G.R. No. 118295.

May 2, 1997
Tanada v Angara

FACTS: On April 15, 1994 Sec. Rizalino Navaro then secretary for DTI representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations wherein the Philippines will be member of the
World Trade Organization. On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate concurred the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. On December 16, 1994 President Fidel V. Ramos signed the instrument of
ratification of the international agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.
On December 29, 1994 the petitioners, then Sen. Tanada et al. filed a petition assailing
the membership of the Philippines to the WTO on the grounds that the WTO requires the
Philippines to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products and that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the
constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, it also contends that the WTO
Agreement violated the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos to give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.
Lastly It was also argued by petitioners that the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic
globalization is unconstitutional.
HELD: The petition was DISMISSED.
The court answers the issues as to the petitioners allegation that the WTO violates article
II and XII of the constitution. Article II which is declaration of principles and state policies are
mere guidelines and are not self executing as stated by the court, these principles in Article II are
not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by
the legislature in its enactment of laws.
The court also stated in its ruling that the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy.
While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and

investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
In addition, the court also mentions the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent
national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community.
On the allegation that the it intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. The court stated that the foregoing
notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence
of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is identical to the genuine one
produced by the patented process and the fact of newness of the genuine product or the fact of
substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the patented process. The
foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the
present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent
Law.
As to the petitioners contention that the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power. The court stated, By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in
exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. The sovereignty
of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter
into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of
nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy,
Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The
age of interdependence is here.
Lastly, the court held that the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave itsconsent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of
the land is a legitimateexercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross
arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not
impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with
petitioners that it ismore advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution
No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to
nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial
power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority.