DISTORTED HISTORY

EAST PAKISTAN 1971

A COMMON MANS NARRATIVE

Colonel (retired) Nazir Ahmed

List of Contents

Part I The Experience

1. Prologue
2. Village Life
3. Ayub Khans Era
4. Call to Arms
5. Move to East Pakistan
6. Thakurgaon
7. Panjbibi
8. Prisoner of war
9. Back home to a New Pakistan
10. South Waziristan
11. Reverting back to Khakis
12. Army Hajj Contingent - 1984
13. Shikarpur and Thereafter
14. Lure of Mountains
15. Retirement and Post Retirement Years

Part II Opinions

16. Conflict with India

17. The Stranglehold
18. 11 Sep 2001 and its Aftermath
19. Taliban
20. Regional Context
21. The Fallacey of Armys Rule
22. Overcoming Unrest in Balochistan
23. The Question of Provinces in Pakistan
24. Local Governments and Community Development
25. Provision of Justice
26. Epilogue

Prologue

No claim of erudition, literary merit or pretence of sagacity prompts me to write the

following account. The stimulus to undertake this demanding endeavour is to state
some facts which would help negate false perceptions about the tragic events in
erstwhile East Pakistan during that fateful year 1971. Being one of about thirty two
thousand armed forces personnel who spent over two years in Prisoners Of War
(POW) camps in India, I have felt extreme frustration and helplessness on vicious
lies about proceedings of that tumultuous year resulting in breakup of Pakistan, the
largest Muslim country of the world.
While the number of prisoners was exaggerated to a preposterous figure aimed at
denigrating Pakisrtan Army, the atrocities attributed to men of the Army are the
greatest falsehood propagated and pursued even after over forty years of that
catastrophic event. Every year around 16 December the local press has been
derisively writing about the disgrace of a military defeat, despite the fact that those
men performed their task beyond the call of duty. The breakup of our country was
caused by factors other than merely the result of military operations. The real factors
are hardly considered. It will become evident from events described in this narrative
that the plan to dismember our country was hatched in West Pakistan by those
people who did not see their chance of coming to power in a united Pakistan. They
got ready support from outside powers with India in the lead, instigating, training and
launching terrorist groups from their soil into East Pakistan, followed by outright
invasion to wind up the plan.
This account gives glimpses of history of Pakistan, the events I witnessed and was a
participant of. These are described from a different angle, from the perspective of a
common man who is neither a historian writing from distance in time and space,
giving subtle twists to events according to his understanding and interpretations. Nor
it is written by someone in haste to build false image, save reputations or mere
glororification of a side, like The Lightening Campaign which Major General D K
Palit of India brought out within weeks on conclusion of war. Except for a book
Mission with a Difference by Lietunent General P N Kathpalia who led his task force
aginst 34 Punjab in Thakurgaon Sector, I have not read the books written by many
Indians and some Pakistanis; so my narrative is not influenced by other peoples
opinions. It is simple statement of facts as I saw on ground.
Some important facts in our short history got distorted and were substituted by
carefully crafted presumptions, spreading lies through controlled media, the state
owned Pakistan Television introduced in 1964 and Radio Pakistan, turning devils
into heroes and vice versa. The present state of all pervasive media is recent
phenomenon and came much later than those momentous events; the two wars with

India and dismemberment of Pakistan. My account thus challenges prevailing

perceptions about rulers and exposes lies with which they befooled the people.
My account will be incomplete without recounting the atmosphere of serenity and
contentment in lives of common people of Pakistan before 1965 War, in contrast to
growing insecurity, uneasiness and agitation of later years, caused by crooked,
dishonest and incompetent policy makers, leading to current chaotic situation that we
find ourselves in. Thus the chronicle starts with some impressions about life one
lived in rural environments about sixty years back. This part was demanded by my
children, particularly the eldest, Ahmad Yaman, who was keen to record
unbelievable changes in living conditions and social environments which have taken
place in these years. My children, who used to visit the village as little boys, would
listen to the state of affairs prevailing in rural areas not long ago with scepticism and
disbelief. The changes, particularly in agricultural processes and overall village life of
comparative isolation and self sustenance have been rapid and fundamental,
replacing old ways, taking away the romance of rural life.
The narrative is in two parts. Part I relates to the experience which I went through.
Counter insurgency operations in erstwhile East Pakistan culminating in war with
India in 1971 have been chronicled in some detail where I was a participant or a
witness. Part II conveys some of my opinions on matters of collective concern
formed while struggling through the journey of life.

Nazir Ahmed
Islamabad,
.......... 2013

PART ONE THE EXPERIENCE

Village Life
As I look back at my journey through life, the kaleidoscope starts with the
momentous event of creation of Pakistan. For a child of about five years, it was not
possible to comprehend its impact. There was no conflict, fighting, arson, looting or
unrest of any kind in our area. My village Kufri, (renamed Bilalabad) is situated about
twelve kilometres away towards west from Talagang, a tehsil headquarters then part
of Campbellpur /Attock district in the rain fed Pothohar region of Pakistan. In that
village there were a few Hindu families and one Sikh family residing at that time. The
Hindu families were more affluent because of owning better tracts of land and doing
small businesses including money lending. As the migration started, the Hindu
families gave keys of their houses to neighbors with the understanding that they
would be coming back after sometime when the dust settled. In most cases the
neighbors accompanied them from the village up to the town of Talagang to bid them
farewell. If the Indian Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh felt nostalgic to invite his
class fellow from Village Gah, near Chakwal to India after almost sixty years of that
event, he must have nurtured fond memories of peaceful life in those times in this
part of the land. Later we heard of killings, mainly in the towns along the railway line
running from Rawalpindi to Lahore, an unfortunate chapter of our history whatever
the reasons which caused this madness.
Life in the household with agricultural background entailed multiple chores like
grazing animals after the school hours, bringing fodder from fields, chopping wood
and other numerous small tasks mostly involving outdoor activities. I still feel longing
for the fragrance of land and its crops of different seasons. The village at that time
was a self sufficient unit meeting almost all the requirements of life. The means of
transporting materials were mainly confined to camels for longer distances and
donkeys for short hauls. Movement of people was mostly on foot. For distant travel,
camels were used to carry the women and children being placed in Kajawas (a
wooden contraption). The present means of communications which make movement
of goods and material so easy were not available then. The communities were
therefore forced to stay self contained, devising their own solutions to meet essential
requirements. Travel was adventure undertaken under extreme compulsion. As a
child I would hear my grandmother narrating account of travel during second and
third decades of twentieth century. Since my grandfather was member of a small
team of revenue officials deputed to the State of Las Bela on the Arabian Sea coast
for making revenue record of the State, my grandmother had a chance to travel on
the newly introduced railway system more than once. She would narrate as to how
they would travel on camels to catch a train at Injra Railway Station on Attock
Mianwali Section, the nearest one from our village. Unpredictable Soan River had to
be crossed before reaching railway station which posed problems. The train journey
would take three days. There were no fast moving trains available then. Karachi was
very small place, the travellers mostly staying at Khara Darr and Mitha Darr in one of
the two inns named after their owners (I cannot recollect the names of those owners

grandmother used to tell). From Karachi to Bela the journey was conducted in seven
stages, each stage covered in one day travelling on the camels. The first stage was
from Kharadar to Hab Chowki, from where the State of Las Bela started. Midway
was Uthal and the seventh stage was Bela.
The village community was self sufficient in its basic needs. Food was grown in the
fields, sown with the old plough using two animals, the practice of thousands of
years as can be seen in murals from the Indus Valley civilization preserved in
frescos at ruins of Harrapa and Mohan Jo Darro. Introduction of 'tractor' has
eliminated the need of old plough and its related gear which is becoming extinct and
will fade away altogether from the agricultural scene.
Wheat, the main crop was sown in early winters after the land had been prepared by
ploughing at least twice and then its surface made plain with the help of a heavy
wooden plank known as majj (suhaga) pulled by the two animals. Sowing was
done by adding a device known as nal to plough and the seed released in the nal
by an experienced hand to avoid cluttering or leaving gaps. Gram and mustered
were also sown during the same period. The crops took about six months to be
ready for harvesting and depended totally on the rains for growth in our rain fed
areas. Wheat crop was ready for harvesting in mid April, by 1st of Besakh in the
Bikrami Calendar in the Punjab and Pothohar region. The festival of Besakhi,
celebrated with zest particularly by the Sikh community was to start the harvesting
process.
The first step was to cut the crop. Armed with sickles the whole household would
reach their fields early in the morning and start cutting plants, binding these into
manageable sizes for easy handling. Anyone who lagged behind in cutting would
invite the neighbors and relatives for help. This was called Maang. The food served
to them would be very well prepared 'Dall Chana' with 'Tandoori Roti' during early
part of the day. In the evening it would be 'Ghee' and 'Shakar' (brown sugar)
consumed with the Tandoori Roti. This was standard practice from which no one
deviated. The food otherwise was very simple. Wheat was staple diet supplemented
by Bajra and Maize for some months in the winters. For afternoon snacks,
particularly for children, seasonal grains like gram, maize, 'Jawar' and 'Bajra' were
roasted by the local Bhatiara/Bathiari who started work after Zuhar prayers and
closed by Maghrib prayers. Milk was not sold in the village. It was processed to
make butter and lassi a drink which was available free of cost to anyone who did
not have animals of his own. Pulses, ocassionaly chicken and vegetable grown in
the village by some families called Maliars on small pieces of irrigated land around
the wells were consumed mainly with the evening meal. Meat would be available
only when someones animal became sick and had to be slaughtered. Other source
of meat was through hunting of the rabbits and birds.
Coming back to the processing of the harvested wheat, the next stage was to
separate grain from the plants which involved spreading plants on a compacted part

of the field, called Khalara and crushing these with the help of heavy branches of
trees bound in a certain pattern pulled by the animals moving in circles. This was
known as gah and the device made with the help of branches known as mairra.
Once the plants were thoroughly broken, the whole material would be collected in a
heap of particular shape known as dharr. Further process was dependent on gentle
breeze to separate grain from the husk Bhoosa by throwing up small portions of the
material in the air using a device known as karahi. The grains being heavier would
fall near the heap and husk a little away completing the separation process. This
however would take a couple of days to complete because blowing of breeze in a
certain direction and speed was not there all the time. The husk would be
compressed with the help of five to six cots Charpoys bound together to form an
open container turning it into a cone shaped Bhowara for use during the year for
feeding animals. The grain would be put into jute bags containing two and a half
maunds (about one hundred kilograms) each. The measures used were vessels of
various sizes like Chaha equal to about three Sers (its fourth part a Paeeni and
Lap being the smallest measure). One Ser was a little less than a kilogram. It was
further divided into Pao a fourth part and Chitank the sixteenth part. Similarly for
currency, one rupee was also divided into sixteen parts called aanas which was
further divided into four parts called paisa. One could make purchases of small
requirements even against half a paisa, called dhela. Smaller coins like Pai, Ratti
and Kauri had gone out of use by then; only their names used in metaphors.
The grain would be loaded on camels and brought home, a happy ending of a long,
difficult process in which everyone from the house including children had remained
involved. This whole process of harvesting crops has been simplified by the use of
tractors and other agricultural machinery during recent years. The equipment and
gadgets used in agricultural process before advent of Tractor age like, Hal, Jula
Panjali, Karah, Tringul, Karahi, Maj, and many others have become extinct.
With wheat brought home, the season of marriages started. After keeping certain
quantity of wheat for domestic requirements till next crop, additional wheat was sold
to generate funds for marriage expenses.
The main population of our village was of the Awan tribe who had come in this area
about one thousand years back when King Mahmood of Ghazni (Afghanistan)
started his attacks across the Indus River. The tribe led by Qutub Shah settled in the
area bounded roughly by Soan River in the North to Salt Range in the south and
west and line Chakwal - Choa Saidan Shah in the east. The tribe was of Arabic
origin who had ventured east in search of livelihood and ultimately landed up in this
region. A theory, that the tribe is from local Jaat stock as given by some British
writers, in not tenable. The use of household words describing utensils in the house
and other items of daily use were pure Arabic words like Sahnak for the large
earthen utensil used to knead flour for making Rotis, the word Tabak for the larger
plate and Sahanki for small plate, all earthenware locally made and Wassal for the
onion. These were obviously different from the words used for describing these items

of daily use in rest of the surrounding areas. The title of Malik with the names of
Awans is also an Arabic word, different from titles added to the names of people of
other tribes and casts in the area. The dress was also a little different particularly the
style of wearing headgear. Till the fifties and early sixties there was no concept of
getting out of ones house and moving about in the village without headgear. Haircut
was also of a particular pattern. All this gradually changed after nineteen sixties due
to external influences and changing environments.
As mentioned earlier, the village was self sufficient in most of its requirements of
daily life. The main source of income being through agricultural activity, the
agriculturist was supported by other artisans. Under a term called saip the artisans
were attached with different agriculturist families to get a share from the harvested
crops as compensation for their work. There was no concept of cash remunerations.
A Lohar combined the work of blacksmith, carpenter and mason. The weaver
produced cloth from thread woven by the women at home on their harkha. Mian
Muhammad the weaver in our neighbourhood was a very skilful artisan producing
Khes (sort of light weight blanket) of very intricate designs when he was free from
producing coarse cloth for general use. The coarse cloth was taken by Dhobi
(washer man) to a stream, Nullah Ankar, about five kilometres away from the village
for bleaching it to white from its original off white colour. Dhobi was also responsible
to prepare food for weddings and other occasions in his famous Deg locally known
as Rangan. The Teli produced oil in his small factory, a Ghaani from the local
oilseeds like Mustard and Tara Mira. A potter produced earthen wear of all kinds
used in the household through a long, laborious process requiring considerable skill
and aesthetic sense. In fact all the artisans working in the village had a well
developed aesthetic sense related to their work producing very presentable
products. The cobbler Mochi, apart from mending shoes would also make new
shoes, starting the process from treating the hides to producing finished shoes of
particular patterns for men and women. In my village a large community of cobblers
was concentrated producing fancy ladies shoes called Kussas using golden thread
to embellish the tops. This was a well organised handicraft industry. An elderly man,
Haji Noor Muhammad with his impressive attire including a stylish headdress would
collect the pairs of shoes from the community every evening and would go to
Talagang on a Tanga a horse drawn carriage, to deliver the produce to a shop
owned by Sheikh Yousuf, a Khoja. These shoes were then sent to other cities and
were quite a famous variety.
The barber Nai was an institution in him. Apart from his work of haircutting and
some shaves, a new trend of not growing beards, the barber was the messenger
whose message was considered most important. He was the event manager on
occasions like marriages and funerals. His wife was to assist him in managing the
female side. She was also the matchmaker suggesting matches and communicating
between the parties. The barbers house was also the beauty parlor, the women
visiting to get their hair done, making plaits and braids of different patterns for special

occasions. Barber also acted as a surgeon, who would also circumcise the children
by diverting their attention followed by a quick cut with a sharp blade. He would apply
ash to stop the blood and later a self prepared balm to heal the wounds. The healing
process was long and painful. An elderly Aulia Nai was expert in such surgery. In my
childhood I had cuts from Baba Aulia twice to take out puss accumulated in some
kind of boils on my hands and I carried the scars for a long time. The medical
services were provided by Hakim Ghulam Muhammad, whose shop or Matab was
full of aromas due to preparation of different medicines. He was good in
understanding and diagnosis of ailments by traditional method of holding a patients
wrist to check the count and strength of heartbeat. His medicines were mainly
herbal, prepared by him in his shop. His young assistant was continuously busy in
grinding something in a marble bowl known as Kharl.
There were a few families of vegetable growers, the Maliars who would grow
vegetables on small pieces of land irrigated from nearby wells. These wells were
located on eastern and western sides of the village on the banks of small seasonal
Nullahs. Our house was on the western side of the village. Water was brought by
women in pitchers from these wells located about one and half kilometre away on
the western side of the village. Here a small spring, which dried up later gave very
good quality water used for drinking.
Fetching water was a major work for women, generally done in the afternoon. At this
time there was lot of rush on the wells. Usually they would carry two pitchers on their
heads, an odd one carrying three. In the houses pitchers would be kept on wooden
stands for three to five pitchers known as Gharwanji. The water being a very scarce
commodity and brought to the house with much labour would be carefully used for
drinking and cooking. Men would generally take bath in bathrooms outside the
Mosque; with water taken from the well located inside mosque premises. From that
well, water was taken out with the help of a bucket pulled by a rope fixed on a round
wooden structure by one person assigned this job for which he was compensated by
the community. The women would generally bathe on the wells from where they
brought water. Washing of clothes was also done on the wells. The present day
emphasis on rain water harvesting was then practiced in the form of water being
stored in small reservoirs known as Bann at suitable places in the undulating
ground. This water was used for drinking by animals and the people alike particularly
while working in fields away from the village.
Life in the village was very different from present times. There was no electricity,
main source of light after sunset was earthen lamp filled with locally made oil from
Tara Mira. This lamp, called Diva would be placed on a wooden platform known as
Darokha with some steps to adjust its position. Lantern had also come into use and
a few Patromax lamps which were used for special occasions like weddings. The
lamps would be used for a short duration because people routinely consumed
evening meals just after Maghrib prayers and would go to sleep after Isha prayers.
This enabled everyone to start the next day early.

