227 F.3d 179 (4th Cir.

2000)

CHERYL S. CONNER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.
SCHRADER-BRIDGEPORT INTERNATIONAL,
INCORPORATED, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
No. 98-2055.

U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 25, 2000.
September 13, 2000.
1

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, at Danville.

Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge. (CA-96-38-D)[Copyrighted Material

Omitted][Copyrighted Material Omitted][Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Counsel Argued: Barbara Rubin Hudson, Evanston, Illinois, for Appellant.

Arthur Bruce Sternberg, Pedersen & Houpt, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.

Before Motz and King, Circuit Judges, and John T. Copenhaver, Jr., United
States District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by
designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Motz and Judge Copenhaver joined.

OPINION
King, Circuit Judge
6

Cheryl Conner appeals the district court's adverse judgment on her Title VII
hostile work environment claim. The lower court vacated a jury verdict in favor
of Ms. Conner and granted judgment as a matter of law and a conditional new
trial to her former employer, SchraderBridgeport International ("SBI"). We
now reverse the district court's judgment and remand for reinstatement of the
jury's verdict.

I.
7

Ms. Conner originally raised three claims against SBI in her civil action filed on
July 1, 1996 in the Western District of Virginia. She claimed SBI: (1)
discharged her on account of her gender, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq. ; (2) subjected her to a hostile work environment, also in violation
of Title VII;1 and (3) willfully violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 255(a).
Prior to trial, the district court dismissed the claim of discriminatory discharge.
After a five-day trial in late November and early December 1997, the jury
found in Ms. Conner's favor on both the hostile work environment and equal
pay claims. On her hostile environment claim, the jury awarded Ms. Conner
$20,000 in compensatory damages and granted punitive damages against SBI in
the sum of $500,000. On the Equal Pay Act claim, the jury found the
employer's violation "willful," and it awarded Ms. Conner $1,700 in
compensatory damages. Upon considering post-trial motions, the district court,
on April 30, 1998, entered judgment on the jury's verdict against SBI for
$1,700 on the equal pay claim, plus an additional $1,700 in liquidated damages
for willfulness. The district court, however, granted SBI's motion for judgment
as a matter of law on the hostile work environment claim, and it awarded SBI a
conditional new trial pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court alternatively granted a reduction in damages and a
remittitur of an unspecified amount, unless Ms. Conner elects a new trial. Ms.
Conner appeals the judgment in favor of SBI on the hostile work environment
claim.
II.
A.

When reviewing a district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law, we must

view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g.,
Brown v. CSX Transp., Inc., 18 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1994). We accordingly
recite the facts presented in support of Ms. Conner's hostile environment claim
in that light.
B.

SBI manufactures high-performance valving for automotive systems, and it

includes Ford, General Motors, Toyota, and Honda among its customers. SBI's
corporate headquarters is in Illinois, and it has several manufacturing plants in
the United States (Virginia, North Carolina, California, New York, and

Oklahoma) as well as in Ireland, Italy, India, Brazil, and Mexico. Its annual
gross sales from 1993 to 1995 were about $75 million, with sales to
approximately six thousand customers worldwide.
10

Ms. Conner began work in 1984 as a temporary unskilled factory worker at the
manufacturing plant in SBI's Piedmont Manufacturing Division in Altavista,
Virginia. By 1992, she was working as a permanent employee in SBI's "cap and
core room," assembling the stems on car and truck tires. J.A. 93.

11

In 1993, SBI moved a production process to its Altavista plant that used
complex specialty equipment -- Acme-Gridley multi-spindle machines.2 SBI
created its Department 710 for this new production work at Altavista, and it
advertised for skilled machine operators. After Ms. Conner passed an initial
screening examination, she was permitted to enroll in a special training class for
such operators at a local community college. Upon completing the class, Ms.
Conner and twenty others took a mandatory hands-on examination. This
examination tested each student's ability to diagnose and correct malfunctioning
machines within a limited time period. Ms. Conner and one of her co-workers
tied for the highest score on this exam.

12

In support of her claim of a hostile work environment with respect to women,

Ms. Conner presented evidence of the following categories of conduct by her
supervisors and other authorized personnel: (1) disparate, lesser training; (2)
unauthorized disciplinary action against her; (3) extra burden in her job
assignments; (4) disparate floor mopping duty; (5) verbal disparagement; (6)
forced display of bloody pants; (7) failure to investigate her disparate treatment
allegations; (8) lower pay rate; (9) timing her breaks with a stopwatch; and (10)
termination threat as a response to her discrimination complaint.
1. Disparate, Lesser Training of Ms. Conner

13

In May 1993, SBI hired Ms. Conner and a number of men (who had also
completed the community college course) for the position of "craftsman
(skilled)" to operate the multi-spindle machines in Department 710. J.A. 1002.
Men who did not have prior experience operating the Acme-Gridley machines
were first temporarily placed in SBI's Department 767, where they received an
additional six months of one-on-one, hands-on training, and were taught how to
properly load metal bars into the machines. These men were then transferred to
Department 710, where they began operating the machines. Like these men,
Ms. Conner had no prior experience operating the AcmeGridley machines,
other than the training acquired in the community college class. SBI, however,

did not place Ms. Conner into Department 767, but placed her directly into
Department 710. Thus, she did not receive the additional six months of training
provided to the male machine operators initially placed in Department 767.3
14

George Schaefer, SBI's foreman and supervisor in Department 710, was

responsible for pay raises, promotions, discipline, and terminations within the
Department. On numerous occasions during the period when Ms. Conner was
employed in Department 710, Schaefer stated explicitly that, in his view,
women did not belong in the workplace at all. However, Schaefer testified at
trial that he believed Ms. Conner had "excellent mechanical ability," and
estimated that of the ten persons SBI hired from the community college
training program, Ms. Conner was "probably number three from the top." J.A.
677.

15

In May 1993, Ms. Conner was assigned to work on the second shift (3:30 p.m.
to 2:00 a.m., including mandatory overtime) in Department 710. J.A. 188.
However, an auto accident the following month hospitalized her and caused an
eight-week medically excused work absence. Upon her return, she did not
receive the regular training in machine operations that the men hired with her
were receiving. For example, when a machine malfunctioned, supervisor Bruce
Boyd would explain and demonstrate to the male operators how to fix the
machine, and he permitted the male machine operators to assist him. If Ms.
Conner's machine malfunctioned, however, Boyd simply fixed it without
showing or explaining what he did, "rolled his eyes" at her, and refused Ms.
Conner's requests to participate and to learn how to fix the machines.4 J.A. 104.
Ms. Conner specifically asked Mr. Schaefer to see that she was provided with
comparable training. However, he dismissed her request by responding that she
had a high rate of absenteeism. J.A. 660. Mr. Schaefer took no action to
improve Ms. Conner's training in machine operating techniques.

16

Boyd also instructed the male machine operators, on an ad hoc basis, on special
procedures essential to operation of the AcmeGridley machines. For example,
some machines processed round metal bars, whereas others processed
hexagonal bars. The round bars would fall into place when the machine
operators beat them in to the machines. In contrast, beating on the hexagonal
bars achieved nothing, as those bars had to be turned gently by hand until they
slipped into place. Significantly, Ms. Conner received absolutely no instruction
or assistance on how to load the hexagonal bars. When she tried to beat them
into place, Boyd and Schaefer mocked her and laughed at her failure. In fact,
they also encouraged other male employees to laugh at her.5 At home at night,
Ms. Conner cried and soaked her blistered hands, acquired from her attempts to
force the hexagonal bars into the machines. When she asked her brother, fellow

employee Jay Shelton, to show her how to load the hexagonal bars, he came to
work early on his own time and did so. Ms. Conner was thereafter able to load
the bars successfully.6
17

However, supervisor Boyd and Mr. Schaefer both accused Ms. Conner of
having her brother do her work for her, and they transferred her away from Mr.
Shelton to work on the first shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.). J.A. 109, 274. Even
then, Mr. Shelton continued to donate his personal time to training his sister in
machine set-ups7 and tool settings. Such set-ups and tool settings were difficult
but necessary skills for a machine operator, in order to prevent a machine
malfunction from disrupting production. When it became apparent to Ms.
Conner's supervisors that she was not relying on her brother to do her work, and
that she actually preferred working on the first shift, she was transferred back to
the second shift.

