Roland Markland Matthews v. Barry K. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 11th Cir. (1990)
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Scribd Government DocsRoland Markland Matthews v. Barry K. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 11th Cir. (1990)
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Scribd Government Docs902 F.
2d 877
16 Fed.R.Serv.3d 896
Roland Markland MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Barry K. GAITHER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 88-8916.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
June 4, 1990.
Steven E. Scheer, Johnathan Hart, (Court-appointed), Savannah, Ga., for
plaintiff-appellant.
Terry L. Long, Dept. of Law, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia.
Before JOHNSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and BROWN * , Senior
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
This case arises on appeal from the district court's order of November 23, 1988,
dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
I. FACTS
2
Roland Matthews, an inmate at Georgia's Coastal Correctional Institution,
sought to file a pro se complaint against the Warden of Coastal Correctional
Institution, Barry Gaither ("the Warden"), and the prison doctor, Dr. Vinueza.
The complaint alleged that the Warden and Vinueza forced Matthews to engage
in work details, knowing that Matthews was suffering from painful arthritis of
the spine. The complaint also alleged that Vinueza denied Matthews
medication that doctors at Augusta Medical Correctional Institution had
prescribed for Matthews's condition.
Matthews sought to proceed in forma pauperis in order to avoid paying filing
fees in this action. On August 8, 1988, he completed a form affidavit of
indigency stating that he received $600 per year in gifts from family members
but that he had zero dollars in his prison account at the time of the affidavit.
Matthews, however, did not obtain from prison officials a certified statement
that his account contained zero dollars. Matthews mailed the complaint and
petition to proceed in forma pauperis to the district court, which apparently
received the materials on August 15, 1988.
In an order dated August 19, 1988, the magistrate stated that he was not
satisfied that Matthews was indigent, noting Matthew's $600-per-year-income
and his failure to obtain a certificate stating his prison account balance. The
magistrate directed Matthews to file a certified copy of his account records and
balance within twenty days. 1 Matthews filed the account records on August 26,
1988. The records showed that $550 had been deposited in Matthews's account
since January 1, 1988. The records also indicated that on the date that
Matthews filed his affidavit of indigency stating that he had zero dollars in his
account, he actually had a balance of $25.02.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the magistrate found that Matthews had
deliberately misstated his balance in order to avoid paying the court filing fee.
The magistrate asserted that he had the discretion to dismiss Matthew's
complaint with prejudice, but determined that a lesser sanction was appropriate.
The magistrate denied Matthews's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and
directed Matthews to pay eighty dollars as a filing fee within twenty days.
On September 8, 1988, Matthews filed a motion for reexamination of his
indigency status, explaining that he filed his affidavit of indigency on the
morning of August 8, 1988, and that he did not receive the twenty-five dollars
noted in his prison account records until 3:00 p.m.2 Matthews proposed a
"compromise" filing fee of forty dollars, to be paid in increments of ten dollars
every two to four weeks. In an order dated September 9, 1988, the magistrate
rejected Matthews's proposed compromise filing fee. The order stated: "If
plaintiff's action is dismissed for failure to pay the $80 partial filing fee,
plaintiff may elect to save his money until he is able to pay the required fee."
On September 16, 1988, Matthews filed a motion to dismiss his complaint
without prejudice, stating that he would refile in state court. On November 10,
1988, the magistrate issued a report and recommendation that the complaint be
dismissed with prejudice because of the false affidavit and Matthews's failure to
pay the eighty dollar filing fee. Matthews filed objections to the magistrate's
report and recommendation and once again requested a dismissal without
prejudice. Nevertheless, on November 23, 1988, the district court adopted the
magistrate's report and recommendation and dismissed Matthews's complaint
with prejudice.
8
In this appeal we consider whether the district court erred in dismissing
Matthews's complaint with prejudice after Matthews moved to dismiss the case
without prejudice.
