Ursal to
follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they
hog-tied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom
of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his
neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry
them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other

As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another

boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the
Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain
Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning
this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach
the boat cautioning them however not to move or say
anything.

used

On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan

together with its passengers one of whom was visibly

boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered

tied.

the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another

pumpboat

which

the

accused

had

earlier

Noting that they were already far out into the sea,
Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now offcourse but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he
would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan
Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be
set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was
threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as
they went farther out into the open sea the engine

town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying

that he would still pull up his net and harvest his
catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You
choose between the two, or I will kill you." 5 Juanito,
obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal
hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined
Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat,
its outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of
the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt

threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water

person who, without authority of law, shall, by means

headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and

of violence, prevent another from doing something not

the

prohibited by law, or compel him to do something

two

swam

together

clinging

to

their

boat.

Fortunately, another pumpboat passed by and towed

them safely ashore.

against his will, whether it be right or wrong."

Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may

Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as

be committed it is essential that there be an attack on

"any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the

or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his

taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,

companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of

equipment,

the

the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but

complement or passengers, irrespective of the value

merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they

thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation

were already on board that they used force to compel

of persons or force upon things, committed by any

the Pilapils to take them to some other place.

person, including a passenger or member of the

Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no

complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall

intention

be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be

depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of

considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter

fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered

provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b),

the brothers right away to approach that boat so they

of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used

could

for transport of passengers and cargo from one place

Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed

to another through Philippine waters. It shall include

grave coercion and not piracy.

or

the

personal

belongings

of

all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in

fishing (emphasis supplied).

of

leave

permanently

the

Pilapils

taking

behind

possession

in

their

or

boat.

We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD

No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art.

On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art.

286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely

286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any

within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that

Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere

other than their place of destination, such compulsion
was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The
testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that
the appellant actually seized the vessel through force
and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is

A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of
that

pumpboat

boarded

your

pumpboat, how did they do that?

A: They

approached

somewhat

suddenly and came aboard the

significant and enlightening

pumpboat (emphasis supplied).

Q: Now, while you and your younger
brother

were

fishing

at

the

Q: How many suddenly came aboard

your pumpboat?

seawaters of Tabogon at that

A: Only one.

time, was there anything unusual

Q: What did that person do when he

that happened?
A: Yes.

came aboard your pumpboat?

A: When he boarded our pumpboat he

Q: Will you please tell the Court what

that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon

aimed

his

revolver

us (emphasis supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his

another pumpboat arrived and

revolver

the passengers of that pumpboat

anything to you?

boarded our pumpboat.

Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said
approached you, how many were
riding in that pumpboat?

at

to

you,

did

he

say

xxx xxx xxx

A: He said, "dapa," which means lie
down (emphasis supplied).

COURT:

the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine

waters was seized by the accused by means of

Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?

violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene

A: He aimed the revolver on me.

Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached

TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:

them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan

aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining

Q: What else did he do?

witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face

A: Then he ordered his companion to

downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver,

come aboard the pumpboat.

hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which,

Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to

Q: What did he do with his revolver?

Daan Tabogon.

A: He struck my face with the revolver,

The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning.

hitting the lower portion of my

The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with

left eye.

four

passengers,

all

strangers

to

them,

easily

Q: Now, after you were struck with the

intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled

revolver, what did these persons

to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The

do?

moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he

had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn

A: We were ordered to take them to a

revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence,

certain place.

the issuance of PD No. 532designed to avert situations

To

Q: To what place did he order you to go?

like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy

A: To Daan Tabogon. 6

in Philippine waters. Thus, we cite the succeeding

sustain

the

defense

and

convert

this

case

of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore

"whereas" clauses of the decree

Whereas, reports from law-enforcement

The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only

agencies reveal that lawless elements

means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave

are still committing acts of depredations

the natural elements and contend with the unknown

upon the persons and properties of

forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It

innocent and defenseless inhabitants

is on these small fishermen that the townspeople

who travel from one place to another,

depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood

thereby disturbing the peace, order and

would be to deprive them of their very subsistence,

tranquillity of the nation and stunting

and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD

the economic and social progress of the

No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social,

people;

educational and community progress of the people."

Whereas, such acts of depredations

constitute

either

piracy

or

highway

robbery/brigandage which are among

the

highest

forms

of

lawlessness

condemned by the penal statutes of all

countries; and,
Whereas, it

is

imperative

that

said

perpetrating such acts of depredations

by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of
economic,

pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone

helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a
broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea,
could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no

lawless elements be discouraged from

eliminating

Had it not been for the chance passing of another

all
social,

obstacles

to

the

educational

and

community progress of the people.

intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their

boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with
their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned
the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down
and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat
that would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately
for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so
they were apprehended by the police soon after the
Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.

The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to

VICENTE

seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot

MATOL, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL

exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and

F. LORENZO, Presiding Judge, RTC,

we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused

Branch 43, Manila and PEOPLE OF

Ursal

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

seized

through

force

and

intimidation

the

AGOTE

pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in

Philippine waters.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision

appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant

SYLLABUS

EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy

penalized

under PD

No.

532 and

sentencing

him

[Link] LAW; APPEALS; PETITION FOR REVIEW ON

accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs

CERTIORARI; PROPER REMEDY WHERE PARTY RAISES

against accused-appellant. cdasia

ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW; REMEDIES OF APPEAL AND

CERTIORARI ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE AND NOT

SO ORDERED.

ALTERNATIVE OR SUCCESSIVE. At the outset, it must

Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.

be stressed that petitioner never put in issue the

||| (People v. Catantan y Tayong, G.R. No. 118075,

[September 5, 1997], 344 PHIL 315-323)

factual findings of the trial court. What he questions is

said

court's

8294 cannot

legal
be

conclusion
retroactively

that Rep.
applied

Act
to

No.
him.

Unquestionably, the issue raised is one purely of law.

EN BANC

As we have said in Macawiwili Gold Mining and

Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals: For a

[G.R. No. 142675. July 22, 2005.]

question to be one of law, the same must not involve

an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any one of them. And the

distinction is well-known: there is a question of law in a

the remedies of appeal and certiorari being mutually

given case when the doubt or difference arises as to

exclusive

what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a

correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, what

question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as

petitioner should have done was to take an appeal

to the truth or the falsehood of the facts alleged.

from the trial court's order of July 15, 1999 which

Considering that "judgments of regional trial courts in

denied his motion for reconsideration of the May 18,

the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be

1999 judgment of conviction.

elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases when

appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law," while "appeals from judgments of the
[same

courts]

in

the

exercise

of

their

original

jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme

Court in cases where the appellant raises only
questions of law," petitioner should have appealed the
trial court's ruling to this Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, pursuant
to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the same Rules, viz.: . . . .
By reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the
remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45, his right
to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was
effectively foreclosed, precisely because one of the
requirements for the availment of the latter remedy is
that "there should be no appeal, or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,"

and

not

alternative

or

successive.

As

[Link].; RULES OF PROCEDURE; MAY BE RELAXED OR

SUSPENDED WHENEVER THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
REQUIRES; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner's case is worse
compounded by the fact that even his period for
appeal had already prescribed when he filed with the
Court of Appeals his certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 2991-UDK. The Rollo of said case reveals that
petitioner received his copy of the trial court's order
denying his motion for reconsideration on July 20,
1999. As the same Rollo shows, it was only on August
23, 1999, or after more than fifteen (15) days when
petitioner filed his wrong remedy of certiorari with the
appellate court. Be that as it may, the Court feels that
it must squarely address the issue raised in this case
regarding the retroactivity of Rep. Act No. 8294, what
with the reality that the provisions thereof are
undoubtedly favorable to petitioner. For this purpose,
then, we shall exercise our prerogative to set aside

technicalities in the Rules and "hold the bull by its

UNDER P.D. NO. 1866; NO SEPARATE OFFENSE OF

horns," so to speak. After all, the power of this Court to

SIMPLE ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS WHERE

suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice

THE

requires is not without legal authority or precedent. In

COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME. As early as

Solicitor General, et al. vs. The Metropolitan Manila

August 1997, the month after Rep. Act No. 8294 took

Authority, we held: Unquestionably, the Court has the

effect, this Court has pronounced in Gonzales vs. Court

power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of

of Appeals that said law must be given retroactive

its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the

effect in favor of those accused under P.D. No. 1866.

Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning 'pleading,

Since then, this Court had consistently adhered to the

practice and procedure in all courts.' In proper cases,

Gonzales ruling. For sure, in People vs. Valdez, where

procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the

the accused was charged with the complex crime of

interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be

multiple murder with double frustrated murder and

miscarried

formalistic

illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under

adherence to such rules. . . . We have made similar

two separate informations, this Court even took a

rulings in other cases, thus: Be it remembered that

bolder

rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to

8294 retroactively so that the accused therein may not

facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and

be

rigid application, which would result in technicalities

possession of firearms, but refused to apply the same

that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial

retroactively so as to aggravate the crime of murder.

justice, must always be avoided. . . . Time and again,

The Valdez ruling had been applied in a host of

this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a

subsequent cases. Yet, in other cases, although the

particular case from their operation whenever the

Court had given Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactive effect so

higher interests of justice so require.

as to prevent the conviction of an accused of the

because

of

rigid

and

[Link] LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8294; GIVEN

RETROACTIVE EFFECT IN FAVOR OF THOSE ACCUSED

UNLICENSED

stance

convicted

of

FIREARM

by
the

IS

USED

applying Rep.
separate

crime

IN

Act
of

THE

No.
illegal

separate crime of illegal possession of firearm when

the said unlicensed firearm was "used" to commit the

crime of murder or homicide, the Court did not

intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant

appreciate this "use" of such unlicensed firearm as an

cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal

aggravating circumstance as provided therein, when

possession

the "use" of an unlicensed firearm was not specifically

attempted homicide. . . . The law is clear: the accused

alleged in the information, as required by the Rules on

can be convicted of simple illegal possession of

Criminal Procedure.

firearms, provided that 'no other crime was committed

[Link].; ID.; SECTION 1 THEREOF, CONSTRUED. In

People

vs.

Walpan

M.

Ladjaalam,

this

Court,

interpreting the subject proviso in Section 1 of Rep. Act

No. 8294, applied the basic principles in criminal law,
and categorically held: . . . A simple reading thereof
shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence,
if the 'other crime' is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct
assault

with

multiple

attempted

homicide

was

committed in this case, appellant can no longer be

held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover,
penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's
simple language is most favorable to herein appellant.
Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the
language of the new law demonstrates the legislative

of

firearms

and

direct

assault

with

by the person arrested.' If the intention of the law in

the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide
and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did
in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we. The aforementioned
ruling was reiterated and applied in the subsequent
cases of People vs. Garcia, where the judgment of
conviction

of

the

accused-appellants

for

illegal

possession of firearms was set aside there being

another crime kidnapping for ransom which they
were perpetrating at the same time; People vs. Bernal,
where the Court retroactively applied Rep. Act No.
8294 in accused-appellant's favor because it would
mean his acquittal from the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms; and People vs. Bustamante,
where, in refusing to convict the accused-appellant of
the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms,
the Court declared that insofar as it is favorable to the
appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 should

be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant

8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court's

must be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of

review. Any perception that the result reached here

firearms.

appears unwise should be addressed to Congress.

[Link].; ID.; WISDOM THEREOF NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW;

THE SOLEMN POWER AND DUTY OF THE COURT TO
INTERPRET AND APPLY THE LAW DOES NOT INCLUDE
THE POWER TO CORRECT BY READING INTO THE LAW
WHAT IS NOT WRITTEN THEREIN. Guided by the
foregoing, the Court cannot but set aside petitioner's
conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal
possession

of

firearm

committed

at

the

since

same

another

time,

i.e.,

crime
violation

was
of

COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.

Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings
considering that it would mean petitioner's acquittal of
the more serious offense of illegal possession of
firearms which carries a much heavier penalty than
violation

of

the

COMELEC

gun-ban

resolution.

However, as we have rationalized in Ladjaalam: . . .

Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal
possession of firearms by using such weapons in
committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and
scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are
punishable

by

arresto

menor.

This

consequence,

however, necessarily arises from the language of RA

Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a

new meaning detached from the manifest intendment
and

language

of

the

legislature.

Our

task

is

constitutionally confined only to applying the law and

jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done
so in this case. The solemn power and duty of the
Court to interpret and apply the law does not include
the power to correct by reading into the law what is
not written therein. While we understand respondent
People's contention that the "use" of the firearm
seemed to have been the main consideration during
the deliberations of the subject provision of Rep. Act
No. 8294, the fact remains that the word "use" never
found its way into the final version of the bill which
eventually became Rep. Act No. 8294. The Court's
hands are now tied and it cannot supply the perceived
deficiency in the final version without contravening the
most basic principles in the interpretation of penal
laws which had always leaned in favor of the accused.
Under our system of government where powers are
allocated to the three (3) great branches, only the

Legislature can remedy such deficiency, if any, by

set aside the following resolutions of the Court of

proper amendment of Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294.

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK, to wit:

[Link].; ID.; ACCUSED CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF THE

[Link]

dated

September

SEPARATE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM

1999, 1 dismissing

DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE UNLICENSED FIREARM

for Certiorari with Prayer for the

WAS NOT ACTUALLY USED TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE

Issuance

OF VIOLATION OF THE COMELEC GUN-BAN. As

Restraining Order filed by the

written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the Court

petitioner against the Honorable

from convicting petitioner of the separate crime of

Manuel

illegal possession of firearm despite the fact that, as in

Judge,

Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually

Manila, Branch 43 for refusing to

"used." For sure, there is, in this case, closer relation

retroactively

between

favor Republic Act No. 8294 2 ;

possession

of

unlicensed

firearm

and

violation of the COMELEC gun-ban than the illegal

possession of unlicensed firearm to the crime of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs in Almeida.

of

F.

the

14,

Temporary

Lorenzo,

Regional

Petition

Presiding

Trial

Court,

apply

in

his

and,
[Link]

dated

2000, 3 denying

February

8,

petitioner's

motion for reconsideration.

DECISION

As culled from the pleadings on record, the following

are the undisputed factual antecedents:

GARCIA, J p:

Petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol was earlier charged

before the sala of respondent judge with Illegal

In this appeal by way of a petition for review

Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No.

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

1866 4 and

petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol seeks to annul and

2826 5 (Gun Ban), docketed as Criminal Cases No. 96-

violation

of

COMELEC

Resolution

No.

149820

and

96-149821,

respectively,

allegedly

then and there carrying the same along

committed, as follows:

V. Mapa Ext. Sta. Mesa, this City, which

is a public place on the aforesaid date

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149820

which is covered by an election period,

That on or about April 27, 1996 in the

without

City of Manila, Philippines, the said

authority

accused did then and there willfully,

provided for by the COMELEC Resolution

unlawfully,

No.

knowingly

have

in

possession and under his custody and

first

2828,

securing

from
in

the

the

written

COMELEC,

relation

to RA

as
No.

7166 (Gun Ban).

control, One (1) .38 cal. Rev. without

CONTRARY TO LAW. CAcIES

serial no. with four (4) live bullets.

Without first having secured from the

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to

proper authorities the necessary license

both charges. Thereafter, the two (2) cases were tried

therefor.

jointly.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Eventually, in a decision dated May 18, 1999, the trial

court rendered a judgment of conviction in both cases,

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149821

separately sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate

That on or about April 27, 1996, in the

penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision

City of Manila, Philippines, the said

mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years eight (8)

accused did then and there, willfully,

months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as

unlawfully and knowingly have in his

maximum, in accordance with PD. No. 1866 in Crim.

possession and under his custody and

Case No. 96-149820 (illegal possession of firearm), and

control one (1) .38 cal. Rev. without

to a prison term of one (1) year in Crim. Case No. 96-

serial

149821 (violation of the COMELEC Resolution on gun

number,

with

four

(4)

live

ammunition/bullets in the chamber, by

ban).

Meanwhile,

on

June

6,

1997, Republic

Act

No.

time of the appellant's commission of

8294 6 was approved into law.

the offense for it is a rule that laws are

repealed

Pointing out, among others, that the penalty for illegal

only

by

subsequent

ones.

Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers

possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 has already

to respect and apply the law as it

been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Rep.

stands.

Act No. 8294, hence, the latter law, being favorable to

him, should be the one applied in determining his

Therefrom, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on

penalty for illegal possession of firearms, petitioner

a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary

moved for a reconsideration of the May 18, 1999

restraining order, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

decision of the trial court.

2991-UDK.

In its order dated July 15, 1999, 7 however, the trial

In the herein assailed resolution dated September 14,

court denied petitioner's motion, saying:

1999, 8 the

While the law (R.A. 8294) is indeed

favorable to the accused and therefore
should be made retroactive we are also
guided by Art. 4 of the Civil Code which
states

that

laws

shall

have

no

retroactive effect, unless the contrary is

appellate

court

dismissed

petitioner's

recourse on two (2) grounds, to wit: (a) the remedy

of certiorari availed of by petitioner is improper since
he should have appealed from the July 15, 1999 order
of the trial court; and (b) lack of jurisdiction, as the
issue involved is a pure question of law cognizable by
the Supreme Court.

provided. Republic Act 8294 did not so

With his motion for reconsideration having been

provide that it shall have a retroactive

denied

effect. The Supreme Court likewise in

subsequent resolution

the case of Padilla vs. CA declared: 'The

2000, 9 petitioner is now with us, submitting for

trial court and the respondent court are

resolution the following issues: (1) whether the Court

bound to apply the governing law at the

of

by

Appeals

the

erred

appellate
of

in

court
February

dismissing

his

in

its
8,

petition

for certiorari; and (2) whether the courts below erred

Considering that "judgments of regional trial courts in

in

the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be

not

giving Rep.

Act

No.

8294 a

retroactive

application.
The petition is partly meritorious.

elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases when

appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law", while "appeals from judgments of the

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner never

[same

put in issue the factual findings of the trial court. What

jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme

he questions is said court's legal conclusion that Rep.

Court in cases where the appellant raises only

Act No. 8294 cannot be retroactively applied to him.

questions of law" 11 , petitioner should have appealed

Unquestionably, the issue raised is one purely of law.

the trial court's ruling to this Court by way of a petition

As we have said inMacawiwili Gold Mining and

for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of

Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 10

the

courts]

1997

in

the

Rules

exercise

of

Civil

of

their

original

Procedure,

as

For a question to be one of law, the

amended, 12 pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the

same must not involve an examination

same Rules, viz:

of the probative value of the evidence

presented by the litigants or any one of
them. And the distinction is well-known:
there is a question of law in a given
case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts; there is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or the falsehood of the facts
alleged. DAEICc

SEC. [Link] of appeal.

(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c)Appeal by certiorari. In all cases
where only questions of law are raised
or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

By reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the

after more than fifteen (15) days when petitioner filed

remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45, his right

his wrong remedy of certiorari with the appellate court.

to resort to a petition for certiorari underRule 65 was

effectively foreclosed, precisely because one of the
requirements for the availment of the latter remedy is
that "there should be no appeal, or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law", 13 the remedies of appeal and certiorari being
mutually

exclusive

and

not

alternative

or

successive. 14

Be that as it may, the Court feels that it must squarely

address the issue raised in this case regarding the
retroactivity of Rep. Act No. 8294, what with the reality
that the provisions thereof are undoubtedly favorable
to petitioner. For this purpose, then, we shall exercise
our prerogative to set aside technicalities in the Rules
and "hold the bull by its horns", so to speak. After all,
the power of this Court to suspend its own rules

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, what

whenever the interest of justice requires is not without

petitioner should have done was to take an appeal

legal authority or precedent. In Solicitor General, et. al.

from the trial court's order of July 15, 1999 which

vs. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, 15 we held:

denied his motion for reconsideration of the May 18,

1999 judgment of conviction.

Unquestionably,

the

Court

has

the

power to suspend procedural rules in

Petitioner's case is worse compounded by the fact that

the exercise of its inherent power, as

even his period for appeal had already prescribed

expressly recognized in the Constitution,

when

to

he

filed

with

the

Court

of

Appeals

promulgate

rules

concerning

hiscertiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK.

'pleading, practice and procedure in all

The Rollo of said case reveals that petitioner received

courts.'

his copy of the trial court's order denying his motion

rules may be relaxed or suspended in

for

the

the interest of substantial justice, which

same Rollo shows, it was only on August 23, 1999, or

otherwise may be miscarried because of

reconsideration

on July

20,

1999.

As

In

proper cases,

procedural

a rigid and formalistic adherence to

Here, the two (2) crimes for which petitioner was

such rules. . . .

convicted by the trial court, i.e., (1) illegal possession

of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 and (2) violation of

xxx xxx xxx

COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 on gun ban, were both

We have made similar rulings in other

committed by the petitioner on April 27, 1996. For the

cases, thus:

crime of illegal possession of firearms in Crim. Case

Be it remembered that rules of

No. 96-149820, he was sentenced to suffer a prison

procedure are but mere tools

term ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day

designed

of prision mayor, as minimum, to (18) eighteen years,

to

facilitate

the

attainment of justice. Their strict

eight

(8)

months

and

one

(1)

day

of reclusion

and rigid application, which would

temporal, as maximum, in accordance with P.D. No.

result in technicalities that tend

1866, Section 1 of which reads:

to frustrate rather than promote

SECTION [Link] Manufacture, Sale,

substantial justice, must always

Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

be avoided. . . . Time and again,

Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments

this Court has suspended its own

Used or Intended to be Used in the

rules and excepted a particular

Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition.

case

The penalty of reclusion temporal in

from

their

operation

whenever the higher interests of

its

justice so [Link]

perpetua shall be imposed upon any

maximum
who

period

to

We shall now proceed to determine whether the

person

provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 amending P.D. No.

manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,

1866 can be retroactively applied to this case.

or possess any firearm, part of firearm,

ammunition

or

shall

reclusion

machinery,

unlawfully

tool

or

instrument used or intended to be used

in the manufacture of any firearm or

rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and

ammunition. (Emphasis supplied)

other firearm of similar firepower,

When Rep.

Act

No.

8294 took

effect

on

July

6,

1997, 16 the penalty for illegal possession of firearms

was lowered, depending on the class of firearm
possessed, viz:
SECTION

part of firearm, ammunition, or

machinery,

tool

or

instrument

used or intended to be used in

the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided,

[Link]

of Presidential

Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:
'SECTION
Manufacture,

Sale,

Disposition
Firearms

or
or

That

no

other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine of

[Link]

Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000)

Acquisition,

shall be imposed if the firearm is

Possession

of

classified as high powered firearm

Ammunition

or

which includes those with bores

Instruments Used or Intended to

bigger

be Used in the Manufacture of

caliber and 9 millimeter such as

Firearms or Ammunition. The

caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also

penalty of prision correccional in

lesser

its maximum period and a fine of

considered

not less than Fifteen thousand

caliber

pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed

center-fire

upon

shall

firearms with firing capability of

unlawfully manufacture, deal in,

full automatic and by burst of two

acquire, dispose, or possess any

or three: Provided, however, That

low powered firearm, such as

no other crime was committed by

any

person

who

in

diameter

calibered

than

firearms

powerful

.357

.38

and

magnum

but

such

caliber
and

as
.22

other

the person arrested. (Emphasis

under P.D. No. .1866. Since then, this Court had

supplied)

consistently adhered to the Gonzales ruling. 21

Based on the foregoing, petitioner contends that the

For sure, in People vs. Valdez, 22 where the accused

reduced penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294 should be

was charged with the complex crime of multiple

the

in

murder with double frustrated murder and illegal

itsManifestation In Lieu of Comment, 17 the Office of

possession of firearms and ammunitions under two

the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner,

separate informations, this Court even took a bolder

positing further that the statement made by this Court

stance by applying Rep. Act No. 8294retroactively so

in People

the

that the accused therein may not be convicted of the

provisions for a lighter penalty under Rep. Act No.

separate crime of illegal possession of firearms, but

8294 does not apply if another crime has been

refused to apply the same retroactively so as to

committed, should not be applied to this case because

aggravate the crime of murder. The Valdez ruling had

the proviso in Section 1 of said law that "no other

been applied in a host of subsequent cases. 23

one

imposed

vs.

on

him.

Jayson 18 to

the

Significantly,

effect

that

crime was committed" must refer only to those crimes

committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm and
not when the other crime is not related to the use
thereof or where the law violated merely criminalizes
the possession of the same, like in the case of election
gun ban, as here.

Yet,

in

other

cases, 24 although

the

Court

had

given Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactive effect so as to

prevent the conviction of an accused of the separate
crime of illegal possession of firearm when the said
unlicensed firearm was "used" to commit the crime of
murder or homicide, the Court did not appreciate this

As early as August 1997, the month after Rep. Act No.

"use" of such unlicensed firearm as an aggravating

8294 took

pronounced

circumstance as provided therein, when the "use" of

in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals 20 that said law must

an unlicensed firearm was not specifically alleged in

be given retroactive effect in favor of those accused

the information, as required by the Rules on Criminal

effect, 19 this

Court

has

Procedure. EaHDcS

In the light of the existing rulings and jurisprudence on

of the enactment of Republic Act No.

the matter, the present case takes center stage

8294, there can be no separate offense

presenting, this time, another twist, so to speak.

of illegal possession of firearms and

Petitioner, who was charged of illegal possession of

ammunition if there is another crime

firearms was also charged of another offense: Violation

committed such as, in this case, that of

of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban), but the

illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

unlicensed firearm was not "used" or discharged in this

(Emphasis supplied)

case. The question then which appears to be of first

impression, is whether or not the unlicensed firearm
should be actually "used" and discharged in the course
of committing the other crime in order that Sec.
1, Rep. Act No. 8294 will apply so that no separate
crime of illegal possession of firearms may be charged.
Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again.
In Cupcupin vs. People, 25 the accused was charged
and convicted for two (2) separate crimes of illegal
possession of firearms, and illegal possession of
prohibited drugs. In the more recent case of People vs.
Almeida, 26 however,

although

the

accused

was

In Almeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed

firearm was merely found lying around, together with
the prohibited drugs, and therefore, was not being
"used" in the commission of an offense.
Given

this

Court's

aforequoted

pronouncement

in Almeida, can the accused in the present case still be

separately convicted of two (2) offenses of illegal
possession of firearms and violation of gun ban, more
so because as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was
not actually "used" or discharged in committing the
other offense?

acquitted of the separate charge of illegal possession

In People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam, 27 this Court,

of firearm for lack of evidence, the Court nevertheless

interpreting the subject proviso in Section 1 of Rep. Act

made the following clear pronouncement:

No. 8294, applied the basic principles in criminal law,

Furthermore, in any event, the Court

has ruled in previous cases that in view

and categorically held:

. . . A simple reading thereof shows
that if an unlicensed firearm is used

in the commission of any crime,

xxx xxx xxx

there can be no separate offense of

simple

illegal

possession

. . . The law is clear: the accused

of

can be convicted of simple illegal

firearms. Hence, if the 'other crime' is

possession of firearms, provided

murder or homicide, illegal possession

of

firearms

aggravating

becomes

merely

circumstance,

that 'no other crime was committed

an

not

by

paragraph

with multiple attempted homicide was

held

liable

for

not

Moreover, penal laws are construed

simple language is most favorable to

herein

appellant.

interpretation

is

Verily,
justified,

no

other

for

the

language of the new law demonstrates

the

legislative

intent

to

favor

the

accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot

be convicted of two separate offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and direct
assault with attempted homicide. . . .

were

to

refer

only

to

paragraph. Verily, where the law does

possession of firearms.

case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's

the

expressly said so, as it did in the third

illegal

liberally in favor of the accused. In this

arrested'. If

homicide and murder, it should have

committed in this case, appellant can no

be

person

intention of the law in the second

separate offense. Since direct assault

longer

the

distinguish,

neither

should

we.

(Emphasis supplied).
The aforementioned ruling was reiterated and applied
in

the

subsequent

cases

of People

vs.

Garcia, 28 where the judgment of conviction of the

accused-appellants for illegal possession of firearms
was set aside there being another crime kidnapping
for ransom which they were perpetrating at the
same time; People vs. Bernal, 29 where the Court
retroactively applied Rep. Act No. 8294 in accusedappellant's favor because it would mean his acquittal
from the separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms; and People vs. Bustamante, 30 where, in

refusing to convict the accused-appellant of the

injuries, both of which are punishable by

separate offense of illegal possession of firearms, the

arresto

Court declared that insofar as it is favorable to the

however, necessarily arises from the

appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294should

language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is

be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant

not subject to the Court's review. Any

must be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of

perception that the result reached here

firearms. DIHETS

appears unwise should be addressed to

menor.

This

consequence,

Congress. Indeed, the Court has no

Guided by the foregoing, the Court cannot but set

discretion

aside petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-

to

give

statutes

new

meaning detached from the manifest

149820 for illegal possession of firearm since another

intendment

crime was committed at the same time, i.e., violation

and

language

of

the

legislature. Our task is constitutionally

of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.

confined only to applying the law and

Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings

jurisprudence to the proven facts, and

considering that it would mean petitioner's acquittal of

we have done so in this case.

the more serious offense of illegal possession of

firearms which carries a much heavier penalty than
violation

of

the

COMELEC

gun-ban

resolution.

However, as we have rationalized in Ladjaalam: 31

The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret

and apply the law does not include the power to
correct by reading into the law what is not written
therein.

While

we

understand

respondent People's contention that the "use" of the

. . . Indeed, the accused may evade

firearm seemed to have been the main consideration

conviction

of

during the deliberations of the subject provision

firearms by using such weapons in

of Rep. Act No. 8294, the fact remains that the word

committing an even lighter offense, like

"use" never found its way into the final version of the

alarm and scandal or slight physical

bill which eventually became Rep. Act No. 8294. The

for

illegal

possession

Court's hands are now tied and it cannot supply the

Since petitioner has already served more than the

perceived deficiency in the final version without

penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in Criminal

contravening

the

Case No. 96-149821, his immediate release from

interpretation of penal laws which had always leaned

custody is hereby ORDERED unless detained for some

in

other lawful cause. HIESTA

favor of

the
the

most

basic

accused.

principles

in

Under our system of

government where powers are allocated to the three

(3) great branches, only the Legislature can remedy
such deficiency, if any, by proper amendment of Sec. 1

SO ORDERED.
||| (Agote y Matol v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 142675, [July 22,
2005], 502 PHIL 318-335)

of Rep. Act No. 8294.

As written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the
Court from convicting petitioner of the separate crime

SECOND DIVISION

of illegal possession of firearm despite the fact that, as

in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually
"used". For sure, there is, in this case, closer relation
between

possession

of

unlicensed

firearm

and

violation of the COMELEC gun-ban than the illegal

possession of unlicensed firearm to the crime of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs inAlmeida.

[G.R. No. 162864. March 28, 2007.]

SPS.

PEBLIA

ALFARO

PROSPEROUS
ALFARO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF

APPEALS,

SPS.

WHEREFORE, Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal

BAGANO

possession of firearms is hereby DISMISSED while the

BAGANO, respondents.

and

OLEGARIO
CECILIA

judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149821

for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 in
relation to Rep. Act No. 7166 (Gun Ban), is AFFIRMED.

and

DECISION

P.
C.

TINGA, J p:

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 78445; that on 22

There lies an inherent oxymoron to the term "duplicate

originals" as applied to documents. Yet, even as two
"duplicate originals" of the same document are not
exactly identical, they may be considered as identical
for all legal intents and purposes. Indeed, each
"duplicate original" may be considered as the best
evidence of the transaction embodied therein.

June

1994,

respondents

executed

Real

Estate

Mortgage over the lot in favor of petitioners to secure

payment

of

an

obligation

in

the

amount

of P180,000.00; that upon payment of the mortgage

debt,

Cancellation

and

Discharge

of

Mortgage 2 dated 20 June 1995 was executed; that

when respondents demanded the return of their title,
petitioners refused, prompting the former to check

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the

with the Register of Deeds; that upon verification,

Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 17 November

respondents learned that their title had already been

2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72335, as well as the

cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 92783 3 was

Resolution dated 3 March 2004, denying the motion for

issued in the name of petitioners by virtue of a

reconsideration.

spurious Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 June 1995

(Deed of Absolute Sale) purportedly executed by

First, the facts on record.

respondents.

Thus,

respondents

sought

the

On 15 April 1996, Spouses Olegario and Cecilia Bagano

nullification of the deed of sale on the ground that

(respondents) filed a complaint against Spouses Peblia

their signatures thereon were forged. cDHCAE

and Prosperous Alfaro (petitioners) for Declaration of

Nullity

of

Sale

with

Damages

and

Preliminary

Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu

City. In the complaint, respondents as plaintiffs alleged
the following: that they were the previous registered

In their answer, petitioners as defendants denied the

alleged forgery. They insisted that respondents sold
Lot No. 1710 to them in consideration of the amount
of P534,000.00 sometime in June 1995.

owners of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1710,

Respondents' evidence tend to establish that they sent

located at San Roque, Talisay, Cebu and covered by

letter-request

to

Romeo

Varona

(Varona),

handwriting expert from the Cebu City PNP Crime

On the same trial date, petitioners manifested their

Laboratory, for the examination of the questioned

intention to have Varona examine another set of

signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale. The request

documents which according to them contain the

was accompanied by a set of documents consisting of

genuine signatures of respondents. Hence, on 12

the Deed of Conditional Sale dated 23 October 1989

March 1999, petitioners sent a letter to Varona,

(Exh. "H") 4 together with documents containing the

requesting him to examine the signatures on the other

specimen signatures of respondents, namely: five (5)

set of documents, namely: Real Estate Mortgage dated

receipts with corresponding dates (Exhs. "I," "I-1," "I-

22 June 1994 (Ex. "2"), 11 Acknowledgement Receipt

2," "I-3," "I-4"), 5 Community Tax Certificate dated 13

for the sum of P216,000.00 dated 14 June 1995 (Ex.

January 1995 (Exh. "J"), 6 Individual Taxpayer's ID

"3"), 12 six (6) deeds of conditional sale (Exhs. "4" to

(Exh.

"9"), 13 China Bank Check No. A-190308 dated 5

"K"), 7 Partido

ng

Masang

Pilipino ID

(Exh.

"L"), 8 and a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh.

August

"B"). 9 After examining Exh. "B" and comparing the

Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 19886842 dated

signatures

8 February 1995 (Exh. "11"). 15 At the continuation of

thereon

purporting

to

be

those

of

1994

for P52,000.00

the

documents provided by respondents, Varona issued

signatures on the documents provided him, which

Report

purport to be those of respondents, as well as the

006-96 10 dated

11

January

1996

containing his findings.

On 25 November 1998, respondents presented Varona
as an expert witness on their behalf. Varona affirmed

Varona

"10"), 14and

respondents with the specimen signatures on the

No.

cross-examination,

(Exh.

stated

that

the

signatures on another copy of the Deed of Absolute

Sale (Exh. "13"), which similarly purport to be those of
respondents, were affixed by the same persons. 16

the conclusion embodied in his Report that the

According to petitioners' evidence, respondents had

questioned signatures appearing on Exhibit "B" were

initially

forged.

for P180,000.00 on 22 June 1994, as evidenced by a

Real

mortgaged
Estate

Lot

No.

1710

Mortgage. 17 Two

in

their

months

favor
later,

respondents sold a different set of lots, i.e., Lot Nos.

809-C, 809-D, 809-J, 809-K, 809-T and 809-U, by virtue

Sale null and void ab initio, reinstated TCT No. 78445

of six (6) deeds of conditional sale in favor of

in the name of respondents, and ordered petitioners to

petitioners who paid the sum of P138,000.00 as

pay the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages and

downpayment. Thereafter, petitioners discovered that

attorney's fee to respondents.

the lots subject of the conditional sale were also sold

on installment basis to other parties. To placate
petitioners, respondents sold to them the lot in
question,

Lot

No.

1710,

in

consideration

of P534,000.00, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute

Sale. Petitioners paid an additional P216,000.00 after
being

credited

the

amounts

of P180,000.00

representing the debt secured by the Real Estate

Mortgage and P138,000.00 representing the aggregate
downpayments for the six (6) conditional deeds of
sale. 18
On

23

In the present petition, petitioners maintain that the

Court of Appeals committed an error in reversing the
judgment of the trial court. Issues were raised,
concerning the following points, to wit: first, the
selective reversal by the appellate court of the RTC's
factual findings; second, the selective discussion of the
elements of a contract of sale as basis for the
invalidation of the Deed of Absolute Sale; third, the
ruling that failure to offer in evidence the second
questioned report proved fatal to petitioners' cause;
fourth, the blanket denial of petitioners' motion for

April

2001,

reconsideration; and fifth, the citing of respondent

Decision 19 dismissing the complaint and ordering

Olegario Bagano's testimony in the Decision despite its

respondents

having been stricken off the records for his failure to

to

damages, P20,000.00

the

RTC

pay P50,000.00
as

rendered
as

moral

attorney's

fees

and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses, plus costs of

suit. DTEIaC

be cross-examined. 21
The first three (3) points raised obviously relate to the
determinative issue whether or not the questioned

On appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated the

signatures of respondents on the Deed of Absolute

assailed Decision, 20 reversing and setting aside the

Sale were forged, thereby rendering the document

Decision of the RTC. It declared the Deed of Absolute

spurious. Such determination is evidently factual in

nature, and the well-entrenched rule is that in the

that the Deed of Absolute Sale was indeed forged. Was

exercise of this Court's power of review, the findings of

the witness successful in that regard?

facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and

binding

on

this

Court. 22 However,

there

are

recognized exceptions, 23 among which is when the

factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
court are conflicting. 24 This case falls under the
exception. The disagreement between the trial court
and the Court of Appeals in the factual conclusion,
especially with regard to the alleged forgery of
respondents' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale,
has constrained us to minutely examine the evidence
submitted by the parties.

as such, it enjoys the presumption of regularity and

carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. 25 Absent evidence that
clear,

convincing,

preponderant,

the

examination, as well as his findings in the examination

of the copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exh. "B."
On that basis, they claim forgery. In their effort to
refute respondents' allegation, petitioners hinge on the
testimony on cross-examination of the same expert
and his findings in the examination of another original
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, marked as Exh. "13." The
two varying findings led the trial court to conclude that
Varona had retracted his earlier finding of forgery,
thus:

On its face, the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized;

is

Respondents rely on Varona's testimony on direct

and

more

presumption

than
must

merely
be

upheld. 26ICHAaT

When Mr. Romeo Varona was

presented by the defendants to identify
and give his expert opinion about the
signatures appearing in the documents
marked as annexes 1 to 13, he
categorically told the Honorable Court
that the signatures of Olegario Bagano

In their bid to establish "clear, convincing and more

and Cecilia Bagano appearing in the

than merely preponderant evidence," respondents

said documents are genuine, thus

presented an expert witness, Varona, who attested

belying the claim of the plaintiff that

said signatures are forged.

It should be noted[,] however,

premise, i.e., that in the second examination which

that in an earlier testimony, Mr. Romeo

involves

Varona testified that the deed of sale in

submitted by petitioners, Varona did not actually

question is a forgery, but he later on

receive and examine the original of the Deed of Sale,

retracted his earlier testimony after he

Exh. "13." It explained, thus:

conducted an examination of the

the

standard

and

specimen

signatures

Records show that the signatures of

documents sent to him by the

Spouses Bagano appearing in the Deed

defendants. 27 SEDIaH

of Sale dated June 14, 1995 were

The trial court further sustained the validity of the

forged. Witness Romeo O. Varona, a

Deed

document examiner of the PNP Crime

of

Absolute

Sale

by

citing

the

rule

that

instruments are evidence, even against third persons,

Laboratory

of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of

Questioned Document Report No. 006-

the

also

96 dated January 11, 1995 which states

emphasized the character of the questioned deed as a

that after a careful examination of the

notarial document, which cannot be disproved by mere

questioned

denial

Spouses Bagano, he found out that the

date

of

of

the

the

latter. 28 The

alleged

signatory,

trial

court

and

bears

the

came

out

document

with

his

submitted

by

presumption of regularity. 29 Moreover, the RTC noted

signatures

that respondents filed the case in bad faith to appease

appearing in the questioned Deed of

their buyers and cover up their wrongdoings in

Sale

subdividing the lot and selling the resulting lots to

forged. . . .

different parties. 30

dated

of
June

Spouses
14,

Bagano

1995

were

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, he confirmed on the

The

Court

conclusion

of

Appeals

and

rejected

proceeded

the

from

trial
a

court's

witness stand on November 25, 1998

different

that indeed the signatures of Spouses

Bagano appearing in the questioned

June 16, 1999, Mr. Varona categorically

Deed of Absolute Sale are forgeries.

testified that he had examined the said

However, on cross-examination

deed of sale and when asked if he

conducted on February 10, 1999,

prepared a report on the said

counsel for Spouses Alfaro manifested

examination he answered in the

that they would submit for examination

affirmative. But when again asked

the subject documents and that she

where that report was, Mr. Varona

would cross-examine Mr. Varona after

referred to Questioned Document

the latter's examination of the

Report No. 039-39 dated March 12.

submitted documents. On February 28,

1999, which was the same report that

1999[,] counsel for the Spouses Alfaro,

he prepared previously on the basis of

Atty. Montesclaros, submitted other

the first request of Atty. Montesclaros

documents for examination, except the

dated February 28, 1999, where it did

Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 14,

not include for examination the

1995. On May 19, 1999, during Mr.

questioned Deed of Absolute Sale

Varona's cross-examination, he testified

dated June 14, 1995. ASIETa

that his findings and conclusions, as

Such a testimony cannot be taken

stated in the Questioned Document

as a retraction of his previous testimony.