18

2. Unauthorized Disciplinary Action Against Ms. Conner

19

In the Fall of 1993, SBI granted Ms. Conner general permission to leave work
early when there were no tasks for her to perform, consistent with its policy of
permitting employees to volunteer to leave when there was a lack of work.
Then, in November 1993, because Ms. Conner had been leaving work early,
Mr. Schaefer denied her a regular pay increase to $9.08 per hour, instead
assigning her a lower $8.55 per hour pay rate.

20

Significantly, alterations in an employee's pay rate on the basis of asserted

attendance problems were not authorized by SBI's disciplinary policy. SBI's
"Work and Safety Rules" provide only that an employee who engages in
prohibited practices (including repeated tardiness or absenteeism, and leaving
work during scheduled work hours without authorization) "shall be subject to
discharge, suspension, or a written or oral reprimand as appropriate." J.A. 973.
Ms. Conner had never been disciplined in her SBI employment for any reason
during the prior nine years. J.A. 115.

21

3. Extra Burden in Ms. Conner's Job Assignments

22

Because the Acme-Gridley machines were idiosyncratic-- each required its own
particular techniques in order for it to perform well -- new machine operators
were typically assigned to a specific machine and first learned how to keep that
particular machine operating. An inexperienced machine operator would then
advance to learning machine set-up and unplanned tool-setting only after
having gained basic operating skills on a single machine. As a result of single-

machine training, the machine operator's efficiency and productivity were

greater. Contrary to this usual practice, however, Mr. Schaefer repeatedly
moved Ms. Conner from one machine to another. This caused her to spend a
much greater proportion of her time on machine set-up and unplanned tool
setting rather than on production, as compared to her male co-workers. For the
period from October 1994 through April 1995, Ms. Conner spent 139.3 hours
on machine set-up and unplanned tool setting.8 J.A. 993. By comparison, male
Acme-Gridley machine operators in Department 710 spent only 82.5, 48.3,
40.9, 15.5, 12.2, and 12.1 hours on these activities during the same time period.
Id.
23

Ms. Conner was also assigned to operate Acme-Gridley machines that were
producing dissimilar products and thus had dissimilar tool settings. These
assignments differed from those of male machine operators, who operated
machines that were producing similar products. Not unexpectedly, the machine
operators that produced similar products obtained greater efficiency and
productivity, resulting from the uniformity of their work and the ability to
directly transfer knowledge gained from one machine's functioning to other
machines performing the same tasks. Ms. Conner's disparate assignments
prevented her from obtaining an equivalent efficiency and productivity.

24

Male machine operators were also assigned to operate machines that were
located in a more convenient manner, side by side, again promoting greater
efficiency and productivity. By contrast, Ms. Conner was assigned to operate
machines that were physically separate from one another, so that she would
have to leave one machine unattended if she had operating problems on a
distant machine. Being unable to simultaneously watch her machines had
adverse practical consequences. For example, when an Acme-Gridley machine
broke a drill bit and Ms. Conner could not see the machine from across the
factory, it "wiped out all the tooling before I could even know it -know it wasn't
producing work . . . it took probably three to four hours to get it set back up and
running."9 J.A. 135. Ms. Conner's assignments to machines that were far apart
from each other further affected her efficiency and productivity. The extra
complexity of Ms. Conner's duties also caused her to experience heightened
job-related stress.
4. Disparate Floor Mopping Duty

25

If Ms. Conner asked for assistance, or if her machine malfunctioned, Mr.

Schaefer regularly stated to her, "You can mop the floor. That's something you
can do. You -- You should already know how to mop the floor." J.A. 113. Even
when her machine was functioning properly, if a male operator's machine

failed, Schaefer would reassign the male operator to Ms. Conner's functioning
machine and would order Ms. Conner to mop the Department's entire floor, on
both sides of all the machines. On those occasions, Ms. Conner lost the credit
that she would have received for producing parts with her machine.
26

While Ms. Conner manually mopped the floor of the Altavista plant using a
large mop and a bucket for squeezing the mopped oil and water into, her coworkers would shout at her,"Cheryl, mop the floor. Mop the floor, Cheryl. At
least you could do that." J.A. 138-39. These events occurred regularly,
approximately fifteen times per month. On the other hand, male operators
mopped the floors around their own machines, but were not required to mop the
entire floor unless it was at the end of the day. In these instances they received
overtime pay for doing so, and unlike Ms. Conner (who was required to use a
hand mop and bucket), the male operators rode a cleaning machine with a large
"squeegee" on the bottom of it to mop the floor.10 J.A. 163.

27

Schaefer justified his decisions in this regard by stating to Ms. Conner, "Why
would I take a qualified machine operator and have them mop the floor and you
run a [multi-spindle] machine?" J.A. 293. Conversely, the male machine
operators were not ridiculed when they performed mopping tasks. Ms. Conner's
mopping assignments resulted in her being less productive than the male
operators and caused her to suffer substantial stress.
5. Verbal Disparagement of Ms. Conner

28

When Ms. Conner became frustrated in dealing with a malfunctioning machine,

Mr. Schaefer would ask her, within the hearing of other employees, "Are you
on the rag today? Didn't you get any last night?" J.A. 134. This occurred
approximately ten to twenty times per month.11 J.A. 239. By contrast, when
male machine operator Noel Farrell became angry due to balky machinery, he
was neither ridiculed nor disciplined when he left his shift early without
permission, merely announcing, "I'm leaving . . . I'm sick of this. I'm
frustrated." Id.

29

Ms. Conner suffered from daily headaches and nausea resulting from the
humiliation she experienced at work. She was unable to take the medication
prescribed for her symptoms, though, because its label warned her not to work
around heavy equipment while taking it. Ms. Conner hated going to work
because of the humiliation that she experienced there. However, because Ms.
Conner was the sole support for her young son, she was unable to resign, and
she lived in constant fear of losing her job at SBI.

6. Forced Display of Bloody Pants

30

In January 1994, Ms. Conner was briefly hospitalized due to uterine

hemorrhaging. She experienced several unexpected episodes of uterine bleeding
during the remainder of her employment at SBI, until her May 1995
termination. If the bleeding was heavy, she became faint, which was dangerous
if she was near the active machinery. To stop the bleeding, Ms. Conner had to
remain immobile in bed for a period of time. Approximately ten of these
bleeding incidents occurred at work, between January 1994 and May 1995.

31

Each time a hemorrhaging episode occurred at work, she wrapped a rag around
her waist to cover her bloodied pants, went to Schaefer's office, and asked for
permission to go home. Ms. Conner was acutely embarrassed by the visible
bloodstains on her pants. In such situations, Schaefer told Ms. Conner, "You
show me that you're bleeding, and I'll let you go." J.A. 137. Significantly,
Schaefer never referred Ms. Conner to SBI's on-site nurse for a medical
verification of her problem. Ms. Conner's co-workers could see her unwrap the
rags from her waist to display her bloodied pants to Schaefer in his open office,
which also had a large glass window facing the factory work area.

