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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION
This Motion seeks to put an end to Leonard Cohens intentional and
unrelenting pattern of misconduct and litigation abuse. The misconduct in this
case includes the excessive and knowing use of perjured statements, fabricated
financial data, concealed evidence, and fraudulent misrepresentations.
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Plaintiffs, together with their legal counsel (specifically officers of the court
Robert Kory and Michelle Rice), have severely undermined the integrity of this
Court and caused substantial prejudice and harm to Kelley Lynch.
Dismissal is warranted where perjury and fraud upon the court is
systemic and designed to sabotage and enhance a case. Terminating sanctions,
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and other relief, would restore order and dignity to the judicial process. No
sanction short of dismissal is appropriate.
PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
On August 15, 2005, Leonard Cohen filed the Summons and Complaint in
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this matter. See Complaint on file. Defendant denies all allegations in
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Plaintiffs Complaint; contends that she was not served the Summons &
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Complaint; continues to maintain that this Court lacks jurisdiction over her
(including with respect to the denial of Defendants Motion to Vacate; and, has
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prepared a Proposed Answer to the exceedingly disturbing Complaint. Exhibit
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1: Proposed Answer to Complaint, attached hereto and made a part hereof.
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Plaintiffs use of litigation tactics and egregious misconduct, throughout
these proceedings, are addressed more fully in the declarations and exhibits
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attached hereto and made a part hereof. See also Lynchs Case History
attached to her Motion to Vacate. Some of the tactics used against Lynch were
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also memorialized in Natural Wealths June 2005 lawsuit against Leonard
Cohen and his lawyer, Robert Kory, in the District Court in Denver, Colorado. A
copy of that lawsuit was attached as Exhibit A to Tactical Allocation Services,
LLCs Ex Parte Application in Intervention for Order Protecting & Preserving
Documentary Evidence filed in Related Case No. BC341120 on November 14,
2005, made a part hereof, and addressed further in Lynchs Summary of
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Factual Allegations & Statements attached hereto and made a part hereof.
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Exhibit 2: Kelley Lynchs Summary of Factual Allegations & Statements Re:
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Natural Wealth Real Estate, Inc., et al. v. Leonard Cohen, et al., Case No. Case
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1:05-cv-01233-LTB.
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Cohens ultimate goal was to crush and destroy Lynch; bring her to her
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knees by rendering her financially incapable of defending against his lurid
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allegations; seal her fate through the use of salacious, inflammatory slander;
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and, undermine her credibility as a witness in this and other matters. Exhibit
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3: Summary of Fraudulent Misrepresentations in Plaintiffs Complaint attached
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hereto and made a part hereof.
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On May 15, 2006, the Court entered a default judgment against
Defendant.
On August 9, 2013, Lynch filed a Motion to Vacate and set aside the
default judgment due to lack of service of the Summons & Complaint.
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On January 17, 2014, without obtaining jurisdiction over Defendant, the
Court denied Lynchs request to vacate the default judgment.
Plaintiffs have acted in bad faith and with improper purpose in a manner
that degrades, offends, and jeopardizes the integrity of the judicial system.
Manufactured evidence, fraudulent misrepresentations, and perjured testimony
have continuously been introduced into this case. When a litigant's conduct
abuses the judicial process, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
dismissal of a lawsuit as the remedy within the inherent power of the court.
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Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. (1991) 501 U.S. 32. Exhibit 4: Declaration of Kelley
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Lynch; Exhibit 5: Declaration of Joan Lynch; Exhibit 6: Declaration of John
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Rutger Penick; Exhibit 7: Declaration of Paulette Brandt; Exhibit 8:
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Declaration of Clea Surkhang; Exhibit 9: Declaration of Palden Ronge; Exhibit
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10: Declaration of Dan Meade, all attached hereto and made a part hereof.
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LEGAL ARGUMENT
This Motion argues that Plaintiffs fraud on the court forms the basis for
dismissal with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice has long been available as a
sanction against litigation misconduct.