The first job of women of the household was to grind flour for the day on their
Chakki, a job done by the morning prayers time, prepare food and deliver to the
men who started their work on the fileds after morning preyers. Ploughing and
working the fields was major task spread over most of the year. It was time
consuming and laborious to prepare even a small field with the help of old
instruments pulled by the animals. With introduction of tractors one cannot conceive
the timeframe and effort involved in agricultural activity in those times.
Whole families, brothers and cousins were housed in rows of adjacent houses.
There were few disputes among men but womenfolk would have many things
against each other. In the absence of men they would take it out verbally with each
other. Some fertile minds would invent their own invective according to the situation.
Crime was almost nonexistent. One murder in the village in my childhood was that of
a person being thrown in an unused well by his wife with the help of her paramour. In
another incident a party in shape of a Lashkar armed with sticks and Kulharis (axe)
attacked the Mohalla of shoemakers due to some dispute. In the ensuing battle two
men, one from each side, were killed.
Overall atmosphere was that of peace and contentment as the limited requirements
of people were being met. The children were a happy lot as there was lot of time to
play in the fields outside village which would continue till late during moonlit nights of
summers months. Marriages were mostly arranged in summers after harvesting
wheat crop which generated income to be spent on such occasions. Marriage
proceedings were quite lengthy, starting about two weeks before the actual date of
marriage. The bridegrooms friends and male cousins would get together in the
evenings, their main activity being singing songs where everyone was persuaded to
sing. Without modern days microphones, singing taxed the vocal cords but some of
the young men could sing very well. Hafiz Sadiq, apart from reciting the Holy Quran,
had melodious voice for songs and used to remain in great demand on these
occasions. Folk dances by men on the sound of 'Dhol', the drum, were performed
with enthusiasm and verve. Hussain Dholi (called Senu; many of us did not know his
real name nor bothered to find out as distorting names was normal practice) was the
only one from village who remained quite busy and his work was supplemented
occasionally by getting more 'Dholis' from the neighbouring village Akwal when
required, particularly on the occasions of bull races.
Husain Dholi had also to provide his services to the women performing their dances.
Otherwise men were not to be seen around the place where women would gather to
perform 'Gharoli' a set of female folk dances, an important part of the marriage
proceedings. Women would go to the village 'cultural centre' in the afternoon,
carrying a small size decorated earthen pitcher, a small 'Ghara' to perform 'Gharoli',
their session ending before sunset. (Aabida Parveen, our great singer refers to this
in her popular song 'main yar the Gharoli bhardi' meaning that I dance for my friend)
This 'cultural centre' was an open space with a rainwater pond at one corner of it,
located on eastern end of the village under massive 'Pipal' trees. During Eid days a

'Mela' would be organised at this place. Main entertainments during the Mela at this
spot were competition to carry weight, swings for children and stalls of various
eatables, mainly sweetmeats. Groups of acrobats would also visit occasionally to
display their skills like walking on a rope and other likewise items.
Occasionally some theatre groups would be invited to perform in the villages, a
group from village Hamok in Khushab being very popular in the area in the fifties.
They would stage traditional dramas based on the love stories like Heer Ranjha and
Sohni Mahiwal etc. The show would be arranged in the fields during the nights,
particularly around dried water storage ponds Banns, because its layout facilitated
the view of spectators. People from adjoining villages would also come over to enjoy
the performance which would last till the time of Fajar prayers. In late fifties theatre
groups of Alam Lohar and Inayat Bhatti started coming to Talagang to perform, their
shows attracting lot of people. Once a story teller came to the village and was
accommodated in Hujra a room within mosque premises. He stayed for quite a few
days. At night after Isha prayers, he would start narrating his stories which were
listened to with rapt attention because of their interesting content. Hujra was part of
the mosque used as a guest room for travellers staying for the night. At Maghrib
prayers, the prayer leader would announce that there were so many guests that
night for the food to be provided to them which would be done by different
households.
The children like adults were equally enthusiastic viewers and listeners to the
entertainment programmes. Parents were not worried about the children, knowing
that they were in a group and in the company of cousins and some elder, the overall
environments being peaceful without any threat. If some dispute erupted the worst
would be a fist fight or use of sticks. Firearms were nonexistent. There were only two
licensed weapons, 12 guage shot guns, in the village; one with my father and
another one with Haji Noor Muhammad, the person I have mentioned earlier. There
was no concept of keeping any unlicensed weapon. Police was much feared, a
single Police constable appearing in the village would create a scare.
When I started going to school, it was a lower middle school housed in a rented
building in one corner of the village in a fairly open area. It had classes from first to
sixth grade. Later during some reorganisation the classes were reduced to five which
remained so for a long period till the school was shifted to a newly constructed
building near the road and classes raised to middle and then high school level. My
first teacher was Lal Khan Dali from a nearby hamlet known as Dhok Dali; an elderly
well built man who had served in the Army and after retirement had taken up
teaching. Till old age he taught first grade class and was expert in developing
interest of small children in learning. Headmaster of the village primary school was
Master Abdul Hadi our immediate neighbour in the village. He was a dedicated
teacher who would organise extra classes for students of class five who had to
appear for the examinations at the middle school of neighbouring village Saghar.
These classes were held between the Maghrib and Isha prayers in a vacant house

near the main Mosque. Well prepared for the examination when I appeared before
an elderly teacher Syed Alam Shah at Saghar School, he asked me a question as to
why Mir Anis, the poet was known as Mir Anis Lakhnavi. In chaste Urdu my reply
was that Lakhnow was name of a city and the people from that city were known as
Lakhnavis. My reply and the tone impressed the old man who asked other teachers
present as to whose son I was? When he was told that I was son of Malik Abdul
Razaq, himself a well known teacher, the old man was pleased. Syed Alam Shah
belonged to a neighbouring village Dher Mond and had been teacher of the then
Headmaster of the School, Malik Karam Ilahi from village Dhulli. All the old teachers
were dedicated men respected by the society who did great service in inspiring
children of the new nation, preparing them to shoulder their responsibilities in life. It
is not surprising that the product of those Tat schools did great service to the nation
in various fields. Tat was thick matting woven in length for small children in primary
classes who were to sit on ground. Tables and benches were made available in
secondary level schools. Management of the schools was done at the District level
by the District Boards for Education. An effective inspections system was in place,
the District Inspectors and Assistant District Inspectors at the District and Tehsil level
respectively carrying out regular inspections to check the standards.
When I joined class sixth in Saghar School, I was told by Syed Alam Shah that
during his period of teaching Persian, I would stand by his chair instead of sitting on
the bench at my assigned place. I would read out the text and the teacher would
explain the meanings. If any of my class fellows was to commit a mistake and the
teacher wanted to punish him, he would ask me to give four blows on the neck of
that student, two on each side. He would ask me to harden my fists by practicing on
stones on my way back home. Promoted to class seventh, I was given relief of not
standing next to the teachers chair and did reading from my bench. My first
experience of getting the blows on my neck and how one felt was in class seventh.
While reading the text I committed a mistake and the teacher told Akbar sitting next
to me to give me four blows. Akbar had been frequent receiver of my blows so he
used his full force to do the job. For a short while there was complete blackout before
my eyes. I took some time to recover from the shock. The teacher realising that
Akbar had been extra efficient in obeying the command, got out of his chair with
some difficulty and himself gave Akbar a few blows with his feeble hands.
The distance between our village and the school at Saghar was about seven
kilometers on a dusty track. It involved crossing of two perennial streams which
would be flooded during rains. We the children from my village, substantial in
number used to move in groups. Going to and coming back from school was fun,
particularly while coming back when there was some spare time to indulge in pranks.
Three years in Saghar School passed and after class eighth I moved to Talagang
High School for matriculation, residing in boarding house on the edge of a seasonal
stream on eastern end of the town. This stream with its white unpolluted sand was
arena of a most entertaining game of Kabbadi organised by the local organisation

once every week. Players from other parts of the region would also be invited to
participate in the game. Competing teams would come to the venue with beating of
drums and lot of fanfare. It was most enjoyable to see the whole proceedings.
Compounder Shafi was star player whose specialty was to jump over the opponent,
putting one foot on the opponents shoulder. For this Shafi would make his opponent
get into a position which facilitated his trick. Every player knew his technique but
would get beaten by his dexterous moves.
There were many other occasions to enjoy witnessing various kinds of sports like the
bulls races, a pair of bulls pulling load of mud. These competitions were frequently
held in different villages and promoted rearing of very good quality animals of Dhani
breed, famous for their beauty and agility. The animals reared by a family of
Talagang, the Sabunia Maliks, known as such because of owning a local 'Desi
Sabun' (soap) factory, continued to win first prize in the annual festival held at
Lahore for a number of years. Other significant means of entertainment were
frequent Melas, the main event being annual three days festival organised by the
local administration at Talagang. One major attraction on this Mela was the game of
'Pirr Kaudi' for which famous players of area including surrounding districts would
participate. Akbar Niazi from some village in Mianwali district was star player of that
game in late fifties. The game was different from 'Kabaddi' which is played in a
confined space and is still being played, the East Punjab government being its recent
patron. 'Pir Kaudi' is played no more. In this game a player challenges the opponents
to catch him. Two players of the opponent team accept the challenge. The
challenger then starts running away from the start point being pursued by the two
men. The challenger, after running for a considerable distance remaining in sight of
the audience which would be a few hundred yards, turns back to reach the starting
point avoiding being stopped by the two men pursuing him. He scores the point if he
can reach starting point without being stopped. This game was played by tall men of
ideal physique and it was a pleasure to watch them running and using different
techniques to score their points. The pursuers would often use a technique called
'Kainchi' (Scissor). This was to use one's legs in a scissor fashion to drop the
challenger entangling his legs. Some player's were very adept in it. The challenger
would mainly use his better speed, pushing and slapping the pursuers when they
tried to come near him. This whole process was most amusing for the audience.
The overall environment was of contentment, happiness and enjoyment in outdoor
sports and Melas. Almost every man living in the village was self employed. The
peasants after sowing their wheat crop would go to Karachi in winters to work in
construction industry as labourers till the time of harvesting their crop in April,
earning some cash during the period. The animals would be looked after by the
women and children. Women worked more than men in the agricultural households.
Service in Army was preferred choice as agriculture could not provide sustainable
livelihood to the communities in the arid, rain fed area. As a young man I started this
journey of adventure spanning over three decades.

Looking back at the life as a witness and participant of events, I feel the pain of
distortions, misconception and lies about important events during our short history as
some would get revealed in the subsequent chapters.

Ayub Khans Era

Pakistan, after independence, lost its founder Governor General Quaid-e-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah just after one year. After another three years the Prime
Minister, Mr Liaqat Ali Khan, a seasoned politician, was assassinated in October
1951 as he was about to address public meeting in Rawalpindi. Former bureaucrats,
Mr Ghulam Muhammad, Mr Iskander Ali Mirza, Mr Muhammad Ali and others took
over control of the country indulging in power games with the result that no stable
government could be formed. In 1954 General Ayub Khan, the Army Chief was
inducted into cabinet as Defence Minister, a strange decision but in keeping with
mindset of rulers bent upon retaining power regardless of propriety. The country did
not have a constitution till 1956. In our first constitution, East and West Pakistan
were made into two equal units, having equal representation in the National
Assembly despite the fact that East Pakistan had more population. After two years
and frequent changes of governments, President of Pakistan, Mr Iskander Ali Mirza
declared Martial Law in the country on 07 October 1958 taking over control of the
government. In an atmosphere of deceptions and intrigues, he was overthrown by
General, later Field Marshal, Muhammad Ayub Khan, the first Pakistani
Commander-in-Chief of our national army, who assumed control of Pakistan
Government on 27 October 1958. Mr Iskandar Mirza was exiled to UK where he
spent rest of his life.
Field Martial Muhammad Ayub Khan, a graduate of Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst, UK, groomed in British Military tradition was a towering personality, a
very impressive man. He took over leadership role in keeping with the trend of
military men heading governments in many other countries after conclusion of
Second World War. At that time, countries like the US, France, Spain, Yugoslavia
and Egypt were led by former military men i.e. General Dwight D Eisenhower,
General Charles de Gaul, General Franco, Marshal Tito, and Colonel Jamal AbdulNaasir respectively.
The initial years of President Ayub Khans rule witnessed rapid progress in every
field. Right after independence, work on developing very sound and farsighted plans
for making overall progress had been undertaken by dedicated and inspired men of
the nascent State institutions. As the political conditions stabilized, development in
agriculture, education, science and technology, industry particularly in the textile
sector, trading, commerce and almost every field became a model for other third
world countries. Two major water storage dams, one at Mangla on river Jhelum and
another at Tarbela on river Indus were constructed after resolving water dispute with
India through World Bank in 1960. A country, predicted by Indian leaders not to last
for long had become a model of progress, development and stability for developing
countries that got their independence from colonial rule after the Second World War.
Pakistan, during Ayub Khans rule was a liberal, peaceful, tolerant and relatively
prosperous society. Unemployment was almost zero. There were lot of employment

opportunities in the expanding industries in Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore, Lyallpur

(now Faisalabad) and other cities. The peasants in rain fed areas would get
seasonal employment in construction industry in the big cities between the period of
sowing winter crops and their harvesting time. Everyone seemed happy and satisfied
with life, having good opportunities of entertainment through frequent local festivals
and sports events of all kinds. The province of West Pakistan (present day Pakistan)
was governed from Lahore, the provincial capital by a Governor assisted by a small
team of ministers. Malik Amir Muhammad Khan, Nawab of Kalabagh, the Governor
was a man of sterling character and outstanding administrative acumen. He ensured
peace in the province. East Pakistan was governed by General Azam Khan who
enjoyed enormous respect because of his hard work in reaching out to the common
man in his own inimitable style, making sincere efforts to solve peoples problems. It
was the golden period of life for a common citizen of Pakistan.
Two incidents will give glimpses of attitude of rulers towards the proprieties and
abiding by rules of law. In a TV programme some years back a retired senior
bureaucrat late Syed Hashim Raza narrated that as Commissioner Karachi he was
approached by the President House to allot some land in Karachi to a particular
person. Since it was against rules, he refused to make the allotment. When the
President visited Karachi, Syed Hashim Raza apprised him of the reason for his
inability to comply with the demand. The Presidents response was that if something
was against the rules, it should not be done. Syed Hashim Raza remained in his job
and was never asked for a favour again. In another incident told by Mr Ahmad
Hasan Qazi, a senior engineer, one of President Ayub Khans nephews studying at
Cadet College Hasan Abdal left College without permission along with some other
students including Mr Qazi to see a film at Ciroz Cinema in Rawalpindi. Here Gohar
Ayub the Presidents son, who had also came to see the film, persuaded his cousin
to stay for the night, rejoining college by early morning. College authorities noticed
this absence and the student was rusticated. Requests to college authorities by
Gohar Ayub and then Major General Muhammad Rafi, the Presidents Staff Officer
had no effect on college authorities to change their decision. No one was removed
from his post in the College for their refusal. Comparison with attitude of a
demonized dictator and present democratic rulers will give clear indication of the
state of deterioration we have descended into.
The 1965 War
Pakistan under Ayub Khan had made rapid progress in all fields. Relations with India
had improved. Water dispute between the two countries had been resolved by
signing Indus Water Treaty in 1960 under the aegis of World Bank. Punjab, the land
of five rivers which extended from Indus in the west to Jumna on the east had been
divided. Some of the head-works of canals irrigating Pakistani Punjab were located
in Indian Punjab. This serious dispute adversely affected Pakistans economy and
peoples lives when the waters from head-works located in India were stopped the
canals became dry, thus causing obvious tension in relations between the two

countries. Ayub Khans detractors later would accuse him of selling rivers to India, a
most unjust criticism ignoring the fact that part of Punjab going to India had equal
right on the waters of Punjab rivers.
President Ayub Khan also offered India a joint defence pact against external
aggression. This was in line with thinking of British Indian Army High Command at
the time of partition of India as given by Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tucker, then
serving in India in his book. He wrote;
Yet the frontiers were of as deep concern to Hindustan as to Pakistan, for
Hindustan, once they were breached, had no natural frontier left to her. More than
that, Pakistan had kindred peoples and probable allies stretching northward far over
her mountain borders into Asia. If she could be by any means persuaded to stand
beside Hindustan, then the latter would have all the advantage of this vast cushion of
Islam between herself and danger. India could then apply herself to her own
undisturbed development with a great feeling of security, knowing that her own men
stood far from her borders on the frontier of another State and shoulder to shoulder
with the soldiers of that State.
( While Memory Serves By Lieut-General Sir Francis Tuker, Cassell & Company Ltd
London 1950, Pages: 22 27).
In 1962 during the Indo - China skirmishes in the Himalayas; Pakistan remained
neutral and did not create any threat to India. Ayub Khans views about relations with
India and his abhorrence from any mention of fighting or use of force is reflected
from his remarks which my friend and fellow unit officer late Khurshid Ahmad Mallal
heard from the President. During an annual Commanding Officers Conference held
at the Punjab Regimental Centre Mardan which was followed by Regimental lunch
attended by senior officers of the Regiment, then Lieutnant Khurshid Mallal heard the
President snubbing Major General Akhtar Hussian Malik, General Officer
Commanding (GOC) at Murree when he said to the President that if you allow me, I
will get you Kashmir in matter of days. The Presidents response was that dont talk
such nonsense again. Soon after, the President was tricked by conspirators into
allowing an action which started armed conflict with India, derailing Pakistan from
path of progress.
In 1964, Mr Jawahar Lal Nehru sent Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, the influential
Kashmiri leader to Pakistan to meet with the Pakistani leadership to work on
negotiated solution of Kashmir dispute. It was great misfortune for people of both the
countries that while Sheikh Abdullah was busy in his meetings in Pakistan, the tragic
news of sudden passing away of Mr Nehru were received and he had to return to
India immediately. That proved to be a lost chance when the main cause of conflict
between the two countries could be peacefully resolved.
Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri took over leadership as Prime Minister of India after the
demise of Mr Jawahar Lal Nehru in 1964. Mr Nehru was an important player on the

world scene, a co-initiator of the Non Alignment Movement along with Mr Jamal
Abdul-ul-Nasir of Egypt and Marshal Joseph Bronze Tito of Yugoslavia. After his
death, India was vulnerable to increased internal disorder leading to possible
fragmentation. In the words Sir Winston Churchill, the great British leader,
India is a geographical term. It is no more a united nation than the equator. 1
Mr Chuchill, as young subaltern had served in India, seeing much of the
subcontinent. He took part in operations as part of Malakand Field Force against
tribes in the areas now part of Pakistan. His observation is fully supported by
recorded history because the subcontinent was never ruled from one power centre.
The sixth king of great Mughal dynasty died struggling to conquer South India. Much
before that, the mythical king Ashoka became Buddhist, renouncing conquest
southwards after seeing enormous killing in the battle of Kalinga in present day
Indian state of Orissa. The semblance of unity under British rule is deceptive
because when they left India in 1947, there were five hundred and sixty two states of
varying sizes apart from directly ruled parts and vast independent tribal regions in all
parts of India. The states were independent in all respects except that they could not
establish diplomatic relations with other nations of the world. It was Mr Jawahar Lal
Nehrus stature and leadership that started transformation of a heterogeneous,
divisive, multi religious, multi ethnic India to one united country. That Pakistan helped
India in transforming her from a geographical term into a strong country by timely
interventions (in 1965 and 1999) to overcome their internal troubles at the cost of
being dismembered itself, is a painful chapter of history as being explained in the
narrative.
The skirmishes on India-China border initiated by the Indians in 1962 helped India to
subdue internal dissentions. At that time the main political party in southern India, the
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), representing Dravidians ethnic population was
openly demanding separation from New Delhi. A number of separatist movements
were waging armed struggle in the eastern parts of India. An external threat,
contrived and blown out of proportions helped Mr. Nehru to suppress internal
discord. After his death, it would have been difficult for his successor to maintain
unity, had Pakistan not initiated armed conflict with many times larger neighbor that
turned the tide of history.
After a few months of Mr. Nehrus death, military forces of Pakistan and India got
involved in border skirmishes in Rann of Kuch, a marshy area in the south near
Arabian Sea, both sides accusing each other of starting the clashes in early 1965.
Cease fire was arranged by June 1965 due to efforts of the UK government and it
was decided to resolve the dispute through arbitration. After skirmishes in Rann of
Kuch subsided, Pakistan infiltrated personnel of Azad Kashmir forces followed by a
group of elite commandos; the Special Service Group of Pakistan Army into Indian
1

Speech at Royal Albert Hall, 18 March 1931.

