Zuffa Motion To Dismiss

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page1 of 40
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WILLIAM A. ISAACSON (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)

([email protected])
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
5301 Wisconsin Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20015
Telephone: (202) 237-2727; Fax: (202) 237-6131
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F L E X N E R
O A K L A N D ,
C A L I F O R N I A
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JOHN F. COVE, JR. #212213

([email protected])
1999 Harrison Street, Suite 900, Oakland, CA 94612
Telephone: (510) 874-1000; Fax: (510) 874-1460
RICHARD J. POCKER #114441
([email protected])
300 South Fourth Street, Suite 800, Las Vegas, NV 89101
Telephone: (702) 382 7300; Fax: (702) 382 2755
DONALD J. CAMPBELL (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
([email protected])
J. COLBY WILLIAMS (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
([email protected])
CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS
700 South 7th Street, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone: (702) 382-5222; Fax: (702) 382-0540
Attorneys for Defendant Zuffa, LLC, d/b/a
Ultimate Fighting Championship and UFC
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA - SAN JOSE DIVISION
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Cung Le, Nathan Quarry, Jon Fitch, on behalf

of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
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v.
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Zuffa, LLC, d/b/a Ultimate Fighting

Championship and UFC,
Defendant.
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Case No. 5:14-cv-05484 EJD

DEFENDANT ZUFFA, LLCS
CONSOLIDATED NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS
COMPLAINTS PURSUANT TO FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
Date:
Time:
Place:
Judge:
July 23, 2015

9:00 a.m.
Courtroom 4
Hon. Edward J. Davila
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Zuffas Not. Mot. & Mot to Dismiss
Case Nos. 5:14-cv-05484 EJD; 5:14-cv-05591 EJD;

5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
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Luis Javier Vazquez and Dennis Lloyd

Hallman, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
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Defendant.
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Brandon Vera and Pablo Garza, on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly situated,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
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Defendant.
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Gabe Ruediger and Mac Danzig, on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly situated,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
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Defendant.
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5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
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TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on July 23, 2015 at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as
this matter may be heard, Defendant Zuffa, LLC will and hereby does move this Court for an
order dismissing the Complaints of Plaintiffs Cung Le, Nathan Quarry, Jon Fitch, Luis Javier
Vazquez, Dennis Hallman, Brandon Vera, Pablo Garza, Gabe Ruediger, and Mac Danzig on the
ground that the Complaints fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The hearing will be conducted before the Hon. Edward
J. Davila, United States District Court Judge for the Northern District of California, in
Courtroom 4 of the San Jose Courthouse, 280 South 1st Street, San Jose, CA 95113.
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This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the supporting Memorandum
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of Points and Authorities, the attached appendix, Zuffas Request for Judicial Notice, the
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Declaration of Suzanne E. Jaffe, and any other evidence or materials that the Court may allow
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before or at the time the matter is set to be heard.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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I.
II.
A.
B.
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INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS ..................................................................................... 2
The Sport and Business of Mixed Martial Arts. ...................................................... 2
The Alleged Scheme to Monopolize and Monopsonize. ..................................... 3
1. The Alleged Relevant Markets. ....................................................................... 3
2. Putative Classes. .............................................................................................. 4
3. Alleged Anticompetitive Conduct. .................................................................. 4
a. Alleged Exclusive Deals Between Zuffa and Fighters. ........................... 4
b. Alleged Exclusive Deals Between Zuffa and Event Venues,

Sponsors and Television Distribution Channels. ..................................... 6
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c. Alleged Expropriation of Identity Rights. ................................................ 6

d. Allegations Related to Zuffas Acquisitions. ........................................... 6
4. Professional MMA Competitors. ..................................................................... 6
LEGAL STANDARD......................................................................................................... 8
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 9
A.
Plaintiffs Have Not and Cannot Plead Specific Facts Plausibly Showing
that the Exclusivity Provisions in Zuffas Contracts Are Anticompetitive. ............ 9
1. Exclusive Dealing Arrangements Are Common, Procompetitive,
and an Integral Feature of the Sports and Entertainment Businesses. ........... 10
2. Plaintiffs Failed to Allege Specific Facts Plausibly Showing That
Zuffas Exclusive Dealing Arrangements Foreclose Competition in
Either Relevant Market. ................................................................................. 11
a. No substantial foreclosure of athletes. ................................................... 12
i No foreclosure in competition for exclusive contracts. .................. 13
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III.
IV.
ii No showing of the duration of exclusivity. .................................... 13

iii No showing of the percentage of market foreclosure. .................... 14
b. No substantial foreclosure of event venues. ........................................... 15
c. No substantial foreclosure of sponsors. ................................................. 15
d. No substantial foreclosure of television distribution outlets. ................. 16
3. The UFC Has No Duty to Deal With Competitors. ....................................... 16
B.
Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Properly Defined Relevant Product Markets. ................. 17
C.
Plaintiffs Have Not and Cannot Plead Specific Facts Plausibly Showing
That the Ancillary Rights Provisions Are Anticompetitive or Reduce
Competition in the Relevant Markets.................................................................... 19
1. Name and Likeness Licenses Are Common and Procompetitive.................. 20
2. Contractual Restrictions on the Use of the UFC Name and Marks
Are the Legitimate Exercise of Zuffas Intellectual Property Rights
and Are Not Anticompetitive. ....................................................................... 21
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V.
3. Plaintiffs Identity Rights Claims Do Not State an Antitrust

Violation. ....................................................................................................... 22
D.
Plaintiffs Have Not Pled Specific Facts Plausibly Demonstrating That
Zuffas Acquisitions Have Had Anticompetitive Effects...................................... 23
E.
Plaintiffs Complaints About Strong Competition Do Not State an
Antitrust Violation................................................................................................. 25
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 25
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Abbyy USA Software House, Inc. v. Nuance Commcns Inc.,

No. C 08-01035 JSW, 2008 WL 4830740 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2008) ................................. 10, 24
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5
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15
16
17
18
Adaptive Power Solutions, LLC v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co.,

141 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1998)................................................................................................ 15, 16
Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., LP,
592 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010)................................................................................................ 10, 11
Am. Football League v. Natl Football League,
323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963)...................................................................................................... 15
Apani Sw., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc.,
300 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2002)...................................................................................................... 17
Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp.,
586 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ..................................................................................... 19
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................................................... 8, 12
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,
724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983) ...................................................................................................... 12
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) ....................................................................................................... 1, 8, 9, 12
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1 (1979) ....................................................................................................................... 16
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23
24
25
26
27
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California v. Am. Stores Co.,

495 U.S. 271 (1990) ................................................................................................................... 24
Carefusion Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
No. 10-CV-01111-LHK, 2010 WL 4509821 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) .................................... 23
Colonial Med. Grp., Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare W.,
No. C-09-2192 MMC, 2010 WL 2108123 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2010),
affd 444 F. Appx 937 (9th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................... 12
Dang v. San Francisco Forty Niners,
964 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ..................................................................................... 19
Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 1980),
affd 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981) ............................................................................................... 19
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F.T.C. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.,

No. SACV 10-1873 AG MLGX, 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011) ...................... 23
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Feitelson v. Google, Inc.,

Case No. 14-cv-02007-BLF (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015) ............................................................... 9
Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
658 F. 2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981).................................................................................... 14, 15, 20, 21
Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) ....................................................................................................... 20
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Hazel Bishop, Inc. v. Perfemme, Inc.,

314 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1963) ....................................................................................................... 20
In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig.,
754 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................................... 22
In re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig.,
691 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Cal. 1988) .......................................................................................... 18
Ind. Entmt Grp. v. Natl Basketball Assn,
853 F. Supp. 333 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ............................................................................................ 11
Intl Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp.,
518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975)...................................................................................................... 24
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................... 9
J&J Sports Prods., Inc., v. Medinarios,
No. C 08-0998 JF (RS),
2008 WL 4412240 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2008) ............................................................................ 5
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JBL Enters., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc.,

698 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1983)................................................................................................ 9, 10
John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs.,
571 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2009)...................................................................................................... 19
Kan. Penn Gaming v. Collins,
656 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2011).................................................................................................... 9
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Kendall v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc.,

518 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2008)...................................................................................................... 9
Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. Guzman,
No. CV070963PHXPGR, 2008 WL 1924988 (D. Ariz. Apr. 30, 2008) ............................. 5
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Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc.,

354 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2004)...................................................................................................... 13
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MiniFrame Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,

