Economic History Association

The Social Basis of English Commercial Expansion, 1550-1650

Author(s): Robert Brenner
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 32, No. 1, The Tasks of Economic History (Mar.,
1972), pp. 361-384
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
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The Social Basis of EnglishCommercial

Expansion,1550-1650
. . . foreach periodintowhichour economichistory
may be divided,there
is a distinctand separateclass of capitalists.In otherwords,the groupof
capitalistsof a given epoch does not springfromthe capitalistgroup of
the precedingepoch. At every change in economicorganizationwe find
a breachof continuity.
It is as if the capitalistswho have up to that time
been active,recognizethattheyare incapableofadapting.... Theywithdraw
fromthe struggleand become an aristocracy,
whichif it again plays a part
in the courseof affairsdoes so in a passivemanneronly,assumingthe role
ofsilentpartners.
In theirplace arisenew men....
- Henri Pirenne'

will nothold
PIRENNE'S generalization,
thoughfullof insight,

about both
up because it restson oversimplified
assumptions
the behaviorof "capitalists"
and the natureof economicdevelopment.Forexample,
as we shallshow,thecommercial
breakthroughs
whichhighlighted
theexpansion
ofEnglishtradebetween1550and
1650werenotall the workof "newmen"and did not alwaysrequirean entrepreneurial
outlook.Nevertheless,
Pirennedid tryto
understand
economicchangein termsof the men who actually
carriedit out.In thisrespect,hisapproachcan providea necessary
corrective
to the economicdeterminism
whichhas characterized
ofeconomicdevelopment.
manymorerecentexplanations
Englishcommercial
expansionbetween1550 and 1650 is often
understoodsimplyby referenceto the changingstructureof
economiccostsand opportunities
facingEnglishmerchants.
Meris thusexplainedas a moreor less automaticrecantileactivity
sponse to marketconditions-crisisin overseas demand, the
and theriseand fallof foreign
of outlets,
disruption
economicand
Factorssuchas thesemustobviously
politicalcompetitors.
be conoflateTudor-early
sideredin anydiscussion
Stuartcommercial
deI wish to expressmy thanksto Dr. David Fischer of the Universityof South
Carolinaforallowingme to make use of resultsfromhis Ph.D. dissertation
on the
Levant trade. TIle sectionof this paper on the easternexpansionowes much to
his work,as I have triedto indicate.I wish also to thankProfessors
Lutz Berkner
and Geoffrey
Symcoxof U.C.L.A. forreadingthispaper and offering
theircritiques.
1 "The Stages in the Social Historyof Capitalism,"AmericanHistoricalReview,
XIX (191L), 494-495.
361

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362

Brerner

velopment.
Nevertheless,
theycannotexplainthatprocessforthe
samereasonsthatno challengecan be said to determine
or explain
a following
response.The reactionto commercial
opportunity
(or
cost),ifindeedthereis one,willtendto varywiththesocial,political, and economiccharacterof the mercantile
group.What is a
promising
enterprise
to one groupof businessmen mightbe unto othersbecause theyoccupydifferent
attractiveor irrelevant
positionsor have had different
experiences
and, therefore,
possess
different
interests,
preferences,
or capabilities.At the same time,
an opportunity
can notbe treatedas simply"given"in thesituation.
Its verycharacterand profitpotentialmustbe seen as partially
and his resources;
in this
alterabledependingon theentrepreneur
defined
in
senseit maybe
and created theveryprocessof being
kindsof commercialprojects
exploited.In short,while different
tendto attract(or repel) different
typesof entreprenurial
groups,
different
are able to shapetheirprojectsin different
entrepreneurs
ways.
It is thustheobjectof thispaperto showthe value of treating
activitiesas social and political,as well as economic,
commercial
processes,by focusingon the different
groupsof merchants
who
undertook
theElizabethanand earlyStuartcommercial
expansion.
we shall comparethe new eastwarddriveof the
In particular,
Elizabethanera,whichwas accomplished
under
by elitemerchants
conditions
controlled
designedto minimizethe need forriskand
with the more typically"entrepreneurial"
innovation,
thrustby
"new men"whichcharacterized
the emergent
colonialcommerce
undertheearlyStuarts.The analysisof thesecontrasting
developschema.It should
mentswillpointup theinadequaciesofPirenne's
also allow us to reassessthe causal significance
of the oft-cited
commercial
economic"determinants"
of sixteenth-century
developtheirreal effecton the particular
mentby establishing
merchant
groupswhoactuallycarriedoutcommercial
change.Thisdiscussion
couldopenthewayfora morepreciseaccountofthechanging
dynamicof commercial
expansionover the periodand thusfora
delineation
ofitsstages.
sharper
It hasbecomeanhistorical
thattheElizabethan
commonplace
commercialexpansionwas a responseto the clothexportcrisisof the
needfornew clothmarkets.2
1550'sand theconsequent
This argu2 See, especially,F. J. Fisher, "CommercialTrends and Policy in Sixteenth
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EnglishCommercial
Expansion

363

it has tendedto impart

mentcontainssomevalidity.Nevertheless,
a misleadingimpression
of the motiveforceof Elizabethancommercialchange and of its relationship
to previouscommercial
which
thrust
trends.
The tradesthatemergedfromtheexpansionary
extendedfromRussiato theLevantto the East Indiesduringthe
secondhalfof the sixteenth
centurydid not begin to solve the
problemsof the clothexporttrade,nor were theyby and large
intendedforthispurpose.Theywerenotset in motionprimarily
the chiefcloth exby the Companyof MerchantAdventurers,
portersof the period.They were organized,instead,by import
merchants
aimingto obtainat theirsourceeasternproductswhich
middlemen
in theLow Counhad formerly
been securedthrough
triesand Portugal.Thus,the new tradesdevelopedin close connectionwith one another,but separatelyfromthe Merchant
dominated
Adventurers'
clothexportbusinesswhichhad previously
only in lightof
Englishcommerce.And this is understandable
theirconstantfocuson orientalimportcommoditiesand their
relativeinabilityto provideexportmarketsforcloth.Elizabethan
and personnel,
commercial
was, in organization
entrepreneurship
of
the
Merchant
Adventurers
belargelydiscontinuous
withthat
cause it had verydifferent
goals.It is in thissensethatthe Elizabreakand
bethanexpansionshouldbe seen to markan important
a new stagein the development
of Englishtrade.
The searchforthespicesand goldof the East was theprimary
motivation
forthefounding
oftheMuscovyCompany(1553-1555),
It is true,neverthethefirst
majorstepin theprocessofexpansion.3
a
composed significant
proportion
less,thatMerchantAdventurers
in the Muscovyjointstock,possiblyoneof the originalinvestors
to thisventure,
at leastto
third.Andtheywereprobablyattracted
new areasof demandfor
someextent,by thehope of discovering
Eventhen,it is worthnotingthatmostofthese
theirclothexports.4
did nottakean activepartin theCompany's
decisionAdventurers
in itsjointstock.In theevent,
making,
remaining
passiveinvestors
CenturyEngland,"EconomicHistoryReview,X (1940), 106-107,as well as C. D.
Ramsay,English Overseas Trade During the Centuriesof Emergence (London:
Macmillan,1957), pp. 20-30; Peter Ramsey,Tudor Economic Problems(London:
VictorGollancz,1963), pp. 68ff.See also Ralph Davis, "England and the Mediterranean"in Essays in the Economicand Social Historyof Tudorand StuartEngland,
Press,1961), pp. 117ff.
ed. F. J. Fisher (Cambridge:The University
of theRussiaCompany,1553-1603(Manchester:
3 T. S. Willan,The EarlyHistory
Press, 1956), pp. 2-3.
The University
4 T. S. Willan, The MuscovyMerchantsof 1555 (Manchester:The University
Press,1953), p. 24.
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364