COURTS INHERENT POWER & AUTHORITY
TO DISMISS ACTION
Courts have inherent equitable powers to dismiss actions or enter default
judgments for failure to prosecute, contempt of court, or abusive litigation
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practices. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct.
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2455, 2463, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632, 82
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S.Ct. 1386, 632, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); United States v. Moss-American, Inc., 78
F.R.D. 214, 216 (E.D.Wis.1978).
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It is well-established that these equitable powers include the authority to
dismiss the claims or defenses against a litigant who engages in dishonest
conduct, obstructs the discovery process, abuses the judicial process, or
otherwise seeks to perpetrate a fraud on the court. See Link v. Wabash Railroad
Co. See also Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp, 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989);
McDowell v. Seaboard Farms of Athens, Inc., 1996 WL 684140, 2-3 (M.D. Fla.
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1996) (cases cited therein); Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D.
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384, 389 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that, when a litigant commits a fraud upon
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the court, the inherent powers of the court support the sanction of dismissal
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and entry of default judgment); Pope v. Federal Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982,
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984 (8 Cir. 1992) (dishonest conduct that threatens the integrity of the judicial
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process is grounds for dismissal with prejudice); Amway Corp. v. Shapiro
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Express Co., 102 F.R.D. 564, 56970 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d
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43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th
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DCA 1992); Figgie Intl, Inc. v. Alderman, 698 So. 2d 563, 56768 (Fla. 3d DCA
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1997); OVahey v. Miller, 644 So. 2d 550, 551 (holding that the ultimate
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sanctions of dismissal or default are justified by the repeated presentation of
false testimony under oath).
The United States Supreme Court held that a court need not endure the
indignity of a fraud being perpetrated upon it and concluded that a court
possesses the inherent power to manage its affairs in such a way as to ensure
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that cases are not resolved by vexatious or oppressive tactics, or through
conduct that skirts the legal obligations that bind all litigants and their
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attorneys to use the courts in a fair, honest, and open manner. The equitable
power also allows a court to vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud
has been perpetrated upon the court. Courts have inherent power to fashion
and impose appropriate sanctions for conduct that abuses the judicial process.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.
This historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten
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judgments, is necessary to the integrity of the courts, for tampering with the
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administration of justice in [this] manner ... involves far more than an injury to
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a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and
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safeguard the public. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.
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238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944). See also Universal Oil Products Co. v.
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Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580, 66 S.Ct. 1176, 1179, 90 L.Ed. 1447
(1946).
The integrity of the litigation process depends on truthful disclosure of
facts. Dismissal with prejudice has long been available as the ultimate civil
sanction against litigation misconduct. A system that depends on an
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adversarys endless ability to uncover falsehoods is doomed to failure, which is
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why this kind of conduct must be discouraged in the strongest possible way.
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Cox v. Burke. The need for the orderly administration of justice does not permit
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violations of due process. Phoceene Sous Marine, S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine,
Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 805-06 (9th Cir.1982).
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The California Supreme Court has recognized that California courts have
inherent powers, independent of statute, derived from two distinct sources: the
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courts equitable power derived from the historic power of equity courts and
supervisory or administrative powers which all courts possess to enable them
to carry out their duties. Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 626, 635 [150
Cal.Rptr. 461, 586 P.2d 942]. Such power is part of the inherent power of the
superior court (and of courts generally) to control litigation before it, to prevent
abuse of its process, and to create a remedy for a wrong even in the absence of
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specific statutory remedies. Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v. RMI, Inc.
(1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1116-1117 [222 Cal.Rptr. 556].
The Peat, Marwick Court, in a highly relevant California decision on the
inherent authority of courts, affirmed that judges are empowered to act when a
party seeks to take unfair advantage of the integrity of the judicial system.
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This decision directly addressed the fact that a courts inherent powers include
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the authority to terminate a case for litigation misconduct. It is the
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responsibility of courts to preserve the integrity of the adversary process and
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the fair and efficient administration of justice. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v.
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Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 272, 287 (1988).