Report No. 039-39 dated March 12,

What the lower court failed to realize

1999, were that the signatures

was that Romeo Varona did not actually

appearing thereon were written by one

receive and examine the original copy

and same person. On May 28, 1999,

of the questioned Deed of Absolute

Atty. Montesclaros again requested Mr.

Sale, as testified to by him. . . .

Varona to examine the Deed of

Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995. On

xxx xxx xxx

Such a statement categorically

same report that he prepared previously

means that Romeo Varona did not

on the basis of the first request of Atty.

actually receive any copy of the

Montesclaros dated February 28, 1999,

questioned deed of absolute sale during

wherein it did not include for

his first examination upon the request of

examination the questioned Deed of

Atty. Montesclaros. This Court observed

Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995, and

that during Mr. Varona's cross-

which he had already identified on May

examination on June 16, 1999,

19, 1999. This only means that the

defendants-appellees' counsel, Atty.

Deed of Absolute Sale was not received

Juanita Montesclaros, tried to make it

and examined by Mr. Varona and yet his

appear that Mr. Varona examined the

testimony on cross, dated June 16,

Deed of Absolute Sale, when in truth

1999[,] still referred to the same report.

and in fact, he did not. . . .

There was[,] therefore no report made

xxx xxx xxx

It is very clear that Atty.
Montesclaros tried to make it appear
that the questioned document which
was the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 14, 1995 was indeed examined.
However, this was not the case because
Mr. Varona's alleged report on the
second request for examination still
refers to the previous report,
Questioned Document Report No. 03939 dated March 12, 1999, which was the

on the second request for examination

dated May 28, 1999 on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995 as
Mr. Varona merely referred to his
previous report as his alleged second
report on the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Moreover, the date of the second
Written Request for examination is May
28, 1999 and the date of the
Questioned Document Report No. 03939 is March 12, 1999, and Mr. Varona's
testimony of June 16, 1999 referred to

the said report of March 12, 1999 which

through the Clerk of Court concerned, where he

report was made on the basis of the first

secured his notarial commission. 36 When he gives all

written request for examination. 31

the other copies to the parties, the latter agree

The disparate conclusions reached by the courts below

between themselves how many copies should be kept

are such because they originated from different but

by each. The parties also agree which copies shall be

similarly erroneous basic premises.

presented to the Register of Deeds for registration, the

When a document in two or more copies is executed at

or about the same time, with identical contents, all
such

copies

are

equally

regarded

as

originals.32 Original does not mean the first paper

written, in contrast to a copy or transcript made later.
The

original

depends

upon

the

issue

to

be

city or municipal assessor in connection with the

payment of transfer tax and other fees, and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue in connection with the
payment of the capital gains tax. All the notarized
copies are originals. They are sometimes loosely
referred to as "original copies" or "duplicate originals."

proved. 33 It is immaterial whether that document

In the case at bar, presented in evidence were two

was written before or after another, was copied from

copies of one and the same Deed of Absolute Sale

another, or was itself used to copy from, 34 as long as

dated 14 June 1995. These are respondents' Exh.

its contents are the subject of inquiry. 35 Hence, one

"B" 37 and petitioners' Exh. "13" 38 which was also

or some of these copies are still considered as

marked by respondents as their Exh. "O." 39 Exh. "B"

originals,

appears to be a certified true copy of the original of

and

they

have

equal

claims

to

authenticity. AIECSD
As a matter of practice, deeds of conveyance are
prepared in several copies for notarization and record

the Deed of Absolute Sale presented to and kept as

part of the records of the Register of Deeds. 40 Exhibit
"13" is a copy of the original retained by petitioners.

purposes. After notarization, the notary public retains

Respondents had engaged Varona to determine the

copies pursuant to the Rules on Notarial Practice, one

genuineness of the signatures purporting to be theirs

for his record and the other for transmittal to the court,

on Exh. "B" by comparing them with the specimen

signatures on the documents 41 which they also

The trial court erred in using the supposed retraction

provided

Varona.

as basis for its ruling. It cannot properly speak of

affirmed

his

On

finding

the
in

witness
his

stand,

Varona

Report 42 that

the

retraction of one finding by the other because the

questioned signatures on Exh. "B" were not affixed by

examinations

the same persons who affixed the specimen signatures

different standard signatures and two different sets of

and thus the questioned signatures were forged. 43

specimen signatures. It would have been a retraction

However, after Varona testified on direct examination,

petitioners manifested that they would engage him to
examine a different set of documents which contain
the

signatures

of

respondents. 44 On

cross-

examination, Varona stated that he examined the

signatures on Exh. "13" and the specimen signatures

conducted

by

Varona

covered

two

or repudiation of the first conclusion if the standard

signatures analyzed and compared with the specimen
signatures were one and the same in the two
examinations, even if the specimen signatures were
contained in two different sets of documents which is
not even the case here.

on the other documents furnished him and that after

Yet clearly, Varona came out with inconsistent findings.

making the examination he arrived at the conclusion

On one hand, he concluded that Exh. "B" is spurious

that the signatures on the documents, including Exh.

because the questioned signatures thereon were

"13," were affixed by the same persons. 45 caHASI

forged.

On the basis of the two findings of Varona, the first

involving Exh. "B" and the second relating to Exh. "13,"
the trial court concluded that the questioned deed is
genuine as the signatures thereon which purport to be
those of respondents are really theirs. It ratiocinated
that Varona had retracted his first opinion when he
came out with his second opinion.

On

the

other,

he

issued

different

determination as regards Exh. "13," finding that the

signatures thereon which purport to be those of
respondents and the counterpart specimen signatures
were affixed by the same persons. Since Exhs. "B" and
"13" are copies of two originals of one and the same
deed, his conclusions with respect to the two exhibits
should

be

common, i.e.,

either

the

questioned

signatures thereon were both affixed by the same

persons or they were affixed by different persons.

The disharmonious findings render Varona's testimony

the

additional

unconvincing. Thus, the presumption of validity of the

respondents.

cash

payment

of

petitioners

to

Deed of Absolute Sale as a notarized document is left

unscathed.
Respondents seek to downplay the determinations
made by Varona concerning Exh. "13" by impugning
the

authenticity

of

the

specimen

signatures,

specifically the signature of Olegario Bagano on the

CTC, Exh. "11." They claim in particular that the
issuance date of the CTC was altered. Respondents,
however, did not present any tangible proof to support
their

allegation.

On

the

other

hand,

petitioners

On the part of the Court of Appeals, it chose to

disregard Varona's conclusions on Exh. "13" on the
premise that the written report which contained the
conclusions was not presented in evidence. However,
as borne out by the record, Varona repeated his
findings in open court in the course of his testimony on
cross-examination and even was asked on re-direct
examination by respondents' counsel thereon. 47

procured a certification from Cebu City Treasurer

Generally, it has been held that handwriting experts,

Eustaquio B. Cesa to the effect that the subject CTC

while

belonged to Olegario Bagano. 46 As regards the other

examining or comparing handwriting. 48 Yet without

documents which contain the specimen signatures,

Varona's testimony, the Court is hard-pressed to find

namely: the Real Estate Mortgage (Exh. "2"), the

any other basis on the record to establish the forgery.

Acknowledgment Receipt (Exh. "3"), the six deeds of

One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish

conditional sale (Exhs. "4" to "9") and the China Bank

his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence

check

which is of greater weight or more convincing than

(Exh.

"10"),

respondent

failed

to

adduce

probably

useful,

are

not

indispensable

in

is

that which is offered in opposition to it. 49 Aside from

noteworthy that the parties to the deeds of sale were

the opinion of the handwriting expert which this Court

also petitioners and respondents themselves. Also, the

finds inconsequential, the bare assertion on the part of

amount covered by the Acknowledgment Receipt was

respondent

countervailing

evidence

of

spuriousness.

It

Cecilia

Bagano

that

the

signature

appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale is not that of

her husband is not enough. No additional witnesses

due execution and the validity of the contents therein.

were presented. DHSaCA

Even

We reassert that forgery is not presumed; it must be

proven by clear, positive and convincing evidence.
Those who make the allegation of forgery have the
burden

of

proving

it. 50 Respondents

failed

to

substantiate with sufficient evidence their claim that

their signatures appearing on the deed of sale were
forged.
We are moreover influenced in our ultimate finding by
the fact that there is also sufficient evidence on record
to bolster the presumption that the notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale was genuine. Ultimately worthy of
consideration is petitioner Plebia Alfaro's positive
testimony that she actually saw respondent Olegario
Bagano

affix

his

signature

document. 51 However

on

self-serving

the
that

questioned
allegation

respondent

Cecilia

Bagano

admitted

the

genuineness of said document in her testimony. 52 No

specific objection was raised by respondents as to the
validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, their
blanket

objection

thereto

being

confined

to

an

overarching allegation against its materiality and

relevancy,

which

is

not

sufficient

to

rebut

the

presumption of authenticity of the notarized deed.

And it must be said that our own comparison of the
signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale to the
specimen signatures submitted by the parties reveals
no substantial variance to warrant the conclusion that
there was forgery. Mere variance of the signatures
cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the
same were forged. 53
What could respondents have done in order to fortify

may seem, it corroborates the other evidence that

their

claim

of

respondents did affix their signatures on the deed.

indecisiveness of the expert witness they had relied

Equally relevant in this supposition is the comparison

on?

of the standard signatures on Exh. "13" with the

respondents to establish the alleged forgery, they

signatures of respondents found in the Real Estate

should have presented evidence on rebuttal, which

Mortgage, Exh. "2," a document which was duly

they did not do, or even another expert witness to

notarized and thus bears prima facie proof as to its

attest to their claim of forgery, which again they failed

Considering

forgery
that

following
the

the

burden

manifest

was

upon

to do. Disingenuous as petitioners' tactic may have

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,

seemed, in using their opponent's expert witness to

SECOND DIVISION, THE HONORABLE

advocate the contrary cause, respondents were not

SECRETARY HERMOGENES EBDANE

without remedy to mitigate the damage wrought by

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

said witness. That they failed to introduce rebuttal

WORKS AND HIGHWAYS ("DPWH"

evidence finally led to the collapse of their cause of

FOR BREVITY), THE OFFICE OF THE

action. TAaEIc

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ("OSP" FOR

BREVITY),

With the foregoing disquisition, discussion of the other

AND

ANTONIO

BALTAZAR, respondents.

issues raised by petitioners is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

DECISION

the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the

Regional

Trial

Court

of

Cebu,

Branch

12,

REINSTATED. TcaAID

is
QUISUMBING, J p:

SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
162864, [March 28, 2007], 548 PHIL 202-218)

The

petition

Resolution 1 dated

for certiorari assails

October

12,

2005

the
of

the

Sandiganbayan, granting the motion of the Office of

the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to suspend pendente
lite the petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal

SECOND DIVISION

Case No. 27911, and its Resolution 2 dated March 2,

2006

[G.R. No. 172123. April 16, 2009.]

MACARIOLA

S.

BARTOLO

denying

the

petitioners'

reconsideration.
and

VIOLENDA B. SUCRO, petitioners, vs.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

motion

for

On November 13, 2003, an Information 3 was filed

LLENTADA, being the Engineer III of

against the petitioners and their co-accused for

[the] Bureau of Design; ROEL BLANCAS

falsification

and

y BAUTISTA, being the Engineer III of

penalized under Article 171 (4) 4 of the Revised Penal

[the] Bureau of Maintenance, LOURDES

Code. The Information alleged:

ANINIPOT

of

public

documents,

defined

That during the year 1998, or sometime

prior or subsequent thereto, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused NONITO FANO y FAMARIN, a
high ranking public officer, being the
Project Director with Salary Grade 29 of
the Project Management Office (PMO) of
the Department of Public Works and
Highways

(DPWH);

MACARIOLA

BARTOLO y SUBARDIAGA, being the

Project Manager II of PMO; VIOLENDA B.
SUCRO, being the Engineer V of PMO;
NORBERTO GALVE y SONEJA, being the
Engineer IV of [the] Bureau of Research
and Standard (BRS); CRISPIN REAL y
REDOQUE, being the Engineer III of BRS;
ROMEO LACORTE y LIAC, being the
Engineer

III

Construction;

of

[the]

LEONARDO

Bureau
LINGAN

of
y

FLORANDA,

being

the

Engineer III, Bureau of Maintenance, alllow ranking public officers and all of
whom

are

Department
Highways

employed
of

with

the

Works

and

committing

the

Public

(DPWH),

offense in relation to their office and

taking

advantage

of

the

same,

conspiring, confederating and mutually

helping

one

another,

together

with

accused SHUICHI MORITA, a private

individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify the
following public documents which they
prepared,

checked,

verified

certified

correct and accepted in discharge of

their

respective

duties

and

official

functions, namely: Statement of Time

Elapsed

and

Work

Accomplished,

Inspection Report for Final Acceptance

and Certificate of Acceptance relative to

the Metro Manila Flood Control Project II,

which they failed to disclose despite

Package A in the amount of One Billion

legal

Four Hundred Ninety-Nine Million One

perverting the truth to the damage and

Hundred

prejudice of the public interest. EaISDC

Eleven

Thousand

Eight

Hundred Five Pesos and [S]ixty [T]hree

[C]entavos

CONTRARY

(P1,499,111,805.63)

Pumping

Station

and

Balut

to

TO

do

so,

thereby

LAW. 5 (Emphasis

supplied.)

intended for the construction of [the]

Vitas

obligation

During their arraignment, the petitioners and their co-

Pumping Station and Improvement of

accused

Estero de Vitas, Pampanga-Earnshaw

charged. 6 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial of the case

Drainage Main, Estero de Sunog Apog,

ensued.

Estero

Buendia

During the trial of the case, the OSP moved for the

Drainage Main, by making it appear

suspension pendente lite of the petitioners and their

in the said documents that the

co-accused

project

Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

de

is

Maypajo

one

and

hundred

percent

(100%) complete when, in truth and

in fact, and as the above-named
accused knew well, the project was
not

fully

completed

considering

that there is an unaccomplished

construction of the parapet wall

pleaded

in

not

guilty

accordance

with

to

the

Section

offense

13

of

Practices Act. 7
In

its

Resolution

dated

October

12,

2005,

the

Sandiganbayan granted the motion and accordingly

ordered the suspension pendente lite of the petitioners
and their co-accused for 90 days.

with a length of 320 lineal meters

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but it was

on the right bank of Estero de

denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated

Sunog

March 2, 2006.

Apog from

Pastor

Street

to

Paulino Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila,

Hence, this petition based on this lone assigned error:

THE

SANDIGANBAYAN,

DIVISION,

ACTED

SECOND

WITHOUT

OR

IN

against

whom

any

criminal

prosecution under

valid

EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH

information under this Act or under

GRAVE

DISCRETION

Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

Code or for any offense involving

JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE

fraud upon government or public

RESOLUTION

DATED

12,

funds or property whether as a simple

2005]

DIRECTING

THE

or as a complex offense and in whatever

THE

stage

ABUSE

OF

[OCTOBER

SUSPENSION PENDENTE

LITE OF

of

execution

and

mode

of

PETITIONERS FOR NINETY (90) DAYS

participation, is pending in court, shall

AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 2,

be suspended from office. Should he be

2006

PETITIONERS'

convicted by final judgment, he shall

FOR

lose all retirement or gratuity benefits

WHICH

URGENT

DENIED
MOTION

RECONSIDERATION. 8

under any law, but if he is acquitted, he

Simply stated, the issue is, did the Sandiganbayan

commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
suspension pendente lite of petitioners?
Petitioners

primarily

argue

that

the

assailed

offense of falsification of public documents does not

fall within the purview of Section 13 of Rep. Act No.
3019, which reads: TADaES
13. Suspension

the salaries and benefits which he failed

to receive during suspension, unless in
the

resolutions were erroneously issued because the

SEC.

shall be entitled to reinstatement and to

meantime

administrative

proceedings have been filed against

him.
In the event that such convicted officer,
who may have already been separated
from the service, has already received

and

loss

of

benefits. Any incumbent public officer

such benefits he shall be liable to

restitute the same to the Government.

resolved in the case of Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan.13 In

(Emphasis supplied.)

that case, we held that "the term fraud as used in

To support their aforesaid submission, the petitioners

point out that the offense of falsification of public
documents falls under Title Four, 9 Book II of the
Revised

Penal

Code

and

not

under

Title

Seven, 10 Book II thereof. They also argue that the

offense of falsification of public documents does not
amount to fraud upon government or public funds. 11

Section 13 of Rep. Act No. 3019 is understood in its

generic sense, which is, referring to an instance or an
act of trickery or deceit especially when involving
misrepresentation". 14 In

Merriam

Webster's

Dictionary of Law, fraud had been defined"as any act,

expression, omission, or concealment calculated to
deceive another to his or her disadvantage; or
specifically, a misrepresentation or concealment with

The OSP counter that Section 13 of Rep. Act No.

reference to some fact material to a transaction that is

3019 extends to any offense involving fraud upon the

made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless

government or public funds or property, and is not

disregard of its truth or falsity and with the intent to

merely limited to the offenses under Title Seven, Book

deceive another and that is reasonably relied on by

II of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, it insisted that

the other who is injured thereby". 15 We thus ruled in

falsification falls within the general definition of fraud,

the afore-cited case that falsification of municipal

considering that it involved a false representation of a

vouchers, although penalized under Title Four and not

fact, and hence within the ambit of Section 13,

Title Seven, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,

Rep. Act No. 3019. 12

constitutes fraud upon public funds, and accordingly

After a careful study of the matter at hand, we find

upheld the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner

that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of

therein

discretion in ordering the suspension pendente lite of

3019. 16

the petitioners and their co-accused.

In the present petition, it is undeniable that the

The contentions raised by the petitioners are nothing

allegation of falsification of the three public documents

new, considering that the same had already been

by making it appear that the flood control project was

pursuant to Section

13 of

Rep. Act

No.

100% complete constitutes fraud upon public funds.

because a reading thereof reveals that not only figures

This is in light of the uncontroverted allegation of the

and numbers, as asserted by the petitioners, but also

OSP

words 20 were used therein giving an account of the

that

it

was

on

the

basis

of

such

false

representation that the government was defrauded or

status of the flood control project.

suffered loss because it paid Toyo-Ebara Joint Venture

P1,499,111,805.63, the full amount corresponding to
the project despite the non-construction of the 320-m

Finally, petitioners' argument that they have not

parapet wall on the right bank of Estero De Sunog

falsified any public document because the 320-m

Apog. 17 ITScAE

parapet wall was deleted from the project by Change

Petitioners' argument that their certification in the

Statement

of

Time

Elapsed

and

Work

Accomplished 18 does not constitute a narration of

facts as contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code since the said statement merely
consisted of a table of figures and numbers 19 is also

Order No. 1 21 is not a proper question for us to

resolve in this petition, considering that it would
require us to make a crucial finding of fact, and to pass
upon the merits of the pending criminal case against
the

petitioners

and

their

co-accused

the

petition

before

the

Sandiganbayan.

without merit. This is because a narration of facts is

WHEREFORE,

merely an account or description of the particulars of

Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated October 12,

an event or occurrence. Hence, the use of words or

2005 and March 2, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs

figures or numbers or any combination of two or three

against petitioners.

of said things, as long as it describes an event or

SO ORDERED.

occurrence is sufficient to make a "narration of facts"

as defined under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal
Code. In this case, it is evident that the questioned
statement qualifies as a "narration of facts" as defined
under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code

is DISMISSED.

The

||| (Bartolo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172123, [April

16, 2009], 603 PHIL 377-384)

SECOND DIVISION

public document under Article 171 of the Revised

Penal Code (RPC). HESIcT

[G.R. No. 168437. January 8, 2009.]

LAURINIO

GOMA

and

UMALE, petitioners, vs.

OF

APPEALS,

PHILIPPINES,
MEMBER

THE

NATALIO

On the basis of the affidavit-complaint of Manuel

COURT

Torralba and two other members of the Sangguniang

THE

Barangay of Brgy. Cabanbanan, Pagsanjan, Laguna,

SANGGUNIAN

the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon filed with the

PEOPLE
and

The Facts

OF

MANUEL

G.

RTC in Sta. Cruz, Laguna an Information for falsification

of public document under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC

TORRALBA, respondents.

against

petitioners

Laurinio

Umale. 3 Specifically,
Laurinio

DECISION

and

Natalio,

the

Goma

complaint

and

Natalio

alleged

as barangaychairperson

that
and

secretary, respectively, falsified a barangay resolution

dated September 24, 1995, allocating the amount of
VELASCO, JR., J p:

PhP18,000 as disbursement for a seminar for the two

officials. The indicting information, docketed as Crim.

The Case
Appealed,

via

this

Petition

Case No. SC-6712 and raffled to Branch 26 of the Sta.

for

Review

on Certiorari under Rule 45, is the Decision 1 dated

June 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 27963, affirming the J0uly 28, 2003 Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26 in Santa Cruz,
Laguna in Criminal Case No. SC-6712. The RTC
convicted petitioners of the crime of falsification of

Cruz RTC, alleged as follows:

That on or about September 24, 1995 in
Barangay
Laguna,

Cabanban [sic],
Philippines

and

Pagsanjan,
within

the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused LAURINIO GOMA
and NATALIO A. UMALI, both public

officials, being the Barangay Chairman

The prosecution presented the three complaining

and Barangay Secretary, respectively,

witnesses, 5 who testified that, for lack of quorum, no

taking

official

actual session of the sanggunian of Brgy. Cabanbanan

positions and committing the offense in

took place on September 24, 1995, the day the

relation to their office, in connivance

disputed resolution was allegedly passed. On that day,

and conspiracy with each other, did

according

then and there, willfully, unlawfully and

the barangay health center to attend a pre-scheduled

feloniously falsify a Resolution dated

session which, however, did not push through as, apart

September

official

from them, only one other member, i.e., Laurinio,

document, by indicating therein that

came. But they later got wind of the existence of

aforesaid Resolution was passed on

subject

motion

Dizon,

September 24, 1995, in which it was made to appear

seconded by Kagawad Recaredo C. Dela

that all the sanggunian members attended the session

Cruz and unanimously approved by

of September 24, 1995 and unanimously approved,

those present in the meeting held on

upon motion of kagawad Renato Dizon, duly seconded

September 24, 1995 at 2:00 P.M., when

by kagawad Ricaredo dela Cruz, the allocation of

in truth and in fact no meeting was held

PhP18,000 to defray the expenses of two officials who

as no quorum was mustered, to the

would attend a seminar in Zamboanga. On the face of

damage and prejudice of public interest.

the resolution appears the signature of Natalio and

advantage

of

24,

of

their

1995,

Kagawad

an

Renato

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
When arraigned, both Laurinio and Natalio, assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the above charge. Pretrial and trial then ensued.

Laurinio,

to

the

Resolution

in

No.

their

three,

T-95

they

(Res.

respective

went

T-95)

to

dated

capacities

as barangay secretary and chairperson. It also bore

the official seal of the barangay.
On October 15, 1995, the sanggunian held a special
session during which it passed a resolution therein

stating that no session was held on September 24,

each of said accused the penalty of four

1995. 6

(4) years and two (2) months of prision

correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)

In their defense, Natalio and Laurinio, while admitting

having

affixed

their

signatures

on

the

years, and two (2) months of prision

adverted

mayor, as maximum.

falsified resolution, alleged that said resolution was

nothing more than a mere proposal or a draft which

Costs against both accused.

Natalio, as was the practice, prepared and signed a

SO ORDERED. 7

week before the scheduled September 24, 1995. They

also alleged that the same resolution was not the

The RTC found Res. T-95 to have all the appearance of

enabling instrument for the release of the seminar

a complete and "true and genuine document", sealed

funds.

and signed by the Sanggunian secretary. 8And for

reasons set out in

The Ruling of the RTC

its decision, the trial

dismissed, as incredulous, the defense's theory, and

After trial, the RTC rendered on July 28, 2003

the

judgment, finding both Laurinio and Natalio guilty as

resolution being just a mere proposal.

charged and, accordingly, sentenced them, thus:

WHEREFORE,

this

Court

finds

both

accused Laurinio Goma and Natalio A.

Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principals in the felony of falsification
of public document punishable under
Section [sic] 171 of the Revised Penal
Code

and

aggravating
circumstance,

there
nor
hereby

being

neither
mitigating

imposes

court

upon

arguments

propping

it,

about

the

subject

The Ruling of the CA

From the RTC decision, Laurinio and Natalio appealed
to the CA, their recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
27963, raising three issues, to wit: (a) whether Res. T95 is a public document; (b) whether they violated Art.
171 (2) of the RPC; and (c) whether the penalty
imposed is proper. Answering all three issues in the
affirmative, the CA, by its Decision dated June 6, 2005,
affirmed that of the trial court, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the 28 July 2003 Decision

As a preliminary consideration, petitioners, in this

of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court of

recourse, merely highlight and discuss their defense

Santa Cruz, Laguna finding accused-

that the subject resolution is a mere draft or proposed

appellants Laurinio Goma and Natalio A.

resolution not acted upon by the sanggunian for lack

Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

of quorum on September 24, 1995, and that they

the

never had any criminal intent when they signed such

crime

of

falsification

of

public

document under Article 171(2) of the

proposed

Revised Penal Code and sentencing

the barangay official seal on the subject resolution.

them to suffer the penalty of four (4)

years and two (2) months of prision
correctional [sic], as minimum, to eight
(8) years, and two (2) months ofprision
mayor, as

maximum,

is

AFFIRMED.

Costs against appellants.

resolution.

They

deny

having

affixed

Subject Resolution a Public Document

Under Sec. 19 (a) of Rule 132, Revised Rules on
Evidence, public documents include "[t]he written
official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a

SO ORDERED. 9

foreign country." Verily, resolutions and ordinances

Petitioners are now before this Court raising the very

of sanggunians,

same issues they earlier invoked before the CA, the

panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan, or barangay, come

first two of which may be reduced into the following

within the pale of the above provision, such issuances

proposition: Whether Res. T-95 may be characterized

being their written official acts in the exercise of their

as a public document to bring the case, and render

legislative authority. As a matter of common practice,

petitioners

an

liable

on

the

basis

of

adduced, under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC.

The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.

the

evidence

action

be

they

appropriating

of

money

the sanggunian

for

some

public

purpose or creating liability takes the form of an

ordinance or resolution.

Black defines a public document as "a document of

testimonies of the witnesses and its

public interest issued or published by a political body

assessment of the probative weight

or otherwise connected with public business."10 The

thereof,

term is also described as a document in the execution

anchored on said findings, are accorded

of which a person in authority or notary public takes

high respect if not conclusive effect.

part. 11 There can be no denying that the public

This is more true if such findings were

money-disbursing and seemingly genuine Res. T-95, in

affirmed by the appellate court. When

the preparation of which petitioners, in their official

the trial court's findings have been

capacity, had a hand, is, in context, a public document

affirmed by the appellate court, said

in a criminal prosecution for falsification of public

findings are generally binding upon this

document. And it bears to stress that in falsification

Court. 13

under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC, it is not necessary that

there be a genuine document; it is enough that the
document fabricated or simulated has the appearance
of a true and genuine document or of apparent legal
efficacy. 12
Petitioners Guilty of Falsification

as

well

as

its

conclusions

And this factual determination, as a matter of long and

sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and
shall not be disturbed on appeal, except only for the
most

convincing

reasons, 14 such

as

when

that

determination is clearly without evidentiary support on

record 15 or

when

judgment

relevant facts which, if properly considered, would

more so when such findings receive a confirmatory

justify a different conclusion. 16 This is as it should be

nod from the appellate court. We explained in one

since it is not the function of the Court under Rule 45

case:

of the Rules of Court to evaluate and weigh all over

the trial court, its calibration of the

supportive

overlooked

on

usually defers to factual findings of the trial court,

The rule is that the findings of fact of

or

based

misapprehension

the

facts

is

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Court

again

of

the

evidence

presented

of

factual

courts. 17 IHTaCE

the

or

the

holdings

certain

premises
of

lower

proceeding when they did not in fact so

The case disposition of the CA and the factual and
logical

premises

holding

it

together

commend

themselves for concurrence. Its inculpatory findings on

the guilt of petitioners for falsification under Art. 171
(2) of the RPC, confirmatory of those of the trial court,

participate.
The elements of the crime of falsification of public
documents, as above defined and penalized, are:
1. That the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public.

are amply supported by the evidence on record,

consisting mainly of the testimony of the complaining

2. That he takes advantage of his official

position.

witnesses and a copy of the subject resolution.

3. That he falsifies a document by

Art. 171 (2) of the RPC provides as follows:

causing it to appear that persons

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer,

have participated in any act or

employee; or notary or ecclesiastical

minister.

The

penalty

proceeding.

of prision

mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000

4. That such person or persons did not

pesos shall be imposed upon any public

in

fact

so

participate

officer, employee, or notary who, taking

proceeding. 18

in

the

advantage of his official position, shall

The first two elements clearly obtain, petitioners,

falsify a document by committing any of

during the period material, being local government

the following acts:

elected officials who, by reason of their position,

certified,

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Causing it to appear that persons
have

participated

in

any

act

or

as

Natalio

did,

as

to

the

holding

of

a barangay session and falsely attested, as Laurinio

did, as to the veracity of a resolution supposedly taken
up therein. The other two elements are likewise
present. As correctly observed by the CA:

. . . [Petitioners] made it appear in the

Barangay

resolution

dated

24

September 1995 that all members of

the Sangguniang Barangay deliberated
upon and unanimously approved the
questioned resolution, when in fact no
such

deliberation

and

approval

occurred. The non-participation of the

xxx xxx xxx

b) the opening paragraph unequivocally
states that the contents thereof were
copied from the minutes of the ordinary
session

of

Sanggunian

held

on

September 24, 1995 meeting, at 2:00

o'clock pm;

members of the Sangguniang Barangay

c) it announces all the names of the

in the passage of the resolution was

members

established by the 15 October 1995

attended the session during which said

resolution issued by 7 of the 8 members

resolution [was] passed;

of the Sangguniang Barangay denying

d) it bears the resolution number, not

that

the proposed resolution number;

the

challenged

resolution

was

passed upon and approved by the

council. 19 ICHAaT

e) the

of

title

the

Sanggunian

clearly

states

that

who

the

Sanggunian had already approved the

Petitioners' bid to pass off the resolution in question as

allocation of P18,000.00 for two (2)

a mere proposal or a draft cannot be accorded merit in

barangay officials . . .;

the light of the manner they worded and made it

appear. Consider the following apt observations of the
trial court:

f) it made mention that Kagawad Renato

M.

Dizon

made

motion,

duly

seconded by Kagawad [Ricaredo] C. de

Barangay Resolution No. T-95 does not

la

appear to be a proposed resolution in all

resolution; and

aspects . . .

the

Cruz,

for

the

passing

of

said

g) accused Natalio A. Umali, in his

petitioners falsified the subject resolution, but only to

official capacity as Barangay Kalihim,

be exposed by private complainants. ECcDAH

certified said resolution as true and

Petitioners' allegation that kagawad Torralba was the

correct, and accused Laurinio A. Goma,

Punong

Barangay,

attested

to

one who affixed the seal or that he harbored ill-

the

feelings towards them strikes this Court as a mere

truthfulness of said resolution. 20

afterthought, absent convincing evidence to support

Indeed, the contents and appearance of Res. T-95

argue against the very idea of its being merely a
proposal

or

draft barangay enactment. Res

ipsa

loquitur. A draft resolution would not be numbered or

be carrying certificatory and attestative signatures, let
alone impressed with the dry seal of thebarangay. It
would

not

also

include

such

particulars

as

the

attendance of all members of the sanggunian and the

identity

of

the

moving

and

secondingkagawads relative to the passage of the

resolution, for such details are not certain; unless they
have been rehearsed or planned beforehand. But the
notion

that

plan

had

been

arranged

by

the sanggunian as a body would be negated by

subsequent development which saw the approval of a
resolution dated October 15, 1995 duly signed by
seven kagawads virtually trashing Res.

T-95 as a

falsity. The sequence of events would readily show that

the imputation.
Finally, petitioners urge their acquittal on the theory
that they did not benefit from, or that the public was
not prejudiced by, the resolution in question, it not
having been used to obtain the PhP18,000 seminar
funds. The argument holds no water. Falsification of a
public document is consummated upon the execution
of the false document. And criminal intent is presumed
upon the execution of the criminal act. Erring public
officers' failure to attain their objectives, if that really
be the case, is not determinative of their guilt or
innocence. The simulation of a public document, done
in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a true
and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors
as

to

its

authenticity,

constitutes

the

crime

of

falsification. 21
In fine, the element of gain or benefit on the part of
the offender or prejudice to a third party as a result of

the

document's

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty

integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for

imposable would be that of a degree lower than the

falsification of public documents. 22 What is punished

medium period of prision mayor as minimum, and the

in falsification of public document is principally the

maximum is any period included in the medium period

undermining of the public faith and the destruction of

of prision mayor. The degree lower than the medium

truth as solemnly proclaimed therein. In this particular

period of prision mayoris the medium period of prision

crime, therefore, the controlling consideration lies in

correccional which ranges from two (2) years, four (4)

the public character of a document; and the existence

months, and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)

of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least,

months. SIDTCa

the

falsification,

intent

to

or

tarnishing

cause

such

of

damage

becomes

immaterial. 23

The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months

of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years

Third Issue: Imposed Penalty Proper

and two (2) months of prision mayor, as maximum,

Finally, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by

thus

the CA, is proper. Art. 171 of the RPC provides for a

authorized imposable range, and is, therefore, proper.

single divisible penalty of prision mayor to public

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of

officers or employees who, taking advantage of their

merit. Accordingly, the appealed CA Decision dated

official positions, shall cause it to appear that persons

June 6, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27963 is hereby

have participated in any act or proceeding when they

AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

did

not

in

fact

participate.

And

where

neither

aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the

execution of the offense, as here, the imposable
penalty is, according to Art. 64 of the RPC, that of the
medium

period

provided.

The

medium

imposed

on

petitioners

well

within

No pronouncement as to costs.
||| (Goma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168437,
[January 8, 2009], 596 PHIL 1-14)

period

for prision mayor is from eight (8) years and one (1)
day to ten (10) years.

is

EN BANC

the

[G.R. No. 180314. April 16, 2009.]

That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or

sometime prior or subsequent thereto in

NORMALLAH

A.

Cotabato City, Philippines and within the

PACASUM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

accused NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a

high ranking public official being the
Regional Secretary of the Department of

DECISION

Tourism in the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while
in

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

the

performance

of

her

official

functions, committing the offense in

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which

relation thereto, taking advantage of

seeks

her official position, did then and there,

to

set

aside

the

Decision 1 of

the

Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 promulgated

willfully,

unlawfully

on 7 August 2007 which found petitioner Normallah A.

falsified

her

Pacasum guilty of Falsification under Article 171,

Clearance 3 submitted to the Office of

paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and its

the

Resolution 2 dated

Autonomous

22

October

2007

denying

Regional

and

feloniously
Employee

Governor
Region

of

in

the

Muslim

petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for

Mindanao, by imitating the signature of

New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.

Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of

On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the

Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public Documents,
defined and punished under paragraph 1 of Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of

claiming her salary for the months of
August and September 2000. 4
On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation

asking

that

she

be

given

the

opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during a

Cotabato

preliminary investigation in order that her right to due

Employee Clearance, which she

process would not be violated. 5 Petitioner further filed

submitted to the Office of the

an Urgent Motion for Preliminary Investigation and/or

Regional

Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer

Autonomous Region

Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. 6 TaDAHE

Mindanao,

for

decreeing that petitioner was not deprived of the

by

of

the

in Muslim

imitating

the

purposes

of

claiming

her

salary for the months of August

opportunity to be heard before the Office of the

and September 2000;

Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be heard

on preliminary investigation. 7

2. Whether or not the accused took

advantage of her official position

On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de

guilty

Governor

her

Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM,

motion for preliminary investigation/reinvestigation

not

falsified

signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the

On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's

parte, pleaded

City,

to

the

in order to commit the crime

crime

charged. 10 EICScD

charged. 8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held

and the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order. 9 The

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely:

parties did not enter any admission or stipulation of

Subaida

facts, and agreed that the issues to be resolved were

Management Officer V of the Autonomous Region in

as follows:

Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y. Pangilan, former

1. Whether or not accused Normallah

Pacasum, being then the Regional
Secretary of the Department of
Tourism
Region

in
in

the
Muslim

Supply

K.

Pangilan, 11 former

Officer

ARMM; 12 and

of

the

Rebecca

Human

Department
A.

of

Resource

Tourism,

Agatep, 13 Telegraph

Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.

Autonomous

Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a

Mindanao,

retired government employee and formerly a Human

Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM which

was not hers. She said Laura Pangilan was her

position she held from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As

daughter-in-law, and that the latter's signature was

such, one of her duties was to receive applications for

very

clearance of Regional Secretaries of the ARMM. She

photocopied 15 the original Employees Clearance with

explained

the intention of sending the same to her daughter-in-

requirement to be submitted to the Office of the

law for the purpose of having the latter confirm if the

Regional Director by retiring employees, employees

signature on top of her name in the Employees

leaving the country or those applying for leave in

Clearance was hers. There being no messenger

excess

for

available, she instead called up Laura to come to her

clearance shall get a copy of the employees clearance

office to verify the signature. Laura, whose office was

and shall accomplish the same by having the different

only a walking distance away, came and inspected the

division heads sign it.

clearance, and denied signing the same. After she

of

that

an

thirty

Employees

days.

The

Clearance

person

was

applying

Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accusedpetitioner Norma Pacasum to be the former
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism

familiar

to

her.

Mrs.

Pangilan

immediately

denied that she signed the clearance, and while they

were

conversing,

the

bearer

of

the

Employees

Clearance took said document and left. ICESTA

(DOT), ARMM. She narrated that in the year 2000,

Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the

petitioner submitted the original of an Employees

person

Clearance

with the

Clearance, but said that the latter was a niece and

memorandum 14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by

staff member of the petitioner. She said that all the

Governor

signatures 16 appearing in the Employees Clearance

to her office in compliance

Nur

Misuari,

directing

all

officers

and

employees to clear themselves of property and money

accountabilities before their salaries for August and
September 2000 would be paid. Upon inspection of the
Employees Clearance, she noticed that the signature
of Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said document

who

took

the

original

of

the

Employee

were all genuine except for Laura's signature.

The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y.
Pangilan, the person whose signature was allegedly
imitated. Laura testified that presently she was holding

the position of Human Resource Management Officer II

Thereupon, Marie Cris Batuampar, the representative

of the Department of Tourism ARMM. Prior to said

of petitioner, took the Employees Clearance and left.

position, she was the Supply Officer of the DOT

ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As such, she issued
memorandum receipts (MR) to employees who were
issued government property, and received surrendered
office properties from officers and employees of the
DOT ARMM. She said she knew the accused, as she
was their Regional Secretary of the DOT ARMM.

Laura

revealed

she

affidavit 19 dated

executed

28 August

joint

complaint-

2001 regarding

the

instant case. She issued a certification 20 with a

memorandum receipt 21 dated 23 November 1999,
signed 22 by petitioner. The certification attested she
did not sign petitioner's Employees Clearance because
all the office properties issued to petitioner had not

Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie

been turned over or returned to the Supply Officer of

Cris 17 Batuampar,

of

the DOT ARMM. Finally, she said that as of 2 January

petitioner Pacasum, went to her house with the

2005, her last day as Supply Officer, petitioner had not

Employees

returned anything.

an

Clearance

officemate
of

and

petitioner.

niece

Batuampar

requested her to sign in order to clear petitioner of all

property accountabilities. She refused to sign the
clearance because at that time, petitioner had not yet
turned over all the office properties issued to her. A
few days later, she was called by her mother-in-law to
go to the latter's office and inspect the Employees
Clearance

submitted

by

the

representative

of

petitioner. She went to her mother-in-law's office and

was shown the Employees Clearance of petitioner.
Upon

seeing

the

signature 18 appearing

same,
on

she
top

of

denied
her

the
name.

The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A.

Agatep, Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon
City, testified that she had been a telegraph operator
for nineteen years. On 31 May 2005, she was at the
Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit, Quezon City.
She received two telegrams 23 for transmissions both
dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to petitioner
and the other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon receiving
said

documents,

through

she

telegram.

transmitted

The

telegram

the

documents

addressed

to

petitioner was received by her relative, Manso Alonto,

in her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed

cash advances were required to get an Employees

to Ms. Batuampar was transmitted to, and received in,

Clearance before they could receive their salaries. She

Cotabato City on 1 June 2005. 24

then instructed her staff to work on her salary.

