United States v. Robert Lee Rowland, JR., 962 F.2d 8, 4th Cir. (1992)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government DocsUnited States v. Robert Lee Rowland, JR., 962 F.2d 8, 4th Cir. (1992)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government Docs962 F.
2d 8
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of
unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
Circuit.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert Lee ROWLAND, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-5887.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Submitted: May 1, 1992
Decided: May 19, 1992
Edwin A. Williams, Kellogg, Williams & Lyons, Vienna, Virginia, for
Appellant.
Richard Cullen, United States Attorney, Michael E. Rich, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before PHILLIPS and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN,
Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Lee Rowland appeals from his conviction of use of a firearm during a
drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 924(c) (West Supp. 1991).
Because we find that the affidavit of a state police officer in support of the
search warrant to search Appellant's residence adequately supported the
magistrate's determination of probable cause to issue the warrant, the district
court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress. We therefore affirm
his conviction.
A state police officer stated in his affidavit in support of a search warrant to
search Appellant's residence that "a confidential, reliable informant" who had
made several controlled drug purchases for the Virginia State Police came to
him "within the past 72 hours ... and provided information regarding the
distribution of marijuana" at the residence at 6003 Ticonderoga Court, Burke,
Virginia. The officer continued that the informant "observed the distribution of
marijuana inside the residence and that additional marijuana was there and
available for purchase." The officer independently verified the description and
location of the house.
The magistrate issued the warrant, and the officers executed it on the same day.
They discovered marijuana, drug paraphernalia, over $4000 in currency, and
several firearms on the premises. Appellant was indicted for using or carrying a
firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The district court denied
Appellant's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search,
and a jury convicted him of the offense. Rowland noted a timely appeal to this
Court.
Appellant argues that the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not
provide adequate information on the informant's veracity and basis of
knowledge or the time and circumstances under which the informant made his
observations. He continues that if the warrant is not supported with probable
cause, the police officers who executed the search could not benefit from the
good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
In reviewing a magistrate's probable cause determination, this Court gives great
deference to the magistrate's assessment of the facts presented to him. United
States v. Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990). This Court need only
determine if the magistrate had substantial basis for determining that probable
cause existed. Id. However, where, as here, the facts are not in dispute, this
Court reviews the magistrate's finding de novo. United States v. Miller, 925
F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1991).
We conclude from the police officer's affidavit in support of the search warrant
that the magistrate indeed had substantial basis for his determination that
probable cause existed to search Rowland's residence. The magistrate had
specific, timely information, that was corroborated in part, which supported the
magistrate's finding. See United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir.
1984). Moreover, even if we were to find the affidavit deficient, we agree with
the district court that the Leon good-faith exception would apply. Therefore,
Rowland's motion to suppress was properly denied. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
