Figueroa v. DEA, 7 F.3d 218, 1st Cir. (1993)
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Scribd Government Docs7 F.
3d 218
NOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished
opinions may be cited only in related cases.
Angel Luis FIGUEROA, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT Administration, Et Al.,
Defendants, Appellees.
No. 93-1059.
United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.
October 12, 1993
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
Angel Luis Figueroa on brief pro se.
A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Suzanne E. Durrell,
Assistant United States Attorney, on Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Disposition, for appellees.
D.Mass.
VACATED AND REMANDED
Before Selya, Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam.
Angel Luis Figueroa (plaintiff) appeals from a district court judgment
dismissing his claim for damages against the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) and two of its special agents. In his pro se complaint, plaintiff alleged
that the defendants knowingly relied on false information in order to effect the
seizure and subsequent forfeiture of various bank accounts held in his name.
The district court granted the government's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)
for judgment on the pleadings, finding that 42 U.S.C. 1983-the statutory
authority cited by plaintiff-was inapplicable to federal officials not operating
under color of state law. Plaintiff's subsequent motion for reconsideration was
summarily denied.
2
Several aspects of this disposition prove problematic. For one thing, the
government's Rule 12(c) motion was premature. The rule expressly provides
that such relief can be sought only "[a]fter the pleadings are closed." Pleadings,
of course, include an answer to the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Yet the
defendants never filed an answer below. See, e.g., 5A C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1367, at 513 ("defendant may not move under
Rule 12(c) until after he has answered"). In addition, the fact that the action was
dismissed solely because of plaintiff's misplaced reliance on section 1983 is
puzzling. For in an earlier order granting IFP status, the district court had
stated: "Although plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, it
must be construed as a Bivens-type action, brought under the general federal
question jurisdiction of the court, 28 U.S.C. 1331, because the defendants are
federal, not state, agents." Order of July 2, 1992 (footnote omitted). Given this
pronouncement, plaintiff might justifiably have concluded that this deficiency
in his complaint had been cured. Furthermore, in his motion for
reconsideration, plaintiff made specific reference to section 1331. This can
reasonably be construed as a request to amend his complaint to advance a
Bivens cause of action. Even though plaintiff was entitled to amend his
complaint at that juncture as a matter of course, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), the
district court summarily denied the motion without examining the viability of
any putative Bivens claim. We therefore conclude that, both in granting the
government's Rule 12(c) motion and in denying plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration without leave to amend, the court abused its discretion.
Defendants contend that the judgment is nonetheless sustainable inasmuch as
any amendment to the complaint would obviously be futile. We are unwilling
to hazard such a prediction. In particular, given the paucity of factual
development to date, we are unable to conclude that plaintiff could make out
no viable constitutional claim. See generally D. Smith, Prosecution and
Defense of Forfeiture Cases 10.05 (1993) (discussing applicability of Fourth
Amendment in forfeiture context). In light of plaintiff's assertion that the
defendants deliberately relied on false information, we cannot say that the
question of qualified immunity is necessarily foreclosed. See, e.g., Schwob v.
Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1421-22 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that issue of DEA
agents' qualified immunity must await supplementation of the record).
Similarly, in part because an administrative forfeiture was apparently also
involved here, we cannot rule out the possibility that the DEA's absolute
immunity might be sidestepped in some fashion. See, e.g., Sarit v. Drug
Enforcement Admin., 987 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing waiver of
sovereign immunity under Administrative Procedures Act); Onwubiko v.
United States, 969 F.2d 1392, 1398-99 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing jurisdiction
under Tucker Act). Finally, without even knowing the basis for plaintiff's
August 1991 motion for relief from judgment in the forfeiture action, we are
not prepared to conclude that his claim here-whatever form it may take-is
barred on the ground of claim preclusion. See, e.g., Wood v. Several Unknown
Metrop. Police Officers, 835 F.2d 340, 343-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see generally
Restatement (Second) of Judgments 22, 30 (1982) (discussing application of
res judicata to omitted defenses and to in rem actions); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller
& E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 4412, 4414 (1981 & '93 Supp.)
(same).
4
We mean to express no opinion as to the ultimate merit of any of these
contentions. Because it is unclear what new facts plaintiff might adduce,
because the government has only briefed these issues in cursory fashion, and
because the district court did not address them, we simply conclude that none
of these arguments are sufficient to deprive plaintiff of an opportunity to amend
his complaint.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
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