II. ANALYSIS
9
Dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P.Rule 41(a)(1) is a question of law subject to de
novo review in this Court. Cf. Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261, 1264 (5th
Cir.1976) (district court has no discretion under Rule 41(a)(1)); Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 914, 916 (5th
Cir.1975). This Court reviews a district court's order dismissing a complaint
under 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1915(d) for abuse of discretion. Harris v. Menendez,
817 F.2d 737, 741 (11th Cir.1987).
A. Jurisdiction
10
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) provides in part,
11 action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a
[A]n
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of
a motion for summary judgment.... Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal
or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice....
12
It is well established that Rule 41(a)(1)(i) grants a plaintiff an unconditional
right to dismiss his complaint by notice and without an order of the court at any
time prior to the defendant's service of an answer or a motion for summary
judgment. Pilot Freight Carriers, 506 F.2d at 916 ("Rule 41(a)(1) means
precisely what it says."); Williams, 531 F.2d at 1264 ("The court had no power
or discretion to deny plaintiff's right to dismiss or to attach any condition or
burden to that right."); Carter v. United States, 547 F.2d 258, 259 (5th
Cir.1977) ("As the plain terms of Rule 41(a)(1)(i) establish, a plaintiff has an
absolute right to dismiss a lawsuit before the defendant has filed an answer or
summary judgment motion."); Exxon Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 599 F.2d
659, 661 (5th Cir.1979) ("Rule 41(a)(1) grants a plaintiff the right to dismiss
'an action' at an early stage of the proceedings voluntarily, without prejudice,
and without consent of the court."). The dismissal is effective immediately
upon the filing of a written notice of dismissal, and no subsequent court order is
required. J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice p 41.02 (1988). The fact that a
notice of dismissal is styled "motion to dismiss" rather than "notice of
dismissal" is without consequence. Williams, 531 F.2d at 1263; Carter, 547
F.2d at 259 n. 2.
13
The in forma pauperis statute provides in part: "The court may ... dismiss the
case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the allegation is
frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1915(d). This Court has held that
dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate sanction in cases involving a badfaith misstatement of assets. Dawson v. Lennon, 797 F.2d 934, 935 (11th
Cir.1986) (dismissal with prejudice, although a last resort, is appropriate in
cases involving bad faith). In the context of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which also concerns sanctions, several circuits have held that
although a district court lacks jurisdiction over the substance of a case after a
Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice of dismissal, the court retains power to impose sanctions
under Rule 11. See Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 875 F.2d 890, 895
(D.C.Cir.1989), cert. granted sub nom. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., --U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 275, 107 L.Ed.2d 256 (argued February 20, 1990); Muthig
v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 603-04 (1st Cir.1988); Schering
Corp. v. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir.1989); Szabo
Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir.1987);
Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 203 (8th Cir.1987); Greenberg v. Sala,
822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir.1987). But see, Johnson Chem. Co. v. Home Care
Prods., Inc., 823 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.1987) (Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice of dismissal
deprives court of jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions). These courts reason
that while a Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal prevents a court from considering
the merits of a case, the court still has the authority under Rule 11 to enforce
rules of court through sanctions.
14 award of fees under Rule 11 is more like a sanction for [criminal] contempt of
An
court than like a disposition on the merits or even an award of costs. An award under
Rule 11 is a "sanction" for violating a rule of court. The obligation to answer for
one's act accompanies the act; a lawyer cannot absolve himself of responsibility by
dismissing his client's suit.
15
Danik, 875 F.2d at 894 (quoting Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1079); see also Schering,
889 F.2d at 495-96 (court retains jurisdiction to impose sanctions designed to
deter misbehavior before the court); Muthig, 838 F.2d at 603 (court retains
jurisdiction to punish with sanctions abuse of the court's process). Under the
rationale of the Rule 11 cases, it is apparent that courts retain jurisdiction to
impose a sanction of dismissal with prejudice in cases involving a bad-faith
misstatement of assets in an in forma pauperis affidavit, notwithstanding the
plaintiff's Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal.
