194 U.S.

486
24 S.Ct. 816
48 L.Ed. 1087

JOSEPH R. BINNS, Plff. in Err.,

v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 196.
Submitted April 6, 1904.
Decided May 31, 1904.

Section 460 of title II. of the Alaska Penal Code (act of March 3, 1899, 30
Stat. at L. 1253, 1337, chap. 429), as amended by the act of June 6, 1900,
entitled 'An Act Making Further Provision for a Civil Government for
Alaska, and for Other Purposes' (31 Stat. at L. 321, 330, chap. 786), reads
'that any person or persons, corporation or company prosecuting or
attempting to prosecute any of the following lines of business within the
district of Alaska shall first apply for and obtain license so to do from a
district court or a subdivision thereof in said district, and pay for said
license for the respective lines of business and trade, as follows, to wit: . . .
Transfer companies, fifty dollars per annum.'
Section 461 provides: 'That any person, corporation, or company doing or
attempting to do business in violation of the provisions of the foregoing
section, or without having first paid the license therein required, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,' etc.
Section 463: 'That the licenses provided for in this act shall be issued by
the clerk of the district court or any subdivision thereof . . . duly made and
entered: . . . Provided, That . . . all moneys received for licenses by him . .
. under this act shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be covered into
the Treasury of the United States, under such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.'
Under this statute, plaintiff in error was prosecuted and convicted in the
district court for the district of Alaska, second division. This conviction
has been brought to this court on writ of error, and the question presented
is whether the statute is in conflict with 8 of article 1 of the Constitution

of the United States, which reads: 'The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States;
but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.' Messrs. J. C. Campbell and W. H. Metson for plaintiff in error.
Assistant Attorney General Purdy for defendant in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 488-490 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

The contention of plaintiff in error is that the license tax is an excise, that it is
laid and collected 'to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States,' because, by 463, it is provided that 'all
moneys received for licenses . . . under this act shall . . . be covered into the
Treasury of the United States;' that it is imposed only in Alaska; and is not
'uniform throughout the United States.'

It is unnecessary to consider the decisions in the Insular Cases, for, as said by

Mr. Justice White in his concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S.
244, 335, 45 L. ed. 1088, 1125, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770: 'Without referring in
detail to the acquisition from Russia of Alaska, it suffices to say that that treaty
also contained provisions for incorporation, and was acted upon;' and by Mr.
Justice Gray, in his concurring opinion (p. 345, L. ed. 1128, Sup. Ct. Rep. p.
809): 'The cases now before the court do not touch the authority of the United
States over the territories, in the strict and technical sense, being those which
lie within the United States, as bounded by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the
Dominion of Canada, and the Republic of Mexico, and the territories of Alaska
and Hawaii; but they relate to territory, in the broader sense, acquired by the
United States by war with a foreign state.'

It had been theretofore held by this court in The Coquitlam v. United States,
163 U. S. 346, 352, 41 L. ed. 184, 186, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1117, that 'Alaska is
one of the territories of the United States. It was so designated in the order [the
order assigning the territory to the ninth judicial circuit], and has always been
so regarded. And the court established by the act of 1884 is the court of last
resort within the limits of that territory.' Nor can it be doubted that it is an
organized territory, for the act of May 17, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 24, chap. 53),
entitled 'An Act Providing a Civil Government for Alaska,' provided: 'That the
territory ceded to the United States by Russia by the treaty of March thirtieth,

eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and known as Alaska, shall constitute a civil
and judicial district, the government of which shall be organized and
administered as hereinafter provided.' [15 Stat. at L. 539]. See also 31 Stat. at
L. 321, chap. 786, 1.
4

We shall assume that the purpose of the license fees required by 460 is the
collection of revenue, and that the license fees are excises within the
constitutional sense of the term. Nevertheless, we are of opinion that they are to
be regarded as local taxes, imposed for the purpose of raising funds to support
the administration of local government in Alaska.

