United States v. Wilkin Pettis, 4th Cir. (2011)
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States v. Wilkin Pettis, 4th Cir. (2011)
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Scribd Government DocsUNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4459
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff Appellee,
v.
WILKIN ONEAL PETTIS,
Defendant Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia.
Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:08-cr-00396-CMC-3)
Submitted:
September 6, 2011
Decided:
September 9, 2011
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, T. DeWayne Pearson, Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Wilkin
ONeal
Pettis
appeals
the
district
courts
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
ten months imprisonment.
The district court revoked Pettiss
supervised release based on a finding that Pettis had engaged in
new criminal conduct when he interfered with a police officer in
the discharge of the officers duties, in violation of Forest
Acres,
South
Ordinance).
Carolina
Pettis
Code
argues
unconstitutionally vague.
of
on
Ordinances
appeal
that
the
15-7
(the
Ordinance
is
We affirm.
We review properly-preserved constitutional claims de
novo.
United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 2009).
Due process requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner
that
does
enforcement.
not
encourage
arbitrary
and
discriminatory
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927-
28 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (per curiam) (Due process requires
that a criminal statute provide adequate notice to a person of
ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal,
for no [perso]n shall be held criminally responsible for conduct
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2
Under the Ordinance, [a]ny person who shall resist or
interfere
with
shall
guilty
be
any
policeman
of
in
the
discharge
misdemeanor.
Pettis
of
his
argues
duties
that
the
Ordinances prohibition of resist[ing] or interfer[ing] with
a
police
officer
in
the
unconstitutionally vague.
discharge
of
his
duties
is
Claims of statutory vagueness that do
not implicate the First Amendment must be examined in the light
of the facts of the case at hand.
F.3d
302,
omitted).
whether
309
(4th
Cir.
Accordingly,
Pettis
had
(4th Cir. 2004).
this
fair
proscribed his conduct.
2002)
United States v. Sun, 278
(internal
courts
notice
that
quotation
review
the
is
marks
limited
statute
at
to
issue
United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 196
We conclude that he did and that the district
court did not err in denying Pettiss motion to dismiss the
revocation petition.
Accordingly, we affirm the district courts judgment.
We
dispense
with
oral
argument
because
the
facts
and
legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
