280 U.S.

52
50 S.Ct. 53
74 L.Ed. 163

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. CITY OF LOS ANGELES.
No. 54.
Argued Oct. 28, 1929.
Decided Nov. 25, 1929.

Mr. Daniel W. Knowlton, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 53-55 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. Jess E. Stephens, of Los Angeles, Cal., and Max Thelen, of San
Francisco, Cal., for respondent.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 56-60 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.

By petition filed July 12, 1928, respondent sought from the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia a writ of mandamus compelling petitioner, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, to consider the evidence introduced in the
proceeding before it known as Los Angeles Passenger Terminal Cases, 100 I.
C. C. 421, I. C. C. 489, for the purpose of determining whether the
Commission shall order the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company,
the Southern Pacific Company, and the Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad
Company to build and use an interstate union passenger station in the city of
Los Angeles, Cal.; and after consideration of the evidence, to make such order
therein as the facts may require. The Supreme Court of the District dismissed
the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed its judgment and remanded the
cause for further proceedings. 34 F.(2d) 228. This court granted a writ of
certiorari.

The Railroad Commission of that state had in 1921 (19 Opinion of the R. R.

Com. of Cal. pp. 740, 937) ordered the carriers to file plans, etc., and to acquire
sufficient land within what is known as the Plaza area in that city for a union
passenger station and terminal, to submit plans therefor, and, upon their
approval of them by that Commission, to proceed with the construction of the
station. The carriers carried these orders by writs of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the State, and that court, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. Railroad Commission of California, 190 Cal. 214, 244 P. 460, held that by
the Transportation Act of 1920 Congress had taken exclusive authority over the
matter of a union interstate terminal depot, and the court therefore denied the
State Railroad Commission the jurisdiction which it had sought to exercise. The
State Railroad Commission petitioned this court for writs of certiorari and at
the same time instituted proceedings before the Interstate Commerce
Commission which resulted in the orders above referred to.
3

This court granted a writ of certiorari and on April 7, 1924, rendered its
decision in Railroad Commission of California v. Southern Pacific Co. et al.,
264 U. S. 331, 44 S. Ct. 376, 68 L. Ed. 713, wherein, in affirming the judgment
of the state court, we held that the relocation of tracks, which were incidental to
the proposed union passenger station, required a certificate of approval by the
Interstate Commerce Commission under paragraphs 18 to 21 of section 1,
Interstate Commerce Act as amended by section 402, Transportation Act of
1920 (41 Stat. 476-478 (49 USCA 1)), as a condition precedent to the validity
of any action by the carriers or of any order by the State Railroad Commission,
and that until the Interstate Commerce Commission had acted under those
paragraphs, the carriers could not be required to provide a new union station or
to extend their main tracks thereto as ordered by the State Railroad
Commission.

Pending the hearing of the causes in 264 U. S. 331, 44 S. Ct. 376, 68 L. Ed.
713, the direct proceeding, referred to above, was instituted before the
Interstate Commerce Commission by the city of Los Angeles, asking for an
order by the Commission requiring the three railroads to build a new union
station at the Plaza site. With it were consolidated an application by the
Southern Pacific Company for authority to abandon certain main line tracks and
the operation of passenger and freight train service on Alameda street, and an
application by the Southern Pacific and the Salt Lake for authority to construct
new, and to extend existing, lines.

The Commission held, 100 I. C. C. 421, that it was without authority to require
the construction of the new union station. It said in the report, at page 430: 'We
conclude that we are not empowered to require the construction of a union
passenger station as sought in No. 14778. To make the record clear, we repeat

that no question of discrimination or preference is presented here; and that

under the issue framed in the complaint in No. 14778 we will give no
consideration to matters shown of record for the purpose of determining
whether we should issue an order requiring the construction and use of a union
station by any of the defendants.'
6

The Commission, in order to facilitate dispatch in the disposition of the case,

although it held that it had no power to require the building of an interstate
commerce passenger station, made hypothetical certificates which could be
summarized as follows: (1) That the public convenience and necessity require
the extensions of lines that may be necessary to reach and serve any union
passenger station within the plaza which may be constructed in accordance
with a lawful order of the State Commission and that may be necessary to
provide for the incidental nearrangement of passenger and freight routes, and
that the expense involved will not impair the carriers' ability to perform their
duties to the public. (2) That public convenience and necessity permit the
abandonment of train service on Alameda street and such other abandonments
of lines as would be necessary in connection with the establishment of any such
station, so lawfully ordered by the State Commission. The report further found
that such joint use of track or other terminal facilities as may be incidental and
necessary to the proper operation of any such union station is in the public
interest and is practicable, without substantially impairing the owning carriers'
ability to handle own business. As to the application by the Southern Pacific
and Salt Lake to extend their lines to permit the joint use of the Southern
Pacific's existing station, the Commission's findings were unfavorable and its
order denied the application. The Commission's then report was not
accompanied by certificates carrying out its findings, and it reserved
jurisdiction to alter its findings in the event that the plan of the State
Commission, as finally evolved, should be materially different from that 'as
here considered to be in the public interest.'

