Rutland Railway Corporation v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 307 F.2d 21, 2d Cir. (1962)
Rutland Railway Corporation v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 307 F.2d 21, 2d Cir. (1962)
2d 21
The four appellant labor unions, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, the Brother of Railroad
Trainmen, and the Order of Railroad Conductors and Brakemen, hereinafter
referred to collectively as the defendant brotherhoods, and the five individual
appellants, each either a general or local chairman of one of the abovementioned brotherhoods, appeal from a judgment order of the United States
District Court for the District of Vermont, enjoining as of October 27, 1960, the
unions, their members, and agents from further striking, picketing, or using any
other form of economic coercion in connection with a dispute which the
The strike began on September 16, 1960. It continued until the injunction order
was effective. Then, obedient thereto, the workers went back to their jobs.
The Rutland Railway operations are divided into three subdivisions. One
subdivision runs from the New Hampshire border at Bellows Falls, Vermont, to
Rutland, Vermont, and is approximately 52 miles long. The main line
subdivision runs northerly from the southwestern corner of the State of
Vermont through North Bennington, Rutland, and Burlington, Vermont, to the
northern tip of Lake Champlain at Alburg, Vermont, a distance of about 155
miles. At Alburg the road proceeds westerly across northern New York State
through Malone and Norwood, New York, to Ogdensburg, New York, a
distance of one hundred twenty-two miles. Malone is halfway between Alburg
and Ogdensburg. Norwood, between Malone and Ogdensburg, is 35 miles from
the former and 25 miles from the latter. The portion of the line from Alburg to
Ogdensburg is called the Ogdensburg Subdivision.
The issuance of these notices was required by Section 6 of the Railway Labor
Act, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. 156.2 At the time these
notices were sent the Rutland Railway had collective bargaining agreements
with the brotherhoods.
The Rutland's financial plight continued to worsen. In the first eight months of
1960 it was hauling 5300 carloads of freight less than it was hauling in the
comparable period of 1959. Its operating revenues were $264,000 less than
those of the same period in 1959. Therefore the railroad's board of directors met
in the spring and summer of 1960 in order to devise methods for combatting the
company's financial problem. A plan was finally agreed upon whereby certain
operating expenses would be reduced by the abolition of several freight runs.
10
"Rutland Railway Corporation effective Sept. 17, 1960 will arrange train
assignment to conform to the demands of traffic. The change is not and cannot
be shown to have violated any rule or agreement as alleged. No agreement has
been violated and the carrier is merely exercising its right to operate in an
economical manner. Conferences on this issue have not been held on the
property with the [brotherhoods]."
11
12
Ten days later, on September 26, the railroad filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Vermont, asking the court to enjoin a
further strike, to order the defendants to comply with the procedural
requirements of the Railway Labor Act, and to award damages to the plaintiff.
13
To support its claim for an injunction the railroad, defining the disagreement
with its employees to be whether the management of the railroad had the right
to rearrange train runs and thereby reduce jobs and change crew terminals
without first negotiating the matter with the representatives of its workers,
promptly submitted the dispute to the National Railroad Adjustment Board
under the "minor dispute" provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 2 Second,
Sixth, 3, 44 Stat. 577, 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. 152 Second,
Sixth, 153. On October 7 the defendants moved to dismiss the action because
of improper venue. This motion was denied on October 10. The defendants
then answered, and filed a counterclaim in which they on their part sought an
injunction preventing the railroad from putting into effect the schedule of
changes set forth in its bulletins of September 8 until at least the relevant
procedures provided by the Railway Labor Act should have been exhausted.
14
After holding hearings on the merits of the respective claims the district court
issued an injunction enjoining the strike. A consideration of the railway's
prayer for an award of damages was postponed to a later date. In its opinion,
reported at 188 F.Supp. 721 (D.Vt.1960), the court held that the dispute out of
which the strike arose was a minor one, subject to the jurisdiction and decision
of the National Railroad Adjustment Board and that the Section 6 notice of
November 2, 1959, sent out by the Class I railroads on the national level did
not alter the minor nature of this particular dispute over the rescheduling of
freight runs. The court did not grant the defendants' prayer for an injunction to
prevent the railroad from effectuating its rescheduling. The defendants appeal
to this court, seeking review of the district court decision adverse to them.
15
The appellants contend that the venue for this action was not properly located
in the District of Vermont; that the controversy out of which this litigation
arose was not a "minor dispute" as the court below held, but a "major dispute"
under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) as amended, 45 U.S.C.A.
151-163, and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A.
101-115, deprived the court of jurisdiction to enjoin the strike. The appellee
railroad asserts, on the other hand, that the court below was correct in
determining the dispute a minor one which permitted the carrier to proceed with
its schedule changes and required that the employees desist from striking.
VENUE
16
17
Inasmuch as this action arises under the laws of the United States, namely, the
Railway Labor Act, the relevant venue provision of the Judicial Code is 28 U.S.
C. 1391(b):
18
19
The brotherhoods assert that, since they are unincorporated associations, the
proper venue for an action against any one of them is only in the judicial district
where its principal place of business is situated.
20
In Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of Am. R. Rs., 132 F.2d 408 (2 Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744, 63 S.Ct. 1031, 87 L.Ed. 1700 (1943), involving the
venue provision for patent infringement actions, Judge Learned Hand discussed
the concept of venue as it related to unincorporated associations. The venue
statute there involved, 35 Stat. 1084 (1909), 28 U.S.C. 109 (1940) (now 28
U.S.C. 1400(b) (1958)), stated that any suit for patent infringement might be
brought "in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district
in which the defendant * * * shall have committed acts of infringement and
have a regular and established place of business." Judge Hand stated that for
venue purposes, as well as for other procedural incidents, an unincorporated
association should be considered a jural entity, cf. United Mine Workers of
America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975
(1922), and that the only practical approach to the procedural problems created
by actions involving unincorporated associations was to assimilate their
treatment to that accorded corporations. Therefore, Judge Hand concluded that
an unincorporated association should be considered "present" wherever it was
continuously carrying on a substantial part of its activities, since this was the
standard for the "presence" of corporations. However, he hastened to add that
being "present" in a district was not tantamount to being an "inhabitant" of that
district. Again assimilating the situation of the unincorporated entity which has
no place of incorporation to that of the incorporated entity, Judge Hand
announced that the unincorporated entity was an "inhabitant" of the district of
its principal place of business.