No. 11 CIV. 7419 RJS, 2013 WL 1385704 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013)
affd, 551 F. Appx 1 (2d Cir. 2013) .......................................................................................... 21
Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma,
468 U.S. 85 (1984) ..................................................................................................................... 16
NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co.,
507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007)........................................................................................................ 9
OBannon v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn,
7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ........................................................................................... 20
Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc.,
127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997).............................................................................................. 10, 12
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commcns, Inc.,
555 U.S. 438 (2009) ..................................................................................................................... 8
Paddock Publns, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996).................................................................................................. 11, 13
PNY Techns, Inc. v. SanDisk Corp.,
No. 11-CV-04689-WHO, 2014 WL 2987322 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2014) .............................. 11, 12
Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Dominos Pizza, Inc.,
124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997) ....................................................................................................... 17
Rheumatology Diagnostics Lab., Inc. v. Aetna, Inc.,
No. 12-cv-05847, 2013 WL 5694452 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013) ............................................. 17
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Rheumatology Diagnostics Lab., Inc. v. Aetna, Inc.,

No. 12-CV-05847-JST, 2013 WL 3242245 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 25, 2013) ............................... 11, 12
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.,
749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984)........................................................................................................ 9
Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ............................................................................................. 20
24
25
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Sambreel Holdings LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,

906 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (S.D. Cal. 2012) ........................................................................................ 8
Sanderson v. Culligan Intl Co.,
415 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2005)...................................................................................................... 25
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Schachar v. Am. Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc.,

870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989)...................................................................................................... 25
2
3
4
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SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc.,

88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996).......................................................................................................... 8
Spiteri v. Russo,
No. 12-CV-2780 MKB RLM, 2013 WL 4806960 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2013) ............................ 16
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001)........................................................................................................ 8
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Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal.,

252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001).................................................................................................... 17
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308 (2007) ..................................................................................................................... 5
TYR Sport, Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc.,
709 F. Supp. 2d 802 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ....................................................................................... 25
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377 (1956) ................................................................................................................... 17
United States v. Oracle Corp.,
331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ............................................................................... 17, 18
United States v. Syufy Enters.,
903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).......................................................................................... 23, 24, 25
Verizon Commcns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398 (2004) ......................................................................................................... 8, 17, 21
Washington v. Natl Football League,
880 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (D. Minn. 2012) ................................................................................ 22, 23
STATUTES
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Rule 8(a)(2) .................................................................................................................................. 8
Rule 12(b)(6) ................................................................................................................................ 1
United States Code
Title 15, Section 2 ........................................................................................................ 1, 8, 17, 23
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OTHER AUTHORITIES
4 Phillip E. Areeda et al.,

Antitrust Law 901a (2009) ...................................................................................................... 23
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Pamela R. Lester,
Marketing the Athlete; Endorsement Contracts, SC47 ALI-ABA 405 (January 22, 1998) ...... 22
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Zuffa, LLC (Zuffa) moves to dismiss the Complaints in the above-entitled
actions for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiffs, professional mixed martial arts (MMA) fighters, allege that Zuffa, d/b/a the
Ultimate Fighting Championship and the UFC, uses exclusive dealing arrangements to
foreclose rival MMA promoters from the inputs necessary to compete in the alleged markets for
what Plaintiffs call Elite Professional MMA Fighter services and the promotion of Elite
Professional MMA bouts in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs allege that this
scheme enabled the UFC to obtain monopoly power and depress fighters compensation for bouts
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and for the rights to their names and likenesses. The Complaints vague and conclusory
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allegations fall far short of the Supreme Courts requirements in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
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550 U.S. 544 (2007) for pleading specific facts showing a plausible antitrust claim.
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First, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that plausibly show that Zuffas alleged exclusive
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dealing arrangements are anticompetitive. Exclusive deals are common and procompetitive,
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including in sports, because they encourage interbrand competition, encourage promoters to
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invest in marketing both the athlete and the sport, and prevent competitors from free-riding on
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those investments. Plaintiffs conclusory accusation that Zuffas contracts indefinitely lock up
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all or virtually all of the Professional MMA fighters necessary to compete in the promotion of
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MMA bouts is unsupported by specific factual allegations and implausible on its face. Plaintiffs
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conclusory allegation that Zuffa has locked up all the venues, television outlets and sponsors
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necessary to compete is similarly implausible and without factual foundation. Plaintiffs
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Complaints do not show that Zuffa has foreclosed any competition in the alleged markets, much
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less foreclosed a substantial share of the alleged markets. Absent plausible allegations that the
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UFCs exclusive deals have foreclosed competitors from obtaining the necessary inputs to
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compete, Plaintiffs cannot show that Zuffas contracts are anticompetitive or justify the enormous
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expense of a large antitrust case.
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Second, Plaintiffs have failed to allege plausible, properly defined relevant product
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markets. Plaintiffs have invented the term Elite Professional MMA Fighter and then defined it
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only by their vague and subjective perceptions of fighters degrees of quality. But antitrust
plaintiffs are required to define relevant markets clearly and based on principles of reasonable
substitutability, not their own outcome-driven preferences. Plaintiffs incomprehensible and
artificially narrow markets for Elite fighters and bouts fail to meet that basic requirement.
Third, Plaintiffs allegations that the UFC refused to co-promote events with rivals does
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not state a cognizable antitrust claim nor do their allegations regarding contractual restrictions on
the use of the UFC name and brand. Firms, even alleged monopolists, have no duty to deal with
competitors or to allow their intellectual property to be used by competitors.