occupied Kashmir. Since the public in Indian Occupied Kashmir was not privy to
plans devised by initiators of this conflict, they did not provide required support to the
infiltrators, who were soon detected, some of them caught, killed and the rest exfiltrated. On the night of 31 August/1 September 1965, Pakistan Armys 7 Infantry
Division, commanded by Major General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan was
launched across cease fire line in Chamb Sector of Indian held Kashmir. Overall
command of the operation was with Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik based at
Murree, an unworkable arrangement because of vastness of the area and lack of
proper command structure, one Divisonal Commander operating under another
Divisional Commander of equal rank. While 7 Division was making good progress to
capture the important bridge over Chenab River at Akhnur, which was then the only
road link between the Kashmir Vally and its jammu Region, the Army High
Command decided to make General Yahya responsible for Chamb Sector directly
under the Army instead of being under Akhtar Malik. This re-arrangement caused
delay of 24 hours, the operation being halted and thus losing momentum. On 6th
September, when Indians crossed International borders in Lahore sector, the
undefended Akhnur Bridge was just a few kilometers away from Mawanwali Khad, a
seasonal nullah where our troops had reached. The chance to isolate Kashmir Valley
from Jammu Region and India by capturing Akhnur Bridge was missed due to
unnecessary or may be deliberate delay. At this stage Indians crossed the
international borders to attack Lahore and the troops had to be pulled out from
Akhnur Sector to counter Indian attacks launched against Sialkot on 8th September.
Shortage of troops had been clearly indicated by the Army Chief, General
Muhammad Musa when operation to send infiltrators was in planning stage. He had
opposed the plan of sending infiltrators into Kashmir apprehending escalation of
conflict to an all out war but his objections were over ruled. His demand of raising
two more infantry divisions, roughly thirty thousand additional troops if the country
was to go to war, was partially met during the war by raising one division.
The War of 1965 lasted for seventeen days resulting into a stalemate. In this war the
conspirators achieved their aim as Ayub Khan did not survive in office for long after
the War. In fact he suffered heart attack soon after the war and never regained
health he had enjoyed earlier.
The 1965 War between India and Pakistan effectively sealed Pakistans fate as a
strong and prosperous country. Pakistan drifted into this War by machinations of a
rabidly ambitious man in too much of a hurry, Mr Zulfiqar Ali (Z A) Bhutto, the young
foreign minister in Ayub Khans cabinet. Working for global capitalist interests who
wanted to derail Pakistan from path of progress, he planned and worked to remove
the President by initiating armed conflict with India.
Mr Bhutto was born and brought up in Bombay (Mumbai) in India. At the time of
creation of Pakistan he was studying in USA. After completing his studies, he came
to settle in Karachi. Till early sixties, when he was a minister in the Pakistani cabinet,
he claimed to be an Indian citizen in litigation to get his fathers property in Bombay,

India. In Karachi soon after his arrival from USA, he cultivated contacts with the then
President Mr Iskandar Mirza by befriending Mirzas son, Mr Humayun Mirza.
Although already married, he contracted another marriage with a Persian girl
reinforcing his contact with presidency through Persian second wife of the President.
A man of sharp intellect and impressive personality, he soon got inducted in the
cabinet as a very young minister. When Ayub Khan took over from Iskandar Mirza,
he retained Mr. Bhutto as a minister in his cabinet first as Minister for Commerce and
then as Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

I got a chance of listening to a retired bureaucrat, a veteran foreign ministry official

who reached the highest rank in the Foreign Service. During conversation with a
friend in my presence, he said that
Mr. Z A Bhutto, the Foreign Minister used to say that the only way to remove
President Ayub Khan was to initiate war with India. After 1965 War he would use
very derogatory and abusive language against Army
I asked the bureaucrat's friend whom I had driven to the ailing man's house if he
would say that in public. The response was that the man would never do that.
Another foreign office veteran on the condition of anonymity had to say this
Generally of course everyone in the foreign office would confirm that Bhutto had a
great part in the events that led to the country's breakup.
This was the kind of insincerity of our men at the level of making and influencing
decisions affecting our fate. Our Foreign Ministry was rightly called Foreigners
Ministry in those days by common people.
The fact that this conflict was initiated by Mr. Bhutto with the help of a small group
was generally known to the people at that time. To general public Bhutto was
projected as a hawk working for Kashmir cause whereas his real motives were
personal. A few years back, US Air Attach in Pakistan during the period of 1965 war
Colonel (retired) George L Singleton, USAF wrote in his letter to a Pakistani
newspaper that,
Foreign Minister Bhutto largely engineered the foolish events that caused or incited
the 1965 war. Ayub Khan had to have known what was going on, but his chief
goader, if you will, into this war was Bhutto. 2
He further wrote,
The 1965 war was a monstrously dumb move on the part of Mr. Bhutto and the
Army chief of staff who clearly initiated the whole war.

Dawn June 14, 2007.

Colonel Singleton wrote this while responding to a controversy on the role of Air
Marshal Asghar Khan, the Air Chief at the time of Rann of Kach skirmishes. Asghar
Khan, on his own got in touch with Arjan Singh, his counterpart in India asking him
not to use Air Force to prevent possible escalation.
The overall responsibility for starting armed conflict with India was that of the
President whos only written direction was to Defreeze Kashmir. His Foreign
Minister had succeeded in convincing the President that it was time to instigate
disturbances in Indian Held Kashmir to bring Kashmir issue to world focus by
sending some infiltrators to start the process. This was done on the false assurance
that problem would remain confined within Kashmir, the disputed area. As operation
in Chamb Sector across the ceasefire line was in progress, our High Commissioner
in India Mr. Arshad Hussain sent an urgent communication to our Foreign Office that
India had decided to launch attack across the international border in Lahore sector
on 6th September. This vital information was concealed from the President by Mr.
Bhutto and his foreign secretary Mr. Aziz Ahmad because they were themselves
working to expand the conflict.
The years between 1965 war with India and that of 1971 war saw lot of disturbance
in the peaceful conditions prevailing before 1965 War. President Ayub Khans
position weakened as a result of an unnecessary and costly war, as intended by
initiators of this war. Just few months after the war some armed forces personnel
from East Pakistan were arrested on the charges of conspiracy to break up Pakistan
with Indian help. Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman, leader of Awami League party was also
arrested for being involved. The case, known as Agartala Consiparacy Case had to
be withdrawn due to political pressure on Ayub Khan by political parties leaders from
West Pakistan.
Mr. Z A Bhutto parted ways with his benefactor, President Ayub Khan, whom he
used to call 'Daddy', by launching his own political party, named Pakistan Peoples
Party (PPP). The party was mainly supported and joined by socialist element of the
society later sidelined by strong feudal elements when Bhutto came to power after
the 1971 war. The people were promised food, clothes and shelter (Roti, Kapra aur
Makan), ownership of lands and factories thus drawing support from large illiterate
sections of the society who continue to dream of those promises being fulfilled,
giving repeated chance to Peoples Party through their votes to plunder national
resources for personal gains.

General Yahya Khans Rule

President Ayub Khan handed over power to the Army Chief General Yahya Khan in
March 1969 after agitations against his rule initiated by Mr. Bhutto and also because
of his sickness. There were reports at that time that the President was forced to hand
over power to the Army Chief, instead of the Speaker National Assembly according
to the 1962 Constitution. Yahya Khan announced general elections which were held
in December 1970. The results of elections were against calculation of the President
and his team who expected a split mandate in both East and West Pakistan.
According to results Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib Ur Rahman swept elections
in East Pakistan based on his six point formula demanding provincial autonomy.
Only two seats were won by others. In West Pakistan Mr. Bhuttos PPP won majority
of seats in the provinces of Punjab and Sind. The provinces of Frontier (now KPK)
and Baluchistan voted for the nationalist and religious elements.
General Yahya is credited with holding fair elections in the country but that can only
be said about West Pakistan. In East Pakistan the elections were won by Awami
League because of massive rigging, intimidation and violence. The opponents of the
Awami league were prevented to go to the polling stations. The government
machinery in the province was totally ineffective and could not prevent Awami
League workers who controlled the polling process denying other parties to exercise
vote.
A major decision by General Yahya before the polls was to break up 'One Unit' which
had been formed by amalgamating the existing provinces, states and tribal areas
into one Province of West Pakistan according to the first constitution adopted in
1956. This arrangement was not changed in the second constitution implemented in
1962. The decision to do away with One Unit was reportedly taken on behest of Mr.
Wali Khan who contacted Yahya's brother Agha Muhammad Ali, a Police officer to
ask his brother to dismantle One Unit. This was not a public demand at that time.
The public demand was adult franchise, one man one vote, to replace the system of
Union Council members electing the President according to 1962 Constitution. This
was granted in the Legal Framework Order formulated by Yahya Khan's government
and elections were held accordingly.
According to election results, Awami League had an overwhelming majority. It was in
a position to form the government but was not allowed to do so, starting a chain of
events which in a short span of one tumultuous year led to break up of Pakistan. The
National Assembly secession, called at Dacca on 03 March 1971, was boycotted by
Mr. Bhutto who stopped his party members to attend the session and threatened
others from West Pakistan of physical violence like breaking their legs if they tried to
attend the session. This development precipitated the crises causing widespread

disturbances leading to virtual anarchy. Military action to control the situation further
aggravated the situation resulting in open rebellion in East Pakistan; culminating in
war with India and break up of Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto ultimately achieved his objective
of ruling a country even if it were only a part of what was once the largest Muslim
country of the world, enjoying most prestigious position in the comity of nations.
General Yahya Khan as President mostly remained in an inebriated state and did not
want to leave the President House. A general impression about him was that during
service he was always hard up in clearing his mess and club bills which mainly were
for drinks he used to consume in large quantities. On reaching the President House
he found that the drinks were free so his problem had been solved. He was enjoying
the best quality drinks free of cost. After elections, he first tried to get assurance from
Mr. Mujib to keep him as President even if was to be without any powers but Mujib
could not give him this assurance. Mr. Bhutto then invited him to Larkana where
understanding developed between the two. After this meeting General Yahya
postponed the National Assembly session called at Dacca on 3 March 71,
precipitating the crisis.
General Yahya, after being released from detention by Zia ul Haq in 1977 lodged a
petition in the Lahore High Court.3 The General made an affidavit therein. In the said
affidavit in paragraph 9, the following is stated,
That this threat of Mr. Bhutto that whosoever will go to Dacca his legs will be
broken could put at stake the national solidarity. This aggravated the situation in East
Pakistan and was a violation of the legal framework order. This threat from Mr.
Bhuttos side provided a cause of revolt in East Pakistan. This was no less
dangerous than the six points and clearly meant separation of the two wings of the
country. The deponent times and again used to warn him and it was a matter of habit
with him that he listened patiently but never bothered to act upon any advice. The
speech delivered by Mr. Bhutto in Iqbal Park was tremendously perilous to the
integrity of Pakistan. Rather, it was more suicidal to the integrity of Pakistan than the
six points formula . but Mr. Z. A. Bhutto was a clever and venomous toad. Mr.
Bhutto was slave to his lust for power so much so that he proposed the concept of
two prime ministers in one country which the deponent strongly condemned. In
answer to Mr. Bhuttos threatening speech of IDDHER HAM UDDAR TUM at
Karachi, Sheikh Mujib on 12.3.1971 also delivered a public speech wherein he
reiterated the unity and solidarity of Pakistan. It is the opinion of the deponent that
Mujib was patriotic at that time unlike Mr. Bhutto. Had Mr. Bhutto not been elected to
the Assembly he would not have been able to make such unpatriotic speeches and
statements which ultimately contributed to the breakage of Pakistan.

Petition number 1649, year 1978, The Lahore High Court.

Call to Arms

After passing out from Pakistan Military Academy with the 2 nd War Course, in June
1966 I joined 34th Battalion of the Punjab Regiment then part of the 9th Infantry
Division located at Kharian Cantonment. The unit had been raised on 29 December
1965 at the Punjab Regimental Centre Mardan and moved to Jamrud Fort near
Peshawar as part of the newly raised 9 Division. After a few months the Division was
ordered to move to Kharian Cantonment, built with US aid in mid fifties. On reaching
Kharian I found that the unit was deployed on ceasefire line (later termed Line of
Control (LOC) after the 1971 war), only a small rear party was left at Kharian. I
joined the Battalion Headquarters located at a small place named Padhaar in
Bhimber Sector. The unit was then being commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Muhammad Abdul Rashid, who had taken command on promotion. I was first posted
to D Company located in area Dewa - Batala. Here apart from enjoying the ripe
mangos falling from the massive old trees, I listened to interesting accounts from
Subedar Abdul Rahman about his journey as part of 6 Jammu and Kashmir Battalion
of State Forces in 1947 from Jammu to Bunji over Burzil Pass and Capt Hassans
role in liberation of Gilgit and Northern Areas. Subedar Abdul Rahman, a wrestler
from Bhimber area was then a lance naik in Hassans Company. I was later moved
to a post named Ban Chihraan in C Company opposite Lalial post occupied by
the Indians. These were well known land marks referred in the context of fighting
during recently concluded 1965 war. My company commander here, Major Riaz
Hussain Javed was a tall, loud and very energetic person, a good hockey player. He
later died of heart attack while commanding a battalion of Azad Kashmir Regiment at
Kharian. Other company commanders included Majors Razzaq, Raja Asghar, and
Capt Shaukat Butt. Capt M Saeed Azam Khan was the Adjutant. Major Nisar
Muhammad Khan, the second in command had also joined the unit at Padhaar. The
unit reverted back to the Cantonment in September 1966 where an intensive period
of training started. Here the unit was converted from normal infantry battalion to the
Reconnaissance and Support Battalion, taking over vehicles, weapons and
equipment from 25 FF in swaping roles.
All units of the Division were newly raised comprising two types of manpower. One
category was of the old retired personnel recalled during the September 1965 war
with India and the other category was of young recruits joining after a short period of
training at respective Regimental Centres. The Division was commanded by Major
General Bahadur Sher, a fearsome officer who was an ideal choice to mould raw
manpower into an effective fighting machine. His dedication, hard work, commitment
and competence made 9 Division a highly trained, motivated and spirited formation
in just three years of his command. During my service I did not see any other general
officer whos orders were obeyed hundred percent. He was the man who could
ensure implementation of his orders by constantly guiding, monitoring and getting
the best out of his command.

Since his methods and approach were unique and never replicated by anyone later,
a little detail would not be out of place. Main points in organising training of raw
manpower of the Division with possible offensive role as Army Reserve were:

During first year, the scope of training was limited to individual, platoon and
company level training. While in the cantonment, no officer including
Commanding Officers could come to the offices before 10 AM. They had to
remain in the unit training area with the troops. The small arms issued to the
Division were the newly introduced Chinese 7.62 mm caliber series weapons
which included pistols, rifles, sub machine guns, light and heavy machine
guns. Extensive practice on functioning of these weapons was given enabling
the men to dismantle and assemble these weapons in complete darkness of
the nights. The firing results of the units were genuinely above 80%. A very
different approach was adopted to achieve these results. Every unit would
give half of their training grant to the Engineer Battalion of the Division who
would prepare targets and make these available at firing ranges along with
range organisation, the manpower and safety measures laid out. The units
just had to take their weapons and ammunition and start their firing practices
without wasting time on fixing targets and safety flags etc. The firing was done
by the individuals without spoon feeding or being given words of command for
every action, a major deviation from normal practice. After start of firing by the
first detail, there was only one word of command given by the officer in charge
throughout the day i.e. Detail Change till the days proceedings were
concluded. The men would advance to the firing point, take up position, fire
and clear their weapons, all their actions being watched by an NCO quietly
without speaking a word. He could just tap a mans shoulder if there was
some mistake but it was very rare. The officer seeing that everyone had
completed the process would order Detail Change. On this all waiting details
that would be busy in carrying out different practices like using aiming rests,
mirrors to correct their positions, and other musketry practices would change
to next position. It gave tremendous confidence to soldiers in handling
weapons and firing standards improved to a great degree. The range
organisation was a model which unfortunately was not emulated.

During the second year scope was expanded to battalion level training. In
outdoor excercises mostly practicing offensive operations, the General would
be present in the battalions at two occasions; the orders by the battalion
commanders and standing on the objective of battalion attacks mostly during
the nights. He would get timing of units adjusted to ensure that he did not
miss any battalion event. Prayers for his sickness never materialised.

During the third year, progressing to brigade level training, brigade exercises
were held culminating in a divisional exercise. Instead of an elaborate control
organisation to conduct Divisional exercise, the General assisted by four
officers had complete control of the Divisional exercise, the two brigades

advancing on two different axes in advance and encounter battle role. While
getting run down on actions by the units on wireless sets of his small control
net, he himself manning his set instead of an operator or staff officer, he
would ask for the actions of various company commanders whom he would
refer by name. He knew the company commanders and their abilities by now
having frequent interaction with them during the last three years.

The General would provide guidance for the smallest detail. He had ordered
that the vehicles when stopped or parked must face the direction in which
these have to move out. If the moving column had to stop even for a very
short duration, the vehicles were immediately camouflaged by using
appropriately garnished nets. This appeared cumbersome at first but with
practice it became a routine. Once Lieutenant Colonel Saeed Qadir (later
Lieutenant Geneneral) commanding officer of Electrical and Mechanical
Engineer (EME) Battalion of the Division came to our Mechanical Transport
Park asking to start up the vehicles. 34 Punjab had about 150 vehicles, mostly
jeeps to carry the recoilless rifles and machine guns detachments. His
purpose of visit was to find out which of the vehicles emitted smoke. While
returning from exercise area, the General has observed our vehicles emitting
smoke and instead of asking our CO, he asked the EME officer as to why
these vehicles had defects. The General knew who was to be made
accountable to get results from his subordinates.

For physical training apart from the normal routine, a special exercise plan
known as BX Plan was introduced. These exercises of about fifteen minutes
were to be done before the afternoon games period and every individual was
to do these at that time wherever he was located. The cooks carried out these
exercises outside their place of duty i.e. the Cook Houses.

Almost half of the year was spent outdoors in the exercise area bounded by
Grand Trunk (GT) Road in the west, up to Bhimber in the east and from
Jhelum River down to the Chenab River. There was no dearth of fuel required
for training and we had become familiar with the terrain to the extent that we
could even refer to old trees in the area.

Although every day created some amusing scene, I will quote one such
incident which still brings smile in solitude even after so many years. In initial
phase of training in our new role when most of our weapons were jeep
mounted, one afternoon the General called our Commanding Officer (CO) to
his lonely tent pitched in the area of Daulatnagar on Gujrat Bhimber road.
We were busy in our platoon level outdoor training, our unit camping near
Daulatnagar. While the Divisional Headquarters was working at Kharian in
normal routine, the General had pitched his tent in the collective training area,
with just a small detachment from the Military Police and a staff officer with
him. Concerned about how the weapons and equipment were being place on

the jeeps, the General briefed our CO about his ideas and told him that he will
see the load tables of different vehicles. Next morning he came for visit and
started with his usual fault finding and outbursts. When he asked a jeep driver
that how much tyre pressure was to be maintained, the driver although aware
of the answer and the limits of tyre pressure written on the tyre in front of him
stammered in his response. Our CO completely absorbed in the situation
shouted at the driver asking him in Urdu which meant,
Jawan, do not get scared, if the General has to eat someone he will eat me
not you
The General concluded his visit realizing that he had overdone his acting by
getting such response from our CO who was otherwise most deferential, just
short of being scared of the man.