On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered 25 its

documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A, A-1, A1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g,
A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-9, to
which the accused filed her objections. 26 The trial
court admitted all the exhibits on 10 August 2005. 27
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena,
former ARMM Regional Solicitor General, took the
stand.

Petitioner said she did not know where the original of

her Employees Clearance was. Neither did she know if
the signature of Laura Pangilan therein had been
imitated or forged. She likewise said that although the
Employee Clearance was in her name, she did not
cause Laura's signature to be affixed thereto.
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary
for the month of August 2000 sometime in said month,

For her defense, petitioner testified that she was

because

appointed by ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari

Parcasio told her that she did not need a clearance

(Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of the DOT of the

before she could get her salary because she was re-

ARMM in 1999. She said she was familiar with the

appointed. 28

Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov.

Misuari directing all ARMM officers and employees to
liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before
31 August 2000 in view of the impending expiration of
the Governor's extended term. At first, she said the
memorandum applied to her, she being a cabinet
secretary, but later she said same did not apply to her
because she had no cash advances. Only those with

ARMM

Executive

Secretary

Randolph

C.

Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original

of the subject Employees Clearance. 29 When she first
saw the photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the
signature of Laura was not there. She was able to see
the photocopy of the Employees Clearance again after
this case had been filed with the Sandiganbayan,
already with the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner

said it was not she who placed or caused Laura's

On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her

purported signature to be affixed there.

receipt of her salary, she believed that an Employees

Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari

did not apply to her, because she had no cash
advances and she could receive her salary even
without clearance. At that time, she said the Cashier,
Accountant and the Auditor checked her records and

Clearance was necessary, and for this reason she had

this document prepared by her staff. She said her
Employees Clearance was always in the possession of
Marie Cris, her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris
who showed her the document twice. 31

found that she had no cash advances. 30Because she

Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General,

was elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get her

testified that he was familiar with the Memorandum

salary. However, she was informed by her staff that her

dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari because

salary could not be released because the Office of the

the same was the product of consultation among him,

Governor required a clearance. Her staff worked on her

Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive Secretary Parcasio.

clearance, the purpose of which was for the release of

He explained that this memorandum pertained only to

her salary for the months of August and September

outstanding

2000. She was able to get all the needed signatures

Employees Clearance was not a requirement and was

except for Laura's signature. With the refusal of Laura

not sufficient to comply with the directive contained in

to sign, her staff went to Executive Secretary Parcasio

the memorandum, because what was required for the

and explained the situation. IAaCST

purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice from

Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst.

cash

advances.

He

added

that

an

the Resident Auditors of the Commission on Audit.

Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G. Aurellano ordering

On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its

her to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor

documentary exhibits 32 consisting of Exhibits 1 to 5,

the original of the Employees Clearance of the DOT-

with sub-markings. The prosecution objected to the

ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-23 August

purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered. The trial court

2000.

admitted all the defense exhibits. 33

On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the

falsified/forged. It did not give much weight on

assailed decision convicting petitioner of the crime

petitioner's defense denying she was the one who

charged in the information. The dispositive portion of

actually falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating

the decision reads:

the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no

WHEREFORE,

judgment

is

hereby

rendered finding accused Normallah A.

Pacasum

GUILTY

beyond

reasonable

doubt of the offense charged in the

Information and, with the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentencing her to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO
(2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1)

DAY

OF prision

correccional as

minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE

(1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum
with the accessories thereof and to pay
a

fine

of

TWO

THOUSAND

(P2,000.00)

with

costs

PESOS

against

the

accused. 34

idea about the alleged falsification, because it was her

assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked
for her clearance and the one who submitted the said
clearance to the Office of the Regional Governor of the
ARMM.

The

trial

court

found

said

denial

unsubstantiated and ruled that while there was no

direct

evidence

"actually"

to

show

falsified/forged

that
the

petitioner

signature

herself

of

Laura

Pangilan, there were circumstances that indicated she

was the one who committed the falsification/forgery,
or who asked somebody else to falsify/forge the
subject signature in her Employees Clearance. The
Sandiganbayan

added

that

considering

it

was

petitioner who took advantage of and profited from the

use of the falsified clearance, the presumption was
that she was the material author of the falsification.
Despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut said
presumption, failing to show that it was another

The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM

person who falsified/forged the signature of Laura

Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing in the

Pangilan, or that another person had the reason or

Employees Clearance of petitioner to have been

motive to commit the falsification/forgery or could

cash advances and the only way to do this was by

have benefited from the same. ACaTIc

obtaining a clearance.

The

Sandiganbayan

sustain

Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees

petitioner's contention that she did not stand to

Clearance had no probative value in proving its

benefit

Employees

contents and was inadmissible because the original

Clearance and from the submission thereof to the

thereof was not presented by the prosecution. The

Office of the Regional Governor, because she allegedly

Sandiganbayan

had no existing cash advances. She claimed that an

presentation and admission of secondary evidence,

Employees Clearance was not needed to enable her to

like a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was

draw her salary for the months of August and

justified to prove the contents thereof, because

September

2000

despite reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the

the

prosecution to petitioner and her assistant secretary to

presumption that he who benefits from the falsification

produce the original of her Employees Clearance, they

is presumed to be the author thereof does not apply to

ignored the notice and refused to present the original

her.

of said document.

from

the

2000

Memorandum

The

of

lower

likewise

falsification

under
Gov.

court

did
of

the
Misuari,

not
her

August
and

explained

that

that

the

aforementioned memorandum applied to petitioner,

she being an official of the ARMM. It said that the
applicability of said memorandum to petitioner was
even admitted by her when she, in compliance
therewith, instructed her staff/assistant secretary to
work for her Employees Clearance to enable her to
collect her salary for the month of August 2000. It said
that the fact that she (allegedly) had no existing cash
advances did not exempt her from the coverage of the
memorandum, because she must show she had no

did

not

agree.

It

said

that

the

On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration

of

the

decision

of

the

Sandiganbayan 35 to which the prosecution filed a

Comment/Opposition. 36 Subsequent

thereto,

petitioner filed a Supplement to Accused's Motion for

Reconsideration & Motion for New Trial/Reception of
Newly Discovered Evidence. 37 Petitioner prayed that
her motion for new trial be granted in order that the
testimony of Marie Cris Batuampar be introduced, the

same

being

newly

discovered

evidence.

The

prosecution filed its Opposition. 38

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion,

On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its

resolution

denying

Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the

for

I. Finding that petitioner benefited from

reconsideration for lack of merit; and the motion for

the alleged falsification, hence

new

must

trial,

presented

because
did

not

petitioner's
the

evidence

qualify

as

motion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in:

sought

newly

to

be

discovered

evidence. 39

our

Resolution 40 dated

27

November

2007,

respondent People of the Philippines, through the

Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was required to
file its Comment on the petition. 41 After two motions
for extension to file comment on the petition, which
were granted by this Court, the OSP filed its Comment
dated

18

February

2008. 42 Petitioner

was

required 43 to file a Reply to the Comment, which she

did on 5 June 2008. 44 acAESC
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition for review on certiorari and
required

the

deemed

the

author

thereof, when the evidence on

record does not support, but even

On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.

In

be

parties

to

submit

their

respective

memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. They

filed their respective memoranda on 21 November
2008 and on 5 November 2008. 45

contradicts, such a conclusion.

II. Presuming

that

unliquidated

petitioner
cash

had

advances

hence was required under the

Misuari Memorandum to submit
her

Employee's

Clearance

to

clear herself of these, when there

is no evidence to that effect and
the prosecution even admitted
so.
III. Not

resolving

doubt

as

to

the

authenticity of the photocopy of

the allegedly forged Employee's
Clearance,

in

favor

of

innocence of the Accused.

the

IV. In short-circuiting the right of the

TO: ALL CONCERNED

petitioner to present additional

evidence

on

her

behalf,

SUBJECT: AS STATED

thus

DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000

denying her due process. 46

1. In view of the impending expiration of

Petitioner

contends

that

under

the

Misuari

memorandum dated 8 August 2000, she was not

required to file an Employees Clearance to draw her
salary,

since

what

was

required

under

said

memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA. She

the

extended

term

of

the

undersigned, it is hereby directed

that

all

outstanding

cash

advances be liquidated on or
before August 31, 2000.

further contends that since she was not required to file

2. Effective September 1, 2000, the

said Employees Clearance because she had no cash

salaries and other emoluments of

advances, the signature in her Employees Clearance

all ARMM officials/employees with

was "irrelevant and a non-issue" because what was

unliquidated cash advance shall

required was a Credit Notice.

be

As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that

under the aforesaid memorandum, what was required
before she could draw her salaries was a Credit Notice
from the COA and not an Employees Clearance. The
full text of the Memorandum 47 form the Regional
Governor reads:
MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL
GOVERNOR

withheld

settled

their

until

they

accounts

have
and

a
is

corresponding

Credit

Notice

issued

them

by

to

the

Commission on Audit.
3. Due

to

budgetary

and

financial

constraints brought about by the

drastic

cut

memorandum

of

our

dated

budget,
December

01, 1998 is hereby reiterated.

Therefore all releases for financial

The Credit Notice requirement was therefore irrelevant

assistance is hereby suspended

and a non-issue as regards the release of salaries prior

effective immediately.

to 1 September 2000.

4. For strict compliance. cTCADI

The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the

signature of Laura Pangilan in petitioner's Employees

PROF. NUR MISUARI

Clearance imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or caused

It is clear from said memorandum that what was

required from officers/employees who had unliquidated
cash advances was the corresponding Credit Notice
issued by the COA after they had settled their
accounts. There was indeed no mention of any
Employees Clearance therein. Up to this point, we
agree with petitioner. However, on her contention that
the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees
Clearance

was

"irrelevant

and

non-issue",

we

the imitation of said signature?

On the first query, the same was answered by Laura
Pangilan. She said that the signature in petitioner's
Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an
imitation. When a person whose signature was affixed
to a document denies his/her signature therein,
a prima facie case for falsification is established which
the defendant must overcome. 48

disagree. Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan was

Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an

imitated or not is the main issue in this case for

Employees Clearance to draw her salary. She adds that

falsification.

Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the

From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit

Notice requirement was effective only starting 1
September 2000 and not before. In the case at bar, the

ARMM,

told

her

and

her

secretary,

Marie

Cris

Batuampar, that she did not need an Employees

Clearance because she was re-appointed.49

information charges petitioner not with failure to

These arguments are untenable. There was a need for

secure a Credit Notice, but with allegedly falsifying her

petitioner to file an Employees Clearance not only for

Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of

compliance with the Misuari memorandum but, more

Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM.

importantly, because her term of office was about to

end, since her position was coterminous with the term

made use of or uttered the Employees Clearance,

of Gov. Misuari, the appointing authority. 50 She even

because there was no evidence that she submitted it

admitted that before she received her salary for

if not, at least caused it to be submitted to the

August,

was

Office of the Regional Governor. To support such claim,

necessary. 52 Moreover, her claim that Atty. Parcasio

she said there were no "receipt marks" in the

told her and her secretary that she did not need an

Employees Clearance to show that the Office of the

Employee Clearance to get her salary does not

Regional Governor received said documents.

2000, 51 an

persuade

us.

appointment",
Employees

In

Employees

fact,

when

Clearance

we

she
at

find
was

Clearance

her alleged

"re-

working

her

around

for

August

2000,

improbable. How could she have been re-appointed by

Gov. Alvarez, 53 whom she claims re-appointed her
sometime in the year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still
the Regional Governor of the ARMM when she had her
Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August
2000? Clearly, her statement that she did not need an
Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed
does not inspire belief. ADaEIH

It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified

document

is

separate

and

distinct

from

the

"falsification" of a public document. The act of "using"

falsified documents is not necessarily included in the
"falsification" of a public document. Using falsified
documents is punished under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification
of the Employees Clearance was consummated the
moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated.
In

the

falsification

of

public

document,

it

is

immaterial whether or not the contents set forth

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the

therein were false. What is important is the fact that

presumption that if a person had in his position a

the signature of another was counterfeited. 54 It is a

falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it),

settled rule that in the falsification of public or official

taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is

documents, it is not necessary that there be present

presumed to be the material author of the falsification.

the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person

He argues that the Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact

for the reason that in the falsification of a public

that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner

document, the principal thing punished is the violation

of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as

secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her

therein solemnly proclaimed. 55 Thus, the purpose for

Employees Clearance.

which the falsification was made and whether the

offender

profited

or

hoped

to

profit from

such

falsification are no longer material.

Petitioner's

denial,

unsubstantiated

and

uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial, when

unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is

The records further show that petitioner "used" or

negative and self-serving evidence, which deserves no

uttered the Employees Clearance. The fact that the

greater evidentiary value than the testimony of

same was circulated to the different division heads for

credible

their signatures is already considered use of falsified

matters. 56Denial

documents as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of

negative and self-serving assertion. 57

the

stamp

mark

"Received"

in

the

Employees

Clearance does not mean that said document was not

received by the Office of the Regional Governor. We
find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C.
Parcasio, Executive Secretary of Office of the Regional
Governor ARMM, as contained in the Employees
Clearance, to be sufficient proof that the same was
submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. It
must be stressed that the Executive Secretary is part
of the Office of the Regional Governor.
Petitioner

denies

having

"actually"

witnesses
is

who

testify

intrinsically

on
weak,

affirmative
being

In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as

her witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the person whom
she instructed to work for her Employees Clearance.
Her failure to present this person in order to shed light
on the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find
that the defense never intended to present Marie Cris
Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial
order, because the defense never listed her as a
witness. 58 Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to
help her cause after she has been convicted is already

falsified

her

too late in the day, and Ms. Batuampar's testimony,

Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of

which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered

Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge

newly discovered evidence as to merit the granting of

about the falsification because it was her assistant

her motion for new trial and/or reception of newly

signature

discovered evidence. ATCaDE

Employees Clearance, to wit

The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner

1. that the accused instructed her staff

"actually" imitated the signature of Laura Pangilan in

Maricris Batuampar to work for her

her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We

Employees

Clearance

have ruled that it is not strange to realize that in cases

with

Memorandum

of forgery, the prosecution would not always have the

Regional Governor Nur Misuari and that

means for obtaining such direct evidence to confute

the forged signature of Laura Pangilan

acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on

was affixed on her clearance are strong

circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of facts,

evidence that the accused herself either

which if woven together would produce a single

falsified the said signature or caused

network establishing the guilt of the accused beyond

the same to be falsified/imitated, and

reasonable

that

doubt. 59 We

totally

agree

with

Sandiganbayan, which said:

show that the accused herself "actually"

forged the signature of Laura Pangilan in
the Employees Clearance in question,
Court

nevertheless

Laura

possession

by

Pangilan

in

in

her

compliance
of

Maricris

ARMM

of

the

falsified clearance of the accused is

While there is no direct evidence to

the

the

the

of

finds

possession

by

the

accused

herself

because the former was only acting

upon the instructions and in behalf of
the latter;

the

following circumstances, obtaining in

the records, to establish/indicate that
she was the one who committed the
forgery or who asked somebody else to
forge or caused the forgery of the

2. that it was the accused who is

required to accomplish and to submit
her Employees Clearance to enable her
to collect her salary for the months of
August and September 2000 is sufficient

and strong motive or reason for her to

inference is justified that such person is

commit the falsification by imitating the

the forger or the one who caused the

signature of Laura Pangilan or order

forgery

someone else to forge it; and

falsification.

3. that the accused was the only one

who profited or benefited from the

and,

therefore,
Thus,

guilty

in People

of
v.

Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court held

that

falsification as she admitted that she

The rule is that if a person had in

was able to collect her salary for the

his

month of August 2000 after her falsified

document and he made use of it

Employees Clearance was submitted

(uttered it), taking advantage of it

and approved by the ORG-ARMM and

and

therefore, she alone could have the

presumption is that he is the

motive for making such falsification.

material

On

the

basis

of

the

foregoing

circumstances, no reasonable and fairminded man would say that the accused
a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM
had no knowledge of the falsification. It
is an established rule, well-buttressed
upon reason, that in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation, when a person
has in his possession or control a
falsified document and who makes use
of

the

same,

the

presumption

or

possession

profiting

thereby,

author

falsification.

falsified

This

of
is

the
the

especially

true if the use or uttering of the

forged documents was so closely
connected

in

time

with

the

forgery that the user or possessor

may

be

proven

to

have

capacity

of

committing

forgery,

or

to

have

the
the
close

connection with the forgers. (U.S.

v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v.
de Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v.
Domingo, 49 Phil. 28;People v.

Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v.

therefore, guilty of falsification. 61The effect of a

Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the

In line with the above ruling, and

considering that it was the accused who
took advantage and profited in the use
of the falsified Employees Clearance in
question, the presumption is inevitable
that she is the material author of the
falsification.

And

despite

full

need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima

facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is
offered, will thereby prevail. 62 A prima facie case of
falsification having been established, petitioner should
have presented clear and convincing evidence to
overcome such burden. This, she failed to do.
Petitioner

assails

the

weight

given

by

the

opportunity, she was not able to rebut

Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two Pangilans

such presumption by failing to show

when they failed to report the alleged falsification to

that it was another person who forged

the police or alert the Office of the Regional Governor

or

of said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from

falsified

the

signature

of

Laura

Pangilan or that at least another person

and not she alone, had the reason or
motive

to

commit

the

forgery

or

falsification, or was or could have been

benefited

by

such

falsification/forgery. 60CDHcaS

getting her salaries.

We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule
that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment
of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded

The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan,

high

respect

as against the denials of petitioner, convince us to

determination of the credibility of witnesses is the

apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory

domain of the trial court, as it is in the best position to

explanation, one who is found in possession of, and

observe

who has used, a forged document, is the forger and,

Sandiganbayan has given full probative value to the

the

if

not

conclusive

witnesses'

effect. 63The

demeanor. 64 The

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So have we.

court and the adverse party for a

We find no reason to depart from such a rule.

fraudulent or devious purpose which its

Aware that the prosecution failed to present the

original from which the photocopy of petitioner's
Employees Clearance was supposed to have been
obtained, she maintains that the Sandiganbayan
should have doubted the authenticity and probative
value of the photocopy of the Employees Clearance.

production would expose and defeat.

Hence, as long as the original evidence
can be had, the Court should not
receive

in

evidence

substitutionary

in

that

nature,

which

is

such

as

photocopies, in the absence of any clear

showing that the original has been lost

The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the

or destroyed or cannot be produced in

photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We agree

court.

when it ruled:

disregarded,

being

Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

evidence

barren

provides

weight. DAHSaT

that

when

the

subject

of

Such

photocopies

and

must

be

inadmissible
of

probative

inquiry is the contents of a document,

The foregoing rule, however, admits of

no evidence shall be admissible other

several exceptions. Under Section 3(b)

than the original document itself. The

of Rule 130, secondary evidence of a

purpose

the

writing may be admitted "when the

production by the offeror of the best

original is in the custody or under the

evidence if the prevention of fraud,

control of the party against whom the

because if a party is in possession of

evidence is offered, and the latter fails

such evidence and withholds it and

to

presents inferior or secondary evidence

notice". And to warrant the admissibility

in its place, the presumption is that the

of secondary evidence when the original

latter evidence is withheld from the

of a writing is in the custody or control

of

the

rule

requiring

produce

it

after

reasonable

of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule

the

130 provides as follows:

subpoena duces

Sec. 6. When original document

is in adverse party's custody or
control. If the document is in
the custody or control of the
adverse

party,

he

must have

reasonable notice to produce it. If

after

such

notice

party

or

via

tecum, provided

a
that

the party in custody of the original has

sufficient time to produce the same.
When such party has the original of the
writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it, or refuses to produce it,
secondary evidence may be admitted.

after

Here, the accused admitted that her

satisfactory proof of its existence,

Employees Clearance was always in the

he fails to produce the document,

possession of her assistant secretary,

secondary

[Marie

evidence

and

adverse

may

be

presented as in the case of loss.

Thus, the mere fact that the original is
in the custody or control of the adverse
party against whom it is offered does
not warrant the admission of secondary
evidence. The offeror must prove that
he has done all in his power to secure
the best evidence by giving notice to
the said party to produce the document
which may be in the form of a motion
for the production of the original or
made in open court in the presence of

Cris]

Batuampar.

So

the

prosecution in its effort to produce the

original copy of the said Employees
Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant
Special

Prosecutor

Anna

Isabel

G.

Aurellano of the Office of the Prosecutor,

sent on May 31, 2005 thru the COA
Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2)
telegram

subpoenas

addressed

to

accused Normallah Pacasum, and [Marie

Cris]

Batuampar

ordering

them

to

submit to the Office of the Special

Prosecutor on or before June 8, 2005,
the original of the Employees' Clearance

in

the

name

questioned

Employees

Lucman-Pacasum for the release of her

secondary

evidence

August and September 2000 salary as

contents thereof was justified. 65

DOT

of

Normallah

Regional

Notwithstanding

Alonto

Secretary.

receipt

of

the

said

telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso

Alonto in her residence on June 1,
200[5], the accused did not appear
before or submit to Assistant Special
Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the
original

of

the

said

Employees

Clearance, much less offered to produce

the same.

was proof of the existence of the

Employees Clearance as evidenced by
the photocopy thereof, and despite the
reasonable

notices

made

by

the

prosecution to the accused and her

secretary

to

produce

the

original of said employees clearance

they ignored the notice and refused to
produce

to

prove

as
the

This Court decrees that even though the original of an

alleged falsified document is not, or may no longer be
produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may
still prosper if the person wishing to establish the
contents of said document via secondary evidence or
substitutionary evidence can adequately show that the
best or primary evidence the original of the
document is not available for any of the causes
mentioned in Section 3, 66Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Under the circumstances, since there

assistant

Clearance

the

original

document,

the

Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the

Sandiganbayan severely restricted her time to present
evidence, allowing her only two hearing dates, thus
resulting in her failure to present another important
witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio.
Petitioner was not denied due process. She was given
every

opportunity

to

adduce

her

evidence.

Sandiganbayan outlined the proceedings of the case

as follows:

the

After the prosecution rested its case, by

photocopy of the original copy of the

agreement of the parties, the initial

presentation

and

admission

of

The

hearing for the reception of defense

despite due notice. In compliance with

evidence was scheduled on September

this Order, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, filed

19 and 20, 2005 both at 8:30 in the

his

morning. However, upon motion of the

Appearance, respectively, which were

prosecution, the Court, in its Order of

both Noted by the Court in its Resolution

September

of January 19, 2006. HAaDTE

16,

2005,

cancelled

the

Explanation

and

Withdrawal

of

setting as the handling prosecutor, Pros.

Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, had to attend
in

In view of the absence of the accused in

September 19-23,

the March 13, 2006 hearing and her

2005 and scheduled anew the hearing

continued failure to get a substitute

on November 23 and 24, 2005, both at

counsel considering that her counsel,

8:30

However, for

Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, had already

failure of the defense counsel, Atty. Rico

withdrawn from the case since January

B.

the

16, 2006, the Court cancelled the March

November 23, 2005 hearing despite due

13 and 14, 2006 hearings and moved

notice,

the

the same to July 3 and 4, 2006 both at

November 23 and 24 hearings, and

8:30 in the morning and designated

moved the same to March 13 and 14,

Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as

2006 both at 8:30 in the morning, and

counsel de oficio of the accused and

at the same time directed the said

directed the accused upon receipt of the

defense

in

order to immediately confer with said

writing within five (5) days from receipt

counsel for purposes of preparing for

of the Order why he should not be held

her defense in the case.

5-day

Tagaytay

in

workshop
City on

the

morning.

Bolongaita,
the

at

to
Court

counsel

to

PHINMA

appear

at

cancelled

show

cause

in contempt for his failure to appear

On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the

On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation

following Resolution, which reads:

of Atty. Conrado Rosario, counsel for the

Accused Normallah L. Pacasum's letter

of February 17, 2006 (received by mail
on

March

extension

16,
of

2006)

time

to

requesting
engage

the

services of counsel is merely NOTED

WITHOUT ACTION as the next hearings
are scheduled on July 3 and 4, 2006 and
said accused would have more than
ample time to engage the services of
counsel

of

her

choice. For

this

accused,

that

since

appointed counsel

de

he

was

oficio,

the

accused has not communicated with

him and therefore he was not ready to
present any evidence for the accused,
the Court cancelled the hearing in order
to give the defense another opportunity
to present its evidence and reset it to
July

4,

2006, the

following

day

as

previously scheduled.

reason, any excuse from the accused on

On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the

said settings that she failed to engage

following Order, which reads

the services of counsel or that her

counsel needs more time to prepare will
be

unacceptable. At

all

events,

this

Court, in its Order of March 13, 2006,

had already appointed Atty. Conrado
Rosario of the PAO as a counsel de oficio
to represent the accused, with specific
orders to the latter to confer with Atty.
Rosario and assist him in preparing for
her defense.

"When this case was called for

hearing, accused asked for the
resetting of the case on the
ground that she just hired a new
counsel who

thereafter

arrived

and entered his appearance as

Atty.

Napoleon

Uy

Galit

with

address at Suite 202 Masonic

Building,

#35

Matalino

St.,

Diliman, Quezon City. With the

appearance of her new counsel,

accused herself cannot also attend the

Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby

said hearing because she is undergoing

discharged as counsel de oficio of

fasting

the accused.

observance of Ramadan, he asked to

"As

prayed

for

by

the

accused, she is given the last

chance to present her evidence
on October 9 and 10, 2006, both

until

October

2006, the Court issued the following,

which reads

For

Appearance,

of

the

in

10, 2006. At the hearing on October 9,

"Acting

failure

2006

postpone the settings on October 9 and

at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

repeated

24,

on

the

Entry

Motion

of
for

accused to acknowledge receipt

Postponement of October 9 and

of the notices of the Court, her

10, 2006 Hearing filed by accused

waiver of appearance is hereby

Normallah

cancelled and she is ordered to

counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman,

personally

finding the same to be without

appear

in

the

scheduled hearings of this case.

L.

Pacasum,

thru

merit, as this case has been set

for hearing several times and the

SO ORDERED.

accused has been given the last

On October 6, 2006, the accused thru

chance to present evidence, the

counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, filed an

Court hereby denies the motion

Entry

for postponement. TEIHDa

of

Appearance,

Motion

For

Postponement of October 9 and 10

Hearings stating therein that since his
service

as

new

counsel

was

just

engaged by the accused, and that the

"In

this

regard,

the absence

of

in

view

of

accused

Normallah L. Pacasum in today's

hearing despite the Order of the

The

Court

thirty (30) days to submit their

dated

canceling

July

her

4,

2006,

waiver

of

parties are

respective

hereby given
memoranda.

appearance, and ordering her to

Thereafter,

personally

appear

before

this

deemed submitted for decision.

Court,

prayed

for

the

as

by

prosecution, let a Bench Warrant

the

case

shall

be

SO ORDERED.

of Arrest be issued against the

Subsequently, the accused thru counsel,

said

bond

filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

posted for her provisional liberty

above Order dated October 25, 2006,

is ordered confiscated in favor of

and Motion to Set Hearing For Motion for

the government. The accused is

Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of

given thirty (30) days from notice

Arrest dated October 31, 2006.

to explain in writing why final

At the hearing of accused's motion for

judgment shall not be rendered

reconsideration on November 3, 2006,

against the said bond.

the Court issued the following Order,

With the Manifestation of Atty.

which reads

accused. The

Bantreas

cash

Lucman

the defense

is

not

that
ready

to

"When the 'Motion To Set Hearing

for Motion

for Reconsideration

present its evidence today and

and to Lift Warrant of Arrest' was

tomorrow, the last chance for it

called for hearing this morning,

to present its evidence, the Court

only

is

the

Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras

present

appeared. Accused Normallah L.

constraint

accused's

to

consider

right

evidence as waived.

to

Attorneys

Bantuas

Pacasum was absent.

M.

In view of the absence of the

is

accused, the Court is not inclined

issuance of the warrant of arrest,

to give favorable action to the

she has to voluntarily surrender

Motion

and appear before the Court or

must

for
be

Reconsideration. It
stressed

that

the

primordial reason for the issuance

of

the

order

sought

to

be

reconsidered in the presence of

the

accused

in

the

previous

hearing in violation of the Court's

Order

for

her

to

reminded/advised

that

the

be arrested and brought to the

Court.
WHEREFORE,

the

Motion

for

Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED. aCTcDH

personally

Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in

appear in the hearings of this

Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution's

case and for her indifference to

Memorandum (And for a Second Look

the directives of the Court. With

on the Matter of Accused's Right to

the absence anew of the accused,

Present

the Court has no alternative but

accused dated November 21, 2006, and

to deny the Motion.

the prosecution's Opposition thereto,

Moreover, the Court notes the

the Court issued the following Order,

allegation in the Motion that the

which reads

counsel sought the assurance of

"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus

the accused (and she promised)

Motion

to appear before this Court if the

Consideration

motion will be granted, as if the

November 7, 2006 Memorandum (And

Court owes the accused the favor

For a Second Look on the Matter of

to appear before it. The accused

Accused's Right to Present Defense

Defense

to

Evidence)

Hold
of

in

of

the

Abeyance
Prosecution's

Evidence)" dated November 21, 2006

Court gave her ample opportunity to

and the plaintiff's Opposition thereto

present her evidence. 67

dated November 28, 2006.

The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation.

"Inasmuch as the accused has already

In fact, we find that the trial court was lenient with the

appeared before the Court and posted

petitioner. The failure of the defense to present Atty.

an

P10,000.00

Parcasio was its own doing. The defense failed to

despite the aforesaid opposition of the

prepare its witnesses for the case. As proof of this, we

prosecution, in the interest of justice,

quote a portion of the hearing when petitioner was

the Court is inclined to reconsider and

testifying:

additional

bond

of

give favorable action to the motion and

grant the accused another and last

ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the

opportunity to present here evidence.

"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted
and this case is set for hearing for the
accused's last chance to present and/or

whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio

would be (sic) at this time?
A He lives in Davao but after what

her

happened to Gov. Misuari, we

6,

have not got together with the

2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in the

other members of the cabinet of

Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in

Gov. Misuari, but he lives in

Quezon City.

Davao, sir.

complete

the

evidence

on

presentation
February

of
and

SO ORDERED.
Thus, despite the initial indifference of
the accused to present her defense, the

Q Would

it

be

possible,

Madame

Witness, to request or ask him to

testify in this case?

A After this hearing, I will look for Sec.

Parcasio just to clear my name,
sir.

handwriting, signature or rubric.

All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently

CHAIRMAN

established. There is no dispute that petitioner was a

Not after this hearing, you should have

already done that. Because we
already

falsifies a document by counterfeiting or imitating any

gave

you

enough

opportunity to present your side,

right? You should not be telling
the Court that only after this
hearing, you will start looking
(for) people who will, definitely,
clear your name. You should be
doing that months ago, correct?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honors. 68 IADaSE
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees
Clearance under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of
falsification under said paragraph, the followings
elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public
officer, an employee, or a notary public; (2) that he
takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he

public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of the

Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when she caused
the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a public
document) for the release of her salary for the months
of

August

and

September

2000.

Such

being

requirement, and she being a public officer, she was

duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit said
document.

Were

it

not

for

her

position

and

employment in the ARMM, she could not have

accomplished
falsification

said

of

Employees

public

document,

Clearance.
the

In

offender

is

considered to have taken advantage of his official

position when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare
or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the
document; or (2) he had official custody of the
document which he falsified. 69 It being her duty to
prepare and submit said document, she clearly took
advantage of her position when she falsified or caused
the

falsification

of

her

Employees

Clearance

imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan.

by

Leonardo-de
Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we
find the same proper. The penalty for falsification
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code isprision
mayor and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. There

Castro,

Brion,

Peralta and Bersamin,

JJ.,concur.
Quisumbing, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Tinga, J., joins J. Quisumbing's dissent.

being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the

Separate Opinions

commission of the felony, the imposable penalty

is prision mayor in its medium period, or within the
range of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from
the

medium

period

of prision

mayor, while

the

minimum shall be taken from within the range of the

penalty

next

lower

in

degree,

which

is prision

correccional or from six (6) months and one (1) day to

six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 dated 7

QUISUMBING, J., dissenting:

With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I
vote to grant the petition and reverse the decision of
the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Normallah A.
Pacasum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code.
In my view, it is erroneous to convict petitioner
because of the following grounds:

August 2007 and its resolution dated 22 October 2007

First, there is lack of sufficient evidence to prove

are hereby AFFIRMED.

petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Article 171,

paragraph 1 1 of the Revised Penal Code punishes

SO ORDERED.

"any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

advantage of his/her official position shall falsify a

Corona,

document

Carpio

Morales,

Velasco,

Jr.,

Nachura,

by

counterfeiting

handwriting, signature, or rubric".

or

imitating

any

The elements of falsification of public document are as

There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing

follows:

that petitioner imitated or caused to be imitated the

(a) the

offender is a public officer,

employee or notary public;

(b) s/he

takes

advantage

of

falsifies

merely

testified

that

the

signature

in

not sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt that she

is guilty of falsification.

by

The Sandiganbayan, for lack of proof of petitioner's

acts

direct participation in falsifying the document, relied

mentioned in Article 171 of the

on the disputable legal presumption that the possessor

Revised

as

of a falsified document who makes use of such to her

counterfeiting or imitating any

advantage is presumed to be the author of the

handwriting,

falsification. 3 At any rate, for the presumption of

committing

witnesses

petitioner's clearance was falsified. This fact alone is

his/her

official position;
(c) s/he

alleged falsified signature in the clearance. The

document

any

Penal

of
Code

the
such

signature

or

rubric. 2

authorship of falsification to apply, the possessor must

Elements (b) and (c) are absent in this case. Petitioner

stand to profit or had profited from the use of the

could not have taken advantage of her official position

falsified document. 4 In this case, petitioner does not

to have her employee clearance falsified because she

stand to profit nor profited from the use of the alleged

had no need for the clearance. Moreover, the mere act

falsified document.

of an employee of having his/her clearance signed is

Second, the allegedly falsified document, petitioner's

not taking advantage of one's official position. It is

employee clearance, was not needed by her to get her

erroneous to conclude that were it not for her position

salaries for the months of August and September 2000

and her employment in the ARMM, petitioner could not

and therefore, no criminal intent or ill motive could be

have accomplished her clearance.

attributed to petitioner to warrant her conviction for

falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1, of the

ROSARIO

S.

Revised Penal Code. SDEHCc

PANUNCIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal intent must be present in felonies committed

by means of dolo, such as falsification. 5 In this case,
there is no reasonable ground to believe that the

DECISION

requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present.

Petitioner had no ill motive to falsify her own
employee's clearance. She had no need to do so since

CARPIO, J p:

the employee clearance was not needed by her in the

procurement of her salaries. Even if she had her

The Case

employee clearance prepared, this act, by itself, is not

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the

felonious. There was nothing willful or felonious in

15

petitioner's acts that would warrant her prosecution for

Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.

falsification.

25254.

June

I therefore vote to set aside the Decision dated August

7, 2007 of the Sandiganbayan and acquit petitioner of
the charges against her.
||| (Pacasum v. People, G.R. No. 180314, [April 16,
2009], 603 PHIL 612-649)

2004

Decision 1 and

15

October

2004

The Antecedent Facts

On 3 August 1992, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
operatives of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and
the Special Mission Group Task Force Lawin of the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) led by then
Philippine

National

Police

Superintendent

Panfilo

Lacson and Police Senior Inspector Cesar Ouano, Jr.,

FIRST DIVISION

armed with Search Warrant No. 581-92 issued by then

Regional Trial Court Judge Bernardo P. Pardo, raided the

[G.R. No. 165678. July 17, 2009.]

residence of Rosario S. Panuncio (petitioner), a jeepney

operator, at 204 E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.

he was only a visitor of the house when the raid took

The operatives confiscated LTO documents, 17 pieces

place. An Information for violation of Article 172 (1) in

of private vehicle plates, a copying machine, several

relation to Article 171 of the RPC was filed against

typewriters, and other tools and equipment. One of the

petitioner, thus: IECcaA

LTO documents confiscated was MVRR No. 63231478

issued to Manlite Transport Corporation (Manlite). The
document was photographed during the raid while it
was still mounted on one of the typewriters.

That on August 3, 1992 at about 4:00

p.m., accused ROSARIO PANUNCIO y SY,
a private individual and owner/operator
of a residence/office located at 204 E.

Petitioner signed a certification of orderly search,

Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, did,

together with Barangay Chairman Antonio Manalo

then and there, willfully, unlawfully and

(Manalo),

feloniously with intent to cause damage

petitioner's

employee

Myrna

Velasco

(Velasco), and one Cesar Nidua (Nidua). Petitioner,

falsified

Manalo, Velasco, and Nidua also signed a Receipt of

appearing on Land Transportation Office

Property Seized issued by PO3 Manuel Nicolas Abuda.

(LTO) official receipt no. MVRR No.

Petitioner and one Jaime L. Lopez (Lopez) were

63231478 dated July 31, 1992 changing

arrested and brought to the PACC.

the meaning of the document and

Juan V. Borra, Jr., Assistant Secretary for the LTO,

Department of Transportation and Communications,
who was representing his office, filed a complaint
against petitioner for violation of Articles 171, 172,
176, and 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended; Presidential Decree No. 1730; Sections 31
and 56 of Republic Act No. 4136; and Batas Pambansa
Blg. 43. Lopez was not charged since it was shown that

causing

the

the

vital

informations

document

to

as

speak

something false, when in truth and in

fact, accused knew fully well that the
document as falsified do not legally
exist and is different from the official file
of the LTO, to the prejudice of public
interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation, which the

Route Arroceros-Project 4, Binangonan-Cubao

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107 (trial

via

court), granted in its order of 1 March 1993. 4The trial

court gave the public prosecutor 20 days within which
to submit his report on the reinvestigation. On 1 June
1994,

the

Prosecutor

Department
Mario

of

A.M.

Justice,
Caraos,

Resolution 5 recommending

that

through

State

submitted

its

petitioner

be

prosecuted for falsification. The trial court set the

arraignment, and on 28 June 1994, petitioner entered
a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, pre-trial and the trial of

Quezon City via Espaa Marcos Highway and

viceversa
Motor No. 179837 100002
Serial No. SP-MM-12857-87-C MEL-3002-C
Gross Weight 3,000 2,700
Net Capacity 1,500 1,350

the case ensued.

Payment of 1992 P513 P468

During the trial, a photocopy of the duplicate original

Renewal Registration

of MVRR No. 63231478 dated 31 July 1992, which was

a faithful reproduction of the document in LTO's file,
was

presented

and

compared

with

MVRR

No.

Owner Manlite Transport Co., Inc. Manlite

Transport Co., Inc.

63231478 confiscated from petitioner's residence. The

Address 204 E. Rodriguez Ave., Q.C. 204 E.

following discrepancies were noted: cCDAHE

Rodriguez Ave., Q.C. 6

As Per EDP/LTO File As Per Photocopy of

Owner's

Copy

(recovered

from petitioner's residence)

File No. 4B-0476-20101 0478-50065
Plate No. DFK 587 DEU 127

Petitioner denied that she was the source of the

falsified documents. She alleged that Manlite, which
she used to co-own with her late husband, already
stopped operating in April 1992 and her business was
operating under the name Rosario Panuncio. She
alleged that she was not at home when the raid took
place, and when she returned home, the police

authorities had already emptied her shelves and she

Penal Code which carries the penalty

was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory

of prision correccional in its medium and

receipt, and the certificate of orderly search. She

maximum period and a fine of not more

further alleged that she was charged with falsification

than

because she refused the police authorities' demand for

Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused

money.

Rosario
The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 2 September 1997 Decision, 7 the trial court

found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of a public document under
Articles 171 and 172 of the RPC. The trial court ruled
that the facts established by the prosecution were not
substantially disputed by the defense. The trial court
ruled that the raid yielded incriminatory evidence to
support the theory that petitioner was engaged in
falsifying LTO documents and license plate registration
receipts. The dispositive portion of the trial court's
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having
proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused is found
guilty as charged with the crime of
Falsification of Public Document under
Art. 171 and Art. 172 of the Revised

P5,000.00.
Panuncio

sentenced

Applying
y

Sy

to suffer the

is

the
hereby

penalty of

imprisonment of Six (6) Months and One

(1) Day of arresto mayor as minimum to
FOUR (4) Years or prision correccional as
maximum, and a fine of P2,000.00 with
subsidiary

imprisonment

in

case

of

insolvency. Without costs.

SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 15 June 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's Decision with modification.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner committed
falsification of a public document. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the search warrant did not suffer from any
legal infirmity because the items to be seized were
already specified and identified in the warrant. The
Court of Appeals declared that the court's designation

of the place to be searched and the articles to be

WHEREFORE,

seized left the police authorities with no discretion,

conviction rendered by the trial court

ensured that unreasonable searches and seizures

against

would not take place and abuses would be avoided.