Fourth, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the contractual provisions relating to their
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name and likeness rights are anticompetitive. Grants of exclusive name and likeness rights,
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including rights in perpetuity, are common in the sports and entertainment industries and have
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been consistently upheld by the courts. Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts showing the
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granting of such rights has impacted competition in either of the alleged markets. Although
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Plaintiffs might have preferred to license fewer rights to the UFC or to receive more money for
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their rights, those desires do not give rise to an antitrust claim.
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Finally, Plaintiffs have not pled specific facts showing that the UFCs acquisition of other
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MMA promoters has resulted in any anticompetitive effect. The Complaints make clear that even
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after these acquisitions, the UFC continues to face robust competition from multiple, well-funded
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competitors able to stage bouts with prominent fighters and television distribution.
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II.
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
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A.
The Sport and Business of Mixed Martial Arts.
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MMA, an interdisciplinary sport that combines attributes of boxing, wrestling, karate,
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muay thai, Brazilian jiu jitsu, judo and other sports, first emerged as a sport in the early 1990s.1
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Le Compl. 59, 105.2 The UFC was one of the earliest promotions, founded in 1993, and
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1 For purposes of this motion only, Zuffa assumes the truth of the Complaints factual allegations.
2 Because all four complaints are essentially identical and for ease of reading, this motion cites
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only the Le Complaint where identical allegations are contained in the other complaints. A list of
cross-references to identical allegations in the other complaints is attached as Appendix A.
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purchased by Zuffa in 2001. Id. 105. Zuffa built the UFC into an international brand that, in
many instances, has been synonymous with the rapidly growing sport of MMA. Id. 75. As the
sport has grown, so have opportunities for athletes. Plaintiffs allege that in 2015, the UFC plans
to hold 45 events nearly one every week. Id. 155. With events typically containing 11
bouts, according to Plaintiffs math, there will be a total of 495 bouts or 990 opportunities for
fighters in the UFC in 2015. Id. Plaintiffs acknowledge that today, professional MMA in general
is now one of the most popular and fastest growing spectator sports in the U.S. and North
America. Id. 95.
B.
The Alleged Scheme to Monopolize and Monopsonize.
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The gravamen of the Plaintiffs claim is that Zuffa has engaged in a scheme to
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monopolize and monopsonize by alleged exclusive dealing arrangements with fighters, venues,
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sponsors, TV networks and other third parties that have allegedly reduced competition by denying
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rivals access to inputs that are necessary to promote live Elite Professional MMA bouts. Le
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Compl. 9-10. Plaintiffs also claim that acquisitions of certain rival promoters reduced
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competition in the alleged markets. Id. 11-12, 129. Plaintiffs allege that the result of this
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scheme is that they received less compensation for participation in bouts and related grants of
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ancillary rights than they otherwise would have. Id. 153, 160.
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1.
The Alleged Relevant Markets.
Plaintiffs allege two relevant product markets: (1) the input market the market for
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Elite Professional MMA Fighter services, and (2) the output market a market for the
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promotion of live Elite Professional MMA bouts. Le Compl. 55, 76. Plaintiffs define an
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Elite Professional MMA Fighter as any Professional MMA fighter who has demonstrated
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success through competition in local and/or regional MMA promotions, or who has developed
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significant public notoriety amongst MMA Industry media and the consuming audience through
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demonstrated success in athletic competition. Id. 30(d).
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Plaintiffs allege that the relevant geographic market for both the input and output markets
is the United States, and, in the alternative, North America. Id. 63.
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2.
Putative Classes.
All Plaintiffs but one seek to represent the same two putative classes: the Bout Class
and the Identity Class. The Bout Class consists of All persons who competed in one or
more live professional UFC-promoted MMA bouts taking place or broadcast in the United States
since December 16, 2010. Le Compl. 30(c), 39. The Identity Class consists of Each and
every UFC Fighter whose Identity was expropriated or exploited by the UFC, including in UFC
Licensed Merchandise and/or UFC Promotional Materials . . . in the United States for the same
period. Id. 30(c), 47.
3.
Alleged Anticompetitive Conduct.
10
Plaintiffs claim that successful promotion of a live Elite Professional MMA event requires
11
Elite Professional MMA fighters and a suitable venue, access to PPV or television distribution
12
outlets, sponsors and endorsements, id. 58, and the UFC has locked up: (i) all or virtually all
13
Elite Professional MMA Fighters with substantial national or regional notoriety; (ii) the vast
14
majority of major sponsors; and (iii) key physical and television venues. Id. 10. They also
15
allege the UFC shuts out rival promotion opportunities for promoters and fighters by refusing to
16
co-promote events with would-be rival MMA Promoters and prohibiting its athletes from
17
competing against non-UFC MMA Fighters in live Elite Professional MMA bouts. Id. 17.
18
19
a.
Alleged Exclusive Deals Between Zuffa and Fighters.
Plaintiffs allege that the UFC deprives rivals of access to Elite Professional MMA
20
Fighters through exclusive dealing agreements with UFC Fighters that lock in Elite
21
Professional MMA Fighter services perpetually and exclusively for the UFC. Le Compl. 110
22
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs cite certain contract provisions in support of this conclusion,
23
including (1) the Exclusivity Clause, which prohibits fighters from working with rival
24
promoters while under contract with the UFC without the UFCs approval, id. 113(a); (2) the
25
Champions Clause, which applies only to the few weight class champions at any given time
26
and purportedly allows the UFC to extend a UFC Fighters contract for as long as the athlete is a
27
champion in his or her weight class, id. 113(b); and (3) unspecified Tolling provisions,
28
which allegedly extend the term of the UFC Fighters contract during periods when he or she is
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injured, retired, or otherwise declines to compete, id. 113(g). Plaintiffs claim these provisions
allow the UFC to extend the period of exclusivity indefinitely. Id. 113(a), (b). Plaintiffs do
not allege the actual duration of any fighters contract with the UFC, including their own.
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Thus, the Complaints conclude that all or virtually all Elite Professional MMA Fighters
are locked up by the UFC indefinitely. Id. 10, 113(a), (b). Many allegations in the
Complaints and many facts properly subject to judicial notice contradict this conclusion.3 For
example, Plaintiffs acknowledge that UFC fighters whose contracts have ended have fought for
Bellator, a rival MMA promoter. Le Compl. 146. Further, judicially noticeable state records
show that some of Plaintiffs themselves actually fought for competitors after fighting for the
10
UFC. Plaintiffs Fitch and Hallman both fought for World Series of Fighting,4 Hallman also
11
fought for Titan Fighting Championship,5 and Plaintiff Ruediger fought for promoter BAMMA.6
12
The Complaints also refer to several prominent fighters who either never fought for the UFC or
13
fought for other promoters since fighting for the UFC Fedor Emelianenko (id. 126), Ben
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
3 [C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily
examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated
into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice. Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Public records of athletic contests
maintained by state athletic commissions are judicially noticeable. E.g., J&J Sports Prods.,
Inc., v. Medinarios, No. C 08-0998 JF (RS), 2008 WL 4412240, at *1 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25,
2008) (taking judicial notice of Nevada Athletic Commission records of bout); Kingvision PayPer-View, Ltd. v. Guzman, No. CV070963PHXPGR, 2008 WL 1924988, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Apr. 30, 2008) (judicial notice of the Nevada Athletic Commission records of bout).
4 Declaration of Suzanne E. Jaffe in support of Zuffa, LLCs Request for Judicial Notice (RJN),
3, Ex. A (Fla. State Boxing Commn, Match Results, July 5, 2014 event for WSoF at
Convention Ctr. Daytona (bout between Fitch and Hallman on line 7)); 4, Ex. B (Nev. State
Ath. Commn, MMA Show Results, June 14, 2013 event for WSOF, LLC at Hard Rock Hotel &
Casino, Las Vegas (bout involving Fitch)); 5, Ex. C (Fla. State Boxing Commn, Match Results,
Oct. 26, 2013 event for World Series of Fighting at Bank United Ctr. Coral Gables, FL (bout
involving Fitch on line 9)); 6, Ex. D (Cal. State Ath. Commn, MMA Bout Results, Dec. 13,
2014 event for promoter WSOF at McClellan Civic Ctr., Sacramento, CA (Fitch in Bout 11)).
5 RJN 7, Ex. E (Mo. Office of Athletics, MMA Bout Results, Aug. 30, 2013 event for Titan
Fighting Champ at Union Station in Kansas City, MO (Hallman in Bout 6)).
6 RJN 8, Ex. F (Cal. State Ath. Commn, MMA Bout Results, May 31, 2013 event for promoter
BAMMA at Commerce Casino, Commerce, CA (Ruediger in Bout 7)).
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Askren (id. 137), Jake Shields (id. 28),7 and Quinton Rampage Jackson (id. 123).8
b.
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Alleged Exclusive Deals Between Zuffa and Event Venues,

Sponsors and Television Distribution Channels.
Plaintiffs allege that the UFC has locked up: the vast majority of major sponsors; and
(iii) key physical and television venues. Le Compl. 10. Plaintiffs do not allege how many
sponsors or potential sponsors exist or what percentage of those sponsors the UFC has under
contract. In regards to venues, Plaintiffs do not describe the universe of key venues or explain
why other venues would be not reasonable substitutes. As for television distribution, Plaintiffs do
not allege which or how many networks are restricted, nor why any other of the hundreds of
10
television networks that do not carry UFC bouts are not adequate alternatives for competitors.
c.
11
12
Alleged Expropriation of Identity Rights.
Plaintiffs also allege that the UFCs contracts with fighters have resulted in fighters
13
names and likenesses being exploited or expropriated (1) without adequate compensation to the
14
fighters based on the scope and duration of the contracts; and (2) in a way that denies fighters the
15
opportunity to exploit their connection with the UFC brand to profit outside of their dealings with
16
the UFC. Le Compl. 3, 6, 92, 113(d).

d.
17
18
Allegations Related to Zuffas Acquisitions.
The Complaints allege that Zuffa acquired certain other MMA promoters between 2006
19
and 2011. Le Compl. 12, 129, 133. Of these acquisitions, only one the Strikeforce
20
acquisition in March 2011 is alleged to have occurred since December 16, 2010. Id. 133.
21
4.
Professional MMA Competitors.
22
The Complaints acknowledge that many new MMA promoters have emerged since 2006,
23
including five named in the Complaints, and compete with the UFC for both fighter services and
24
the promotion of live events. Le Compl. 141-144, 146, 150. Many of these competitors are
25
26
27
28
7 RJN 9, Ex. G (Nev. State Ath. Commn, MMA Show Results, January 17, 2015 event for
WSOF at Planet Hollywood Resort, Las Vegas (bout involving Shields)).