Brenner

Russia provedto be incapableof absorbinglarge quantitiesof

Englishcloth.Englishcloth exportsto Russia over the period
before1620 did not exceed2500 clothsper annum,less than3
And in thisrespect,the
percentof England'stotalclothexports."
wereonlya littlemoreprofitable.
othereasternmarkets
Once theeastwardexpansion
reachedtheLevantin 1581,it beseem
Adventurers
andtheMerchant
focusedonimports,
camefirmly
The
fromactiveparticipation.
forthemostpartto havewithdrawn
was to bringbackspices,silks,
centralaimoftheLevantcommerce
in thistradelargely
clothsappearto havefunctioned
and currants;
as a mediumof exchange.In thelate 1590's,clothexportsto the
Levantaveragedaround7000-8000clothsper annum,or perhaps
alreadyby the later
?50,000-&60,000in value.6In comparison,
to bringin
1580'sit was not unheardof forEnglishmerchants
while anin a singleshipment,7
?70,000 of Levantcommodities
nual Levant imports,by value, more than doubled its exports
the period.8By the 1620's and early 1630's,Levant
throughout
reaching?352,263 in
importsseem to have grownimpressively,
valuations
1630 and ?212,186 in 1634,accordingto the official
cloth
exportsstagnated,reMeanwhile,
(probablyunderstated)."
levels. In 1621,Lionel
mainingsteadyat late sixteenth-century
to
Cranfieldsingledout the Levant commerceas particularly
balance of trade."Upon the
blame forthe nation'sunfavorable
customsbookswe shall see,"he said, "thatthe TurkeyCompany
hurtsit morethanthe East India Company.They now give two
Of course,theEast
partsin moneyand thethirdin commodities."10
5 B. E. Supple,Commercial
Crisisand Change 1600-1642 (Cambridge:The UniversityPress,1959), p. 258.
6 Davis, "England and the Mediterranean,"
p. 120; Supple, CommercialCrisis,
p. 258; AstridFriis,AldermanCockayne'sProjectand the Cloth Trade (London:
Press,1927), pp. 70-1, n.2.
OxfordUniversity
7 T. S. Willan,"Some Aspectsof the EnglishTrade withthe Levant in the SixteenthCentury,"EnglishHistoricalReview,LXX (1955), 407.
8 David Fischer,"The Developmentand Organization
of EnglishTrade to Asia,
1553-1605,"(Universityof London Ph.D. Thesis,1970), pp. 200-10, 355-9. For a
similarfinding,see Willan,'Trade withthe Levant,"pp. 407-10. Willan concludes
"thatthe Levantwas nota verygood marketforEnglishgoods."Ibid., p. 410.
9 A. M. Millard,"The ImportTrade of London,1600-1640" (Universityof London Ph.D. Thesis,1956), Appendix2, Table C. Mrs. Millard'sfigureswere compiled
fromthe London Port Books forimports.
10 CommonsDebates 1621, ed. Wallace Notestein,Francis Relf, and Hartley
Press,1935), VI, 300. Prof.Davis' contention
Simpson(New Haven: Yale University
thisperiodis hard to reconcilewith:
thatthe Levanttradewas balancedthroughout
(1) Mrs. Millard'sfigureson imports;(2) the admittedstagnationof Levant cloth
centuryand the apparentimpresexportsover the earlydecades of the seventeenth

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EnglishCommercial
Expansion

365

India Companyneverreallyattempted
substantial
exportsof cloth.
Theirswas purelyan import
trade.'1
As it becameclearthattheeastwardtradescould not offerimforEnglishcloth,the MerchantAdventurers
portantnew markets
appearto have lostwhateverinterest
theyhad had in commercial
the Adventurers'
of mid-century,
expansion.Afterthe dislocations
tradeto Northern
short-route
ownverysafeand protected
Europe
had been stabilizedat a fairlyhighlevel.'2The MerchantAdventurersmonopolizedby farthe richesttradein London and they
sectionof the City'smerchant
naturally
composeda predominant
offered
elite.'3The easterncommerce
greatopportunities.
Yet,with
commercial
to be made in theirownprivileged
steadyprofits
line,
had littlereasonto run the risksor sufferthe
the Adventurers
inconveniences
requiredto build a new trade.There may have
Adventurers
beenthreeorfourMerchant
amongthetwelveTurkey
of1581,butnotall ofthesetraders
charter
merchants
appeartohave
involvedin theclothexportcommerce.14
been heavilyor primarily
Only fiveof the forty-one
leadingMerchantAdventurers
of the
of 1000 or more clothsper
years 1606-1614(that is, exporters
annum)wereamongthe118LevantCompanychartermembers
of
1605.'6In the1630's,thetwotradeswerebeingoperatedbylargely
sive growthof Levant importsat the same time (especiallyin lightof the conclusions of Fischerand Willan thatthe tradewas extremely
unbalancedbefore1600).
See Davis, "Englandand the Mediterranean,"
pp. 124-25.
11 K. Chaudhuri,The EnglishEast India Company(New York: Reprintsof EconomicClassics,1965), p. 13.
12 Supple, Commercial
Crisis,pp. 23-4; Fisher,"CommercialTrends,"p. 96. The
MerchantAdventurers
normallyexportedaround 65,000 cloths per annum over
the last 30 yearsof the 16thcentury.In comparison,
all the tradeto the East combined did not exportmorethan 10,000 clothsper annum.
13 See R. G. Lang, "The GreaterMerchantsof London, 1600-1625" (Oxford
University
D. Phil. Thesis, 1963), pp. 149-51; Ramsey,Tudor EconomicProblems,
pp. 63-65.
14 Fischer,"Trade to Asia," p. 169, also appendix.This resultmustbe tentative,
because relevantsourcesare so scarce. Very few London Port Books survivefor
thisperiod.One can say withcertainty,
however,thatEdward Osborneand Richard
Stapers,the two leadingorganizersof the project(as well as JohnSpencer,another
patentee),were definitely
not MerchantAdventurers,
since theycan be foundon a
list of merchantsdescribedas "not freeof the MerchantAdventurers"
who shipped
clothsor kerseysout of London in 1577-1578.B. M. Harleian Mss. 167, fos. 75ff.
and 91ff.
15 Comparelist of MerchantAdventurers
in Friis, Cockayne'sProject,pp. 95-7,
with Levant Companychartermembersin M. Epstein,The Early Historyof the
Levant Company (London: George Routledgeand Sons, 1968), pp. 158-60. Note
also thatof 219 men activein the MerchantAdventurers'
tradein 1606, only7 also
exportedclothto theLevantin thatyear.Friis,Cockayne'sProject,p. 100. R. G. Lang
has also adduced a good deal of evidenceforthe MerchantAdventurers'
heavycon-

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366

Brenner

discrete
setsofmerchants.
Amongtheseveralhundredclothtraders
to theMerchant
Adventurers'
privileges
in 1632and 1640,theonly
yearsin thatdecade forwhichrelevantrecordssurvive,
therewere
onlythirteen
different
Levant Companymembers.'0
II
Whilethe tradeto theLevantthusgrewup largelyapartfrom
theMerchantAdventurers,
its owndevelopment
was closelyintertwinedthrough
thecentury
after1550withthatoftheothertrades
totheEast,toRussiaandtheEast Indies.Although
eachhad importantspecialtiesof itsown,all aimedto openup thebestapproach
to the orientalmarketsin spices,silks,and othercommodities.
Unitedbythiscommon
goal,significantly
overlapping
groupsofmerchantswerebehindall of thesetrades,and theiroperationsmay
be seen to representsuccessiveconnectedphases in a unified
processofdevelopment.
By theend ofthecentury,
thesetradersto
theEast had begunto emergeas a coherent
commercial
group,distinctfromtheMerchant
Adventurers,
and soonto rivalthemin importance.
In the expansionof Elizabethancommerce,the disruption
of
theAntwerpentrepot
in the 1560'sand 1570'sprobablymarkeda
turning
point.It encouragedEnglishmerchants
to lessentheirdependenceon Europeanmiddlemen
and to go themselves
further
east, directlyto the sourcesof supply.17Even beforethis time,
however,the tradersof the RussiaCompanywere attempting
to
penetrate
theoriental
markets.
The Company
wasoriginally
founded
withthe aim of tappingthe richesof the orientby a routefree
interference.
fromPortuguese
To thisend, duringthe 1560'sand
1570's,it sentout sixmajorvoyagesto Persiaby way of the land
routethrough
Moscow.Someoftheseventures
mayhavesucceeded,
buttheywerefraught
withdangerand cameabruptly
to an end in
1581,the yearthe TurkeyCompanywas founded.18
on theirown marketsin the early17th century.See "GreaterMerchants
centration
of London,"pp. 149-68.
1a This resultwas obtained by comparingcompletelists of Levant Company
memberscompiledfromthe CompanyCourt Books,P.R.O. S.P.105/147-149,with
listsof tradersto the MerchantAdventurers'
privilegesin 1632 and 1640 compiled
fromthe London Port Books forcloth exportsforthose years,P.R.O. E.190/36/5,
E.190/43/4. I wish to thankProfessorF. J. Fisher forgenerouslyallowingme to
consulthis noteson the London Port Book forclothexportsfor1640.
17 See Chaudhuri,East India Company,pp. 6-7.
18 Willan,RussiaCompany,pp. 2, 57-61,90-91, 145-55.