32

7. Failure to Investigate Disparate Treatment Complaints

33

Beginning in January 1994, Ms. Conner complained on numerous occasions to

the plant's personnel manager, Mr. Keller, concerning her improper treatment
by Mr. Schaefer. SBI's "Anti-Harassment Policy" required investigation of
employee complaints "thoroughly and promptly to the fullest extent
practicable." J.A. 1067. During 1994, Ms. Conner spoke to Mr. Keller on three
separate occasions about the unreasonable differential treatment to which she
was subjected by her supervisors in the workplace. Indeed, she asked Mr.
Keller to observe her supervisors' treatment of the employees in Department
710 and to investigate further.

34

Despite these complaints, Keller failed to either observe how Ms. Conner was
treated or review her daily labor activity sheets. These activity sheets
demonstrated that Ms. Conner spent far more time on machine set-ups and
unplanned tool settings than the male machine operators. Instead, Keller simply
spoke to Ms. Conner's supervisors, Schaefer and Boyd, about her. Mr. Keller
concluded from those conversations that Ms. Conner was not treated differently
from other employees. Although Keller had assured Ms. Conner that he would
contact her after investigating her complaints, he failed to follow through.

8. Lower Pay Rate for Ms. Conner

35

In March 1994, Mr. Schaefer evaluated Ms. Conner's attendance and production
quantity as "satisfactory." According to Boyd, Ms. Conner had no performance
or aptitude problems in her job, and she was among the top employees of the
Altavista plant with respect to her ability to keep the Acme-Gridley machines
functioning. Mr. Keller agreed that there was never any problem with Ms.
Conner's quality and quantity of production, her attitude, or her safety record at
work.

36

However, in March 1994, Ms. Conner was advised that she would not receive a
pay raise comparable to that received by male operators who were less
experienced and less skilled than she was, because of her absences from work.
She asked Mr. Schaefer to explain why she was not classified in the set-up pay
grade. To qualify for the higher pay grade, a machine operator must have
learned how to set up her machine. Ms. Conner regularly performed set-ups for
male machine operators who could not perform their own set-ups, but the men
received the higher set-up pay rates. Indeed, she sometimes came into the plant
on Sunday (a regular day off) to perform set-ups for male machine operators.
Mr. Schaefer responded that she would do what she was told to do -- without
question -- or she could leave. During the period from October 1994 through
April 1995, SBI paid a number of male machine operators -- who were hired
after Ms. Conner -$10.47 per hour to perform the skilled tasks of machine setups and unplanned tool setting. These men performed these skilled tasks less
frequently than Ms. Conner did, but Ms. Conner was paid a rate of only $9.44
per hour -- over a dollar per hour less than the male co-workers.12

37

On September 9, 1994, Ms. Conner overslept her 7:00 a.m. starting time, and at
7:25 a.m. she called the plant to inform them that she would be at work as soon
as possible. When she arrived, Mr. Keller counseled her about her "intolerable"
and"unacceptable" performance, and he included a written warning to her,
based on thirty-six absences and eight tardies for the year. Of those absences,
twenty were medically excused accompanied by a doctor's note, and five were
vacation days.13 Later, in November 1994, Schaefer evaluated Ms. Conner's
attendance and production quantity as"satisfactory," the same as on her
previous evaluations, and noted that her "attendance and attitude . . . has much
improved." J.A. 979.

38

9. Timing Ms. Conner's Breaks with A Stopwatch

39

In late 1994, Mr. Boyd followed Ms. Conner about the plant with a stopwatch,

timing her while she was in the ladies room and when she was on breaks. He
engaged in timing Ms. Conner's breaks for approximately a month and a half.
By contrast, Boyd did not time male machine operators.
40

On January 3, 1995, Mr. Schaefer evaluated Ms. Conner's performance as

"barely meets requirements" for production quantity and stated that she was
"slightly neglectful" in attendance. He concluded that Ms. Conner needed to
improve her "attendance, production and performance." However, there was no
consideration given to the disproportionate amount of time that Ms. Conner had
been assigned to machine set-ups and unplanned tool setting, or the time that
she spent mopping the Department's entire floor area.

41

Then, in early January 1995, SBI disciplined Ms. Conner for returning eight
minutes late from a timed break that began when she entered the ladies room to
wash off machine oil. 14 In contrast, breaks by the male machine operators did
not begin until after they had completed cleaning machine oil off of themselves
and had exited the restroom. Male machine operators also frequently extended
their breaks for an extra ten minutes, without any reprimands for doing so. In
fact, Ms. Conner often operated the machines of her co-workers during the time
that they overstayed their breaks.

42

10. Termination Threat as Response to Discrimination Complaint

43

On January 18, 1995, Ms. Conner requested a meeting with the Piedmont
Manufacturing Division's president and plant manager, Martin Giudice,
concerning differences between the employment conditions for her and those of
her male co-workers. Mr. Giudice prepared for the meeting by reviewing Ms.
Conner's record; he decided that in the meeting, he would express to her his
disapproval of her attendance record.

44

This meeting took place on January 23, 1995, with Ms. Conner, Mr. Giudice,
and Mr. Keller in attendance. According to Ms. Conner, during the meeting Mr.
Giudice dismissed her complaints by directing her to do what her supervisor
told her to do, and further directing her not to worry about what male machine
operators in the Department were doing. Ms. Conner responded that, in her
view, Giudice's response constituted sexual discrimination. Giudice then
slammed his fist down on his desk, stood up, and screamed at her that "if this
ever comes out of your mouth again, you will be fired right here on the spot
right now." J.A. 155. Ms. Conner sat mute and crying for the remainder of the
meeting, and then exited. Stacey Haskins, who happened to be in the hallway
outside Giudice's office at the time, saw that Ms. Conner was upset and crying

as she left the meeting.

45

At trial, SBI presented evidence that Mr. Keller wrote a memorandum

describing the January 1995 meeting, which vaguely characterized Ms. Conner
as having complained of unfairly being selected by her supervisors for
monitoring and discipline. Significantly, this memorandum did not note any
response to Ms. Conner's complaint. Keller's memorandum states that Mr.
Giudice informed Ms. Conner that her attendance was "unacceptable," and that
if she failed to change her behavior her employment would be terminated.
Keller failed to record any mention of sexual discrimination. Both Giudice and
Keller signed the memorandum, which was placed in Ms. Conner's
employment record. Ms. Conner was not informed of the memorandum's
existence and did not review it at any time while she was employed at SBI.15
C.

46

On May 30, 1995, SBI terminated Ms. Conner's employment, stating that her
excessive absences were its reason. Mr. Keller testified that he calculated that
approximately 34% of Ms. Conner's 1994 absences occurred on a Monday, and
that in his experience, such a higher than usual absence rate is often associated
more with weekend activities rather than illness. Keller had not, however,
performed the same calculation for any other machine operators, and when he
did so at trial, he acknowledged that male operators Harvey and Shelton had
approximately 59% and 82% of their absences, respectively, on work days
associated with weekends. See also supra note 13.
III.
A.