It must be remembered that Congress, in the government of the territories as

well as of the District of Columbia, has plenary power, save as controlled by
the provisions of the Constitution; that the form of government it shall establish
is not prescribed, and may not necessarily be the same in all the territories. We
are accustomed to that generally adopted for the territories, of a quasi state
government, with executive, legislative, and judicial officers, and a legislature
endowed with the power of local taxation and local expenditures; but Congress
is not limited to this form. In the District of Columbia it has adopted a different
mode of government, and in Alaska still another. It may legislate directly in
respect to the local affairs of a territory, or transfer the power of such legislation
to a legislature elected by the citizens of the territory. It has provided in the
District of Columbia for a board of three commissioners, who are the
controlling officers of the District. It may intrust to them a large volume of
legislative power, or it may, by direct legislation, create the whole body of
statutory law applicable thereto. For Alaska, Congress has established a
government of a different form. It has provided no legislative body, but only
executive and judicial officers. It has enacted a penal and civil code. Having
created no legislative body and provided for no local legislation in respect to
the matter of revenue, it has established a revenue system of its own, applicable
alone to that territory. Instead of raising revenue by direct taxation upon
property, it has, as it may rightfully do, provided for that revenue by means of
license taxes.

In reference to the power of Congress, reference may be had to Gibbons v.

District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 29 L. ed. 680, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427, in
which it was held that 'it is within the constitutional power of Congress, acting
as the local legislature of the District of Columbia, to tax different classes of
property within the District at different rates;' and further, after referring to the
case of Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L. ed. 98, it was said (pp. 407,
408, L. ed. p. 681, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 429):

'The power of Congress, legislating as a local legislature for the District, to

levy taxes for District purposes only, in like manner as the legislature of a state
may tax the people of a state for state purposes, was expressly admitted, and
has never since been doubted. 5 Wheat. 318, 5 L. ed. 98; Welch v. Cook, 97 U.
S. 541, 24 L. ed. 1112; Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687, 24 L.
ed. 1098. In the exercise of this power Congress, like any state legislature
unrestricted by constitutional provisions, may, at its discretion, wholly exempt
certain classes of property from taxation, or may tax them at a lower rate than
other property.'

In view of this decision it would not be open to doubt that, if the act had
provided for a local treasurer to whom these local taxes should be paid, and
directed that the proceeds be used solely in payment of the necessary expenses
of the government of Alaska, its constitutionality would be clear; but the
contention is that the statute requires that the proceeds of these licenses shall be
paid into the Treasury of the United States, from which, of course, they can
only be taken under an act of Congress making specific appropriation. In fact,
all the expenses of the territory are, in pursuance of statute, paid directly out of
the United States Treasury. Act of June 6, 1900, title I., 2 and 10 (31 Stat. at
L. 322, 325, chap. 786); act of March 3, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 960, 987, chap.
830, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 41); April 28, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 120, 147,
chap. 594); and February 25, 1903 (32 Stat. at L. 854, 882, chap. 755). True,
there are some special provisions for revenues and their application. Thus, the
fees for issuing certificates of admission to the bar, and for commissions to
notaries public, are to be retained by the secretary of the district, and 'kept in a
fund to be known as the District Historical Library Fund,' and designed for
'establishing and maintaining the district historical library and museum' (act of
June 6, 1900, title I., 32, 31 Stat. at L. 333, chap. 786), and municipal
corporations are authorized to impose certain taxes for local purposes. Title III.,
201, 31 Stat. at L. 521, chap. 786. By 203, 50 per cent of all the license
moneys collected within the limits of such corporations are to be paid to their
treasurers, to be used for school purposes. By subsequent legislation (31 Stat. at
L. 1438, chap. 859), it is provided that if the amount thus paid is not all
required for school purposes, the district court may authorize the expenditure of
the surplus for any municipal purpose. And by the same statute it is also
provided that 50 per cent of all license moneys collected outside municipal
corporations, and covered into the Treasury of the United States, shall be set
aside, to be expended for school purposes outside the municipalities. By still
later legislation,although that was enacted after the commencement of this
prosecution (32 Stat. at L. 946, chap. 978), the entire proceeds of license taxes
within the limits of municipal corporations are to be paid to the treasurer of the
corporation, for school and municipal purposes.