21
Although Sperry Prods., Inc. involved the venue provision for patent
infringement actions, courts have applied Judge Hand's reasoning in that case to
the determination of questions that have arisen involving the general venue
statute. Until the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948 there was little difficulty
in so doing because the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 112 (1940), provided
only that "no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person *
* * in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant * * *." Thus Judge
Hand's discussion of where an unincorporated association was an inhabitant
was applicable with equal force under the general venue provision as it then
existed. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, etc. v. Graham, 84 U.S.
App.D.C. 67, 175 F.2d 802 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 232, 70
S.Ct. 14, 94 L.Ed. 22 (1949). Cf. Darby v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 73 F.Supp.
522 (E.D.Pa.1947). But see Thermoid Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 70
F.Supp. 228 (D.N.J.1947). But in 1948 the general venue statute was redrafted
as 28 U.S.C. 1391; and a subsection (c) was added. This subsection stated:
22
23
Under the venue provision drafted in 1948 courts were faced with the question
whether they should follow Judge Hand and hold that an unincorporated
association resides only at its principal place of business, or whether the
process of assimilation which Judge Hand advocated should be extended by
assimilating the treatment of unincorporated associations for venue purposes
with the newly expanded concept of corporate residence.
24
The cases are divided on this issue. Some courts have held that for determining
venue an unincorporated association resides only at its principal place of
business. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, etc. v. Graham, supra; McNutt
v. United Gas Workers, 108 F.Supp. 871, 875 (W.D.Ark.1952); Griffin v.
Illinois Cent. R. R., 88 F.Supp. 552, 555 (N.D. Ill.1949); Salvant v. Louisville
& N. R. R., 83 F.Supp. 391, 396 (W.D.Ky.1949); Cherico v. Brotherhood of R.
R. Trainmen, 167 F.Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y.1958). Cf. Hadden v. Small, 145
F.Supp. 387 (N.D.Ohio 1951). Other courts have held that an unincorporated
association may be sued in any district in which it is doing business.
26
Turning to the case before us, we hold that the defendant brotherhoods were
doing business in the District of Vermont. They set up and maintained
grievance committees and other facilities among the employees of the Rutland
Railway in Vermont. They organized a strike of railroad employees in
We think that there are only two general questions presented by the issues of
labor law involved in this case. They are: First, is this a so-called "major" or
"minor" dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45
U.S.C.A. 151-163 (1958)? Second, does the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat.
70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 101-115 deprive the district court of jurisdiction to
enjoin the strike?
28
For either of these statutes to be operative, there must be first of all a "labor
dispute." The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 13(c), 47 Stat. 73, 29 U.S.C.A. 113(c),
defines a labor dispute as follows:
29
"(c) The term `labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
30
Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C.A. 151a,
sets out the disputes to which it applies as "all disputes concerning rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions" and "all disputes growing out of grievances or out
of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions." In Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. R.,
362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960), the Supreme Court explicitly
held that a labor dispute existed under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and implied
that one existed under the Railway Labor Act, when a railroad sought to close a
number of its stations and thereby reduce employment. The Court stated:
31
"Plainly the controversy here relates to an effort on the part of the union to
change the `terms' of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The change
desired just as plainly referred to `conditions of employment' of the railroad's
employees who are represented by the union. The employment of many of
these station agents inescapably hangs on the number of railroad stations that
will be either completely abandoned or consolidated with other stations. And, in
the collective bargaining world today, there is nothing strange about
Numerous other courts have assumed the presence of labor disputes in similar
situations. E. g., Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R. R., 290 F.2d 881 (7 Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961); In the Matter of
Hudson & M. R. R. Co., 172 F.Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Stichman
v. General Grievance Comm. of the Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen, 267 F.2d 941 (2
Cir., 1959), cert. denied, Hatler v. Dawson, 361 U.S. 928, 80 S.Ct. 385, 4
L.Ed.2d 351 (1960). Cf. Butte A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864, 80 S.Ct. 122, 4
L.Ed.2d 104 (1959). The court below was correct when it found that a labor
dispute relating to working conditions existed when the case was heard on
October 20, 1960.
33
34
"The first [major dispute] relates to disputes over the formation of collective
agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such
agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the
issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look
to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to
have vested in the past.
35
latter event the claim is founded upon some incident of the employment
relation, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective
agreement, e. g., claims on account of personal injuries. In either case the claim
is to rights accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the future." Id. at
723, 65 S.Ct. at 1290.
36
37
In both types of disputes the Act requires that, as a first step, the parties must
make every reasonable effort to settle their differences in conference. 2 First,
Second, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. 152 First, Second.
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, supra at 724-725 and nn. 12, 18, 65 S.Ct. supra at
1290-1291. Major disputes commence with the issuance of a notice known as a
"Section 6 notice," given by the party seeking to change existing agreements.
2 Seventh, 6, 44 Stat. 577, 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. 152,
Seventh, 156. In major disputes, if settlement cannot be reached in conference,
the matter is referred to mediation under the auspices of the National Mediation
Board. 5, 44 Stat. 580 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. 155. If mediation
fails, the Mediation Board proposes voluntary arbitration to the parties, 5, 7,
44 Stat. 580, 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. 155, 157, a course of
action neither party is required to adopt. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v.
Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534 (1944). Finally,
if the President of the United States desires, he is empowered to set up an
emergency board to investigate and report to him with respect to the dispute.
10, 44 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. 160. The parties are
required to comply with each stage in the above-described procedure before
either may resort to self-help, and it is the statutory duty of the carrier not to
alter rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, i. e., to maintain the status quo,
until the Mediation Board has acted upon the dispute. 6, 44 Stat. 582 (1926),
as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. 156; see Burke v. Morphy, 109 F.2d 572 (2 Cir.),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 635, 60 S.Ct. 1078, 84 L.Ed. 1404 (1940). Grand
International Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v. Morphy, 109 F.2d 576 (2 Cir.),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 635, 60 S.Ct. 1078, 84 L.Ed. 1404 (1940). However, the
Act does not create any tribunal having final authority to decide a major dispute
without the consent of both parties, and in such disputes no provision in the
Railway Labor Act prohibits the workers from striking as soon as all of the
procedures for settling the dispute have been exhausted without a mutually
satisfactory solution having been reached.6
38
The procedure under the 1926 Act for handling the other type of dispute (the
minor dispute) soon proved ineffectual to produce peace in the railroad
industry. Deadlock often resulted from the refusal by one side or the other to
participate in the voluntary local boards which the Act contemplated as the
source of decision in such disputes. Moreover, in many cases in which boards
were established no decision could be reached because of the equal number of
labor and management members on each board. These circumstances produced
an ever-increasing backlog of unresolved disputes. See Hearings on S. 3266
before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 137
(1934). To eliminate these roadblocks, the statute was amended in 1934 and the
National Railroad Adjustment Board was created, making it unnecessary for
the parties to set up local boards. 3, 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. 153;
H.R.Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3; S.Rep. No. 1065, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 2 (1934). Under this amendment, if the parties fail to agree in
conference, either side may submit the matter to the National Railroad
Adjustment Board. Procedures are provided for assuring that the Board will not
become deadlocked, and unless the Board's decision contains a monetary award
the decision of the Board is final and binding on the parties. 3 subd. 1(i) (l)
(m) (n), 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. 153 subd. 1(i) (l) (m) (n), see
Union Pac. R. R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 79 S.Ct. 1351, 3 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1959).