47

We review de novo a district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law. See

Brown, 18 F.3d at 248. A motion for judgment as a matter of law after a verdict
is returned is properly granted only if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party with respect to that issue." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine "whether a reasonable trier of fact could draw only
one conclusion from the evidence." Brown, 18 F.3d at 248 (citation omitted);
see also Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 437 (4th Cir. 2000).
If, giving the non-movant the benefit of every legitimate inference in her favor,
there was evidence upon which the jury could reasonably return a verdict for
her, we must reverse the judgment below. See Mays v. Pioneer Lumber Corp.,

502 F.2d 106, 107 (4th Cir. 1974).

48

A sexual harassment claim due to a hostile or abusive work environment

requires proof of: (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff's
sex; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff's
conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4)
which is imputable to the employer. See Spicer v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't
of Corrections , 66 F.3d 705, 709-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).

49

The parties do not dispute the first and fourth prongs, i.e., that Ms. Conner
experienced unwelcome conduct that was imputable to the employer through
the actions of Mr. Schaefer and Mr. Giudice. As to the second prong, that such
conduct was based on Ms. Conner's gender, we agree with the district court's
rejection of SBI's argument that Ms. Conner's sexual harassment claim must fail
because she did not establish conduct of a "sexual nature."16 On appeal, SBI
does not dispute the district court's ruling on this issue.

50

The issue here therefore relates only to the third prong of a hostile environment
claim. Under Harris, the Supreme Court determined that "[t]he conduct in
question must be judged by both an objective and a subjective standard: [t]he
conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and the victim must
subjectively regard that environment as abusive." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.

51

Harris directs that we must look at all the circumstances to determine whether a
work environment is hostile or abusive, including: (1) the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; (4) whether the conduct
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance; and (5) what
psychological harm, if any, resulted. See id. at 23; Smith v. First Union Nat'l
Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Ms.
Conner asserts error in the district court's determination that no "actionable"
harassment occurred during the applicable period"[b]ecause none of the
conduct complained of by Conner rises to the level required to be compensable
under Title VII." J.A. 1098.
B.

52

In its post-trial decision, the district court identified nine separate categories or
types of conduct evidenced at trial. These categories are as follows:

53

(1) male employees mocked Ms. Conner when her machine malfunctioned;

54

(2) her supervisor asked her, "Didn't you get any last night?" and "Are you on
the rag?";

55

(3) she and the other women were forced to mop the floor when their machines
broke down and were told in a condescending manner that "at least [they] could
mop the floor";

56

(4) she was singled out for discipline relating to her absences;

57

(5) Schaffer made her remove the rags that she used to cover her bloodstained
pants;

58

(6) she was timed with a stopwatch when she went to the bathroom;

59

(7) she was assigned to machines at opposite ends of the factory, requiring her
to run back and forth; (8) she was given less training than male machine opera
tors; and

60

(9) in response to her complaints of unfair disparate treat ment, Giudice

threatened to fire her if she ever men tioned the words "sexual harassment."

61

J.A. 1095-96. However, the district court erred when it analyzed these
categories of Ms. Conner's evidence in a disaggregated fashion, contrary to
Harris's "totality of the circumstances" test. The court concluded that the "only
allegations that are even remotely close to meeting the severe and pervasive
threshold are the comments, `Are you on the rag?' and `Didn't you get any last
night?'" and the court analyzed those comments independently of the "totality"
of the situation. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
81-82 (1998) ("The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on
a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the
physical acts performed."); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553,
562-63 (6th Cir. 1999) (evidence of sexually related remarks, foul language,
and mean and inequitable treatment by co-workers gave rise to a jury question,
because impact of separate successive incidents may accumulate to create
hostile environment); Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir.
1999) (citation omitted) (improper to consider each offensive event in isolation,
"as the very meaning of `environment' is `[t]he surrounding conditions,

influences or forces which influence or modify").

62

The district court characterized "[t]he mocking, the mopping, the singling out
for discipline, the timing with the stopwatch, the machine assignments, the
disparate training and the threats by Giudice" as merely evidence "revealing the
work environment to be `unpleasant and sometimes cruel.'" It then dismissed
each of these types of conduct as "at most bothersome incidents." J.A. 1097
(citation omitted). In this regard, in addition to improperly disaggregating the
incidents from the whole, the district court adopted the view that these
incidents were not discriminatory, and thus erred by failing to draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of Ms. Conner. Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prod., Inc.,___,U.S.___, ___, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2102, 147 L.Ed.2d 105
(U.S. June 12, 2000) (court misapplied standard of review under Rule 50 by
disregarding evidence that supported plaintiff's prima facie case and
undermined the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation).
C.

63

As a preliminary matter, in its post-trial memorandum order granting judgment

as a matter of law, the district court erred in determining that certain evidence
presented by Ms. Conner was"irrelevant and prejudicial." We construe the
court's post-trial determination to be a reversal of its decision during trial that
the evidence was admissible; the district court is fully empowered to reverse its
evidentiary rulings post-trial and to reconsider that evidence's effect on the trial.
See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 (2000). However, upon
review, we must conclude that the district court properly admitted the evidence
during trial, and that its post-trial decision reversing its prior evidentiary rulings
was erroneous. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997) (abuse
of discretion standard of review for district court's evidentiary rulings).
1.

64

With respect to the comments the district court credited as potentially severe or
pervasive ("Are you on the rag?" and "Didn't you get any last night?"), after the
jury returned its verdict, the court found that the evidence that Department 710
was an unpleasant place to work was "irrelevant and prejudicial." J.A. 1103-04.
The court concluded that such comments were simply insufficient to constitute
harassment, in light of the "rugged environment" of physically demanding work
that usually caused the machine operators to be covered in oil. J.A. 1096. The
court indicated that"[t]hose of us who work in refined office jobs where
socially imposed speech codes predominate must not lose sight of the fact that

Title VII was not meant to transform the rough into the sublime." Id. However,
Ms. Conner does not take issue with the physically demanding, rough, and oily
workplace (indeed, the evidence demonstrates that she performed the
demanding work well) -- instead, she alleges that she was not comparably
treated because of her gender.
65

We are unable to discern an "inhospitable environment" exception to Title VII's

mandate that employers may not discriminate based on employees' gender as to
the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." See, e.g., Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-35 (1977) (Title VII's bar to gender-based
discrimination with respect to female applicant for "contact" prison guard job in
a maximumsecurity male prison was not surmounted merely by"peculiarly
inhospitable [environment] for human beings of whatever sex" subject to
regular "violence and disorganization"); Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 ("women
working in the [male-dominated] trades do not deserve less protection from the
law than women working in a courthouse"), cf. Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d
529, 534 (7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing the idea that a prevailing workplace
culture can excuse discriminatory actions, as "[t]here is no assumption-of-risk
defense to charges of work place discrimination") (citing Oncale , 523 U.S. at
81-82). The objective prong of the Harris test instead requires the jury to assess
the events in the context of the workplace, as is appropriate.

66

Additionally, SBI simply does not assert that Department 710's physical
environment permits different treatment of its employees based on their gender.
See United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (4th Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted) (employer has burden to prove that gender-based distinction is
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business"); see
also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334 (Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification
exception is "extremely narrow").