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English CommercialExpansion

367

in large part,to carry

The TurkeyCompanywas established,
out the objectivesof the Russia Company'sPersianVoyagesby
It represented
also,it seems,
a moresecureand profitable
means.19
theintention
of merchants
tradingto Spain and Portugalto get
beyondtheirIberiansuppliersand enterdirectlythe importmarThe originaltwelve-man
Turkey
ketsof theeasternMediterranean.
amongthem
jointstockincludednineRussiaCompanymembers,
of thatCompanyduringthe
threetraderswho becamegovernors
1580's.The TurkeyCompanyalso receiveda majordirectinvestten Spanishmermentfromthe RussiaCompanyitself.Similarly,
chantswereamongthoseinitialTurkeyCompanyinvestors.20
In muchthe same way as the TurkeyCompanyassumedthe
commerceof the Russianand
objectivesof the eastward-looking
to take
theEast IndiaCompanywas established
Spanishmerchants,
overan important
commercial
rolehitherto
carriedoutbytheTurkey
merchants.
century,
EnglishTurkeyComDuringthelatersixteenth
theirspicesin Syria
to procuring
panytradersbecameaccustomed
frommiddlemen
who broughtthesegoodsoverlandfromthe Far
as the Dutch were able to demonstrate,
East. Nevertheless,
the
directsea routearoundtheCape was thecheapestapproachto the
commercein spices; and the Englishwere forcedto followthe
Dutch exampleto keep up withtheircompetition.21
As K. N. Chaudhurihas explained,we should"lookat therise
of the EnglishEast India Company,not as an independent
combutas an attempt
to separatethespicetradefrom
mercialventure,
themainbodyoftheLevanttradeand todriveitby a newroute."22
LevantCompanymerchants
Not surprisingly,
dominatedthiscorin 1599-1600.
itsfoundation
The EastIndiaCompany's
from
poration
was also governor
SirThomasSmyth,
firstgovernor,
of theLevant
the
Seven
of
original
directors
twenty-four
Company.23
Company's
And LevantCompanymembers
wereLevantCompanyofficers.24
Ibid., 153-54.
Fischer,"'Tradeto Asia," pp. 121, 161-62,166-68.
21 Chaudhuri,East India Company,p. 11.
22 Ibid., p. 12.
23 A. C. Wood, A Historyof the Levant Company(London: FrankCass, 1964),
p. 31.
24 Compare list of originalEast India Companyassistantsin Calendar of State
Papers,Colonial Series,East Indies,1513-1616,ed. W. N. Sainsbury(Vaduz, Kraus
Reprint,1964), p. 117, with lists of Levant assistantsin 1601 charter,printedin
Select Chartersof the Trading Companies,1530-1707,ed. C. T. Carr (London:
Selden Society,1913), p. 32.
19
20

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368

Brenner

providedbetweenone fourthand one thirdof the totalfundinjointstocks.25

Duringits early
vestedin thefirst,
thirdand fourth
devotedto thespice
yearstheEast India Companywas exclusively
But even as the
tradeforwhichit had been organizedoriginally.
and producedinitiaCompanydeveloped,gainedfullautonomy,
continuedto providethe bulk
tivesof its own,Levantmerchants
of itsleadingmen.By the 1630's,theircontroloverthisimportant
tradehad,in fact,beenstrengthened.
The emergenceof a distinctset of easterntradersmarkedan
activity;
for,as we have
important
newstageofEnglishcommercial
fromthe
seen, the eastwardexpansiondid not flowprimarily
northEuropeancloth trade.Nevertheless,
hithertopredominant
thisfundamental
commercial
disjuncture
was paralleledby no real
breakin social development.
It leftthe socialfabricof the City's
India
merchant
theLevant-East
community
largelyintact.Although
merchants
outsidethe circleof MerchantAdventurers,
originated
theywerein no way the"newmen"whichPirenne'stheorywould
and positiontheydid not
lead us to expect.In socialbackground
As Dr. David
fromotherleadingCitymerchants.
differ
substantially
Fischerhas shown,thesmallgroupof TurkeyCompanypatentees
andmostinfluential
wereamongtheCity'swealthiest
businessmen,27
and the same can be said forthe East India Companypromoters
success
twenty
yearslater.Indeed,it was thepreviouscommercial
whichto a crucialextentpreparedthe way
of thesemerchants
initiatives.
fortheirentrepreneurial
The tradestotheEastwerethusthespecialprojectofa particular
witha specificset of assumptions
about the
groupof merchants
The interest
fortheirentrepreneurship.
ofEnglish
properframework
in eastwardexpansion
was no doubtheightened
commerce
by the
of the 1560'sand 1570's.
of theold Europeanentrepots
disruption
theconcreteprocessesbywhichthenewtradeswere
Nevertheless,
25 These resultswere obtainedby comparing
fulllistsof Levant Companymemand the amountof theirinvestments,
berswithlistsof East India Companyinvestors
whichsurviveforthe first,third,and fourthjointstocks.These East India investor
listshave been printedin The Registerof LettersEtc. of the Governorand Company of the Merchantsof London TradingInto the East Indies 1600-1619,ed. Sir
George Birdwood (London: BernardQuaritch,1965 repr.) pp. 275-81, 294-95;
The Dawn of the BritishTrade to the East Indies,printedby HenryStevens(London: HenryStevensand Son, 1886), pp. 1-5.
26 See below, p. 372.
27 Fischer,"Trade to Asia,"pp. 166-68.

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English CommercialExpansion

369

established
canhardly
be explained,
as hassometimes
beenimplied,28
as a simpleresponseto commercialdifficulties.
The exceptional
wealthand influence
of the originalTurkeyCompanypatentees
gavethemaccessto thehighestcirclesofnationaldecision-making.
This allowedthem,in turn,crucialpoliticalcontrols
overthe conditionsunderwhichtheirnew tradewouldbe organized.Unless
theirabilityto setthetermsoftheirentrepreneurial
is emactivity
phasized,theirinnovatingrole cannotbe properlyunderstood.
Ratherthanresponding
to crisisimperatives,
theywereexploiting
specialopportunities
whichtheythemselves
had created.
By theTurkeyCompanypatentof 1581,thewholeof thelucrative middleeast marketwas reservedto just twelvemerchants.
Withina fewyearsthisrestricted
bodyoftraders
was makingsome
of the richestshipments
in Englishcommercial
whileinhistory,
citingthe envyand resentment
of less well-placedtraders.29
One
opponentof the new Companyno doubt exaggeratedwhen he
statedthat,"It is well knownthatthe partsof Italyand Turkey
will bear a greatertradethanall partsof Christendom
in amity
withhermajesty."30
Still,hismainpointwas undeniable:theLevant
tradewouldhavesupported
withprofit
manymoremerchants
were
it notfortheTurkeyCompany's
monopoly.
So protectedan environment
fortradedevelopment
could not
have been procuredby just any merchants.
The originalTurkey
Companywas a veryspecial group.Of the twelvepatenteesof
1581,sixwereLondonaldermen
by the 1580's;threewereM. P.'s.
was ?216 in 1589;in thisyearthere
Theiraveragesubsidypayment
wereonlyforty-nine
othercitizensin theentireCitywhopaid ?200
or more.Perhapsmostimportant
of all,theirnumberincludedtwo
of the mostimportant
mediators
betweenthe crownand the City
in thisperiod:"Customer"
commercial
community
ThomasSmythe,
was
collectoror farmerof the London customsthroughout
who
muchofthelatersixteenth
and RichardMartin,Masterof
century;
theMint.It was perhapsMartin'sintervention
whichfinalizedthe
?5000 loanto theQueen (latermadea gift)thatseems
merchants'
to have assuredtheTurkeypatent'sissue.3'
28 See, e.g., Davis, "England and the Mediterranean,"
p. 117; Chaudhuri,East
India Company,pp. 6-7.
29 Willan, "EnglishTrade with the Levant,"p. 407.
30 Quoted in Epstein,Levant Company,33, n.14
31 Fischer, "Trade to Asia," 166-168, 195-200; "The Subsidy Roll for 1589,"