Panuncio y Sy is AFFIRMED, but with the

The Court of Appeals further ruled that the Rules of

MODIFICATION that she should be, as

Court do not require that the owner of the place to be

she hereby is, sentenced to serve an

searched be present during the conduct of the raid.

indeterminate penalty of two (2) years

The Court of Appeals noted that the search was

and

conducted not only in the presence of petitioner but

correccional as

also

years

in

the

presence

of

Manalo,

Velasco,

and

Nidua. IHCESD
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:

the

judgment

accused-appellant

four

(4)

months
minimum

of prision

of

Rosario

of prision
to

six

(6)

correctional as

maximum. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 15
October 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether the elements of falsification
of

public

document

under

Article 172 (1) in relation to

Article 171 of the RPC have been

particulars or a motion to quash the information.

established;

Petitioner's failure to object to the allegation in the

2. Whether the search was regularly

conducted;
3. Whether

the

gathered

in evidence; and
the

amounted

to

waiver

of

the

defect

in

the

information. 10 Objections as to matters of form or

evidence

during the search are admissible

4. Whether

information before she entered her plea of not guilty

Indeterminate

first time on appeal. 11

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article

Court

properly

substance in the information cannot be made for the

of

Appeals

172 12 in relation to Article 171 13 of the RPC refers

applied

the

to falsification by a private individual, or a public

Law

officer or employee who did not take advantage of his

Sentence

(ISL).

official position, of public, private, or commercial

The Ruling of this Court

documents. 14 The

The petition has no merit.

Falsification of Public Documents

elements

of

falsification

documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC

are:
(1) that

the

offender

is

private

At the outset, petitioner argues that the Information

individual or a public officer or

was defective because it did not specifically mention

employee

the provision that she violated. As such, she was not

advantage of his official position;

informed of the specific violation for which she was

held liable.
We cannot sustain petitioner's argument. Petitioner
failed to raise the issue of the defective information
before the trial court through a motion for bill of

of

who

did

not

take

(2) that he committed any of the acts of

falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the RPC; and

(3) that the falsification was committed

she had participation in the criminal act. The Court

in a public, official or commercial

disagrees with petitioner. The falsified copy of MVRR

document. 15

No. 63231478 was found during a valid search

conducted in petitioner's residence. It was issued in
the name of Manlite which petitioner admitted as co-

In this case, petitioner is a private individual. MVRR No.

owned by her together with her late husband. Thus,

63231478, denominated as LTO Form No. 2, is an

there is a presumption that she falsified it and she was

official document issued by the LTO. It is the owner's

using it for her benefit. The falsified document,

copy of the Official Receipt of the payment of the

purportedly issued in the name of Manlite, could be

vehicle's

the

used for another vehicle operated by Manlite to make

owner's copy of MVRR No. 63231478 by making it

it appear that it was validly registered with the LTO. In

appear that it was an owner's copy issued to a vehicle

this case, the original document in LTO's files was

of Manlite with Plate No. DEU 127 when in the LTO's

issued to a Manlite vehicle with Plate No. DFK 587

files, it was issued to a vehicle of Manlite with Plate No.

plying Arroceros-Project 4, Quezon City via Espaa.

DFK 587. The discrepancies between the document in

The falsified document was purportedly issued to a

LTO's files and the document confiscated in petitioner's

Manlite

house were duly noted by the trial court and remained

Binangonan-Cubao via Marcos Highway.

registration

fee.

Petitioner

falsified

undisputed. The alteration made by petitioner changed

the meaning of the document within the context of
Article

171

falsification

(6)
the

of

the

making

RPC
of

which
"any

punishes

as

alteration

or

intercalation in a genuine document which changes its

meaning". aHIEcS
Petitioner argues that MVRR No. 63231478 was not
found in her possession and that it was not proved that

vehicle

with

Plate

No.

DEU

127

plying

Petitioner further argues that only a photocopy of the

purported owner's copy was presented to the trial
court and there could be no falsification of a mere
photocopy.
Again, we do not agree with petitioner. It has been
established that there is a genuine copy of MVRR No.
63231478 in the LTO's files and the owner's copy of it

was in petitioner's possession. The original copy of

SEC.

MVRR No. 63231478 was not presented during the trial

premises, to be made in presence of

because petitioner kept it in her possession. However,

two witnesses. No search of a house,

it has been established during the trial that as per

room, or any other premise shall be

usual practice, the owner's copy is usually photocopied

made except in the presence of the

and it is the photocopy which is usually kept inside the

lawful occupant thereof or any member

vehicle. 16 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the

of his family or in the absence of the

presentation of a mere photocopy of the document to

latter, two witnesses of sufficient age

any traffic enforcer is enough to convince the traffic

and discretion residing in the same

enforcer that the public vehicle was validly and

locality.

lawfully registered. The fact remains that LTO Form No.

2, which petitioner falsified, is a genuine and public
document.

8. Search

of

house,

room,

or

Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant

of the house was not present when the search was
conducted, the search was done in the presence of at

Validity of the Search and Admissibility of the

least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion

Articles Seized

residing in the same locality. Manalo was the barangay

Petitioner assails the validity of the search which was

chairman of the place while Velasco was petitioner's

allegedly conducted while she was not in the house.

employee. 17 Petitioner herself signed the certification

Petitioner alleges that since the search warrant was

of orderly search when she arrived at her residence.

defective, the items seized during the search could not

Clearly, the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the

be used in evidence against her.

Rules of Court were complied with by the police

We will discuss these issues together.

Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

authorities

who

conducted

the

search.

Further,

petitioner failed to substantiate her allegation that she

was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory
receipt, and the certificate of orderly search. In fact,
the records show that she signed these documents

together with three other persons, including the

In this case, the Court of Appeals sentenced petitioner

barangay chairman who could have duly noted if

to serve an indeterminate penalty of two years and

petitioner was really forced to sign the documents

four months of prision correccional as minimum to six

against her will.

years of prision correccional as maximum. There being

Articles

which

are

the

product

of

unreasonable

searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence

pursuant

to

Article

III,

Section

(2)

of

theConstitution. 18 However, in this case, we sustain

the validity of the search conducted in petitioner's
residence and, thus, the articles seized during the
search are admissible in evidence against petitioner.
Application of the ISL

individual under Article 172 (1) in relation to Article

171 of the RPC is punishable by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods, which ranges from
two years, four months and one day to six years, and a
fine of not more than P5,000. Applying the ISL,
petitioner may be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty the minimum of which must be within the
of arresto

mayor in

its

maximum

period

to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four

months

and

one

months. SCHcaT

day

to

two

years

it proper in this case to lower the maximum penalty

imposed by the Court of Appeals from six years to four
years,

nine

months

and

eleven

days

of prision

correccional. Further, the penalty for falsification of a

public document under Article 172 (1) in relation to
Article 171 of the RPC includes a fine of not more than
P5,000 which the Court of Appeals failed to impose.
Hence, we also modify the penalty to include the fine.

Falsification of a public document by a private

range

no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, we deem

and

four

WHEREFORE, we DENY the

petition.

We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 15 June 2004

Decision and 15 October 2004 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25254. We find petitioner
Rosario S. Panuncio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of falsification of a public document under
Article 172 (1) in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentence her to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ofIMPRISONMENT from two
years

and

four

months

of prision

correccional as

minimum to four years, nine months and eleven days

of prision

correccionalas

maximum

and

to

pay

a FINE of P3,000.

2003, convicting petitioner of ten (10) counts of

Falsification of Public Document defined and penalized
under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal

Costs against petitioner.

Code, and [2] Resolution 2 dated September 24, 2003,

SO ORDERED.

denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

||| (Panuncio v. People, G.R. No. 165678, [July 17,

2009], 610 PHIL 594-608)

Petitioner Romeo D. Lonzanida, then Municipal Mayor

of San Antonio, Zambales, was among those criminally
charged with Falsification of Public Document as
defined and penalized under Paragraph 2 of Article 171

FIRST DIVISION

of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the

Provincial Prosecutor on separate complaints 3 filed on

[G.R. Nos. 160243-52. July 20, 2009.]

various dates by Efren Tayag, Elsie de Dios, Daniel

Alegado

and

Rene

Abad.

Also

included

in

the

ROMEO D. LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs.

complaints was Romulo Madarang (Madarang), the

PEOPLE

Assistant Municipal Treasurer.

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

The complaints alleged that petitioner, as Municipal

Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, notarized thirteen

DECISION

(13) Affidavits

of

Ownership 4 of

parcels

of

117-

hectare public land located at Barangay Pundakit, San

Antonio, Zambales, particularly described as Lot No.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
On appeal to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the [1] Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan dated July 25,

5504. The Affidavits of Ownership appeared to have

been executed by Edzel L. Lonzanida, Leo Lonzanida,
Japhet Lonzanida, Peter John Madarang, Leo Madarang,
Dolores

Joy

Madarang,

Elsie

de

Dios,

Medardo

Domingo, Pedro Lacorte, Efren Tayag, Cedric Legrama,

Thus, ten (10) Informations for Falsification of Public

Charlie

Document against petitioner were filed before the

Lacap

and

Raphael

Gonzales

(Edzel

Lonzanida, et al.). The purported affiants either denied

executing and signing the same or were the minor
children of petitioner and of Madarang.

thirteen (13) identically worded Joint Affidavits 5 of

two disinterested persons purportedly executed and
signed by Rufino Aniceto who is an illiterate and
Roberto Querubin who was already deceased at the
time of their execution.
March

16,

1998,

Criminal Case Nos. 24644 to 24652, 8 except for the

names of the alleged affiants of the falsified Affidavits

The complaints also alleged that petitioner notarized

On

Sandiganbayan.

of Ownership, were similarly worded, viz.:

That on or about the 17th day of
October, 1995, in the Municipality of
San Antonio, province of Zambales,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused

Special

being then the Municipal Mayor of San

Prosecutor issued a Memorandum 6 recommending

Antonio, Zambales, taking advantage of

that petitioner be charged with ten (10) counts of

his official position and committing the

falsification, one for the Joint Affidavits and nine in

offense in relation to his duties, did then

connection

and

with

the

Office

the Affidavits

of

of

the

Ownership. The

there,

willfully,

unlawfully

and

recommendation was based upon the finding that of

feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified

the

the

thirteen

(13)

Ownership, seven

(7)

affiants
were

in

the Affidavits

minors. 7 Hence,

of

Affidavit

of

Ownership

dated

their

October 17, 1995 which he subscribed

signatures appearing thereon and the facts stated in

thus making said document a public or

the said documents were all false. In addition, two (2)

official document, by making it appear,

affiants, Efren Tayag and Elsie de Dios denied their

as it did appear, that said document

participation in the Affidavits of Ownership. HaAIES

was made, prepared and signed by

DOLORES

JOY

MADARANG

thereby

The

attributing to the latter participation and

executed and signed before him by

intervention

Rufino Aniceto and Roberto Querubin, as

in

the

making

and

preparation of said document by signing

affiants

his name and affixing his signature

personally the owners of the parcel of

thereon when in truth and in fact, said

land

accused well knew, the said DOLORES

Pundakit as Edzel L. Lonzanida, Peter

JOY MADARANG did not so participate

John

nor authorize the herein accused or

Madarang,

Leo

anybody else to prepare and sign the

Lonzanida,

Dolores

same, thereby causing damage and

Medardo Domingo, Pedro Lacorte, Efren

prejudice to public interest. 9

Tayag, Cedric Legrama, Charlie Lacap

Information

in

Criminal

Case

23850 10 contained the following allegations:

No.

at

who
Sitio

Madarang,

declared
Talisayen,
Elsie

de

to

Barangay
Dios,

Lonzanida,
Joy

know

Leo

Japhet

Madarang,

and Rafael Gonzales and who have

openly and continuously occupied the
said land for thirty (30) years, when in

That on or about the 17th day of

truth and in fact, as said accused well

October, 1995, in the Municipality of

knew, the said "Joint-Affidavit" was not

San Antonio, Province of Zambales,

executed and signed by Rufino Aniceto

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of

and Roberto Querubin, the latter having

this Honorable Court, the said accused

died prior to the execution of the said

being then Municipal Mayor of San

joint-affidavit, nor said affiants, ever

Antonio, Zambales, did then and there,

appear before the accused for the

willfully,

unlawfully

feloniously

purpose of swearing and subscribing the

prepare

which

said document, to the damage and

and

Joint-Affidavit

he

ratified by stating and making it appear

in the said document that the same was

prejudice of the government.

Upon arraignment on November 5, 1998, petitioner,

applicants, Sketch Plan and the Certification from the

assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to

CENRO. According to Cacho, after preparing the Tax

all the charges.

Declarations, he advised Madarang to present to him

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses

Municipal Assessor Leopoldo Cacho; complainants
Efren Tayag, Elsie de Dios and Daniel C. Alegado; and
relatives

of

purported

affiants

in

the Joint

Affidavits Rodolfo Querubin and Lydia Aniceto y dela

Cruz.
Municipal Assessor Leopoldo Cacho testified that he is
in charge of the preparation of Tax Declarations. He
explained that for Tax Declarations of undeclared
lands, the applicant is required to submit a Joint
Affidavit of the neighboring owners of the property
subject of the application together with the Affidavit of

the applicants to personally sign their respective Tax

Declaration.

However,

Madarang

took

the

Tax

Declarations and assured Cacho that he [Madarang]

would be the one to make the declarants sign. Cacho
found out later that the Tax Declarations were already
approved by the Provincial Assessor.
Efren Tayag testified that he is the real occupant of Lot
No. 5504. He has been occupying the subject land
since 1971 together with twenty-four (24) other
persons and that none of the individuals who executed
the Affidavits of Ownership were ever in possession of
the said parcel of land. IECAaD

Ownership, a sketch plan and a Certification from the

Daniel

Community Environment and Natural Resources Office

Development

(CENRO). Cacho disclosed that in the latter part of

narrated that sometime in July 1996, he visited Vice-

1995,

Governor Saturnino Bactad in his office at Capitol

Madarang

filed

13

applications

for

Tax

C.

Alegado,
Officer

the
of

San

Planning

Antonio,

Zambales,

Building,

Iba,

said parcel of land were, as mentioned earlier, Edzel

13 Joint

Affidavits, 13 Affidavits

Lonzanida, et al. Attached to each application were

Mayor's Certification and a Special Power of Attorney.

the Joint Affidavits of Rufino Aniceto and Roberto

According to Alegado, said documents unraveled an

Querubin, Affidavits

attempt to sell Lot No. 5504. He also testified that

Ownership of

each

of

the

Bactad

and

Declaration for Lot No. 5504. The applicants for the

of

Zambales.

Municipal

showed
of

to

him

Ownership, a

Edzel, Leo and Japhet, all surnamed Lonzanida, who

Rodolfo

appear to have signed the Affidavits of Ownership, are

testified that his brother Roberto could not have

the minor children of petitioner. He stated further that

executed the Joint Affidavits on October 17, 1995

Peter

because Roberto died in Tarlac on May 3, 1981.

John,

Leo

and

Dolores

Joy,

all

surnamed

Madarang, are the minor children of Romulo Madarang

while Cedric Legrama is the son of Municipal Treasurer
Cecilia Legrama and was only one year old at the time
of the execution of the Affidavits of Ownership on
October 17, 1995. Alegado added that on the same
day October 17, 1995, petitioner also administered
the oath in the 13 Joint Affidavits making it appear that
the same were executed by Rufino Aniceto and
Roberto Querubin and that petitioner personally knew
the two affiants to be the owners of the land adjacent
to that subject of the Affidavits of Ownership.
Elsie de Dios testified that the signature appearing in
the Affidavit of Ownership she purportedly executed
was not hers and was in fact a forgery. She had not
been in possession of any portion of Lot No. 5504 for
thirty (30) years and she did not apply for the issuance
of a Tax Declaration of the same.

Querubin,

brother

of

Roberto

Querubin,

Lydia Aniceto y dela Cruz, the widow of the late Rufino

Rafanan Aniceto who died on June 25, 1998, testified
that she had been married to Rufino for 16 years.
According

to

Lydia,

the

signatures

in

the Joint

Affidavits appearing over the typewritten name Rufino

R. Aniceto could not have been her husband's because
the latter was illiterate and only used his thumbmark
in affixing his signature on any document. As proof
thereof, she presented a community tax certificate of
Rufino with the latter's thumbmark.
The prosecution also presented the Counter-Affidavit of
Cecilia Legrama, the mother of said Cedric Legrama
wherein Cecilia declared that her son Cedric Legrama
was only eleven (11) months old at the time of the
execution of the purported Affidavits of Ownership and
could not have therefore executed the same.
On the other hand, petitioner testified in his own
defense. He acknowledged the signatures in the Joint
Affidavits as

his.

According

to

petitioner,

the

documents were brought to him by Madarang and he

signed on each of the affidavits as oath administering

Rules of the Sandiganbayan in relation to Section 2 (a)

officer. He also admitted that he did not know Roberto

of Rule 121 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. 12

Querubin and Rufino Aniceto, the affiants therein.

Petitioner posited that the affidavits in question or the
documentary exhibits of the public prosecutor are not
documents, as contemplated under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and therefore, they cannot be
falsified and made a criminal act thereunder. As to
the Affidavits of Ownership, petitioner insisted that no
witness was presented to show and state under oath

On January 8, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied the

motion for reconsideration. 13 On January 19, 2001,
petitioner filed a Manifestation and Submission of
Evidence

Which

Became

Available

Only

Recently. 14 The evidence consisted of affidavits of

recantation executed by Elsie de Dios, Rene Abad and
Rodolfo Querubin. AETcSa

that the signatures on the contested documents

In

the

resolution 15 dated

April

5,

2001,

the

belong to him. He contended that in the absence of

Sandiganbayan deferred ruling on the Manifestation

such evidence, he should be acquitted.

with Motion to Consider the Motion for Reconsideration

as a Motion for New Trial and required Elsie de Dios,
Rene Abad and Rodolfo Querubin, to appear and testify

On October 20, 2000, the Sandiganbayan through its

Fourth

Division

rendered

decision 11 convicting

petitioner of ten (10) counts of Falsification as charged

in Criminal Case Nos. 23850, 24644 to 24652.

before it.
In

the

resolution 16 dated

petitioner's Motion

to

October

Consider

the

30,

2001,

Motion

for

Reconsideration as a Motion for New Trial was treated

On October 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion for

as a second motion for reconsideration, and denied on

reconsideration. Again on December 22, 2000, without

the ground that the same was filed without leave of

awaiting

for

court and that the filing of a second motion is

reconsideration, petitioner filed a Manifestation with

proscribed by the rules. With the denial of his motion,

Motion to Consider the Motion for Reconsideration as a

petitioner filed a third motion for reconsideration which

Motion for New Trial as per Rule VIII of the Revised

was opposed by the prosecution.

the

resolution

of

said

motion

Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Manifestation and/or

geared towards proving that no one was prejudiced

Explanation with Leave of Court to File a Motion for

with the issuance of the Tax Declaration.

Reconsideration 17 questioning the October 30, 2001

resolution.
In

as witnesses for the prosecution. Recanting her

the

previous testimony, Elsie de Dios testified that the

Sandiganbayan gave in to petitioner's plea for a new

complaint-affidavit which she signed was already

trial and allowed him a last chance to present evidence

prepared at the time she first laid eyes on it in the

in his behalf.

office of Atty. Hermana Bactad, who was allegedly a

The

the

Elsie de Dios and Leopoldo Cacho previously testified

resolution 18 dated

prosecution

January

filed

3,

2002,

petition

for certiorari, prohibition with prayer for a temporary

restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
with this Court assailing the Sandiganbayan's January
3, 2002 resolution. The petition was docketed as G.R.

political opponent of petitioner. She claimed that no

prejudice had been caused her by the execution of
the Joint-Affidavits and Affidavit of Ownershipbecause
she did not apply for the issuance of a Tax Declaration
on any portion of Lot No. 5504.

Nos. 152365-74 but eventually dismissed by the Court

Leopoldo Cacho's recantation was to the effect that no

in the resolution 19 dated July 24, 2002.

one was prejudiced by the issuance of subject Tax

Petitioner was thus given a new trial and allowed to

present, before the Sandiganbayan, witnesses Elsie de
Dios, Leopoldo Cacho and Rene Abad as part of his
testimonial evidence.

Declarations. He rationalized that the government was

not prejudiced by the issuance of the Tax Declarations
in favor of the thirteen (13) applicants because the
taxes therefor had been duly paid. He added that no
person, other than the thirteen persons who signed

The three claimed that they were compelled by the

the

political enemies of petitioner to testify against him

claimed ownership over Lot No. 5504 which remains a

and to sign the document, the contents of which they

public land until a title is issued to cover it.

did not understand. Principally, their testimony was

applications

and Affidavits

of

Ownership, has

Rene Abad claimed that he was used as a pawn by

accused is hereby sentenced to suffer in

petitioner's political adversaries. According to him, he

each

was brought by Atty. Hermana Bactad to the Office of

imprisonment of four (4) years and one

the Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales where he was

(1)

made to sign a prepared affidavit which he neither

minimum to eight (8) years and one (1)

read nor fully comprehended. He likewise claimed that

day of prison mayor (sic) as maximum,

he was not prejudiced by the execution of the

and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, in each

affidavits of ownership and the issuance of the tax

of

declarations over the subject land.

imprisonment

On July 25, 2003, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a

of

the

day

the

cases

of prision

cases

the

penalty

correccional as

without
in

of

subsidiary
case

of

insolvency. cTESIa

Decision convicting petitioner of the crimes charged. In

Considering that this decision is the

so ruling, the Sandiganbayan belittled the recantation

result of the new trial granted upon

of the three prosecution witnesses. Dispositively, the

motion

decision reads:

notwithstanding that the same finding

WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused

Mayor

Romeo

Lonzanida

Dumlao guilty of ten (10) counts of

Falsification of Public Document defined
and penalized under Article 171 par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code, and in the
absence

of

aggravating

any

mitigating

circumstances,

and

applying

the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said

of

the

accused

and

of guilt was arrived at despite the

evidence presented in the new trial, the
resolution of this court promulgated on
January 21, 2003, ordering the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against the
accused, and which is the subject of
accused's Motion
Clarification/Reconsideration

for
(With

Prayer to Recall/Set Aside Warrant of

Arrest), is hereby set aside and the
arrest accused is held in abeyance until

such

time

that

the

new

decision

JUSTIFYING THE CONVICTION OF THE

becomes final and executory, pursuant

ACCUSED

WHEN

to the provisions of Secs. 22 and 24,

WHICH THE INFERENCE WERE DERIVED

Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. 20

WERE

NOT

THE

FACTS

ESTABLISHED

FROM

THEREBY

DEPARTING FROM THE RULING OF THE

SO ORDERED.

SUPREME

COURT

IN PEOPLE

V.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a

GENOBIA,234 SCRA 699 ON JUDGMENT

supplemental motion for reconsideration but both

OF

motions were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

CONVICTION

Resolution 21 dated September 24, 2003.

elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review

on certiorari imputing the following errors against the
Sandiganbayan:

ALL THE REQUISITES FOR CONVICTION

OF

AN

ACCUSED

BASED

ON

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE NOT

PRESENTED/PROVEN,

COURT A

ON

III

Unable to accept the judgment of conviction, petitioner

THE

BASED

HENCE

HE

IS

ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL AS HIS

QUO SERIOUSLY

MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS THEREBY

GUILT

WAS

NOT

PROVEN

BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT.

LEADING IT TO A CONCLUSION NOT IN

In the Resolution 22 dated July 14, 2004, the Court

ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE

denied the petition, thus:

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Considering the allegations, issues, and

II

arguments adduced in the petition for

THE COURT A QUO RELIED ON PURELY

review on certiorari of the decision and

CIRCUMSTANTIAL

resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated

EVIDENCE

IN

July 25, 2003 and September 24, 2003,

respectively, the Court further Resolves

and Roberto Aniceto, the affiants

to DENY the petition for failure of the

therein;

petitioners to sufficiently show that the

Sandiganbayan
reversible

committed

error

in

the

any

3. A Joint Affidavit is an indispensable

requirement in an application for

challenged

a tax declaration; EaCSHI

decision and resolution as to warrant

the

exercise

by

this

Court

of

its

4. It

was

upon

the

submission

of

discretionary appellate jurisdiction in

the Joint Affidavits, Affidavits of

this case.

Ownership, Certification

However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court,

in its Resolution 23 of January 26, 2005, reinstated and
gave due course to the petition. We now take a second
look at this case and the facts and circumstances

CENRO and the sketch plan that

Tax Declarations were issued in
favor of the thirteen applicants
for Tax Declaration;
5. Of the thirteen applicants for Tax

obtaining herein.
In handing down a verdict of guilty, the Sandiganbayan
appreciated against petitioner the following factual
circumstances:

Declarations, three were minor

children of petitioner; one was a
two-month old child of Municipal
Treasurer Cecilia Legrama; and,

1. Petitioner did not deny having signed

as

from

subscribing

officer

the

thirteen Joint Affidavits;

three

were

Assistant

the

children

Municipal

of

Treasurer

Romulo Madarang;

2. Even as petitioner admitted that he

6. None of the 7 children were more

signed as subscribing officer the

than thirty years old, yet, there

subject Joint Affidavits, he denied

was a declaration in the Affidavits

that he knew Roberto Querubin

of

Ownership that

the

affiants

were in possession of the subject

The general rule is that the factual findings of the

lot for more than thirty years;

Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except

7. Two of the alleged applicants for tax

declaration, Elsie de Dios and
Efren Tayag, never applied for the
issuance of a Tax Declaration in
their

favor

nor

filed

any

document relative to the said

application;
8. Petitioner

where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely

on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a
mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and
(5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of
evidence

and

are

contradicted

by

evidence

on

record. 24

issued

Mayor's

Certification dated February 19,

1996 attesting that the thirteen

A perusal of the records reveals that none of the above

applicants

Declaration

exceptions obtains in this case. There is no showing

were the actual occupants of Lot

that the conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan on

No.

the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution is

for

5504

Tax

and

had

been

in

possession of the same for more

manifestly

than thirty years; and,

speculation and conjectures.

9. The applicants for Tax Declaration

executed
Attorney

Special

giving

Power

Madarang

of
the

authority to sell the land subject

thereof

and

to

proceeds of the sale.

receive

the

mistaken

or

grounded

entirely

on

Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for

falsification of a public document to be established,
the following elements must concur:
1. That the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public;

2. That he takes advantage of his official

position;

f) Making

any

alteration

or

intercalation in a genuine

3. That he falsifies a document by

committing any of the following
acts:

document which changes

its meaning; TSIDaH
g) Issuing in authenticated form a

a) Counterfeiting or imitating any

handwriting, signature or
rubric;
b) Causing

it

document purporting to be
a

copy

of

an

original

document when no such

original exists, or including

to

appear

that

in such copy a statement

persons have participated

contrary

in any act or proceeding

from, that of the genuine

when they did not in fact

original;

so participate;
c) Attributing

to

persons

to,

or

different

h) Intercalating any instrument or

who

note

relative

to

the

have participated in an act

issuance

or proceeding statements

protocol, registry or official

other than those in fact

book . . . 25

made by them;

thereof

in

Undeniably, the foregoing elements of the crime were

d) Making untruthful statements

proven in the present case. Petitioner is a public officer

in a narration of facts;

who has taken advantage of his position to commit the

e) Altering true dates;

felonious acts charged against him, i.e., knowingly

subscribing or signing the oath as administering officer
the affidavits mentioned in the informations under

false circumstances. The petitioner's acts of signing

officers in the public service of the

the oaths as administering officer in the said affidavits

government of the Philippines whose

were clearly in abuse of the powers of his office for his

appointments

authority to do so was granted to him by law as

President

municipal mayor and only in matters of official

confirmation by the Commission on

business.

Appointments; all other constitutional

As alleged in the Informations and proven during the

are

and

vested
are

in

the

subject

to

officers; and notaries public.

trial of the cases, the accused was exercising his

Sec. 42. Duty to Administer Oath.

authority to administer oath as a municipal mayor

Officers authorized to administer oaths,

when he committed the acts complained of. The

with the exception of notaries public,

Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by R.A. No.

municipal judges and clerks of court, are

6733 (July 25, 1989), pertinently provides:

not obliged to administer oaths or

Sec.

41. Officers

Administer
officers

Oath.

have

administer

Authorized
The

general

oaths:

to

following

authority

President;

to

Vice-

President; Members and Secretaries of

both Houses of the Congress; Members
of

the

Judiciary;

Secretaries

of

execute certificates save in matters

of official business; and with the
exception of notaries public, the officer
performing the service in those matters
shall charge no fee, unless specifically
authorized

by

law.

(emphasis

supplied) 26

Departments; provincial governors and

As for the petitioner's defenses, this Court finds them

lieutenant-governors;

to be without merit.

mayors; municipal

city
mayors; bureau

directors; regional directors; clerks of

courts; registrars of deeds; other civilian

In Lumancas v. Intas, 27 this Court held that in the

falsification of public or official documents, whether by
public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary

that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to

whether the allegations contained therein are true. In

injure

in

addition to these, and as evidenced by the questioned

contradistinction to private documents, the principal

affidavits, petitioner attested that the affiants swore

thing punished is the violation of the public faith and

and signed their affidavits in his presence when in fact

the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly

they never did. Petitioner likewise issued a Mayor's

proclaimed.

Certification falsely attesting to the fact that the

third

person,

for

the

reason

that,

Petitioner repeatedly decries that there was no proof

that he authored such falsification or that the forgery
was done under his direction. This argument is without
merit. Under the circumstances, there was no need of

alleged applicants for tax declaration (three of whom

are his children while the other four are the minor
children

of

his

municipal

officials)

hadve

been

occupying the said lot for thirty years. DTAcIa

any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of

These Affidavits of Ownership and Joint Affidavits were

the forgery. As keenly observed by the Sandiganbayan,

material to the issuance of a Tax Declaration after

petitioner

Affidavits allegedly

which, the alleged applicants would then able to use

executed by Querubin and Aniceto whom petitioner

as proof of ownership of the lot subject thereof. Here,

admittedly never met and who were later proven to

the Tax Declarations were successfully obtained and

have been incapable of signing the said affidavits.

the applicants, in the exercise of their purported right

Petitioner's signature also appeared as the attesting

of ownership over the subject land, executed a Special

officer in the Affidavits of Ownership, nine of which

Power of Attorney authorizing Madarang to sell their

were undoubtedly without the participation of the

respective lots.

notarized

the Joint

indicated affiants.

Petitioner maintains that he had no participation in the

As attesting officer, petitioner was required to verify

preparation

and

they

Ownership, and no witness was presented to prove

voluntarily executed their affidavits; whether they

that he signed said Affidavits. We quote with approval

understood the contents of their affidavits; and,

the findings of the Sandiganbayan on this matter:

ascertain

from

the

affiants

whether

and/or

execution

of

the Affidavits

of

Interestingly,

the

accused

maintains

then took advantage of his position as

that his signatures appearing in the

thirteen Affidavits of Ownership were
forged. The Court cannot accept the
claim of the accused that he has no
knowledge of the Affidavit of Ownership.
Besides, his signatures appearing in the
thirteen Joint-Affidavits appear to be the
same

as

those

of

his

signatures

appearing in the Affidavit of Ownership.

But what the accused cannot deny,
however, is that while he maintains that
he has no knowledge that his three (3)
children

had

been

included

as

applicants for the issuance of a tax

declaration,

the

Certification,

(Exh.

"TT"), shows that it was signed by him

(accused), declaring that his children,

municipal mayor. 28
Petitioner

singles

out

the Affidavit

of

Ownership pertaining to Dolores Joy Madarang and

capitalizes on the absence of his signature therein to
get

an

acquittal.

It

must

be

pointed

out

that

this Affidavit of Ownership is inextricably connected

with

the

rest

of

the

documents i.e., the Joint

Affidavit, the otherAffidavits of Ownership purportedly

executed on the same date and Mayor's Certification
of 30-year occupancy, all of which were intended to
enable the purported affiants to obtain the Tax
Declarations over Lot No. 5504. There is no other
logical conclusion but that petitioner was also the
author

of

the

supposed Affidavit of

Ownership of

Dolores Joy Madarang or that he caused its preparation

albeit unsigned by him.

actual

Petitioner belatedly, at this stage of the case, pointed

occupants of the subject land. Clearly,

out the prosecution's failure to present the original of

therefore,

Madarang

the Mayor's Certification, 29 and complained in his

appears to be only a subordinate to the

petition that only a certified xerox copy of the xerox

herein accused who was undeniably the

copy on file was submitted in the proceedings a quo. It

municipal mayor when he signed the

must be stressed that the Mayor's Certification was not

documents as subscribing officer, he

even the subject of any of the criminal cases against

among

others,
as

Mr.

were

the

Romulo

petitioner. It is only one among equally damning

the

evidence presented by the prosecution.

petitioner, i.e., from administering the oath of the

Although petitioner contested the authenticity of his

signature in the Mayor's Certification as well as those
appearing

in

nonetheless

the Affidavits

admitted

of

having

Ownership, he

signed

the Joint

Affidavits and upon comparison of the signatures

thereon, the Sandiganbayan found that they were
made by one and the same person. We find no reason
to

deviate

from

this

factual

finding

of

the

Sandiganbayan.

Sandiganbayan,

all

the

acts

of

herein

alleged affiants, which included the petitioner's minor

children, in the questioned documents to his act of
issuing a Mayor's Cetification attesting to the fact that
the applicants, which again included the petitioner's
minor children, for tax declaration have been in
possession of the lot for more than thirty years, prove
beyond cavil that he was the one who falsified the
documents and would benefit therefrom. HDATSI
Petitioner contends that the subject lot remains public

To overcome the presumption that the person who

stood to benefit by the falsification of the documents is

and that no damage resulted from the issuance of the

tax declaration.

the material author of the falsifications, petitioner

points out that it was Madarang, not him, who was
authorized to sell and receive the proceeds of the sale
of the land. Thus, he would not have benefited from
the issuance of the Tax Declaration.

Jurisprudence 30 has

already

settled

that

in

the

falsification of public or official documents, whether by

public officials or by private persons, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or

True, Madarang was the one designated as attorney-in-

intent to injure a third person. This notwithstanding, it

fact in the Special Power of Attorney, but it is a fact

cannot be denied that petitioner consummated his act

that Madarang was petitioner's Assistant Municipal

in falsifying the documents, and which documents

Treasurer.

have

petitioner used in successfully obtaining the tax

allowed the falsification of these documents if he

declaration in the names of the alleged applicants

would not benefit from them. As aptly pointed out by

causing prejudice to the real occupant, Efren Tayag.

Undeniably,

petitioner

would

not

Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to

combination of evidence which in the

insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to

ordinary and natural course of things,

setting felons free. 31 The standard that should be

leaves no room for reasonable doubt as

observed by the courts in appreciating circumstantial

to his guilt. Stated in another way,

evidence was extensively discussed in the case

where

of People of the Philippines v. Modesto, et al. 32thus:

circumstances are capable of two or

the

quantity

of

inculpatory

facts

and

more explanations, one of which is

. . . No general rule can be laid down as

to

the

consistent with innocence and the other

circumstantial

with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill

evidence which in any case will suffice.

the test of moral certainty and is not

All the circumstances proved must be

sufficient to convict the accused.

consistent with each other, consistent

with the hypothesis that the accused is

The evidence presented by the prosecution, albeit

guilty,

mostly

and

at

the

same

time

circumstantial,

is

sufficient

to

warrant

inconsistent with the hypothesis that he

petitioner's conviction. The following requisites for

is

circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction were

innocent,

and

with

every

other

rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

It

has

been

said,

and

we

met, to wit:

believe

correctly, that the circumstances proved

should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty

person.

circumstances,

From
there

all

should

the
be

(a) There

is

more

than

one

circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and
(c) The

combination

circumstances
produce

of
is

all

such

conviction

reasonable doubt. 33

the
as

to

beyond

All told, the Court finds no reason to disagree with the

SY TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY,

Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction. With the

JOLIE

overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution

CHARLIE TAN, and JESSIE JAMES

and applying Sec. 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of

TAN, petitioners, vs.

Court, there are more than enough bases to sustain

FELICIDAD CHAN SY, respondents.

the

findings

of

the

Sandiganbayan

that

counts

of

Falsification

under

TAN,

ROMER
SY

CHIM

TAN,
and

herein

petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten

(10)

ROSS

Article

[G.R. No. 179438. March 30, 2009.]

171,

particularly paragraph 2, "causing it to appear that

SY

persons have participated in an act or proceeding

SY, petitioners, vs. SY TIONG SHIOU

when in fact and in truth, they did not participate in

and JUANITA TAN, respondents.

CHIM

and

FELICIDAD

CHAN

the act or proceeding."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

DECISION

Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution dated

September

24,

2003

of

the

Sandiganbayan

are

hereby AFFIRMED.
ORDERED. DcICEa
||| (Lonzanida v. People, G.R. Nos. 160243-52, [July 20,
2009], 610 PHIL 687-708)

TINGA, J p:
These

consolidated

petitions

involving

the

same

parties, although related, dwell on different issues.

G.R. No. 174168.
This is a petition for review 1 assailing the decision

SECOND DIVISION

and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May

2006 and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP

[G.R. No. 174168. March 30, 2009.]

No. 91416. 2

On 30 May 2003, four criminal complaints were filed

despite the fact that they had not executed any

by Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses Sy)

conveyance of their shares. 7 CIHTac

against Sy Tiong Shiou, Juanita Tan Sy, Jolie Ross Tan,

Romer Tan, Charlie Tan and Jessie James Tan (Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al.) before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Manila. The cases were later consolidated. Two of the
complaints,

I.S.

Nos.

03E-15285

and

03E-

15286, 3 were for alleged violation of Section 74 in

relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code. In
these complaints, the Spouses Sy averred that they
are stockholders and directors of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc.
(the corporation) who asked Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.,
officers of the corporation, to allow them to inspect the
books and records of the business on three occasions
to no avail. In a letter 4 dated 21 May 2003, Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al. denied the request, citing civil and intracorporate cases pending in court. 5

Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argued before the prosecutor

that the issues involved in the civil case for accounting
and damages pending before the RTC of Manila were
intimately related to the two criminal complaints filed
by the Spouses Sy against them, and thus constituted
a

prejudicial

question

that

should

require

the

suspension of the criminal complaints. They also

argued that the Spouses Sy's request for inspection
was premature as the latter's concern may be properly
addressed once an answer is filed in the civil case. Sy
Tiong Shiou, on the other hand, denied the accusations
against him, alleging that before the 2003 GIS was
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the same was shown to respondents, who at
that time were the President/Chairman of the Board

In the two other complaints, I.S. No. 03E-15287 and

and Assistant Treasurer of the corporation, and that

03E-15288, 6 Sy

with

they did not object to the entries in the GIS. Sy Tiong

falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171

Shiou also argued that the issues raised in the pending

of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and perjury under

civil case for accounting presented a prejudicial

Article 183 of the RPC. According to the Spouses Sy, Sy

question that necessitated the suspension of criminal

Tiong Shiou executed under oath the 2003 General

proceedings.

Tiong

Shiou

was

charged

Information Sheet (GIS) wherein he falsely stated that

the shareholdings of the Spouses Sy had decreased

On 29 December 2003, the investigating prosecutor

criminal action for violation of Section 74 in relation to

issued a resolution recommending the suspension of

Section 144 of the Corporation Code since a finding in

the criminal complaints for violation of the Corporation

the

Code and the dismissal of the criminal complaints for

misappropriated the funds would not be determinative

falsification and perjury against Sy Tiong Shiou. 8 The

of their guilt or innocence in the criminal complaint. In

reviewing prosecutor approved the resolution. The

the

Spouses Sy moved for the reconsideration of the

falsification and/or perjury should not have been

resolution, but their motion was denied on 14 June

dismissed on the ground of prejudicial question

2004. 9 The Spouses Sy thereupon filed a petition for

because the accounting case is unrelated and not

review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which the

necessarily determinative of the success or failure of

latter denied in a resolution issued on 02 September

the falsification or perjury charges. Furthermore, the

2004. 10 Their subsequent motion for reconsideration

Court of Appeals held that there was probable cause

was likewise denied in the resolution of 20 July

that Sy Tiong Shiou had committed falsification and

2005. 11 IHDCcT

that the City of Manila where the 2003 GIS was

The Spouses Sy elevated the DOJ's resolutions to the

Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DOJ. The appellate court granted the petition 12 and

civil

case

same

that

manner,

respondents

the

criminal

mishandled

complaints

or

for

executed is the proper venue for the institution of the

perjury

charges.

Sy

Tiong

Shiou, et

al. sought

reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but

their motion was denied. 13

directed the City Prosecutor's Office to file the

On 2 April 2008, the Court ordered the consolidation of

appropriate informations against Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.

G.R. No. 179438 with G.R. No. 174168. 14

for violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144 of

the Corporation Code and of Articles 172 and 183 of
the RPC. The appellate court ruled that the civil case
for accounting and damages cannot be deemed
prejudicial to the maintenance or prosecution of a

Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argue that findings of the DOJ in

affirming, modifying or reversing the recommendations
of the public prosecutor cannot be the subject
of certiorari or review of the Court of Appeals because

the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body within the purview

the appointed independent auditor. Hence, the DOJ did

of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners

not commit any grave abuse of discretion in affirming

rely on the separate opinion of former Chief Justice

the

Andres

of

Manila. 18 They further argue that adherence to the

Appeals, 15 wherein he wrote that this Court should

Court of Appeals' ruling that the accounting case is

not be called upon to determine the existence of

unrelated to, and not necessarily determinative of the

probable cause, as there is no provision of law

success of, the criminal complaint for falsification

authorizing an aggrieved party to petition for such a

and/or perjury would unnecessarily indict petitioner Sy

determination. 16 In any event, they argue, assuming

Tiong Shiou for the said offenses he may not have

without admitting that the findings of the DOJ may be

committed

subject to judicial review under Section 1, Rule 65 of

unfavorable to him in the civil action. 19 AEIDTc

R.