See generally Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique
Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567 (1937). Thus a system of compulsory
arbitration of minor disputes was created by the 1934 amendment. Brotherhood
of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R. R., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1
L.Ed.2d 622 (1957); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 77 S.Ct. 1037, 1
L.Ed.2d 1034 (1957). See Hearings on H.R. 7650 before House Committee on
Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 58, 60, 81-82, 118 (1934);
Hearings on S. 3266 before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 35 (1934). To effectuate these procedures for the
conclusive determination of minor disputes, courts have issued injunctions
against strikes by the railroad unions. E. g., Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Ind. R. R., supra; In the Matter of Hudson & M. R. R., 172
F.Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Stichman v. General Grievance Comm.
of the Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen, 267 F.2d 941 (2 Cir., 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 928, 80 S.Ct. 385, 4 L.Ed.2d 351 (1960).7
39
The defendants contend that the present controversy is a major dispute under
the Railway Labor Act; and, therefore, their strike may not be enjoined, or, at
least, may only be enjoined for the short period of time necessary for the
exhaustion of mediation and the other major dispute procedures. The railroad,
on the other hand, claims that this is a minor dispute; and, therefore, the strike
must be enjoined so that the issue between the parties can be decided with
finality by the Railroad Adjustment Board. We are called upon to decide
whether this dispute is a major or a minor dispute, so that the parties then may
In reaching for resolution of this problem of course we must not place undue
emphasis on the contentions or the maneuvers of the parties. Management will
assert that its position, whether right or wrong, is only an interpretation or
application of the existing contract. Unions, on the other hand, in their
assertions about the dispute at issue, will obviously talk in terms of change.
Since a Section 6 notice is required by the statute in order to initiate a major
dispute, the labor representatives are likely to serve such a notice in any dispute
arising out of any ambiguous situation so as thereby to make the controversy
appear more like a major dispute. Compare Order of R. R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N. W. R. R., 362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960). Or
they may seek to bring the particular conflict at issue within the bounds of an
outstanding Section 6 notice that in reality does not relate to that dispute. See
Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo in Railway Labor
Disputes, 60 Colum.L. Rev. 381, 394-397 (1960).
41
But, on the other hand, we should not in the process of classifying this dispute
as major or minor thereby also adjudicate the merits of the controversy between
the parties. If this is a minor dispute, a decision on the merits of the dispute is
the function of the National Railroad Adjustment Board; and if this is a major
dispute the outcome of the parties' difference is to be determined by extrajudicial forces and procedures. See Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S.
561, 66 S.Ct. 322, 90 L.Ed. 318 (1946); Norfolk & P. B. L. R. R. v.
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4 Cir., 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 914, 78 S.Ct. 343, 2 L.Ed.2d 274 (1958).
42
The disagreement between the Rutland Railway and its employees is not
whether the train runs on the Ogdensburg Subdivision should be rescheduled,
but, instead, whether the railroad has the unilateral right to make those changes
without negotiating about them with the brotherhoods. Cf. Norfolk & P. B. L.
R. R. v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, supra; Missouri-K.-T. R. R. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 266 F.2d 335 (5 Cir., 1959), reversed on
other grounds, 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1960). Whether it
The unions assert that the Section 6 notices of November 2, 1959, demonstrate
that this is a major dispute. These notices were issued pursuant to national
handling and similar notices were issued by most of the other Class I railroads
in the country on the same day. Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R. R., 290 F.2d 881 (7
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961).
Conferences over the changes referred to in those 1959 notices were still going
on when the Rutland bulletined the new schedules for the Ogdensburg
Subdivision in September 1960.
44
However, we note that the language in the Rutland's notices was not
necessarily inconsistent with the railroad's present contention that it has the
right under its existing agreements to change train schedules without
negotiation. The November 2, 1959 notices set out a procedure for establishing
new runs "which the carrier does not now have the right to establish without
agreement with its employees * * *" The notices also state:
45
46
The Seventh Circuit, faced with the same notices in Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.
R., supra, held that the railroad's November 2, 1959, Section 6 notices involved
in that case did not turn a subsequent controversy over a proposed change in
certain home terminals of the road into a major dispute. Cf. Pennsylvania R. R.
v. Local 2013 of United R. R. Workers, 178 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.Pa.1959). We
believe a similar situation exists in the case before us. The Section 6 notices
created a major dispute, but the dispute so created was not the dispute over
which the Rutland's employees went out on strike ten and one-half months
later. Although there is an apparent similarity between the changes proposed in
the notice given by the Rutland on November 2, 1959, and the schedule
changes which the railroad later made unilaterally, the court below found that
the railroad in making the September 1960 changes was not acting pursuant to
the earlier notices. We cannot say that the district court was in error in so
finding.
47
48
The Rutland Railway points out several provisions in its agreements with the
defendant brotherhoods which, the railroad contends, demonstrate that it had
the right to act as it did. One such provision is Article 39(a) of its agreement
with the Order of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen:
49
"(a) All vacant or new runs will be posted on the division on which they occur
within five (5) days, to close within five (5) days, and to be assigned to the
oldest bidder within ten (10) days, merit, fitness and ability to be considered. In
case of men being away when run is advertised, when reporting for duty their
claims to the run will be considered if a junior man has been assigned, if such
claim, in writing, is made within five (5) days."
50
51
"(e) When established runs are changed to operate out of different terminals,
schedules changed two (2) hours or more, twenty (20) miles or more, or the
layover of such runs changed, they will be considered new runs and bulletined
as such."