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Plaintiffs serial misconduct cannot be remedied by any sanction other
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than a terminating sanction. The misconduct, involves a deliberate and
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elaborate scheme of perjury, fraudulent misrepresentations, and abusive
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tactics, and, clearly qualifies as a willful deceit that has irreparably harmed
Lynch and the integrity of the Court itself. Sanctions should be imposed to
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redress the misconduct that severely undermines the integrity of the judicial
system.
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FRAUD UPON THE COURT
Fraud upon the Court, an equitable remedy, deals with the integrity of
courts and justice. The concept of fraud upon the court correctly challenges a
preferential judicial legal principle: the finality of a judgment. A fraud on the
court as that term has been defined by the 9th Circuit is an unconscionable
plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its
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decision. England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir. 1960).
A party who is guilty of fraud or misconduct, in the prosecution or
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defense of a civil proceeding, should not be permitted to continue to employ the
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very institution it has subverted to achieve his or her ends. Carter v. Carter, 88
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So.2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1956). Thus, egregious and irreparable misconduct should
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result in the case being dismissed with prejudice. The power of a court to
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grant such relief not only deters improper actions by a party, but offers the
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defendant an opportunity to remedy the fraud through appropriate and
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available sanctions.
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The inherent power allows a court to vacate its own judgment upon proof
that fraud has been perpetrated upon the court. See Hazel-Atlas Glass
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Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co; Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co. It is
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a well-recognized principle that a court of general jurisdiction has the inherent
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power to set aside a judgment obtained through fraud practiced upon the court.
McKeever v. Superior Court, 85 Cal.App. 381 [259 P. 373]; McGuinness v.
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Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222 [237 P. 42, 45, 40 A.L.R. 1110]. There can be no
question as to the inherent power of the court to set aside the final decree if
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obtained by fraud. Miller v. Miller, 26 Cal. 2d 119, 121 [156 P.2d 931].
To constitute fraud on the court, the alleged misconduct must harm the
integrity of the judicial process. Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424
(9th Cir.1989). Fraud upon the court should embrace only that species of fraud
which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by
officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual
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manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for
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adjudication. Gumport v. China International Trust and Inv. Corp. (In re
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Intermagnetics America, Inc.), 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting 7
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James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 60.33, at 515 (2d ed.
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1978)). Fraud upon the court includes both attempts to subvert the integrity of
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the court and fraud by an officer of the court.
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7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 60.33, at 515 (2d ed. 1978)
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[hereinafter Moore], quoted in Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424 (9th
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Cir.1989).
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There are evidently no maxims of the law more firmly established, or of
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more value in the administration of justice, than those which were designed to
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prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same
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subject of controversy. However, according to United States v.
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Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878), there is an admitted exception to this general
rule in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a
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suit, there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case.
Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case,
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by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him
away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to
represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly
employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side,these, and
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similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or
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hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set
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aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new
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and a fair hearing. See U.S. v. Throckmorton. Relief has also been granted, on
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the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief
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against the judgment or decree, that party has been prevented from presenting
all of his case to the court.
There is no statute of limitations for bringing a fraud on the court claim.
As the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals explained: a decision produced by fraud on
the court is not in essence a decision at all and never becomes final. Kenner v.
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 387 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1968).
Due to the irreparable prejudice accruing to Defendant by reason of the
misconduct, interference with the Court's adjudicatory function, the public
interest in the integrity of the judicial system, dismissal is warranted.
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TERMINATING SANCTIONS
Defendant seeks sanctions for litigation abuses and misconduct.
Plaintiffs conduct warrants dismissal sanctions under the Courts inherent
equitable power. California courts retain flexibility to exercise historic inherent
authority in modern circumstances, fashioning procedures and remedies as
necessary to protect litigants rights. See Board of Supervisors v. Superior
Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830, 848, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560; Cottle v. Superior
Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377-1378, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882.
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Dismissal is an available sanction in extraordinary circumstances. Valley
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Engineers, Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Dismissal is appropriate where a pattern of deception and discovery abuse
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made it impossible for the district court to conduct a trial with any
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reasonable assurance that the truth would be available. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
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v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 352 (9th Cir.1995).