After a further hearing in the direct proceeding instituted by Los Angeles for an
order directing the erection of a union station the prayer of Los Angeles was
denied. 142 I. C. C. 489. Thereafter the city filed the petition above referred to
in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus. This
was in the present proceeding.

Attached to the petition as exhibits were the pertinent parts of the record in the
previous cases. There were filed an answer of the Commission, and a demurrer
to the answer. The Commission still adhered to its original report. The Supreme
Court of the District entered a judgment overruling the demurrer and, the city
electing to stand upon the petition, dismissed the petition. On an appeal, the

judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals of the District, which held, in
substance, that the Commission was vested with supervisory control over the
three carriers and that they were subject to an order requiring the construction
of the union station and the necessary connecting tracks prayed for.
9

The sole question for decision is whether the Interstate Commerce Commission
has jurisdiction to order the construction of the union station. This issue arises
on provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended by the
Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456. These are paragraphs 18 to 22 added
to section 1 of the original act (49 USCA 1), and paragraphs 3 and 4 of
section 3 (49 USCA 3).

10

These paragraphs and sections of the Transportation Act of 1920 may be

shortly stated as follows:

11

Paragraph 18 forbids the construction of a new line of railroad, or the

acquisition or operation of any line of railroad or extension thereof in interstate
commerce, unless there shall have been obtained from the Commission a
certificate that the present and future convenience and necessity require or will
require the construction or operation of additional or extended line of railroad
and forbids any interstate carrier to abandon all or any portion of its line, unless
there shall have been obtained from the Interstate Commerce Commission a
certificate of public convenience and necessity.

12

Paragraph 19 requires notice and hearings in any proceeding to secure such

certificate.

13

Section 20 gives the Commission discretionary power to issue such certificates

and provides for an injunction at the suit of the United States for any
construction, operation, or abandonment of such line of railroad or extension
thereof without a certificate, and punishes a violation.

14

Section 21 provides that after a hearing in such proceeding upon complaint, or

upon its own initiative without complaint, the Commission may authorize of
require by order any carrier by railroad subject to the act to provide itself with
safe and adequate facilities for performing as a common carrier its car service,
as that term is used in the act, and to extend its line or lines, if the Commission
finds that it is reasonably required in the interest of public convenience and
necessity, and will not impair the ability of the carrier to perform its duty to the
public.

15

Section 3, embracing paragraphs 3 and 4, provides, in paragraph 3, that carriers

shall afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of
traffic between their respective lines and for the receiving, forwarding, and
delivering of passengers of property to and from their several lines and those
connecting therewith and forbids discrimination.

16

Paragraph 4 provides that if the Commission finds that to do so will not

substantially impair the ability of a carrier owning and entitled to the
enjoyment of terminal facilities to handle its own business, it may require the
use of any such terminal facilities of any carrier, including main-line track or
tracks for a reasonable distance outside of such terminal, by another carrier or
other carriers, on such terms and for such compensation as the carriers affected
may agree upon, or, in the event of a failure to agree, as the Commission may
deem just and reasonable for the use so required, as if in condemnation
proceedings.

17

In its final report the Interstate Commerce Commission held that it had no
power to require the construction and operation of a union station upon the site
specified. The Commission's report was in part as follows:

18

'Complainants have again raised the question whether we have power to require
the defendants to construct and operate a union passenger station upon the site
heretofore specified in our findings. Their contention that we have such power
was pressed with vigor upon the original submission before us. The
complainants point to section 3, paragraph 3 and 4 of the interstate commerce
act as furnishing the necessary statutory authority. As stated in the original
report, at page 430, we concluded that we are not empowered to require the
construction of a union passenger station as sought in No. 14778, under the
issues framed in the complaint therein. * * * In Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. Co.
v. Jackson & Eastern Ry. Co., 271 U. S. 244, 250 (46 S. Ct. 535, 70 L. Ed. 928)
the Supreme Court said:

19

"In matters relating to the construction, equipment, adaptation and use of

interstate railroad lines, with the exceptions specifically set-forth in paragraph
22, Congress has vested in the Commission the authority to find the facts and
thereon to exercise the necessary judgment. The Commission's power under
paragraph 3 of Sec. 3 to require the establishment of connections between the
main lines of carriers were asserted by it in Pittsburgh & W. V. R. R. Co. v.
Lake Erie, A. & W. R. Co., 81 I. C. C. 333, a case decided after the withdrawal
by the Jackson & Eastern of its application to the Commission for leave to
make the junction at Curran's Crossing, and in Chamber of Commerce v.