67

Whether Ms. Conner experienced unlawful discrimination -- even in SBI's

"rough" environment -- must be determined based on "the simple test of
whether the evidence shows `treatment of a person in a manner which but for
that person's sex would be different.'" City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and
Power v. Manhart , 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). The jury must therefore evaluate
the employer's treatment of Ms. Conner in light of the work environment at the
Altavista plant, which was, as the district court found, "an unpleasant place to
work" where none of the employees were treated"tenderly." J.A. 1103. Cf.
Reeves, U.S. ___,___, 120 S.Ct. at 2014 (reasonable jury could find unlawful
discrimination even where supervisor also harassed other employees). The
factual development concerning SBI's work atmosphere was therefore entirely
appropriate and necessary, and was properly admitted into evidence at trial by

the district court. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. It was, arguably, the most probative
and relevant evidence with respect to Ms. Conner's claim, and we are simply
unpersuaded by the district court's post-verdict view in this regard.
2.
68

Further, the district court found it "not surprising that Shaeffer [sic] sought
verification" of Ms. Conner's uterine hemorrhaging condition by insisting that
she display her bloodied pants to him rather than to a nurse, in light of her poor
attendance record. J.A. 1097. After the jury returned its verdict against SBI, the
district court also expressed "serious concerns about the impact of the
testimony relating to the bloody pants incidents," based on its view that Ms.
Conner's counsel "chose to repeatedly elicit details" about this "irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence." J.A. 1103-04. However, we again disagree, conclude that
this evidence was highly relevant and probative, and find the district court's
post-verdict ruling to be erroneous.

69

First, the court admitted evidence of the uterine hemorrhaging and SBI's
conduct relating to it, and thus had assessed its probative value during the jury
trial. See infra III.D. During trial, the district court properly determined that
this evidence's probative value was not substantially outweighed by a danger of
unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Because the evidence had been
properly admitted and was before the jury, counsel's argument in reliance on it
was also entirely proper.17

70

Second, the record simply fails to support the district court's impression of any
overemphasis of this evidence-- of approximately 1000 pages of transcript, Ms.
Conner's testimony on the subject is barely thirty lines. Likewise, Ms. Haskins's
corroborating testimony is fewer than fifteen lines. And, of thirty-seven pages
of counsel's closing argument, fewer than twenty-three lines refer to the subject.
Under these circumstances, we must conclude that there was no unfair
prejudice to SBI resulting from references to this highly relevant evidence
relating to the bloody pants.
D.

71

In addition, the district court committed two distinct errors of law by failing to
apply the Harris test to determine whether the unwelcome conduct was "severe
or pervasive," and by failing to properly assess the evidence in its totality.
Application of the Harris test to this evidentiary record, viewed in the totality of
the circumstances, leads us to conclude that sufficient evidence exists for the

trier of fact to find an actionable hostile work environment in the Altavista

plant. We review the Harris factors in turn:
1. Frequency of the Unwelcome Conduct
72

We find ample evidence before the jury to support a conclusion of both

frequent and unwelcome conduct. More specifically, the evidence established:

73

(a) Ms. Conner was required to mop the entire floor sev eral times each week,
while her supervisors led her co workers in ridiculing, belittling, and mocking
her. See supra II.B.4. Unlike the male machine operators, she was not
allowed time to clean the heavy layer of machine oil off of herself before her
breaks began. See supra II.B.9. She was followed and timed with a stopwatch
during her breaks for approximately six weeks. Id.

74

(b) On a regular basis, her work assignments were not comparable to those of
the male operators, as demon strated by the contrast between the number of
hours Ms. Conner spent on the advanced tasks of unplanned tool setting and
machine set-up, as compared to the male operators. See supra II.B.3.

75

(c) When the men learned the advanced tool setting and machine set-up skills,
they were promoted to a higher pay grade, unlike Ms. Conner. See supra
II.B.8.

76

SBI's failure to pay Ms. Conner comparably affected her daily from November
1993 until her termination in May 1995, and was particularly egregious
because: (i) she was one of the most capable employees in the Department
(according to Boyd and Schaefer); and (ii) she even came to the plant on her
non-work days to perform advanced tasks for men who were incapable of
performing them and were themselves paid at the higher rate. Id.

77

(d) Schaefer repeatedly and inappropriately asked Ms. Conner if she was "on
the rag." See supra II.B.5.

78

(e) Schaefer repeatedly and inappropriately asked Ms. Conner if she "got any
last night." See supra II.B.5.

79

(f) Approximately ten different times, Ms. Conner was not permitted to leave
the factory floor until, each time, she showed her supervisor the blood from her
uterine hemorrhaging. See supra II.B.6.

80

The frequency and regularity of the unwelcome conduct established by the

evidence here is similar to that underlying our decision in Amirmokri v.
Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126 (4th Cir. 1995). In Amirmokri, a
supervisor and co-workers referred to the plaintiff by derogatory nicknames
almost daily, just as Schaefer often used gender-based taunts to ridicule Ms.
Conner. See Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1131. Like the plaintiff in Amirmokri , Ms.
Conner experienced frequent humiliation because she was given work
assignments that were more difficult than those of her co-workers. Id. The
regularity of the unwelcome conduct here is entirely different from the few,
scattered remarks that we determined were merely"offensive" in Hartsell v.
Duplex Products, Inc., 123 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting four instances of
others' gender-based derogatory office commentary). Further, unlike the
plaintiff in Hartsell, who herself uttered numerous vulgarities in the workplace,
Ms. Conner was the regular target of the unwelcome conduct rather than a
willing participant in such conduct. See Hartsell, 123 F.3d at 773. There was
therefore ample evidence before the jury establishing that Ms. Conner
experienced frequent and unwelcome gender-based hostile conduct.
2. Severity of the Unwelcome Conduct

81

The second Harris factor, the severity of the unwelcome conduct, taken as a
whole, is also firmly established on this evidentiary record. For example:

82

(a) Ms. Conner was denied the necessary training to per form her job. See supra
II.B.1. She was thereafter inequitably assigned to perform more difficult
tasks. See supra II.B.3; see also Amirmokri , 60 F.3d at 1131 (supervisor tried
to embarrass plaintiff by giving him impossible tasks and by stating in front of
his co workers that plaintiff did not know what he was doing). She nonetheless
performed skilled tasks, some times assisting men who did not have those
necessary skills, and she did so at a lower rate of pay. See supra II.B.8. Also,
she was selectively disciplined for her absences. See supra II.B.2. When she
sought remedy for these disparities, her concerns were repeatedly ignored by
the responsible authorities. See supra II.B.7; see also, e.g., Kimzey v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 573 (8th Cir. 1997) (managers' fail ure to
respond to complaints added to hostile environ ment).

83

(b) Ms. Conner was required to expose her uterine blood to Mr. Schaefer, and to
do so within view of her co workers. See supra II.B.6. This unnecessary and
deeply invasive mandate is certainly "severe" by any definition. See, e.g., Forts
v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1214 n.5 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that privacy justified
the district court's order that prevented male prison guards from viewing female
inmates during the early morning, when "one may find her night clothes and

bedding visibly soiled from an unexpected menstrual flow [which she] wish[ed]
to clean up"), cited with approval in Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119-20
(4th Cir. 1981).
84

(c) Schaefer publicly asked Ms. Conner if she was"on the rag," and in this
manner, he dismissed the legitimacy of her frustrations by personal genderbased remarks. See supra II.B.5. His remarks are unlike the general ized and
plaintiff-invited references to gender stereo types in Hartsell. See Hartsell, 123
F.3d at 772 (office comments that females would "cry like a baby," and
suggestions that women be a "mini van driving mommy," or "like a good wife"
were not severe in a context where the plaintiff herself referenced mastur bation
and used profanity to refer to her supervisor).

85

Schaefer's references to Ms. Conner's menstruation amplified the severity of his

requirement that Ms. Con ner actually expose her gynecological blood to him.

86

(d) Schaefer publicly asked her "didn't she get any last night?," another
personalized offensive utterance. See supra II.B.5; see also, e.g. , Spicer, 66
F.3d at 707 (abusive environment established by two days of a few co-workers'
remarks such as "This is nipple check day," and "Which one is bigger?").