52
The railroad also calls our attention to Articles 16 and 31 of its agreement with
the Conductors and Trainmen, Articles 17 and 51 of the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen agreement, and Article XVII in the
agreement with the Engineers. None of these provisions by themselves alone
bestow upon the railroad the right unilaterally to change train runs and home
terminals. But they are some indication that each agreement, taken as a whole,
implicitly recognizes such a right in the carrier. As we said earlier in the
opinion, the present controversy is over the extent of the railroad's managerial
prerogative. The scope of the management's prerogative is often not spelled out
in collective bargaining agreements, but the prerogative exists implicitly to
some extent in all such agreements. See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of
Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 Harv.L.Rev.
389, 401 (1950); Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 198 F.Supp. 402, 408411 (S.D.Cal.1961).
53
The court below found that in general there had been no negotiation in the past
between the Rutland and its employees over changes in train runs. This finding
was not clearly erroneous. Across the nation there seems to be no uniform
pattern in this matter; some railroads have more latitude to act unilaterally over
changes of this sort than do others. See the Presidential Railroad Commission
Report (Feb. 28, 1962) at 295.
54
In the light of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements, the prior
conduct of the parties as found by the trial judge and the decisions in analogous
cases, we hold that the existing agreements involved here, reasonably
interpreted, may recognize implicitly a right in the railroad unilaterally to make
the changes which it bulletined on September 8, 1960; therefore, we hold that
the ensuing dispute must be viewed by the courts as a minor dispute. Whether
the railroad does in fact have the rights it claims, or whether on further analysis
it does not is for the Board to determine; on the ultimate resolution of this issue
we express no opinion. We only hold that for the purpose of defining the extent
to which a court may intervene and enjoin a strike the dispute in the present
case is to be considered minor as one involving the interpretation of existing
agreements.
56
Our decision is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Order of
R. R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4
L.Ed. 2d 774 (1960). Besides concluding in that case that a controversy over a
railroad's proposal to reduce the number of its stations was a labor dispute
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court held that that disagreement between
management and labor involved a bargainable issue and that the controversy
was a major dispute. We do not say that the issue in the present case is not a
bargainable one. We have no doubt that the brotherhoods, upon the expiration
of the existing agreements, may require the railroad to bargain over future
procedures for changing train runs and schedules. We only hold that there is a
sufficient indication that the existing agreements have preserved management's
right unilaterally to make the schedule changes management intended to make
so as to require that the dispute be submitted to the National Railroad
Adjustment Board, as provided by the Railway Labor Act.
57
We are not entirely certain what constituted the basis in the Chicago & N. W.
R. R. case for the Court's other conclusion that there a major dispute existed.
Cf. Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R. R., 290 F.2d 881, 895 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961). Probably the Court was applying
the traditional standards for distinguishing the two types of disputes, and, on
the facts presented to it in that case, concluded that a major dispute was present.
On a different set of facts we have found a minor dispute here. But perhaps the
Court in Chicago & N. W. R. R. was adding a new dimension to the usual
criteria for distinguishing major disputes from minor ones, that of the
magnitude of the effect on working conditions which would result from the
proposal by the railroad. But even if the Court was adding this ingredient to its
analysis, which we doubt, the controversy before us is still a minor dispute
because the proposed schedule changes on the Ogdensburg Subdivision would
only affect very few jobs.
58
The court below did not condition its issuance of the injunction against
appellants on a requirement that the railroad maintain the status quo. It was
certainly within the court's power to impose such a condition. See Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-K.-T. R. R., 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326,
4 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1960); also United R. R. Workers, etc. v. Baltimore & O. R.
R., 364 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1609, 4 L.Ed.2d 1719 (1960). But likewise it was in
the court's discretion to decline to impose conditions. 363 U.S. at 534-535, 80
S.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379. We find no abuse by the court of its discretionary
powers in this area.
59
INTERRELATION
OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND THE NORRIS-LA
GUARDIA ACT
60
In general, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S. C.A. 101115, passed in 1932, deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction to issue
injunctions against strikes by employees in labor disputes, 4(a), 47 Stat. 71
(1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 104(a); allows injunctions to be granted against unlawful
acts which will cause irreparable injury only under strict procedural
requirements, 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 107; and precludes
injunctive relief even when these stringent requirements are met if the
complainant has failed to fulfill, on its part, its legal obligations or has failed, on
its part, to make reasonable attempts to settle the labor dispute by negotiation,
mediation, or voluntary arbitration, 8, 47 Stat. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 108.
See 75 Cong. Rec. 4626, 4629 (1932); Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R. v.
Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2 Cir., 1961), certiorari denied 370 U.S. 936,
82 S.Ct. 1578, 8 L.Ed.2d 806. This statute embodies a policy of fostering the
resolution of labor difficulties through the interplay of private forces
unhampered by judicial interference. See S.Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
18 (1932); H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932). The draftsmen of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act had before them the 1926 provisions of the Railway
Labor Act, which included most of the present procedures for settling major
disputes, the provisions for disposing of minor disputes through voluntary local
boards, and Section 2 First and Second, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C.A. 152
First and Second, which imposed on both management and labor the duty to
confer over any dispute. All of these provisions channeled, but did not
eliminate, the operation of private forces in the determination of labor disputes.
See Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321 U.S. 50, 5859, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534 (1944); cf. 75 Cong. Rec. 4505-10, 4618-26,
5462-515 (1932). Subsequent labor legislation, however, including the 1934
amendments to the Railway Labor Act which provided for official adjudication
of certain labor disputes by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, reflected a
policy of interpositioning greater governmental participation in labor relations.
See Note, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to Other Federal
Statutes, 72 Harv. L.Rev. 354, 356 (1958). To accommodate the differing
policies underlying the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act is not
an easy task. In Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R. R.,
353 U.S. 30, 40, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957), the Supreme Court stated:
61
"* * * the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be read alone in matters dealing with
railway labor disputes. There must be an accommodation of that statute and the
Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of each is
preserved. We think that the purposes of these Acts are reconcilable."
62
63
In Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R. R., 353 U.S. 30,
77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957), the Supreme Court held that the NorrisLaGuardia Act did not preclude a federal court from enjoining a strike which
might defeat the effectiveness of the National Adjustment Board's authority to
adjudicate a minor dispute. The Court concluded first, that Congress had
intended the proceeding before the Adjustment Board to be a reasonable
substitute for self-help and second, that the earlier and more general language
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act should give way to the later specific provisions of
the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act. For cases in which lower
courts have enjoined strikes in such situations, see supra at p. 2092. In the
present case, as in the Chicago River case, a minor dispute is involved, the
railroad has submitted the matter to the Railroad Adjustment Board, and we
follow the lead provided for us in that case and its progeny. We hold that an
injunction is properly issuable in order to enforce compliance with the
requirement of the Railway Labor Act that a minor dispute is to be heard and
determined by the National Railroad Adjustment Board.8 Cf. Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457-459, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972
(1957).