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370

Brenner

Throughout
theirearlyhistory,
the tradersto the Levantwere
able to controlto an important
extenttheconditions
underwhich
theybuiltup theirtrade.At theexpiration
of theirpatentin 1588,
the TurkeyCompanymerchants
carriedout a mergerwith the
recentlycharteredVenicepatentees.The newly-joined
companies
then petitionedfor a new chartercoveringthe entireeastern
Mediterranean
area and listedforty-one
tradersto whomtheydemandedthistradebe limited.Since almostall of the mennamed
were connectedalreadywitheitherthe Turkeyor Venice Companies,it was hardlysurprising
that this proposedmembership
restriction
provokedsubstantial
opposition
frommerchant
outsiders
anxiousto getin on a valuabletrade. To counteract
theirobjections,nineteenoftheleadingTurkeyand Venicepatenteesdefined
for the government
the preconditions
of theirentrepreneurship.
Assuredlyno bettersuccessis to be expectedin thistradeif moreshouldbe
admitted,forin verytruth,the one halfof us alreadytradersare too many
and in numbersufficient
to maintainthattrade. . . . Mosthumblybeseeching
yourhonour(the premissesconsidered)to be a means that we may have
use of thattradewithoutreceivingin of any others. . . otherwiseit will not
onlydiscourageus and othersin like respecthereafter
to attemptand go on
withlikechargesand discoveries,
but be utterly
discouragedto enterintoany
new charge. . . and so ratherto withdrawourselves,givingover the trade
33

of course,these merchants
did not have occasion
Ultimately,
to carryout theirthreatto leave the trade.By thenew charter
of
men were admittedto the Levant Company
1592, fifty-three
(twelvemorethanhad been namedby the Venice-Turkey
merchants),whiletwentyothersweregiventheoptionto join within
twomonthsuponthepaymentof an admission
fee of ?130. This
diminish
slightopeningof thetradecouldnotseriously
theattraction of a twelve-year
monopolyof the Levant commerce,
which
now includedthe lucrativeVenicecurrantsand wine trades,as
well as exclusiverightsto the overlandroute to the Indies.34
Underitscharters
of 1601and 1605,theLevanttradecontinued
in
to operate highlyprotected
conditions.
By thistimeorganizedas
a regulatedComnanv.theindividualLevantmerchants
tradedfor
printedin Visitationof London 1568, ed. H. StanfordLondon and Sophia W. Rawlins (London: JohnWhitehead,1963), 148-164.
32 Epstein,Levant Company,pp. 25-36.
83 S.-P. 12/239/44,printedin Epstein,Levant Company,pp. 260-61.
84 Ibid., pp. 36-9.

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EnglishCommercial
Expansion

371

themselves
underrulesand policiesestablished
by the corportion.
Thesewereintendedto controlCompanymarkets
and to maintain
favorable
pricesforCompanyproducts.
The regulations
variedfrom
timeto time,but essentially
involvedthe limitation
of shippingto
specificperiodsin designatedvesselsand the settingof pricesof
Levant trade commodities,
in particularcurrants.35
The Levant
Companymembership
had exclusiverightsto valuable markets.
In the traditionof the MerchantAdventurers,
the City'slargest
regulatedCompany,theywished to leave as littleas possible
tochanceinexploiting
them.
The structure
of commercial
was fortified
regulation
by significantlimitations
on entryto thetrade.Indeed,thesystemof admissionstendedto place a gooddeal ofcontroloverrecruitment
in the
handsof the leadingCompanymerchants.
Here the institution
of
apprenticeship
playeda crucialrole.The primary
modeofentry
into
theCompanywas through
boundserviceto a Companymerchant
forsevenyears,fourof themin the Company'soverseasfactories.
To carryon the trade,specialskillswereneeded,and thesewere
difficult
to acquirewithoutthe guidanceof a merchantalready
engagedin the trade.Equallyimportant,
was perapprenticeship
haps thebestway to establishthosecommercial
connections
upon
whichsuccessin thisbusinessso oftendepended.Finally,service
in the Levantbroughtcommissions
and, duringthe last yearsof
the
one's apprenticeship, rightto carryon a privatetrade;from
thesesourcesit was possibleto derivetheinitialcapitalnecessary
to launchone'sown career.36
For thesereasons-andbecause the
Levanttradecouldbe so lucrative-thepriceofapprenticeship
was
normallyquite substantial.Duringthe 1630's it seems to have
rangedbetween?200 and ?300, puttingit beyondthe meansof
all buta selectsectionofthepopulation.87
tendedto makethe Company'smemThe systemof admissions
bershipto a significant
In general,only
degreeself-perpetuating.
35 Epstein,Levant Trade, chs. viii, ix. For a discussionof these regulations
and
theirchanges in the early seventeenthcenturysee Robert Brenner,"Commercial
Change and Political Conflict:The MerchantCommunityin Civil War London"
(PrincetonUniversity
Ph.D. Thesis, 1970), pp. 18-9.
-86 For a good discussionof apprenticeship
and the reasonsfor its crucial importanceto the prospectiveLevant merchant,
see Ralph Davis, Aleppo and DevonshireSquare (London: Macmillan,1967), pp. 64-8.
87 The evidence on which this conclusionis based was derivedfromscattered
miscellaneoussources,especiallywills of merchantsleaving bequests to have their
childrenapprenticed.For details,see Brenner,"CommercialChange,"pp. 22-3, n.44.

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372

Brenner

thosewithwealthor good connections

could affordto join. It is
therefore
understandable
thata greatnumberof the Company's
recruits
tendedto be relatives
ofCompanymembers.
Betweenonethirdand one-halfof all activeLevanttradersin the 1630'shad
had fathers,
fathers-in-law,
or brothers
in theCompanyat thetime
when they entered.Naturally,those with the best connections
tendedto be mostsuccessful.In fact,by the 1630's,morethan
halfof the Company'stradewas in the handsof fewerthan25
individualtraderswho could tracerelationships
of birthor marriage-oftenas a thirdgeneration-tomerchants
who enteredthe
Levanttradein its founding
periodbetweenthe charters
of 1581
and 1605.Indeed,by 1640,a greatnumberof thebig menof the
Companywereattachedto one anotherin a complexnetworkof
interlocking
kinship
connections.38
Duringthe earlyseventeenth
the workingout of long
century,
termcommercial
trendsbroughtthe Levant-EastIndia merchant
complextoa pre-eminent
inLondon'smerchant
position
community.
The tradeto theLevantgrewand prospered
at thesametimethat
the MerchantAdventurers'
commerce
wentthrough
seriouscrisis.
Between1614 and 1640,the Adventurers'
northEuropeancloth
marketswere cut in half.39
In contrast,
silk imports,
whichhad
totalledforall areasonly?9920 in 1560,reached?125,246 from
the Levant alone in 1630.40 Moreover,between1600 and 1640,
Levantcurrants
imports
actuallyquadrupledin volume(although
probablynotin value).41 Meanwhile,
theEast India Companyalso
developedquiterapidly.In the first30 yearsof its existence,
the
Companywas responsiblefor the expenditureof more than
?2,500,000in commercial
investments,
makingit by farthelargest
unifiedcommercial
ventureof the period.42
In consequence,the
East India Company'sboard of directorssoon became the most
importantmercantilegoverningbody in London. As we have
noted,theEast IndiaCompanywas at all timesstrongly
influenced
by theLevanttrade.In the 1630's,whenan investment
of ?2000
was requiredforeligibility
to the East India Company'sboardof
38 The evidence for this paragraphis based on a full analysisof the Levant
Companymerchants,
theirtrade and familyconnections
in the pre-civilwar period.
For a Lull presentationof data and documentation,
see Brenner,"Commercial
Change,"pp. 29-34.
39 Supple,Commercial
Crisis,p. 258 and passim.
40 Millard,"The Importsof London,"appendix.
41 Davis, "Englandand the Mediterranean,"
p. 136.
42 Chaudhuri,
East India Company,p. 209.

