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Paflu vs. BLR

This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines ruling regarding a certification of a labor union. The court upheld the certification of the National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) as the exclusive bargaining agent for employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills Company over objections from the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU). In an election, NAFLU received 429 votes compared to 414 for PAFLU. The court found that under current labor laws and regulations, the union receiving a majority of valid votes cast is to be certified, even if less than an absolute majority of all employees voted. The court also noted the importance of stability in labor relations for industrial development and the deference owed to interpretations of statutes

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
78 views2 pages

Paflu vs. BLR

This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines ruling regarding a certification of a labor union. The court upheld the certification of the National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) as the exclusive bargaining agent for employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills Company over objections from the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU). In an election, NAFLU received 429 votes compared to 414 for PAFLU. The court found that under current labor laws and regulations, the union receiving a majority of valid votes cast is to be certified, even if less than an absolute majority of all employees voted. The court also noted the importance of stability in labor relations for industrial development and the deference owed to interpretations of statutes

Uploaded by

Mj Briones
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43760 August 21, 1976
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS (PAFLU), petitioner
vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HONORABLE
CARMELO C. NORIEL, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
FREE LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC., respondents.
Guevara, Pineda, Guevara & Castillon for petitioner.
Olalia Dimapilis & Associates for respondent Union
(NAFLU)
Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and
Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz for respondent Bureau of
Labor Relations, etc., et al.
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:
A certification by respondent Director of Labor
Relations, Carmelo C. Noriel, that respondent
National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU)
as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the
employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills,
Company, Inc. disregarding the objection raised by
petitioner, the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (PAFLU), is assailed in this certiorari
proceeding. Admittedly, in the certification election
held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union
obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner
Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and
Regulations implementing the present Labor Code,
a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for
certification of the victorious labor union as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were
four votes cast by employees who did not want any
union. On its face therefore, respondent Union
ought to have been certified in accordance with the
above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred,
would seize upon the doctrine announced in the
case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines
v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots
should be counted in determining the valid votes
cast. Considering there were seventeen spoiled
ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Director. Implicit in the comment of respondent
Director of Labor Relations, considered as an
answer, is the controlling weight to be accorded
the
implementing
rule
above-cited,
no
inconsistency being shown between such rule and
the present Labor Code. Under such a view, the
ruling in the Allied Workers Association case that
arose during the period when it was the Industrial
Peace Act, that was in effect and not the present
law, no longer possesses relevance. It cannot and
should not be applied. It is not controlling. There
was no abuse of discretion then, much less a grave
one.

This Court is in agreement. The law is on the side


of respondent Director, not to mention the decisive
fact appearing in the Petition itself that at most,
only ten of the spoiled ballots "were intended for
the petitioner Union," thus rendering clear that it
would on its own showing obtain only 424 votes as
against 429 for respondent Union. certiorari does
not lie.
1. What is of the essence of the certification
process, as noted in Lakas Ng Manggagawang
Pilipino v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. "is that every
labor organization be given the opportunity in a
free and honest election to make good its claim
that it should be the exclusive collective bargaining
representative." Petitioner cannot complain. It was
given that opportunity. It lost in a fair election. It
came out second best. The implementing rule
favors, as it should, respondent Union, it obtained a
majority of the valid votes cast. So our law
Prescribes. It is equally the case in the United
States as this excerpt from the work of Cox and
Bok makes clear: "It is a well-settled rule that a
representative will be certified even though less
than a majority of all the employees in the unit
cast ballots in favor of the union. It is enough that
the union be designated by a majority of the valid
ballots, and this is so even though only a small
proportion of the eligible voters participates.
Following the analogy of political elections, the
courts have approved this practice of the Board."
2. There is this policy consideration. The country is
at
present
embarked
on
a
wide-scale
industrialization project. As a matter of fact,
respondent firm is engaged in such activity.
Industrialization, as noted by Professor Smith,
Merrifield and Rothschild, "can thrive only as there
is developed a. stable structure of law and order in
the productive sector." That objective is best
attained in a collective bargaining regime, which is
a manifestation of industrial democracy at work, if
there be no undue obstacles placed in the way of
the choice of a bargaining representative. To insist
on the absolute majority where there are various
unions and where the possibility of invalid ballots
may not be ruled out, would be to frustrate that
goal. For the probability of a long drawn-out,
protracted process is not easy to dismiss. That is
not unlikely given the intensity of rivalry among
unions capable of enlisting the allegiance of a
group of workers. It is to avoid such a contingency
that there is this explicit pronouncement in the
implementing rule. It speaks categorically. It must
be obeyed. That was what respondent Director did.
3. Nor can fault of a grave and serious character be
imputed to respondent Director presumably
because of failure to abide by the doctrine or
pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Allied
Workers Association case. The reliance is on this
excerpt from the opinion: "However, spoiled
ballots, i.e., those which are defaced, torn or
marked (Rules for Certification Elections, Rule II,

sec. 2[j]) should be counted in determining the


majority since they are nevertheless votes cast by
those who are qualified to do so." Nothing can be
clearer than that its basis is a paragraph in a
section of the then applicable rules for certification
elections. They were promulgated under the
authority of the then prevailing Industrial Peace
Act. That Legislation is no longer in force, having
been superseded by the present Labor Code which
took effect on November 1, 1974. This certification
election is governed therefore, as was made clear,
by the present Labor Code and the Rules issued
thereunder. Absent a showing that such rules and
regulations -are violative of the Code, this Court
cannot ignore their existence. When, as should be
the case, a public official acts in accordance with a
norm therein contained, no infraction of the law is
committed. Respondent Director did, as he ought
to, comply with its terms. He took into
consideration only the "valid votes" as was
required by the Rules. He had no choice as long as
they remain in force. In a proper showing, the
judiciary can nullify any rule it found in conflict with
the governing statute. That was not even
attempted here. All that petitioner did was to set
forth in two separate paragraphs the applicable
rule followed by respondent Director and the
governing article. It did not even bother to discuss
why such rule was in conflict with the present
Labor Code. It failed to point out any repugnancy.
Such being the case, respondent Director must be
upheld.
4. The conclusion reached by us derives further
support from the deservedly high repute attached
to the construction placed by the executive officials
entrusted with the responsibility of applying a
statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing
the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary
Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took

effect on February 3, 1975, the present Labor Code


having been made known to the public as far back
as May 1, 1974, although its date of effectivity was
postponed to November 1, 1974. It would appear
then that there was more than enough time for a
really serious and careful study of such suppletory
rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency
with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore
the interpretation thereafter embodied in the
Rules. As far back as In re Allen," a 1903 decision,
Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt
from the leading American case of Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, decided in 1891: "The principle that
the contemporaneous construction of a statute by
the executive officers of the government, whose
duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect,
and should ordinarily control the construction of
the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in
our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited
to support it. "There was a paraphrase by Justice
Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v.
Rafferty," a 1918 decision: "Courts will and should
respect the contemporaneous construction placed
upon a statute by the executive officers whose
duty it is to enforce it, and unless such
interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be
controlled thereby." Since then, such a doctrine has
been reiterated in numerous decisions. As was
emphasized by Chief Justice Castro, "the
construction placed by the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a
Code should he given controlling weight. "
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
dismissed. Costs against petitioner Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU).
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ.,
concur.

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