64
But what significance for the case before us have Section 2 First, Second, and
Sixth of the Railway Labor Act and Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act?
Section 2 First and Second impose a duty on both parties to make every
reasonable effort to settle a dispute, whether it be major or minor, and, as a part
of their efforts, to confer over their differences.9 Section 2 Sixth provides the
procedure for calling a conference to discuss a minor dispute. These
conferences are to take place before a submission of the dispute to the Railroad
Adjustment Board. 3 First (i), 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. 3 First (i);
Elgin J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886
(1945); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R. R., supra at
33. The present Section 2 First, Second and Sixth were already part of the
Railway Labor Act when the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed. See Railway
Labor Act 2 First, Second, Fourth, 44 Stat. 577 (1926).
65
66
67
Section 8 thus imposes two different requirements on one who seeks injunctive
relief in a labor dispute. He must comply with all his legal obligations relevant
to the dispute and, further, he must make every reasonable effort to settle the
dispute by the methods enumerated. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Toledo,
P. & W. R. R., 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed.534 (1944). This is known
as the "clean hands" provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See 75 Cong.Rec.
5464 (1932).10
68
Since section 2 First, Second and Sixth of the Railway Labor Act were enacted
before the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the rule of thumb upon which courts too often
rely that the scope of earlier and more general legislation must always be
reconsidered in the light of more specific provisions appearing in subsequent
legislation does not help in deciding the present question. Moreover, the
purpose of the Railway Labor Act, 2 First, Second and Sixth and the purpose
of the "clean hands" provision of the anti-injunction statute are not so
inconsistent that it is impossible to accommodate one to the other.
69
70
Reading the relevant sections of the Railway Labor Act together with the
"clean-hands" provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and remembering that the
dispute here is a minor dispute, we observe that an applicant for an injunction
(1) must comply with all legal obligations required of it including the making of
every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by conference and (2) must make
every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by negotiation.12 We are not certain
whether the draftsmen intended different concepts by the words "conference"
and "negotiation." See Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.
R., supra, 321 U.S. at 61, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534. However, we find that in
applying these terms to the present controversy a distinction should be drawn
between the duty to negotiate and the duty to confer. We construe "negotiation"
to mean full-scale discussion and disputation. We construe "conferring" to
mean activity of a similar type to negotiation but activity requiring a lesser
output of time and of energy. We must make this distinction in the present case
because of the nature of the issue which divides the parties. The basic dispute is
whether the railroad under its existing agreement must negotiate before it
reschedules the runs on the Ogdensburg Subdivision. If the railroad were
required by statute to negotiate this issue before it submitted the dispute to the
Adjustment Board, the result would be to require the railroad to negotiate with
employee representatives over whether it should negotiate with them a
solution sounding a lot like an exercise in theoretical logic. We think in practice
it would be virtually impossible for the parties to negotiate whether they would
negotiate about the rescheduling without actually negotiating about the
rescheduling itself. Thus the brotherhoods would immediately achieve what
they are only entitled to obtain after adjudication of the dispute by the Railroad
Adjustment Board. Therefore, we hold that any requirement in section 8 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act that a railroad negotiate before obtaining an injunction is
superseded by the statutory scheme in the Railway Labor Act that gives the
Adjustment Board the power to decide whether there should be any negotiation
at all between management and the brotherhoods.
71
But in minor disputes involving the scope of the managerial prerogative it must
be that Section 2 First, Second and Sixth of the Railway Labor Act together
with the Norris-LaGuardia Act impose some lesser duty on a railroad which
seeks injunctive relief. Otherwise, in any minor dispute in which a railroad can
contend that the question is one committed to managerial prerogative, the
railroad will be tempted not to try to reach a private understanding with the
representatives of its employees, a result inconsistent with one of the
fundamental policies of the Railway Labor Act. See Brotherhood of R. R.
Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W., supra; Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 198
F.Supp. 402 (S.D.Cal.1961). Therefore, we hold that the relevant sections of
the Railway Labor Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act impose a duty upon a
railroad, short of negotiation, to take some reasonable steps toward dispute
settlement before it can obtain an anti-strike injunction. These lesser efforts are
comprehended within the concept of "conferring." It is not easy to state exactly
what the railroad must do in cases in which it must confer but need not
negotiate. In each case the district judge must apply his experience and good
sense to the specific circumstances of the case. However, certain minimum
steps can be suggested for the usual case. Unfair surprise should be avoided
whenever possible. The representatives of management should meet with those
of labor. Each side should listen to the contentions of the other side and each
side should explain its position clearly and honestly, but not for as long a time
In the present case the district court made no finding whether the management
of the railroad made the good faith efforts which we have held to be a
prerequisite to the obtaining by it of injunctive relief. The telegram that the
railroad sent to the brotherhoods on September 15 stated "Conferences on this
issue have not been held on the property with the [brotherhoods]." However,
the railroad claimed at the hearing that its representatives met with
representatives of the brotherhoods on September 9 and on September 16. We
cannot determine from the record alone, without the benefit of observing the
witnesses, whether the extent of these discussions met the standard we find is
imposed by the Railway Labor Act.
73
If in fact the railroad has failed to take the steps required of it by the Railway
Labor Act, it is not entitled to injunctive relief against the strike of its
employees. Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 268
F.2d 54 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864, 80 S.Ct. 122, 4 L.Ed.2d 104
(1959). Therefore, we must remand the case for the district court to determine
whether the railroad made reasonable efforts to settle this dispute in conference.
See Pennsylvania R. R. v. Transport Workers Union, 178 F.Supp. 30
(E.D.Pa.1957) (Finding No. 15), appeal dismissed, 3 Cir., 278 F.2d 693 (1960).
If the district court finds that the railroad has not done so, it should not issue the
injunction until the railroad has perfected its right to such relief by compliance
with its statutory obligation.
74
76
Notes:
1
The relevant part of the notices given by the Rutland were as follows:
"We hereby give notice, under our existing agreements and pursuant to the
provisions of the Railway Labor Act, that effective January 1, 1960, we
propose to revise and supplement such agreement or agreements in accordance
with the proposal set forth in `Attachment A' appended hereto.
"ATTACHMENT A
*******
"ROAD TRAIN AND ENGINE SERVICE ASSIGNMENTS.