8 RJN 10-11, Ex. H (N.J. State Ath. Control Bd., Scoring Detail, Nov. 15, 2013 event for
Bellator Sports Worldwide LLC at Revel Atlantic City (bout involving Jackson)).
6
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backed by well-funded individuals or corporations, have established television distribution,
and/or have attracted fighters whom the Complaints expressly acknowledge are prominent
fighters.
Elite Professional MMA Fighters, id. 141, and is broadcast on AXS TV, which is
backed by billionaire owner of the Dallas Mavericks and HDNet founder, Mark Cuban.
Id. 130(b), 141 (AXS TV is formally HDNet).
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Resurrection Fighting Alliance is operated by Ed Soares, the prominent manager of many
is promoted by multi-millionaire Jeff Aronson. Id. 142. Titan FC has been able to
secure the services of Plaintiff Hallman. Note 5, supra.
10
11
Legacy Fighting Championship, which has been promoting MMA bouts since 2009, also
has television distribution through AXS TV. Le Compl. 143.
12
13
Titan Fighting Championship has been broadcast on the CBS Sports cable network and
Invicta Fighting Championship, which focuses on the promotion of womens MMA bouts,
14
is owned by a veteran of the MMA Industry and has secured distribution on the UFCs
15
Internet broadcast subscription service Fight Pass. Id. 144.
16
Bellator has access to national television distribution, including Pay-Per-View (Le Compl.
17
150 (PPV), Vazquez Compl. 149 (national television distribution)), and has secured
18
prominent fighters such as Quinton Jackson, whom Plaintiffs identify as a fighter capable
19
of attracting major sponsors and licensing deals. RJN 11-12, Ex. H; Le Compl. 123.
20
Bellator is a subsidiary of publicly-traded Viacom, Inc., and is broadcast on Viacoms
21
Spike TV Network.9
22
In addition to those competitors listed in the Complaints, state athletic commission records
23
show other currently-active MMA promoters, including two others (World Series of Fighting and
24
BAMMA) that three named Plaintiffs fought for after their time with the UFC. Notes 4 and 6,
25
supra.
26
9 RJN 12 Ex. I at 8. Viacom also owns many other TV networks such as MTV, VH1, BET,
27
28
Nickelodeon, Comedy Central and had worldwide revenues last year over $13.7 billion. Id. at 1,
33.
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III.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a court may dismiss a complaint as a
matter of law for (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable
legal claim. SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th
Cir. 1996). Twombly directs a two-pronged approach in determining whether an antitrust
complaint should be dismissed: identify and disregard naked assertions and conclusory
allegations, and then determine whether the factual context presented by the remaining specific
factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable under the relevant law. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Determining whether a claim is plausible is context-specific,
10
requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense. Id. at 663-64. On a
11
motion to dismiss, the court generally accepts Plaintiffs allegations as true, but need not,
12
however, accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or
13
. . . allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
14
inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
15
To state a claim for unlawful monopolization or monopsonization under Section 2 of the
16
Sherman Act, a plaintiff must allege: (1) Possession of monopoly power in the relevant market;
17
(2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power; and (3) causal antitrust injury. SmileCare,
18
88 F.3d at 783. Section 2 targets the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
19
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
20
acumen, or historic accident. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commcns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448
21
(2009). The mere possession of monopoly power . . . is not only not unlawful; it is an important
22
element of the free-market system. Verizon Commcns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
23
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). That is why to safeguard the incentive to innovate, the
24
possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element
25
of anticompetitive conduct. Id. Anticompetitive conduct is that which is without a legitimate
26
business purpose that makes sense only because it eliminates competition. Sambreel Holdings
27
LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1081 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
28
In reviewing a Section 2 claim based on multiple theories of conduct, Each legal theory
8
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must be examined for its sufficiency and applicability, on the entirety of the relevant facts.
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999). If allegations are so
general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs have
not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. Kan. Penn Gaming v.
Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011).

Given the substantial expenditures of discovery and the opportunity to extort large
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6
7
settlements even where [plaintiff] does not have much of a case, Kendall v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc.,
518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008), something beyond the mere possibility of [relief] must be
alleged, lest a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up the time of a number
10
of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement
11
value. NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
12
at 557-58). As our Supreme Court has noted precisely in the context of private antitrust
13
litigation, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of
14
discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.
15
Feitelson v. Google, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-02007-BLF, Slip Op. at 6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015)
16
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59). Thus, a district court must retain the power to insist
17
upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to
18
proceed. Id. at 6-7.
19
IV.
20
ARGUMENT
A.
Plaintiffs Have Not and Cannot Plead Specific Facts Plausibly Showing that
the Exclusivity Provisions in Zuffas Contracts Are Anticompetitive.
21
Exclusive dealing is a common and procompetitive form of agreement that encourages
22
participants to invest in mutually beneficial promotional activities and prevents competitors from
23
free-riding on those investments. JBL Enters., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc., 698 F.2d 1011, 1015
24
(9th Cir. 1983); see Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984)
25
(Posner, J.) (exclusive dealing enables a firm to prevent others from taking a free ride on his
26
efforts (for example, efforts in the form of national advertising) to promote his brand). For
27
example, exclusive multi-year contracts are common with executives and performers in
28
entertainment and sports and with television networks that televise shows exclusive to their
9
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network. Because of these procompetitive benefits and because all contracts restrict the parties
freedom to some extent, plaintiffs pleading antitrust claims based on exclusive dealing must
allege specific, plausible facts showing that the arrangement is anticompetitive, i.e., that its
effect is to foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.
Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., LP, 592 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir.
2010) (quoting Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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The Complaints fail this standard. First, even where they allege that fighters, sponsors
and other third parties agreed to exclusive contracts, Plaintiffs have not alleged that competitors
were foreclosed from competing for those contracts in the first place. Second, even assuming
10
incorrectly that competition for those fighters and third parties is foreclosed, the Complaints do
11
not allege facts plausibly showing these contracts have blocked competitors access to so many
12
athletes, venues, sponsors and media outlets that it has foreclosed competition in the promotion of
13
MMA bouts and in MMA fighter services. Nor do Plaintiffs allege the purported extent or
14
duration of foreclosure from exclusive contracts with fighters, venues, television networks or
15
third parties. See Abbyy USA Software House, Inc. v. Nuance Commcns Inc., No. C 08-01035
16
JSW, 2008 WL 4830740, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2008) (dismissing complaint for failure to
17
plead facts showing foreclosure where exclusive dealing foreclosed only certain outlets). Third,
18
Plaintiffs allegations rely on the faulty assumption that the antitrust laws require the UFC to deal
19
with its competitors and co-promote events, which they do not.
20
21
1.
Exclusive Dealing Arrangements Are Common, Procompetitive, and

an Integral Feature of the Sports and Entertainment Businesses.
22
The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged the well-recognized economic benefits to exclusive
23
dealing arrangements, including the enhancement of interbrand competition. Allied Orthopedic,
24
592 F.3d at 996 (quoting Omega, 127 F.3d at 1162). Exclusive dealing stimulates interbrand
25
competition and increases output by incentivizing contracting parties to make mutually beneficial
26
investments in product quality, marketing, and promotion without having to worry about other
27
firms taking a free ride on their efforts. JBL Enters., 698 F.2d at 1015.
28
Exclusive dealing arrangements are a longstanding, critical, and procompetitive part of

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many businesses, including sports and entertainment businesses, yielding benefits for athletes,
promoters, fans, and other partners. First, exclusivity is valuable in sports because, as in other
fields, athletes benefit financially from promoters engaging in competition-for-the-contract for
their services. Paddock Publns, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J.) (Competition-for-the-contract is a form of competition that antitrust laws
protect rather than proscribe, and it is common). Second, the promoter who wins the exclusive
rights to a particular athletes services can promote events that are both more attractive to [fans]
and more distinctive from its rivals. Id. at 43. Finally, by reducing the ability of rivals to free-
ride on a promoters investments, exclusive contracts encourage a promoter to invest in
10
recruiting, developing, and marketing athletes; building and maintaining an infrastructure for the
11
sport; and building the leagues brand. Ind. Entmt Grp. v. Natl Basketball Assn, 853 F. Supp.
12
333, 340 (C.D. Cal. 1994). For example, in Independent Entertainment Group, the court rejected
13
antitrust claims that exclusive contracts between the NBA and players that prevented a rival
14
promoter from contracting with NBA players for an offseason pay-per-view basketball event
15
violated the Sherman Act, finding plaintiffs antitrust suit an attempt to free-ride on the NBAs
16
investment in its star players and in rebuilding the League during the 1980s. Id.
17
18
19
2.
Plaintiffs Failed to Allege Specific Facts Plausibly Showing That