A large number of young officers, Second Lieutenants joined to complete

authorized strength of the newly raised units who had sprinkling of seniors
officers taken out from the old units. Officers from short cources were passing
out from the Pakistan Military Academy every month so after one year of
being raised, each unit had about ten to twelve Second Lieutenants on its
strength. To improve their professional competence and mould them into
effective team, the General ordered a very comprehensive promotion
examination spread over about two weeks for them to get the the next rank, of
a Lieutenant. According to Army rules no such examination is required and
the promotion is granted after completion of short period. It was a very unusal
and interesting activity when about one hundred and twenty young officers
spent about two weeks together in outdoor activities being put through tests of
physical fitness, firing skills, decision making in battle situations, knowledge
about administration, rules and regulations etc. It created very healthy feelings
of comradeship among the officers of different arms and services in the
Division in addition to a concentrated dose of professional training.

There is endless tale of interesting incidents. Each day was an exciting day
generating activity stimulated by boundless commitment to achieve
professional excellence by everyone in the Division under an inspiring
commander.

The years between 1966 and 1971 spent at Kharian were full of learning, adventure
and joy. The life and its requirements were very simple. A young officers pay in mid
sixties when I joined my unit was about Rupees 500/- (five hundred) per month. This
was more than enough because the expenses on food were about one third of pay
and rest of the amount was enough for other expenses i.e. on clothes, travel and
entertainment, mainly cinema even if one had to travel to other cities. The quality
and quantity of food was much better than one can afford these days. The day stated
with bed tea. Breakfast comprised porridge, two eggs, bread, butter, jam and tea.

After some snacks with tea or coffee in the offices/unit, lunch in the mess contained
two dishes, one a meat dish and the other vegetable or lintels and fruit. That was
followed in due time by evening tea with biscuits. Dinner again was an elaborate
affair in the form of frequent dinner and guest nights. The expenses on the day's
meal, the 'daily messing' was not to exceed Rs 3.5 as laid down in the regulations.
However the messing would at times exceed that limit but in any case not increasing
a limit of Rs 5/- per day on special occasions. A strict check was kept by the officer
detailed as Mess Secretary and further supervised by the second in command of the
units as their duty.
The officers messes and the officers clubs served drinks from well stocked bars.
Most of the senior officers did not mind having an occasional drink. We who had
joined in bulk after the 1965 War, mostly from the villages were from different family
backgrounds where in our houses and environments we were not exposed to use of
spirits. On joining the units we were initiated into drinks by our seniors. Some of us
started enjoying occasional drinks particularly during the week ends. Most favourite
place was the garrison club where one had the facility to watch a movie screened on
a wall out in the open, a game of Tambola and a bottle or two of a fine quality
Murree Brewery beer in the summers. During winters Whiskey and Jinn were in
demand. The Aabdaar, a term no more in use, who poured drinks ordered at the
bar remained quite busy on the weekends. Liquor was freely available throughout
the country from particular shops that had the license from the government to sell it.
Even opium was avialble from specified shops having licence to sell till late nineteen
fifties. Sale and consumption of spirits was banned by Mr. Z A Bhutto in his last days
in power to please Mullahs expecting to save his rule.
The routine of officers in an infantry unit started with physical exercise period in the
morning with the troops. After that we would come back to the mess to change into
uniforms, have breakfast and rush back for training with the troops which lasted till
mid morning. After attending the training in unit training areas we would come to the
company offices located in the residential barracks of troops to attend to office
routine. At lunch time we would go back to the messes, have some rest after lunch
and then come back to units for a sports period with the troops. This lasted till about
sunset after which we would get back to our rooms in the mess and prepare for the
dinner nights which were quite frequent. These were attended by senior officers of
the unit in turn basically to ensure propriety and grooming of young officers. All this
running about during the day was done on rented bicycles. Every unit maintained a
cycle shop to cater for the needs of the officers and the soldiers alike. Television was
introduced in 1964, a novelty not available at the household level. The life therefore
was mostly spent outdoors in healthy activities.
Cinema was main source of entertainment in those days. There were a number of
cinemas providing entertainment for the whole families. There were different charges
for various classes of seats within the cinema halls; front seats being the cheapest
and galleries at the back costlier. The charges of tickets varied from half a rupee to

about three rupees at the maximum. Whole families could watch movies together
because there was no vulgarity in the films like present times. Some cinemas
screened English films only. In Rawalpindi, Cirose (which is still not demolished)
Plaza and Odeon screened English films. For watching Indian movies people would
travel to Kabul when these got banned to be screened in Pakistan. Travelling from
Kharian to Rawalpindi or Lahore on weekends was frequent because it was not
expensive, the fare being about two and half rupees to both cities as Kharian is
almost at equal distance from both major cities. My roommate Asif Ali Rizvi would
make the choice of destination easy. According to him as we came out on the G T
Road, parking our bicycles at the Petrol Station, the first bus in either direction was
to be taken to reach Rawalpindi or Lahore. We would stay with our fellow officers in
the Messes so there was no expense on lodging. Expenses on food and watching
the films were not much burden on the pocket.
For entertainment of troops, the units would invite singers including singing and
dancing girls to perform in the open on special occasions like raising days or on
some other excuse. Mian Aziz Qawwal had been recently introduced into the army
units and was in great demand. On the eve of our departure to East Pakistan, the
unit arranged a function inviting singer Bilqees Khanum alongwith a dancing girl from
Lahore and another bunch of dancing girls from nearby Lalamusa. The soldiers
would also sing and perform skits particularly targeting the seniors for their
idiosyncrasies.
I picked up the habit of reading, starting with the biographies. On weekends I would
often travel to Rawalpindi and spend a few hours at London Book Company in
Saddar where now a bakery stands. Books in paperback did not cost much, about
five rupees for a Penguin Classic. Libraries were also well stocked and there was
culture of making use of these fine institutions. Reading was a pleasure which I
enjoyed for a few years till I landed into the turmoil in East Pakistan followed by a
period of incarceration. After that I lost enrgy required to concentrate on reading
books, my reading capacity restricted to newspaper articles.

Move to East Pakistan

My unit was required to move to East Pakistan in April 1971 to replace 27 Baluch, a
unit of similar composition, according to orders issued by the General Headquarters
in their annual movement/rotation plans for the units. I, a Captain then, was doing
Martial Law Duties as a member of Special Military Court at Lyallpur (later renamed
Faisalabad). Late one evening I got a message to move back as the unit was to
move in emergency to East Pakistan. 9 Division from Kharian had been ordered to
move immediately. Another division, the 16th Division from Quetta had also been
ordered to move as a consequence of Army action of 25 March 1971 to overcome
unrest in East Pakistan. Before moving these two divisions, there was only one
infantry division; the 14th Division of Pakistan Army located in East Pakistan. This
Division had four brigades instead of normal three which included seven battalions
from the East Bengal Regiment. 4 These units and about thirteen thousand troops of
para military East Pakistan Rifles revolted. Bengali troops in the remaining units
wich were upto thirty percent in some of these units had also to be disarmed. 14
Division was thus virtually ineffective till reinforcements arrived from West Pakistan.
The two divisions moving to East Pakistan were not to take their complete elements
i.e. Armour Regiments and full complement of Artillery, Engineers and Signal units
etc. Basically these two Divisions moved with their infantry battalions by air to
reinforce the troops in East Pakistan. Roughly about twenty thousand troops were to
reinforce the small garrison trapped in East Pakistan.
Our move started from Kharian by train up to Karachi and then onward by Pakistan
International Airline to Dacca on a circuitous route passing over Ceylon (now Sri
Lanka). The Indians had stopped our flights over India earlier by staging a drama of
hijacking. A Fokker aircraft, nick named Ganga, was brought to Lahore by some
Kashmiri persons resulting in banning of Pakistans flights over India thus increasing
flight time from two hours to almost seven hours. Mr. Z A Bhutto was prompt in
embracing the hijackers praising their action.
It was a most remarkable achievement of our national carrier, the PIA, to move the
troops in such a short time. The airline staff worked tirelessly far beyond their call of
duty. We could genuinely take pride in their performance and achievement.
Otherwise also the PIA was considered one of the best airlines in the world. Air
Marshal Noor Khan, in his younger days when he was Air Commodore worked in his
4

Six regular army Bengali infantry regiments were present in East Pakistan in March 1971. The 1st
East Bengal Regiment (EBR) was in Jessore, attached to the 107th Brigade. The 2nd EBR was in
Joydevpur north of Dacca, attached to the 57th Brigade. The 3rd EBR was in Saidpur with the 23rd
Brigade, and the 4th EBR was in Comilla with the 53rd Brigade. The 8th EBR was preparing to ship to
West Pakistan and was at 75% strength in Chittagong. The East Bengal Regimental Center (EBRC) in
Chittagong housed 2,000 Bengali troops including the newly raised 9th EBR. The 10th EBR, a training
unit, was in the Dacca cantonment attached to the 14th Division. Bengali officers commanded the
1st, 2nd and the 10th EBR, while the rest were under West Pakistani officers.

inimitable style to make our airline one of the top ones in the world. The motto
adopted great people to fly with truly reflected their status. Noor Khan was replaced
by Air Martial Asghar Khan, another outstanding professional. The airline lost its
position by induction of political workers which gradually eroded its efficiency to land
it in its present state. Karachi, a city of lights in those days was hub of air travel east
of Suez. Gulf region airports then did not exist.
I along with my company landed at Dacca airport on the morning of 6 th April 71. In
the company I had two more officers, Captain Muhammad Afreen and Lieutenant
Muhammad Saeed Tariq (who embraced SHAHADAT on 13 December 71 at
Panjbibi, District Bogra). We were just carrying our personal weapons, their
ammunition and a spare pair of uniforms in our backpacks. Our heavier equipment
and weapons like vehicles, recoilless rifles etc were to move by sea from Karachi to
Chittagong from where these were to be collected later. We could get hold of our
equipment after the completion of first phase of operations in May 71.
Initial Operations - April 71
After assembling and doing duties at Dacca for a couple of days, the unit was given
the task to clear area up to Narsinghdi, a small town north of Dacca. The unit was
placed under 14 Division, losing its affiliation with the 9th Division. The unit started its
move on the morning of 11th April. It was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hafeez
Ur Rahman, Alpha Company commanded by Major M Saeed Azam Khan, Bravo
Company by Major Khurshid Ahmad Mallal, Charlie Company by Captain Nazir
Ahmed (author) and Delta Company by Captain Nisar Hussain Bukhari. The move
started with Major Mallals company leading. We had mustered a few small civilian
vehicles including a Volkswagen ambulance to make one platoon (about thirty plus
strength) mobile. This mobile platoon commanded by Captain Mian Bux Baloch led
the advance movement, rest of the troops following on foot along the road. We also
had the support of four Artillery guns following behind us under command Major
Khurram Jahandur.
As soon as the leading platoon covered a distance of about three kilometers, it came
into a well laid ambush from the both sides of the road through trees forming a
horseshoe pattern. Leading platoon took up position alongside the road to return
fire. According to well practiced drill, the following platoon was given codeword
Babbar Sher Alpha by Major Mallal, the company commander ordering the platoon
to come behind rebels position moving from the right side, keeping a distance of
about one thousand yards from the rebels position. Alpha meant move from right
and Bravo was for move from the left side depending upon the lay of the ground. The
distance of one thousand yards was considered safe from enemy small arms fire
even if the move had to be done in open without cover being available. Naib
Subedar Abbas leading his platoon started moving at quick pace, unmindful of the
firing which he knew could not be effective, to come behind the positions from where
fire was coming.

Map 1. 34 Punjab (R&S) During Counter Insurgency Operations and 1971 War

As the rebels realised that they were being encircled, they started gradually
withdrawing taking advantage of the cover available to them as could be seen from
decreasing intensity of their fire. Their withdrawal was being covered till last by one
light machine gun (LMG) position. To tackle this LMG fire, Naik Amanullah along with
a sepoy (whose name I cannot recollect now) from the platoon trying to encircle
rebels, started crawling towards the position. The area in front of the trees from
where fire was coming was open and without any cover except for slightly raised
edges of the fields from where rice crop had been harvested. Naik Amanullah
reached LMG position from behind and physically got hold of the man firing it. In the
process he got a bullet in his thigh. Naik Amanullah, an ethnic Pakhtoon, was an
interesting character. He had recently been demoted from Lance Havidar to Naik.
This had happened to him second time. He would always do some funny thing to
deserve a demotion soon after he got promotion because of his seniority. He
rejoined the unit after his wound had healed. The person who was firing the LMG to
cover withdrawal of rebels from ambush site was a stout, well built person. Despite
efforts, he did not speak a word. He did not look like a Bengali. In all probability he
was an Indian working with rebels as we learnt of Indians physical involvement later.
During exchange of fire few unoccupied thatched huts caught fire, most likely by
retreating rebels which were later shown as evidence of arson against the Army.
As that position got cleared in about two hours time and unit was preparing to
resume advance, General Officer Commanding (GOC), Major General M Rahim
Khan landed on the roadside in a small helicopter. He had recently taken over
command of 14 Division replacing Major General Khadim Hussain Raja who was
responsible for the Army action on 25 March. That operation had resulted in
unnecessary killings of unarmed civilians due to indiscriminate firing which could
have been avoided by better planning and execution. Bungling up Dacca operation
resulted in removal of Major General Khadim Raja, the GOC and Lieutenant General
Tikka Khan from command. Tikka was replaced by Lieutenant General Amir
Abdullah Khan (AAK) Niazi who reached Dacca in second week of April 71. Later Mr
Bhutto rewarded Tikka Khan making him Army Chief and Khadim Raja given
diplomatic assignments in new Pakistan.
Major General Rahim was briefed by our CO about the situation. The move restarted
with Alpha Company leading. Study of the map indicated a possible rebels position
about five kilometers ahead in areas of two road bends. As our leading elements
neared first road bend, the CO ordered my company to move towards a possible
escape route of the enemy and take up position to block that route. I quickly moved
in that direction and as soon as reached the indicated position, fire fight in the road
bends area had begun. During this firing, the unit called for Artillery fire from the four
guns following the column. Captain Muhammad Saleem, my course mate from 2 nd
War Course was artillery observer for directing fire. Distance between rebels
position deployed in tree lines and our troops deployed on the road was about
hundred fifty yards apart. Because of miscalculation, all the four shells landed on our

own positions. First shell landed directly on a LMG being fired by Second Lieutenant
Abdul Ghafoor killing him instantly. Second shell landed near the CO injuring
Subedar Major Alam Badshah, the third wounded Captain Saleem, the artillery
observer who had called for fire and the fourth one also killed and wounded some
men. In all, there were four dead and five wounded from this volley of our own fire.
As I reported to the CO on wireless set that I had taken up position as ordered, he
told me to come behind the enemy positions from a flank. I started to move quickly
keeping safe distance from small arms fire, moving in full view of the enemy
positions drawing fire which was ineffective, the bullets landing near us which did not
stop our move. As my company reached behind enemy positions from a flank,
darkness of the night had taken over. Firing had stopped and the rebels, taking
advantage of the darkness and cover available to them from the woods withdrew
towards Narsinghdi. I established contact with the unit and then learnt of casualties
suffered by the unit that day.
Next morning i.e. on 12th April we resumed advance towards Narsinghdi. On
reaching a small stream we found the road bridge demolished. The troops had to
wade through water. By afternoon we approached the town where we saw a number
of people lined up on road, some wearing Jinnah caps and carrying Pakistan flags.
They informed that the miscreants had fled (Malaun log bhag gia).
Next day the unit was ordered to prepare for move further north towards Bhairab
Bazar where rebels were entrenched across Meghna River at Ashuganj rail/road
Bridge blocking movement towards Brahmanbaria in the east. The position was very
difficult to approach and a brigade size operation of considerable complexity was
reportedly being planned. It was to approach the rebel positions from three directions
i.e. frontally over the bridge, through the river using river craft and from behind the
positions landing some troops from Special Services Group (SSG) using few
available helicopters. The operation, however, got swiftly completed when SSG
troops commanded by the legendry TM, Major Tariq Mahmud (later Brigadier who
lost his life during a practice para jump in Gujranwala Cantonment) assaulted the
positions from behind after heli-landing at dawn. The rebels, suffering heavy
casualties, abandoned their trenches and ran towards east leaving huge caches of
arms in their abandoned positions.
After spending about two days at Bhairab Bazar, the unit moved over the Ashuganj
Bridge towards Brahmanbaria. After covering some distance in that direction it was
ordered to turn back and move north in the direction of Kishorganj, as part of the
Brigade tasked to clear area up to Mymensingh. In this move there was no
opposition encountered but the journey to Mymensingh from eastern direction took
over a week ending on 23 April. As our Brigade approached from the east, another
force supported by some tanks had already reached the city from south a day earlier
as transpired later after some confusion and loss of life. A branch of River
Brahmaputra running east of city separated the two forces. On reaching the river

from east our leading troops were fired upon from across the river. The fire fight
raged for some time when noise of tanks getting started in Mymensingh was heard.
This rumbling of tanks caused alarm. After frantic efforts to establish contact the
confusion got cleared. The Division had failed to coordinate the movement causing
this unfortunate situation resulting in loss of life of two soldiers of the leading unit of
our Brigade. The reason given was that our Brigade was out of communication with
the Division.
While marching towards Mymensingh, normal routine was to start the move early
morning and after covering a distance of roughly 30 to 35 kilometers set up camp for
the night. On first day of our march, main problem confronted was from where to
procure meals because there was no system of logistics supporting the move. When
the unit halted for a break at mid day, solution was found in searching for rice and
cooking utensils from abandoned houses. It took lot of time to prepare a meal of
boiled rice and some lentils. Later it became a practice to prepare meal of boiled rice
and meat by slaughtering a goat or even a calf taken from the abandoned habitats
en route. As our column advanced, the local population living in small
villages/hutments on the route vacated their houses and moved away on sides to
avoid contact with the force. As we approached towns the people came out on the
road with Pakistans flags. This was to assure the troops that there was no need to
take any hostile action. Bulk of the population from these towns en route had also left
to safer areas in the interior avoiding contact with the forces because of uncertainty
and fear caused by Army action in Dacca. On reaching Mymensingh we came to
know of the mass killings of the non Bengalis. Some people had taken refuge in the
main mosque but they were also killed to the last soul.
While marching towards Mymensingh, the unit stayed for a day at Kishorganj, a
small town connected with Dacca on the railway network. Here for the first time since
we started from Narsinghdi, we got some ration supplies through improvised
transportation on the railway track by the efforts of our quartermaster, Capt Shafiq
Sarwar Malik. Leaving one company (Delta, commanded by Major Nisar Bukhari) at
Kishorganj, the unit resumed onward march to reach Mymensingh. Here, we came
under command another brigade, commanded by Brig Noor Ahmad Hussain.
Leaving C Company at Mymensingh, the unit was tasked to secure area up to
Durgapur bordering India towards north. Two companies, Alpha and Bravo under
units Second in Command (2IC), Major Muhammad Hafeez Raja secured the area
without any resistance.
The unit stayed in Mymensingh/Durgapur area for about a month before it was
ordered to move to Bogra in North Bengal, crossing River Jumna. By this time
railway system had been largely restored and the unit moved by train to
Bahadurabad Ghat on river bank. The vast river was crossed by means of a large
ferry; rather a small ship which took more than one hour to cross the great waterway.
On reaching the other bank we were informed that instead of Bogra we were to
proceed to Rangpur in the north.