"A. Except as hereinafter provided, eliminate all agreements, rules, regulations,
interpretations, and practices, however established, applicable to any class or
grade of road train or engine service employees, which
"(i) prohibit or impose restrictions on the right of the carrier to establish, move,
"Sec. 6. Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty
days' written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of
conference between the representatives of the parties interested in such
intended changes shall be agreed upon within ten days after the receipt of said
notice, and said time shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. In
every case where such notice of intended change has been given, or conferences
are being held with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board
have been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services,
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until
the controversy has been finally acted upon, as required by section 5 of this
Act, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after
termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the
Mediation Board."
3
Meanwhile, another dispute was raging between the Rutland Railway and its
employees. This second dispute was only tangentially related to the dispute
spelled out in the text. In August 1960 the brotherhoods asked for pay increases
for the employees whom they represented. A conference to negotiate this
dispute convened on August 30, eight days prior to the September 8 bulletin.
The president of the railroad explained to the labor representatives that the
financial condition of the carrier made it impossible for management to meet
the wage demands of the unions but he stated that if certain rule changes were
agreed to by the unions the savings from these changes might permit increases
in pay. The changes proposed by the railroad were these:
Open closed yards the only closed yard on this property is Rutland yard,
closed to trainmen (yardmen)
Another difference between the new statute and the old one was that the new
one spoke in terms of "residence" instead of "inhabitance"; but it is clear from
the Reviser's Notes to 1391 that the two terms were intended to be
synonymous. H.R.Report 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A147 (1947)
Since the Railway Labor Act contains no provision to the contrary, the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 101-115, operates to prevent
the federal courts from enjoining strikes in major disputes, at least after the
exhaustion of all of the procedures provided by the Railway Labor Act for
settling such disputes. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, n. 24, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957); Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L. Ed.
534 (1944); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R.R., 362 U.S.
330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960)
There is some doubt whether a federal court has power to issue an anti-strike
injunction in a minor dispute before the matter is submitted to the Railroad
Adjustment Board. Cf. Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 353 U.S. 927, 77
S.Ct. 706, 1 L.Ed.2d 722 (1957); Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 881 (7
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961). But
inasmuch as the Rutland Railway has submitted the present controversy to the
Board, we are not here faced with this problem
8
In 1960 the Supreme Court again spoke on the relationship between the NorrisLaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act. Order of R. R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N. W. R. R., 362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960). The
Court held that Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew jurisdiction
from the federal court to enjoin the strike involved in that case. The Court
discovered no provision of the Railway Labor Act which made the strike
unlawful and concluded that there the dispute was a major one. That case is
distinguishable from the present one for the labor dispute here is a minor
dispute. The Supreme Court in Chicago & N. W. R. R., though holding that the
strike there could not be enjoined, recognized that federal courts could enjoin
strikes arising out of minor disputes. 362 U.S. at 341, 80 S. Ct. 761. Moreover,
a strike which would frustrate the procedures created by the Railway Labor Act
for the final determination of such disputes would be unlawful. Cf. Chicago, R.
I. & Pac. R. R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2 Cir. 1961), certiorari
denied 370 U.S. 936, 82 82 S.Ct. 1578, 8 L.Ed.2d 806
10
The extent to which the Supreme Court has gone to enforce compliance with
this provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is seen in Brotherhood of R. R.
Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534
(1944), in which the Court reversed an order granting injunctive relief to a
complainant that had not complied with section 8, and this despite the fact that
the acts complained of had caused violence
11
involves the converse situation. The railroad, perhaps, has failed to comply with
those provisions, and, therefore, under 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, if its
failure is shown, it may be deprived of injunctive relief as long as it continues
in its dereliction. See also Long Island R. R. v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen,
185 F.Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y.1960)
12
Mediation and voluntary arbitration are only relevant for major disputes
13
The defendants also assert that the railroad is not entitled to an injunction
because it has not complied with the non-statutory duty of clean hands imposed
on all who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity. We believe that
in the present case the scope of this non-statutory obligation is no greater than
the statutory obligation imposed by Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
77
78
With deference to my brothers, I deem the issues raised by the present case to
be of such importance that a statement of my dissenting views is necessary.
Because the "Section 6" and contract termination notices served by Rutland
were also issued by most of the Class I railroads in the country, the factual
pattern before us is of national importance. Much of what the majority says
seems to me not only well put but also quite correct. I do not disagree with their
treatment of the venue problem, with most of their general statements as to
when a strike is legal or illegal under the Railway Labor Act, or with the
assertion that a "labor dispute" is involved in this case. I strongly disagree,
however, with the result they reach and would suggest that much of what they
say is actually inconsistent with that result.
79
The majority correctly states the principal issue to be whether the dispute
between the parties was "major" or "minor" under the Railway Labor Act. That
proposition, however, is of such generality that it fails to pose the problems we
must solve in any meaningful fashion. The legal dispute here involves two
questions. First, what procedures must a party to a collective agreement in the
railroad industry follow in order to terminate that agreement or any part
thereof?1 Second, the termination having been accomplished, under what
circumstances may the parties resort to economic force?
80
The majority's conclusion is radically different. They hold explicitly that the
agreement insofar as it dealt with the establishment of runs and terminals was
not terminated and sub silentio that there was in fact no way in which to
terminate it. They enjoin the union's use of economic force, therefore, pending
exhaustion of the drawn-out minor dispute procedures and leave Rutland free to
act unilaterally.
82
The words "major" and "minor" have no intrinsic legal significance. They are
derived from the terminology of railway industrial relations and are used
judicially merely as a shorthand way of referring to a distinction incorporated in
the structure of the Railway Labor Act. The statute, itself, however, does not
use the words. The distinction is of legal significance solely because the Act
establishes mutually exclusive mandatory procedures to be followed in
resolving two different kinds of disputes.
83
84
85
While the Act provides for compulsory arbitration of minor disputes, it leaves
the resolution of major disputes to free collective bargaining and the use of
economic force subject only to certain mandatory procedural requirements.