According to the 9th Circuit, extraordinary circumstances exist where
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there is a pattern of disregard for Court orders and deceptive litigation tactics
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that threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of a case. Valley
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Engineers, Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co.
Terminating sanctions are appropriate when a party seeks to take unfair
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advantage; the integrity of the judicial system is at risk; and as punishment or
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redress for grossly improper litigation behavior. Federal courts, and their state
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counterparts, have a well-acknowledged inherent power to levy sanctions in
response to abusive litigation practices. DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde
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Park, 163 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 1998). When the offending party has engaged
in truly willful or bad faith egregious litigation practices, the Supreme Court
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has affirmed that outright dismissal of a lawsuit . . . is within the court's
discretion. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.
The court in Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 736, held that a trial court has inherent power to impose a
terminating sanction where a plaintiff's litigation abuse and misconduct was
deliberate and egregious. It is well settled that dismissal is warranted where a
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party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the
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integrity of judicial proceedings: courts have inherent power to dismiss an
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action when a party has willfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct
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utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice. Wyle v. R.J.
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Reynolds Tobacco Company, 709 F.2d (9th Cir. 1983).
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In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., the U.S. Supreme Court
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granted relief based on the introduction of fraudulent evidence. The Court
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explained that the inquiry as to whether a judgment should be set aside for
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fraud upon the court focused on whether the alleged fraud harmed the integrity
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of the judicial process: Tampering with the administration of justice in the
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manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single
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litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard
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the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated
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consistently with the good order of society. Surely it cannot be that
preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always wait upon the
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diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the agencies of public
justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims
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of deception and fraud. The policy of finality is not absolute.
When the plaintiff has engaged in misconduct during the course of the
litigation that is deliberate, that is egregious, and that renders any remedy
short of dismissal inadequate to preserve the fairness of the trial, the trial court
has the inherent power to dismiss the action. Such an exercise of inherent
authority is essential for every court to remain a place where justice is
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judicially administered. Von Schmidt v. Widber (1893) 99 Cal. 511, 512, 34 p.
109, quoting 3 Blackstone Commentary 23.
PERJURY
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Plaintiffs willfully deceived the court and engaged in misconduct utterly
inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice, requirements of due
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process, and severe sanctions are the appropriate remedy.
The court in Televideo Systems, Inc. vs. Heidenthal (9th Cir. 1987) 826
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F.2d 915, 917) concluded that the appellants elaborate scheme involving
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perjury clearly qualifies as a willful deceit of the court and noted that it
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infected all of the pretrial procedures and interfered egregiously with the
courts administration of justice. The Court sanctioned Heidenthal not merely
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to punish him, but to enable the court to proceed to hear and decide the case
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untainted by further interference and possible further perjury on the part of
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Heidenthal.
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Dismissal is an appropriate sanction for perjury because committing
perjury is tantamount to acting in bad faith. Arnold v. County of El Dorado, No.
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2:10-CV-3119 KJM-GGH, 2012 WL 3276979, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012)
report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:10-CV-3119 KJM-GGH (E.D. Cal.
Sep. 27, 2012).
California Penal Code Section 118 defines perjury as deliberately giving
false information while under oath. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a
witness testifying under oath or affirmation violates this statute if she gives
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false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide
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false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty
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memory. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). All perjured
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relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment not
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resting on truth. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 228 (1945).
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Plaintiffs, together with officers of the court Robert Kory and Michelle
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Rice, have obstructed the judicial process by repeatedly providing false
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statements and testimony under oath, through fraudulent misrepresentations,
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by concealing evidence, providing misleading and deceptive statements to the
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Court, and submitting fraudulent financial and accounting data to the Court
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(which was referred to, with respect to Lynchs Motion to Vacate, in Robert
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Korys declaration that attached Kevin Prins declaration in support of the
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default and expense ledger.