On reaching Rangpur, coming under command 23 Brigade, the unit was tasked to
clear the area of Bhurangamari across Dharla River. This cone shaped area with its
base on the river was surrounded by India from three sides. One Captain Nawazish,
a Bengali officer had established rebels position across river, covering the main
route and other possible crossings. He had started conducting raids on our thinly
held positions manned by 25 Punjab.
For planning the operation to clear that area, Brigade Commander, Brigadier
Abdullah Malik (later Major General) accompanied by CO 29 Cavalry, took our CO
and the company commanders to the area held by 25 Punjab. Briefing had been
arranged in the Company Headquarters of Major Khalid (25 Punjab) who gave a
rather grim picture of the situation. After his briefing, plan given by CO 29 cavalry,
Lieutenant Colonel Sagheer Hussain Syed (later Lieutenant General) included
crossing the river frontally with four amphibious tanks (the only ones available in
East Pakistan) and a crossing from a different site by about fifty men of 34 Punjab,
thus bagging the rebels. On this our CO showed reservations on use of such a small
force to capture a large, well entrenched enemy occupying position over a stretch of
about three to four kilometers on the river astride main route. Lieutinant Colonel
Saghir, a blue eyed of Abdullah Malik made a remark that if they (34 Punjab) could
not do it, he would do it with his own force. On this a very unpleasant exchange of
words took place, Maj Khursheed Mallal taking on the Colonel with some harsh
words in a nasty tone. On this the meeting broke, Abdullah Malik visibly annoyed,
ordered that the unit should plan and carry out the operation as they like. Sagheer
Syed then showed inability to provide the amphibious tanks and the unit had to rely
on its own strength.
Crossing was attempted during next night from the place earlier suggested by
Sagheer Syed but it was obviously occupied as was expected. The unit had to
launch a frontal assault wading through water to reach the enemy positions. During
this operation the unit lost two men. After securing the enemy position on the river
bank, the unit started advance to clear the area up to borders which took another
three days. Brig Abdullah Malik was so annoyed on insult to his friend, Sagheer
Syed that when told by the Brigade Major Abdul Haq Mirza that the unit had secured
far bank of Dharla River, he remarked that tell the unit that this operation is failure
from my side.
After clearing that area and stabilising the situation, 34 Punjab was ordered to relieve
8 Baluch in Thakurgaon in the extreme northwest, handing over Bhrangamari sector
to 25 Punjab. Starting from Dacca, the unit had changed many formations and
ultimately landed at a place where it had to fight its final battle. It had covered great
distances overcoming opposition in clearing vast areas from rebels, a feat
unmatched by any other unit operating in East Pakistan during that period.
When we were at Mymensingh, the CO (Hafeez ur Rahman) ordered Captain
Muhammad Afreen of my Company to proceed to Dacca/Chittagong and other

places and bring mechanical transport of the unit which had reached by ship at
Chittagong and some of the vehicles particularly recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps
had been distributed to different units spread all over. Captain Muhammad Jamil had
arrived with the units equipment and stores but he could not manage to move the
equipment upwards. In fact he had no clue as to where the unit was located because
of the continuous movement up to that time as I have narrated. When Captain
Afreen was leaving, he overheard CO telling Major Mallal that we could write off this
officer. In his assessment the officer would take months to recollect the distributed
vehicles from different places because of severely disrupted communication network
and disturbed conditions. When Captain Afreen, with his indomitable will, unbounded
courage and superb improvisation abilities brought all the vehicles, equipment and
stores in less than a months time while we had reached Rangpur, the CO was
surprised on this outstanding feat of the officer. Later he would remark that if a
British officer of earlier times would have carried out this job, he could write an
absorbing book on the problems confronted and methods adopted to resolve such
problems in completing this task. The officer deserved to be awarded for his
achievement but we in 34 Punjab were working with different mindset; oblivious of
self interest, struggling to overcome difficulties in most extraordinary conditions
prevailing at the time in East Pakistan.

Thakurgaon
On reaching Thakurgaon in June 71, the unit relieved 8 Baluch which was to go
elsewhere; leaving one company commanded by Captain Akbar Niazi at Pachagarh.
The area of responsibility spanned about one hundred and fifty kilometers of border
with India. The unit, with strength of about six hundred men was responsible for the
Thakurgaon sub division of Dinajpur District tasked to maintain law and order and
restore normal living conditions for the disturbed civilian population besides looking
after the borders. This was seemingly impossible task. A part of the sub division, a
finger like area projecting towards Nepal in the north west named Titulia, had not
been cleared from the rebels because it was difficult to hold, being in firing range of
Indians from both flanks. In the deployment made by CO, three companies in
addition to 8 Baluch Company were placed along the borders and the remaining one
company placed at Thakurgaon. My company was deployed along the border with
India covering about seventy kilometers length of the border. Company
Headquarters(HQ) with one platoon was located at a place named Rani Shankail,
one platoon commanded by Captain Muhammad Afreen placed at Nek Mard and the
third platoon commanded by Lieutenant Muhammad Saeed Tariq at Pirganj (there
were more than one towns of this name). A Company commanded by major M
Saeed Azam Khan was deployed towards north of my positions in area Balidangi
Ruhea and D Company (Major Bukhari) further north and east to cover the area of
responsibility given to the unit.
We started patrolling the area and contacting people in the villages to restore their
confidence, helping them to overcome fear caused by the events of last few months.
This area had remained comparatively peaceful being away from the major cities.
During the period of lawlessness when there was no government control all over
East Pakistan in the months of Feb, March and April, the non Bengalis had been
killed in large numbers all over the country. Here at Rani Shankail we found a small
group of Pathans who had survived the ordeal. Their business was money lending
and they were in the area to collect their dues. They had survived because this area
had not been affected by the hatred rampant in in other areas particularly large
cities.
The period from June till August was comparatively peaceful with few incidents by
rebels, the Mukti Bahini conducting a few raids, including one on my Company HQ
during one night and planting mines, coming from across the border. The fact that
rebels could not establish any sanctuary in the Thakurgaon sub division was due to
untiring struggle of the officers and men of our unit. The efforts were spearheaded by
the new CO, Lieutenant Colonel Amir Muhammad Khan, one of the pioneers of
Special Services Group (SSG) who had replaced Hafeezur Rhaman in July, the later
going to Command and Staff College Quetta as Directing Staff, a prestigious career
assignment. Colonel Amir was nicknamed Governor by the unit officers because of
his name, cast, style and manner resembling the redoubtable Malik Amir Muhammad
Khan, Nawab of Kalabagh, ex Governor of West Pakistan during earlier part of Ayub

Khan era. The Governor would get hold of Maulvi Tameez ud Din, a local Jamaat
Islami Amir almost every morning and start his tour of the area addressing people
covering different villages according to a systematic plan. His focus was to explain to
the people as to what caused this tragedy and that the army was for their service
and was there to help them. His efforts and that of rest of the officers and men
succeeded in denying sanctuaries to Mukti Bahini formed by Indians in the vast area
of our responsibility. Their attempts remained confined to cross border activity mainly
in laying mines on different tracks in the area near borders which caused some
casualties to our officers and men.
During one such patrolling mission along the border Lieutenant Abdul Waheed
embraced Shahadat due to Indian mortar fire. Naib Subedar Abbas got his leg
amputated due to mine laid on a track. The COs priority was so focused on
continuous touring the area that one day when Commander Eastern Command
Lieutenant General A A K Niazi landed at the Battalion Headquarters at Thakurgaon;
the CO was out on his normal tour. There was also some lack of coordination
between the Brigade Headquarters and the unit, as Adjutant Captain Javed Anwar
Cheema claimed ignorance about the visit while Brigade Major Abdul Haq Mirza
insisted that he had informed the unit Adjutant on telephone. Such incidents further
aggravated relations between the unit and its immediate higher formation. This was
one factor because of which no one from the unit got any gallantry award although
performance of the officers in some actions merited highest gallantry awards.
About awards, Lieutenant Colonel Hafeez Ur Rahman, the CO till July 71 did not
initiate any recommendation. It was suggested to the CO to initiate citations for
awards for the first days actions. On that day we had two encounters and cleared
the opposition in a very short time in most audacious manner. In those actions we
had suffered nine casualties including one officer being martyred. The COs
response was that we were being paid for the job and should not claim awards for
fighting against rebels. This was faulty logic because the bullets fired by rebels were
equally lethal and acts of bravery merited recognition.
After change of command, the new CO sent some recommendations including that
of Captain Muhammad Afreen for an action in Pachagarh area but because of
unsporting attitude from the Brigade Headquarters as alluded to from the incidents
mentioned earlier, these recommendations were not processed. Later when the
gallantry awards were announced after few months in August on Pakistan Day, a
large number of people from other units had been bestowed with gallantry awards.
As the awards were announced, I got in touch with Major (later Lieutenant Colonel)
Muhammad Safdar (popularly known as ginger, a Khattak from Shaidu near
Nowshera) of my unit who was posted at Headquarters Eastern Command as staff
officer dealing with the awards. I asked him as to why 34 Punjab had not received
any awards having lost two officers by then and having achieved some most
spectacular successes in operations. He informed that Eastern Command had not
received any citation/recommendation about any one from 34 Punjab.

The only gallantry award received by the unit was Tamgha e Jurrat (TJ) to Havildar
Muhammad Sharif after repatriation from the Indian POW camps in 1974. Brigadier
Saad Ullah, the Brigade Commander in Brahman Baria area, with whom one anti
tank platoon of 34 Punjab had been attached, commanded by the burly Captain Mian
Bux, a Chandio Baloch from Sindh, initiated Havildar Sharifs citation and got him
this award for an action he himself witnessed during battle near Aashuganj Bridge on
Padma River in December 71. Havildar Sharifs case is interesting. He was our
Officers Mess NCO working for quite some time in that appointment very efficiently.
While at Thakurgaon, he was removed from that task because he was getting meat
free of cost but charging the Mess a nominal amount knowing that the officers would
not tolerate getting anything free of cost from the public. The Officer in Charge Mess,
while checking, found that the rates of meat were very low so he probed to find the
facts. This caused Sharifs removal from mess duty to a task which earned him his
award.
With this experience which confirmed earlier apprehensions, it is evident that
distribution of gallantry awards depends of personal whims of individuals. Deserving
men are mostly left out and those seeking favours and good writing skills who can
paint better picture to the distant higher headquarters are awarded. To eliminate
chances of this injustice we must do away with the gallantry awards. Instead, the
families of those who sacrifice their lives must be supported by the State to live a life
of comfort and dignity, being provided with adequate resources commensurate with
their social standing. Similarly those who become disabled should also get required
support to live the life with maximum facilitation and ease. This will eliminate the
causes of concocting false stories and lies by those seeking glory through
questionable means. This will also put men going into action at mental peace that
their families are assured of support in any eventuality.
To continue with the narrative, my company remained deployed along the vast
stretch of border for over a month after which it was relieved by B Company (Major
Khurshid Mallal) as another task was awaiting me. During this deployment period
every day was full of surprises and adventure. A few days after arrival at Rani
Shankail, my Company Headquarters was rained with mortar shells during the night.
The attackers were chased up to the borders about ten kilometers away. This was
our first encounter with the Mukti Bahini operating from their sanctuaries inside India.
Once I, with about ten men, marched out to see the abandoned border out posts
(BOPs) in my area earlier manned by the former East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) who had
joined the rebels. After visiting one post and then moving along the border to reach
the next one it started to get dark. I decided to stay the night there. This post was
about two hundred meters away from an opposite Indian post, only a small stream
separating the two. As darkness thickened, I realised that it was very dangerous to
stay on the post with just ten men carrying personal weapons without any other fire
support or even communications with any one because the wireless set, an old PRC10 was out of range with others in the Company. I decided to take my men to a

clump of trees located about six hundred yards away from the post along the stream
and told them not to make even a slightest noise which could give away our location.
At about 2 a.m. we heard noise of some vehicles moving towards the Indian post.
Obviously it was additional force coming for some action as I had apprehended.
About one hour after arrival of the vehicles, intense small arms firing started at our
post from which I had moved away.
These were some extremely anxious moments for me because generally our men
are trigger happy in such situations and want to fire back. I had told my men that if
we could see someone coming towards us, only then we will fire and that too not
without my specific orders, myself firing the first bullet. Otherwise they just had to
watch, rather get the feel of the show. Because the night was very dark we could not
see the enemy but just their direction of fire through tracer bullets. The firing
continued for about an hour and those were some of the tensest moments of my life.
One mistake by anyone of us, just a bullet fired, could land us in a situation
jeopardising our life for no good cause. A familiarisation mission in our own territory
had landed us in precarious position to be exploited by the enemy.
As continuous firing by the Indians did not get any response from the post, they
stopped firing. After sometime the noise of vehicles starting and moving away from
Indian post indicated that additional troops were going back to where they had come
from. By now it was dawn. I told my colleagues that we will sneak back into the post
unobserved by the enemy making use of available cover which we did. At the post
we lit fire creating smoke showing our presence with confidence that since additional
enemy troops had gone back, the enemy post could cause us no harm. We prepared
our tea and some breakfast and well after sunrise left the post for return journey
again using cover so that our leaving the post could not be observed by the enemy.
This morning episode, though unnecessary, was to keep the enemy guessing about
our presence or otherwise on the post during night and our so effective fire control.
On reaching the company headquarters I was admonished by the CO on telephone
for remaining out of communication for two days. I did not tell him the whole story to
escape further rebuke.
At Ranishankail local Police Officer, the Station House Officer (SHO) was an elderly,
mature and wise person. Known as Bara Babu as SHOs were known throughout
the area, he was a great help in bringing peace and normalcy in the area reassuring
the population that Army was there to help restore peace. Our own effort to reach out
to the people and interact with them by addressing small gatherings in different
villages brought positive response from the population who had been fed with
misinformation that Army was ruthlessly killing the local population. The spread of
fear had a genuine reason because at start of the operation in Dacca on the night of
25th March 1971, the Army started with indiscriminate firing causing death to over
one thousand people in the first two days. Although both Generals responsible for
this operation, Major Geneneral Khadim Raja and Lieutenat General Tikka Khan
were removed from command but the damage was done. Bulk of the population fled

Dacca to the areas in the interior of the country spreading the news. When we
reached Dacca on 6th April and were initially deployed inside the city, my company
being in the Jaggannath College, the city gave a deserted look. Very few people
could be seen on the streets of Dacca. As the troops started arriving from West
Pakistan, they were formed into columns and dispatched from Dacca in different
directions to clear areas up to the borders and link up with troops of 14 Division
isolated and trapped in certain areas. These troops met resistance at the initial
stages of operations but the people involved in mass killing of non Bengalis escaped
to India retreating at leisure by blowing up bridges and culverts in the path of
advancing troops to retard movement. While retreating towards India the rebels kept
spreading panic among the population about the Army coming forward to cause
them harm.
Killings and Atrocities
Large scale killings and atrocities were committed in East Pakistan but who were
perpetrators of these crimes and who were the victims will be clear from the pattern
of Army operation explained, at the cost of some repetition, in the following
paragraphs.
On 25 March 1971 when military action was ordered in Dacca, very few troops were
located at the Kurmitola Cantonment in Dacca. The troops of 14 Division, the only
Army formation in East Pakistan were located in small cantonments all over the
country. The force had become ineffective because more than half of its strength
revolted and the remaining force got confined to barracks. Some company size
groups were surrounded and suffered heavy casualties in extricating from areas like
Rajshahi, Dinajpur etc. West Pakistani officers and men serving in the units of East
Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles were brutally killed alongwith their
families including small children. Dead bodies of officers killed in places like
Mymensingh and Thakurgaon were dragged into bazaars as we learned on reaching
these places. These officers were posted to East Pakistan Rifles and were located
away from the few cantonments at the mercy of criminal gangs operating with
impunity for those months when the State had lost control over that part of the
country.
About twenty thousand troops were flown by PIA to Dacca in about two weeks time
to reinforce East Pakistan garrison. As the troops arriving from West Pakistan started
their move outwards from Dacca, each column encountered a number of blocking
positions in the form of well laid out ambushes. On clearing one position and
advancing further yet another position blocking the route of advance awaited these
columns. The pattern was same on all directions indicating well coordinated plans.
As narrated before in the progress of our column advancing towards north from
Dacca, the bridges on streams were blown off making the vehicular movement
impossible. The progress therefore was slow in accordance with the speed of
marching columns which had to negotiate water obstacles causing further delay.