87

(e) The regular mocking of Ms. Conner while she mopped the floor is also of
consequence for our view of the totality of the circumstances. See supra
II.B.4; see also Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1131 (supervisor and co workers abused
Iranian plaintiff almost daily by calling him a "camel jockey," "the local
terrorist," and "the Emir of Waldorf").

88

The more serious incidents enumerated here were complemented by numerous

additional occurrences that, in isolation, may have seemed less problematic, but
which actually served to exacerbate the severity of the situation. Reviewed and
considered cumulatively, the unwelcome conduct here was clearly of sufficient
severity to support the jury's verdict against SBI.
3. Nature of the Unwelcome Conduct

89

We next turn to the third Harris factor: whether the evidence demonstrates
unwelcome conduct that was physically threatening or humiliating, or that
instead merely constituted offensive utterances. Some examples of such
unwelcome conduct found in the evidentiary record are the following:

90

(a) Ms. Conner, one of the higher-performing machine operators at the plant,

90

(a) Ms. Conner, one of the higher-performing machine operators at the plant,
was paid less than male machine operators who did not possess equivalent
skills, and who sought her assistance on their machines. See supra II.B.8. This
difference in compensation, unrelated to her job performance, was humiliating
and offensive.

91

(b) Ms. Conner experienced a single powerful incident of gender-based

intimidation, when in her meeting with Giudice, he slammed his clenched fist
on his desk and screamed that he would fire her on the spot if she ever
mentioned sexual discrimination again. See supra II.B.10; see also Smith, 202
F.3d at 242 (discrimina tory intimidation, as well as ridicule and insult, can
contribute to an alteration of the conditions of the vic tim's employment to
create an abusive working envi ronment).

92

(c) Schaefer's questions of "Are you on the rag?" and "Didn't you get any last
night?" constitute, in context and by their frequency, personally humiliating
public ridicule. See supra II.B.5. Such gender-based ridicule was amplified by
Schaefer's leadership in mocking Ms. Conner while she complied with his
orders that she perform the stereotypically female task of mop ping, which men
in the same job class were not required to perform. See supra II.B.4.

93

(d) In order to obtain permission to leave the work floor in response to a

medical and safety need, Ms. Conner repeatedly had to display her
gynecological bleeding to Schaefer, who also frequently and quite publicly
humiliated her by asking, "Are you on the rag?" See supra II.B.5, II.B.6.
While the district court rea soned that "[t]here was no evidence that Schaefer
made the plaintiff show her blood-stained pants for any rea son other than to
verify the presence of a medical prob lem," this suggestion is logically flawed.
First, because Schaefer flatly denied Ms. Conner's version of these incidents,
there is no affirmative evidence of any medi cal purpose underlying his
disavowed conduct. Sec ond, Schaefer's visual inspection could not provide any
verification of a medical problem, because blood on a woman's pants can also
indicate normal body func tions.18 Cf. Dorland's Medical Dictionary 1013 (28th
ed. 1994) (menstruation is a normal discharge of blood from the uterus). A
senseless mandate from a supervi sor that an employee expose symptoms of a
deeply pri vate reproductive system dysfunction is simply humiliating,
especially when, as here, that mandated display must occur within eyesight of
other employees.

94

We conclude that the unwelcome conduct established by this record was

sufficiently humiliating and physically threatening to support the jury's verdict.

95

4. Unreasonable Interference with Work Performance

95

4. Unreasonable Interference with Work Performance

96

The fourth Harris factor requires us to determine whether the evidence shows
that the frequent and unwelcome conduct unreasonably interfered with Ms.
Conner's work performance.

97

Under the evidence, SBI failed to provide the usual training to Ms. Conner, see
supra II.B.1, by not initially assigning her to Department 767 with the new
male machine operators, and also by denying her ad hoc lessons and practice on
a day-to-day basis throughout her employment. These omissions undermined
her ability to perform despite her excellent aptitude for the tasks. As a result,
Ms. Conner alone bore the responsibility for acquiring the necessary job skills,
unlike her counterparts, the male machine operators.

98

Ms. Conner's specific job assignments (unlike those of her male counterparts),
see supra II.B.3, II.B.4, also interfered with her performance -- she operated
physically separated machines; those machines produced dissimilar parts,
which slowed her operation time by precluding a rapid transfer of knowledge
between machines. She was often reassigned to tool setting and set-ups rather
than permitted to operate her machines as they were producing parts. She also
regularly had to mop the entire floor during the time that the men were able to
produce parts.

99

We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
that the disparate and adverse treatment of Ms. Conner in Department 710
unreasonably interfered with her work performance, due to her gender, during
the course of her SBI employment.
5. Psychological Harm

100 We must also consider, pursuant to Harris, whether there was evidence, from
the plaintiff's subjective perception of the hostile work environment, i.e., that
psychological harm resulted therefrom.
101 On this record, Ms. Conner experienced regular, profound humiliation because
of her gender, unlike the male machine operators. The disparate duties assigned
to her, and the failure to provide her with needed training prior to the task
assignments, placed her in a significantly higher-stress workplace than
experienced by the male machine operators. She suffered pain from the
blistered hands that resulted from her efforts to force the hexagonal bars into
the machines, because her supervisors failed to show her how to properly load

the bars.
102 Ms. Conner suffered daily headaches and nausea from the humiliation, and as a
result, a doctor prescribed medication for her. The workplace disparities caused
her to have constant fear that she would lose her job, adding even more stress.
When she met with the plant manager, Mr. Giudice, to inform him of these
disparities, he screamed at her and threatened to terminate her "on the spot,"
causing her to immediately start crying. She cried throughout the rest of that
meeting. J.A. 155.
103 We find sufficient evidence before the jury to support Ms. Conner's subjective
perception of Department 710 as a hostile and abusive environment towards
women. The evidence supports the jury's finding that this environment resulted
in psychological harm to her.
6. Summary
104 Applying the Harris factors to this record, viewed in the totality of the
circumstances, there is ample support for the jury finding of severe or pervasive
conduct sufficient to constitute a hostile work environment. Indeed, in our
view, the conduct evidenced here is extreme. Our conclusion is buttressed by
the legal principle that whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile work environment is "quintessentially a question of
fact" for the jury, Smith, 202 F.3d at 243 (citing Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d
524, 530 (4th Cir. 1994)), as is the issue of the plaintiff's credibility. The fact
that two female machine operators later hired into the Department, Ms. Rorer
and Ms. Haskins, experienced the same types of unwelcome conduct is also
highly supportive of the jury's determination of a gender-based hostile work
environment. See Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 981 (4th Cir.
1997) (identical course of harassment experienced by two female employees
indicated it was not an isolated phenomenon); Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.,
19 F.3d 533, 538 (10th Cir. 1994) (because critical inquiry in hostile
environment claim is the environment, sexual harassment incidents directed at
other employees can prove plaintiff's claim).
105 We accordingly conclude that there is sufficient evidence in this record to
support the jury's finding of a hostile work environment.19
IV.
106 We review for abuse of discretion the district court's grant of a conditional new