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In order to lawfully hold a person to answer on the charge of perjury
under California Penal Code section 118, evidence must exist of a willful
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statement, under oath, of any material matter which the witness knows to be
false. Cabe v. Superior Court, (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 732. The statements
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were material and used to affect the outcome of the proceedings and most
certainly had the probability of influencing the outcome. In Ex Parte Davis,
(1921) 52 Cal.App. 631 the Court held that: The matter sworn to need not be
directly and immediately material. It is sufficient if it be so connected with the
fact directly in issue as to have a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove such
fact by giving weight or probability to the testimony of a witness testifying
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thereto, or otherwise.
Perjury is a criminal offense and an affront to the judicial system.
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Sanctions should be imposed to redress the misconduct that severely
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undermines the integrity of the judicial system. In the instant matter, Plaintiffs
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have engaged in a deliberate deception of this Court by the continuous
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presentation of statements known to be perjured and through other means.
UNCLEAN HANDS
Defendant additionally argues that Plaintiffs should be precluded from
seeking relief due to its own unclean hands. The underlying aim of the unclean
hands doctrine is to promote justice by making a plaintiff answer for his own
misconduct. Kendall-lackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 4th
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970, 978-79 (1999). This doctrine arises from long-standing legal principles
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rooted in fairness. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted regarding the unclean
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hands doctrine, This maxim is far more than a mere banality. It is a selfimposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with
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inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief. That
doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of a court of equity as a vehicle for
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affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith.
Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co. 324 U.S. 806, 814
(1945).
The clean hands doctrine allows courts to refuse relief to any plaintiff
who has acted inequitably. Judicial integrity, justice, and the public interest
form the basis for the doctrine. The defense of unclean hands arises from the
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maxim, He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Blain v.
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Doctors Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1059. The doctrine demands that a
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plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy. He must come
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into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief,
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regardless of the merits of his claim. Precision Co. v. Automotive Co; Hall v.
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Wright (9th Cir. 1957) 240 F.2d 787, 794-795.
California has long recognized the maxim that No one can take
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advantage of his own wrong. (Civ. Code. 3517.) He who comes into equity
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must come with clean hands. See Wilson v. S.L. Rey, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.
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App.4th 234, 244; Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd v. Superior Court. The doctrine
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promotes justice and prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his
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transgression. Precision Co. v. Automotive Co.; Keystone Co. v. Excavator Co.
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(1933) 290 U.S. 240, 245. See also London v. Marco, 229 P.2d 401, 402 (Cal.
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Dist. Ct. App. 1951)(misleading statements made to the court constitutes
unclean hands); Lazaro v. Lazaro (In re Marriage of Lazaro), No. A107473,
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2005 WL 1332102, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 6, 2005) (finding that presenting
false testimony in a court proceeding goes to the core of the unclean hands
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doctrine).
Under the unclean hands doctrine, a party is barred from relief if he
has engaged in any unconscientious conduct directly related to the transaction
or matter before the court. Burton v. Sosinsky (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 562,
573 [250 Cal.Rptr. 33]; California Satellite Systems, Inc. v. Nichols (1985) 170
Cal. App. 3d 56, 70 [216 Cal.Rptr. 180].
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The authority to dismiss a lawsuit for litigant misconduct is a creature of
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the clean hands doctrine and is applicable to both equitable and legal
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damages claims. Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co v Firestone Tire & Rubber
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Co., 544 F.Supp. 242, 244-245 (D SC, 1981). See also Mas v Coca-Cola Co., 163
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F.2d 505, 507 (CA 4, 1947).
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Plaintiffs have come before this Court with unclean hands. They have
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engaged in extreme and abusive litigation misconduct. They have taken
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advantage of Dependent due to the fact that she has been self-represented
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since the Complaint in this matter was filed. The Court should not aid or
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reward Plaintiffs for their egregious misconduct. Cohens very presence before
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this Court is the result of his own wrongful conduct, retaliation, fraud, and
inequity.
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THE JUDGMENT IS VOID & SHOULD BE VACATED
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The judgment is void to the extent it provides relief which a court under
no circumstances has any authority to grant. Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership
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v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 20 [84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715];
Selma Auto Mall II v. Appellate Department (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1683
[52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599]. No judgment of a court is due process of law, if
rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party. Scott
v. McNeal,154 U. S. 34,154 U. S. 46.