This gave the rebels freedom to indulge in unspeakable atrocities on non Bengalis
retreating towards borders at their leisure. The Army columns advancing towards
borders thus could not lay their hands on the people who needed to be killed.
During the initial phase, as the troops advanced on different routes outwards of
Dacca, the civil population of small villages located en route vacated their houses
and moved away to avoid contact with the Army. In the towns, while most of the
population had moved away due to the fear, some people stayed on and came out
on the roads carrying Pakistan flags to avoid firing from the approaching columns. By
the time the columns had reached up to the borders, a substantial number of
civilians had also crossed over to India fearful of the approaching Army. These
people were put up in temporary camps in the border area and were later used as
recruiting ground for forming of the Mukti Bahini. After few months, the people in
these camps wanted to come back to harvest their paddy crops. By now they were
clear that the Army was helping people to restore normal life, not killing them. The
Indians forcibly detained these people by erecting fences around them and placing
guards to prevent their move back. They were assured that by December, they
would be allowed to go back. We, on our part had established reception camps at
different places along the borders for people returning from India. These camps
would receive very few people trickling in. These people would be registered, given
some help in the form of food items and allowed to go home.
After declaration of war on 3 December, I received over one thousand people at
Panjbibi camp. They informed that the guards had been removed from the camps.
The Indians, apart from taking young men for induction in Mukti Bahini were
indulging in large scale molesting of captive women. Almost all the women of child
bearing age whom I saw returning to the camp after declaration of war were
pregnant. Pictures of women in such conditions were printed by the Times magazine
and other publications which we saw in the POW camps attributing crimes to men of
Pakistan Army. I had a Bengali young man working with me as volunteer who had
moved with family to India in the initial days. He had two wives. Both had been
detained by the Indians.
At Hilli railway station the border was demarcated with the help of corrugated iron
sheets placed vertically. The Bengali civilians were being kept in camp nearby. At
night there would be wailing, shrieks and noise when the Indian troops would comb
through the camp to get hold of girls to be taken to their bunkers to be molested
throughout the night, a daily routine till declaration of war. Conversely the Indian
propaganda campaign was supported by the world media to demonise Pakistan
Army by attributing acts of molestation of Bengali women.
Three under strength Divisions of Pakistan Army had been put into a very difficult
situation of overcoming resistance and restoring normal living conditions. The
officers commanding these units were well aware that this task could not be done by
committing crimes. It was understood that any such laxity would be most detrimental

in keeping the discipline, so essential for success of the mission. During initial stage
of the operation, four persons of my unit were punished by holding their court martial
on charges of trespassing private premises. They were dismissed from service and
sent to jail on receipt of complaints from the civilians. The prevailing environments of
constant danger subdued carnal desires and passions. Still if someone could afford
to indulge in such thought for some time, particularly in the rear areas, there were
facilities available in almost every small and large town where sex workers in defined
localities would cater to such needs. Given that these army units, operating without
rest or relief for about ten months in most disadvantageous position could retain their
cohesion and fighting spirit is ample proof of a disciplined force doing its best against
great odds.
Similarly the stories of killing of Bengali civilians attributed to Pakistan Army were
exaggerated beyond limits. At the start of operation from Dacca on 25 March 71,
over one thousand people had been killed in two days of indiscriminate firing, a most
unfortunate and tragic happening. For bungling up this operation, both the Generals
responsible were removed from command. Major General Khadim Raja the General
Officer Commanding 14 Division was replaced by Major General M Rahim Khan and
Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, Commander Eastern Command was replaced by
Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan (A A K) Niazi who arrived in East Pakistan in
second week of April 71. As the troops arrived from West Pakistan and started
moving to reach borders in different directions from Dacca, the rebels opposed their
advance by laying ambushes. . As civilians living in small hutments astride the route
of advance moved away into the interior fearing casualties, we found that residents
of larger villages and small towns did not completely vacate. In these places people
came out on roads carrying Pakistan flags and chanting slogans Pakistan Zinda
Bad. Obviously the Army did not fire on them.
Large scale killing of non Bengalis, mostly the people who had migrated from India to
East Pakistan and the West Pakistanis working in East Pakistan was done by
Bengali rebels joined by criminal elements during the months of Jan to April 71 when
the government had no control over the situation. Another spree of large scale
killings and atrocities on non Bengalis was unleashed after 16 December 71 by
Bengali armed gangs; like Qadir Bahini in Tangail area north of Dacca. The Indian
occupation Army took some time to control such bands of criminals operating in
other areas where non Bengali population was still left, ultimately confining to
ghettos in Dacca.
The scale of this killing can be determined from the numbers of non Bengali
population residing in East Pakistan till January 1971 and those left after the war.
These people were killed in thousands during that period. This was the period of
complete lawlessness in the whole country when criminal elements in the garb of
Awami League activists indulged in unspeakable atrocities committed on the hapless
non Bengalis. They would be collected at one place, the women were gang raped
and then all were killed. As the Army columns were advancing towards borders on

different routes on foot, the bridges and culverts on the roads having been blown,
progress of move was slow and predictable allowing criminal gangs to indulge in an
orgy of killings at their leisure. When a column led by Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab
reached Santahar railway junction in North Bengal, the place was littered with dead
bodies killed moments before arrival of the Army. Other columns also witnessed
signs of similar atrocities. On reaching Mymensingh we found people of a whole
colony of non Bengalis butchered; even those who had taken refuge in the mosques
had not been spared and were killed inside the mosques. When our column was
moving towards Brahamanbaria from Aashuganj Bridge and was recalled to move
towards Kishorganj towards the north, lots of dead bodies of freshly killed people
were found lying along the railway line. Recollection of such atrocities becomes more
painful when the lies and false perceptions blaming Pakistan Army have become an
accepted truth.
Raid across Jagdal Hat
Proceeding with my narrative, as my Company was replaced and brought to
Thakurgaon in July, Captain Muhammad Afreen was taken away by the CO to lead
newly formed Commando Platoon. This platoon comprised of about twenty two men
mainly young soldiers and had to undertake an operation in Pachagarh area. While
one platoon from 8 Baluch Company (Captain Akbar Niazi) took up position to
engage the rebels from front, Capt Afreen with his commandos surprised the rebels
by reaching their position from the rear by a meticulously planned move. It was a
swift raid on a well prepared rebels defensive position at the base of Titulia salient
across stream opposite Jagdal Hat between Amar Khana and Pachagarh.The raid
resulted in over sixty rebels killed and hundreds injured at a cost of only one of our
soldier losing life and four young soldiers getting injured. The rebels suffered injuries
while withdrawing and fleeing in the open, subjected to our artillery fire using special
fuse (high explosive air burst) which made the shell burst at some height above
ground. These shells would cause great damage to exposed persons who were not
under cover in trenches. Captain Cheema from Artillery, accompanying raiding party
told that he had personally counted fifty five bodies but there were still more in the
area where Lt Qaswar Naseers section had gone closer to the Indian border. The
party had to quickly withdraw before any Indian reaction. This raid was classic
combination of audacity and wisdom displayed by Capt Afreen which was hallmark
of all his actions during the prolonged struggle. In at least three such actions he
deserved the highest gallantry awards but as explained earlier we were not working
for worldly honours because of our peculiar circumstances and attitudes.
A few days stay at Thakurgaon was a great relief. Here the Battalion Headquarters
were located in the old East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) Wings accommodation. At the
entrance of this complex two Bengal tigers were kept in cages at the main gate by
EPR people. Our unit inherited these from 8 Baluch and continued to look after these
wild animals. The Battalion Officers Mess was located a little away in a Rest House.
Chacha Jahan Dad, the head waiter looked after officers with his peculiar

patronizing style. Jahan Dad was a dedicated man who served the unit officers with
love and commitment. As prisoner, he was offered by the Indians to be repatriated
earlier but he preferred to remain with the officers in POW camp. An ex Havildar,
retired from one of the old Punjab battalions, he had got enrolled as Mess Waiter
with the newly raised 34 Punjab in 1966. He died at ripe old age while still serving in
the unit. In those few days when I could enjoy the food in the Mess, Jahan Dad
treated me with most delicious pineapples that he had stocked in the fridge. Those
pineapples were recovered from an abandoned field when almost half its yield had
already been consumed by conservancy staff of the unit. Fruit in East Pakistan was
in abundance, particularly coconuts, mangoes, litchi, bananas and kathal; a fruit with
pungent smell and difficult to prepare for eating. Since it was known to increase
potency, the trouble to peel it was considered worth the effort by the locals. It was
said that if some part of its pulp stuck one's beard while eating carelessly, the pulp
could not be removed; rather beard had to be shaved off. Banana from a place
Munshiganj near Dacca had a special fragrance found nowhere else.
Move to Bogra/Hilli Sector
One late evening as I was about to go to sleep after days work and consuming
dinner, there was a knock at the door of the room. Captain Mian Bux Baloch
informed me that early next morning I was to go to Brigade Headquarters (Bde HQ)
at Rangpur where I had to meet the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 16 Division
who was visiting the Brigade. Next morning I started for Rangpur. After travelling for
about two hours I reached Bde HQ where I was rushed in to meet the GOC, Major
General Nazar Hussain Shah, a bulky man who knew me from Kharian where he
was commander of one of the brigades of 9 Division. He welcomed me and told me
that my company will be operating under 205 Brigade and I should start travelling on
Road Rangpur Bogra where somewhere en route I will find Brigadier Hassan,
Commander 205 Brigade, travelling northwards. I started travelling further south
looking for the Brigade Commmander whom I found meeting a small crowd along the
roadside in a school near Plasbari, a small town. He told me to join him as he was
travelling to visit 4 FF located in area Hilli, a small village and a railway station on the
north-south railway line in North Bengal.
We reached 4 Frontier Force (FF) Battalion HQ located at a small village, rather few
hutments named Chattni. Here I was briefed by Brigadier Hassan that there was a
possibility of an Indian attack on 14th August, our Independence Day. Since Hilly
offered the shortest approach to Indians in reaching Road Rangpur Bogra, main
communication artery in North Bengal, my Recce and Support (R&S) Company had
been provided to the Brigade to strengthen 4 FF positions. On a map, he indicated a
track junction which was supposed to be my battle position and told me to
reconnoiter this position before my company arrived.
The Indian border at Hilli ran along the railway line for some distance. In fact the
main entrance of Railway Station Building, built before partition, opened into India

and was now blocked with the help of corrugated iron (CGI) sheets. A look at
alignment of the border would indicate that Hilli town should have been part of
Pakistan but it was learnt that an influential Hindu family owning a factory on that
side got the alignment changed resulting in a very unusual demarcation of the
border. There were some other such travesties in deciding border demarcation in the
northern part of Bengal where some enclaves inside Pakistan were Indian Territory
and vice versa.
I did my reconnaissance in heavy rain and on very difficult slushy kachha tracks.
The two small American Jeeps, M-38 A1, which I had with me, helped me to
negotiate the torturous terrain. After two days my company started arriving from
Thakurgaon area in groups by train disembarking at Hilli Railway Station. I had two
officers, Captain Afreen and Lieutenant Muhammad Saeed Tariq commanding two
platoons and Subedar Aziz Khan, an experienced, mature Pathan JCO,
commanding the third platoon.
The composition of my R&S Company was one antitank platoon comprising twelve
106 mm Recoilless Rifles (an anti tank weapon), another platoon with six Medium
Machine Guns and third platoon with twelve Light Machine Guns. All these weapons
were mounted/carried on the jeeps. On reaching East Pakistan the number of anti
tank guns was reduced from twelve to six in a Company, considering that the area
was not much suitable for use of tanks so there was lesser need of antitank
weapons. This premise proved wrong particularly in North Bengal where the Indians
used tanks during the winters as area was suitable for tank movement. An
interesting conversation in this regard took place between CO 25 Punjab, Lieutenant
Colonel Muhammad Hussain (called Dora because he was hard of hearing) and
Major Abdul Haq Mirza, Brigade Major (BM) 23 Bde. As the Indians started their
move from the border advancing into area occupied by 25 Punjab, the CO reported
to Brigade on wireless net that Indian tanks were moving towards his positions. The
BM responded that it could not be tanks because the area was not suitable for tank
movement. After some argument over wireless net, the CO concluded conversation
saying that,
OK may be those are buffalos but they seem to be carrying gun barrels on their
back.5
We in our unit were following flexible drill on employment of these weapons. Where
required, and mostly this was the case, we had formed composite platoons, each
platoon having all the three weapons. Each infantry division had nine infantry
battalions and one R & S Battalion. The R&S unit was authorised about 150
vehicles, mostly jeeps as major weapons were all jeep mounted. I, in my company
was authorised to have 35 vehicles. But in East Pakistan the unit operated as
normal infantry battalion carrying out operations at the initial stage of reaching the
5

Spoken in Punjabi, (Hala Majhee he hosan par lagnae utte baerralan ladian hoian ne) this sentence
gives a real taste of satire it contains..

borders on foot. After that it was given vast areas of responsibility during the counter
insurgency phase which needed constant vigil, by establishing posts and foot
patrolling.
As my company was detached to 205 Brigade in first week of August, an anti tank
platoon under command Captain Mian Bux Baloch was also detached to Comilla
Brigade commanded by the Brigadier Saadullah, a commander reputed for courage
and competence. 34 Punjab was left with less than three companies of its own and
with an additional company from 8 Baluch at Pachagarh which was later replaced
with a company from 48 Punjab.
Battle in Thakurgaon Sector
The happenings in Thakurgaon Sector after I had left in first week of August are
described from the information gathered initially from Major Mazari, 48 Field
Regiment, Artillery, Battery Commander with the unit who was in Prisoners of War
(POW) Camp Number 25 at Ramgarh and later from the unit officers after
repatriation.
The Indians, a task force of more than a divisional strength, 71 Mountain Brigade
Group, having four regular infantry battalions i.e.12 Rajputana Rifles, 21 Rajputs, 12
Garhwal Rifles and 7 Maraths, with additional force placed undercommand for
operations comprising an armour squadron, a mountain regiment, two field
companies of engineers, five battalions of the Border Security Force, one battalion of
Territorial Army and seven companies of Mukti fauj was commanded by Brigadier
(later Lieutenant General) Pran Nath Kathpalia who after the war, expanded his after
mission report in to a book titled Mission with a Difference. The objective of Indian
task force was to capture Dinajpur operating on axis Pachagargh- ThakurgaonDinajpur. His detailed account on the progress of his operations opposed by a small
force, less than three companies of 34 Punjab is a very interesting study about
performance of the unit during war.
The Indians started their operation by putting attack by an infantry battalion on Amar
Khana; the border outpost located about ten miles north of Pachagarh. This post,
manned by about fifteen persons was vacated about a month before start of Indian
offensive due to paucity of troops. Capture of that unoccupied post by using an
infantry battalion was celeberated as great victory as narrated by the Indian force
commander in his book. After savouring the fruits of victory and gaining some much
needed confidence, the next move aginst occupied positions at Pachagarh came on
26 November.
Pachagarh, a town just about three kilometer from Indian borders towards its west
was held by a company of 48 Punjab commanded by Major Khurshid (name sake of
our Bravo Company Commander, Khurshid Mallal) which had replaced 8 Baluch
company under command 34 Punjab. Indian move from west to cut off the positions
made holding Pachagarh positions untenable. The positions were almost surrounded

when Colonal Amir ordered Major Khurshid, the Company Commander to extricate
from the positions. The company was ordered to rejoin 48 Punjab in
Nilphamari/Saidpur sector.
To counter Indian move south of Pachagarh, 34 Punjab was left with less than three
companies. A battery (six guns) of 48 Field Regiment commanded by Major Mazari
was providing artillery support to the unit. Confronted with seemingly impossible
task, the unit deployed its small force with great skill to delay the Indian advance
before they could contact Thakurgaon; the town which had been prepared as strong
point and was to be occupied after fighting the delaying battles.
After clearing Pachagarh, the Indians resumed their advance on Pachagargh-BodaThakurgaon-Dinajpur axis served by a good metalled road. Their move was resisted
by skilful deployment of vastly outnumbered troops. From Pachagarh, the Indian took
almost eight days to cover a distance of about twenty miles, mostly empty spaces to
contact our main defensive position at Thakurgaon on 3 December 71. The town of
Thakurgaon had been converted into a strong point by laying minefields and creating
other obstacles.
Compared to the advancing Indians it was a very small force and could not have
delayed the Indians for more than 48 to 72 hours. But the Indians took almost eight
days to contact Thakurgaon positions speaks volumes about stiff resistance skillfully
offered by 34 Punjab. Adroit use of weapons, delaying tactics and our inherent
mobility provided the capability to occupy, adjust and readjust positions with
considerable ease and was fully exploited by daring officers and men who
accomplished a seemingly impossible task of resisting advance of such a large
Indian force for so long.
The delaying battle between Pachagarh and Boda, a distance of about nine miles
astride the road was fought by D Company commanded by Major Nisar Hussain
Bukhari with Lieutenant Qaswar Naseer as one of his platoon commanders. At Boda
A Company with some EPCAF elements commanded by Major M Saeed Azam
Khan was deployed in the role of Advance Position. Both these companies fought to
delay the Indians for about five days before they could move forward from Boda
towards Thakurgaon a distance of another about twelve miles along the road.
Considering the size of Indian force, it was remarkable achievement made possible
by the indomitable will of the officers and men using innovative tactics with their jeep
mounted weapons.
Between Boda and Thakurgaon, Captain Jamil from B Company with about fifty
men was tasked to delay the Indians to enable A and D companies falling back to
occupy Thakurgaon positions. As narrated by Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel)
Jamil, during night he saw an enemy patrol comprising about a dozen men
approaching towards his position on a bridge on main road. Instead of engaging that
patrol, Jamil surreptitiously left his position on the bridge for the enemy probing men

to see that the bridge was unoccupied. When next morning the enemy started
advancing astride road with confidence that the place was unoccupied, all hell was
let loose on them with available weapons fired from close range for maximum effect
causing them large casualties, making them to recoil, thus delaying their move.
Jamil, tasked to delay the enemy for eight hours, caused delay of almost three days
to Indians in their move from Boda to Thakurgaon a distance of about twelve miles.
These types of actions and tactics used by the officers and men enabled them to
accomplish their tasks with remarkable sucess.
These troops after fighting delaying battles fell back to rejoin the main defecsive
positions at Thakurgaon which the Indians contacted by 3 December 1971 when war
was formally declared by Pakistan.
Here an unexpected situation developed. As the war was formally declared by
Pakistan on 3 December 1971, the CO was told to vacate Thakurgaon and take up
position on River Karatoya some distance south of Birganj, a town located about
twenty miles south of Thakurgaon. The message was passed by the Brigade Major,
Abdul Haq Mirza on 3 December in the late evening. Our CO tried to contest and
argue that he had not seen the new position and that his defenses at Thakurgaon
were ready. But he was told that the General Officer Commanding (GOC) had
ordered this move and it had to be complied immediately. The Brigade Commander
was not available, confusion prevailing because of change of command, Brigadiers
Ansari and Shafi both being present in the brigade area. This order was a complete
surprise as CO or any one from the unit had not seen the position because no such
contingency had been planned. All effort was to convert Thakurgaon town into a
strong point by laying minefield and creating other obstacles. Withdrawal from
Thakurgaon became a controversial decision and the CO had to do some explaining
after repatriation to clear his position. After repatriation from India, I came across late
Abdul Haq Mirza and asked him about his passing on that withdrawal message. He
told me that as war was declared on 3 December, the GOC Major General Nazar
Hussain Shah told him to convey directly to CO 34 Punjab to take up position on
Karatoya River south of Birganj. As he was taking time to encode the message using
slidex keys, the GOC was getting impatient. Since both of them belonged to same
area, District Chakwal, General Nazar told Major Mirza in typical Chakwali dialect
something like,
'Mirzia unj ta toon Bara efficient ban Na ain, hun wela aaya ae tan teri khoti
khub gai ay'.6
Abdul Haq Mirza was an enthusiastic man whose cheerfulness was infectious. He
radiated vitality affecting all those around him. Alas, he, a man of great potential got

Translation would be (You claim to be very efficient but when the time has come, you seem to have
been bogged in a quagmire).