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English CommercialExpansion

373

were in the hands of

two thirdsof the directorships
directors,
menwho held the
The fourdifferent
LevantCompanymembers.
deputygovernor,
and
positionsof East India Companygovernor,
in thisdecade all were leadingLevant Companymertreasurer
chants.43
it is underdevelopments,
commercial
In view of theforegoing
came to join and,
standablethattheLevant-EastIndia merchants
as Lonreplacethe MerchantAdventurers
to an important
extent,
don's leading commercialgrouping.In 1638, Lewes Roberts,a
coulddeclarewith
matters,
on commercial
authority
contemporary
reasonthat the "TurkeyCompanyof London forits heightand
His contention
is nowsecondtononeotherin thisland."44
eminency
of the alderis strikingly
bornout in the changingcomposition
governing
manicbench,London'smostpowerfuland prestigious
of ?10,000 was requiredto
fortune
body,forwhicha minimum
AdventheMerchant
century,
be eligible.In theearlyseventeenth
on this
merchant
representation
dominated
turersoverwhelmingly
electedin the
to R. G. Lang,ofthe140 aldermen
board.According
thatis, overseas
weremerchants,
aboutone-half
period1600-1625,
tradedat one time or another
traders.Of these,three-quarters
in Germanyand
markets
to theMerchantAdventurers'
privileged
one-half
were mainlyor
and
one-third
to
the Low Countries
exclusivelyoccupied there.45By contrast,in the period 16261640,sixteenLevanttraderswereelectedaldermanin comparison
In 1640,almosthalfof thetwentyto nineMerchantAdventurers.
by Levant tradersand
six-manaldermaniccourtwas controlled
Wellbeforethistime,thecustoms
East India Companydirectors.46
financial
plumof the period,had
farms,the greatestgovernment
hands
of the easterntraders.47
into
the
fallento a large extent
unusualcommercial
and politicalsuccess
The easternmerchants'
43 This resultwas obtainedby comparingfull lists of East India Companyofficers extractedfromEast India Companycourt minuteswith full lists of Levant
See Calendarof State Papers,East Indies,1630-1634;CalenCompanymembership.
dar of the CourtMinutesof the East India Company,1635-1639,ed. E. B. Sainsbury
(Oxford: The ClarendonPress,1907); CourtBooks of the Levant Company.
44 MerchantsMappe of Commerce(London, 1638), p. 319.
45 Lang, "GreaterMerchantsof London,"pp. 149-51.
46 These resultswereobtainedby comparing
fulllistsof aldermenin A. B. Beaven,
The Aldermenof the City of London,2 vols. (London: Eden Fisher,1908-1913),
and withreasonwithfulllistsof Levantmembersand East India Companyofficers
fromthe London Port Books for cloth exably full lists of MerchantAdventurers
can't be exact.
ports.Te figureforMerchantAdventurers
47 RobertAshton,The Crown and the Money Market(Oxford: The Clarendon
Fmess,1960), ch. iv, esp. pp. 87-105.

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374

Brenner

appearsto have led themto adoptan increasingly

cautiousattitude
towardtheongoingEnglishcommercial
Thiswas hardly
expansion.
surprising,
giventherangeof opportunities
alreadyopen to them.
It was simplyrationalfor thesemerchantsto plow back their
profits
into the growing,
yet securecommerceto the Levant,or
moreadventurously,
intotheEast India jointstock.In thisrespect,
theywereonlyfollowing
the pattern
set by the MerchantAdventurersin thelatersixteenth
century.
As we noted,theAdventurers
chosetoreturn
theirprofits
to theirownestablished
line
commercial
ratherthanto takea chanceon thedevelopinglong-distance
commerceto the East. In the same way,the Levant-EastIndia merchantsfailedto findthe new plantation
tradesto the Americas
anywherenear as attractive
as theirown establishedbusinesses.
Theyallowedthesenew tradesto fallto othertraders,
"newmen"
whowouldultimately
challengetheirhegemony.
III
In itsinitialphase,thecommercial
thrust
towardtheWestarose
directlyfromthe Elizabethanexpansionary
movement.
Organized
along establishedjoint-stock
lines between1606 and 1614, the
Virginia,
Bermuda,and Newfoundland
Companieswereto an importantdegreecontrolled
by the greaterCitymerchants.
LevantEast India tradersinvestedextensively
in theirjointstocksand at
roles.Nevertheless,
first
occupiedmajorleadership
thecommitment
of thesegreatCitymagnateswas nevermorethantentative.
As it
becameevidentthatAmericandevelopment
wouldrequiresignififromtheirestablished
cantdeviations
commercial
theleadroutines,
ing Citymerchants
quicklylostinterest.
Theywouldnottakethe
in plantation
risksor makethenew typesofinvestment
production
that colonial trade demanded.By the later 1620's,all of the
hadcollapsedforlackofCitymerchant
American
original
companies
whichmarkedthe
backing.The acceleratedcolonialdevelopment
decadeswas carriedout by an entirelydifferent
following
set of
traders.
inherent
in all of theoriginalattempts
The problems
to develop
linesareevidentin thehiscolonialtradealongtraditional
company
themostambitious
toryoftheVirginia
Company,
colonizing
venture
oftheperiod.Thiscompanywas foundedwitha gooddeal of government
backingand theapparentsupportof largesectionsof the
merchant
community.
Citymerchants
providedperhapshalfof the

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EnglishCommercial
Expansion

375

fundsinvestedin theoriginal
jointstockand elitetradersconnected
withtheLevant-EastIndia complex,as well as otherCitycompanies,helda number
ofthekeydirecting
positions.48
Nevertheless,
the
expectations
of thesemerchants
appearto have been disappointed
early.Hopes for quick profitsthrough
the furtradeor through
thediscovery
ofpreciousmetalsfailedto materialize
and it became
obviousthatprofits
wouldhave to awaitthedevelopment
of plantationproduction.49
Unable to offerimmediatereturnson investment,the Companyhad to face a permanentfinancialcrisis.
Withintwo yearsof its 1609 charter,new contributions
to the
Companyjointstockhad driedup.50In a periodin whichovertwo
millionpoundswere beingraisedfor the East India Company's
jointstock,largelyby Londonmerchants,
the VirginiaCompany
jointstockcouldnotattractZ40,000.51
Its financialweaknesssoon obligedthe VirginiaCompanyto
giveup directcontrolof colonialdevelopment.
Between1614and
1619,colonialentrepreneurship
was to a largeextenttakenover
whoactedaloneor in variousformsof assoby privateindividuals
ciationsunderthe Company'sauspices,but who were,in fact,
freeto maketheirowneconomicdecisions.Thus,thecomentirely
mercialmodes upon whichthe colony'sdevelopment
ultimately
established
evenbeforetheofficial
wouldbe basedwereessentially
The corporation's
dissolution
in
Companyshellfinallycollapsed.52
an alreadyexisting
1624merelyratified
The keyareasof
situation.
colonialproduction,
Virginiaand theWestIndies,wereallowedto
developlargelyoutsideof the corporatecontrolwhichstructured
London'sleadingtrades.The voluntary
partnership,
usuallyinon a temcludingonlya handfulof individualsand constituted
formof
porarybasis, came into its own as the mostimportant
association.
mercantile
48 TheodoreK. Rabb, Enterprise
and Empire (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,1967), pp. 56-7,66, and appendix.
49 W. F. Craven,The Dissolutionof the VirginiaCompany(New York: Oxford
University
Press,1932), pp. 32-3.
60 CharlesM. Andrews,The Colonial Period of AmericanHistory,4 vols. (New
"The LotHaven: Yale University
Press,1934-1938), I, pp. 106-07; R. C. Johnson,
teries of the VirginiaCompany,"VirginiaMagazine of Historyand Biography,
LXXIV (1966), 259ff.
51 W. R. Scott, The Constitution
and Finance of English, Scottish,and Irish
Press, 1912),
JointStock Companiesto 1720, 3 vols. (Cambridge: The University
II, pp. 254, 258, 288; Chaudhuri,East India Company,p. 209.
52 For an accountof the different
formsof independententerprise
in thisperiod,
see Craven,VirginiaCompany,pp. 35, 56; Andrews,ColonialPeriod,I, pp. 124-25.