Zuffas Exclusive Dealing Arrangements Foreclose Competition in
Either Relevant Market.
In light of the important procompetitive benefits that exclusive dealing arrangements
20
yield, antitrust plaintiffs must allege, and ultimately prove, that the arrangements effect is to
21
foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected. Rheumatology
22
Diagnostics Lab., Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., No. 12-CV-05847-JST, 2013 WL 3242245, at *10 (N.D.
23
Cal. Jun. 25, 2013) (quoting Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 996); see PNY Techns, Inc. v.
24
SanDisk Corp., No. 11-CV-04689-WHO, 2014 WL 2987322, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2014)
25
(exclusive dealing must bar a substantial number of rivals or severely restrict the markets
26
ambit). It is insufficient to allege merely that a defendants exclusive dealing contracts have
27
denied rivals access to inputs without pleading facts showing the extent of foreclosure because
28
virtually every contract to buy forecloses or excludes alternative sellers from some portion of
11
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the market, namely the portion consisting of what was bought. Omega, 127 F.3d at 1162
(quoting Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983)
(Breyer, J.)). If competitors can reach the ultimate consumers of the product by employing
existing or potential alternative channels of distribution, it is unclear whether such restrictions
foreclose from competition any part of the relevant market. Omega, 127 F.3d at 1163.
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Based on these principles, courts routinely dismiss complaints that fail to plead specific
facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that the percentage of the product market
foreclosed is sufficiently substantial to state an antitrust claim based on exclusive dealing.
Colonial Med. Grp., Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare W., No. C-09-2192 MMC, 2010 WL 2108123,
10
at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2010), affd 444 F. Appx 937 (9th Cir. 2011); see also PNY Techs,
11
2014 WL 1677521, at *7 (dismissing antitrust complaint because bare allegations of foreclosure
12
are exactly what Twombly and Iqbal warned against); Rheumatology, 2013 WL 3242245,
13
at *11 (dismissing exclusive dealing based claims where allegations did not permit court to
14
evaluate whether the . . . agreement foreclosed competition in a substantial share of the line of
15
commerce affected). Plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts as to the extent of any alleged
16
foreclosure and instead rely on vague, implausible, and economically nonsensical allegations that
17
the UFC locked up: (i) all or virtually all Elite Professional MMA Fighters with substantial
18
national or regional notoriety; (ii) the vast majority of major sponsors; and (iii) key physical and
19
television venues. Le Compl. 10 (emphasis added). These conclusory allegations are
20
insufficient to justify the expense and burden of an antitrust claim based on what is recognized as
21
pro-competitive conduct.
22
23
a.
No substantial foreclosure of athletes.
Plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to show (1) that competitors were foreclosed from
24
initially competing for the contract for any athlete who signed a UFC contract; (2) that the
25
duration of contracts for so many UFC fighters was so long that competitors are foreclosed from
26
competing for those fighters when their contracts run out or are otherwise terminated; or (3) even
27
if one were to assume (incorrectly) that the UFC somehow obtained without competition
28
complete and perpetual exclusivity with the 500 fighters it allegedly has under contract, that the
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5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
inability to access these UFC fighters forecloses competitors from competing for a substantial
share of the relevant alleged markets with other Professional MMA fighters.
i
As noted, courts have long recognized that competition to persuade people to sign
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No foreclosure in competition for exclusive contracts.
exclusive contracts, often called competition for the contract, provides important
procompetitive benefits. E.g., Paddock Publns, 103 F.3d at 45. Plaintiffs allege no facts
showing that Zuffa has foreclosed competitors from competing for exclusive contracts with any
fighter.
ii
9
10
No showing of the duration of exclusivity.
Plaintiffs allege no facts showing the contract duration or any other indicia of the time
11
period that they, or any other fighters, are limited to UFC bouts; instead, they proffer vague,
12
unsupported conclusions, such as that UFC fighters contracts are long-term (Le Compl. 5),
13
or last all but indefinitely. (Id. 9). The Complaints refer to the Champions Clause and
14
tolling provisions that may apply when a fighter is injured or otherwise not participating in bouts,
15
but these provisions apply only to the few individual champions at any given time and the subset
16
of injured or otherwise non-participating fighters. Id. 113(b), (g). Plaintiffs provide no other
17
facts plausibly supporting their all but indefinitely claim. Nor do they show why competitors
18
cannot compete for fighters on a staggered basis as fighters UFC contracts end, even as some
19
UFC fighters remain under contract. See Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., 354
20
F.3d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2004) (staggered expiration dates make entry easier because
21
competitors can sign individual contracts as they expire, as opposed to having to enroll the whole
22
industry at once). In sum, there is no plausible support for the conclusion that rivals are
23
precluded from access to all or virtually all Elite Professional MMA fighters. Id. 10, 115.
24
The Complaints are not saved by their curious disclaimer that Plaintiffs do not contend
25
their own individual contracts violate the antitrust laws. Id. 115. To the contrary, this
26
allegation shows that contracts at issue are not plausible violations of the antitrust laws. This
27
disclaimer emphasizes the need for Plaintiffs to plead plausible facts showing contracts
28
foreclosing competition.
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iii
No showing of the percentage of market foreclosure.
Plaintiffs also fail to allege the percentage of the markets allegedly foreclosed. The
Plaintiffs claim approximately 500 athletes are under contract with the UFC and thus, under their
theory, completely blocked from competitors. Le Compl. 155. But they provide no information
about the total number of so-called Elite Professional MMA fighters available to fight in the
U.S. or how many such fighters a promoter would need to stage competitive bouts. Nor do they
attempt to quantify the number of actual or potential non-Elite Professional MMA Fighters.
Thus, even incorrectly assuming that rivals could not compete for UFC fighters before or after
their UFC contracts, there is still no basis to conclude that Zuffa has foreclosed a substantial share
10
of the markets for either set of Professional MMA Fighter services or bouts. To the contrary, the
11
Complaints make clear that accomplished Professional MMA Fighters are available to rivals. See
12
II.B.4, supra. Further, Plaintiffs do not allege that Professional MMA Fighters are not
13
reasonable substitutes for Elite Professional MMA fighters, id. 59-62; see IV.B, infra.
14
The allegation that the leading firm has contracts with current top athletes does not mean
15
that rivals cannot compete for other talented athletes. See Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
16
Inc., 658 F. 2d 139, 150-51 (3d Cir. 1981). In Fleer, the Third Circuit rejected Fleers attempts to
17
draw a similar distinction between two types of professional baseball players major league and
18
minor league baseball players in claiming that Topps exclusive deals had monopolized the
19
market for trading cards of major league baseball players. Id. The Plaintiff argued, and the
20
district court accepted, that competition for agreements with minor leaguers did not suffice
21
because it would take several years of contracts with the minor league players before enough
22
reached the majors and created an alternative series of baseball trading cards, Id. at 146. The
23
Third Circuit reversed, holding that Fleers claim that Topps dominance precludes rapid entry
24
into the market misses the mark. A rival competitor may not be able to obtain major league
25
players already under contract to Topps, but it can still compete for player licenses in the same
26
forum in which Topps secured its present licensing agreements: the minor leagues. Id. at 150.
27
28
Similarly, Plaintiffs conclusory allegations that Zuffa has foreclosed the market for
Elite fighters asks this Court to ignore the wide open supply of Professional MMA Fighters,
14
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
and hold that the antitrust laws guarantee competitors not merely the right to compete, but a right
of rapid entry into the market. And unlike Fleer, which could only wait and see if the minor
leaguers developed into major leaguers, promoters such as Bellator or Titan FC who already
contract with, and promote bouts featuring, Elite Professional MMA Fighters can do the job
themselves by signing Professional MMA Fighters and promoting their fighters and bouts
themselves. Le Compl. 142, 150; and notes 5 and 8, supra.
B O I E S ,
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8
9
b.
No substantial foreclosure of event venues.
As with their allegations regarding fighters, Plaintiffs allegations that rival promoters
cannot access a suitable location to stage an MMA bout because of Zuffas alleged contractual
10
restrictions with the venues it rents are both conclusory and wildly implausible. Le Compl. 9-
11
10, 73, 108, 122. Plaintiffs allege only that Zuffas exclusive deals prevent rivals from holding
12
events with top event venues along the Las Vegas Strip and force rivals to use second-rate
13
venues. Id. 122. The Complaints do not identify which event locations constitute these top
14
venues or second-rate venues or even attempt to approximate the number or percentage of
15
event venues allegedly foreclosed to rivals on the Las Vegas Strip. This allegation is
16
insufficient to allege foreclosure in one city, much less to allege foreclosure in the geographic
17
market that Plaintiffs allege the United States (id. 63). See Am. Football League v. Natl
18
Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 1963) (rejecting monopolization claim based on
19
allegations that the NFL had locked up the most desirable local markets in the United States
20
because those local markets are not the relevant market).
21
22
c.
No substantial foreclosure of sponsors.
Plaintiffs allegations of foreclosure in the market for sponsors do not make economic
23
sense. Adaptive Power Solutions, LLC v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 141 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir.
24
1998) (to survive a motion to dismiss, antitrust claims must make economic sense). Plaintiffs
25
claim Zuffa has locked up key or major sponsors, but do not identify the universe of
26
sponsors or the extent to which rivals are foreclosed from access to them. Le Compl. 10, 116.
27
For example, if Zuffa has an exclusive deal with Reebok, Reebok may well be a major or key
28
sponsor, but this allegation says nothing about whether competitors can compete for other major
15
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
apparel providers, such as Nike, Under Armour, Adidas, Puma, Everlast, Champion, and
countless others. The same principle applies to the other categories subject to the alleged
exclusion, e.g., beer and soft drink companies, gyms, video games, publications, various
manufacturers, etc. an exclusive deal with one beer company, no matter how major or key,
leaves all the other beer companies free to deal with competitors. These allegations do not
plausibly demonstrate foreclosure or exclusion at all, much less substantial foreclosure.