wasted away retiring soon after repatriation in the rank of Lieutenant Colonal, a
casualty of adverse circumstances.
With commendable organisational acumen, unit broke contact with enemy to
complete the move during night 3/4 December 71. By morning of 4 December the
unit was busy in preparing defensive positions astride bridge on River Karatoya
south of Birganj. All its ammunition and essential stores had been taken out during
the night due to meticulous work of our Quartermaster, Captain Shafiq Sarwar Malik,
an officer of outstanding abilities. On reaching the new position south of Birganj it
was realised that Thakurgaon thermal power station had not been disabled before
withdrawal. Captain Zahid Nawaz Janjua was told to go back and disable the power
station. By now enemy had also reached and made contact with our new position.
Despite heavy odds Captain Zahid with his party completed the assigned mission
and rejoined unit when fighting at the new position was going on.
The Indians started their attacks while the unit was still busy in preparing trenches.
Next three days tested the mettle of 34 Punjabis in fighting from a hastily prepared
position against over a divisional size force. The Indians at one point reached our
trenches astride the bridge. This position was held by a platoon led by Second
Lieutenant Abbas, recently arrived from PMA, of Bravo Company commanded by
Major Khurshid Mallal. The attack was beaten back with heavy losses to 7 Marhatta.
Since their wireless transmissions could be monitored, the CO of 7 Marhatta was
being exhorted by his force commander to exert more pressure to capture the bridge
with promise of a Vir Chakkar of high order. The CO was heard saying that his unit
had been butchered and he was not in a position to do any more fighting.
At one stage the situation became so precarious that CO, Colonel Amir, the
Governor had to get hold of washer men, barbers and sanitary workers to plug a
gap. All these people had been given arms and had been trained to fight. In fact
barber contractor Kuda Bakhsh, affectionately called Bakhshoo Nai, was quite
trigger happy and a problem to control. After three days of intense fighting, the Indian
force commander asked for more troops to proceed further towards his objective of
reaching Dinajpur. He was told to abandon the effort on this axis and was redirected
to join forces operating towards Nilphamari/Saidpur. Thus 34 Punjab stayed in the
positions they had occupied on night 3/4 December 71 till ceasefire was announced
on 16 December. That later turned out to be surrender and incarceration in the
Indian POW camps. Captain Shafiq Sarwar Malik had saved some photographs
which he gave to the unit on re-raising in 1975. These pictures included four Indian
tanks destroyed in front of the units positions.
The unit destroyed its major weapons like recoilless rifles and equipment including
vehicles to avoid these being handed over to Indians. Brigadier Kathpalia, while
giving the details of troops opposing him makes a very unusual mistake. He does not
mention 34 Punjab opposing him. Was he really unaware till writing of his book well
after the war that the unit opposing him in Thakurgaon Sector was 34 Punjab? While

listing the troops opposing him he gives 48 Punjab to protect areas Thakurgaon,
Pachagargh and 85 Punjab (Reconnaissance and support battalion) to deny areas
Boda, Thakurgaon and Nilphamari. In actual fact, our troops opposing Kathpalias
task force as described above were; a company of 48 Punjab at Pachagarh, which
was withdrawn when being encircled on 26 November and rest of the area covered
by A Company, B Company (less its anti tank platoon) and D company of 34 Punjab.
The company from 48 Punjab after withdrawl from Pachagarh on 26 November
rejoined its own unit deployed in Nilphamari across the Karatoya River in the south
east of Tahkurgaon.
If the unit was able to hide its actual identity till after the war, it speaks volumes
about the detailed procedures and practices adopted by all ranks of the Battalion.
May be the our intelligence officer (IO) Lieutenant Moin Nawaz Warraich, always
wearing an impish smile, ever prepared to turn a serious situation into a comic one
by his witty remarks, had some contribution in hiding units actual identity by getting
the security instructions implemented. There was no unit by the designation of 85
Punjab on the Order of Battle (ORBAT) of Pakistan Army till then.
The officers and men of 34 Punjab were remarkable people. Battalion performed
assigned tasks with outstanding success although overall result of the conflict
washed away all good deeds. The officers were a valiant lot of young leaders who
performed their role with extraordinary dedication, motivation, unbounded courage
and selflessness. With fond memories of respect and honour, I have always felt
privileged to be part of that lot (List of officers with the unit is given at annex A)
Looking back at performance of the Battalion in three distinct phases of the conflict;

During initial phase of clearing operations, 34 Punjab covered largest

distances marching through a good part of the country overcoming opposition
en route and clearing areas up to the borders (Durgapur in Mymesingh district
and Bhurangamari in Kurigram district) a feat unmatched by any other unit in
that phase of operations.

In the next phase of restoring normalcy, the unit was responsible for a very
vast area restoring peace and normal living conditions in Thakurgaon sub
division of Dinajpur district and one of its companies in Panjbibi area (District
Bogra) under 205 Brigade. The unit did not allow rebels to establish
sanctuaries in their area of responsibility.

During the war as Indians started invasion from different directions, 34 Punjab
was only unit in the whole of East Pakistan which could not be dislodged by
Indians from its hastily prepared defensive position south of Birganj. These
positions were defended against heavy attacks by over a division size task
force commanded by Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Kathpalia till

ceasefire was ordered on 16 December 71.7 The task force could not pursue
their further move towards Dinajpur and having suffered heavy casualties
were ordered to shift direction to join another force directed against
Nilphamari/Saidpur.
The unit suffered over eighty casualties in dead and wounded. Three officers
embraced SHAHADAT; Second Lieutenant Abdul Ghafoor on 11 April, Lieutenant
Abdul Waheed by mortar fire from across the Indian border in October 71 and
Lieutenant Mohammad Saeed Tariq, the last person from unit to make the ultimate
sacrifice on 13 December 1971.

In his book titled, Mission with a Difference The Exploits of 71 Mountain Brigade, the General has
specifically mentioned this fact which he regretfully claims to have led to change in his original
mission.

Panjbibi
After spending sometime in 4 FF area, patrolling places which had not been visited
by the troops earlier like Dhupchanchia, I was ordered by the Bde to relieve 8 Baluch
Company at Panjbibi, the railway station south of Hilli. I was to leave one composite
platoon comprising two recoilless rifles detachments, two machine gun detachments
and four LMG detachments to strengthen 4 FF defensive positions. Three more
recoilless detachments were added to reinforce these positions as soon as the
Indian attacks started on Hilli on 22 Nov 71. At this time the deployment of 205 Bde
was, Bde HQ at Bogra, 4 FF in area Hilli covering the shortest approach to main
Rangpur Bogra Road, 8 Baluch located in area Jaipur Hat and 13 FF in area
Patnitola. 32 Baluch joined the Bde during war and was used to fight the Indians
moving on Rangpur - Bogra road. The Bde was covering a vast area in its
counterinsurgency role as well as covering the most threatened approach in case of
Indian attack.
I took over the area of responsibility from 8 Baluch Company commanded by Major
Mujtaba spanning border area of over fifty kilometers. To cover the area in counter
insurgency role with the aim of denying insurgents any sanctuary for carrying out
sabotage activities, three posts were established along the border. One post was
manned by EPCAF Company covering a track coming to Panjbibi from the west.
This Company was commanded by Capt Badar Munir, AC (later Brig) He was
replaced by Capt Aashiq, (Punjab Regiment). North of it another post was
established by a Platoon commanded by Lt M Saeed Tariq to cover the gap between
Hilli and EPCAF post. This platoon was later shifted to astride the railway line north
of Panjbibi. South of EPCAF post a party of sixteen civilian Bengali volunteers were
given the responsibility to establish a post. They were provided with old 3.3 rifles.
Although they did not get any other benefit like pay or rations or any other facility but
still they did commendable job by not allowing any intrusion into their area. Another
Platoon commanded by Capt Afreen was employed to carry out patrolling and
additional tasks assigned by the Bde which were frequent like going for a raid in the
area of other units thus supplementing their strength. Company HQ was located in
the Panjbibi village.
Panjbibi is situated south of Hilli on both sides of the railway line running north to
south in the north-western part of East Pakistan. Like other large villages, Panjbibi
had a weekly bazaar called HAT in local language. It was very interesting to see
barter trade going on in the bazaar, large gathering of people and haggling on prices,
the day full of vibrant activity. The Bazaar was organised on an open piece of land
on one side of the village.
Most vital factor in keeping the area peaceful was public support cultivated through
our conduct and dealing with the population, not interfering in functioning of local
administration. I would remain on the move in the area in a small jeep without any
escort with complete confidence that there was no fear of any hostile act. One day

when I was travelling towards EPCAF border post on the Katcha track, two civilian
young men waived to stop me before I could reach the place they were standing. On
reaching them, they pointed to freshly dug earth on the track. As we removed the
earth from surface, we found an anti tank mine placed there. Bara Babu, the Police
officer in charge of the area was informed. Within two days he found the men who
had planted that mine. They were locals who had remained in refugee camp across
the border in India and were cultivated to perform acts of sabotage. The civilian
population wanted to live in peace and was against any activity which could disturb
peace in the area. The Police played very important role in having their informer
system in the villages in place to detect any unusual activity.
One afternoon while I was returning from a routine visit of EPCAF post to my
Company HQ, I heard firing in vicinity of our post manned by civilians some distance
south of EPCAF post. Travelling in a small jeep which carried only four persons,
Capt Afreen was driving whereas driver and another soldier carrying light machine
gun were sitting behind. Rest of us carried our rifles. We immediately turned south
on dirt tracks to reach the post and found that firing had stopped, our civilian party
having repulsed a Mukti Bahini raid coming from across the border. We formed two
groups one led by me and the other by Capt Afreen and pursued miscreants who ran
back into India. We could see a large crowd of civilians sitting across border
watching the show. These posts were about fifteen to twenty kilometers away from
my Company HQ and I used to frequently travel in the area without any
apprehension of threat from civil population. We were not facing any hostility from
general population of East Pakistan. It was a myth created and propagated in the
world media.
At Panjbibi, a reception camp was established to receive people who wanted to
come back from camps on Indian side of the border. Such camps had been
established all along the border at suitable places where returning people were
registered and provided with some food and clothing before being sent to their
homes. At our camp about a dozen people would be received daily. As elsewhere
mentioned, people in Indian camps wanted to come back because they wanted to
harvest crops knowing by then that they had nothing to fear from the Army. But the
Indians forcibly detained them with the promise that if nothing happened till Dec they
would be allowed to go back. It was on 3 rd Dec when guards were removed from
their detention camp that they came across in bulk. I had got some leaflets printed in
Bengali language urging people who had gone across to India at the beginning of
Army operations out of fear to return home. These leaflets were sent to the camps
opposite our area through our Bengali volunteers who were working with us. Such
measures and the general peaceful atmosphere in the area encouraged displaced
persons to return home.
Since the month of June, Indians were using artillery fire on our border posts all
along the border. This was used to help Mukti Bahini persons in crossing the
borders. From our side there was no response to this firing as we were already

spread thin on ground because of lack of adequate resources. After spending these
months in a state of perpetual tension when we felt that situation was under control,
the country side peaceful except few acts of sabotage confined to the border areas,
Indians started their next move with the Indian Army undertaking ground operations
across the international borders.
Indian attack on Hilli started on 22 Nov 71, on the day of Eid. The Indians first
attacked positions around Hilli railway station. 4 FF had prepared positions about
three kilometers away from the border on a small nullah creating an artificial obstacle
by raising a bund. The trenches were very well sited covering the approaches on that
axis. Gen Niazi, Commander Eastern Command, was so impressed with the well
sited positions that he ordered unit commanders of other formations to visit 4 FF to
see their defences. However, shortly before start of Indian attack, the command of
brigade had changed. Brig Hassan had been replaced by Brig Tajammal Husaain
Malik, an energetic and courageous man who had been awarded for gallantry as unit
commander in 1965 War. He did not allow 4 FF to leave their positions along the
borders to fall back to occupy the prepared positions without giving a fight from
outposts along the borders. The unit fought from those positions with unmatched
valour causing heavy casualties to the Indians. In the process they lost some very
good officers and JCOs, including Major Muhammad Akram who was awarded
Nishan-e-Haider posthumously for his gallant fight. Source of strength and
inspiration to his command, Major Akram was a mature and brave man unruffled in
the tumult of fighting. I had met him on my arrival in their area when his company
was deployed at the Hilli railway station. Later his company was shifted towards a
little north of Hilli, Major Peters company being placed at Hilli. During the intense
fighting Major Akram tried to approach an Indian tank with a 40mm anti tank rocket
launcher but before he could hit the tank, he was spotted and engaged. He
embraced Shahadat, the ultimate sacrifice one can offer in line of duty.
My composite platoon comprising five recoilless rifle detachments, two machine gun
and four light machine gun detachments was deployed to strengthen 4 FF defensive
positions which contributed enormously in fighting their battle with remarkable
resilience. The platoon was commanded by Subedar Aziz, a mature and courageous
JCO. During the fighting I received a message from the Brigade that Havildar Haq
Nawaz of my Company, a detachment commander of one of the recoilless rifles had
embraced Shahadat (martyrdom) after he had destroyed one enemy tank. As the
fighting was going on, I took a jeep and drove from Panjbibi to Hilli railway station
post taking a circuitous route to avoid enemy fire but still received a volley of artillery
fire which luckily landed a few yards away from my moving jeep. At Hilli post I met
Major Julian Peter, (later Major General) the company commander, Sub Aziz and the
men of my company deployed there. I saw three enemy tanks destroyed in front of
that position. One of these had been destroyed by Hav Haq Nawaz and another by
Sepoy Shah Mehmood of my company from a well sited position. After spending
some time with them I returned to my post at Panjbibi.

When the War was formally declared by Pakistan on 3 Dec, a message was
received from the Brigade that Pakistan Army had captured Jammu by afternoon of
3rd Dec. We forgot about our own travails and everyone was filled with great joy to
hear such good news. Alas; the joy was short lived as the news was false resulting in
greater disappointment. Earlier, since the months of August we had heard rumours
that people in GHQ considered these three Divisions in East Pakistan as written off.
At that time we took this as a joke but it proved true. The ruling junta, a coterie of
callous, insensitive Generals in connivance with Z A Bhutto seemed bent upon break
up of Pakistan in a humiliating manner.
As fighting in Hilli area was increasing in intensity after declaration of War, the Bde
Comd wanted me to exert pressure on Indians from the southern side. For this I
organised a fighting patrol comprising about fifteen men led by Capt Afreen to
conduct raid inside India in the rear of Indian troops in contact with 4 FF positions.
With great audacity this raid was conducted in area Balurghat, a few miles deep into
India resulting in killing of fourteen Indian soldiers caught asleep during night. On our
side there was one person wounded. The party safely withdrew back to own
positions. For some time I had two artillery field guns placed at Panjbibi. To cause
some damage in the rear areas of the advancing Indians, I sent these guns to the
EPCAF border post from they could target Balurghat area well in depth of Indian
forward line. These guns were soon taken away from my area.
As the Indians did not make any progress on Hilli-Ghoraghat track, they tried to
move on a parallel track further north. On this track a company of 8 Baluch,
commanded by Major Ashraf was deployed in a small village called Badhuria. As
fighting intensified, Bde Comd, Brig Tajammal ordered a company from 13 FF
deployed towards south in Patnitola area, to reinforce Badhuria positions. The
company had to pass through Panjbibi, where they halted for a short while. The
company commander Major Sabir Kamal Meyer had just returned from leave in
Spain, having married the daughter of our Ambassador Gen Bilgirami. After
honeymoon in paradise like environments of Spain, he felt the environments most
depressing. A suave and stylish officer, he left a very good impression. On 8 Dec,
tragic news of his Shahadat was most saddening. He himself fired a recoilless rifle
round to hit a tank but received a volley of tank fire from Indian tank squadron
opposite his position. This weapon was also from my company which he relocated
for better field of fire and tried a shot himself. His JCO Subedar Sher Afzal, standing
next to him also embraced Shahadat in the process and the weapon was
destroyed.
When the Indians got stuck on this route also, they tried yet another track further
north. It was on this track that I had been tasked by Brig Hassan in August to take up
position in case of the Indian attack. However because of change of command and
my company getting deployed elsewhere as explained, this track was left
unoccupied. There was some confusion over the inter formation boundary. Brig
Tajammal, when told that the Indian armour was moving on that track north of 4 FF

positions, responded that it was not through his area of responsibility that the Indians
were moving. The confusion over inter brigade boundary was not cleared by the
Division.
The Indians kept moving on that track unopposed and finally emerged at Pirganj
(different town from one mentioned earlier) on road Rangpur-Bogra. As the Indians
were adjusting their positions, by dusk a convoy of jeeps carrying Major General
Nazar Hussain Shah, (GOC 16 Div) Brig Tajammal (Comd 205 Bde) and others
travelling from Rangpur to Bogra, arrived at Pirganj. The surprise encounter startled
both parties. The GOC, a bulky man had some difficulty in dismounting from the jeep
but despite that the party was quickly provided shelter by the local civilians hiding
them from the searching Indians. Only one jeep could turn back and reached
Rangpur to tell the tale. The civilians who provided shelter to the General and his
party, arranged for their safe passage to Bogra during the night on a different route.
On reaching Bogra, Brigadier Tajammals response to deal with this situation was
ordering 32 Baloch to evict Indians from that area. When CO 32 Baloch tried to tell
him that an infantry battalion could not evict tanks from the area, he was rebuked.
The CO Lieutenant Colonel Raja Sultan conveyed these orders to his officers who
also showed reservation in undertaking the mission. After some discussion the CO
told them that he was moving as ordered, the officers and men then followed. In the
ensuing battle in Pirganj area, CO lost his life and the unit suffered over thirty dead,
besides many persons wounded. Next morning the Indians started advance towards
Bogra. 32 Baloch took up delaying positions at two different places between Pirganj
and Bogra but each time they were bypassed, as Indians went behind their positions.
Brigadier Tajammal had his tactical headquarters (Tac HQ) in 4 FF area. When
Indians started moving towards Bogra, they decided to clear 4 FF position from the
rear. The GOC told Brigadier Tajammal to relocate 4 FF to face Indians at a place
called Mahaasthan north of Bogra. This message was carried by CO 8 Baloch,
Lieutenant Colonel M M A Beg who, passing through my position at Panjbibi, told me
about it. A short while afterwards, he came back with the reply from Brigadier
Tajammal that he would not relocate 4 FF, as his Brigade had stopped the advance
of an Indian Corps and that the Indians behind 4 FF positions could be bagged. It
was most unrealistic assessment of the situation.
On morning of 11 December, Brigade Commander with his Tac HQ arrived at my
Company HQ. I was told that Indians had started moving towards 4 FF positions
from their rear. In the process they had ejected Brigade Tac HQ and artillery gun
positions supporting the unit. He told me that he was establishing his Tac HQ at my
location and that, I accompanied by Major Muhammad Anis Ahmad, Engineers, his
outgoing Brigade Major, should contact CO 4 FF to find out his latest situation. He
told us to go and contact CO 4 FF and that we should change into local dress while
proceeding towards 4 FF positions. Major Anis, the first Pakistani award winner from
the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK told me to forget about donning Dhotis

