319 F.
2d 853
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Isaac FREDIA and Charlotte Scott, Appellants.
No. 373, Docket 28101.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued May 29, 1963.
Decided June 25, 1963.
Stone & Diller, New York City (Joseph I. Stone, New York City, of
counsel) for appellants.
Robert M. Morgenthau, U.S. Atty., Southern District of New York
(Charles A. Stillman, Thomas Day Edwards, Asst. U.S. Atty., of counsel)
for appellee.
Before WATERMAN, FRIENDLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
After a trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York before Judge Palmieri sitting without a jury, appellants were convicted of
having violated 21 U.S.C. 173, 174, by receiving, concealing, and selling one
ounce of cocaine, and with having conspired to do so.
In post-arrest confessions, properly received into evidence below, both
appellants admitted their participation in the April 12, 1960 sale of one ounce
of cocaine to Narcotics Agent John F. Brady. We must assume that the trial
judge used each confession against only the defendant making it. At the trial,
appellant Scott repudiated her confession, but the evidence of her participation
in the sale and of her possession of the narcotics was overwhelming. Appellant
Fredia admitted at trial his participation in the sale, but set up the defense of
entrapment by Agent Brady and the government informer 'Sally,' who
introduced Brady and Fredia on April 12.
Fredia now contends that Judge Palmieri erred in refusing to order the
Government to disclose the informer's full name. The right of defendants in a
criminal case to have the name of an informer disclosed, however, is not an
absolute one. In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62, 77 S.Ct. 623, 628, 1
L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) the Court stated:
'We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. * * *
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the
particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's
testimony, and other relevant factors.'
In this case, appellants' confessions, considered together with the testimony of
the Government Agents who participated in the sale and arrest, establish
beyond peradventure of doubt that appellants made a willing sale of narcotics to
a buyer who 'look(ed) all right.' It is inconceivable that anything the informer
might have said, if called as a witness, would materially have aided appellants
in setting up a defense of entrapment.
Affirmed.