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376

Brenner

At no timeenthusiastic
aboutcolonization,
thegreaterCitymerwiththe colonialtradesupon the
chantsseveredall connections
dissolutionof the VirginiaCompany.Between1625 and 1640,
ofLevantCompanymembers,
East IndiaCompany
barelya handful
or Cityaldermencan be foundamongthe hundredsof
directors,
Theirfailureto retaincontrol
tradersactivein thecolonialfield.53
commercial
areamustbe explainedin termsofthe
ofthisexpanding
featuresof the colonialtradeswhichdistinguished
characteristic
themfromregularLondoncommercial
The regulated
operations.
and the Levant
companies,typified
by the MerchantAdventurers
involvedsimplythecarrying
ofcommodities.
Company,
Theywere
controlledconditionsdeoperatedunder restricted,
corporately
and competitive
signed to mitigatetheirindividualistic
aspects
Even the East
and therebyto minimizeriskand to insureprofits.
whichdid involvesomerisk,carefully
India Company,
avoidedthe
of long-term
in "development."
insecurities
capitalinvestments
Its
the
minimized Company'sexpenditures
directors
on fixedcapital
refusedto participatein colonial
of any kind and scrupulously
projects,despiteseverepressuresto do so fromthe Court and
in the 1630's and 1640's.54Moreover,the
merchantcompetitors
soleaccesstoitsmarkets.
East Indiacharter
That
gavetheCompany
commercial
monopoly
was,in fact,a fundamental
precondition
for
became evidentin the 1630's.
the greatmerchants'
participation
The Company'sprivilegeswere challengedby the firmof Sir
WilliamCourteen,whichalso had government
backing.Aftera
theold Company's
fewyearsof Courteen's
competition,
jointstock
ceasedto advancefunds,and thecorporation
investors
was brought
In fact,theEast India Companydid not
to theedge of collapse.55
effectsof competition
on its
fullyrecoverfromthe discouraging
until1657,whenits charterwas finallyrestored
leadinginvestors
assured.
anditsmonopolv
53 Seven such establishment
merchantswho enteredthe colonial trades have
so far.This resultwas obtainedby comparinglists of Levant Combeen identified
and City aldermenwithfairlyfulllistpanymembers,East India Companyofficers,
ings of Americantraders.The latterare based on lists of tobacco tradersextracted
fromthe London Port Books forimportsfor 1626, 1630, 1633, 1634, 1640, and a
wide varietyof government
documents,petitions,judicial records,etc. For more
detailed information,
includingnames of merchants,see Brenner,"Commercial
Change,"pp. 71-2.
54 W. Foster,"An EnglishSettlement
in Madagascar,1645-6,"EnglishHistorical
Review,XVII (1912), 239-40; Calendarofthe CourtMinutesofthe East India Company 1635-9,pp. 248-49,328, 330, 338, 339, 341.
55 Ibid., 274ff,302. For an account of the Courteenproject,see Sir William
Ibid,
Foster's"Introduction,"

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English CommercialExpansion

377

In markedcontrastto the establishedLondon trades,colonial

notmerely
production,
incommodity
investment
required
operations
exchange.The growthof Americancommercedein commodity
and it
pendedin thefirstinstanceupon plantationdevelopment,
involvewithoutfinancial
was difficult
in theformer
to participate
economyneededconstant
mentin thelatter.Thenascentplantation
of outsidecapitalto get it startedand to keep it going.
injections
interested
merchants
Thus,at leastintheearlyyearsofdevelopment,
could not avoid takingsome
in tradingon a largescale normally
part in the productiveprocess.Merchantsmightpurchaseand
theycould enter
Otherwise,
directly
operatetheirownplantations.
themwithland,
supplying
withcolonialplanters,
intopartnership
These busithe finalproduct.56
and marketing
tools,and servants
nesses,of coursehad tobe carriedout underfreetradeconditions.
many
Since therewas no companycontrolof colonialcommerce,
tradersunable to gain admissionto the establishedroutesfound
Andas thenumberof particiattractive.
thisnew fieldparticularly
fierce.
becameincreasingly
pantsgrew,competition
Indiatraders
to submitthemselves
The failureoftheLevant-East
in
is understandable
operations
to therigorsofcolonialcommercial
cautiousapproachto business.As we have
lightof theirgenerally
seen,thegroupofeasterntraderswas able to dictatetheconditions
Withno
fromtheverystartofitsestablishment.
oftheircommerce
tobe madein
easyprofits
crisestospurthemon,withcomparatively
of East India comthe Levanttrade,and withthe development
were
is
it understandable
thatthesemerchants
mercea highpriority,
to others.
worldofcolonialcommerce
willingto leavetheuncertain
Indiamerchants'
stancetowardthenewAmeriThe Levant-East
withtheirpreviouspractice.
consistent
can tradeswas thusentirely
in
thattheone area ofVirginiacommercial
activity
It is significant
and required
was totallyrestricted
whichtheydid showan interest
In 1616,whenthedevelopin colonialproduction.
no investment
forthefirst
of
mentoftobaccoplanting
time,thepossibility
offered,
a semi-autonomous
subsidiary
company,
colonialexports,
profitable
was organizedby
withfullmonopoly
importand exportprivileges
and
the VirginiaCompanyto carryout thecolony'sprovisioning
This "Magazine,"as it was called,was closelyidentimarketing.57
56 R. Pares, "Merchants
and Planters,"EconomicHistoryReview,SupplementIV
"CommercialChange,"pp. 73-75.
(1960), 5, 52ff.See also, Brenner,
57 Andrews,
ColonialPeriod,I, pp. 126-27;Craven,VirginiaCompany,pp. 33-34;
Scott,JointStockCompanies,I, pp. 256-77.

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378

Brenner

fiedwiththe Company's"merchant
and its directorship
interest,"
seemsto have includedsomeof London'sleadingmerchant
magSirThomasSmythe,
nates:58
probably
thegreatest
Londonmerchant
oftheperiod,whowas at one timeor anothergovernor
of theEast
India, Muscovy,French,and SomersIsland Companies,as well
as Lord Mayorof London;RobertJohnson,
Smythe'sson-in-law,
an officer
oftheLevantCompany,
an East IndiaCompanydirector,
and London alderman;Sir JohnWolstenholme,
one of London's
a customsfarmer,
leadingfinanciers,
and lateran East India Companydirector;
a Merchant
WilliamEssington,
Adventurer
who was
theson-in-law
of SirThomasHayes,a Lord Mayorof Londonand
a leading MerchantAdventurer;
and WilliamCanning,deputy
of
the
Bermuda
governor
Companyand severaltimesMasterof
At a timewhen the Company'sgeneraljoint
the Ironmongers.59
stockhad reacheditslowestebb,withthetreasury
closeto ?8000
in thered00and unableto financeCompanyactivities
of anytype,
leaderswereable to raise?7000 fortheirown
theseCitymerchant
and to extracta substantial
privatesyndicate
rateofprofit
fromthe
forthesemerchants,
colonists.6'
the Magazinewas
Unfortunately
oftheCompanyby the"gentry
dissolvedin 1619withthetakeover
party'underSir EdwinSandys.And thebig Citymerchants
were
neverable to regaintheirlostposition.
Whentheyfailedto have a
new Companyestablished
undertheirown direction
in 1624-1625
aftertheold onehad beendissolved,
theywithdrew
entirely
fromall
phasesof the Americancommerce.62
The entrepreneurs
behindthe vital expansionary
thrustwhich
a
American
trades
on
firmfoundation
put the
over the period
1618-1648were "new men" in severalsenses.As we have seen,
hardlyanywerefromtheCitymerchant
establishment.
Moresurpris58 The Recordsof the VirginiaCompanyof London, ed. Susan M. Kingsbury,
4 vols. (Washington:Libraryof Congress,1906-1935), III, p. 598.
59 C. E. Cockayne,Some Accountof the Lord Mayorsanc Sheriffs
of the City of
London ... 1601-1625 (London, 1897), pp. 4-5, 80; Beaven,Aldermen,II, p. 54;
R. H. Tawney,Businessand PoliticsUnder JamesI (Cambridge: The University
Press, 1958), p. 87; Port Book for cloth exports,1640 (P.R.O. E.190/43/4); The
Visitationof London 1633, 1634, and 1635, ed. J. J. Howard and J. L. Chester,
2 vols. (London: Harleian Society,1880-3), I, p. 259; Friis, Cockayne'sProject,
p. 96; AlexanderBrown,The Genesisof the UnitedStates,2 vols. (Boston and New
& Co., 1890), II, p. 842.
York: Houghton,Mifflin
60 Craven,VirginiaCompany,p. 35.
61 Scott,JointStockCompanies,II, p. 256. In an agreementwith the Company
of 1618, the Magazine'srate of profitwas limitedto 25%. Craven,VirginiaCompany,p. 51.
62 Craven,VirginiaCompany,ch. vii; Andrews,
ColonialPeriod,ch. vii.