Wichita Falls, R. & Ft. W. R. Co., 109 I. C. C. 81. That its jurisdiction is
exclusive was held in People ex rel. New York C. R. Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 233 N. Y. 113, 119-121 (135 N. E. 195). Compare Lake Erie, A.
& W. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 109 Ohio St. 103 (141 N. E.
847)."
The Commission proceeded:
20

'The distinction between a simple switch connection such as was contemplated

by the cases previously referred to, and the elaborate facilities sought to be
required by us in the present case, is obvious. Re-examination of the whole
subject again leads us to the conclusion that under existing law we are not
empowered to require the construction of a union passenger station of the
character sought by the complaint. * * *

21

'All issues of fact having been considered and concluded by our original report
and by this report on further hearing, nothing remains for us but to deny the
application of the city of Los Angeles and the intervener, the Railroad
Commission of the State of California, for a final order herein requiring the
construction of a station as found in the public interest. * * *'

22

In weighing the effect of the Transportation Act, it should be noted that in this
important measure affecting associations between interstate carriers of a
compulsory character, there is nowhere express authority for the establishment
of union passenger stations compulsory or otherwise. Emphasis is put on
physical connection between the tracks of one carrier and others if permitted by
the Interstate Commerce Commission and if properly paid for, either by
agreement or condemnation, by the carrier enjoying the use of the track of the
other companies. But it is limited in extent to connections with the terminals of
other companies within a reasonable length. This court said: The possible peril
to interstate commerce in a physical connection between two main tracks
'shows that the jurisdiction of the Commission over such connections must be
exclusive, if the duty imposed upon it to develop and control an adequate
system of interstate rail transportation is to be effectively performed. Moreover,
the establishment of junctions between the main lines of independent carriers is
commonly connected with the establishment of through routes and the
interchange of car services, and is often but a step toward the joint use of
tracks.' Alabama Railway v. Jackson Railway, 271 U. S. 244, 46 S. Ct. 535,
537, 70 L. Ed. 928.

23

The description in the Alabama Railway Case, 271 U. S. 244, 46 S. Ct. 535, 70

L. Ed. 928, is that of a physical connection between railroads engaged in

interstate commerce, but it contains no suggestion that the junction is to include
union passenger stations.
24

There are cases in the state courts in which by virtue of statutory provision
railroads are required expressly to unite in a passenger station, if determined by
commissioners appointed by the court or by a Railroad Commission. Mayor
and Aldermen of Worcester v. Norwich and Worcester Ry. Co., 109 Mass. 103,
113; Railroad Commission of Alabama v. Alabama Northern Ry. Co., 182 Ala.
357, 62 So. 749; Railroad Commission of Alabama v. Alabama Great Southern
Ry. Co., 185 Ala. 354, 362, 64 So. 13, L. R. A. 1915D, 98; Missouri, O. & G.
Ry. Co. v. State, 29 Okl. 640, 119 P. 117; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State,
90 Okl. 173, 217 P. 147; State v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ.
App.) 165 S. W. 491, 199 S. W. 829, 930. But there is no Federal case in which
is built up out of such words as those which we find in the Transportation Act
of 1920 authority for requiring such a station.

25

Without more specific and express legislative direction than is found in the act,
we cannot reasonably ascribe to Congress a purpose to compel the interstate
carriers here to build a union passenger station in a city of the size and extent
and the great business requirements of Los Angeles. The Commission was
created by Congress. If it was to be clothed with the power to require railroads
to abandon their existing stations and terminal tracks in a city and to combine
for the purpose of establishing in lieu thereof a new union station, at a new site,
that power we should expect to find in congressional legislation. Such
authority, if conferred in Los Angeles, would have application to all interstate
railroad junctions, including the numerous large cities of the county , with their
residential, commercial, shopping, and municipal centers now fixed and
established with relation to existing terminals. It would become a statute of the
widest effect and would enter into the welfare of every part of the country.
Various interests would be vitally affected by the substitution of a union station
for the present terminals. A selection of its site from the standpoint of a city
might greatly affect property values and likewise local transportation systems.
The exercise of such power would compel the carriers to abandon existing
terminals, to acquire new land and rights of way and enter upon new
construction, to abandon large tracts, and to sell territory of the same extent as
no longer necessary for the use of the carriers.