Section 65 governs the procedure to be followed in changing agreements
affecting working conditions. Any party desiring such a change must give 30
days written notice to the other party. Either party may then request the services
of the Mediation Board or the Board may step in on its accord under Section 5.6
Under Section 6 "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered"
until final action by the Mediation Board under Section 5. Section 5 prohibits
changes in "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices"
until 30 days after the Board has notified the parties of the failure of its
mediatory efforts. Section 10 7 empowers the President to establish an
emergency board after the failure of mediation efforts and provides "no change,
except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the
conditions out of which the dispute arose" until thirty days after the Board
makes its report to the President. The legislative history indicates that when the
rail unions and carriers agreed upon these provisions, the unions surrendered
their right to strike pending exhaustion of major dispute procedures in exchange
for a statutory provision restraining management from disturbing the status
quo.8 These "freeze"9 or "cooling-off"10 provisions have been held to be
enforceable by the courts. Grand International Brotherhood, etc. v. Morphy,
109 F.2d 576 (2 Cir., 1940); cert. denied 310 U.S. 635, 60 S.Ct. 1078, 84 L.Ed.
1404 (1940); Railroad Yardmasters v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 224 F.2d 226 (3
Cir., 1955).
86
87
Within this legal framework, I fail to grasp how the factual pattern here presents
the difficulties encountered by the majority. On November 2, 1959, Rutland
served notice on the Brotherhoods "under our existing agreements and pursuant
to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act" that it wanted a new contract,
"effective January 1, 1960," which would in effect eliminate all "agreements,
rules, regulations, interpretations and practices, however established,"
restricting the carrier's right to establish new runs and which would also
explicitly "[e]stablish a rule to provide that * * * [t]he carrier shall have the
right to establish, move, consolidate and abolish crew terminals * * * with the
right to operate any * * * run * * * through established crew terminals." This
was a 30 day notice of termination of all contractual provisions, explicit or
implied, relating to the establishment of new runs and crew terminals. Rutland,
by thus invoking Section 6 of the Act, and the termination provisions of the
contracts, notified the Brotherhoods that it desired not only to terminate all
restrictive provisions, practices and even all ambiguities as to the establishment
of new runs but also that it wanted an explicit provision incorporated in a new
agreement which would bestow upon it the absolute prerogative to change crew
terminals. Rutland thereby voluntarily terminated the old agreement to this
extent and invoked the major dispute procedures. Having invoked them,
presumably it was bound by them.
88
89
In reviewing that action, I should have thought the principal question would be
whether the union was free to strike against Rutland's illegal actions or whether
the conduct of both parties in derogation of the major dispute procedures must
be enjoined. On balance, I would have adopted the latter course both on the
grounds that resort to the courts is generally preferable to this kind of self help12
and on the further grounds that the "cooling off" policies of the major dispute
procedures cannot be effectuated by allowing both parties simply to do away
with the Act. These problems have become irrelevant, however, for the
majority has concluded that the dispute is minor and must be resolved by an
Adjustment Board determination of the meaning of the old agreement.
90
One reason asserted by the majority in support of this result seems to be that the
Section 6 notice was not sufficiently broad to cover the matters in dispute. Two
quotations from the notice are set out, apparently to demonstrate that it was
intended only to do away with restrictions on the managerial prerogative to
establish new runs. The majority then finds there are no explicit restrictions in
the agreements, and, therefore, the Section 6 notice does not encompass this
dispute. But if all this is true, why did Rutland serve notices pursuant to Section
6 and the various contracts in the first place? Plainly, Rutland's purpose was to
eliminate the ambiguities13 in the agreement which the majority admits exist
and in fact relies upon in sending this case to the Adjustment Board. I have not
found any language in the statute or policy behind it which would prohibit or
nullify this use of Section 6 in the manner suggested by the majority. I believe
that clarification through collective bargaining of ambiguous contractual
provisions is a most laudable purpose and should be encouraged rather than
hampered by the courts. Moreover, the majority inexplicably ignores paragraph
B(1) of the notice. That paragraph explicitly notifies the unions that Rutland
seeks to "Establish a rule to provide that * * * 1. The Carrier shall have the
right to establish, move, consolidate and abolish crew terminals * * *". Surely a
request to incorporate a comprehensive clause such as this must be said to
change an ambiguous contract or an agreement containing no such explicit
provision. That paragraph B(1) encompasses the dispute here is plainly evident,
for the majority itself states the present "disagreement * * * [is] whether the
management of the railroad had the right to * * * change crew terminals."
91
92
"It is a major dispute if the present agreements between the railroad and the
brotherhoods contain express provisions contrary to the position taken by the
railroad or if the clear implication of these agreements is inconsistent with the
railroad's proposals. It is a minor dispute if there is a clearly governing
provision in the present agreements, although its precise requirements are
ambiguous; * * *."
93
While this might be a correct statement of the law in the absence of a Section 6
notice, I would suggest that it is entirely erroneous once such a notice has been
served. The majority opinion itself at one point concedes that major disputes
commence with notice under Section 6. Moreover, it must be so, for under the
Railway Labor Act a party is free to terminate an ambiguous contract in the
hope of making it explicit without going to an Adjustment Board for a
determination of its meaning. This is precisely what Rutland attempted to do.
The reliance placed by Rutland and the majority upon the collective agreement
is utterly inconsistent with the Section 6 notice, for Rutland intended by that
notice to terminate and do away with the very same contractual provisions
which are now so strenuously relied upon. And, the inconsistency of relying on
these provisions is magnified since the notice was also based upon the
termination clauses of the same agreements. I dare say that if this were a
commercial contract with a 30 day termination provision, we would not show
such solicitude for one who invoked the termination procedures but later
claimed the agreement was still in effect when the other party refused to meet
his demands for a new contract.
94
But the significance of today's decision transcends the immediate and hopefully
temporary problems of the Rutland Railroad and its employees. There is much
in the majority opinion which implies there cannot be a major dispute if the
relevant agreement contains an "ambiguous," but "clearly governing",
provision, regardless of whether a Section 6 notice has been served. The
quotation in the preceding paragraph seems to be to that effect. Along the same
lines, reliance is placed upon "a number of cases involving disagreements
similar to the one in the present case, [in which] courts have classified the
disputes as minor." In all but one, however, there was no effective Section 6
notice and, therefore, no effective termination of the agreement.14 The Railway
Labor Act establishes a system of free collective bargaining, Section 6 being an
integral part of that system. It is designed to allow either party to terminate an
agreement, whether or not its meaning is clear, and bargain freely over new
provisions subject only to certain procedural requirements. To hold that Section
6 is rendered inoperative if there is an ambiguous, but clearly governing,
provision in the present agreements is to give it an effect precisely opposite to
that intended and to deprive the parties of their right to bargain freely.