CLARIFICATION OF AMBIGUOUS JUDGMENT
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For the past 10 years, Leonard Cohen and his representatives have
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steadfastly refused to provide Lynch with IRS required form 1099 for the year
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2004, corporate tax documents for the years 2004 and 2005, rescind K-1s
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issued to Lynch by Leonard Cohens wholly owned LC Investments, LLC,
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provide intellectual property valuations and information (including royalty
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statements, evidence of royalty payments, all contracts and agreements, federal
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and state tax returns), she requires to have a complete and proper accounting
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prepared. Cohen has included income on his expense ledger. This tax
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information is required for Lynchs 2004 and 2005 federal and state tax
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returns. At the March 12, 2012 hearing, Cohen falsely testified that Lynch
failed to file her tax returns. Leonard Cohen, and his legal representatives,
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have knowingly and willfully refused to provide Lynch with the required
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information and are obstructing justice with respect to Lynchs ability to file
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these returns. Lynch would like clarification of the issues raised in Exhibit 11,
Clarification of Ambiguities in Default Judgment, attached hereto and made a
- 17 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
part hereof. That would include clarifying whether or not the judgment is
retroactive and, if so, to what date.
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A court of general jurisdiction has the inherent power to correct clerical
error in its records, whether made by the court, clerk or counsel, at anytime so
as to conform its records to the truth. Aspen Internat. Capital Corp. v. Marsch
(4th Dist., Div. One 1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 1199, 1220. A clerical mistake
may include an ambiguous provision in a judgment which seemingly changes
what was actually agreed to and ordered in open court. The mistake may be
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that of the lawyer who was asked to draft the court order. The judgment should
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accurately express what was done in court and what the judge had called for. It
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is the understanding of the court and not that of the parties that is the
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determinative factor. Russell v. Superior Court of Placer County (3rd Dist.
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1967) 252 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8. Ambiguous language in a judgment was addressed
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In Re: JCCP 4221/4224/4226&4428 Natural Gas Anti-Trust Cases (Pipeline).
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The Court had the authority to correct the ambiguous language where no such
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issue was raised, no arguments were made, no determinations were rendered,
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and no such conclusions were intended by the Court. The issue in that case
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involved the clerical correction of an ambiguous provision and over which the
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court maintained jurisdiction.
State and local government agencies may not encumber the exercise of
federal authority. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl.2, a state is
without power ... to provide conditions on which the federal government will
effectuate its policies. United States v. Georgia Public SefVice Comm'n, 371
- 18 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
U.S. 285, 293 (1963). Leonard Cohens argument, with respect to Lynchs
request for IRS filing and reporting requirements, essentially concludes that a
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state judgment negates Cohens tax obligations to Lynch and those of the
corporate entities themselves.
Since the United States is a government of delegated powers, none of
which may be exercised throughout the Nation by any one state, it is necessary
for uniformity that the laws of the United States be dominant over those of any
state. Such dominancy is required also to avoid a breakdown of administration
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through possible conflicts arising from inconsistent requirements. The
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Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states this essential
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principle. Article VI. A corollary to this principle is that the activities of the
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federal government are free from regulation by any state. No other adjustment
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of competing enactments or legal principles is possible. Mayo v. United States,
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319 U.S. 441 (1943).
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As the activities of the federal government are presumptively free from
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state regulation, unless Congress has clearly authorized state regulation in a
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specific area (See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1976)), it would
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seem self-evident that a state or local municipal courts judgment does not
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subvert IRS reporting and filing requirements.
After the entry of a state judgment, federal law dictates the consequences
for federal tax purposes. Thus, under the doctrine of preemption, which is
based upon the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal
law must control
- 19 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
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The trial court has continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior
judgments, either by summarily ordering compliance with a clear judgment or
by interpreting an ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate the
judgment as interpreted. This authority is grounded in its inherent powers.
