UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4793
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARY EARL ADAMS, a/k/a David A. Freeze,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (4:96-cr-00058-BR-1)
Submitted:
March 31, 2011
Decided:
April 22, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Susan S. Kister, St. Louis, Missouri, for Appellant.
George
E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gary
supervised
Earl
release
Adams
and
appeals
imposing
the
judgment
sixty-month
revoking
sentence.
On
appeal, Adams contends that the district court erred in revoking
his
period
of
supervised
release
and
unreasonable sentence upon revocation.
imposed
plainly
Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
Adams first contends that the district court erred in
revoking his period of supervised release.
To revoke supervised
release, the district court must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated terms of his release.
18
U.S.C. 3583(e)(3) (2006); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d
829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992).
Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Adams violated the terms of his supervised release.
See
United States v. Benton, 627 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2010)
(reviewing
district
courts
findings
of
fact
supervised release violations for clear error).
related
to
Therefore, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking Adamss supervised release.
See Copley, 978 F.2d at
831 (reviewing district courts decision to revoke defendants
supervised release for abuse of discretion); see also United
States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999) (reviewing
district courts termination of defendants supervised release
for abuse of discretion).
Adams also contends that the district courts sentence
imposed upon revocation was plainly unreasonable.
did
not
Guidelines
request
Manual
sentence
policy
outside
statement
the
Because Adams
U.S.
range,
Sentencing
we
review
his
challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence for plain error.
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010); see
United
States
v.
Olano,
507
U.S.
725,
732
(1993)
(detailing
plain error standard).
The district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendants supervised release.
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
assume
deferential
appellate
posture
concerning
United
Thus, we
issues
of
fact and the exercise of [that] discretion, United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted), and will affirm unless the sentence is plainly
unreasonable in light of the applicable 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)
(2006) factors.
Id. at 437.
Our first step in reviewing a sentence imposed upon a
revocation
of
supervised
sentence is unreasonable.
generally
the
procedural
release
is
Id. at 438.
and
to
whether
the
In doing so, we follow
substantive
employed in reviewing original sentences.
3
decide
Id.
considerations
A sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court has considered the
policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the Guidelines and
the applicable 3553(a) factors, id. at 439, and has adequately
explained the sentence chosen, though it need not explain the
sentence
in
as
sentence.
much
detail
595
Thompson,
as
when
F.3d
at
imposing
547.
the
original
sentence
is
substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper
basis
for
its
maximum.
imposition
sentence
up
to
district
courts
the
statutory
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
[I]n
imposing
of
some
cases,
within-range
sentence
may
be
clear
reasons
from
for
context,
including the courts statements to the defendant throughout the
sentencing
hearing.
citation omitted).
Thompson,
595
F.3d
at
547
(internal
Unless the district court completely fails
to indicate any reasons for its sentence, [w]e may be hardpressed
to
find
any
explanation
for
within-range,
revocation
sentences insufficient given the amount of deference we afford
district courts when imposing these sentences.
Id.
If we
determine that the sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
Our
review
of
the
record
on
appeal
leads
us
to
conclude that the district court committed no plain error and
that the revocation sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
4
court.
legal
before
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions
the
court
are
adequately
and
argument
presented
would
not
in
aid
the
the
materials
decisional
process.
AFFIRMED