95
The dilemma created by the majority opinion is neatly posed when it says, "
[T]he brotherhoods, upon the expiration of the existing agreements, may
require the railroad to bargain" over the issues in dispute. But the only manner
in which the existing agreements may "expire" is through notice pursuant to
Section 6 by one of the parties, since none of these contracts contains a fixed
expiration date.15 Presumably, if the union had, on November 2, 1959, issued a
Section 6 notice stating its desire to "eliminate all agreements, rules,
regulations, interpretations and practices, however established, allowing the
carrier to establish new runs without the union's consent" and to "establish a
rule that the carrier shall not have the right to establish, move, consolidate crew
terminals or to operate any runs through established crew terminals, without the
union's consent," the majority's ruling would not vary.16 Yet that is not
significantly different from Order of R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co., 363 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960), in which the Supreme
Court held that a major dispute existed. While the majority is "not entirely
certain" as to the basis of that decision, I would submit the governing
consideration must have been the Section 6 notice.17 Otherwise, the case would
have been indistinguishable from the Court's decision in Chicago River, supra,
and all the other cases which have followed it. E. g. cases cited in note 14,
supra. The most profitable inquiry for the majority is not how to distinguish
Chicago and N. W. Ry. from this case but how to distinguish it from all the
cases finding minor disputes. Viewed from that perspective, the "uncertainty"
vanishes. In any case, Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9 Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864, 80 S.Ct. 122, 4
L.Ed.2d 104 (1959) is precisely on point and explicitly supports my view of the
statute. I do not grasp how it may be disposed of simply by asserting the facts
are different.18 As for Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 290 F.2d 881 (7 Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1961), relied on
by the majority, I would decline to follow it since it also seems based on the
erroneous notion that Section 6 is inoperative when the existing agreement is
ambiguous.
96
Notes:
1
This seems to me to be the principal issue in the case since I would agree that if
the relevant contractual provisions had not been terminated, the decision would
be clearly governed by Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. Ry.,
353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957)
Even though the majority believes a minor dispute is involved, it does not
discuss the applicability of that decision to this case. Since I cannot agree this is
a minor dispute, I shall also forgo discussion
45 U.S.C.A. 156
45 U.S.C.A. 155
45 U.S.C.A. 160
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. Co. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61, 66 (2
Cir. 1961)
10
11
Arguably, these provisions might be read merely to mean that the collective
agreement, with all its ambiguities, is to remain in force pending exhaustion of
the major dispute procedures. Under that view, minor disputes could occur
during that period and might involve the subject matter of the major dispute. In
such a case, however, the union would still be free to strike over the issue after
exhaustion of the major dispute procedures. A contrary holding would mean
that ambiguous terms in a collective agreement would not be subject to change
through collective bargaining until their meaning had been determined by the
Adjustment Board. This would effectively lengthen the term of the contract
beyond the intentions of the parties and would prohibit clarification through
collective bargaining of those contractual provisions which need it most. It
would, moreover, seem directly contrary to the intent of Section 6 which
contemplates the proposal of changes in agreements whenever the parties desire
and which contains no provisions restraining its use until an Adjustment Board
decision has been rendered on the meaning of the old contract
In any case, the preferable view is that changes in existing conditions which are
the subject of a major dispute are forbidden whether or not they are arguably
authorized by the collective agreement. The "freeze" provisions carefully avoid
reference to the collective agreement, but emphasize "working conditions"
(Section 6), "established practices" (Section 5), and "conditions out of which
the dispute arose" (Section 10). This is in contrast to other parts of the Act, and,
indeed, Section 6 itself, which refer directly to the "agreement" when
necessary. Moreover, the legislative history of the statute shows the "freeze"
provisions were intended to enforce a "cooling off" period upon both labor and
management in the railroad industry. See Note 10, supra. But this policy cannot
be effectuated if management is allowed to take advantage of an ambiguous
contract during the "freeze" to make changes in working conditions relating to
the dispute. Such action is far more likely to warm up the dispute than cool it
off.
12
Cf. Bakery Sales Drivers Local 33, v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437, 68 S.Ct. 630, 97
L.Ed. 79 (1948); Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 47 S.Ct. 86, 71 L.Ed. 248
(1926); but see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 350 U.S. 270, 76 S.Ct.
349, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956)
13
In the Matter of Hudson & M. R. Co., 172 F.Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.1959), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. Stichman v. General Grievance Comm. of the Bhd. of R.
Trainmen, 267 F.2d 941 (2 Cir. 1959) cert. denied 363 U.S. 843, 80 S.Ct. 1608,
4 L.Ed.2d 1727 (1960) (proposal to amend the agreement withdrawn); Norfolk
& P. B. L. R. v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4 Cir. 1957) cert.
denied 355 U.S. 914, 78 S.Ct. 343, 2 L.Ed.2d 274 (1958) (no section 6 notice);
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 266
F.2d 335 (5 Cir. 1959) rev'd on other grounds 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 4
L.Ed.2d 1379 (1960) (no section 6 notice); Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United R.
Workers, 271 F.2d 87 (2 Cir. 1959) vacated and remanded on other grounds
364 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1609, 4 L.Ed.2d 1719 (1960) (no section 6 notice). Of
the cases cited by the majority, only Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 290 F.2d
881 (7 Cir. 1961) cert. denied 368 U.S. 900, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1960)
involved a Section 6 notice. I would submit that decision is erroneous
The majority omits one decision involving a dispute "similar to the one in the
present case." Order of R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 363 U.S.
330, 80 S.Ct. 761, 4 L.Ed.2d 774 (1960). A Section 6 notice was involved in
that case, and the Supreme Court found it to be a major dispute. See Note 18,
infra, and accompanying text.
15
16
Since there is no explict grant to the carrier of these rights and there is an
ambiguous, but clearly governing, provision, the majority's criteria for
determining that a minor dispute exists would be satisfied. Surely the fact that
the carrier gave the notice here does not serve to distinguish the two cases. That
factor, if anything, would help the brotherhoods
17
The majority is correct in stating that the magnitude of the effect upon working
conditions is not the governing factor. The statute itself does not use the words
major and minor and, therefore, provides no standards for judging the
magnitude. Adoption of such a test would engulf us in sterile inquiries such as
when does a little dispute on a big railroad become a big dispute on a little
railroad. On the one hand, it might tip the tactical balance by allowing
management the protection of the equity arm of the federal courts so long as it
bit off a little at a time and did not attempt to get everything in one gulp. On the
other hand, a literal application of major and minor might encourage the unions
Butte differs from our ruling in Stichman, note 14 supra, as to the effect of a
withdrawal of a Section 6 notice. The notice here, however, was not withdrawn