d.
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No substantial foreclosure of television distribution outlets.
Plaintiffs allegations that Zuffas exclusive dealing arrangements have foreclosed rivals
access to key or major television venues (Le Comp. 10, 73) are similarly conclusory,
10
wildly implausible, and do not make economic sense. Adaptive Power Solutions, 141 F.3d at
11
952. If Zuffa enters an exclusive deal with one television distribution outlet, then all of the other
12
hundreds of television channels can enter deals with the UFCs rivals. Plaintiffs do not plead any
13
facts regarding the universe of television outlets or how Zuffas conduct restricts rivals access to
14
this universe. In fact, four of the five rival promoters named in the Complaints already have either
15
cable TV or PPV distribution, and Bellator is owned by TV network giant Viacom, Inc. See
16
II.B.4 supra. The Court is neither obligated to reconcile nor accept [these] contradictory
17
allegations in the pleadings as true in deciding a motion to dismiss. Spiteri v. Russo, No. 12-CV-
18
2780 MKB RLM, 2013 WL 4806960, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2013) (citing cases).
19
In contrast to Plaintiffs assertion of foreclosure, their Complaints allege the very indicia
20
of a competitive market that MMA is one of the most popular and fastest growing spectator
21
sports in the U.S. and North America. Le Compl. 95. Increasing output is a sign of
22
competition, not foreclosure. Cf. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
23
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (increasing output indicates practice is procompetitive)
24
(citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1979)).
25
26
3.
The UFC Has No Duty to Deal With Competitors.
Plaintiffs allege that the UFCs refusal to co-promote events with rivals constitutes part of
27
28
16
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
B O I E S ,
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its allegedly anticompetitive scheme.10 These allegations do not support an antitrust claim
because it is black letter law that Zuffa has no duty to deal with or aid competitors. E.g., Trinko,
540 U.S. at 411.
B.
To state a claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must allege
Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Properly Defined Relevant Product Markets.
facts showing that the defendant possesses monopoly power in a properly defined relevant
market. Rheumatology Diagnostics Lab., Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., No. 12-cv-05847, 2013 WL
5694452, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013) (To state a claim, the plaintiffs must allege
monopoly power in the relevant market, and not just any market). Failure to allege facts
10
showing a plausible market is fatal to a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Tanaka v.
11
Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001).
12
Both of Plaintiffs market definitions are based on what the Complaints describe as Elite
13
Professional MMA fighters, a term not used in the industry and apparently created solely for the
14
purpose of this litigation. Plaintiffs do not define the contours of these markets, particularly in
15
what distinguishes an Elite fighter from other Professional MMA fighters, in any
16
understandable, much less a legally cognizable, way. The test of market definition turns on
17
reasonable substitutability. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1131 (N.D.
18
Cal. 2004) (citing United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)).
19
Where the plaintiff fails to define its proposed relevant market with reference to the rule of
20
reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand, or alleges a proposed relevant
21
market that clearly does not encompass all interchangeable substitute products even when all
22
factual inferences are granted in plaintiffs favor, the relevant market is legally insufficient, and a
23
motion to dismiss may be granted. Apani Sw., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 300 F.3d 620,
24
628 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Dominos Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d
25
10 E.g., Le Compl. 17 (the UFC shuts out rival promotion opportunities for promoters and
26
fighters by refusing to co-promote events with would-be rival MMA Promoters); 130(b)
(referring to the UFCs persistent refusal to co-promote as part of its aggressive
anticompetitive campaign); 147 (alleging that Bellator has been unsuccessful in part because
the UFC refuses to co-promote with any of Bellators fighters regardless of talent or merit).
27
28
17
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
B O I E S ,
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L L P
Cir. 1997)). Plaintiffs do not define their proposed markets in accord with these principles.
Plaintiffs claim that an Elite fighter is a Professional MMA Fighter who has
demonstrated success or developed significant public notoriety, but also contend that any
fighter who participated in a single UFC bout is an Elite Professional MMA fighter, even if he
fought only once and lost. Le Compl. 30(d), (s). While Plaintiffs name other prominent non-
UFC fighters who are presumably Elite, id. 126, 137, they also allege that all or virtually
all Elite Professional MMA fighters are under contract with the UFC. Id. 115. Plaintiffs do
not allege why a Professional MMA Fighter is not a reasonable substitute for an Elite
Professional MMA fighter, nor even how one tells the difference.
10
This attempt to define a market for Elite Professional MMA Fighters fails for at least
11
two reasons. First, courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to define narrow antitrust markets by
12
subjective, vague terms purporting to reflect alleged qualitative differences because such
13
distinctions are economically meaningless where the differences are actually a spectrum of price
14
and quality differences. In re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp.
15
1262, 1268 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (listing cases) (finding that gradations among various qualities of
16
ice cream are not sufficient to establish separate relevant markets).
17
As in Super Premium Ice Cream, Plaintiffs here attempt to use standardless notions of
18
demonstrated success and significant public notoriety to draw a distinction between
19
Professional MMA Fighters and so-called Elite Professional MMA Fighters. Le Compl.
20
30(d). But the court cannot delineate product boundaries in [antitrust] suits based upon the
21
mere notion that there is something different about the [products identified by the complaint]
22
and all others, especially when that something different cannot be expressed in terms to make a
23
judgment of the court have meaning. More is required. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. at 1159 (rejecting
24
proposed product market definition of high function software sold to largest enterprise
25
customers because it improperly excluded so-called mid-market vendors who sold similar
26
software to smaller companies). That more is sorely lacking here.
27
28
Second, Plaintiffs allegation that all or virtually all . . . Elite Professional MMA
fighters are under contract to the UFC (Le Compl. 115) is just a tautology to create a singleZuffas Not. Mot. & Mot to Dismiss
18
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
B O I E S ,
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brand market comprised solely of UFC fighters under a different name. Courts acceptance of
such circular, single-brand markets are, at a minimum, extremely rare. Apple, Inc. v. Psystar
Corp., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2008); accord Dang v. San Francisco Forty
Niners, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The fact that the association with UFC
brings stature to a fighter does not mean that other fighters are not reasonable substitutes. Donald
B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 1980), affd 638
F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981) (Although Michelin is a premium tire with a reputation for durability and
safety these attributes are insufficient . . . to justify such a narrow product market definition.).
C.
10
11
Plaintiffs Have Not and Cannot Plead Specific Facts Plausibly Showing That
the Ancillary Rights Provisions Are Anticompetitive or Reduce Competition
in the Relevant Markets.
Plaintiffs allege that the UFC has expropriate[d] Plaintiffs names and likenesses and
12
paid [fighters] a fraction of what they would earn in a competitive marketplace, Le Compl. 1.
13
They seek to certify a class of Each and every UFC Fighter whose Identity was expropriated or
14
exploited by the UFC. Id. 47. But loaded, conclusory words like exploited and
15
expropriated are not a substitute for a coherent antitrust theory or for facts to show either that:
16
(1) the contractual provisions relating to Plaintiffs names and likenesses are anything other than
17
the ordinary license of an individuals rights to publicity; or (2) the contractual grants of
18
intellectual or identity property rights reduced competition in either of the alleged relevant
19
markets.
20
While their theory is not clear, to the extent Plaintiffs argue that they wanted greater
21
freedom to license their identities in other contexts, they do not explain how this would have
22
increased competition in either MMA bouts or MMA fighter services. Clearly, the Plaintiffs who
23
fought for other promoters after leaving the UFC were able to use their names and likenesses in
24
promoting competitive bouts. See II.3.a, 4, supra. Stripped of epithets, Plaintiffs claim boils
25
down to no more than a complaint that they believe they contracted away too many rights for too
26
little compensation because Zuffa allegedly possesses a monopoly. But complaints about the
27
prices and other contract terms of an alleged monopolist do not amount to antitrust violations.
28
John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2009) (the basic rule is that mere
19
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
possession of monopoly power and the practice of charging monopoly prices does not run afoul
of 2).
B O I E S ,
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&
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O A K L A N D ,
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L L P
1.
Name and Likeness Licenses Are Common and Procompetitive.
There is nothing uncommon or anticompetitive about an athlete or performer granting to a
promoter or producer his publicity rights in the performance in exchange for his compensation for
the performance. OBannon v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 968 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (Professional athletes often sell group licenses to use their names, images, and likenesses
in live game telecast, videogames, game re-broadcasts, advertisements, and other archival
footage). Allowing athletes and promoters to contract for intellectual property rights associated
10
with their services, including exclusive rights, is necessary to allow athletes to obtain value for
11
their performance of services. Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
12
(2d Cir. 1953). This right of publicity would usually yield [rights holders] no money unless it
13
could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using
14
their picture. Id. Licenses that extend past the term of the contract provide a number of
15
practical economic benefits, including certainty and reducing transaction costs. For example, it is
16
hard to imagine how a DVD of a bout or video game could be produced if it would need to be
17
taken off the shelves every time an athlete appearing in the DVD or video game had his or her
18
contract expire.
19
Courts have consistently upheld exclusive grants of such name and likeness rights, e.g.,
20
Fleer, 658 F.2d at 149-50 (upholding exclusive license of baseball players names and likenesses
21
on trading cards to one company), including where the grant is in perpetuity. Rooney v. Columbia
22
Pictures Indus., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211, 227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (upholding contract terms
23
granting movie studios the perpetual right to actors likeness and voice in connection with movies
24
filmed for the studios); Hazel Bishop, Inc. v. Perfemme, Inc., 314 F.2d 399, 400-01, 404 (2d Cir.
25
1963) (upholding the perpetual license of a persons name and likeness to be used in the
26
promotion of cosmetic products even after she left the company). Further, courts recognize that
27
group licenses, where a promoter becomes the licensor for all its athletes, are necessary to prevent
28
the prohibitive transaction costs that would be incurred if every potential retailer had to contract
20
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
with each player individually. Fleer Corp., 658 F.2d at 151 (Far from being a restraint of trade,
the commercial authorization agreement is pro-competitive. . . . If every potential retailer had to
contract with each player individually for a group license, few licenses would exist.).
4
5
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2.
Contractual Restrictions on the Use of the UFC Name and Marks Are
the Legitimate Exercise of Zuffas Intellectual Property Rights and
Are Not Anticompetitive.
Plaintiffs complaints about restrictions on the use of Plaintiffs identity rights in
connection with the UFC brand and trademarks ignore Zuffas right to control its name and
intellectual property.11 See MiniFrame Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 11 CIV. 7419 RJS, 2013 WL
1385704, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) affd, 551 F. Appx 1 (2d Cir. 2013) (holders of
10
intellectual property rights have no duty to deal with their competitors or permit them access to
11
their intellectual property). For example, Plaintiffs allege that the UFC charges a fee to sponsors
12
for the right to associate their brands with specific UFC Fighters in order to sponsor a UFC
13
Fighter during UFC events. Le Compl. 124 (emphasis added). But nothing in the antitrust
14
laws requires Zuffa to permit sponsors to gain free exposure on UFC programming and benefit
15
from the UFCs investment in its brand and its events without paying for it or to allow its name to
16
be used by competitors. Tellingly, Plaintiffs do not allege that Zuffa charges a fee when the UFC
17
brand is not involved. And alleging that the fee or so-called tax is used to dominate MMA
18
industry segments (id.) cannot transform a protected exercise of intellectual property rights into
19
an antitrust violation. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.12 The same principle applies to Plaintiffs claim
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
11 The Complaints show that the name and likeness grants are narrowly tailored to UFC licensed
merchandise, promotional materials and intellectual property, and do not encompass a blanket
name and likeness right in all capacities and for all purposes. Le Compl. 30(s) (UFC fighter is a
person whose Identities were acquired for use and/or used in UFC Licensed Merchandise and/or
UFC Promotional Materials). UFC Licensed Merchandise is apparel and other promotional
items that contains the trademarks, trade names, logos and other intellectual property owned or
licensed by Zuffa. Id. 30(t) (emphasis added). UFC Promotional Materials includes all forms
of television . . . merchandising and program rights in connection or based upon the UFC brand,
UFC bouts, UFC Pre-Bout Events or UFC Post-Bout Events. Id. 30(u) (emphasis added).
12 That a sports organization insists on permission before allowing its name to be used in a
commercial sponsorship is commonplace. When an NFL player appears in a commercial in his
NFL uniform, his team and/or the NFL has granted permission. When an NFL player appears in
a commercial in something other than his NFL uniform and without the name of his team or the
21
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
that fighters are limited in their ability to use the UFC brand to promote themselves when they
fight for a competitor. Le Compl. 30(s), 113(d). This is no more than another complaint that
the UFC refuses to cooperate with its competitors. Moreover, the argument the UFC should have
been more liberal in allowing Plaintiffs to associate their sponsors with UFC events is a clear
acknowledgement that the UFC brand adds value and is subject to free-riding.
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Further, Plaintiffs do not show that, in the absence of contractual restrictions on the
Plaintiffs use of the UFC brand, there would be additional competition in UFC Licensed
Merchandise or Promotional Material because no one can use the UFC brand without Zuffas
permission. To the extent that Plaintiffs contend that the contracts restrict rights unrelated to the
10
UFCs trademarks, name or brand, they have not shown (1) as discussed above, that the contracts
11
go beyond Zuffas legally protected rights to control its own intellectual property or (2) that the
12
contracts have restricted competition that would otherwise exist for those rights. See Washington
13
v. Natl Football League, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007 (D. Minn. 2012) (Plaintiffs do not explain
14
what market might exist in game footage that features only that footage to which any player can
15
claim to be individually entitled: a single players image without any NFL logos or marks).
16
Finally, even if they could, Plaintiffs have not shown that any possible effect in the markets for
17
sponsor licensing rights reduces competition in the markets alleged in the Complaints the
18
markets for bouts and fighter services.
19
20
3.
Plaintiffs Identity Rights Claims Do Not State an Antitrust Violation.
In essence, the claim that Plaintiffs identities have been exploited and expropriated
21
amounts to no more than a challenge to the terms and compensation received under their
22
contracts. Where a plaintiff simply attaches antitrust labels and conclusions to what is, at
23
most, an ordinary contract dispute, the complaint does not state a plausible claim for relief under
24
the Sherman Act. In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2014).
25
26
27
28
NFL, permission is not required. See Pamela R. Lester, Marketing the Athlete; Endorsement
Contracts, SC47 ALI-ABA 405, 410 (January 22, 1998) (For example, a professional football
player cannot appear in his team uniform in an advertisement unless the manufacturer or the
player has entered into a separate licensing agreement with NFL Properties for the use of the team
name and logo). The Complaints do not show that Zuffas contracts operate differently.
22
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
Plaintiffs attempt to shoehorn their allegations into an antitrust claim should be rejected.
Washington, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1005, 1008 (dismissing claim that the NFL monopolized the
market for former players licenses by denying access to game films and images because, What
they have are claims for royalties, not claims for antitrust).
5
6
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D.
Plaintiffs Have Not Pled Specific Facts Plausibly Demonstrating That Zuffas
Acquisitions Have Had Anticompetitive Effects.
The mere fact that a merger eliminates competition between the firms concerned has
never been a sufficient basis for illegality. 4 Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law 901a
(2009). Acquisitions may enhance competition by combining complementary assets,
10
eliminating duplicative assets, or achieving scale economies, which result in efficiencies that
11
directly benefit consumers by, for example, improving quality, increasing innovation, and
12
lowering prices. F.T.C. v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. SACV 10-1873 AG MLGX, 2011 WL
13
3100372, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011) (citing cases). [I]n a competitive market, buying out
14
competitors is not merely permissible, it contributes to market stability and promotes the efficient
15
allocation of resources. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 673 (9th Cir. 1990).
16
Because of these procompetitive benefits, a plaintiff can sustain a Section 2 claim only
17
where he pleads plausible, specific facts showing that the acquisition has the effect of
18
lessen[ing] competition or tend[ing] to create a monopoly. Carefusion Corp. v. Medtronic,
19
Inc., No. 10-CV-01111-LHK, 2010 WL 4509821, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) (dismissing
20
Section 2 claim based on a variety of alleged conduct including acquisitions of alleged rivals).
21
In Syufy, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment that a movie theater operator, Syufy, had
22
not monopolized the Las Vegas theater market through acquisitions of three other theaters even
23
though the acquisitions resulted in Syufy controlling, at least temporarily, 100% of the first-run
24
film market in Las Vegas. Id. at 665. Just as Plaintiffs have alleged here, Syufys acquisitions
25
temporarily diminished the number of competitors . . . . But this does not necessarily indicate
26
foul play; many legitimate market arrangements diminish the number of competitors. It would be
27
odd if they did not, as the nature of competition is to make winners and losers. Id. at 664.
28
The allegations here are weaker than in Syufy. First, all but one of the acquisitions that
23
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
Plaintiffs discuss occurred outside the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Abbyy, 2008
WL 4830740, at *6 (citing 15 U.S.C. 15b). They cannot, therefore, serve as a basis for
imposing liability now. Intl Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 929
(9th Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds, California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990)
(The abuses which would occur if plaintiffs were permitted to search the history of other firms
and challenge at their pleasure any possible violations, no matter how old, seem apparent).13
B O I E S ,
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Second, Plaintiffs have not pled facts showing plausible high barriers to entry in the
promotion of MMA bouts. Leaving aside the facially implausible allegations, such as that Zuffa
has locked up all the suitable venues in the United States or all the possible TV distribution
10
networks, nothing in the Complaints suggests that there is any structural barrier to entry such as
11
necessary intellectual property rights, high fixed-cost facilities, or research and development
12
expenses. Instead, the Complaints show that new competitors are able to and do freely access
13
necessary inputs to stage MMA bouts. See Section II.B.4, supra.
14
Third, as in Syufy, Plaintiffs have not pled any specific, plausible allegations from which
15
the court could conclude that the Strikeforce acquisition had any anticompetitive effect. For
16
example, Plaintiffs do not and cannot allege that fighter compensation was reduced after the
17
acquisition. Plaintiffs allegations actually contradict their claims that Zuffas acquisitions have
18
reduced competition or output in either relevant market. Notwithstanding assertions that the
19
acquisitions left only fringe and minor league rivals to the UFC, the Complaints and state
20
athletic commission records demonstrate that Zuffa continues to face well-funded competitors
21
that can attract prominent fighters and television distribution. See II.B.4, supra (describing
22
allegations relating to current MMA competitors, their backers, their TV arrangements, and
23
named Plaintiffs participation in their bouts).
24
25
Finally, Plaintiffs fail to plead specific facts showing that the acquisitions have reduced
output. The Complaints reveal the exact opposite of a monopolized market: a rough-and-tumble
26
13 The Strikeforce acquisition in 2011 was the subject of an FTC investigation that was closed
27
28
without further action in January 2012. RJN 13, Ex. J (Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary,
Federal Trade Commission to Stephen Axinn, Esq. (Jan. 25, 2012)).
24
5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
industry, marked by easy market access, fluid relationships with distributors, an ample and
continuous supply of product, and a healthy and growing demand. Syufy, 903 F.2d at 667.
Since 2006, when Plaintiffs claim the UFCs alleged scheme began, several new promoters have
emerged, capable of securing prominent fighters (including Plaintiffs), TV distribution, and event
venues. The result is that MMA has become one of the most popular and fastest growing
spectator sports in the U.S. and North America, if not the entire world. Le Compl. 95.
E.
Plaintiffs Complaints About Strong Competition Do Not State an Antitrust

