United States v. Anthony Devore Hailstock, 103 F.3d 121, 4th Cir. (1996)
United States v. Anthony Devore Hailstock, 103 F.3d 121, 4th Cir. (1996)
3d 121
Anthony Devore Hailstock pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent
to distribute and to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846
(1994). The district court sentenced Hailstock to serve 262 months
imprisonment. He appeals his conviction and sentence. Hailstock's attorney has
filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
raising three issues but stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious issues
for appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm Hailstock's conviction and
sentence.
Hailstock was over eighteen years old when he committed the instant felony
offense, which involved a controlled substance. Hailstock also has two prior
crimes-of-violence felony convictions. In 1989, Hailstock was convicted of
strong-arm robbery and receiving and possessing stolen goods and sentenced to
serve ten years imprisonment. He was also convicted of assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature and sentenced to serve an additional ten-year term.
See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 4B1.1
(Nov.1994) (outlining career offender status requirements). Hailstock's criminal
history satisfied the career offender criteria; therefore, we find that he was
properly sentenced according to the career offender provision.
Hailstock also asserts that the district court should have exercised its discretion
and modified his sentence because of the disparity in the lengths of sentences
imposed on him and his co-defendants. * The district court is only allowed to
depart from the applicable sentencing guidelines range to correct the disparity
of the sentences received between co-defendants upon proof of actual
prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Fonville, 5 F.3d 781, 783 (4th
Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 62 U.S.L.W. 3754 (May 16, 1994) (No. 937612). Hailstock fails to allege prosecutorial misconduct, and we find no
evidence of it. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to modify Hailstock's sentence.
Hailstock's assertion that his plea was accepted without an independent factual
basis is directly belied by the record. A special agent with the South Carolina
Law Enforcement Division informed the district court of Hailstock's
involvement in the offense. We find that this recitation of the evidence satisfied
all the essential elements of the offense and sufficiently supported Hailstock's
guilty plea.
7
We also find that Hailstock's guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently given.
The district court found Hailstock to be legally competent to offer his plea. He
was informed of the essential elements of the offense to which he was pleading
guilty. The district court also advised Hailstock of the possible punishment
range. Further, Hailstock responded affirmatively when questioned as to
whether he understood the nature of the proceedings and if he still wished to
offer a guilty plea after being informed of the punishment range.
Hailstock also challenges the district court's refusal to grant his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. We review a district court's refusal to allow plea
withdrawal under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Brown, 617
F.2d 54, 55 (4th Cir.1980). To warrant a withdrawal of a plea, a defendant has
the burden of showing a "fair and just" reason for the withdrawal, even if the
government has not shown that it would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
857 (1991). Because the district court found that Hailstock's plea was
knowingly and voluntarily given; that the defendant had not credibly asserted
his legal innocence; that there was a substantial delay between the entering of
the plea and the motion to withdraw; and, that to allow a withdrawal of his plea
at that stage of the proceedings would result in a waste of judicial resources, the
district court properly concluded that Hailstock failed to show a fair and just
reason that would warrant withdrawal of his guilty plea. We therefore find that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hailstock's withdrawal
motion.