trial. See Atlas Food Sys. and Serv., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d
587, 594 (4th Cir. 1996). A new trial is warranted when (1) the verdict is
against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) the verdict is based upon evidence
which is false; or (3) the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. In
considering a new trial motion, the district court may weigh the evidence and
consider the credibility of the witnesses. Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transport
Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1980).
A.
107 As explained previously, the district court erred when it failed to apply the
appropriate legal standard to evaluate whether the evidence was sufficient to
establish existence of a hostile work environment. See supra III.A. And a
material legal error by definition constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). We therefore must reverse the district
court's grant of the conditional new trial. Cf. Weisgram, 120 S. Ct. at 1015 (if
court of appeals concludes that the loser on appeal has had full and fair
opportunity to present the case, including arguments for a new trial, appellate
court may appropriately instruct district court to enter judgment).
B.
108 Further, the district court based its grant of a conditional new trial on its
weighing of the evidence, concluding that the verdict was a product of the
jury's "passion, whim, and emotion." The court viewed Ms. Conner's testimony
about the frequency of Mr. Schaefer's comments and about the meeting with
Mr. Giudice as not credible, incorrectly determined that irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence affected the jury's verdict, see supra III.C., and found
that the damages award was too large. See J.A. 1100-07.
1.
109 Our review of the record convinces us that the extensive corroborating
evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, support Ms.
Conner's testimony on the two minor points that the district court apparently
disbelieved. See Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055, 1059 (4th Cir.
1984) (trial judge should not substitute his own judgment of facts and witness
credibility, particularly where the subject matter of the trial is easily
comprehended by a lay jury).20 In any event, minor inconsistencies cannot
justify such an intrusion into the jury's purview. This jury verdict was simply
not against the clear weight of the evidence; a jury could reasonably find, under

the totality of circumstances, that Ms. Conner was subjected to an abusive work
environment based on gender. See Abasiekong , 744 F.2d at 1059; cf. Boczar v.
Manatee Hosp. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514, 1519 (11th Cir. 1993)
(reversing conditional new trial grant and remanding for reinstatement of the
verdict in light of simple issue presented that was sharply disputed, and
evidence permitted reasonable jury inference supporting plaintiff's claim).
2.
110 As we have already determined, the district court's view that the jury heard
irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial evidence is incorrect under Harris. See supra
III.C. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion in ruling that the evidence
was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.21 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Georgia Gulf Corp.,
961 F.2d 1190,1197 (5th Cir. 1992) (district court abused its discretion by
granting conditional new trial based on prejudice from evidence that was
relevant, admitted, and only briefly referenced by counsel); Douglass v. Eaton
Corp., 956 F.2d 1339, 1344 (6th Cir. 1992) (district court abused its discretion
by concluding evidence of workplace disparities was irrelevant, based on the
court's interpretation of the employer's differential treatment of employees),
abrogated on other grounds by Weisgram, 120 S. Ct. at 1019.
3.
111 Whether the jury's award was excessive is a question of law, which we review
de novo. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435-36 &
n.18 (1996). We find that a compensatory damages award of $20,000 is entirely
reasonable -- and not excessive -for discrimination that the jury reasonably
could find that Ms. Conner experienced. Cf. Kimzey, 107 F.3d at 570 ($35,000
compensatory damages for sexual harassment); Hearn v. General Elec. Co.,
927 F. Supp. 1486, 1500-01 (M.D. Ala. 1996) ($50,000 and $20,000 in
compensatory damages for plaintiffs' mental anguish from suffering gender
discrimination); Reinhold v. Commonwealth of Va., No. 96CV82, 1996 WL
1061854, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 31, 1996) (jury verdict summary) ($85,000
compensatory damages for sexual harassment), vacated and remanded in light
of new Supreme Court decisions, 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998).
4.
112 A punitive damages award is appropriate where the employer "engaged in a
discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless
indifference to the [plaintiff's] federally protected rights." 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)

(1). The standard required to qualify for a punitive damages award, the
"reprehensible character of the conduct[,] is not generally considered apart from
the requisite state of mind," and employers need not "engage in conduct with
some independent, `egregious' quality before being subject to a punitive
award." Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2124, 2126
(1999).22 Under this Kolstad standard, the evidence presented here was
sufficient to support the jury's award of punitive damages. However, the
amount of the award was by law excessive and we must remand for factual
development. See 42 U.S.C. 1981a(c) (Title VII plaintiff's total compensatory
and punitive damages award may not exceed $300,000).23
V.
113 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's award of judgment as a
matter of law to SBI, and we also reverse its award to SBI of a conditional new
trial. We remand this case to the district court for the jury's verdict to be
reinstated, and for such further proceedings as may be warranted.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

Notes:
1

A "hostile work environment" is also often referred to as an "abusive work

environment." See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66
(1986).

The record establishes that each Acme-Gridley machine was approximately 20

feet in length. Machine operators fed metal bars twelve to fourteen feet long
and weighing as much as 70 pounds into the machine. After the machine
processed the metal bars into parts, the finished parts dropped from the
machine into a pan; the Acme-Gridley machine operator then carried the full
pan of oil-covered parts to a degreaser. Full pans of parts weighed up to 100
pounds. The atmosphere around these machines was dense with the oil required
to run them smoothly. Machine operators regularly were required to submerge
their arms in oil; vaporized oil from the machine would fall and settle, covering
the machine operators' clothes, hair, and skin, as well as the floor around the
machine.

When SBI hired additional machine operators in 1994, the men hired were
again initially assigned to Department 767 for several months before being
transferred into Department 710. As with Ms. Conner's placement in the

previous year, SBI also placed Debra Rorer, another female hired into
Department 710, directly into that Department without interim training in
Department 767. In fact, the supervisor, George Schaefer, did not allow Ms.
Rorer to operate Acme-Gridley machines for six months after she was hired as
a machine operator in August 1994. When Ms. Rorer complained, Schaefer
attempted to transfer her to a different department where women performed
assembly work. However, Ms. Rorer insisted that she should be trained to
operate the AcmeGridley machines, and the personnel manager, Mr. Keller,
intervened on her behalf. Keller required Schaefer to permit Ms. Rorer to
continue to work in Department 710, as she had been hired to do. Ms. Rorer was
then assigned to operate the Acme-Gridley machines, and she worked on the
same shift as Ms. Conner prior to Ms. Conner's termination. A third female
operator hired in Department 710, Stacey Haskins, also received no training.
Schaefer showed Ms. Haskins how to turn on her machine and told her that the
next day she would run the machine by herself. Hence, the men who worked in
Department 710 received additional training that was not provided to any of the
women who performed the same work.
4

Likewise, when co-worker Stacey Haskins's machine malfunctioned, Boyd

fixed it without showing her what he did. When Ms. Haskins asked Boyd how
he fixed the machine, he responded, "Never mind, just run it now."

The men also laughed at Ms. Rorer in 1995 when she began working on the
Acme-Gridley machines, as she tried to beat hexagonal bars into place before
learning how to properly load them. Ms. Conner then taught Ms. Rorer how to
load the hexagonal bars.

Mr. Shelton was also an Acme-Gridley machine operator on the second shift
and had received training in Department 767. He witnessed the Department 710
employees making fun of Ms. Conner when she tried to load the machines with
hexagonal bars, and he observed that no one would assist her.

When a machine operator changes a machine's settings in order for the machine
to produce a different part, the operator performs a "set-up." This process
involves changing the machine's tooling, and adjusting each tool according to
blueprint specifications. Machine operators who performed set-ups were
ranked at a higher grade, and thus received higher pay rates.

Likewise, Ms. Haskins spent 131.3 hours on these tasks during the same
period.

Mr. Schaefer also required one of the other female operators, Ms. Rorer, to
operate machines that were physically separated.

10

Of significance, Mr. Schaefer also required the other female co-workers, Ms.
Rorer and Ms. Haskins, to mop the entire floor during their regular work shifts,
which prevented them from operating their machines during that time. Ms.
Rorer mopped the entire floor approximately three times per week.

11

Schaefer also made similar derogatory remarks to Ms. Haskins, such as "Are
you on the rag?," on three occasions when she was not smiling or in a good
mood. J.A. 326-27. Ms. Haskins would cry later at home from the degradation
of Schaefer's remarks.