Violation.
Plaintiffs devote considerable space to brash, colorful, and sometimes intemperate
remarks about rival MMA promoters, fighters, and the UFCs own place in the industry by UFC
B O I E S ,
S C H I L L E R
&
F L E X N E R
O A K L A N D ,
C A L I F O R N I A
L L P
10
President Dana White, whose job it is to promote the UFC. Le Compl. 8, 12-15, 18, 70,
11
113(e), 117-19, 145, 148. Courts have long recognized such remarks are indicative of vigorous
12
competition. Warfare among suppliers and their different products is competition. Antitrust law
13
does not compel your competitor to praise your product or sponsor your work. To require
14
cooperation or friendliness among rivals is to undercut the intellectual foundations of antitrust
15
law. Sanderson v. Culligan Intl Co., 415 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schachar v.
16
Am. Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also TYR Sport, Inc. v.
17
Warnaco Swimwear, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (Promotion and persuasion
18
are not actionable as antitrust violations, even where the speaker holds extraordinary prestige and
19
influence). An efficient, vigorous, aggressive competitor is not the villain antitrust laws are
20
aimed at eliminating. Syufy, 903 F.2d at 669. Similarly, Plaintiffs complaints that Zuffa
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allegedly counter programmed against rivals, i.e., scheduled bouts for the same night as
22
competitors, amount to nothing more than complaints about fierce competition. Le Compl.
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132, 150.
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V.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Zuffa respectfully requests an order dismissing Plaintiffs
Complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD
Dated: February 27, 2015
Respectfully Submitted,
By: /s/ William A. Isaacson