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EnglishCommercial
Expansion

379

ing,comparatively
fewhad been overseasmerchants
of anykindat
the timewhentheyenteredthisfield.They were not,moreover,
drawnfromtheupperranksofeitherCityorCountysociety.Originallymenof the"middling
sort,"theywerealmostalwaysbornoutsideLondonandby and largetheyounger
or
sonsofsmallergentry
prosperous
yeomen.Somecamefromboroughcommercial
families.
It was perhapstheirverylack of assuredplace,career,or income
whichopenedthesemento thefarfromobviouscommercial
promiseofcolonialdevelopment.63
The new merchants'
initialinvolvement
in colonial enterprise
tendedto occurin twodifferent
ways.Sometimes,
theymoveddirectlyinto colonialactivityby emigrating
to the colonies.Their
plantation
businesseswouldthenprovidethebase to propelthem
intothewiderworldofoverseascommerce,
thecapitaland experienceto setthemselves
up as Citymerchants.
Thosewhodid notgo
to live in thecoloniesoftenenteredtheAmerican
fieldby way of
Londonand theirCityoccupations.
in coThus,theirinvolvement
lonialactivity
tendedtogrowoutoftheirprevious
businessconcerns
as shopkeepers,
sea captains,and domestictradersof all types.
The colonialtradesoffered
tomensuchas thesea newand growing
marketforsuppliesand provisions,
as well as the chanceto save
thesubstantial
middleman's
cost on tobacco.04
As a contemporary
described
thecolonialtrading
group:
Theyare no merchants
bred,norversedin foreign
ports,or any trade,but to
theseplantations,
and thatfromeitherplantersthereor wholesaletobacconists
and shopkeepers
retailingtobaccoherein England.05

It is essentialtonotein thisrespectthatthecorporate
commercial
Levant
and
as
the
the
Merchant
Advensuch
companies,
Company
to "meremerchants,"
werelimitedbycharter
thatis,to those
turers,
occupied solely with overseascommerce.Any shopkeeperwho
had firstto divesthimselfof his
wishedto be admitted,
therefore,
Thisrestriction
reducedthefeasibiloldbusinessinterests.
seriously
successful
domestictraders
ityofevenfinancially
theranks
entering
oftheoverseascompanies.'Atthesametime,itnaturally
madethe
63 The precedingparagraphis based on a detailed biographicaland statistical
account of the colonialmerchanttradinggroup,presentedin Brenner,"Commercial Change,"ch. iii.
64 Ibid.
65 "The HumbleRemonstrance
of JohnBland of London,Merchant.. ." Virginia
Magazine of Historyand Biography,I (1894), 144.
66 For cases in which the Levant Companytook action to make sure that a

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380

Brenner

American
trades,whichweretotallyfreeandopen,thatmuchmore
attractive
tothesemen.
IV
Some of thereasonswhyEnglishcommercial
expansioncan not
be viewedin purelyeconomictermsshouldnow be evident.It is
clear that the processesby whichAmericancommercewas first
developedhave no simpleeconomicexplanation.
The new trades
did offerreal opportunities.
London'sannualtobaccoimportsincreasedspectacularly
from61,500lbs.in 1620to over2,000,000lbs.
in 1638;67and therewas moneyto be made in otherareas as well
etc. Alreadyby 1640,important
-fur trading,provisioning,
indihad beenaccruedin thisvital,ifchaoticnewfield.68
vidualfortunes
thatLondon'sestablished
Still,it remainsentirelyunderstandable
would have littleto do with it. Why,for
merchantcommunity
example,shouldLevantCompanytradershave enduredthe difficultiesof the tobacco trade (in which therewere 175 traders
activein 1634and 330 in 1640),whentheycouldmakebig profits
commerce
currants
to thirtyin theirlucrative
(whichwas confined
in the same twoyears)?69
tradersrespectively
sevenand fifty-one
Clearly,London's establishedmerchantshad littleincentiveto
enterthecolonialcommerce.
Indeed,thisfieldmighthave proved
farless attractive
to the"newmen"had thecompanytradesbeen
moreaccessible.
it shouldnotbe concludedthatthosewho entered
Nevertheless,
the colonialtradesdid so morereadilythandid the established
The new men
elite merelybecause theyhad feweralternatives.
were also farbetterpreparedthanthe old elite to properlydeAs we have argued,the value or
velop the existingpossibilities.
cannotbe viewed statically.
qualityof an economicopportunity
are createdin the veryprocessof beingexploited.
Opportunities
Theirworthis not objectivelygiven,but to a large extentdeterminedby the mannerin whichtheyare developed,and this,in
prospectivememberhad actually relinquishedhis formertrade and become a
see Levant CompanyCourt Books,P.R.O. S.P.105/149/250,253;
"meremerchant,"
S.P.105/150/265;S.P.105/151/120.
67 G. L. Beer,The Originsof the BritishColonial System,
1578-1660 (New York:
MacmillanCo., 1908), p. 110, n.3; J. A. Williamson,The Caribbee Islands Under
the Proprietary
Patents(London: OxfordUniversity
Press, 1926), pp. 137-39.
68 See Brenner,"CommercialChange,"pp. 142-43.
t9 These figures
were compiledfromthe Port Books forimportsfor 1634, P.R.O.
E.190/38/5,and 1640,P.R.O. E.190/43/5.

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English CommercialExpansion

381

turn,oftendependson whodevelopsthem.The case oftheeastern

expansion
has alreadyillustrated
thispoint.Thus,the openingof
the Levanttradeoffered
to the greatCitytradersan opportunity
unavailableto most other London businessmen.Paradoxically,
thisfieldwas so promising
becausethemenwhodevelopedit were
abletominimize
theneedforrisk,initiative,
"entrepreneurship."
On the otherhand,it was just because theLevant-EastIndia
merchantsso scrupulously
avoided innovationin theirnormal
courseofbusinessthattheywereunableto see and exploitthe increasingly
impressive
opportunities
whichthe new tradescameto
was at
offer.
It is truethatthenew merchants'
"'entrepreneurship"
firstin a senseforcedupon them.A certainamountofexperimentation was simply unavoidable. What is significant,however, is
the way in which the new merchants'participationin the early
phases of Americancolonizationopened their eyes to far more
spectacular commercialenterprise.From the later 1630's leading
groupsof merchantsfromthe Americancolonial tradeslaunched a
large-scalecommercialoffensivethat involved them in tradingactivitiesfromNew England, to the West Indies, to West and East
Africa,to the East Indies.70 This drive arose, to a certainextent,
fromthe needs and problemsof the originalcolonial economies.It
could neverhave occurred,however,had not the previous experience ofthenew merchantspreparedthemto seize upon and develop
The changes
systematically
a whole seriesof potentialopportunities.
which these traders carried out mark a revolutionarybreak in
Englishcommercialactivity,but they cannot be seen as isolated,
speculative ventures.They flowed from an increasinglycoherent
on a world-widescale.
programforcommercialtransformation
During the later 1630's the Americaneconomyhad sufferedincreasinglyfromover productionand fallingprices in tobacco. The
land-scarceWest Indies were particularlyhard-hit.Thus, when a
groupof Dutch merchantsfromBrazil set up sugar plantationson
Barbados, the innovationwas immediatelywidely copied. Within
the space of two decades the tobacco economyof small men and
small plotswas forcedto give way to the greatplantationsystemof
slaves and sugarmills.7'English merchants,along with the Dutch,
And it was the very
played an integralrole in this transformation.
same leading groups of new merchantswho had immersedthem70 For a fullaccountof thisoffensive,
see Brenner,"CommercialChange,"ch. iv.

71

Williamson,CaribbeeIslands,pp. 137-39,157-58.