10

But outside of these special matters there are no provisions for collecting
revenue within the territory for the expenses of the territorial government other
than these license taxes and charges of a similar nature. According to the
information furnished by the officers of the Treasury Department, as shown in
the brief of counsel for the government, all the revenues of every kind and
nature which can be considered as coming from Alaska are not equal to the cost
and expense of administrating its territorial government. How far we are at
liberty to rely upon this information, which was not presented upon the trial of
this case, or how far we can take judicial notice of the facts as shown by the
records of the Treasury Department, need not be determined, for if an excess of
revenue above the cost and expense of administering the territorial government
must be shown to establish the unconstitutionality of the license taxes, the fact
should have been shown by the plaintiff in error. The presumptions are that the
act imposing those taxes is constitutional, and anything essential to establish its
invalidity which does not appear of record or from matters of which we can
take judicial notice must be shown by the party asserting the
unconstitutionality.
The question may, then, be stated in this form: Congress has undoubtedly the
power, by direct legislation, to impose these license taxes upon the residents of
Alaska, providing that, when collected, they are paid to a treasurer of the
territory, and disbursed by him solely for the needs of the territory. Does the
fact that they are ordered to be paid into the Treasury of the United States, and
not specifically appropriated to the expenses of the territory, when the sum total
of these and all other revenues from the territory does not equal the cost and
expense of maintaining its government, make them unconstitutional? In other
words, if, under any circumstances, Congress has the power to levy and collect
these taxes for the expenses of the territorial government, is it essential to their
validity that the proceeds therefrom be kept constantly separate from all other
moneys, and specifically and solely appropriated to the interests of the
territory? We do not think that the constitutional power of Congress in this
respect depends entirely on the mode of its exercise. If it satisfactorily appears
that the purpose of these license taxes is to raise revenue for use in Alaska, and
that the total revenues derived from Alaska are inadequate to the expenses of
the territory, so that Congress has to draw upon the general funds of the nation,
the taxes must be held valid. That the purpose of these taxes was to raise
revenue in Alaska for Alaska is obvious. They were authorized in statutes
dealing solely with Alaska. There is no provision for a direct property tax to be
collected in Alaska for the general expenses of the territory. The entire moneys
collected from these license taxes and otherwise from Alaska are inadequate for
the expenses of that territory. So far as we may properly refer to the
proceedings in Congress, they affirm that these license taxes are charges upon

the citizens of Alaska for the support of its government. While it is generally
true that debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from
which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body
(United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 318, 41 L. ed.
1007, 1019, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540), yet it is also true that we have examined the
reports of the committees of either body with a view of determining the scope
of statutes passed on the strength of such reports. Church of Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U. S. 457, 464, 36 L. ed. 226, 229, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511.
When 461 and 462 were under consideration in the Senate, the chairman of
the Committee on Territories, in response to inquiries from Senators, made
these replies:
11

'The Committee on Territories have thoroughly investigated the condition of

affairs in Alaska, and have prepared certain licenses which, in their judgment,
will create a revenue sufficient to defray all the expenses of the government of
the territory of Alaska. . . . They are licenses peculiar to the condition of affairs
in the territory of Alaska on certain lines of goods, articles of commerce, etc.,
which, in the judgment of the committee, should bear a license, inasmuch as
there is no taxation whatever in Alaska. Not one dollar of taxes is raised on any
kind of property there. It is therefore necessary to raise revenue of some kind,
and in the judgment of the Committee on Territories, after consultation with
prominent citizens of the territory of Alaska, including the governor and several
other officers, this code or list of licenses was prepared by the committee. It
was prepared largely upon their suggestions, and upon the information of the
committee, derived from conversing with them.' Vol. 32, Congressional
Record, Part III, p. 2235.

12

While, of course, it would have simplified the matter and removed all doubt if
the statute had provided that those taxes be paid directly to some local
treasurer, and by him disbursed in payment of territorial expenses, yet it seems
to us it would be sacrificing substance to form to hold that the method pursued,
when the intent of Congress is obvious, is sufficient to invalidate the taxes.

13

In order to avoid any misapprehension we may add that this opinion must not
be extended to any case, if one should arise, in which it is apparent that
Congress is, by some special system of license taxes, seeking to obtain from a
territory of the United States revenue for the benefit of the nation, as
distinguished from that necessary for the support of the territorial government.

14

We see no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.

15

Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the decision of this case.

15

Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the decision of this case.