William A. Isaacson
Attorneys for Defendant Zuffa, LLC, d/b/a
Ultimate Fighting Championship and UFC
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B O I E S ,
S C H I L L E R
&
F L E X N E R
O A K L A N D ,
C A L I F O R N I A
L L P
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5:14-cv-05621 EJD; 5:15-cv-00521 EJD

Appendix A
Cross references from the Le Complaint to identical or substantially similar paragraphs
in the Vazquez, Vera and Ruediger Complaints
Le et al.
Vazquez et al.
Vera et al.
Ruediger et al.
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Le et al.
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Le et al.
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Le et al.
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Zuffa Motion To Dismiss

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Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page1 of 40

WILLIAM A. ISAACSON (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)

JOHN F. COVE, JR. #212213

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA - SAN JOSE DIVISION

Cung Le, Nathan Quarry, Jon Fitch, on behalf

Zuffa, LLC, d/b/a Ultimate Fighting

Case No. 5:14-cv-05484 EJD

July 23, 2015

Case Nos. 5:14-cv-05484 EJD; 5:14-cv-05591 EJD;

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page2 of 40

Luis Javier Vazquez and Dennis Lloyd

Case No. 5:14-cv-05591 EJD

Zuffa, LLC, d/b/a Ultimate Fighting

Brandon Vera and Pablo Garza, on behalf of

Case No. 5:14-cv-05621 EJD

Zuffa, LLC, d/b/a Ultimate Fighting

Gabe Ruediger and Mac Danzig, on behalf of

Case No. 5:15-cv-00521 EJD

Case Nos. 5:14-cv-05484 EJD; 5:14-cv-05591 EJD;

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page3 of 40

TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD:

before or at the time the matter is set to be heard.

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page4 of 40

b. Alleged Exclusive Deals Between Zuffa and Event Venues,

c. Alleged Expropriation of Identity Rights. ................................................ 6

ii No showing of the duration of exclusivity. .................................... 13

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page5 of 40

3. Plaintiffs Identity Rights Claims Do Not State an Antitrust

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page6 of 40

Abbyy USA Software House, Inc. v. Nuance Commcns Inc.,

Adaptive Power Solutions, LLC v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co.,

California v. Am. Stores Co.,

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page7 of 40

F.T.C. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.,

Feitelson v. Google, Inc.,

Hazel Bishop, Inc. v. Perfemme, Inc.,

JBL Enters., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc.,

Kendall v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc.,

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page8 of 40

Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc.,

MiniFrame Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,

Rheumatology Diagnostics Lab., Inc. v. Aetna, Inc.,

Sambreel Holdings LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page9 of 40

Schachar v. Am. Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc.,

SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc.,

Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal.,

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page10 of 40

4 Phillip E. Areeda et al.,

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page11 of 40

including in sports, because they encourage interbrand competition, encourage promoters to

necessary to compete is similarly implausible and without factual foundation. Plaintiffs

expense of a large antitrust case.

Case5:14-cv-05484-EJD Document64 Filed02/27/15 Page12 of 40

substitutability, not their own outcome-driven preferences. Plaintiffs incomprehensible and