Narvasa

in Roberts,

Jr.

v.

Court

the Rules of Court, the DOJ has not committed any

grave abuse of discretion in affirming the findings of
the City Prosecutor of Manila. They claim that the
Spouses Sy's request for inspection was not made in
good faith and that their motives were tainted with the
intention to harass and to intimidate Sy Tiong Shiou, et
al. from pursuing the criminal and civil cases pending
before the prosecutor's office and the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 46. Thus, to accede to
the Spouses Sy's request would pose serious threats to
the existence of the corporation. 17 Sy Tiong Shiou, et
al. aver that the RTC had already denied the motion for
production

and

inspection

and

instead

ordered

petitioners to make the corporate records available to

recommendation

but

of

only

the

City

because

Prosecutor

of

an

of

outcome

Indeed, a preliminary proceeding is not a quasi-judicial

function and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency
exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence
of probable cause. 20 Moreover, it is settled that the
preliminary investigation proper,i.e., the determination
of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should
be

subjected

to

embarrassment

of

the
trial,

expense,
is

the

rigors

function

of

and
the

prosecution. 21 This Court has adopted a policy of

non-interference
investigations

in

and

the

conduct

leaves

to

of

the

preliminary
investigating

prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the

determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence

the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately

as will establish probable cause for the filing of

related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

information against the supposed offender. 22

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or

As in every rule, however, there are settled exceptions.

not the criminal action may proceed. 24

Hence, the principle of non-interference does not apply

The civil action and the criminal cases do not involve

when there is grave abuse of discretion which would

any prejudicial question. DHEACI

authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition

for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. 23

The civil action for accounting and damages, Civil Case

No. 03-106456 pending before the RTC Manila, Branch
46, seeks the issuance of an order compelling the

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ

Spouses Sy to render a full, complete and true

gravely abused its discretion when it suspended the

accounting of all the amounts, proceeds and fund paid

hearing of the charges for violation of the Corporation

to, received and earned by the corporation since 1993

Code on the ground of prejudicial question and when it

and to restitute it such amounts, proceeds and funds

dismissed the criminal complaints.

which the Spouses Sy have misappropriated. The

A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a

situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed since howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. The reason behind
the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a)

criminal cases, on the other hand, charge that the

Spouses Sy were illegally prevented from getting
inside

company

premises

and

from

inspecting

company records, and that Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the

entries in the GIS, specifically the Spouses Sy's shares
in the corporation. Surely, the civil case presents no
prejudicial question to the criminal cases since a
finding that the Spouses Sy mishandled the funds will
have no effect on the determination of guilt in the
complaint for violation of Section 74 in relation to

Section 144 of the Corporation Code; the civil case

on the principle that every crime is defined by its

concerns the validity of Sy Tiong Shiou's refusal to

elements, without which there should be at the

allow

most no criminal offense. 26

inspection

of

the

records,

while

in

the

falsification and perjury cases, what is material is the

veracity of the entries made by Sy Tiong Shiou in the

Section 74 of the Corporation Code reads in part:

xxx xxx xxx

sworn GIS.

The records of all business transactions

Anent the issue of probable cause, the Court also finds
that there is enough probable cause to warrant the
institution of the criminal cases.

of the corporation and the minutes of

any meeting shall be open to inspection
by any director, trustee, stockholder or
member

of

the

corporation

at

The term probable cause does not mean 'actual and

reasonable hours on business days and

positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It

he may demand, in writing, for a copy of

is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus

excerpts from said records or minutes,

a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry

at his expense.

into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a

conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence

of

the

prosecution

in

support

of

the

charge. 25

Any officer or agent of the corporation

who shall refuse to allow any director,
trustee, stockholder or member of the
corporation

to

examine

and

copy

excerpts from its records or minutes, in

accordance with the provisions of this

In order that probable cause to file a criminal case may

Code, shall be liable to such director,

be arrived at, or in order to engender the well-founded

trustee,

belief that a crime has been committed, the elements

damages, and in addition, shall be guilty

of the crime charged should be present. This is based

of an offense which shall be punishable

stockholder

or

member

for

under

Section

this

punished by a fine of not less than one

Code: Provided, That if such refusal is

thousand (P1,000.00) pesos but not

made pursuant to a resolution or order

more than ten thousand (P10,000.00)

of the Board of Directors or Trustees, the

pesos or by imprisonment for not less

liability under this section for such

than thirty (30) days but not more than

action

five (5) years, or both, in the discretion

shall

be

144

of

imposed

upon

the

directors or trustees who voted for such

of

refusal: and Provided, further, That it

committed by a corporation, the same

shall be a defense to any action under

may,

this section that the person demanding

dissolved in appropriate proceedings

to examine and copy excerpts from the

before the Securities and Exchange

corporation's records and minutes has

Commission:

improperly

dissolution

used

any

information

the

court.

after

If

notice

the

violation

and

hearing,

Provided,
shall

not

That
preclude

is
be

such
the

secured through any prior examination

institution of appropriate action against

of the records or minutes of such

the director, trustee or officer of the

corporation or of any other corporation,

corporation

or was not acting in good faith or for a

violation: Provided, further, That nothing

legitimate

in this section shall be construed to

purpose

in

making

his

demand. DTcHaA
Meanwhile, Section 144 of the same Code provides:
Sec. 144. Violations of the Code.
Violations of any of the provisions of this
Code or its amendments not otherwise
specifically penalized therein shall be

responsible

for

said

repeal the other causes for dissolution

of a corporation provided in this Code.
In the recent case of Ang-Abaya, et al. v. Ang, et
al., 27 the Court had the occasion to enumerate the
requisites before the penal provision under Section
144 of the Corporation Code may be applied in a case
of violation of a stockholder or member's right to

inspect the corporate books/records as provided for

information secured through any prior

under Section 74 of the Corporation Code. The

examination of the records or minutes

elements of the offense, as laid down in the case, are:

of such corporation or of any other

First. A director, trustee, stockholder or

member has made a prior demand in
writing for a copy of excerpts from the
corporation's records or minutes;
Second. Any officer or agent of the
concerned corporation shall refuse to
allow

the

stockholder

said
or

director,
member

trustee,
of

the

corporation to examine and copy said

excerpts;

corporation, or was not acting in good

faith or for a legitimate purpose in
making his demand, the contrary must
be shown or proved. 28
Thus, in a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74
of the Corporation Code, the defense of improper use
or motive is in the nature of a justifying circumstance
that would exonerate those who raise and are able to
prove the same. Accordingly, where the corporation
denies inspection on the ground of improper motive or
purpose, the burden of proof is taken from the

Third. If such refusal is made pursuant

shareholder

to a resolution or order of the board of

corporation. 29 However, where no such improper

directors or trustees, the liability under

motive or purpose is alleged, and even though so

this section for such action shall be

alleged, it is not proved by the corporation, then there

imposed upon the directors or trustees

is no valid reason to deny the requested inspection.

who voted for such refusal; and, THEcAS

and

placed

on

the

In the instant case, however, the Court finds that the

Fourth. Where the officer or agent of the

denial of inspection was predicated on the pending

corporation sets up the defense that the

civil case against the Spouses Sy. This is evident from

person demanding to examine and copy

the 21 May 2003 letter of Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.'s

excerpts from the corporation's records

counsel 30 to the Spouses Sy, 31 which reads:

and minutes has improperly used any

Gentlemen:

Even

We write in behalf of our clients, SY SIY

HO, INC. (Guan Yiac Hardware); SY
TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY; JOLIE
ROSS TAN; CHARLIE TAN; ROMER TAN;
and JESSE JAMES TAN, relative to your
letter dated 16 May 2003. Please be
informed that a case for Accounting and
Damages had already been filed against
your clients, Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan
Sy before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 46, denominated as Civil
Case No. 03-106456.

in

their

Joint

Counter-Affidavit

dated

23

September 2003, 33 Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. did not

make any allegation that "the person demanding to
examine and copy excerpts from the corporation's
records

and

minutes

has

improperly

used

any

information secured through any prior examination of

the records or minutes of such corporation or of any
other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for
a legitimate purpose in making his demand." Instead,
they merely reiterated the pendency of the civil case.
There being no allegation of improper motive, and it
being undisputed that Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. denied Sy
Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy's request for inspection,
the Court rules and so holds that the DOJ erred in

We fully understand your desire for our

dismissing the criminal charge for violation of Section

clients to respond to your demands,

74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code.

however,
circumstance

under
this

the
would

prevailing
not

be

advisable. The concerns that you raised

Now on the existence of probable cause for the

falsification and/or perjury charges.

in your letter can later on be addressed

The Spouses Sy charge Sy Tiong Shiou with the offense

after your clients shall have filed their

of falsification of public documents under Article 171,

responsive pleading in the abovesaid

paragraph 4; and/or perjury under Article 183 of the

[Link]

Revised Penal Code (RPC). The elements of falsification

We trust that this response will at the

moment be enough. 32

of public documents through an untruthful narration of

facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document

untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the

executing the document under oath, he, in effect,

offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of

attested

the facts narrated; 34 (c) the facts narrated by the

Spouses Sy claim that the entries in the GIS pertaining

offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of

to them do not reflect the true number of shares that

truth in the narration of facts was made with the

they own in the company. They attached to their

wrongful intent to injure a third person. 35 On the

complaint the 2002 GIS of the company, also executed

other hand, the elements of perjury are: (a) that the

by

accused made a statement under oath or executed an

therein vis-a-vis the ones in the 2003 GIS. The Spouses

affidavit

the

Sy noted the marked decrease in their shareholdings,

statement or affidavit was made before a competent

averring that at no time after the execution of the

officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c)

2002 GIS, up to the time of the filing of their criminal

that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a

complaints did they execute or authorize the execution

willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d)

of any document or deed transferring, conveying or

that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the

disposing their shares or any portion thereof; and thus

falsity is required by law or made for a legal

there is absolutely no basis for the figures reflected in

purpose. HSIaAT

the 2003 GIS. 39 The Spouses Sy claim that the false

upon

material

matter;

(b)

that

A General Information Sheet (GIS) is required to be

filed within thirty (30) days following the date of the
annual or a special meeting, and must be certified and
sworn to by the corporate secretary, or by the

Sy

to

the

Tiong

veracity 38 of

Shiou,

and

its

contents.

compared

the

The

entries

statements were made by Sy Tiong Shiou with the

wrongful intent of injuring them. All the elements of
both offenses are sufficiently averred in the complaintaffidavits.

president, or any duly authorized officer of the

corporation. 36 From

the

records,

the

2003

GIS

submitted to the SEC on 8 April 2003 was executed

under oath by Sy Tiong Shiou in Manila, in his capacity
as

Vice

President

and

General

Manager. 37By

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals' holding,

citing the case of Fabia v. Court of Appeals, that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction no longer precludes the

simultaneous filing of the criminal case with the

On 3 February 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer

corporate/civil case. 40 Moreover, the Court finds that

of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation), a family

the City of Manila is the proper venue for the perjury

corporation doing business under the name and style

charges, the GIS having been subscribed and sworn to

Guan Yiac Hardware, submitted a letter 46 to the

in the said place. Under Section 10 (a), Rule 110 of the

corporation's Board of Directors (Board) stating that

Revised Rules of Court, the criminal action shall be

the control, supervision and administration of all

instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or

corporate funds were exercised by Sy Chim and

territory where the offense was committed or where

Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses Sy), corporate president

any

and assistant treasurer, respectively. In the same

of

its

essential

occurred. 41 In Villanueva

v.

ingredients
Secretary

of

letter, Juanita Tan disclosed that Felicidad Chan Sy did

the

felony

is

not make cash deposits to any of the corporation's

statement

is

banks from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus

made. 43 Thus in this case, it was alleged that the

the total bank remittances for the past years were less

perjury

Shiou

than reflected in the corporate financial statements,

subscribed and sworn * to the GIS in the City of Manila,

accounting books and records. Finally, Juanita Tan

thus, following Section 10 (a), Rule 110 of the Revised

sought to be free from any responsibility over all

Rules of Court, the City of Manila is the proper venue

corporate funds. The Board granted Juanita Tan's

for the offense.

request and authorized the employment of an external

Justice, 42 the

Court

held

that

consummated

when

the

false

was

committed

when

Sy

Tiong

auditor to render a complete audit of all the corporate

G.R. No. 179438.

This

petition

assails

the

decision 44 and

resolution 45 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May

2004 and 29 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 81897. cDHAaT

accounting books and records. 47 Consequently, the

Board hired the accounting firm Banaria, Banaria &
Company. In its Report 48 dated 5 April 2003, the
accounting

firm

P67,117,230.30

attributed
as

to

the

unaccounted

disbursements from 1994 to 2002. 49

Spouses
receipts

Sy
and

A demand letter 50 was subsequently served on the

before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete and true

Spouses Sy on 15 April 2003. On the same date, the

accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and

children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the

earned by the company since 1993 and for the

corporation

other

restitution of the said amount. 56 The complaint also

important documents. After the incident, the Spouses

prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and or

Sy

preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling

cash,

allegedly

reporting

postdated

transferred

to

the

checks

residence

corporation.

and
and

ceased

Thereupon,

the

corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery

against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor's
Office

of

Manila. 51 A

search

warrant

was

subsequently issued by the Regional Trial Court. 52

a stockholders' meeting on the ground of lack of

authority.
By way of Answer, 57 the Spouses Sy averred that Sy
Chim was a mere figurehead and Felicidad Chan Sy
merely performed clerical functions, as it was Sy Tiong

On 26 April 2003, Sy Tiong Shiou, corporate Vice

Shiou and his spouse, Juanita Tan, who have been

President and General Manager, called a special

authorized by the corporation's by-laws to supervise,

meeting to be held on 6 May 2003 to fill up the

control and administer corporate funds, and as such

positions vacated by the Spouses Sy. Sy Tiong Shiou

were the ones responsible for the unaccounted funds.

was subsequently elected as the new president and his

They assailed the meetings called by Sy Tiong Shiou

wife, Juanita Tan, the new Vice President. 53Despite

on the grounds that the same were held without notice

these developments, Sy Chim still caused the issuance

to them and without their participation, in violation of

of a Notice of Stockholders meeting dated 11 June

the by-laws. The Spouses Sy also pursued their

2003

counter-claim for moral and exemplary damages and

in

his

capacity

as

the

alleged

corporate

president. 54

attorney's fees.

Meanwhile, on 1 July 2003, the corporation, through

On

Romer

their Motion

S.

Tan,

filed

its Amended

Complaint

for

Accounting and Damages 55 against the Spouses Sy

September
for

2003,

the

Leave

to

Spouses
File

Sy

filed

Third-Party

Complaint, 58 praying that their attached Third Party

Complaint 59 be allowed and admitted against Sy

allowed pleadings under Section 2, Rule 2 thereof.

Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party

Moreover, even if such a pleading were allowed, the

complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou and

admission of the third-party complaint against Sy

Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation's claim

Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan still would have no basis

for misappropriating corporate funds.

from the facts or the law and jurisprudence.62 The

On 8 October 2003, the trial court granted the motion

for

leave

to

file

the

third-party

complaint,

and

forthwith directed the issuance of summons against Sy

Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan. 60 On 16 January 2004,
their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou
and Juanita Tan were not furnished with the copies of
several pleadings, as well as a court order, which
resulted in their having been declared in default for
failure to file their answer to the third-party complaint;
thus,

they

opted

not

to

file

motion

for

reconsideration anymore and instead filed a petition

for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision dated 26 May 2004, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan. 61 The appellate court declared that a
third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim
Rules

of

Procedure

Governing

Court of Appeals also ruled that the respondent judge

committed a manifest error amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in admitting the third-party complaint and
in summarily declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan
in default for failure to file their answer within the
purported reglementary period. The Court of Appeals
set aside the trial court's 8 October 2003 Order
admitting the third-party complaint, as well as the 19
December 2003 Order, declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their answer.
The trial court was further ordered to dismiss the thirdparty complaint without prejudice to any action that
the corporation may separately file against Sy Tiong
Shiou and Juanita Tan. 63 aHcDEC
The Spouses Sy filed a motion for reconsideration, but
their motion was denied on 29 August 2007. 64

Intra-Corporate

Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy argue before this Court

Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules), it

that a third-party complaint is not excluded or

not being included in the exclusive enumeration of

prohibited by the Interim Rules, and that the Court of

Appeals erred in ruling that their third-party complaint

(5) Motion for postponement and

is not actionable because their action is not in respect

other motions of similar intent,

of

the

except those filed due to clearly

disallowance of the third-party complaint will result in

compelling reasons. Such motion

multiplicity of suits.

must be verified and under oath.

the

corporation's

claims.

They

add

that

The third-party complaint should be allowed.

Rule 2, Sec. 2. Pleadings allowed. The

only pleadings allowed to be filed under

The conflicting provisions of the Interim Rules of

these Rules are the complaint, answer,

Procedure for Inter-Corporate Controversies read:

compulsory

counterclaims

or

cross-

Rule 1, Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings.

claims pleaded in the answer, and the

The following pleadings are prohibited:

answer to the counterclaims or crossclaims. 65 TAIaHE

(1) Motion to dismiss;

(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(3) Motion for new trial, or for
reconsideration of judgment or
order, or for re-opening of trial;

There is a conflict, for while a third-party complaint is

not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it
among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict
may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule
in statutory construction, that every part of the statute

(4) Motion for extension of time

must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,

to file pleadings, affidavits or any

that every part of the statute must be considered

other paper, except those filed

together with the other parts, and kept subservient to

due

the

to

clearly

compelling

general

intent

of

the

whole

reasons. Such motion must be

enactment. 66 Statutes, including rules, should be

verified and under oath; and

construed in the light of the object to be achieved and

the evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should

be given such construction as will advance the object,

determination

suppress

proceeding. 69

the

mischief

and

secure

the

benefits

intended. A statute should therefore be read with

reference to its leading idea, and its general purpose
and intention should be gathered from the whole act,
and this predominant purpose will prevail over the
literal import of particular terms or clauses, if plainly
apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as
a reason for expanding the signification of others, so
that the interpretation may accord with the spirit of
the entire act, and so that the policy and object of the
statute as a whole may be made effectual and
operative to the widest possible extent. 67 Otherwise
stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law
determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in the
rules in this case, must be read according to its spirit
and intent. 68

1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:

Sec. 3. Construction. These Rules
shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a
just, summary, speedy and inexpensive

every

action

or

Now, a third-party complaint is a claim that a

defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action, called the third-party
defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. It is
actually a complaint independent of, and separate and
distinct from the plaintiff's complaint. In fact, were it
not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such
third-party

complaint

independently

and

would

have

separately

from

to

be

the

filed

original

complaint by the defendant against the third-party

defendant. Jurisprudence is consistent in declaring that
the purpose of a third-party complaint is to avoid
circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law
suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all
the

This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule

of

matters

arising

from

one

particular

set

of

facts. 70 DTCAES
It thus appears that the summary nature of the
proceedings governed by the Interim Rules, and the
allowance of the filing of third-party complaints is
premised

on

one

objective

the

expeditious

disposition of cases. Moreover, following the rule of

liberal interpretation found in the Interim Rules, and

defendant: (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter

taking into consideration the suppletory application of

to

the Rules of Court under Rule 1, Sec. 2 71 of the

subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of

Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party

direct liability of the third-party defendant to the

complaint is not, and should not be prohibited in

plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant

controversies governed by the Interim Rules. The logic

to both the plaintiff and the defendant. 72

and justness of this conclusion are rendered beyond

question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan are not complete strangers to the litigation
as in fact they are the moving spirit behind the filing of
the principal complaint for accounting and damages
against the Spouses Sy.

the

defendant

for

contribution,

indemnity,

In determining the sufficiency of the third-party

complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and
the third-party complaint must be examined. A thirdparty

complaint

facie show

that

must
the

allege

facts

defendant

is

which prima
entitled

to

contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief

The Court also rules that the third-party complaint of

the Spouses Sy should be admitted.

from the third-party defendant. 73

The complaint alleges that the Spouses Sy, as officers

A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that

of the corporation, have acted illegally in raiding its

some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found

corporate funds, hence they are duty bound to render

to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity,

a full, complete and true accounting of all the

subrogation, contribution or other substantive right.

amounts, proceeds and funds paid to, received and

The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he

earned by the corporation since 1993 and to restitute

would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or

to the corporation all such amounts, proceeds, and

both for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the

funds which they took and misappropriated for their

original

third-party

own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of

defendant's liability arises out of another transaction.

the plaintiff and its stockholders. 74 On the other

The defendant may implead another as third-party

hand, in the third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy

defendant,

although

the

claim that it is Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who had

claims, 75 and thus the allowance of the third-party

full and complete control of the day-to-day operations

complaint is warranted.

and complete control and custody of the funds of the

corporation, and hence they are the ones liable for any
shortfall or unaccounted difference of the corporation's

WHEREFORE, these cases are resolved as follows:

G.R. No. 174168

cash account. Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan

The petition for review is DENIED. The Decision and

should render a full, complete and true accounting of

Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2006

all the amounts, proceeds, funds paid to, received and

and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.

earned by the corporation since 1993, including the

91416 are AFFIRMED. aCITEH

amount attributed to the Spouses Sy in the complaint

for accounting and damages. In their prayer, the
Spouses Sy moved that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan

Costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. 179438

be declared as directly and solely liable in respect of

The petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution

the corporation's claim for accounting and damages,

of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May 2004 and 29

and that in the event that they, the Spouses Sy, are

August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81897 are

adjudged liable to the corporation, Sy Tiong Shiou and

SET ASIDE and the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of

Juanita Tan be ordered to pay all amounts necessary to

Manila Branch 46 dated 8 October 2003 and 19

discharge their liability to the corporation by way of

December 2003 are REINSTATED.

indemnity or reimbursement. CAaDSI

The allegations in the third-party complaint impute
direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita

SO ORDERED.
||| (Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168,
179438, [March 30, 2009], 601 PHIL 510-538)

Tan to the corporation for the very same claims which

the corporation interposed against the Spouses Sy. It is
clear therefore that the Spouses Sy's third-party
complaint is in respect of the plaintiff corporation's

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127327. February 13, 2009.]

defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315

of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), meted upon co-

LIBERATA AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO,

petitioners Liberata and Basilio Ambito; and two

and

CRISANTO

charges of Falsification of Commercial Document, as

AMBITO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF

defined and penalized under Articles 171 and 172 of

THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF

the RPC, meted upon co-petitioner Crisanto Ambito in

APPEALS,respondents.

the Decision 2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 26, dated November 29,
1990, in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to

DECISION

14587.
The facts of this case, as summarized in the assailed
CA decision, are as follows:

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Before

this

Court

is

Petition

for

Review

on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure of the Decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals (CA), dated March 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No.
12727, entitled People of the Philippines v. Liberata
Ambito, et al., filed by petitioners Liberata Ambito,
Basilio Ambito and Crisanto Ambito. The assailed CA
decision

affirmed

the

judgment of

conviction

of

multiple charges of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.

22(B.P. Blg. 22) meted upon co-petitioner Basilio
Ambito; multiple charges of the complex offense of
Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents,

Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were

the principal owners of two rural banks
in the province of Iloilo namely, the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in
the municipality of Leon, and the Rural
Bank of Banate, Inc. in the municipality
of Banate. In addition, the spouses
Ambito were the owners of Casette
[Kajzette]

Enterprises,

establishment

in

Jaro,

commercial
Iloilo

City

engaged in procuring farm implements

intended for the use of the agricultural

loan borrowers of the said banks. The

payment by the drawee bank, the same

spouses Ambito obtained their supply of

were dishonored for insufficiency of

farm implements and spare parts from

funds. These are Check No. 79173946

the Iloilo City branch of Pacific Star, Inc.

dated June 20, 1979 in the amount of

which was then engaged in selling

P39,168.75 (Exh. 'A', CC No. 14556);

'Yanmar'

Check No. 79173948 dated June 15,

machineries

and

spare

parts. TIEHSA
On

several

1979 in the amount of P75,595.00 (Exh.

occasions

in

1979,

the

spouses Basilio Ambito and Liberata

Ambito transacted business with Pacific
Star,

Inc.

whereby

they

purchased

Yanmar machineries and spare parts

from the said company allegedly for the
use of the loan borrowers of their banks.
In

these

transactions,

the

spouses

Ambito made down payments in their

purchases either in cash, in checks or in
certificates of time deposit issued by
the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.
However,

when

the

Manila

Banking

by Basilio Ambito as down payment of

purchases

were

presented

dated June 30, 1979 in the amount of

P45,957.00 (Exh. 'A', CC No. 14558);
Check No. 79182639 dated October 18,
1979 in the amount of P4,501.36 (Exh.
'A', CC No. 14559); Check No. 79182638
dated

September

27,

1979

in

the

amount of P1,957.60 (Exh. 'A', CC No.

14560); Check No. 79182637 dated
September 18, 1979 in the amount of
P2,425.50 (Exh. 'A', CC No. 14561) and
Check No. 79175930 dated August 9,
1979 in the amount of P2,875.25 (Exh.
'A', CC No. 14562).

Corporation (Manila Bank) checks issued

their

'A', CC 14557); Check No. 79173947

for

At the time the spouses Basilio Ambito

and Liberata Ambito made purchases of
farm implements from the Pacific Star,
Inc. in 1979, the general manager of the

Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. was Liberata

follow Liberata Ambito, Marilyn Traje

Ambito herself and the cashier, Marilyn

signed and gave the blank certificates

Traje, while the general manager of the

of time deposit to her without receiving

Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. was

any consideration therefor. HcaDIA

Crisanto

Ambito,

Ambito,

and

brother

the

cashier,

of

Basilio

Reynaldo

Baron.

The same thing happened to Reynaldo

Baron, the cashier of the Community
Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. who was asked

On three separate occasions, Liberata

by the spouses Ambito as well as the

Ambito forced the cashier of the Rural

manager of the bank, Crisanto Ambito,

Bank of Banate, Marilyn Traje, to sign

to sign and give blank certificates of

several

time

time deposit to them. Reynaldo Baron

deposit and to give the same to her

was at first hesitant to accommodate

alleging

said

the request of the Ambitos but due to

certificates in connection with some

their persistence and considering that

transactions involving the bank. Marilyn

they were his superiors and owners of

Traje at first refused to give Liberata

the bank, Baron signed the certificates

Ambito the said certificates but the

of time deposit in blank and gave the

latter scolded her, at the same time

same to the Ambitos. When Baron asked

assuring

for

blank
that

her

certificates
she

that

needed

she

of
the

would

be

the

duplicate

copies

of

the

responsible to anybody for the issuance

certificates, he was told that they were

of said certificates including personnel

still negotiating with Pacific Star, Inc.

and investigators of the Central Bank

Later, the Ambitos told Baron that the

tasked with the examination of the

transaction was cancelled and that he

accounts of the bank. Afraid that she

should just cause the printing of similar

would lose her job if she would not

blank certificates by the Apostol Printing

Press in Iloilo City. Baron got scared and

1. Certificate of Time Deposit No.

objected to the idea vouched to him by

079, due date May 7, 1979,

the Ambitos until finally he resigned

in the amount of P7,276.50

from his job because he could no longer

(Exh. 'A', Crim. Case No.

withstand the pressure exerted on him

14563) as down payment

involving transactions he believed were

of the articles covered by

anomalous. Baron worked as cashier of

Sales

the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.

dated November 9, 1978 of

from August to December 1979. When

Pacific Star, Inc. (Exh. 'A-1',

the Central Bank investigators came

Crim. Case No. 14563);

and

conducted

examination

of

the

records and transactions of the bank,

Baron reported the anomalies to them.

Invoice

No.

3002

2. Certificate of Time Deposit Nos.

083 and 085 both with due
date May 14, 1979 in the

The blank certificates of time deposit of

amounts of P17,283.00 and

the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained

P3,132.00,

by the spouses Basilio and Liberata

(Exhs. 'A' and 'A-1', Crim.

Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up

Case No. 14564) as down

with the amounts of deposit and the

payment.

name

as

Nos. 3003, 3004 and 3005

depositor and used by the spouses as

(Exhs. 'A-1', 'A-2' and 'A-3',

down payments of the purchase price of

Crim.

the

14564); cDTACE

of

the

Pacific

machineries

and

Star,

Inc.

spare

parts

purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc.

These certificates of time deposit are as
follows:

respectively

Sales

Case

Invoice

No.

3. Certificate of Time Deposit No.

086, due date May 21,

1979, in the amount of

payment,

P11,896.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

Nos. 3009 and 3010 both

Case No. 14565) as down

date December 1, 1978

payment, Sales Invoice No.

(Exhs. 'A-1' and 'A-2', Crim.

3006

Case No. 14567);

(Exh.

'A-1',

Crim.

Case No. 14565);

Sales

Invoices

6. Certificate of Time Deposit No.

4. Certificate of Time Deposit No.

095, due date June 20,

087, due date May 27,

1979 in

1979 (Exh. 'A', Crim. Case

P24,062.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

No. 14566) in the amount

Case No. 14568) as down

of

down

payment in Sales Invoice

payment, Sales Invoice No.

Nos. 3031 dated December

3007 dated November 27,

11, 1978 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.

1978 and Sales Invoice No.

Case No. 14568);

P7,945.00

as

3008 dated November 28,

1978 in the total amount of
P7,945.00 (Exhs. 'A-1' and
'A-2',

Crim.

Case

No.

14566);

the

amount of

7. Certificate of Time Deposit No.

089, due date May 29,
1979, in the amount of
P17,090.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Case No. 14567) as down

5. Certificate of Time Deposit No.

payment in Sales Invoice

089, due date May 29,

No. 3035 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.

1979, in the amount of

Case No. 14567);

P17,090.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

Case No. 14567) as down

8. Certificate of Time Deposit No.

097, due date June 13,

1979, in the amount of

payment in Sales Invoice

P5,827.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

No. 3097 dated January 23,

Case No. 14570) as down

1979

payment in Sales Invoice

Case No. 14572);

Nos. 3066 and 3067 both

dated

January

3,

1979

(Exhs. 'A-1' and 'A-2', Crim.

Case No. 14570); acIHDA

(Exh.

'A-1',

Crim.

11. Certificate of Time Deposit

No. 100, due date July 25,
1979, in the amount of
P9,380.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

9. Certificate of Time Deposit No.

Case No. 14573) as down

098, due date June 16,

payment in Sales Invoice

1979, in the amount of

No. 3099 dated January 25,

P8,365.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

1979

Case No. 14571) as down

Case No. 14573);

payment in Sales Invoice

Nos. 3081 dated January
10, 1979 and Sales Invoice
No. 3091 dated January 16,
1979 (Exhs. 'A-1' and 'A-2',
Crim. Case No. 14571);
10. Certificate of Time Deposit
No. 099, due date July 22,
1979, in the amount of
P27,226.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Case No. 14572 as down

(Exh.

'A-1',

Crim.

12. Certificate of Time Deposit

No. 101, due date July 28,
1979 in

the

amount of

P3,132.50 (Exh. 'A'; Crim.

Case No. 14574) as down
payment in Sales Invoice
No. 3106 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.
Case No. 14574); CITSAc
13. Certificate of Time Deposit
No. 102, due date August
15, 1979 in the amount of

P21,420.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

P58,712.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

Case

in

Case No. 14577) as down

payment of Sales Invoice

payment of Sales Invoice

No. 3120 dated February 8,

No. 3134 dated February

1979,

Sales

Invoice

17, 1977 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.

3121

dated

February

No.

14575)

No.
8,

1979 and Sales Invoice No.

3126 dated February 12,
1979, (Exhs. 'A-1', 'A-2' and
'A-3',

Crim

Case

No.

14575);
14. Certificate of Time Deposit

Case No. 14577); TDcHCa

16. Certificate of Time Deposit
No. 107, due date August
21, 1979, in the amount of
P16,205.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Case

No.

14578)

and

Certificate of Time Deposit

No. 105, due date August

No.

104,

14, 1979, in the amount of

September 18, 1979, in the

P25,375.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

amount of P2,730.00 (Exh.

Case No. 14576) as down

'A-1',

payment of Sales Invoice

14578) as down payment

No. 3129 dated February

in Sales Invoice No. 3137

15, 1979 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.

dated February 22, 1979

Case No. 14576);

and Sales Invoice No. 3178

Crim.

due

Case

date

No.

dated March 22, 1979;

15. Certificate of Time Deposit
No. 106, due date August
16, 1979, in the amount of

17. Certificate of Time Deposit

No. 108, due date October
15, 1979, in the amount of

P78,277.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

'A-1' and 'A-2', Crim. Case

Case No. 14579) as down

No. 145810);

payment in Sales Invoice

Nos. 3215, 3216 and 3217
all dated April 18, 1979,
(Exhs. 'A-1', 'A-2' and 'A-3',
Crim. Case No. 14579);

20. Certificate of Time Deposit

No. 111, due date October
29, 1979, in the amount of
P7,218.75 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Case No. 14582) as down

18. Certificate of Time Deposit

payment in Sales Invoice

No. 109, due date October

No. 3409 dated May 2,

16, 1979, in the amount of

1979

P8,557.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

Case No. 14582);

Case No. 14580) as down

payment in Sales Invoice
No. 3221 dated April 19,
1979

(Exh.

'A-1',

Crim.

Case No. 14580); AEIHaS

(Exh.

'A-1',

Crim.

21. Certificates of Time Deposit

Nos. 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 117 and 118 all dated
November 1, 1979 in the
amounts

of

P57,750.00,

19. Certificate of Time Deposit

P93,933.00,

P21,393.75,

No. 110, due date October

P12,285.00,

P13,860.00,

22, 1979, in the amount of

P20,002.50

P38,529.75 (Exh. 'A', Crim.

P156,555.00

Case No. 14581) as down

(Exhs. 'A', 'A-1', 'A-2', 'A-3',

payment in Sales Invoice

'A-4',

No. 3240 and 3241 both

Case No. 14583) as down

dated April 25, 1979 (Exhs.

payment in Sales Invoice

'A-5',

and
respectively
'A-6',

Crim.

Nos.

3423

to

3429,

have been falsified are (1) Certificate of

inclusive (Exhs. 'A-7' to 'A-

Time

13', inclusive, Crim. Case

February 4, 1980 in the amount of

No. 14583); EScIAa

P32,555.25 (Exh. 'A', Crim. Case No.

22. Certificate of Time Deposit

No.

119,

due

date

December 18, 1979, in the

amount of P5,892.25 (Exh.

Deposit

No.

039,

due

14586) and (2) Certificate

date

of Time

Deposit No. 040, due date February 14,

1980 in the amount of P9,103.19 (Exh.
'A', Crim. Case No. 14587).

'A', Crim. Case No. 14584)

The said certificates of time deposit

as down payment in Sales

supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of

Invoice

dated

the Banate, Inc. and the Community

June 21, 1979 (Exh. 'A-1',

Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded

Crim. Case No. 14584);

and not covered by any deposit so that

No.

3505

23. Certificate of Time Deposit

No. 134, due date January
23, 1980, in the amount of
P3,984.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Case No. 14585) as down
payment in Sales Invoice
No. 3272 dated July 27,
1979

(Exh.

'A-1',

Crim.

Case No. 14585);

The certificates of time deposit of the
Community Rural Bank of Leon found to

when

presented

the (sic) Pacific

for

Star,

redemption
Inc.,

the

by

same

were not honored. As a consequence,

Pacific

Star,

Inc.

suffered

actual

damages in the amounts representing

the total value of the machineries and
spare parts sold and delivered by the
complainant to the Ambitos and the
latter failed and refused to pay the
same despite demands on them. HISAET

In view of the anomalous transactions

the name of Pacific Star, Inc. were

entered into by the Ambitos, both the

actually issued in the name of Paciencia

Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the

Cantara

Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.

Francisco

became insolvent and so sometime in

1979 and

May 7, 1980, the Central Bank of the

P1,000.00 and P3,000.00, respectively

Philippines placed both banks under

(Exh. 'B', Crim. Cases Nos. 14586 and

receivership and liquidation. Maria Luz

14587).

Preires, bank examiner of the Central

Bank, was appointed deputy receiver
and

later

deputy

liquidator

of

the

Community Rural Bank of Leon. The

Central Bank took over the affairs and
records of the banks including their
deposits, assets and liabilities. Records
showed no certificate of time deposit in

on

October

Alinsao

17,

on

1979

and

November

only in the

amounts

19,
of

Subsequently, on complaint of Pacific

Star, Inc., the Ambitos were charged of
violations of B.P. Blg. 22, Falsification
and

Estafa

through

Falsification

Commercial

Document

Informations

filed

in

under

the

of
the

aforecited

cases.

the name of Pacific Star, Inc. properly

After due proceedings, the Court a quo,

funded and covered by any deposit.

promulgated

Anomalous issuances of certificates of

November

time deposit were uncovered as, for

portion of which reads as follows:

instance,

Community

Rural

Bank

of

a
29,

Decision,
1990,

the

dated
decretal

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Cases

Leon, Inc. Certificates of Time Deposit

Nos.

Nos. 039 (Exh. 'A', Crim. Case No. 14586

14559, 14560, 14561 and 14562,

and 040 (Exh. 'A', Crim. Case No.

the

14587) which were supposed to be in

accused, Basilio Ambito, guilty

14556,
Court

14557,

hereby

14558,

finds

the

beyond reasonable doubt of the

and penalized in Articles 48, 171,

offense

the

172 and 315 of the Revised Penal

provisions of Section 1 of Batas

Code and hereby sentences the

Pambansa

hereby

said accused to suffer in each

sentences the said accused to

case, an indeterminate sentence

suffer in each of the seven cases,

ranging from TWO (2) YEARS,

the penalty of imprisonment of

FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)

SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY

DAY

and to indemnify the offended

minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS,

party, Pacific Star, Inc. the total

NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN

sum of P173,480.55, with interest

(11)

thereon at the legal rate of 12%

correccional as

per annum from the date of filing

pay a fine of P3,000.00 and to

of the Informations on May 10,

indemnify

1982,

without

Pacific Star, Inc. the total sum of

subsidiary imprisonment in case

P18,287.00 with interests thereon

of insolvency, and to pay the

at the legal rate of 12% per

costs. caIEAD

annum from the date of the filing

of

violation
Blg.

until

22 and

paid,

of

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14574 and

14585, the Court hereby finds the
accused,

Basilio

Ambito

and

Liberata Ambito, guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the complex
offense of Estafa thru Falsification
of Commercial Document, defined

of prision

correccional as

DAYS

the

of prision
maximum,
offended

and
party,

of the Informations on May 10,

1982

until

paid,

without

subsidiary imprisonment in case

of insolvency, together with the
accessory penalties provided for
by law, and to pay the costs.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14563,

per annum from the date of the

14570, 14580, 14582 and 14584,

filing of the Informations on May

the

Court

finds

the

10,

Ambito

and

subsidiary imprisonment in case

Liberata Ambito, guilty beyond

of insolvency, together with the

reasonable doubt of the complex

accessory penalties provided for

crime of Estafa thru Falsification

by

of Commercial Document, defined

costs. CcAESI

accused,

hereby
Basilio

and penalized in Articles 48, 171,

172 and 315 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences the
said accused to suffer, in each of
these cases, an indeterminate
prison

sentence

ranging

from

TWO (2) YEARS, ELEVEN (11)

MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS
of prision

correccional as

minimum,

to

SIX

(6)

YEARS,

EIGHT (8) MONTHS and TWENTY

ONE

(21)

DAYS

mayor as

maximum,

indemnify

the

of prision
and

offended

to

party,

Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of

P83,095.00,

with

interests

thereon at the legal rate of 12%

1982

law,

until

and

paid,

to

without

pay

the

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14566,

14569, 14571 and 14573, the
Court hereby finds the accused,
Basilio

Ambito

and

Liberata

Ambito, guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the complex offense of
Estafa

thru

Falsification

of

Commercial Document, defined

and penalized in Articles 48, 171,
172 and 315 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences the
said accused to suffer, in each of
these cases, an indeterminate
prison

sentence

FOUR

(4)

ranging

YEARS,

MONTHS
correccional as

TWO

from
(2)

of prision
minimum,

to

EIGHT

(8)

YEARS

mayor as

maximum,

indemnify

the

of prision
and

offended

to

prison

sentence

FOUR

(4)

ranging

YEARS,

TWO

(2)

(1)

DAY

party,

MONTHS

Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of

of prision

P103,900.00

minimum, to ELEVEN (11) YEARS

with

interests

and

from

ONE

correccional as

thereon at the legal rate of 12%

of prision

per annum from the date of the

and to indemnify the offended

filing of the Informations on May

party, Pacific Star, Inc., the total

10,

without

sum of P116,530.00 with interests

subsidiary imprisonment in case

thereon at the legal rate of 12%

of insolvency, together with the

per annum from the date of the

accessory penalties provided for

filing of the Informations on May

by law and to pay costs.