12

Ms. Haskins and Ms. Rorer were also paid less than the male machine
operators who performed the same specialized work, and their pay progression
ceased shortly after their employment began. Ms. Haskins achieved a pay rate
of $8.53 per hour, and Ms. Rorer attained an $8.08 per hour rate. Ms. Conner
advised her supervisor that her lower pay rate was unfair, especially
considering that a male co-worker, Noel Farrell, was regularly tardy and left
work early without permission, and that he did so without being disciplined.
Shortly afterwards, Farrell received a written warning that documented two
incidents of tardiness, and advised him that another unexcused tardiness would
result in a three-day suspension. (Farrell's attendance record at the Altavista
plant does not show either of the two tardy arrivals referenced in his
supervisor's written warning.) When Ms. Conner missed two days of work in
August 1994 due to an unexpected death in her family, she was placed on
suspension for two days without pay because of an unexcused absence. She
complained to Mr. Schaefer that her suspension was unfair, in light of Farrell's
regular unexcused absences that were not disciplined. Five days later, Farrell
was suspended for one day without pay when he arrived two hours late without
an excuse.

13

At trial, Schaefer incorrectly characterized Ms. Conner's attendance record as

"by far the worst" and "still probably one to two times greater than the next
person in the [D]department," even excluding her medically necessary
absences. Ms. Conner had 36 unexcused absences during her SBI employment.
In comparison, male operators Richard Harvey and Jay Shelton had 36 and 44
absences, respectively, for the same time period (May 1993 through May
1995). Shelton was never disciplined based on his absences, and according to
the plant manager, Martin Giudice, Shelton's absences were about average, not
excessive. Similarly, SBI's records show that Noel Farrell had 27 absences and
28 tardies from December 1993 (when he began working at the plant) to May
1995. See supra note 12 (SBI's records overstated Farrell's actual work
attendance).

14

In comparison, Mr. Schaefer failed to discipline male machine operator Richard

Harvey when, on January 13, 1995, Harvey pulled out his knife and started to
sharpen it while Mr. Schaefer spoke to him about inappropriate actions the
previous day -- when Harvey threw a knocker rod at work that could have
injured others, and when he purposely broke a machinery part. In response to
Harvey's knife-sharpening activity, Schaefer told Harvey that he was scaring
Schaefer. According to Schaefer, "it was clear he was trying to intimidate me."
15

Four days after Ms. Conner's meeting with Giudice, on January 27, 1995, Mr.
Giudice called Ms. Haskins into his office. He asked her if she had been
sexually harassed during her employment, and he emphasized that he had an
open-door policy to talk with employees on any issue whatsoever.

16

Actionable discrimination includes conduct "because of" the victim's gender,

which is broader than conduct of a "sexual nature." See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-81 (1998). The district court correctly
concluded that here, sufficient evidence supported a finding that Ms. Conner's
gender was the cause of complained-of conduct such as the comments, "Are
you on the rag?" and "Didn't you get any last night?" as well as the requirement
that the female operators mop the floor more frequently than the male
operators.

17

If there had been some basis to restrict the use of this evidence -and none is
evident -- the court was empowered to give limiting instructions to prevent the
jury from drawing improper inferences from it. The district court gave no such
limiting instructions, consistent with its determination that the evidence was
relevant and admissible.

18

The district court indicated that "[g]iven Conner's poor attendance record, it is
not surprising that Shaeffer [sic] sought verification of this condition." We are
unpersuaded by this argument, in light of Schaefer's blanket denial of having
engaged in the conduct, and in light of the undisputed evidence that SBI's
medical verification policy required employees to provide a note from a health
care professional. There simply was no evidence suggesting that SBI physically
inspected its employees to verify their asserted medical needs.

19

SBI raises three additional arguments, as follows: First, SBI contends that the
harassment claim impermissibly exceeds the scope of Ms. Conner's EEOC
charge that alleged that she was "harassed and subjected to different terms and
conditions of employment . . . and in general was treated differently than the
males." J.A. 1014. We find that her claims in her judicial complaint are
reasonably related to her EEOC charge. See Smith, 202 F.3d at 246 (citation
omitted). Second, SBI asserts that Ms. Conner's sexual harassment claim is
limited to the 180-day period preceding her EEOC claim because incidents

outside the statutory window are time-barred unless they can be related to a
continuing violation. SBI contends that no continuing violation occurred. We
agree with the district court's rejection of this argument, as the continuing
conduct was plainly evidenced during the relevant period. Third, SBI maintains
that Ms. Conner failed to file her charge with the appropriate state agency. Ms.
Conner moved to supplement the record on appeal with a copy of the EEOC's
letter transmitting Ms. Conner's charge to the Virginia Council on Human
Rights ("VCHR") pursuant to the agencies' worksharing agreement. We grant
the motion and conclude that Ms. Conner properly filed her charge with the
VCHR. See Puryear v. County of Roanoke, 214 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2000);
see also J.A. 278-79 (evidence of charge filed with EEOC and its issuance of
right-tosue letter).
20

We are also unpersuaded by the district court's reasons for discounting two
points in Ms. Conner's testimony. First, as to Ms. Conner's trial testimony on
the frequency that Schaefer remarked,"Didn't you get any last night?" or "Are
you on the rag?," she testified that Schaefer made these remarks approximately
ten to twenty times per month. This testimony is not necessarily inconsistent
with her deposition testimony, which SBI was permitted to fully utilize for
impeachment purposes. Second, the district court apparently disbelieved Ms.
Conner's testimony about her meeting with Giudice. Giudice and Keller
testified that sexual harassment was not mentioned in the meeting. The district
court found Giudice and Keller more credible because they"testified in
conformity with a contemporaneously drafted memorandum." The court also
viewed as "almost impossible to believe" Ms. Conner's testimony about the
meeting, based on Ms. Haskins' "very credible" testimony that four days later,
Giudice initiated a meeting with her to ascertain that she did not feel sexually
harassed. The district court did not view as probative that Ms. Haskins saw Ms.
Conner leave her meeting with Giudice in tears. However, the jury evidently
accepted another reasonable interpretation: (1) the memorandum -- allegedly
contemporaneous, but which was not shown to Ms. Conner until after litigation
began -- was constructed in anticipation of possible litigation; (2) Giudice's
unusual meeting with Ms. Haskins (Ms. Conner's co-worker) four days after his
meeting with Ms. Conner, appears to have been in reaction to Ms. Conner's
discrimination claim to him; and (3) Ms. Conner left her meeting with Giudice
in tears because he threatened her with termination if she mentioned sexual
discrimination again. Intrusion into the jury's province -- the determination of
credibility -- is simply not warranted on this evidence. Cf. Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at
2104 (reinstating jury verdict of workplace discrimination that was sufficiently
supported by the evidence, rather than reconsidering new trial motion after
reversing grant of summary judgment).

21

That the jury carefully considered the evidence before it, and based its award

thereon, is further indicated by the jury's award of less damages than requested
on Ms. Conner's Equal Pay Act claim. The jury's award corresponded to her
claimed lost wages limited to the statutory period for allowable recovery under
Title VII. Although the Equal Pay Act actually permits a longer recovery period
than does Title VII, the jury's damages award demonstrates its thoughtful and
rational deliberation of the matters with which it was charged.
22

The district court's opinion relied on a standard that was subsequently vacated
by the Supreme Court's Kolstad decision.

23

The parties disagree as to the applicable damages maximum under 42 U.S.C.

1981a. The issue relating to determination of this damages maximum has not
yet been addressed by the district court.