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382

Brenner

selvesin the Americantradesfromthe 1620'swholed thewayin

everyfacetof a unified
WestIndiesdevelopment.72
Some of these
tradersalreadyownedland in the islandsand mosthad tobacco
tradingconnections
there.7Theyinvadedthe privilegedterritory
of the EnglishGuineaCompany,whosemonopoly
was no longer
adequatelyprotected
bya weakenedroyalpower,and becamekey
suppliersof Africanslaves.74
Indeed,it was at thispointthatthe
British
slavetradeto Americawas established
on a largescale,and
these merchants
wereits firstmajorundertakers.
The same men
also continued
to act as provisioners
and marketers
of colonialproduce and established
in thisperiodtheso-called"triangular
trades,"
connecting
England,New England,Africa,
and theWestIndiesin
an integrated
commercial
Mostimportant
system.75
of all, manyof
these merchantsentereddirectlyinto the combinedindustrialactivitiesrequiredfor theproduction
of sugar.70
agricultural
The
and capitalcommitment
kindof organizational
requiredby the
sugar industry's
"factoryin a field"far surpassedanythingdemandedby the oldertobaccoeconomy.It shouldbe hardlysurthatdespitetheenormous
prisingto find,therefore,
profits
yielded,
attractedonly a handfulof
the sugar plantations'development
investors
fromtheoldCitymerchant
elite.77
72 The personnelof the West Indies commercialdevelopmentcan be put togetherfromthe numerouscolonial merchantpetitionsof the 1640's and 1650's,
which include hundredsof signatures;also fromthe standardgovernmental
and
judicial documents-StatePapers, High Court of Admiralty
Papers, ChanceryProceedings,etc. See especiallyJournalof the House of Lords, IX, 50, for a list of
manyof the keymerchantleaders.See also P.R.O. C.O.1/11/23,24; C.O.1/12/5,8,
16. For details on the West Indies merchantssee Brenner,"CommercialChange,"
pp. 150-59.
73 Ibid., 151-52.
74 For the Guinea tradein thisperiod,see J. W. Blake, "The Farm of the Guinea
Trade in 1631," in Essays in BritishHistory,ed. H. A. Cronne,T. W. Moody,and
D. B. Quinn (London: FrederickMuller,1949), pp. 86-106. For the loss of its
patent,see Ibid., p. 97; Journalof the House of Common?,II, pp. 33, 278, 970;
The Journalof Sir SimondsD'Ewes, ed. W. Notestein(New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1923), p. 540. For furtherdetails, see Brenner,"CommercialChange,'
pp. 152-54.
75 For the development
of the "triangletrades,"see B. Bailyn,The New England
Merchantsin the Seventeenth
Century(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,
1955), pp. 84-91; V. T. Harlow,Barbados1625-1685 (Oxford:The ClarendonPress,
1926), ch. vi.
76 Journalof the House of Lords,IX, p. 50; HistoricalManuscripts
Commission,
Sixth Report,Appendix,pp. 202-03. See also, Brenner,"CommercialCrisis,"pp.
151-52,n.13.
77 This is based on a comparison
of fulllistsof Levant membersand East India
withlistsof West Indies traderscompiledfromsourcesindicated
Companydirectors
in fn.72.

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English CommercialExpansion

383

ExtendingfarbeyondWest Africaand the Americas,the deled

grouping
veloping
commercial
interests
ofthecolonialmerchant
eliteon its own ground.
themto challengethe old Citymerchant
wereable notmerelyto wrest
Duringthe1640's,thenewmerchants
controlof theEast India CompanyfromtheLevant-EastIndia establishment,
but to modifythe old tradein accordancewiththeir
ownnovelcommercial
conceptions.
Aswe havenoted,in themiddle
1630's,CharlesI had temporarily
licensedthe greatAnglo-Dutch
merchant
venSirWilliamCourteen
trading
tooperateaninterloping
area. By the outturewithintheEast India Company'sprivileged
breakof civilwar,Courteenhad largelygivenovercontrolof this
to operateit on
projectto a numberof hispartners
who continued
was drawnlargelyfromthesame
theirown.Thisnew association
colonialmerchant
groupingthatwas alreadyactivein the West
were preparednot
These merchants
Indies sugardevelopment.78
in
the
old
of
East India Comonlyto pursuethe project defiance
theestablishment
of
pany,butalsotoexpanditsscopeto encompass
a plantation
colonyofftheeast coastof Africa,theopeningof the
of the Guinea
tradein theEast,and theincorporation
port-to-port
the East Indies withina
gold trade.Theirplan was to integrate
whichwouldreplacetheformer
world-wide
multilateral
commerce
wouldbe foundedon coloniesand
two-way
route.The newsystem
drawtogether
England,WestAfrica,Madagascar,and India in a
The variousascomplicatednetworkof exchangerelationships.79
pectsof thisprogramhad alwaysbeen opposedby the old Company directorate
which,as we have seen,had alwaysrefusedto
and had adheredsteadfastly
to a
becomeinvolvedin colonization
bilateralcommerce.
magnateshad been so
Yet, the old merchant
of competition,
as well as the
weakenedby the economiceffects
politicalimpactof civilwar,thattheywereunableto hold offthe
whichwas carriedon bothinsideand outnewmerchants'
offensive,
side theold Company.80
had notonly
By 1650,thenewmerchants
78 The personnelof the groupwhichtook over fromCourteencan be compiled
fromCalendar of the Court Minutesof the East India Company1644-9, pp. 16,
305, n.1, p. 382; Journalof the House of Lords,X, pp. 617, 624; HistoricalManuSeventhReport,Appendix,p. 66; P.R.O. H.C.A.24/108/51,265.
scriptsCommission,
For -a full discussionof the personnelof this group, see Brenner,"Commercial
Change,"pp. 173-75.
see Foster,"Intro79 For the new merchants'programand its implementation,
duction,"Calendarof the CourtMinutesof the East India Company,1644-9; Foster,
"Madagascar;" J. E. Farnell,"The NavigationAct of 1651, the First Dutch War,
EconomicHistoryReview,XVI (1964), 444.
and the LondonMerchantCommunity,"
80 Calendarof the CourtMinutesof the East India Company,1644-9,xv, xvi,xix,
218, 227, 342, 377-378; Brenner,"CommercialChange,"pp. 178-83.

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384

Brenner

substantially
penetrated
the Company,but had forcedthe implementation
oftheirprogram.81
The colonialmerchants'
commercial
victory
overtheLevant-East
Indiaestablishment
was notsimplytheresultoftheirsuperior
entrepreneurship.
The politicalupheavalsof the 1640'shad brokenthe
powerof theroyalist-leaning
merchant
elite,whileenhancingcorrespondingly
the politicalpositionof the parliamentarian
colonial
traders.Indeed,withthe Independent
victoryin 1648,the new
merchants
gainedaccessto thehighest
circlesofgovernment
power,
a positionreservedbeforethe civilwar to the Levant-EastIndia
leadership.82
Not surprisingly,
thesetradersused theirnewly-won
in a manneranalogoustothatoftheold elite,yetin accord
influence
withtheirownbroadercommercial
conceptions.
Whereastheeastern
tradingcomplexhad employedtheirextra-economic
powerto monopolizetrade and enhancetheirmarketposition,the colonial
merchantgroupingused theirsto tryto pryfromtheirpowerful
Dutch rivals commercialopportunities
perhapsunattainableby
purelyeconomicmeans.As has been arguedelsewhere,
theAct of
1650barring
foreigners
from
thetradetothecolonies,
theNavigation
Actof 1651,and thefirstDutchWar are notfullycomprehensible
apartfroma consideration
of thenew merchants'
commercial
and
In an increasingly
politicalstrength.83
competitive
international
commercialenvironment,
opportunities
wouldrarelyanylongersimply
presentthemselves.
Theywouldhaveto be created,ifnecessary
by
politicalforce.
ROBERT BRENNER,

University
of Californiaat Los Angeles

81 P.R.O. C.O.77/7/6,7, 8; Calendar of the Court Minutesof the East India

Company1650-4,p. 49.
82 A full account of merchantpoliticsin Civil War London, on which these
general statementsare based, can be found in Brenner,"CommercialChange,"
chs. vi-ix.
83 See JamesFarnell'simportant
articleon "The NavigationAct, the FirstDutch
In my view, a preciseevaluationof
War, and the London MerchantCommunity."
the new merchants'role and influenceon commercialpolicyrequiresa more exact
than Prof.Farnellhas givenof the new merchants'positionwithinthe
specification
overallstructureof power. As Prof.Farnell is aware, the colonialmerchantswere
an important,
but far fromdominantelementin the politicsof the Commonwealth
and the Protectorate.

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