10,

1982

until

paid,

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14564 and

14578, the Court hereby finds the
accused,

Basilio

Ambito

and

Liberata Ambito, guilty beyond

mayor as

1982

until

maximum,

paid,

without

subsidiary imprisonment in case

of insolvency, together with the
accessory penalties provided for
by law and to pay costs.

reasonable doubt of the complex

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14565, the

offense of Estafa thru Falsification

Court hereby finds the accused,

of Commercial Document, defined

Basilio

and penalized in Articles 48, 171,

Ambito, guilty beyond reasonable

172 and 315 of the Revised Penal

doubt of the complex offense of

Code and hereby sentences the

Estafa

said accused to suffer, in each of

Commercial Document, defined

these cases, an indeterminate

and penalized in Articles 48, 171,

Ambito

thru

and

Liberata

Falsification

of

172 and 315 of the Revised Penal

Ambito, guilty beyond reasonable

Code and hereby sentences the

doubt of the offense of Estafa

said accused to suffer, in each of

thru Falsification of Commercial

these cases, an indeterminate

Document, defined and penalized

prison

from

in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315

FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)

of the Revised Penal Code and

MONTHS

hereby

sentences

the

correccional as minimum, to NINE

accused

each,

suffer

(9)

indeterminate

sentence

ranging

of prision

YEARS

of prision

mayor as

to
prison

said
an

sentence

maximum, and to indemnify the

ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and

offended party, Pacific Star, Inc.,

TWO

the

with

correccional as minimum, to TEN

interests thereon at the legal rate

(10) YEARS of prision mayor as

of 12% per annum from the date

maximum, and to indemnify the

of the filing of the Informations on

offended party, Pacific Star, Inc.,

May 10, 1982 until paid, without

the

subsidiary imprisonment in case

interests thereon at the legal rate

of insolvency, together with the

of 12% per annum from the date

accessory penalties provided for

of the filing of the Informations on

by law and to pay costs. cITaCS

May 10, 1982 until paid, without

sum

of

P35,190.00

(2)

sum

MONTHS

of

ofprision

P50,555.00

with

subsidiary imprisonment in case

of insolvency, together with the
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14567, the

accessory penalties provided for

Court hereby finds the accused,

by law and to pay costs.

Basilio

Ambito

and

Liberata

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14568 and

subsidiary imprisonment in case

14575, the Court hereby finds the

of insolvency, together with the

accused,

accessory penalties provided for

Basilio

Ambito

and

Liberata Ambito, guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the offense
of

Estafa

thru

Falsification

of

Commercial Document, defined

and penalized in Articles 48, 171,
172 and 315 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences the
said accused to suffer, in each of
these cases, an indeterminate
prison

sentence

FOUR

(4)

MONTHS

ranging

YEARS,
and

of prision

from

TWO

(2)

(1)

DAY

ONE

correccional as

minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS

of prision

mayor as

maximum,

and to indemnify the offended

party, Pacific Star, Inc., the sum
of

P134,375.00

with

interests

thereon at the legal rate of 12%

per annum from the date of the
filing of the Informations on May
10,

1982

until

paid,

without

by law and to pay costs. IDScTE

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14572,
14576

and

14581,

the

Court

hereby finds the accused, Basilio

Ambito

and

Liberata

Ambito,

guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the offense of Estafa thru
Falsification

of

Commercial

Document, defined and penalized

in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315
of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby

sentences

the

said

accused to suffer, in each of

these cases, an indeterminate
prison sentence ranging from SIX
(6)

YEARS

and

ONE

(1)

DAY

of prision mayor as minimum, to

THIRTEEN (13) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to
indemnify

the

offended

party,

Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of

P235,170.00

with

interests

thereon at the legal rate of 12%

temporal as maximum, and to

per annum from the date of the

indemnify

filing of the Informations on May

Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of

10,

P1,110,500.00

1982

until

paid,

without

the

offended
with

party,

interests

subsidiary imprisonment in case

thereon at the legal rate of 12%

of insolvency, together with the

per annum from the date of the

accessory penalties provided for

filing of the Informations on May

by law and to pay costs.

10,

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14577,

14579

and

14583,

the

Court

hereby finds the accused, Basilio

Ambito

and

Liberata

Ambito,

1982

until

paid,

without

subsidiary imprisonment in case

of insolvency, together with the
accessory penalties provided for
by law and to pay costs.

guilty beyond reasonable doubt

The foregoing penalties imposed

of the complex offense of Estafa

upon the accused are, however,

thru Falsification of Commercial

subject to the threefold rule as

Document, defined and penalized

provided for in Article 70 of the

in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315

Revised Penal Code so that the

of the Revised Penal Code and

maximum

hereby

said

accused's imprisonment shall not

accused to suffer, in each of

be more than three times the

these cases, an indeterminate

most severe of the penalties the

prison sentence ranging from TEN

total

(10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY

exceed Forty (40) years.

sentences

the

of prision mayor as minimum, to

TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion

period

duration

of

which

of

not

the

to

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14586 and

charged in these Criminal Cases

14587, the Court hereby finds the

Nos. 14586 and 14587. AHacIS

accused, Crisanto Ambito, guilty

On

beyond reasonable doubt of the

offense

of

Falsification

of

Commercial Document, defined

Reynaldo

Baron,
of

the

Traje

and

are

hereby

the

offense

against them and the bail bonds

Code and hereby sentences the

posted for their provisional liberty

said accused to suffer, in each of

cases,

Marilyn

doubt,

charged in all the criminal cases

and 172 of the Revised Penal

two

accused
ACQUITTED

and penalized under Articles 171

these

reasonable

are hereby ordered cancelled. 3

an

sentence

After they were convicted by the RTC, petitioners

ranging from ONE (1) YEAR and

appealed their case to respondent CA which, in turn,

ONE

denied their appeal via the assailed CA Decision, the

indeterminate

prison

(1)

DAY

correccional as
FOUR

(4)

of prision

minimum,

YEARS,

TWO

MONTHS

to

dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

(2)

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,

of prision

correccional as

maximum,

the

and

the

accessory

Decision

is

hereby

AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the

pay a fine of P2,000.00, together

with

assailed

Appellants.

penalties

SO ORDERED. 4

provided for by law, and to pay

the costs. For insufficiency of

Petitioners

evidence,

Reconsideration of the adverse CA Decision but this

Liberata

Basilio
Ambito

ACQUITTED

of

Ambito
are
the

and

hereby
offenses

was

promptly

succinctly

Resolution 5dated

interposed

rejected

by

November

a
the

8,

Motion
CA

1996,

in

for
its

hence,

petitioners'

recourse

to

this

Court

for

review

on certiorari.

even resorted to imposing a fine on petitioners'

counsel for his repeated non-compliance as stated by

This Court initially denied said Petition for Review

on Certiorari 6 through a Resolution 7 dated January
29, 1997 on the ground that the said petition raised
factual issues. Undaunted, petitioners filed a Motion

our Resolution 15 dated March 8, 2006 but to no avail.

Thus, in a Resolution 16 dated June 20, 2007, this
Court

resolved

to

dispense

with

the

filing

of

petitioners' memorandum.

for Reconsideration 8 dated February 25, 1997 seeking

In their Petition, 17 petitioners raised the following

to persuade this Court to give due course to their

grounds:

petition

which

this

Court

granted

in

Resolution 9 dated April 28, 1997, thereby reinstating

the

petition.

Respondents

were

required

to

file

comment on the petition as ordered in the same

Resolution. Respondents filed their Comment 10 on
September 9, 1997, while petitioners filed a delayed
Reply 11 on September 4, 1998. In turn, respondents
filed a Rejoinder 12 on January 18, 1999. TADaES
On

January

17,

2005,

this

Court

A. THE
APPEALS

RESPONDENT
COMMITTED

COURT
A

OF

REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS

GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES IMPUTED TO
THEM, THERE BEING UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT FROM THE
NATURE OF THE TRANSACTIONS AND
DEALINGS BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS

issued

AND PSI FOR A LONG PERIOD OF 14

Resolution 13 directing both parties to submit their

YEARS,

respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from

PETITIONERS, IF ANY, IS ONLY CIVIL IN

notice.

NATURE, AND NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Respondents

submitted

their

Memorandum 14 on March 18, 2005 but petitioners

failed to submit theirs despite the fact that this Court
had already granted numerous extensions of time to
file as requested by petitioners' counsel. This Court

THE

LIABILITY

OF

THE

ATTACHES TO THEM.
B. THE

RESPONDENT

APPEALS

COMMITTED

COURT
A

OF

REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A

OF ALL THE OFFENSES IMPUTED TO

REVERSIBLE

THEM,

PETITIONER

THE

FACTS

OF

THE

CASE

ERROR

IN

BASILIO

AMBITO

SHOWING THAT THE VALUE OF THE

GUILTY

SUBJECT CHECKS AND CCTDS [CREDIT

OF BP22 DESPITE

CERTIFICATES OF TIME DEPOSIT] HAVE

SUBJECT

ALREADY BEEN FULLY PAID PRIOR TO

PRESENTED FOR PAYMENT WITHIN

THE INSTITUTION OF THE CRIMINAL

90

CASES BELOW.

CHECK. HTCESI

C. ANENT

CRIMINAL

THAT

CHECKS

DAYS

THE

WERE

FROM

NOT

DATE

14556 TO 14562, THE RESPONDENT

14556

AND

COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE

COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR

PETITIONER

IN

BEYOND

DOUBT

OF

VIOLATION

THE

AMBITO

REASONABLE
OFFENSE

OF BP22 DESPITE

OF
THE

FINDING

CASE

OF

CRIMINAL

BASILIO

NOS.

VIOLATION

E. ANENT

GUILTY

CASE

OF

FINDING

14557,

PETITIONER

THE

BASILIO

AMBITO GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE

OF

VIOLATION

OF BP22 DESPITE

THAT THERE WAS IN EACH CASE NO

LACK OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF

PROPER

PRIOR NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND

PROVE THE CRIME CHARGED.

DEMAND

FOR

ALLEGED

PAYMENT

DISHONORED

OF

THE

CHECKS

GIVEN BY PSI TO PETITIONERS.

D. ANENT
14556,

CRIMINAL

14557

AND

NOS.

F. ANENT

EVIDENCE

CRIMINAL

OFFERED

CASE

TO

NOS.

14563 TO 14585, THE RESPONDENT

COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

CASE

NOS.

14558,

THE

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE

PETITIONERS

GUILTY

BEYOND

REASONABLE

DOUBT

OFFENSE

ESTAFA

OF

PRETENSES

OF
BY

THE

TO RESOLVE THE ASSIGNED ERROR

FALSE

COMPLEXED

OF

DOUBLE

PAYMENT

OF

WITH

INDEMNITY OR CIVIL LIABILITY ON

FALSIFICATION OF A COMMERCIAL

THE MERITS THEREOF, IT BEING IN A

DOCUMENT,

POSITION TO DO SO, AND DESPITE

THERE

BEING

PROSECUTION EVIDENCE TENDING

TIMELY

TO

INSTITUTION OF THE CIVIL CASE

SHOW

THE

LACK

OF

THE

ELEMENT OF DECEIT.
G. ANENT

CRIMINAL

NOTICE

INVOLVING
CASE

OF

THE

THE

PRIOR
SAME

TRANSACTIONS AS IN THE CASES AT

NOS.

BAR. 18 SHDAEC

14563 TO 14585, THE RESPONDENT

COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

In essence, petitioners' recourse to this Court is hinged

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE

on their belief that their conviction in the lower court

PETITIONERS

BEYOND

was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt and

REASONABLE DOUBT OF ESTAFA BY

that the respondent CA failed to perform its duty to

FALSE

PRETENSES

fully ascertain whether the prosecution's evidence was

WITH

FALSIFICATION

GUILTY

COMPLEXED
OF

sufficient enough to warrant a finding that would

COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT, IT BEING

support their conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and

CLEAR FROM THE FACE OF THE

for

SUBJECT CCTDS THEMSELVES THAT

Documents.

Estafa

through

Falsification

of

Commercial

THERE THEREIN EXISTS NO FALSE

NARRATION OF FACTS.
H. THE

RESPONDENT

COURT

OF

We hold the petition to be meritorious in part.

Anent the issue of whether or not co-petitioner Basilio

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING

Ambito's conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to

APPEALS

COMMITTED

14562 for the seven (7) counts of violation ofB.P. Blg.

22 was in accordance with law, petitioners argue that

Pacific Star, Inc. (PSI) filed with Branch 2 of the RTC of

he cannot be convicted of the same since the

Manila

prosecution allegedly failed to prove the dispensable

petitioners, or more than three (3) years before the

elements of prior notice of dishonor and demand for

thirty-two (32) Informations for violations of B.P. Blg.

payment of the checks at issue. 19 Furthermore, they

22 and for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial

insist that there

is no violation ofB.P. Blg. 22,

Documents were filed against petitioners on May 10,

particularly in Criminal Case Nos. 14556, 14557 and

1982. Within that three-year span of time, the OSG

14558 as the subject checks therein were presented

points out, co-petitioner Basilio Ambito failed to pay

for payment more than ninety (90) days from date. 20

the value of the checks despite having been notified of

In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

civil

complaint

for

collection

against

their dishonor. 21

asserts that petitioners' claim of necessary and

As to petitioners' contention that the prosecution was

indispensable elements of notice of dishonor and

not able to prove the indispensable element that the

demand to pay cannot be found in the statute defining

drawer had knowledge that the checks were not

the essential elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The

backed up by sufficient funds since the checks subject

OSG further insists that, from among the said essential

of Criminal Case Nos. 14556, 14557 and 14558 were

elements, there is no particular manner prescribed in

presented for payment more than ninety (90) days

which the person who made and issued the dishonored

from date, the OSG claims that the said element had

checks

been clearly established by the petitioners' testimony

should

be

notified

of

the

fact

of

dishonor. HSTCcD
Be that as it may, the OSG avers that as far as the
checks subject of the charges of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 in these criminal cases are concerned, co-petitioner
Basilio Ambito had been more than sufficiently notified
of the fact of dishonor because on December 28, 1979,

in the lower court where petitioners contend that the

subject checks were issued only as mere guarantee
and, as such, were not supposed to be deposited as
previously agreed by PSI and petitioners. 22 In any
case, the OSG argues that under Section 2 of B.P. Blg.
22, the maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of funds

is legally presumed from the dishonor of the check for

of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions,

insufficiency of funds. 23

the making of worthless checks and putting them in

After

carefully

submissions

of

reviewing
the

the

parties,

records
we

find

and

the

that

the

prosecution's evidence was inadequate to prove copetitioner Basilio Ambito's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1)
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment. 24
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg.
22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust

circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the

public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order. 25 Thus,
the mere act of issuing a worthless check whether
as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of
pre-existing debt is malum prohibitum. 26 TIEHSA
In light of the foregoing, petitioners' contention in the
lower court that the subject checks were only issued
as mere guarantee and were not intended for deposit
as per agreement with PSI is not tenable. Co-petitioner
Basilio Ambito would be liable under B.P. Blg. 22 by the
mere fact that he issued the subject checks, provided
that the other elements of the crime are properly
proved.
With regard to the second element, we note that the
law provides for a prima facie rule of evidence. A
disputable presumption of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds in or credit with the bank is assumed from the
act of making, drawing, and issuing a check, payment
of

which

is

refused

by

the

drawee

bank

for

insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days

from the date of issue. However, such presumption

process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be

does not arise when the maker or drawer pays or

actually sent to and received by the accused. The

makes

the

accused has a right to demand and the basic

receiving

postulates of fairness require that the notice of

notice that such check had been dishonored. In order

dishonor be actually sent to and received by the same

for the maker or drawer to pay the value thereof or

to afford him/her the opportunity to avert prosecution

make arrangements for its payment within the period

under B.P. Blg. 22. 28

arrangements

check within

five

for

banking

the

payment

days

after

of

prescribed by law, it is therefore necessary and

indispensable for the maker or drawer to be notified of
the dishonor of the check.

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records that

would indicate that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was
given any notice of dishonor by PSI or by Manila Bank,

Under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove not only

the drawee bank, when the subject checks were

that the accused issued a check that was subsequently

dishonored for insufficiency of funds upon presentment

dishonored. It must also establish that the accused

for payment. In fact, all that the OSG can aver

was actually notified that the check was dishonored,

regarding this matter is that co-petitioner Basilio

and that he or she failed, within five (5) banking days

Ambito had been notified of the fact of dishonor since

from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the

PSI filed a collection case against petitioners more

check

than three (3) years before the same filed the criminal

the

amount

due

thereon

or

to

make

arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the

accused received such notice, a prosecution for
violation

of

the Bouncing

Checks

Law cannot

prosper. 27 TCAScE

cases before this Court. 29

Likewise, respondent CA merely cited, in its assailed
Decision, co-petitioner Basilio Ambito's July 17, 1989
trial court testimony as basis for concluding that he

The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily

was properly informed of the dishonor of the subject

deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a

checks, viz.:

criminal

prosecution.

Accordingly,

procedural

due

Appellant Basilio's claim that he was

to replace the same with cash or make

never notified of the dishonor of the

arrangements

checks he issued in partial payments of

payments

the purchases Kazette Enterprises made

checks. 30

from PSI is belied by his own admission

made when he testified in the Court a
quo thus:

the

PSI,
amounts

for
of

the
the

Verily, the aforementioned circumstances are not in

accord with the manner or form by which a notice of
dishonor should be made under the law and existing

xxx xxx xxx

Q Inspite

of

with

of

you

jurisprudence.

agreement

they

The notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to the

deposited and when presented

drawer or maker by the drawee bank, the holder of the

they bounce?

check, or the offended party either by personal

delivery or by registered mail. The notice of dishonor

A That was in the receipts.

to the maker of a check must be in writing. 31

Q So you admit you have presented

these checks already marked as
Exhibit 'A' for the prosecution for
criminal cases Nos. 14556 to
14562,

inclusive,

were

all

returned for insufficiency of funds

by the depository bank? ETHSAI
A Yes, sir. (t.s.n., Ambito, page 35, July
17, 1989)

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state

that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in
conjunction, however with Section 3 of the law,i.e.,
"that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit
with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a
mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be
insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court has
previously held that both the spirit and letter of

the

the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to

dishonor of the checks, Appellant failed

be punished thereunder not only that the accused

Notwithstanding

his

notice

of

issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the

dishonored

accused has actually been notified in writing of the

cases, 33 we have held that an acquittal based on

fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal

reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil

statutes have to be construed strictly against the State

damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the

and liberally in favor of the accused. 32

liability of the accused for damages only when it

There being no proof that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito

was given any written notice either by PSI or by Manila
Bank informing him of the fact that his checks were
dishonored and giving him five (5) banking days within
which to make arrangements for payment of the said
checks, the rebuttable presumption that he had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds has no
application in the present case. TCAHES

checks.

In

number

of

similar

includes a declaration that the facts from which the

civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, in the case
at bar, the trial court's directive for Basilio Ambito to
indemnify PSI the total sum of P173,480.55, with
interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum
from the date of filing of the Informations on May 10,
1982, until paid, and to pay the costs is affirmed.
Anent the question of whether or not petitioner
spouses Liberata and Basilio Ambito's conviction for
the

offense

of

Estafa

through

Falsification

of

Due to the failure of prosecution in this case to prove

Commercial Document was proven beyond reasonable

that

the

doubt, the petitioners interposed the defense that they

requisite notice of dishonor and the opportunity to

cannot be properly convicted of the same as there was

make arrangements for payment as provided for under

no finding of false narration of facts and of deceit.

co-petitioner

Basilio

Ambito

was

given

the law, We cannot with moral certainty convict him of

violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioners assert that PSI was not deceived by the

issuance of the subject credit certificates of time

However, Basilio Ambito's acquittal for his violations

deposit (CCTDs), which did not contain a false

of B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove all

narration of facts, for the reasons that: (i) said CCTDs,

elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt did

which were undated as to their respective dates of

not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the

issuance, did not state that funds had already been

certificates of time deposit but "CREDIT Certificates of

deposited by PSI; (ii) during the course of their alleged

Time Deposit" because the term "credit" indicates a

fourteen-year long business relationship, PSI, which

"deferred or delayed nature of the payment", thus,

had been accepting said CCTDs, knew that they were

signifying a promise to pay at a future date; 39 (viii)

unfunded as said certificates of time deposit were

PSI was not defrauded as it gave discounts in its sales

issued to serve as "promissory notes" to guarantee

invoices if petitioners paid in full the value of the

payment for the balance of the invoice price of the

certificates "on or before 180 days" from delivery. By

machineries; 34 (iii) petitioners did not represent to

giving discounts for early payment, it was thus aware

PSI that "the money was already deposited" because

of the possibility that said certificates might not be

the subject CCTDs were "even postdated"; 35 (iv) the

funded when they fell due; 40 (ix) the sales invoices

amounts

not

issued by PSI gave it the right to institute civil actions

"downpayments" but "CREDIT extended to petitioner

only and not criminal actions; 41 and (x) petitioners

Basilio

the

had already performed their obligations to PSI by way

petitioners'

of the payment of the amount of P300,000.00 and the

obligation is civil in nature because current and

return of one unit Kubota machinery valued at

savings deposits constitute loans to a bank and, thus,

P28,000.00. 42 aSTHDc

stated
Ambito

sales/purchases

in
payable
were

the
six

CCTDs
months

made; 36 (v)

were
after

a CCTD is an evidence of a simple loan; 37 (vi) the

essential element of fraud was absent because PSI
knew that the CCTDs issued to it by petitioners were
not covered by funds because it knew that the
deposits were yet to be made when the farmers, to
whom Basilio Ambito resold on credit the machineries,
shall have deposited in the rural banks their payments

We are not persuaded. We find no reason to disturb

the identical findings of the CA and the RTC regarding
the

particular

circumstances

surrounding

the

petitioners' conviction of Estafa through Falsification of

Commercial

Documents

because

the

same

are

adequately supported by the evidence on record.

for those machineries; 38 (vii) the subject certificates

It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh

of time deposit issued to PSI were not ordinary

evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that

the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of

commission of the fraud, it being essential that such

support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute

false statement or representation constitutes the very

palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. 43

cause or the only motive which induces the offended

The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether

committed by false pretenses or concealment, are the
following (a) that there must be a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (b) That such false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be

party to part with his money. In the absence of such

requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however
fraudulent and suspicious it might appear, cannot
serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said
provision. 46 ACaTIc

made or executed prior to or simultaneous with the

In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was

commission of the fraud. (c) That the offended party

given assurance by petitioners that they will pay the

must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act

unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the

or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part

CCTDs with petitioners' banks, the Rural Bank of

with his money or property because of the false

Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.

pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (d) That

(RBLI), and issued under the name of PSI, would be

as a result thereof, the offended party suffered

presented for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn,

damage. 44

will pay the amount of deposit stated thereon. The

In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315,

paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC, 45 it is indispensable that
the

element

of

deceit,

consisting

in

the

false

statement or fraudulent representation of the accused,

be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the
delivery of the thing by the complainant.
The

false

committed

pretense

or

fraudulent

prior

or

simultaneously

to

act

amounts stated in the CCTDs correspond to the

purchase cost of the machineries and equipment that
co-petitioner Basilio

Ambito

bought

from

PSI

as

evidenced by the Sales Invoices presented during the

trial. It is uncontroverted that PSI did not apply for and
secure loans from RBBI and RBLI. In fine, PSI and copetitioner Basilio Ambito were engaged in a vendor-

must

be

with

the

purchaser

business

relationship

while

PSI

and

RBBI/RBLI were connected as depositor-depository. It is

likewise established that petitioners employed deceit

confirming the lower courts' finding that petitioners

when they were able to persuade PSI to allow them to

are guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through

pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment

Falsification of Commercial Documents.

through down payments paid either in cash or in the

form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and
RBLI issued in PSI's name with interest thereon. It was
later found out that petitioners never made any
deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI. In
fact, the issuance of CCTDs to PSI was not recorded in
the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy Liquidator
appointed by the Central Bank of the Philippines even
corroborated

this

finding

of

anomalous

bank

As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is

that

petitioners'

representations

were

outright distortions of the truth perpetrated by them

for the sole purpose of inducing PSI to sell and deliver
to

co-petitioner

Basilio

Ambito

machineries

complex crime had been committed by petitioners is

proper because, whenever a person carries out on a
public, official or commercial document any of the acts
of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC 48 as a necessary means to perpetrate another
crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex
crime is formed by the two crimes.
Under Article 48 of the RPC, 49 a complex crime refers

transactions in her testimony during the trial. 47

indubitable

The pronouncement by the appeals court that a

and

equipments. Petitioners knew that no deposits were

ever made with RBBI and RBLI under the name of PSI,
as represented by the subject CCTDs, since they did

to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less

grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a
single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary
means for committing the other (or others). Negatively
put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more
crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2)
committing one crime is not a necessary means for
committing the other (or others).50

not intend to deposit any amount to pay for the

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial

machineries. PSI was an innocent victim of deceit,

document may be a means of committing Estafa,

machinations and chicanery committed by petitioners

because before the falsified document is actually

which resulted in its pecuniary damage and, thus,

utilized to defraud another, the crime of Falsification

has already been consummated, damage or intent to

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC, 54 the

cause damage not being an element of the crime of

elements of falsification of public documents through

falsification of public, official or commercial document.

an untruthful narration of facts are: (1) the offender

In other words, the crime of falsification has already

makes in a document untruthful statements in a

existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or

narration of facts; (2) the offender has a legal

commercial document to defraud another is estafa.

obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;

But the damage is caused by the commission of

(3) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely

Estafa, not by the falsification of the document.

false; and (4) the perversion of truth in the narration of

Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or

facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a

commercial document is only a necessary means to

third person. 55

commit the estafa.51

As earlier discussed, the issuance of the falsified

In the case before us, the issuance by petitioners of

CCTDs for the sole purpose of obtaining or purchasing

CCTDs which reflected amounts that were never

various machinery and equipment from PSI amounts to

deposited as such in either RBBI or RBLI is Falsification

the criminal offense of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)

under Articles 171 52 and 172 53 of the RPC. The

of the RPC. 56 The petitioners falsified the subject

particular

of

CCTDs, which are commercial documents, to defraud

petitioners, taking advantage of their position as

PSI. Since the falsification of the CCTDs was the

owners

necessary means for the commission of Estafa, the

criminal
of

RBBI

undertaking
and

statements/representations

RBLI,
with

consisted

making

the

assailed judgment of the appeals court convicting

existence of time deposits in favor of PSI by issuing the

petitioners of the complex crime of Estafa through

subject CCTDs without putting up the corresponding

Falsification of Commercial Documents is correct.

deposits in said banks. DaHcAS

regard

untruthful
to

Quite

apart

from

the

prosecution's

successful

discharge of its burden of proof, we find that the

accused failed to discharge their burden to prove their

defense. To begin with, there appears to be no proof on

petitioner Crisanto Ambito's conviction for Falsification

record of the alleged 14-year financial arrangement

of Commercial Documents (in Criminal Case Nos.

between

14586 and 14587). However, the aforesaid Decision is

accused

and

PSI

or

the

purported

"consignment only" agreement between them other

REVERSED

than the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of

Ambito's conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (in

the accused. Moreover, we uphold the findings of the

Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562), who is hereby

CA

proper

ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not been

characterization of the CCTDs and the lack of credible,

established beyond reasonable doubt. However, the

independent evidence of the alleged payment of the

portion of the said Decision insofar as it directs Basilio

accused's obligations to PSI.

Ambito to indemnify Pacific Star, Inc. the total sum of

and

the

court a

quo as

to

the

Finally, with respect to co-petitioner Crisanto Ambito,

we find no reason to disturb the trial court's ruling that
he is liable for only the crime of Falsification of
Commercial Documents in connection with CCTD Nos.
039 and 040 of RBLI, there being no showing that the

with

respect

to

co-petitioner

Basilio

P173,480.55, with interest thereon at the legal rate of

12% per annum from the date of filing of the
Informations on May 10, 1982, until paid, and to pay
the costs (also in Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562)
is AFFIRMED.

said CCTDs were used to purchase farm implements

SO ORDERED.

from PSI. 57 THacES

||| (Ambito v. People, G.R. No. 127327, [February 13,

2009], 598 PHIL 546-580)

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated March 29, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED with respect to petitioner spouses Basilio

THIRD DIVISION

and Liberata Ambito's conviction for Estafa through

Falsification of Commercial Documents (in Criminal
Case Nos. 14563 to 14585) and with respect to co-

[G.R. No. 186101. October 12, 2009.]

GINA

A.

DOMINGO, petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

branch. Petitioner, on the other hand, is a dentist who

had a clinic in Remedios' compound.
Being the wife of the best friend of Remedios' son,
petitioner had a close relationship with Remedios and
her family.

DECISION

On June 15, 1995, Remedios accompanied petitioner to

BPI because the latter wanted to open an account

VELASCO, JR., J p:

therein. Remedios then introduced petitioner to the

bank's staff and officers. Soon thereafter, petitioner

The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated November
24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR

frequented

Remedios'

office

and

volunteered

to

deposit her checks in her bank account at BPI.

No. 31158 entitled People of the Philippines v. Gina A.

Sometime in October 1996, Remedios wanted to buy a

Domingo, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated May 21,

car thinking that she already had a substantial amount

2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75971-87 of the

in her account. Thus, she went to BPI to withdraw two

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 in Quezon City.

hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000). To her surprise,

The

however, she found out that her money had already

RTC

convicted

petitioner

Gina

Domingo

(petitioner) of 17 counts of Estafa through Falsification

been

of Commercial Document.

through 18 encashment slips bearing her forged

The Facts

withdrawn.

The

withdrawals

were

effected

signatures reaching the amount of eight hundred

thirty-eight thousand pesos (PhP838,000). She denied

Private complainant, Remedios D. Perez (Remedios), is

having affixed her signatures on the encashment slips

a businesswoman and a valued depositor of the Bank

used. DISHEA

of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Aurora Boulevard

Testimonies

showed

that

on

several

occasions

beginning September 18, 1995 until October 18, 1996,

Mayof24, 1996
petitioner presented a number of encashment slips

50,000.00

50,000.00

none

various amounts to BPI, and by virtue of which sheJune

was7, 1996
able to withdraw huge amounts of money fromJune
the26, 1996
July 5, 1996
checking account of the complainant. She deposited

40,000.00
45,000.00
25,000.00

40,000.00
45,000.00
25,000.00

none
none
none

17, 1996
the bigger portion of these amounts to her July
own

40,000.00

40,000.00

none

account and pocketed some of them, while also paying

Aug. 5, 1996
the rest to Skycable. The transactions were processed
Sept. 17, 1996
by four tellers of BPI, namely: Regina Ramos, Oct.
Mary4, 1996
Oct. 18, 1996
Antonette Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim Rillo who

50,000.00
35,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00

48,550.00
35,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00

1,450.00 (PS)
none
none
none

Mary Antonette
Pozon
Shiela Ferranco
Shiela Ferranco
Mary Antonette
Pozon
Mary Antonette
Pozon
Shiela Ferranco
Shiela Ferranco
Kim P. Rillo
Kim P. Rillo

verified the signatures of the complainant on the

After having been apprised of the illegal transactions

questioned encashment slips.

As synthesized by the trial court, the transactions are
as follows:
Date of
encashment
slip

Amount
withdrawn
via
encashment
slip

Amount
deposited
to
accused's
account

Sept. 8, 1995
Sept. 18, 1995
Feb. 12, 1996
Feb. 15, 1996

P10,000.00
30,000.00
30,000.00
20,000.00

P8,000.00
20,000.00
28,550.00
20,000.00

March 21, 1996

April 8, 1996
April 10, 1996
April 29, 1996
May 13, 1996

40,000.00
40,000.00
30,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00

30,000.00
35,000.00
30,000.00
34,500.00
38,550.00

of petitioner on complainant's account, the latter

complained to the bank for allowing the withdrawal of

the money with the use of falsified encashment slips

Amount paid Name of Teller
and demanded that the amount illegally withdrawn be
to Skycable
who processed
returned. She was required by BPI to submit checks
(PS)
the transaction
or Pocketed
bearing her genuine signature for examination by the
(Po)
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. After
by the accused
P2,000.00 (Po) Regina Ramos
examination, Josefina dela Cruz of the PNP Crime
10,000.00 (Po)
Laboratory came up with a finding that complainant's
1,450.00 (PS)
Shiela Ferranco
signatures on the questioned encashment slips had
none
Mary Antonette
Pozon
been forged. Only then did the bank agree to pay her
10,000.00 (Po) Shiela Ferranco
the amount of PhP645,000 representing a portion of
5,000.00 (Po)
Regina Ramos
none
Shiela Ferranco
the amount illegally withdrawn with the use of the
5,500.00 (Po)
Regina Ramos
forged encashment slips. DASEac
1,450.00 (PS)
Shiela Ferranco

In her defense, petitioner testified that she is a dentist,

That on or about the 18th day of

practicing her profession in her house at No. 21,

October

Alvarez Street, Cubao, Quezon City. She further stated

Philippines, the above-named accused,

that she knew Remedios as the owner of the house

a private individual, by means of false

that she and her husband were renting at No. 3 New

pretenses

Jersey Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She declared

executed prior to or simultaneously with

that she never used "Perez" as an alias or nickname

the commission of the fraud and by

and that the signatures appearing on the questioned

means of falsification of commercial

encashment slips were not hers.

document did, then and there willfully,

Petitioner, however, admitted that she was once a

depositor of BPI Aurora Boulevard branch, having
opened an account in said bank sometime in June
1995. She had been maintaining said account until she
was arrested in 1998. She used to frequent the bank
three times a week or as the need arose for her bank
transactions, for which reason, she and the bank
tellers had become familiar with each other. She knows
that, like her, Remedios was also a depositor of BPI
Aurora Boulevard branch, but there was no occasion
that they met each other in the bank.

1996,

unlawfully

in

and/or

and

Quezon

City,

fraudulent

feloniously

acts

defraud

Remedios D. Perez and/or the Bank of

the Philippine Islands represented in the
following manner, to wit: said accused
falsified or caused to be falsified an
encashment

slip

of

Bank

of

the

Philippine Islands dated October 18,

1996

for

P40,000.00,

Philippine

Currency, by then and there filling up

said encashment slip and signing the
name of one Remedios D. Perez, a
depositor of said bank under Account

Remedios and BPI filed a complaint before the

No. 3155-0572-61, thereby making it

prosecutor's office.

appear, as it did appear that said

The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971

encashment

reads as follows:

respect, when in truth and in fact said

slip

is

genuine

in

all

accused well knew that Remedios D.

Perez never signed the said encashment
slip; that once said encashment slip was
forged and falsified in the manner set
forth, accused pretending to be the said
Remedios D. Perez used it to withdraw
the aforesaid sum of P40,000.00 from
the

latter's

account,

and

once,

in

possession of the said amount of money

misappropriated,

misapplied

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

July 17, 1996

July 5, 1996
June 26, 1996
June 7, 1996
May 24, 1996
May 13, 1996
April 29, 1996
April 10, 1996
April 8, 1996
March 21, 1996
February 15, 1996
February 12, 1996
September 18, 1995

40,000.00
25,000.00
45,000.00
40,000.00
50,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
30,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
20,000.00
30,000.00
30,000.00 4

and

Upon motion by the prosecution, the 17 cases were

converted the same to her own personal

consolidated and tried jointly by the trial court. When

use and benefit, to the damage and

arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the

prejudice of the offended party.

crimes charged in the 17 Informations. Trial on the

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

merits ensued with the prosecution presenting seven

The allegations in the Information in Criminal Case

Nos. Q-98-75972-87 are all substantially the same as
those in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971, except for the
dates of the commission of the crime or dates of the
BPI encashment slips and the amounts involved, to
wit: CSAcTa

1.
2.
3.

Q-98-75975
Q-98-75976
Q-98-75977
Q-98-75978
Q-98-75979
Q-98-75980
Q-98-75981
Q-98-75982
Q-98-75983
Q-98-75984
Q-98-75985
Q-98-75986
Q-98-75987

Criminal Case No. Date of the commission

of the crime/
encashment slip
Q-98-75972
October 4, 1996
Q-98-75973
September 4, 1996
Q-98-75974
August 5, 1996

witnesses, namely: Remedios; Arturo Amores, General

Manager of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; Regina Ramos,
Mary Antonette Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim P.
Rillo, all bank tellers of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; and
Josefina Dela Cruz, a Document Examiner III of the PNP
Crime Laboratory. On the part of the defense, it
presented petitioner herself and Carmelita Tanajora,

Amount Involved
P40,000.00
35,000.00
50,000.00

petitioner's house helper.

Ruling of the Trial Court

On May 21, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, the

[Link]

dispositive portion of which reads:

beyond

No.

Q-98-

Eleven (11) Months and

judgment is hereby rendered finding the

GUILTY

Case

75972 Two (2) Years,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, joint

accused

Criminal

reasonable

(11)

Days

of [prision]

correccional to

Seven (7) Years and Twenty

doubt of the crimes charged in Criminal

One (21) Days of prision

[Case] Nos. Q-98-75971; Q-98-75972;

mayor;

Q-98-75973; Q-98-75974; Q-98-75975;

Q-98-75976; Q-98-75977; Q-98-75978;

Eleven

[Link]

Criminal

Case

No.

Q-98-

Q-98-75979; Q-98-75980; Q-98-75981;

75973 Two (2) Years,

Q-98-75982; Q-98-75983; Q-98-75984;

Eleven (11) Months and

Q-98-75985;

Eleven

(11)

75987. Accordingly, and applying the

of [prision]

correccional to

Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is

Seven (7) Years and Twenty

hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty

One (21) Days of prision

of imprisonment, as follows:

mayor; ADCETI

[Link]

Q-98-75986

Criminal

Case

and

No.

Q-98-

Q-98-

75971 Two (2) Years,

Eleven (11) Months and
Eleven

(11)

of [prision]

correccional to

Days

Seven (7) Years and Twenty

One (21) Days of prision
mayor;

Days

[Link]

Criminal

Case

No.

Q-98-

75974 Two (2) Years,

Eleven (11) Months and
Eleven

(11)

Days

of [prision]

correccional to

Eight (8) Years and Twenty

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]

One (21) Days of prision

One (21) Days of prision

mayor;

mayor;

Criminal

Case

No.

Q-98-

[Link]

Criminal

Case

No.

Q-98-

75975 Two (2) Years,

75978 Two (2) Years,

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven

(11)

Eleven

(11)

of [prision]

correccional to

of [prision]

correccional to

Days

Days

Seven (7) Years and Twenty

Seven (7) Years and Twenty

One (21) Days of prision

One (21) Days of prision

mayor;

mayor;

Criminal

Case

No.

Q-98-

[Link]

Criminal

Case

No.

Q-98-

75976 Two (2) Years,

75979 Two (2) Years,

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven

(11)

Eleven

(11)

of [prision]

correccional to

of [prision]

correccional to

Days

Days

Six (6) Years and Twenty

Eight (8) Years and Twenty

One (21) Days of prision

One (21) Days of prision

mayor;

mayor;

Criminal

Case

No.

Q-98-

[Link] Criminal Case No. Q-98-

75977 Two (2) Years,

75980 Two (2) Years,

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven

(11)

Eleven

(11)

of [prision]

correccional to

of [prision]

correccional to

Days

Eight (8) Years and Twenty

Days

Seven (7) Years and Twenty

One (21) Days of prision

One (21) Days of prision

mayor;

mayor;

[Link] Criminal Case No. Q-98-

[Link] Criminal Case No. Q-98-

75981 Two (2) Years,

75984 Two (2) Years,

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven

(11)

Eleven

(11)

of [prision]

correccional to

of [prision]

correccional to

Days

Days

Seven (7) Years and Twenty

Seven (7) Years and Twenty

One (21) Days of prision

One (21) Days of prision

mayor;

mayor;

[Link] Criminal Case No. Q-98-

[Link] Criminal Case No. Q-98-

75982 Two (2) Years,

75985 Two (2) Years,

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven

(11)

Eleven

(11)

of [prision]

correccional to

of [prision]

correccional to

Days

Days

Six (6) Years and Twenty

Six (6) Years and Twenty

One (21) Days of prision

One (21) Days of prision

mayor;

mayor; aDATHC

[Link] Criminal Case No. Q-98-

[Link] Criminal Case No. Q-98-

75983 Two (2) Years,

75986 Two (2) Years,

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven (11) Months and

Eleven

(11)

Eleven

(11)

of [prision]

correccional to

of [prision]

correccional to

Days

Seven (7) Years and Twenty

Days

Six (6) Years and Twenty

One (21) Days of prision

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

mayor;

Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the

[Link] Criminal Case No. Q-987598[7] Two (2) Years,

Eleven (11) Months and
Eleven

(11)

Days

of [prision]

correccional to

Six (6) Years and Twenty

One (21) Days of prision
mayor;
Further, the accused is hereby ordered
to pay BPI and/or Remedios Perez the
total sum of Six Hundred Thirty Five
Thousand Pesos (P635,000.00), as civil
indemnity, plus six percent (6%) interest
per annum from the time of the filing of
these cases, until fully paid.

challenged Joint Decision of the Court a

quo is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 6
The CA held that petitioner was the one who authored
the crimes of which she was convicted reasoning that
she was the only person who stood to be benefited by
the falsification of the document in question; thus, the
presumption that she is the material author of the
falsification is present.
Moreover,

petitioner's

theory

that

the

crimes

committed were perpetrated by the bank tellers or is

an inside job cannot be sustained because of the lack
of any evidence showing that the tellers harbored any
ill motive against her. The CA emphasized that the
defense of denial, unsubstantiated by clear and

The bond posted by the accused for her

convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and

provisional liberty is hereby canceled.

merits no weight in law; it cannot be given greater

SO ORDERED. 5
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated November 24,
2008, disposed of the case as follows:

evidentiary value than the testimony of credible

witnesses who testified on affirmative matter.
On March 4, 2009, petitioner filed a timely appeal
before this Court.