CONCLUSION
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Based on the foregoing, Kelley Lynch respectfully requests that the Court
sustain the Motion, impose terminating and other sanctions upon Plaintiffs and
their counsel (Robert Kory and Michelle Rice), and grant such other or further
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relief as the Court may deem just and appropriate. That would include, but is
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not limited to, in the alternative, permitting Lynch to be heard on the actual
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merits of the case, referring this matter to the local prosecutor for perjury
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charges and the state disciplinary board. Additionally, Lynch asks this Court to
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clarify the ambiguous judgment entered against Lynch. Finally, Defendant
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Lynch asks the Court to overturn and invalidate the settlement agreement
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entered into by Cohen and former co-defendant, Richard Westin, and order
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Plaintiffs to provide Lynch with transcripts of all mediation proceedings and a
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copy of the settlement agreement itself.
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Dated: 16 March 2015
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__________________________________
Kelley Lynch
In Propria Persona
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- 20 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
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MOTION EXHIBITS
Case No. BC338322
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Exhibit 1: Defendants Proposed Answer to Complaint.
Exhibit 2: Kelley Lynchs Summary of Factual Allegations & Statements Re:
Natural Wealth Real Estate, Inc., et al. v. Leonard Cohen, et al., Case No. Case
1:05-cv-01233-LTB.
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Exhibit 3: Summary of Fraudulent Misrepresentations in Plaintiffs Complaint.
Exhibit 4: Declaration of Kelley Lynch.
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Exhibit 5: Declaration of Joan Marie Lynch.
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Exhibit 6: Declaration of John Rutger Penick.
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Exhibit 7: Declaration of Paulette Brandt.
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Exhibit 8: Declaration of Clea Surkhang.
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Exhibit 9: Declaration of Palden Ronge.
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Exhibit 10: Declaration of Dan Meade.
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Exhibit 11: Clarification of Ambiguities in Default Judgment.
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- 21 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
EXHIBIT 1
DEFENDANTS PROPOSED ANSWER
TO COMPLAINT
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- 22 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
EXHIBIT 2
KELLEY LYNCHS SUMMARY OF FACTUAL
ALLEGATIONS & STATEMENTS
RE: NATURAL WEALTH V. LEONARD COHEN
CASE NO. 1:05-cv-01233-LTB
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- 23 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
EXHIBIT 3
SUMMARY OF FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
IN PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT
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- 24 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
EXHIBIT 4
DECLARATION OF KELLEY LYNCH
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- 25 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
EXHIBIT 5
DECLARATION OF JOAN MARIE LYNCH
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- 26 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
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EXHIBIT 6
DECLARATION OF
JOHN RUTGER PENICK
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- 27 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
EXHIBIT 7
DECLARATION OF PAULETTE BRANDT
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- 28 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
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EXHIBIT 8
DECLARATION OF CLEA SURKHANG
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- 29 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
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EXHIBIT 9
DECLARATION OF PALDEN RONGE
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- 30 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
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EXHIBIT 10
DECLARATION OF
DANIEL J. MEADE
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- 31 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
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EXHIBIT 11
CLARIFICATION OF AMBIGUITIES
IN DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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- 32 Memorandum of Points & Authorities
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Paulette Brandt, certify as follows:
1. At the time of service I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this
action.
2. My residence address is: 1754 N. Van Ness Avenue, Los Angeles,
California 90028.
3. The electronic service address from which I served the documents is
[email protected].
4. On March 13, 2015, I served the following documents:
NOTICE OF MOTION
FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES
DECLARATIONS & EXHIBITS
5. I served the documents on the person below, as follows:
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a. Name of person served: JEFFREY KORN, ESQUIRE
(Attorney of record for Leonard Cohen and LC Investments, LLC)
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b. Residential address where person was served:
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714 W. Olympic Blvd.
Suite 450
Los Angeles, California 90015
c. Electronic service address where person was served:
[email protected]I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on March 13, 2015.
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____________________________________
Paulette Brandt
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- 33 Memorandum of Points & Authorities