B. Sanctions
16
The purpose of section 1915(d) is not to punish litigants whose affidavits
contain insignificant discrepancies, but to weed out the litigants who falsely
understate their net worth in order to obtain in forma pauperis status when they
are not entitled to that status based on their true net worth. Camp v. Oliver, 798
F.2d 434, 438 n. 3 (11th Cir.1986).3 A district court has the discretion to
dismiss a case with prejudice where a plaintiff has in bad faith filed a false
affidavit of poverty. Dawson, 797 F.2d at 935.4 In the absence of a finding of
bad faith misstatement of assets, litigiousness or manipulative tactics, however,
dismissal with prejudice is not warranted. Camp, 798 F.2d at 438.
17
In the present case, the magistrate found that Matthews deliberately had
misstated his prison account balance and, in order to support the misstatement,
Matthews had withdrawn all of his funds from his account shortly before filing
his complaint. The magistrate noted that Matthews had offered to pay a partial
filing fee, but the magistrate nonetheless found that Matthews had acted in bad
faith. Magistrate's Report and Recommendation 2. Considering these facts as a
whole, Matthews's inaccurate affidavit should not have foreclosed in forma
pauperis eligibility. Camp, 798 F.2d at 438. The inaccuracy in Matthews's
affidavit was minimal: $25.02. There is no evidence that the misstatement was
made in bad faith in order to qualify Matthews for in forma pauperis status
when he was not entitled to that status.5 In fact, Matthews willingly sent his
account records, which showed the inaccuracy of his affidavit, to the district
court. There also was no finding that Matthews had previously misrepresented
his assets in order to obtain in forma pauperis status. See Dawson, 797 F.2d at
935 (courts previously had found plaintiff's affidavits of poverty to be false).
Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in determining
that this case warranted dismissal with prejudice.
18
The magistrate originally imposed a less drastic sanction than dismissal with
prejudice. The magistrate's September 9, 1988 order gave Matthews a choice
between paying an $80.00 partial filing fee as a sanction and having the case
dismissed without prejudice.6 Matthews chose the latter course, moving for
dismissal without prejudice. The court then, without explanation, changed its
position and recommended that the dismissal be with prejudice. This unjustified
change also was an abuse of discretion. See Camp, 798 F.2d at 438.
19
REVERSED.
Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior U.S. District Judge for the District of
Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior U.S. District Judge for the District of
Kansas, sitting by designation
The magistrate allowed the complaint to be filed "for record purposes only,"
with no service of process
The magistrate disputed this claim in an order dated September 9, 1988, where
the magistrate found the following:
Upon receiving a record of plaintiff's prison account transactions, the Court
discovered that $50.00 had been deposited to plaintiff's prison account on July
26, 1988, giving him a balance of $50.02. Plaintiff withdrew the sum of $25.00
on August 2, 1988, leaving a balance of $25.02. Plaintiff made no further
withdrawals from his account until August 10, 1988, which was after the date
he executed an affidavit that he had no funds in his account.
(emphasis in original).
The Camp Court overturned a district court's order dismissing an in forma
pauperis complaint with prejudice because the plaintiff had stated that he had
no assets when his prison account actually contained $63.65. This Court noted
that there had been no finding of bad faith, litigiousness or manipulative tactics,
that the plaintiff had attached a certified copy of his account records to the in
forma pauperis petition, and that the plaintiff had tendered $20.00 in partial
payment of fees on receipt of the defendant's motion to dismiss. Camp, 798
F.2d at 438
The Dawson Court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by attempting to
obtain in forma pauperis status while failing to draw the district court's attention
to previous authoritative determinations that he was not indigent. Dawson, 797
F.2d at 935-36
The magistrate emphasized that Matthews made two withdrawals of $25.00
shortly before filing his complaint: on August 2 and August 10, 1988.
Apparently, prisoners are permitted to withdraw a maximum of $25.00 per
week for purchases at the prison store. Matthew's offer to pay a partial filing
fee over time, however, belies the magistrate's finding that Matthew's
withdrawals were designed to avoid paying filing fees
The September 9, 1988 order provided: "If the plaintiff's action is dismissed for
failure to pay the $80.00 filing fee, plaintiff may elect to save his money until
he is able to pay the required fee." This statement clearly implied that any
dismissal would be without prejudice