The Issues
Petitioner

interposes

in

the

Elements of Falsification of Commercial

present

appeal

Documents are Present

the

following assignment of errors:

Petitioner contends that the decision of the lower court

is not supported by the evidence on record and that

this evidence cannot sustain in law the requirements

ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE

of proof beyond reasonable doubt for the crime for

EVIDENCE,

DOCUMENTARY

which she was charged.

TESTIMONIAL,

WERE

THE

LOWER

AND

COMMITTED

COURT

IN

BY
THE

PROMULGATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE

SUBJECT DECISION; STcEaI

Specifically, petitioner claims that, as a matter of

policy, the bank personnel verified the signature cards
of

private

complainant

Remedios

before

any

encashment can be drawn against the account of

II

Remedios.

Thus,

petitioner

contends

that

the

ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF THE

signatures in the encashment slips are genuine as

LAW, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL,

found by the staff and manager of BPI and that the

WERE

cases filed against her are the products of inside jobs.

COMMITTED

PROMULGATION

OF

IN
THE

THE
SUBJECT

Further,

she

argues

that

the

results

of

the

examinations conducted by Josefina dela Cruz of the

DECISION.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Substantially, the issues raised boil down to the
question of whether or not the evidence adduced by
the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

PNP Crime Laboratory lack evidentiary value, since the

report

only

stated

that

the

signatures

on

the

Encashment/Withdrawal Slips were different from the

genuine signatures of Remedios based on the checks,
which contained the genuine signatures of Remedios,
but did not state that the signatures belong to
petitioner.

The contentions are flawed.

they

Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes

did

not

in

fact

participate;

any private individual who commits any of the acts of

[Link] to persons who have

falsification enumerated in Art. 171 of the Code in any

participated in an act or

public or official document or letter of exchange or any

proceeding

other kind of commercial document. The acts of

other than those in fact

falsification enumerated in Art. 171 are:

made by them; cDTACE

Art. [Link] by public officer,

employee
minister.

or

notary
The

or

penalty

ecclesiastic
of prision

mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000

pesos shall be imposed upon any public

statements

[Link] untruthful statements in

a narration of facts;
[Link] true dates;
[Link]

any

alteration

or

officer, employee or notary who, taking

intercalation in a genuine

advantage of his official position, shall

document which changes

falsify a document by committing any of

its meaning;

the following acts:

[Link]

[Link] or imitating any

form

in

an

authenticated

document

handwriting, signature, or

purporting to be a copy of

rubric;

an original document when

[Link] it to appear that

persons

have

participated in any act

or

proceeding

when

no such original exists, or

including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or
different from, that of the
genuine original; or

[Link] any instrument or

note

relative

her

testimony,

Remedios

categorically

denied

the

having filled out and signed any of the subject

encashment slips on the dates indicated on them. Her

protocol, registry or official

testimony is further strengthened by the testimonies

book.

of the bank manager and the bank tellers, who

issuance

to

In

thereof

in

(Emphasis

and

underscoring supplied.)

facilitated the banking transactions carried out by

Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of

Commercial Document under Art. 172 are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification; and (3) that
the act of falsification is committed in a commercial
document.
As borne by the records, all the elements of the crime
are present in the instant case. Petitioner is a private
individual who presented to the tellers of BPI 17 forged
encashment slips on different dates and of various

petitioner with their branch. Their testimonies were

coherent and consistent in narrating that it was indeed
petitioner

who

presented

the

encashment

received the proceeds of the transactions, and/or

caused the transfer of the money to her own bank
account.
Moreover, the testimony of Josefina dela Cruz (dela
Cruz) bolsters the findings of the trial court that the
alleged signatures of Remedios in the encashment
slips are forged, to wit:

amounts. The questioned encashment slips were

Q:Using the method you employed in

falsified by petitioner by filling out the same and

the examination of questioned

signing the name of the private complainant, thereby

and

making

Remedios Perez, will you please

it

appear

that

Remedios

signed

the

encashment slips and that they are genuine in all

respects, when in fact petitioner knew very well that
Remedios never signed the subject encashment slips.

slips,

standard

signatures

of

elaborate the study you made?

A:After conducting the examination, I
reduced

my

examination

to

writing and my findings are as

strokes are smooth. In the capital

follows:

'R' in the questioned signature,

'Scientific comparative examination and

analysis

of

the

questioned

documents

and

the

submitted

standard

signature

reveals

significant

divergences

handwriting
structure

movement,

and

other

in
stroke

individual

handwriting characteristics.'
Q:You

mentioned

divergences

there

is

presence

of

re-trace

strokes while in the standard

signature, there is no re-trace
strokes. In the downward portion
of the letter 'R' in the questioned
signature,

the

direction

is

downward while in the standard it

is horizontal. Now the angular
strokes following the capital 'R' is

in

traced in the middle part of the

handwriting movement, will you

letter 'R', the downward portion

please point to this Honorable

while in the standard, it is found

Court this significant divergences

in the last stroke of capital 'R'. In

of differences in the strokes of

the middle name letter 'D', the

handwriting?

shape is more rounded on the

A:First of all the manner of execution.

questioned signature but in the

The manner of execution is slow

standard it is more elongated. In

while in the execution of the

the loop of the family name, it is

standard, it is moderate. The line

more

quality

questioned

signature[;] while in the standard,

signature, there is presence of

it is more elongated. With that, I

tremors in the strokes while in the

was able to conclude that the

standard

questioned signatures Remedios

in

the

signatures,

all

the

rounded

in

questioned

D. Perez marked 'Q-1' to 'Q-36'

truth that the questioned encashment slips had been

standard signatures of Remedios

falsified by petitioner and that they were presented to

Perez

the bank in order to defraud the bank or holder of the

marked

'S-1'

to

'S-27'

inclusive were not written by one

and the same person. 7

account.
Additionally, the Court has held that in gauging the
relative

Typically, such inconspicuous divergences noted by

dela Cruz on the questioned signatures could not be

weight

handwriting

to

be

experts,

given

the

to

following

the

opinion

standards

adhered to:

easily detected by untrained eyes or by one who had

We have held that the value of the

no formal training in handwriting examination; thus,

opinion of a handwriting expert depends

resort to the opinion of an expert is imperative. This

not

explains why the bank tellers who processed the illegal

whether a writing is genuine or false,

transactions entered into by the petitioner on the

but upon the assistance he may afford

account of Remedios failed to notice the forgery or

in pointing out distinguishing marks,

falsification. As a result, they allowed the encashment

characteristics and discrepancies in and

by petitioner. The training or skill, if any, of the tellers

between genuine and false specimens

in detecting forgeries is usually minimal or inadequate

of writing which would ordinarily escape

and their opinion is generally unreliable. It was,

notice or detection from an unpracticed

therefore, prudent on the part of the bank to seek the

observer. The test of genuineness ought

opinion of an expert to determine the genuineness of

to

the signatures in the encashment slips. DEAaIS

formation

As found by the trial court, the totality of the

testimonies of Remedios, dela Cruz, the handwriting
expert, and the bank tellers bears the earmarks of

upon

be

his

the
of

mere

statements

resemblance,
letters

in

not

some

of

the
other

specimens but to the general character

of writing, which is impressed on it as
the involuntary and unconscious result

of
are

of

constitution,

habit

or

other

and signature appears thereon to encash a check and

permanent course, and is, therefore

withdraw the amount indicated therein.

itself permanent. 8

Even more, petitioner would have this Court believe

Moreover, it cannot be said that since none of the

that

prosecution witnesses saw the falsification actually

document did not exist because Remedios and BPI did

done by petitioner, she cannot be held liable. The bank

not suffer any damage. Such argument is specious. It

tellers who processed the illegal transactions of

has been ruled that damage or intent to cause damage

petitioner involving the account of Remedios were

is not an element in falsification of a commercial

consistent in their testimonies that it was petitioner

document, because what the law seeks to repress is

herself who presented the encashment slips and

the

received the proceeds of the slips. In such a situation,

documents. 11

the applicable rule is that if a person has in his

possession a falsified document and he made use of it,
taking advantage of it and profiting from it, the
presumption is that he is the material author of the
falsification. 9 In the instant case, petitioner has failed

Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's assertions, the

encashment

slips

are

commercial

documents. Commercial documents are, in general,

documents

or

instruments

crime

prejudice

of

to

falsification

the

public

of

commercial

confidence

in

such

Therefore, the acts of petitioner clearly satisfy all the

essential elements of the crime of Falsification of
Commercial Document.
Crime of Falsification was a Necessary Means
to Commit Estafa

to overthrow the presumption.

questioned

the

which

are

used

by

merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate

trade. 10 An encashment slip necessarily facilitates
bank transactions for it allows the person whose name

It has been held that whenever a person carries out on

a public, official, or commercial document any of the
acts enumerated in Art. 171 of the RPC as a necessary
means to perpetrate another crime, such as estafa or
malversation, a complex crime is formed by the two
crimes. 12 CAIaDT

Under Art. 48 of the RPC, a complex crime refers to:

the offended party or third person. Deceit is the false

(1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave

representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or

felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single

conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by

act; or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for

concealment

committing the other (or others).

disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial

document may be a means of committing estafa,

of

that

which

should

have

been

deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his

legal injury.

because before the falsified document is actually

In the case before us, all the elements of estafa are

utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification

present. Once petitioner acquired the possession of

has already been consummated, damage or intent to

the amounts she encashed by means of deceit, she

cause damage not being an element of the crime of

misappropriated, misapplied, and converted the same

falsification of public, official, or commercial document.

to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage

In other words, the crime of falsification has already

and prejudice of the private complainant and BPI.

existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official,

or commercial document to defraud another is estafa.
But the damage is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official, or
commercial document is only a necessary means to
commit estafa. 13
In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the
accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence
or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to

Without a doubt, the falsification of the encashment

slips was a necessary means to commit estafa. At that
time, the offense of falsification is already considered
consummated even before the falsified document is
used to defraud another.
Therefore, the trial court aptly convicted petitioner for
the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Document.
Defense of Denial Is Untenable

It is a hornbook doctrine that the defense of denial,

judicial dictum that the findings of fact of the trial

unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is

court are not disturbed on appeal, except when it

negative and self-serving, and merits no weight in law

overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts

and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than

or circumstances of weight and substance that would

the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on

have materially affected the outcome of the case. We

affirmative matters. 14

find that the trial court did not err in convicting

In the instant case, petitioner's defense of denial

crumbles in the face of the positive identification made
by

the

prosecution

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to

enunciated by this Court, "[p]ositive identification

sufficiently show reversible error in the assailed

where categorical and consistent and not attended by

decision. The Decision dated November 24, 2008 of

any

the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 31158 is AFFIRMED.

of

ill

motive

on

during

the

trial.

Commercial Document.

As

showing

witnesses

petitioner of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of

part

of

the

eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and

denial". 15 The defense has miserably failed to show

No costs.

any evidence of ill motive on the part of the

SO ORDERED.

prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against

||| (Domingo v. People, G.R. No. 186101, [October 12,

2009], 618 PHIL 499-519)

her. aEDCAH
Thus, between the categorical statements of the
prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and bare
denials of the accused, on the other hand, the former
must, perforce, prevail. 16
We accord the trial court's findings the probative
weight it deserves in the absence of any compelling
reason to discredit its findings. It is a fundamental

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144692. January 31, 2005.]

CELSA

P.

ACUA, petitioner, vs.

Pedro

Pascua

("respondent

ACNTS'

Officer-In-Charge

PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA,

("respondent Turla") was a member of its faculty. 2

City

National

Trade

School), respondents.

respondent

was

DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON,

(Angeles

while

Pascua")

Ronnie

Turla

On 13 July 1998, a certain Erlinda Yabut ("Yabut"),

another ACNTS teacher, together with other school
personnel, requested a dialogue with respondent

DECISION

Pascua

on

some

unspecified

matter.

Respondent

Pascua agreed to the request and the meeting took

place on 16 July 1998. Respondent Turla attended the
meeting

CARPIO, J p:

Petitioner,
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari 1 of the Resolution
dated 4 April 2000 and the Order dated 19 June 2000
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The 4 April 2000
Resolution dismissed for lack of probable cause the
complaint for perjury of petitioner Celsa P. Acua
against respondents Pedro Pascua and Ronnie Turla.
The 19 June 2000 Order denied the motion for
reconsideration.

upon

respondent

whom

Yabut

Pascua's

apparently

directive.

invited,

also

attended the meeting.

As an offshoot to an incident during the 16 July 1998
meeting, petitioner charged respondent Pascua with
misconduct ("OMB-ADM-1-99-0387") and with violation
of Article 131 3 of the Revised Penal Code ("OMB 1-99903")

before

the

Office

of

the

Ombudsman

("Ombudsman"). 4 In his sworn counter-affidavit in

OMB-ADM-1-99-0387,

respondent

Pascua

alleged,

among others, that: (1) OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is a

The Facts

Petitioner Celsa P. Acua ("petitioner") is a former

teacher of the Angeles City National Trade School
("ACNTS") in Angeles City, Pampanga. Respondent

"rehash and a duplication with a slight deviation of

fact" of an administrative case pending with the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS")
which petitioner and Yabut earlier filed against him and

(2) Yabut had no authority to invite to the 16 July 1998

Public respondent dismissed petitioner's complaint in

meeting a non-employee of ACNTS like petitioner

his 4 April 2000 Resolution, 9 thus:

considering that he (respondent Pascua) was the one

who called the meeting. 5 Respondent Pascua also
submitted a sworn statement of respondent Turla
confirming that respondent Pascua and not Yabut

Upon careful evaluation of the case

record, we find no evidence to indict
respondents for perjury.
xxx xxx xxx

called the 16 July 1998 meeting. 6

The Ombudsman dismissed OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and

It could not be established by the

OMB 1-99-0903.

evidence on record that it was Erlinda

Contending

that

private

respondents

perjured

themselves in their sworn statements in OMB-ADM-199-0387, petitioner charged private respondents with
perjury ("OMB 1-99-2467") before the office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ("public respondent").
Petitioner alleged that private respondents were liable
for perjury because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut

Yabut who called the meeting on July 16,

1998 and invited complainant. Annex
"B-1" . . . of the complaint is the letter of
Erlinda Yabut to Dr. Pedro Pascua, dated
July 13, 1998, which shows that Ms.
Yabut was requesting respondent to
have a dialogue (sic). The letter states:

filed against respondent Pascua before the Civil

"We, the undersigned would like

Service Commission, later endorsed to the DECS, was

to request your good office to

not "the same" as her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-

allow us to have a dialogue on

0387 and (2) it was Yabut and not respondent Pascua

Thursday, July 1[6], to once and

who called the 16 July 1998 meeting. 7

for

Private respondents denied the charge against them

and sought the dismissal of the complaint. 8
The Ruling of the Public Respondent

all

ventilate

our

complaints/observations and also

listen to the rebuttal of the other
side.

It is the desire of everybody who

called by the undersigned

attended the meeting last time

on said date but a dialogue

that whatever is the outcome of

among

this

the

Angeles City National Trade

basis of the next appropriate

School which I previously

step.

headed. Mrs. Acu[]a at

confrontation

will

be

We would like to request the

incoming

Administrator

or

somebody from the DECS to act

as moderator."
Pursuant
respondent

to

that

the

time

teachers

was

not

of

teacher to attend the said

dialogue,

thus

stated

openly on said occasion

that I will not start the

such

Pascua

circumstance,
stated,

among

meeting

if

there

are

outsiders, and Mr. ROGELIO

others, in his counter-affidavit in OMB-

GUTIERREZ

ADM-1-99-0387 that:

Complainant to step out of

"5. Be

that

as

it

vehemently
charge

may,

deny

the room so we could start

the dialogue, . . . ;
6. I also deny the charge that she

Complainant Celsa Acu[]a

was invited by Mrs. Erlinda

from testifying against Mrs.

Yabut,

co-complainant

Amelia Yambao on July 16,

hers

in

1998

Administrative

the

the

herein

prevented

matter

that

asked

truth

case,

because I was the one who

or

called for that dialogue and

investigation conducted or

not Mrs. Yabut, thus I never

no

that

the

DECS

there

was

being

of

the

of

hearing

gave

any

authority

Hence, petitioner filed this petition. Petitioner contends

any

that public respondent committed grave abuse of

anyone

to

person

who

was

not

of

the

school

member
faculty

or

invite

to

an

discretion in dismissing her complaint for lack of

probable cause. 11

employee

Public respondent, in his Comment, maintains that he

thereof."

did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing

Clearly, the letter of Ms. Yabut and the

aforequoted
respondent

counter-affidavit
Pascua

petitioner's complaint in OMB 1-99-2467. 12

of

belie

In their Comment, private respondents claim that

the

petitioner filed this petition out of time. Hence, this

commission of perjury since there was

petition should be dismissed outright. On the merits,

no deliberate assertion of falsehood on

private respondents submit that public respondent

a material matter.
Respondent
likewise
charged.

be

correctly

Ronnie
indicted

Since

it

Turla
for
was

could
the

not

dismissed

crime

Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 65"). 14

The Issues

deliberate assertion of falsehood on the

The petition raises these issues:

part of respondent Ronnie Turla. 10

but

1. Whether petitioner filed the petition

public

respondent denied her motion in the 19 June 2000

Order.

against

her petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997

way. There was also no willful and

reconsideration

charge

In her Reply, petitioner counters that she timely filed

respondent

it would be truthful of him to state that

sought

perjury

them. 13

Pascua who called him to that meeting,

Petitioner

the

on time; and
2. Whether

public

committed

grave

respondent
abuse

of

discretion

in

dismissing

the

The contention has no merit. Section 27 is no longer in

complaint in OMB 1-99-2467 for

force

lack of probable cause.

Desierto 16 declared it unconstitutional for expanding

this

Court

in Fabian

of Article

The petition, while filed on time, has no merit.

VI,

Section

30

of

the

Constitution.

Furthermore, Section 27 relates only to appeals from

rulings

The Petition was Filed on Time

Private respondents contend that petitioner filed this
petition beyond the ten-day period provided in Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770. 15 Section 27 states in
part:
Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.
...

of

the

Ombudsman

in

administrative

disciplinary cases. It does not apply to appeals from

the Ombudsman's rulings in criminal cases such as the
present case. 17
The

remedy

of

an

aggrieved

party

in

criminal

complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this

Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, we
held in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario: 18

In all administrative disciplinary cases,

orders, directives, or decisions of the
of

the

Ombudsman

may

be

appealed to the Supreme Court by filing

a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the motion for reconsideration
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

v.

the Court's jurisdiction without its consent in violation

The Ruling of the Court

Office

because

The Ombudsman Act specifically deals

with the remedy of an aggrieved party
from orders, directives and decisions of
the

Ombudsman

disciplinary
in Fabian,

cases.
the

in

administrative
As

aggrieved

we

ruled

party

[in

administrative cases] is given the right

to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such
right of appeal is not granted to parties
aggrieved by orders and decisions of

the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like

The Public Respondent did not Gravely Abuse

finding probable cause to indict accused

His Discretion in Dismissing OMB 1-99-2467

persons.

We reiterate this Court's policy of non-interference

However, an aggrieved party is not

with the Ombudsman's exercise of his constitutionally

without recourse where the finding of

mandated prosecutory powers. 19 We explained the

the Ombudsman . . . is tainted with

reason

grave abuse of discretion, amounting to

Ombudsman: 20

lack

[or]

excess

of

certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997

of

Civil

such

policy

in Ocampo,

IV

jurisdiction. An

aggrieved party may file a petition for

Rules

for

Procedure.

(Emphasis

supplied)

The rule is based not only upon respect

for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman but upon

Petitioner precisely availed of such remedy when she

practicality

filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging

functions of the courts will be grievously

that public respondent gravely abused his discretion in

hampered

dismissing her complaint against private respondents.

assailing the dismissal of investigatory

Under Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, petitioner

proceedings conducted by the Office of

had 60 days from her receipt of the 19 June 2000

the

Order within which to file this petition. Petitioner

complaints filed before it, in much the

received a copy of the 19 June 2000 Order on 13 July

same way that the courts would be

2000. Thus, petitioner had until 11 September 2000

extremely swamped if they could be

within which to file this petition. Petitioner did so on 11

compelled to review the exercise of

August 2000. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on

discretion on the part of the fiscals or

time.

prosecuting attorneys each time they

as
by

well.

Otherwise,

innumerable

Ombudsman

with

the

petitions

regard

to

v.

decide to file an information in court or

deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and,

dismiss

(d) that the sworn statement or affidavit

complaint

by

private

complainant.

containing the falsity is required by law

or

The Court, in the present case, finds no reason to

made

for

legal

purpose.23 (Emphasis supplied)

deviate from this long-standing policy.

Petitioner contends that public respondent committed

Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and

grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint

third elements are absent here in that private

for perjury for lack of probable cause. The contention

respondents' statements in their counter-affidavits

is untenable. Probable cause, as used in preliminary

in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were not material to that

investigations, is defined as the "existence of such

case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate

facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a

assertion of falsehood.

reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the

On the Element of Materiality

knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged

In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is

was

the "main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or

guilty

of

the

crime

for

which

he

was

prosecuted." 21 The elements of perjury under Article

any

183 22 of the Revised Penal Code are:

fact . . . ." 24 To hold private respondents liable, there

(a) that the accused made a statement

circumstance

which

tends

to

prove

that

must be evidence that their assailed statements in

an

OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were the subject of inquiry in

affidavit upon a material matter; (b)

that case. Petitioner has presented no such evidence.

that the statement or affidavit was

The records are hardly helpful, as petitioner did not

made

furnish the Court a copy of her complaint in OMB-ADM-

under

oath

before

or

executed

competent

officer,

authorized to receive and administer

1-99-0387.

oath; (c) that in that statement or

What is before the Court is a portion of respondent

affidavit, the accused made a willful and

Pascua's counter-affidavit in that case as quoted by

public respondent in his 4 April 2000 Resolution.

and

Admittedly, some inference is possible from this

requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua, it was

quoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioner's

respondent Pascua's consent to their request which led

complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is that respondent

to the holding of the meeting. Thus, respondent

Pascua prevented her from taking part in the 16 July

Pascua's statement in question is not false much less

1998 meeting. However, it would be improper for the

malicious. It is a good faith interpretation of events

Court to rely on such inference because the element of

leading to the holding of the meeting.

materiality must be established by evidence and not

left to inference. 25

some

Regarding

unidentified

respondent

counter-affidavit

in

Pascua's

personnel

allegation

in

OMB-ADM-1-99-0387

duplication with a slight deviation of fact" of the DECS

that OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is significantly the same as

administrative case petitioner and Yabut filed against

petitioner's

complaint

respondent Pascua, petitioner has not shown why this

against respondent Pascua before the DECS is

is false. Petitioner again did not furnish the Court a

immaterial to the inferred issue.

copy of her and Yabut's complaint with the DECS.

On

the

Element

of

Deliberate

Assertion

of Falsehood

mere

"rehash

that

not prosper because respondent Pascua's statement

administrative

his

petitioner's

Yabut's

was

who

At any rate, petitioner's complaint for perjury will still

and

complaint

ACNTS

and

Respondent Turla's statement in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387

that respondent Pascua called the 16 July 1998

The third element of perjury requires that the accused

meeting was a mere reiteration of what respondent

willfully and deliberately assert a falsehood. Good faith

Pascua told him. Consequently, it was correct for

or lack of malice is a valid defense. 26Here, the Court

public respondent to hold that since respondent Turla

finds that respondent Pascua's statement in his

merely repeated what he heard from respondent

counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that he called

Pascua, he could not be held liable for making a false

the 16 July 1998 meeting does not constitute a

and malicious statement. IEHTaA

deliberate assertion of falsehood. While it was Yabut

There is grave abuse of discretion where power is

EJERCITO

ESTRADA

and

THE

exercised in arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of

HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF

passion or hostility. The abuse must be so patent and

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to

a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
DECISION

contemplation of law. 27 No such conduct can be

imputed on public respondent. Public respondent
disposed of petitioner's complaint consistent with
applicable law.

BRION, J p:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. The Resolution

The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this

dated 4 April 2000 and the Order dated 19 June 2000

Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 to seek the reversal

of respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon are

of the Sandiganbayan's Joint Resolution dated July 12,

AFFIRMED.

2004,

granting

respondent

Joseph

Ejercito

Estrada's (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case

SO ORDERED.

No. 26565. 2

||| (Acua v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon , G.R. No.

144692, [January 31, 2005], 490 PHIL 640-653)

THE FACTS
On

April

4,

2001,

an

Information

for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558)

was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent

EN BANC

Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information

[G.R. Nos. 164368-69. April 2, 2009.]

PEOPLE

OF

PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

THE
JOSEPH

for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No.

26565,
Amended

was

likewise

Information

reads: HTaIAC

filed
in

against

Crim.

Estrada.

Case

No.

The

26565

That on or about 04 February 2000, or

Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently

sometime prior or subsequent thereto,

consolidated for joint trial. Still another Information,

in the City of Manila, Philippines and

this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No.

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against

Court, the above-named accused, being

Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim.

then President of the Republic of the

Cases No. 26558 and 26565.

Philippines, without having been duly

authorized,

judicially

or

administratively, taking advantage of

Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a

warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.

his position and committing the offense

On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a

in relation to office, i.e., in order to

Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and

CONCEAL

HE

decide the charges of plunder and related cases

ACQUIRED during his tenure and his

(illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent

true identity as THE President of the

Estrada. 3

Republic of the Philippines, did then and

At the trial, the People presented testimonial and

there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally

documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the

REPRESENT HIMSELF AS 'JOSE VELARDE'

Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and

IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use

perjury. The People's evidence for the illegal alias

and

charge, as

THE

employ

ill-gotten

the

SAID

wealth

alias

"Jose

Velarde" which IS neither his registered

name at birth nor his baptismal name,
in signing documents with Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

summarized

by

the

Sandiganbayan,

of

Philippine

and

Industrial

consisted of: EcHTCD

A. The

testimonies
Commercial

Bank (PCIB) officers

Clarissa

Ocampo (Ocampo) and

Manuel

G.
Atty.

Curato(Curato) who

commonly

declared

that

on

b. 8

February 4, 2000, Estrada opened

a numbered trust account (Trust
Account

C-163) with

PCIB

and

c. 22

Aprodicio

Lacquian

and

d. 24

e. 25

B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills

who declared that a certain Baby
times

with

her;

that

Ortaliza deposited several checks

in

PCIB

Savings

Account

No.

0160-62502-5 under the account

name

"Jose

Velarde"

on

the

following dates (as evidenced by

(Exh.

November

1999

(Exh.

November

1999

(Exh.

December

1999

(Exh.

1999

(Exh.

1999

(Exh.

"QQQQQ")
g. 21

December
"RRRRR")

Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted

several

1999

"PPPPP")
f. 20

Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan,

November

"OOOOO")

Fernando Chua were present on

that occasion;

(Exh.

"NNNNN")

Ocampo and Curato also testified

that

1999

"LLLLL")

signed as "Jose Velarde" in the

account opening documents; both

November

h. 29

December
"SSSSS")

i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT")

j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU")
k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV")

deposit receipts duly marked in

l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")

evidence):
a. 20

October
"MMMMM")

1999

(Exh.

(2) Documents

duly

identified

by

witnesses showing that Lucena

Ortaliza was employed in the

Office of the Vice President and,

evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias)

later on, in the Office of the

was anchored on the following grounds: 11

President when Estrada occupied

these

positions

and

1. Of

when

Savings

Account

thirty-five

presented

deposits were made to the Jose

Velarde

the
only

No.

by

two

(35)
the

(2)

witnesses

prosecution,

witnesses,

Ms.

Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel

0160-62502-5.

Curato,

testified

that

on

one

The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the

occasion (4 February 2000), they

consolidated

saw movant use the name "Jose

cases,

which

the

Sandiganbayan

admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October

13,

2003. 4 The

reconsider

the

accused

separately

Sandiganbayan

moved

to

Resolution; 5 the

People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated

Comment/Opposition

to

the

motions. 6 The

Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution

dated November 17, 2003. 7
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense
moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in
these cases. 8 In its Joint Resolution dated March 10,
2004, 9 the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense
leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565
(illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).

Velarde"; cCSDaI
2. The use of numbered accounts and
the

like

was

legal

and

was

prohibited only in late 2001 as

can

be

gleaned

from

Bangko

Sentral Circular No. 302, series of

2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and
habitual

use

documents
prosecution
documents

of

alias

offered
are
which,

as
by

the
the

banking
by

their

nature,

are

confidential

Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim.

cannot

be

Case Nos. 26565 and 26905. 10 His demurrer to

following proper procedures; and

revealed

and

without

4. The use of alias is absorbed in

regard

plunder.
The

People

to

convict

movant

for

illegal use of alias; and

opposed

the

demurrers

through

4. Contrary

to

the

submission

of

Consolidated Opposition that presented the following

movant, the instant case of illegal

arguments: 12

use of alias is not absorbed in

1. That the use of fictitious names in

bank

transaction

was

not

expressly prohibited until BSP No.

302 is of no moment considering
that as early asCommonwealth
Act No. 142, the use of alias was
already
being

prohibited.
prosecuted

of C.A.

No.

Movant
for

142 and

is

violation
not

BSP

Circular No. 302;

plunder.
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through
a Consolidated Reply Opposition.
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN'S RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the
Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient
points of the assailed resolution are:
First the coverage of Estrada's indictment. The
Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence

2. Movant's reliance on Ursua vs. Court

of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996])
is misplaced;

for the indictment are those relating to what is

described in the Information i.e., the testimonies
and documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163
on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out

3. Assuming arguendo that C.A.

No.

that the use of the disjunctive "or" between "on or

requires

about 04 February 2000" and "sometime prior or

publication of the alias and the

subsequent thereto" means that the act/s allegedly

habitual

the

committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually

prosecution has presented more

taken place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of

142,

as

amended,
use

thereof,

than sufficient evidence in this

the

conjunctive

was

simply

the

prosecution's

the alias was used in connection with the opening of a

procedural tool to guard against any variance between

numbered trust account made during the effectivity

the date stated in the Information and that proved

of R.A. No. 1405, as amended, 14 and prior to the

during the trial in a situation in which time was not a

enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160. 15

material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean

and cannot be read as a roving commission that

Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde":

and

a. Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his

distinct from those that took place on the single date

dealings with Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4,

"on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or

2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the

subsequent thereto". The Sandiganbayan ruled that

acts imputed to Estrada under the Information were

the use of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from

the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only.

interpreting the Information any other way. IcCEDA

Additionally, the phrase, "Estrada did . . . represent

includes

acts

and/or

eventsseparate

Second the People's failure to present evidence

that proved Estrada's commission of the offense. The
Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present
evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished
under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142),as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals. 13 It
ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the
context

of CA

142 only

is public and habitual.

if
In

the

use

Estrada's

of

the

alias

case,

the

Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles

was not as simple because of the complications
resulting from the nature of the transaction involved

himself as 'Jose Velarde' in several transactions",

standing alone, violates Estrada's right to be informed
of the nature and the cause of the accusation, because
it is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified
and explained by the succeeding phrase "and use
and employ the said alias 'Jose Velarde'" which "is
neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal
name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank
and/or

other

representations

corporate
before

entities".
persons

Thus,

other

Estrada's

than

those

mentioned in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza

and Dichavez do not fall within the "Equitable PCI Bank
and/or other corporate entities" specified in the

Information. Estrada's representations with Ortaliza

to secrecy by the same law cannot be

and Dichavez are not therefore covered by the

considered as 'public' as to fall within

indictment.

the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On

account of the absolute confidentiality
of the transaction, it cannot be said that

b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the

movant intended to be known by this

principle in the law of libel that mere communication

name

to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that

name. Confidentiality

the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is

negate publicity. Ursua instructs:

defined under the law on libel; additionally, the

application of the libel law definition is onerous to the
accused

and

is

precluded

by

the

ruling

in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be

construed strictly against the State and favorably for
the accused. It ruled that the definition under the law
on libel, even if it applies, considers a communication
to

third

person

covered

by

the

privileged

communication rule to be non-actionable. Estrada's

use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one
such privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405,
as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:
Movant's act of signing "Jose Velarde" in
bank

documents

being

absolutely

confidential, the witnessing thereof by

bank officers who were likewise sworn

in

addition

to

his

and

real

secrecy

Hence, the use of a fictitious

name

or

different

name

belonging to another person in a

single instance without any sign
or

indication

that

the

user intends to be known by

this name in addition to his real
name from that day forth does
not fall within the prohibition
in C.A.

No.

142 as

amended. IESAac
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention
not to be publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde" is
shown by the nature of a numbered account a
perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust

Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No.

numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further

142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be

ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to

harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No. 1405and

disclose his real identity the obligation R.A. No.

R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute

6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of

should be construed in a way that will harmonize it

assets and liabilities. 16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No.

with

1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the

Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the

absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the

present case, led it to conclude that the use of an alias

amount of his bank deposits, but he was under no

within the context of a bank transaction (specifically,

obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the

the opening of a numbered account made before bank

bank account (such as the name he used to open it).

officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A.

Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No.

9160. 17 The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute

existing

laws.

reasonable

scrutiny,

the

No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No.

142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.

prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of

THE PETITION

anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names,

The People filed this petition raising the following

and

issues:

all

other

similar

accounts,

is

legislative

acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed

in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true
identities.

The

Sandiganbayan

prohibition

was

lifted

from

noted

Bangko

that

the

Sentral

ng

Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000

another confirmation that the opening of a numbered
trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened
on February 4, 2000.

1. Whether

the

court a

quo gravely

erred and abused its discretion in

dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565
and in holding that the use by
respondent Joseph Estrada of his
alias

"Jose

Velarde"

was

not

public despite the presence of

Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and

Fernando Chua on 4 February

1405 and Commonwealth Act No.

2000;

142 were proper; HIAESC

2. Whether

the

court a

quo gravely

5. Whether

the

court a

quo gravely

erred and abused its discretion in

erred and abused its discretion in

dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565

limiting

and in holding that the use by

amended

respondent Joseph Estrada of his

Case No. 26565 to the use of the

alias "Jose Velarde" was allowable

alias

under banking rules, despite the

respondent

clear

February 4, 2000;

prohibition

underCommonwealth

Act

No.

142;

6. Whether

the

coverage

Information

"Jose

the

of
in

the
Crim.

Velarde"

Joseph

court a

Estrada

by
on

quo gravely

erred and abused its discretion in

3. Whether

the

court a

quo gravely

departing from its earlier final

erred and abused its discretion in

finding on the non-applicability

dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565

ofUrsua v. Court of Appeals and

and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as

forcing

an exception to the illegal use of

instant case.

alias

punishable

under Commonwealth

Act

No.

142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization
and

application

court a

made

quo of R.A.

by

the
No.

its

application

to

the

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition has no merit.
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua
Ruling
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:

Section

1. Except

pseudonym

proceedings like those legally provided

solely for literary, cinema, television,

to obtain judicial authority for a change

radio or other entertainment purposes

of name and no person shall be allowed

and in athletic events where the use of

to secure such judicial authority for

pseudonym

more than one alias. The petition for an

is

as

normally

accepted

practice, no person shall use any name

alias

different from the one with which he

baptismal and family name and the

was registered at birth in the office of

name recorded in the civil registry, if

the local civil registry or with which he

different, his immigrant's name, if an

was baptized for the first time, or in

alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such

case of an alien, with which he was

names other than his original or real

registered in the bureau of immigration

name, specifying the reason or reasons

upon entry; or such substitute name as

for

may

authority for the use of alias, the

have

competent

been
court:

authorized
Provided,

by

That

shall

the

Christian

set

desired
name

forth

alias.

the

person's

The

and

judicial

the

alien

persons whose births have not been

immigrant's name shall be recorded in

registered in any local civil registry and

the proper local civil registry, and no

who have not been baptized, have one

person shall use any name or names

year from the approval of this act within

other than his original or real name

which to register their names in the civil

unless the same is or are duly recorded

registry of their residence. The name

in the proper local civil registry.

shall comprise the patronymic name

and one or two surnames.

How this law is violated has been answered by

the Ursua definition of an alias "a name or names

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an

used by a person or intended to be used by

alias shall apply for authority therefor in

himpublicly and habitually usually

in

business

transactions in addition to his real name by which he

names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the

is registered at birth or baptized the first time or

act of using an alias name, unless such

substitute

alias was duly authorized by proper

name

authorized

authority". There

must

by

be,

in

competent
the

words

of Ursua, a "sign or indication that the user intends to

be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his
real name from that day forth . . . [for the use of alias
to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No.
142 as amended". 18

judicial proceedings and recorded in the

civil register. 19
Following the doctrine of stare decisis, 20 we are
guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished
under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence
to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the

Ursua further relates the historical background and

application of and the determination of criminal

rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as

liability under CA No. 142.

follows: cDCSET
The

Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid

enactment

142 was

the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from

made primarily to curb the common

Estrada's position in the government; at the time of

practice among the Chinese of adopting

the commission of the offense, he was the President of

scores of different names and aliases

the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true

which created tremendous confusion in

name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify

the field of trade. Such a practice

a distinction between a man on the street, on one

almost bordered on the crime of using

hand, and the President of the Republic, on the other,

fictitious

obvious

for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place,

successfully

the law does not make any distinction, expressly or

reasons

names
could

of C.A.

No.

which
not

be

for

maintained against the Chinese who,

impliedly,

rightly

they

treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact

one

allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph

or

possessed

wrongly,
a

claimed

thousand

and

that

would

justify

differential

Estrada, which name he has used even when he was

means "otherwise known as" (Webster

already the President of the Philippines. Even the

Third New International Dictionary, 1993

petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the screen

ed., p. 53). The charge of using an

name of the accused, as shown by the title of the

"alias" logically implies that another

present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make

name

based on the People's claim unduly prejudices Estrada;

habitually. Otherwise, he will not be

this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142,

known by such name. In any case, the

as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against

amended

the State and in favor of the accused. 21 The mode of

"several transactions" and signing of

violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever

documents with the Equitable PCI Bank

the accused may be.

and/or other corporate entities where

The People also calls our attention to an earlier

Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6,
2002)

denying

Estrada's

motion

to

quash

the

the

has

been

used

information

above-mentioned

publicly

and

adverts

to

alias

was

allegedly employed by the accused.

The facts alleged in the information are

Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected

distinctly

different

from

facts

the application of Ursua under the following tenor:

established in the Ursua case where

another name was used by the accused
in a single instance without any sign or

The use of the term "alias" in the

indication that that [sic] he intended to

Amended Information in itself serves to

be known from that day by this name in

bring this case outside the ambit of the

addition to his real name. 22

ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of

Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]),

on

which the accused heavily relies in his

motion

to

quash.