26

There would have to be tribunals to apportion the expenditures and cost as

between the carriers. A proper statute would seem to require detailed
directions, and we should expect the intention to be manifested in plain terms
and not to have been left to be implied from varied regulatory provisions of

uncertain scope. It would be a monumental work and one requiring the most
extensive exercise of expert engineering and railroad construction. It would
make possible great changes of much importance in the plans of every city and
in the rearrangement and mutations of railroad property and public and private
business structures everywhere. We find no statutory preparation for the
organization of such machinery.
27

We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals of the District in its disposition to
view section 3, paragraph 3, as vesting the Interstate Commerce Commission
'with almost unlimited power in the matter of establishing terminals and union
stations for the proper interchange of traffic between the converging interstate
railroad lines.' The words 'reasonable, proper and equal facilities' are, of course,
comprehensive enough to include not only trackage but terminal facilities
described as extending a reasonable distance outside of the terminal, but hardly
to give the Commission 'unlimited power' in the building of union stations.

28

To attribute to Congress an intention to authorize the compulsory establishment

of union passenger stations the country over, without special mention of them
as such, would be most extraordinary. The general ousting from their usual
terminal facilities of the great interstate carriers would work a change of title
and of ownership in property of a kind that would be most disturbing to the
business interest of every state in the country.

29

To recognize what is here sought as within the power of the Commission to

order to be done in each of all the great cities throughout the United States and
to sustain it as legal, without provision for effective restraint by the carriers, or
other interests, would expose the community to possible abuse, with nothing but
self-imposed restraint on bureaucratic extravagance.

30

When the interest of a great city in its improvements is to be promoted entirely

at the expense of railroads that enter it, Congress would be expected to hesitate
before it would change discretionary leave for the erection of such stations into
positive command. In such a case the expenditure of a large amount of capital
will not bring with it corresponding increase in the railroad revenues. If
Congress had intended to give an executive tribunal unfettered capacity for
requisitioning investment of capital of the carriers and the purchase of lange
quantities of land and material in an adverse proceeding, we may well be
confident that Congress would have made its meaning far clearer and more
direct than in the present meager provisions of the Transportation Act. The
suggestion of complainants is that out of provisions for local union of main
tracks and switching tracks we should use our imaginations and develop them
into provisions for giant union passenger stations. It is true that the railway

systems may be united through switches and connecting tracks in physical

connection, but this has not been held to justify great monumental structures,
extended in their complicated machinery and superficial extent and expense.
There is a difference of real substance between such conecting tracks and
switches and junctions and a passenger metropolitan union station. The latter
calls into being a new entity naturally requiring new legislative authority. This
court, referring to a kindred matter, said of this case: 'But there is great
difference between such relocation of tracks or local union stations and what is
proposed here. The differences are more than that of mere degree, they and
their consequences are so marked as to constitute a change in kind.' 264 U. S.
331, 346, 44 S. Ct. 376, 379, 68 L. Ed. 713.
31

But it is said that we have already foreclosed the conclusion in this case by our
opinion in 264 U. S. 331, 44 S. Ct. 376, 68 L. Ed. 713. The only issue there
presented to this court was whether it was necessary to secure from the
Interstate Commerce Commission its approval of the construction of a union
station and the relocation of the connecting tracks proposed. The point in that
case was the necessity for the acquiescence by the Interstate Commerce
Commission in respect to a union passenger station. We held such a certificate
to be necessary before a union station or connecting lines of interstate carriers
could be lawful. That is all we held.

32

It is quite true that we made references in the opinion to a case foreshadowed in

the hypothetical certificates of the Commission in the building of a union
station. Such references had, however, not the slightest significance in respect
to who could or should build the station, or whence its cost should be defrayed.
It was as far as possible from the purpose of the court in its opinion to indicate
its views of the powers which the Commission could exercise adversely to the
carriers in compulsory proceedings. They were not before the court for
adjudication.

33

In what situations, if any, action of the Interstate Commerce Commission may

be controlled or corrected by mandamus need not now be considered, because it
is apparent that there is here no meritorious basis for exerting such power, even
if found to exist.

34

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is reversed.