The

term

"alias"

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely

abused its discretion in
applying Ursua notwithstanding this

earlier final ruling on its non-applicability a ruling

The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415

that binds the parties in the present case. The

having resolved only an interlocutory

People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to

matter,

the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it

judicata cannot

resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in

case. There

the reversal of its earlier final ruling. SDEHCc

judicata where the previous order

the

principle
be

of res

applied

can

in

be

this

no res

two

in question was not an order or

reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a

judgment determinative of an issue

mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a motion

of fact pending before the court but

to quash 23 that cannot be given the attributes of

was

finality and immutability that are generally accorded to

because it required the parties to

judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole,

perform

of

case. 24 The

adjudication. In this case, the lifting of

Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order

the restraining order paved the way for

because its effects would only be provisional in

the possession of the fishpond on the

character, and would still require the issuing court to

part

undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the

representatives pending the resolution

controversy to rest. 25 It is basic remedial law that an

of the main action for injunction. In

interlocutory order is always under the control of the

other words, the main issue of whether

court

or

We

find

or

no

merit

particular

and

may

be

in

this

matters

modified

argument

in,

or

for

rescinded

upon

only

of

not

an

interlocutory

certain

acts

petitioners

private

for

and/or

respondent

order
final

their

may

be

sufficient grounds shown at any time before final

considered a sublessee or a transferee

judgment. 26 Perez v. Court of Appeals, 27 albeit a

of the lease entitled to possess the

civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory

fishpond under the circumstances of the

order carries no res adjudicata effects. SaysPerez:

case had yet to be resolved when the

restraining order was lifted. 28

Second, in

the

earlier

the

was designed to cause and did cause "confusion and

Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the

fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law

Information to determine the sufficiency of these

and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People

allegations

any

also argues that the evidence it presented more than

evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present

satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as amended,

demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a

and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that

fuller view of the prosecution's case, and was faced

Estrada's use of the alias was public.

and

motion

did

not

to

quash,

consider

with the issue of whether the prosecution's evidence

was

sufficient

Information.

to

Under

prove
these

the

allegations

differing

of

the

views,

the

Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on

the application of Ursua, the leading case in the
application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is
not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That
there is no error of law is strengthened by our
consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the
application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursua's jurisprudential
binding effect, the People also argues in its petition
that Estrada's case is different from Ursua's for the
following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and
intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in
addition to the name "Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estrada's
use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single
transaction; and (3) the use of the alias "Jose Velarde"

In light of our above conclusions and based on the

parties'

expressed

examine within

the

positions,
Ursua

we

shall

framework the

now

assailed

Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to

evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to
show

that

the

Sandiganbayan

evidence
satisfied

it

presented

with

the

the Ursua requirements,

particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality

in the use of an alias. TAECaD
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely
erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage
of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565
to Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde" on February
4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction
one that took place on February 4, 2000 but there
were other transactions covered by the phrase "prior

to or subsequent thereto; the Information specifically

complaint or information the precise date the offense

referred to "several transactions" . . . "with Equitable

was committed except when it is a material ingredient

PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities". To the

of the crime. This liberality allegedly shaped the time-

People, the restrictive finding that the phrase "prior

tested rule that when the "time" given in the complaint

to or subsequent thereto" is absorbed by the phrase

is not of the essence of the offense, the time of the

"on or about 04 February 2000" drastically amends

commission of the offense does not need to be proven

the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive

as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if

criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the

the proof shows that the offense was committed at any

transactions involved and the documents signed with

time within the period of the statute of limitations and

various entities; there is the undeniable essential

before the commencement of the action (citing People

relationship between the allegations of the multiplicity

v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US

of transactions, on one hand, and the additional

v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of

antecedent of "prior to or subsequent thereto", on the

the commission of an offense are liberally interpreted,

other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the

the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely

phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" into a useless

abused its discretion in disregarding the additional

appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and

clause "prior to or subsequent thereto"; under the

totally unwarranted escape route.

liberality

The People further argues that the allegation of time is

the least exacting in satisfying the constitutional
requirement that the accused has to be informed of
the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation
of the approximate date of the commission of the
offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule
provides that it is not necessary to state in the

principle,

the

allegations

of

the

acts

constitutive of the offense finally determine the

sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus
claims that no surprise could have taken place that
would

prevent

Estrada

from

properly

defending

himself; the information fully notified him that he was

being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more
than just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.

At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the

on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its

right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause

commission. 31

of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of

the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional
right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense in the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense

was

committed. 29 As

to

the

cause

of

accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as

constituting

the

offense

and

the

qualifying

and

The

information must at

all

times embody

the

essential elements of the crime charged by setting

forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that he can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense. 32 In
short, the allegations in the complaint or information,
as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused
the primary reader of and the party directly affected
by the complaint or information of the charge/s
laid. HEIcDT

aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary

and concise language and not necessarily in the

The heretofore cited Information states that ". . . on

language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient

or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or

to enable a person of common understanding to

subsequent

know the offense charged and the qualifying and

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this

aggravating circumstances, and for the court to

Honorable

pronounce

[did] . . . willfully, unlawfully and criminally

judgment. 30 The

date

of

the

thereto,
Court,

in

the

the

City

of

above-named

Manila,
accused

commission of the offense need not be precisely

REPRESENT

stated in the complaint or information except when the

SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ

precise date is a material ingredient of the offense.

the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither

The offense may be alleged to have been committed

his registered name at birth nor his baptismal

HIMSELF

AS

'JOSE

VELARDE'

IN

name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI

approximate dates, so that the phrase "sometime prior

Bank and/or other corporate entities."

or

We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan's

reading of the Information, as this was how the
accused might have similarly read and understood the
allegations in the Information and, on this basis,
prepared his defense. Broken down into its component
parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly
states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before
February

4,

2000;

(3) OR sometime

prior

or

subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila,

Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in
several

transactions

in

signing

documents

with

Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

subsequent

thereto"

would

effectively

be

surplusage that has no meaning separately from the

"on or about" already expressed. This consequent
uselessness of the "prior or subsequent thereto"
phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and
necessary consequence of the use of the "OR"
between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that
referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second
phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very
different (and would have been clearly in accord with
the

People's

Information

present

simply

interpretation)

used "AND" instead

had

the

of "OR" to

separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various

transactions occurring on various dates and occasions

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving

all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be

the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank

disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision

and/or other corporate entities all had their reference

in the use of "OR" is the reality the case has to live

to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or

with. To act contrary to this reality would violate

about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly

Estrada's right to be informed of the nature and cause

implying that all these transactions took place only on

of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on

February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime

several separate days that the People claims would

before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the

result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to

Information could have simply said "on or about

prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the

February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative

single day mentioned in the Information.

Separately from the constitutional dimension of the

documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public"

allegation of time in the Information, another issue

use of an alias that violates CA No. 142.

that the allegation of time and our above conclusion

raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a
violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged
in the Information.

On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues

that to premise the validity of Estrada's prosecution for
violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is
gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave

The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on

abuse of discretion; no banking law provision allowing

the People's case, as it deals a fatal blow on the

the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts

People's claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose

existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention or

Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an

industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by the

alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual",

legislature. Additionally, that Estrada's prosecution

as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.

was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated

This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition

October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada

under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.

stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized

The issues of publicity, numbered accounts,

and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.

since 1936, and not with a violation of a mere BSP

Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior
to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential
because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias
(except for certain purposes which do not include
banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in CA No.

The People claims that even on the assumption that

142 exempted

the

use

of

aliases

in

banking

Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy

transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit

under the law, the presence of two other persons who

its application; it was therefore grave error for the

are not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian and

Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point,

Fernando Chua when Estrada's signed the bank

bank regulations being mere issuances cannot amend,

modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting and

loans). A trust account, according to the People, may

enforceable provision of CA No. 142.

not be considered a deposit because it does not create

On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and

its relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing
in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No.
142's coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People
posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be
harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at

the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and

deposit operations are treated separately and are
different in legal contemplation; trust operation is
separate and distinct from banking and requires a
grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not
covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as
amended). CDScaT

least related with one another. The three laws which

The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan's

the

not

conclusion that the transaction or communication was

remotely related to one another; they each deal with a

privileged in nature was erroneous a congruent

different subject matter, prohibits a different act,

interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows

governs a different conduct, and covers a different

that a person who signs in a public or private

class of persons, 33 and there was no need to force

transaction a name or alias, other than his original

their application to one another. Harmonization of

name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held

laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of

liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank

conflict or incongruence between or among the

employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank

provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in

transactions except in the circumstances enumerated

the present case. HEDSIc

in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the

Sandiganbayan

tried

to

harmonize

are

The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not
apply to trust transactions, such as Trust Account No.
C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple

prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees

and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not
prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his
use of an alias to other people, including Ocampo and

Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit and

tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias

use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.

is more than mere communication to a third person;

Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan

ruling that the use of an alias before bank officers does
not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the
commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of illgotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an
anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to
silence bank officials and employees from reporting
the commission of crimes. The People contends that

the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be

made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to
cause it to become generally known. In order to be
held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the
alias must have held himself out as a person who shall
publicly be known under that other name. In other
words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be
manifest.

the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when

Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage

Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust

for the commission of crimes and cannot be so

Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his

interpreted;

interpreted,

intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose

understood and applied so that right and justice would

Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua

prevail.

were not part of the public who had no access to

the

law

can

only

be

Estrada's privacy and to the confidential matters that

We see no merit in these arguments.

transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President;

We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the

Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared

Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel

matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while

that mere communication to a third person is

Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office

publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142.

and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy

Our

the

and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be

requirement that there be intention by the user to be

said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be

culpable and the historical reasons we cited above

for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian

close

reading

of Ursua

particularly,

and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The

used therein is to be understood broadly

same holds true for Estrada's alleged representations

and not limited only to accounts which

with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for

give

these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada's

relationship between the depositor and

representations to these people were made in privacy

the bank.

and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

rise

to

creditor-debtor

The policy behind the law is laid down in

Section 1:

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the

SEC. 1. It is hereby declared to be

indictment

the policy of the Government to

rests,

affords

Estrada

reasonable

expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act

give

related to the opening of a trust account a

people to deposit their money in

transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely

banking

confidential

in

rejected,

discourage private hoarding so

in Ejercito

v.

People's

that the same may be properly

nitpicking

nature. 34 We

previously

Sandiganbayan, 35 the

argument

on

the

alleged

dichotomy

encouragement

utilized

to

institutions

by banks in

the

and to

authorized

between bank deposits and trust transactions, when

loans to assist in the economic

we said: EHSADc

development

of

the

country.

(Underscoring supplied)

The contention that trust accounts are

not covered by the term "deposits", as

If

the

money

deposited

under

an

used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that

account may be used by bank for

they do not entail a creditor-debtor

authorized loans to third persons, then

relationship between the trustor and the

such account, regardless of whether it

bank, does not lie. An examination of

creates a creditor-debtor relationship

the law shows that the term "deposits"

between the depositor and the bank,

falls under the category of accounts

SEC.

which the law precisely seeks to protect

whatever nature with bank or

for

banking

the

purpose

of

boosting

the

economic development of the country.

one such account. The Trust Agreement

between petitioner and Urban Bank
provides that the trust account covers
"deposit, placement or investment of
funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf
petitioner.

The

money

deposited

under Trust Account No. 858, was,

therefore,

intended

not

merely

to

remain with the bank but to be invested

by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of
account

is

not

protected

byR.A.

1405 would encourage private hoarding

of

funds

that

could

otherwise

be

invested by bank in other ventures,

contrary to the policy behind the law.

in

political

was

understood broadly:

intended

to

the

by

the

subdivisions
are

and

its

hereby

considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not
be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person, government
official,

bureau

office, except upon

or
written

permission of the depositor, or in

cases of impeachment, or upon
order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or in
cases where

the

money deposited or invested is

litigation.

"deposits"

the

issued

instrumentalities,

more

that

in

Government of the Philippines, its

the

shows

institutions

bonds

Section 2 of the same law in fact even

clearly

deposits of

Philippines including investments

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt,

of

2. All

term
be

subject

matter
(Emphasis

underscoring supplied)

of

the
and

The

phrase

"of

whatever

nature"

imposed by R.A. No. 1405 on the bank officers; what is

proscribes any restrictive interpretation

essentially significant is the privacy situation that is

of "deposits". Moreover, it is clear from

necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This

the immediately quoted provision that,

statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively

generally, the law applies not only to

negate a conclusion that the transaction was done

money which is deposited but also to

publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.

those which are invested. This further

shows that the law was not intended to
apply only to "deposits" in the strict
sense of the word. Otherwise, there
would have been no need to add the
phrase "or invested. cSICHD

We

The enactment of R.A. No. 9160, on the other hand, is

a significant development only because it clearly
manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered
accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted
banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law
or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an

Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad

indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent

enough to cover Trust Account No.

law

858. 36

constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use

have

consistently

ruled

that

bank

deposits

cannot

be

maintained

without violating

the

of ex post facto laws. 38

under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits

We hasten to add that this holistic application and

Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of

interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt

privacy. 37 Given the private nature of Estrada's act of

to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of

signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the

the

opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim

necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for

that there was already a public use of alias when

culpability,

Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need

of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estrada's

not even consider here the impact of the obligations

use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that the

offense
as

punished
amplified

under CA

No.

in Ursua. The

142 must
application

law considers private or, at the very least, where the

requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as

law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to

they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that

the parties to the transactions; it is at this point

we so declare. We do so now in this review and

that R.A. No.

accordingly find no reversible error of law in the

1405tangentially interfaces with

an

indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is no

actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No.
1405 that

requires

harmonization.

Each

operates

within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read

assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

we DENY the

petition for lack of merit.

together when these spheres interface with one

SO ORDERED. cEaTHD

another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent

||| (People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, [April 2,

2009], 602 PHIL 226-254)

vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada,

cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his
indictment.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we
simply looked at the totality of the circumstances
obtaining

in

Estrada's

use

of

the

Velarde"vis--vis the Ursua requisites.

alias

We

do

SECOND DIVISION

"Jose
not

[G.R. No. 186030. March 21, 2012.]

decide here whether Estrada's use of an alias when he

occupied the highest executive position in the land

NORMA DELOS REYES VDA. DEL

was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the

PRADO, EULOGIA R. DEL PRADO,

Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable

NORMITA R. DEL PRADO and

for the offense charged based on the evidence the

RODELIA R. DEL

People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt

PRADO, petitioners,vs. PEOPLE OF

must be based on the evidence and proof beyond

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability

DECISION

This petition stems from an Information for falsification

under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 (4), of
the Revised Penal Code filed against herein petitioners

REYES, J p:

Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado (Norma), Normita

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to assail and
set aside the following issuances of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in the case docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.

Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado (Eulogia) and

Rodelia 3 Del Prado (Rodelia) with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, allegedly
committed as follows:

31225 and entitled "Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del

That on or about the 19th day of July,

Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado, Normita R. Del Prado and

1991, in the [M]unicipality of Lingayen,

Rodelia R. Del Prado v. People of the

[P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines,

Philippines": SDITAC

and within the jurisdiction of this

1)the Decision 1 dated September 15,

2008 affirming with modification
the decision and order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
38, Lingayen, Pangasinan in
Criminal Case No. L-8015; and
2)the Resolution 2 dated January 6,

Honorable Court, the above-named

accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsified, execute[d] and
cause[d] the preparation of the DEED
OF SUCCESSION, by stating and making
it appear in said document that they

2009 denying the motion for

were the only heirs of the late Rafael del

reconsideration of the Decision of

Prado, when in truth and in fact, all the

September 15, 2008.

accused well knew, that Ma. Corazon

The Factual Antecedents

Del Prado-Lim is also an heir who is

entitled to inherit from the late Rafael

Del Prado, and all the accused

Del Prado" to cover the distribution of several

deliberately used the DEED OF

properties owned by the late Rafael, including the

SUCCESSION to claim ownership and

parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title

possession of the land mentioned in the

(OCT) No. P-22848, measuring 17,624 square meters,

DEED OF SUCCESSION to the exclusion

more or less, and situated at Libsong, Lingayen,

of the complainant Ma. Corazon Del

Pangasinan.

Prado-Lim to her damage and prejudice.

Per agreement of the heirs, Corazon was to get a

Contrary to Art. 172 in relation to Art.

3,000-square meter portion of the land covered by

171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 4

OCT No. P-22848. This right of Corazon was also

Upon arraignment, the accused therein entered their

plea of "not guilty". After pre-trial conference, trial on
the merits ensued.
The prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del PradoLim (Corazon), private complainant in the criminal
case, was the daughter of the late Rafael Del Prado
(Rafael) by his marriage to Daisy Cragin (Daisy). After
Daisy died in 1956, the late Rafael married Norma with
whom he had five children, namely: Rafael, Jr., Antonio,
Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia.
The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29,
1979, Corazon, as a daughter of the late Rafael, and
Norma, as the late Rafael's surviving spouse and
representative of their five minor children, executed a
"Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of Rafael

affirmed in the Deed of Exchange dated October 15,

1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she
executed with Norma. acAIES
Corazon, however, later discovered that her right over
the subject parcel of land was never registered by
Norma, contrary to the latter's undertaking. The
petitioners instead executed on July 19, 1991 a Deed
of Succession wherein they, together with Rafael, Jr.
and Antonio, partitioned and adjudicated unto
themselves the property covered by OCT No. P-22848,
to the exclusion of Corazon. The deed was notarized
by Loreto L. Fernando (Loreto), and provides in part:
WHEREAS, on the 12[th] day of July
1978, RAFAEL DEL PRADO[,] SR., died
intestate in the City of Dagupan, leaving

certain parcel of land, and more

name, is the surviving spouse and the

particularly described and bounded to

rest are the children of the decedent;

wit:

xxx xxx xxx

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. P-22848

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in

consideration of the premises and

"A certain parcel of land (Lot No.

invoking the provisions of Rule 74, Sec.

5518, Cad-373-D) Lingayen

1 of the Rules of Court, the parties

Cadastre, situated in Poblacion,

hereto do by these presents, agree to

Lingayen, Pangasinan, Island of

divide and partition the entire estate

Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by

above[-]described and accordingly

Lots Nos. 5522, 5515; and 6287;

adjudicate, as they do hereby

on the SE., by Lots Nos. 5516,

adjudicate the same among themselves,

5517, 55 and Road; on the SW.,

herein below specified to wit:

by Road, and Lots Nos. 5521,

5510, and 5520; and on the NW.,

xxx xxx xxx 5

by Road; . . . containing an area

By virtue of the said Deed of Succession, OCT No. P-

of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX

22848 was cancelled and several new titles were

HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR

issued under the names of Corazon's co-heirs. When

(17,624) Square Meters, more or

Corazon discovered this, she filed a criminal complaint

less. Covered by Psd-307996

against now petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and

(LRC), consisting of two lots. Lot

Rodelia. Antonio and Rafael, Jr. had both died before

No. 5510-A and Lot 5518-B."

the filing of said complaint.

WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the

Among the witnesses presented during the trial was

only heirs of the decedent, the first

Loreto, who confirmed that upon the request of Norma

and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the deed of

months and one day of prision correccional as

succession. He claimed that the petitioners appeared

maximum. They were also ordered to pay a fine of

and signed the document before him. DEacIT

P5,000.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case

For their defense, the petitioners denied having signed

of non-payment of fine.

the Deed of Succession, or having appeared before

Considering the minority of Rodelia at the time of the

notary public Loreto. They also claimed that Corazon

commission of the crime, she was sentenced to suffer

was not a daughter, but a niece, of the late Rafael.

the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, plus

Norma claimed that she only later knew that a deed of

payment of fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary

succession was prepared by her son Antonio, although

imprisonment in case of non-payment.

she admitted having executed a deed of real estate

mortgage in favor of mortgagee Prudential Bank over
portions of the subject parcel of land already covered
by the new titles.
The Ruling of the MTC

All the petitioners were ordered to indemnify Corazon

in the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to
pay the costs of suit.
Unsatisfied with the MTC's ruling, the petitioners filed a
motion for new trial on the grounds of alleged gross

The MTC rejected for being unsubstantiated the

error of law, irregularities during the trial, and new and

petitioners' denial of any participation in the execution

material evidence. To prove that they did not intend to

of the deed of succession, further noting that they

exclude Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael, the

benefited from the property after its transfer in their

petitioners cited their recognition of Corazon's right to

names. Thus, on August 9, 2006, the court rendered its

the estate in the deed of extra-judicial partition,

decision 6 finding petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita

confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange, joint

and Rodelia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

affidavit and petition for guardianship of minors Rafael,

crime charged, sentencing them to suffer an

Jr., Eulogia, Antonio and Normita, which they had

indeterminate penalty of four months and one day

earlier executed. 7 Again, the petitioners denied

of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four

having signed the deed of succession, and instead

A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of

insisted that their signatures in the deed were forged.

merit by the RTC via its resolution 11 dated October

The motion was denied by the MTC via a

resolution 8 dated December 21, 2006, prompting the
filing of an appeal with the RTC.
The Ruling of the RTC
On August 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its
decision 9 affirming the MTC's decision, with
modification in that the case against Rodelia was
dismissed in view of her minority at the time of the

31, 2007. Hence, Norma, Eulogia and Normita filed a

petition for review with the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 15, 2008, the CA rendered its
decision 12 dismissing the petition and affirming the
RTC's ruling, with modification as to the imposable
penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

commission of the crime. The decretal portion of the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

decision reads: HIaTDS

appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

appealed Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan dated
August 9, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, but
modified as to accused Rodelia R. Del
Prado as the case against her is hereby
DISMISSED on account of her minority
at the time of the commission of the
offense.
SO ORDERED. 10

Decision dated August 10, 2007 and

Order dated October 31, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
Pangasinan, in Crim. Case No. L-8015
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION th
at appellants Norma delos Reyes Vda.
Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado and
Normita R. Del Prado are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
three (3) years, six (6) months and

twenty-one (21) days of prision

EXECUTED BY THE PETITIONERS

correccional, as maximum.

WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF

SO ORDERED. 13

COMPLAINANT MS. CORAZON DEL

PRADO-LIM, SHE WAS

The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners

SPECIFICALLY NAMED AS AN HEIR

was denied by the CA in its resolution 14 dated

WITH CORRESPONDING

January 6, 2009. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners

SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE

appealed from the decision and resolution of the CA to

ESTATE OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL

this Court, through a petition for review

PRADO. CcTHaD

on certiorari 15 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Present Petition

[Link] DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER

COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN

The petitioners present the following assignment of

FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE

errors to support their petition:

GOOD FAITH OF THE PETITIONERS

[Link] DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER

COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT COMPLAINANT MA.
CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM WAS

WHICH NEGATES THE

COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF
FALSIFICATION ON THEIR PART.
[Link] DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER

EXCLUDED AS AN HEIR OF THE

COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN

LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.

CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS

[Link] DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER

COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT IN
SEVERAL
DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS

WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND

LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE OF THE
PETITIONERS NOT HAVING BEEN

OVERCOME BY THE

exclude private complainant Corazon from the estate

PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.

of the late Rafael.

[Link] DUE RESPECT [THE LOWER

COURT ERRED] IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE CASE IS PURELY CIVIL
ONE[,] NOT CRIMINAL. 16
To support their assigned errors, the petitioners invoke
the existence and contents of the several documents
which they had presented before the MTC, including
the deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Rafael Del Prado dated October 29, 1979, confirmation
of subdivision, deed of exchange and petition in the
guardianship proceedings for the minor Del Prado
children filed by Norma, in which documents they
claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is
also an heir of the late Rafael. Given these documents,
the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with
falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir of
their decedent.

This Court's Ruling

The petition is bound to fail.
Only questions of law may be raised
in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
First, the questions being raised by the petitioners
refer to factual matters that are not proper subjects of
a petition for review under Rule 45. Settled is the rule
that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised. It is not this Court's
function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence
already considered in the proceedings below, our
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of
law that may have been committed by the lower court.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
received with respect. A question of law which we may

In sum, the issue for this Court's resolution is whether

pass upon must not involve an examination of the

or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioners'

probative value of the evidence presented by the

conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said

litigants. 17 This is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of

petitioners' defense that they never intended to

the Rules of Court, as amended, which

provides: ITHADC

Section [Link] of petition with

the other hand, there is a question of fact when the

Supreme Court. A party desiring to

doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged

appeal by certiorari from a judgment,

facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration

final order or resolution of the Court of

of the whole evidence, considering mainly the

Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court

credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of

of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court

specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to

or other courts, whenever authorized by

one another and to the whole, and the probabilities of

law, may file with the Supreme Court a

the situation. 18

verified petition for review

on certiorari. The petition may include
an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies
and shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set
forth. The petitioner may seek the
same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its
pendency. (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction between a question of law and a
question of fact is settled. There is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts. Such a question does not
involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. On

Contrary to these rules, the petitioners ask us to

review the lower courts' factual finding on Corazon's
exclusion in the subject deed of succession, to
reconsider its contents and those of the other
documentary evidence which they have submitted
with the court a quo, all of which involve questions of
fact rather than questions of law. In their assignment
of errors, petitioners even fully question the factual
basis for the courts' finding of their guilt. However, as
we have explained in Medina v. Asistio, Jr.: 19
Petitioners' allegation that the Court of
Appeals "grossly disregarded" their
Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E", in
effect, asks us to re-examine all the
[evidence] already presented and
evaluated as well as the findings of

fact made by the Court of Appeals.

misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact

Thus, in Sotto v. Teves (86 SCRA 154

are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA

[1978]), [w]e held that the appreciation

went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are

of evidence is within the domain of the

contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and

Court of Appeals because its findings of

the appellee, (7) when the CA's findings are contrary

fact are not reviewable by this Court

to those by the trial court, (8) when the findings are

(Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236

conclusions without citation of specific evidence on

[1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80

which they are based, (9) when the acts set forth in

[1988] and a long line of cases).

the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and

It is not the function of this Court to

analyze or weigh such evidence all over
again. Our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower court.
(Nicolas[,] et al. v. CA, 154 SCRA 635
[1987]; Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58
SCRA 89 [1974]).
There are recognized exceptions to this rule on
questions of law as subjects of petitions for review, to
wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on

reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10)

when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. 20 After a consideration of the
petitioners' arguments, this Court holds that the
present appeal does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
There can be no good faith on the
part of the petitioners since they
knew of the untruthful character
of statements contained in their
deed of succession.

Even granting that the present petition may be

officer, employee, or notary who, taking

admitted, we find no cogent reason to reverse the CA

advantage of his official position, shall

decision appealed from, considering that the elements

falsify a document by committing any of

of the crime of falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of

the following acts:

the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 thereof,

were duly proved during the proceedings below. Said
elements are as follows: EAIaHD
(a)The offender makes in a public
document untruthful statements
in a narration of facts;
(b)The offender has a legal obligation to

xxx xxx xxx

[Link] untruthful statements in
narration of facts;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. [Link] by private
individual and use of falsified

disclose the truth of the facts

documents. The penalty of prision

narrated by him; and

correccional in its medium and

(c)The facts narrated by the offender

are absolutely false. 21
These elements are based on the provisions of Art.
172, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads:

maximum periods and a fine of not

more than P5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
[Link] private individual who shall
commit any of the
falsifications enumerated

Art. [Link] by public officer,

in the next preceding

employee or notary or ecclesiastical

article in any public or

minister. The penalty of prision

official document or letter

mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000

of exchange or any other

pesos shall be imposed upon any public

kind of commercial

anchor their defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial

document; and

partition dated October 29, 1979, the parties'

[Link] person who, to the damage

of a third party, or with the
intent to cause such
damage, shall in any
private document commit

confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and

Norma's petition for guardianship of her then minor
children. Specifically mentioned in these documents is
the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir,
of the late Rafael.

any of the acts of

The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the

falsification enumerated in

truth in their deed of succession is clear, taking into

the next preceding article.

account the very nature of the document falsified. The

xxx xxx xxx

deed, which was transformed into a public document

upon acknowledgement before a notary public,

The material document claimed to be falsified in this

required only truthful statements from the petitioners.

case is the Deed of Succession dated July 19, 1991,

It was a legal requirement to effect the cancellation of

the presentation of which before the Register of Deeds

the original certificate of title and the issuance of new

and other government agencies allowed the

titles by the Register of Deeds. The false statement

cancellation of OCT No. P-22848, and the issuance of

made in the deed greatly affected the indefeasibility

several new titles in its stead. The first and third

normally accorded to titles over properties brought

elements were committed by the inclusion in the

under the coverage of land registration, to the injury of

subject deed of the clause that states, "(w)hereas, the

Corazon who was deprived of her right as a landowner,

parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the

and the clear prejudice of third persons who would rely

first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the

on the land titles issued on the basis of the

children of the decedent." 22 The untruthfulness of

deed. cEAIHa

said statement is clear from the several other

documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners

We cannot subscribe to the petitioners' claim of good

THIRD DIVISION

faith because several documents prove that they knew

of the untruthful character of their statement in the

[G.R. No. 183132. February 8, 2012.]

deed of succession. The petitioners' alleged good faith

is disputed by their prior confirmation and recognition

RICHARD

CHUA, petitioner, vs.

of Corazon's right as an heir, because despite

PEOPLE

knowledge of said fact, they included in the deed a

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

OF

THE

statement to the contrary. The wrongful intent to injure

Corazon is clear from their execution of the deed,
DECISION

showing a desire to appropriate only unto themselves

the subject parcel of land. Corazon was unduly
deprived of what was due her not only under the
provisions of the law on succession, but also under

MENDOZA, J p:

contracts that she had previously executed with the

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

petitioners.

seeks to annul and set aside the February 21, 2008

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for

Decision 1 and June 2, 2008 Resolution 2 of the Court

review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision

of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 29051, modifying

dated September 15, 2008 and Resolution dated

the October 6, 2004 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial

January 6, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR

Court, Branch 132, Makati City (RTC) in Criminal Case

No. 31225 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No. 21499 entitled People of the Philippines v. Richard

SO ORDERED.
||| (Vda. del Prado v. People, G.R. No. 186030, [March
21, 2012])

Chua, for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial

Document.
The Facts:

In 1982, Allied Banking Corporation (the bank) hired

"Kindly

Richard Chua as a general clerk in its International

immediately SA# 1000-209312 of

Banking Division which processed the opening of

R. CHUA representing proceeds

domestic and international letters of credit, domestic

of remittance by order of Amado

and international remittances as well as importation

Roque under TT ref. BKT/1752/25

and exportation. Specifically, Chua was tasked to

dated 10-26-84."

process trust receipts, accept trust receipt payments

and

issue

the

corresponding

receipts

for

these

payments. 4

credit

&

advi[s]e

[Link] Foreign Remittance Advice of

Credit dated 6 August 1984 in the
amount of P16,024.70:

In response to a complaint of a bank client regarding

the non-application of his payments, an internal audit
was conducted. In the course of the audit, twenty-nine
(29) fictitious payments backed by equally bogus
foreign remittances were discovered. The audit led to a
finding that these remittances were not supported by
the necessary authenticated advice from the foreign
bank concerned. Two of these remittances were with

"Please

credit

&

advi[s]e

immediately SA# 1000-209312 of

R. Chua representing proceeds of
remittance from San Francisco by
order

of

US$899.75

Linda
@

Castro
17.822

for
less

charges." 5 HDATSI

instructions to credit specified amounts to Savings

Meanwhile, the accounts payable

Account No. 1000-209312 which turned out to be

payments made by two clients of the Bank, ATL Plastic

under Chua's name.

Manufacturing Industries and Unidex Garments, were

[Link] Foreign Remittance Advice of

Credit dated 29 October 1984 in
the amount of P16,729.96:

or the

excess

used to cover up the discrepancy created as a result of

the crediting of the foregoing amounts to Chua's
account. It was made to appear that the said amounts
were refunded to the same clients although they were
not. Debit Tickets were even accomplished to justify

the act of crediting the subject amounts to Chua's

Manufacturing Industries, the respective

account. Afterwards, when the same had been credited

sums of P16,024.70 and P16,729.96 for

to his account, Chua withdrew them on different

the purpose of applying the same to the

dates. 6

payment of the excess indebtedness of

On December 17, 1985, Chua was charged with Estafa

through Falsification of Commercial Documents before
the RTC. The Information reads:

said clients with the complainant bank

but the accused instead made it appear
that said amounts were to be credited
to the current account of the client by

That on or about May 18, 1984 and

executing an advice of credit which the

October 24, 1984 and for sometime

said accused, however, did not forward

prior to and subsequent thereto, in the

to

Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,

complainant and, instead, he prepared a

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of

fictitious

this Honorable Court, the above-named

advice of credit by falsely making it

accused, by means of deceit and false

appear therein that there existed dollar

pretenses

or

remittances of a certain Linda Castro

simultaneous with the commission of

and Amado Roque in the U.S. dollar

the fraud, did then and there willfully,

equivalent of said amounts which the

unlawfully and feloniously defraud Allied

accused

Banking Corporation in the following

account with the bank; and the accused,

manner, to wit: the said accused, as

once in possession of said funds, did

General Clerk of the said complainant

then and there willfully, unlawfully and

and taking advantage of his position as

feloniously appropriate and convert the

such, received from clients of the bank,

same to his own personal use and

Unidex

benefit, to the damage and prejudice of

executed

Garments

and

prior

ATL

to

Plastics

the

Cash

Department

inward

credited

foreign

to

his

of

the

remittance

personal

the

complainant,

Allied

Banking

On appeal, the CA modified the RTC's judgment of

Corporation, in the total amount of

conviction by holding Chua liable for falsification of

P32,754.66. 7 IDSEAH

commercial documents only. The CA reasoned out that

Records show that the case was ordered archived on

March 31, 1986 when Chua evaded arrest after the
court's issuance of an arrest warrant. He was finally
arrested on September 10, 1999, after 13 years, but
was

released

on

bail

the

following

day.

When

arraigned, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. 8

Chua, being a mere general clerk of the bank, did not

acquire both material and juridical possession of the
subject amounts. He was likened to a bank teller
"whose possession over the money received by him is
possession by the bank itself." 11 Be that as it may,
the CA, still under the same indictment/information
and pursuant to this Court's ruling in Gonzaludo v.

For his defense, Chua denied that he prepared the

People, 12 held

subject Debit Tickets. He insisted on their regularity as

commercial documents as defined in Articles 172 and

these were duly signed and approved by two of his

171 of the Revised Penal Code. 13

immediate supervisors. Chua likewise denied having

prepared the Advice of Credit documents that covered

Chua

liable

for falsification

The CA wrote:

the questioned foreign remittances. He pointed out

In the case at bench, the prosecution

that these documents were likewise approved for final

was able to prove that the subject

processing by his supervisors. Finally, he denied

Inward Foreign Remittance Advices of

having prepared the withdrawal slips, much more, the

Credit which were used to transfer the

cash

excess payments made by ATL Plastic

withdrawals

corresponding

to

the

subject

amounts. 9
In the assailed decision dated October 6, 2004, the
RTC found Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents and was sentenced accordingly. 10

Manufacturing Industries and Unidex

Garments to the appellant's account in
the guise of remittances, were fictitious
since there were really no Linda Castro
or Amado Roque who sent the same. It

of

adduced

two

documents, i.e.,

the

Thus, the CA gave no value to his defense. The

Advices of Credit and the Debit Tickets,

dispositive portion of its February 21, 2008 Decision

which were merely used to cover up the

reads:

fictitious remittances. It is true that

there is no direct proof that appellant
was the author of the falsification.
However, since he benefited from the
fictitious transactions in question, the
inevitable conclusion is that he falsified
them. It is an established rule that when
it is proved that a person has in his
possession a falsified document and
makes

use

of

the

same,

the

presumption or inference is justified that

such person is the forger. On this score,
the

prosecution

convincingly

demonstrated that appellant withdrew

the

subject

amounts

on

different

dates. 14
Chua's defense of forgery failed to impress the CA. As
it was his burden to establish his defense, it was not
enough for him to submit just any specimen of his

WHEREFORE,

the

Decision

dated

October 2004 of the Regional Trial

Court,

Makati

City,

Branch

132,

is

MODIFIED. Appellant RICHARD CHUA is

hereby

ACQUITTED

of

the

complex

crime of Estafa through Falsification of

Commercial Documents. However, he is
adjudged

GUILTY

of

the

crime

of

Falsification of Commercial Documents

and

is

SENTENCED

to

suffer

an

indeterminate penalty of 4 months and

1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
2

years

and

months

of prision

correccional, as maximum. Likewise, he

is

ORDERED

to

PAY

fine

of

P5,000.00. ADTCaI
No Costs.
SO ORDERED. 15

signature. The NBI requested him to submit additional

Chua sought partial reconsideration but his motion was

documents containing his signatures for the years

denied by the CA on June 2, 2008. Still not satisfied,

1983 and 1984 but he failed to meet its requirements.

Chua now comes to this Court raising the following

ISSUES:

Chua claims that the CA's statement, "It is true that

there is no direct proof that appellant was the author

I
Whether

or

not

of the falsification," 17 absolves him from criminal

the

Honorable

liability even for the lesser offense of falsification of

Court of Appeals erred in finding

commercial documents. According to Chua, the CA was

the petitioner guilty of the crime of

merely speculating when it held that he was the

Falsification

Commercial

author of the falsified commercial documents because

Documents considering that it has

he allegedly benefited from them. He further argues

categorically ADMITTED that there

that the prosecution "failed to show other facts and

is no direct proof that petitioner

circumstances from which it may be reasonably and

was the author of the falsification

logically inferred that he committed the crime of

in the case at bar.

falsification." 18

of

II
Whether
Court

of

or

not

Appeals

applying

the

Chua is obviously clutching at straws when he argues

the

Honorable

that the CA's judgment of conviction was based merely

not

on speculation. He apparently misread the CA decision.

paramount

First of all, the CA never abandoned or set aside the

erred

in

of

factual findings of the RTC when it ordered the

innocence in favor of the petitioner

modification of the judgment of conviction. The

in view of its explicit admission

modification was merely on the RTC's conclusion as to

that there is no direct proof that

the crime actually committed. In its appealed decision,

the petitioner was the author of the

the CA pointed out that an essential element in the

falsification. 16

complex

constitutional

presumption

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

crime

of estafa

through

falsification

commercial documents was lacking, thus:

of

Evidently,

in

appellant

did

bench,

subject amount to him; (e) his own admission on cross

juridical

examination that the subject amounts were indeed

possession over the subject payments

credited to his savings account with the bank; and (f)

which were made by two of Allied

his admission that after the subject incident with the

Bank's clients, i.e.,

bank, he filed a notice of leave and never came

and

ATL

the

case

not

at

acquire

Unidex Garments

Plastic

Manufacturing

Industries. It must be borne in mind that

appellant is a mere general clerk of
Allied Bank. As part of his duties, he
received payments from clients. His
position therefor may be likened to the
position

of

bank

teller

whose

possession over the money received by

The CA never disturbed, categorically or otherwise, the

RTC's factual findings with regard to (a) the discovery
fictitious

payments

purportedly

from

The absence of a direct proof that Chua was the author

of the falsification is of no moment for the rule remains
that whenever someone has in his possession falsified
documents and "uttered" or used the same for his
advantage and benefit, the presumption that he
authored it arises.
. . . . This is especially true if the use or

him is possession by the bank itself. 19

of

back. 20

equally

fictitious foreign remittances; (b) the fictitious debit or

refund to the bank's clients although in truth there
were none as indicated in the bank's History of Daily
Transactions, and was instead credited to the account
of Chua; (c) authenticity of his signature in the

uttering of the forged documents was so

closely connected in time with the
forgery that the user or possessor may
be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close
connection
therefore,

with
had

the

forgers,

complicity

in

and
the

forgery. ACETSa

withdrawal slips as testified to by the bank's signature

In

the

absence

verifier; (d) his denial that he ever knew the two

explanation,

persons named above who allegedly remitted the

possession of a forged document and

one

of
who

satisfactory
is

found

in

who used or uttered it is presumed to

his own account, 23 squarely falling under paragraph

be the forger. 21

Certainly, the channeling of the subject payments via

false

remittances

to

his

savings

account,

his

subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his

unexplained flight at the height of the bank's inquiry
into the matter more than sufficiently establish Chua's
involvement in the falsification.

of

Article

171

of

the

Revised

Code; 24 and (iii) the falsification was committed in

two commercial documents, namely, "inward foreign
remittance

advice

of

credit"

and

the

bases relied upon by the CA when it instead found

Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt offalsification of

tickets." 25 Without doubt, his subsequent conviction

to a lesser crime was not unfounded.

complex or a more serious crime is nothing new. The

CA was merely following the Court's lead in the case
of Gonzaludo v. People, 26 where it was held: TSIDEa

commercial documents. The facts are the same. The

The lack of criminal liability for estafa,

elements of the crime as found in paragraph 1, Article

however, will not necessarily absolve

172 of the RPC, are: "1) the offender is a private

petitioner from criminal liability arising

individual or a public officer or employee who did not

from the charge of falsification of public

take advantage of his official position; 2) the offender

document under the same Information

committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated

charging the complex crime of estafa

in Article 171; and 3) the falsification was committed

through falsification of public document.

in a public or official or commercial document." 22

It is settled doctrine that

Applying this to the present case, all three elements

"When a complex crime has been

are

individual; (ii) he

present
used

(i) Chua
fictitious

"debit

A conviction coming from the heels of an acquittal in a

The evidentiary bases of the RTC were the very same

undeniably

Penal

is

private

charged in an information and the

"inward

foreign

evidence

fails

to

support

the

remittance advice of credit" to cause the funneling or

charge on one of the component

transfer of the two named bank clients' payments into

offenses, can defendant still be

separately convicted of the other

accused

offense? The question has long

charge." 28 (previous

been answered in the affirmative.

omitted)

In United States v. Lahoylahoy

and Madanlog, 27 the Court has
ruled to be legally feasible the
conviction of an accused on one
of the offenses included in a
complex

crime

charged,

when

properly established, despite the

failure of evidence to hold the

of

the

other
citations

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February

21, 2008 Decision and June 2, 2008 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29051 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Chua v. People, G.R. No. 183132, [February 8,
2012], 681 PHIL 476-485)