the local Bengali dress and instead to proceed as we were, in uniforms. Both of us
moved towards Hilli along the railway line. I had a post on the railway track manned
by Lieutenant Mohammad Saeed Tariq from where 4 FF positions were visible. From
this post we sent a young Bengali volunteer with a written message from Major Anis
to Lieutenant Colonel Akhlaq Abbasi, CO 4 FF, asking about the latest situation. The
Bengali young man started his move taking suitable cover to avoid detection and fire.
This was a slow process and we kept waiting for his return till about 3 p.m. As we
were observing the happenings towards north in 4 FF area, my batman Sepoy Raza
told me on field telephone that Brigade people had left and new BM, Major Mazhar ul
Haq, Baloch Regiment, had left a message for me asking to take care of myself. I
had known Major Mazhar from Kharian days as our units were located in the same
block. He was a very cheerful and energetic officer. I did not understand what it
meant and was rather surprised at the move of Brigade HQ. After waiting for
considerable time, Major Anis wanted to leave to find out where the Brigade
Commander had gone.
We came back to my company HQ and as we were having a cup of tea, our Bengali
friend reached back with a beautifully handwritten message from Lieutenant Colonel
Akhlaq Abbasi. Its essence was that till the ammunition lasted, he would be holding
on. Major Anis very carefully put that small piece of paper in his pocket and left the
place to rejoin Brigade HQ which had gone towards Bogra via Jaipurhat. 8 Baloch,
with its Battalion HQ and two companies was located at Jaipurhat. The Brigade
Commander ordered the unit to take up position at Khetlal about ten kilometres from
Jaipurhat towards Bogra.
After darkness on night 11/12 December, troops of 4 FF stared withdrawing from
their positions, moving through my location towards Bogra. This movement
continued throughout the night. By morning of 12 December 71, 4 FF positions had
been vacated. Indians having failed to make any progress from the front had
bypassed these positions and landed up in their rear. Paucity of troops to man all
approaches caused this unfavourable development. A total of three under strength
Divisions totalling about thirty two thousand troops could not defend the whole
country, particularly when these were deployed in penny packets for counter
insurgency operations. To counter the Indian invasion, which had become obvious
by concentration of Indian forces in October/ November 71, there was a need to
redeploy available troops to defend the core area around Dacca according to their
capacity. Orders to defend every inch of the land, led to dissipation of forces all over
the country. This lack of clarity at the national level or wilful neglect of established
principles of war caused defeat in detail.
On the morning of 12 December, I could see Indian tanks, part of the force which
had cleared 4 FF positions; about one thousand yards away from my location.
Expecting their further advance to clear Panjbibi, I recalled my detachments to take
up positions around the village in trenches which had been prepared earlier but had
remained unoccupied. By now, my platoon with additional anti tank detachments

commanded by Subedar Abdul Aziz; which had undergone intense fighting with 4 FF
for almost twenty days, had rejoined the company on night 11/12 while 4 FF was
passing through my position on their move to Bogra. I could clearly see that spirit of
these men was not affected by the hardships caused during intense battle for such a
long period of time. Sub Abdul Aziz was the same calm and confident man and his
subordinates equally cool and unruffled. One of them acted with unmatched valour
being narrated in succeeding paras.
Since on the previous day while going towards Bogra, Brigade Commander had told
8 Baloch to vacate Jaipurhat to occupy positions on a small nullah in area Khetlal,
my company was left on its own without any support from own troops who were now
about twenty kilometres away from my location. I, being on Brigade wireless
communication network (GRC-9 Sets) tried to contact the Brigade for fresh orders,
but there was no response to my calls. It was only 8 Baloch who responded with the
message that I was to remain in position at Panjbibi. The day passed without any
activity from the Indian side.
On night 12/13 Dec, Lieutenant Mohammad Saeed Tariq, occupying position north of
village between a nullah and the railway line reported noises of possible troops
movement some distance away from his trenches. Since I had no artillery support to
engage the enemy at that distance, there was no option but to wait for them to
approach our positions. This was unexpected direction of enemy move because
Indian troops who had cleared 4 FF positions were on eastern side of the village,
their tanks visible at a distance. By about 4 a.m. intense artillery fire started on my
positions. Although my troops and I had gone through enough battle inoculation, this
was the worst we had to endure. Intense shelling continued for about an hour during
which, the Indian attack came on the positions of Lieutenant Saeed Tariqs platoon.
The fire fight continued for about one hour in which Indians could not get closer to
our positions. Suddenly there was a lull in the fire fight, meaning that first Indian
attack was beaten back. Indian artillery fire however continued unabated. After a
break of about an hour, Indians resumed their attack with greater intensity,
overrunning part of the positions of Lieutenant Tariqs platoon. In the process
Lieutenant Mohammad Saeed Tariq embraced Shahadat and his platoon JCO, Naib
Subedar Aziz was injured. I had two JCOs by the name of Aziz. One was a Subedar
commanding No 9 Platoon and another Naib Subedar Aziz, a Platoon JCO with
Lieutenant Saeed Tariq.
Realising that the position had become untenable, I told my men to withdraw,
covering the withdrawal myself with six men including Subedar Aziz, (9 platoon) Naik
Nawaz, and an LMG detachment providing covering fire. Sepoy Raza, my runner,
pulling my arm from the trench I was standing in, wanted me to come out and leave
but I told my detachment; the jeep driver, signalman with GRC-9 Set and the runner
to leave and wait for me outside the village in the south. Our small party of six men
with one LMG covered the withdrawal of remaining men in the Company HQ and
cookhouse area. By now I had lost communication with EPCAF elements under

Captain Ashiq deployed on the western side of the village, so I almost ran towards
their position to find out if they had known about the decision to withdraw. As I was
moving towards their position, I found my jeep standing in middle of the village
waiting for me. I shouted at them to move out of the village and wait for me as told to
them earlier. On reaching EPCAF positions, I found that they were in the process of
moving out. Becoming satisfied, I started moving back and found that the bunker on
a crossroad where my jeep was standing only minutes ago had been obliterated by
artillery fire. It was a close call for my detachment, had they not moved few moments
earlier on my shouting at them, they also would have gone with the bunker.
After getting out of built-up area of Panjbibi, I collected men of my Company on
southern edge of the village, and once again tried to contact the Brigade on wireless
net. The only response was from 8 Baloch who had nothing to tell me in this new
situation. Asking my company to wait for me, I drove towards Khetlal to physically
contact someone responsible to find out what was to be done. As I was driving
towards Khetlal, via Jaipurhat, I could hear tank movement on a parallel track on my
eastern side. These were same tanks which had been positioned east of Panjbibi
and were visible from my positions on 12 December. On reaching Khetlal, I found 8
Baloch withdrawing from those positions having been ordered to move towards
Bogra. I was told that I should join 13 FF in Patnitola area towards west, as Indian
tanks by now were nearing 8 Baloch positions at Khetlal. By the time, 8 Baloch
column got on track for move, the Indian tank column reached them, forcing them to
disperse and move helter-skelter reaching Bogra in disarray.
I drove back to Panjbibi where my company was waiting for me. I told them about the
new situation and started moving towards 13 FF positions about 30 kilometres away
towards west, part of the track passing very close to the Indian border from where I
received fire while passing through that area.
By late afternoon on 13 December, I reached 13 FF positions on the border in
Patnitola area. Their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Amir Nawaz Khan and his Adjutant
Captain Akram Panwar were waiting for my company. Fortunately, a bridge in Jaipur
Hat area, prepared for demolition, was not blown up by 13 FF Company that had
crossed it in order to rejoin the unit, otherwise I could not have reached their
positions that day. The next two days were without much activity. 13 FF positions
had been prepared with great foresight. Bunkers were very well sited, covering entire
area and turning it to an ideal killing ground for enemy approaching those positions.
However, Indians did not approach these positions as their focus was reaching the
main communication artery i.e. Rangpur-Bogra road.
Lieutenant Muhammad Saeed Tariq, hailing from Sahiwal City had lost his father as
a child. He and his sister were brought up by their mother. He was far mature than
his years, a wise man amongst us. In early June when we had taken over the
Thakurgaon area from 8 Baloch and my Company was deployed in Ranishankail
area, Lieutenant Tariqs assessment was that we had landed up in a Vietnam like

situation and it would be difficult to get out from here. Captain Afreen and I, due to
lack of understanding and maturity scolded him on his pessimism but his words were
prophetic. He would say that if something happened to him, his mother would not be
able to bear it. He died of bullets fired at close range by Indians. When LMG position
on his Platoons extreme left stopped firing, he first sent his Platoon JCO, Naib
Subedar Aziz to find out. As the JCO did not return for some time, he himself moved
out of his trench in that direction. Ensuing moments are a tale of unparalleled
courage demonstrated by Sepoy Muhammad Durez. Hailing from some village near
Chakwal he had rejoined the company on night 11/12 Dec after withdrawal from 4 FF
positions. Seeing that Saeed Tariq had gone towards the positions on left side and
Indians were closing in on their Platoon HQ trenches, he started a jeep standing
nearby and drove through fields after his Platoon Commander. As he approached
the officer, a hail of bullets hit Saeed Tariq. Instead of caring for his own life and
withdrawing, Sepoy Durez put Lt Saeed Tariq in the jeep with help of Naib Subedar
Aziz. In the process JCO also got wounded. Despite intense firing from close range,
he drove the jeep carrying both the injured to my position. I, standing in my trench,
shouted at him to move straight to 8 Baluch location at Khetlal about twenty
kilometres back where doctor was available. Lieutenant Saeed Tariq embraced
Shahadat before reaching 8 Baluch position and was buried at Khetlal. The
boundless courage and selflessness shown by Sepoy Durez cannot be captured in
words.
There were countless incidents of tests of courage which will take much more effort
to record. After a prolonged struggle and seemingly hopeless situation, the men of
Pakistan Army had not lost the nerve which is quite possible in such circumstances.
Some men who during the peacetime were not rated favourably, proved their mettle
during this prolonged conflict. One such NCO, Havildar Azam from a village near
Talagang proved to be a most reliable person. When given independent tasks, he
performed with admirable sense of responsibility, courage and competence.
One unassuming young boy, Sepoy Akram from Shakargargh area performed a
great act of valour by enabling a patrol surrounded by the Mukti Bahini in border area
to extricate safely. It so happened that, in 4 FF area, a young artillery officer was
sent to a border post which had about twenty people, a mixed lot from the army and
CAF. The officer took out a small party to patrol along the border. As the party
reached open area from where paddy crop had been cut, it was fired upon from
three sides, fire coming from tree tops. Two men from the party were injured. The
officer asked for help from the Company Commander at Charkai. As reinforcement
party along with two mortars moved towards the border, they were intercepted
midway at a small place named Chintamin. The pinned down officer decided to stay
in the open patch till night when the party could undertake withdrawal in cover of
darkness. Main impediment in withdrawing under fire was taking the wounded out.
Here, Sepoy Akram of my company who was part of that patrol volunteered to
perform an act of unmatched courage which saved the party from more casualties.

He took the two wounded men one by one, carried them on his shoulders crawling a
distance of about two hundred yards to reach a small cover provided by some trees.
He had to traverse this distance four times which he did with admirable skill to avoid
detection. Thus the party was able to extricate from that precarious situation where
longer stay could have resulted in more casualties.
In one incident when I was asked to reoccupy a post on the border, I along with
Captain Afreens platoon moved to occupy that. As we approached that post from a
flank, Mukti Bahinis occupying the post got unnerved and started withdrawing using
covering fire. When Captain Afreen saw a few men running back towards the border,
he along with another man started chasing the running enemy. After covering a short
distance, Afreen because of his speed, found himself chasing the rebels alone. One
of the rebels carrying LMG dropped his weapon to run faster. Captain Afreen brought
that LMG and a few rifles dropped by Muktis who ran away crossing over into India.
Captain Afreen from village Guliana, near Kharian Cantonment in Gujrat district
performed the tasks assigned to him with remarkable combination of courage and
wisdom. He planned his actions meticulously to cause maximum damage to the
enemy without incurring casualties to own troops and achieved success in all his
undertakings with remarkable results. During the operations, at least in three actions
at different times, he deserved the highest gallantry award. He was recommended
for an award after raid in Pachagargh area but as mentioned earlier none of our
citations ever reached Eastern Command. A lively, outspoken and witty man, he
claimed to have excelled in the game of Kabbaddi in his native district before joining
Army. Nimble in footwork, despite his small frame he never lost a point in the game,
be it catching the opponent or escaping capture. Even after spending over two years
as POW in India, his Kabbadi performance was incredible. For some years Kabbadi
had been played in the Army and officers were allowed to play in the team. After
repatriation in 1974, I witnessed his remarkable skill in the game during 17 Division
final matches at Kharian won by 2 Punjab team led by him.
On 16 Dec, we received a wireless message that a CEASEFIRE had been agreed to
between India and Pakistan ending the fighting. By now the Indians in Bogra area
were in contact with our positions in Bogra city. 13 FF deployed in Patnitola area
near border was ordered to concentrate at Naogaon near Santahar railway junction,
about 50 kilometres towards south. CO 13 FF ordered my Company to cover the
withdrawal. There was a gloomy silence in nearby villages. As I was collecting my
men and preparing to withdraw my Company in late afternoon, I saw a middle aged
man coming towards me at brisk pace. I can never forget the way he embraced me
and cried, saying that he remembered Ayub Khans time and that this is not what
they had wanted (Hum ne yeh to nahin chaha tha). It was very emotional moment for
both of us knowing that we will not meet again.
We concentrated at Naogaon, where EPCAF Wing HQ was located. Since no Indian
troops were nearby, an Indian unit, 22 Marhatta along with their Brigade Commander

came from Bogra to Naogaon on 21 Dec. It was only then that we learnt that we had
to hand over our weapons to Indians. The reason given by the Indians was that since
we will be moving through India en route to Pakistan so our weapons had to be
taken away.
My experience with local Bengali population, as reflected in few incidents I have
quoted earlier of e.g. the Bengali volunteer getting reply of a message from CO 4 FF
and the person embracing me and crying at Patnitola, is entirely different from
general perception about attitude of Bengalis in this tragic chapter of our history. At
Panjbibi I was responsible to cover a very vast area along the borders. At one post,
covering a part of border area, responsibility was given to local Bengali civilians,
giving them old .303 rifles and ammunition. They, being independent and away from
other posts, performed their task exceptionally well, not allowing any intrusion from
that side. All such Bengali volunteers were well spirited worked for keeping peace in
their areas without getting any remuneration.
During my travel from Dacca to Bhairab Bazar, Kishore Ganj and Mymesingh on foot
and later traversing vast areas of North Bengal during about eight months, I found
that the general population was cooperative and not hostile towards Pakistan Army.
They wanted peace. While some of the young men, mostly picked up from people
who had crossed over to India, were inducted into Mukti Bahini. Conversely, a
substantial number, certainly more than the opposing ones, was fighting Indian
sponsored insurgency along with Pakistan Army. The protection provided by civilians
to General Nazar, Brigadier Tajammal and party at Pirganj during thick of war,
saving them from searching Indians, amply negates the false propaganda of
portraying Bengali population against Pakistan Army.
The epic Battle at Hilli is a saga of unparallel valour by our soldiers who were faced
to fight a much superior force. Each one of them acquitted himself remarkably well. I
have mentioned about the spirit of my men who after fighting at Hilli rejoined me at
Panjbibi. The two Indian tanks destroyed at initial stage of the battle at Hilli were by
my men, one by Havildar Haq Nawaz who embraced Shahadat due to retaliatory
fire and another tank was destroyed by Sepoy Shah Mahmud from a very well sited
position. This initial loss of tanks forced the Indians to shift their effort away from Hilli
towards Badhuria on the northern track. From my position at Panjbibi, the southern
flank of positions at Hilli were being protected and supported.
4 FF was initially reinforced by men of my Company, the Chalie Company 34
Punjab (R&S). Additional troops inducted into the battle in Hilli Sector were; one
Company from 8 Blauch commanded by Major Ashraf and another Company from
13 FF commanded by Major Sabir Kamal Mayer at Badhuria. The Brigade
Commander, Brigadier Tajammal Hussain Malik remained present in the area with
his Tactical HQ located with 4 FF. 80 Field Regiment Artillery commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Anis was supporting the battle. Major (later Brigadier) Anwar
Khattak, Battery Commander with 4 FF was ever available to the CO 4 FF

Lieutenant Colonel Akhlaq Abbasi (later Brigadier). Both got injured in one incident,
were evacuated for a short while and soon rejoined the fight. When Lieutenant
Colonel Abbasi was away from the unit, Lieutenant Colonel Mumtaz Malik (later
Brigadier) of the same unit serving at HQ Eastern Command rushed to join the unit
for those few days during fighting. Such was the spirit and sense of responsibility of
soldiers and officers in those critical times.

Prisoner of War
22 Marhatta accompanied by Brigadier Bhatti, the Indian Brigade Commander, came
to Naogaon on 21 Dec 71. They conducted themselves with utmost propriety, giving
due respect to our officers and men. They asked for the lists giving particulars like
home address etc with they told us were to be given to Red Cross. After staying in
Naogaon till 1st Jan 1972, we were made to move on military trucks to Malda in West
Bengal. The Indian unit bid us farewell in a very respectable manner. On exchanging
notes later on with others in Prisoner Camps, the attitude of Indian units was found
to be almost similar in all other places. The only exception was a Sikh unit whose
personnel misbehaved with our troops, perhaps to avenge the shame of their
becoming POW in 1965 war.
Indians took about fifteen days to shift prisoners from different parts of East
Pakistan, placing them in various cantonments of their three provinces, i.e. Bihar,
Uttar Pardesh and Madhia Pardesh by 15 Jan 1972. There were a total of three
under strength infantry divisions in East Pakistan. The authorised strength of one
infantry division was and probably still is around fifteen thousand persons. In East
Pakistan, three under strength divisions operated. On 25 March 71 when Army
action started only one Division, the 14th was scaterred at various places in East
Pakistan with more than half of its units having revolted.
The two Infantry Divisions flown from West Pakistan, 9 Division from Kharian of
which my unit was a part, and 16 Division from Quetta, did not take their complete
elements like Armour Regiments, Medium Artillery units and some other integral
units along. During the last days of war two ghost Divisions were announced to have
been raised but that was a hoax, more to confuse ourselves rather than the enemy.
Taking into account the number of forces fielded and considerable attrition in about
ten months of fighting, the total number of army persons who surrendered in East
Pakistan could not be more than about thirty two thousand. There were hardly about
eight to ten thousand other people in different categories like Scouts, Mujahids and
civilians with us. A local force, raised to replace East Pakistan Rifles; the East
Pakistan Civil Armed Forces (EPCAF), comprised of locals mainly non Bengalis who
rejoined their families as war ended. Among civilians, there were only a small
number of senior bureaucrats, as junior lot was mostly locals. As far as civilian
families are concerned there were hardly any because they had shifted earlier during
the turmoil.
The confusion about total number of prisoners will continue to prevail because Mr. Z
A Bhutto appointed General Tikka Khan first as the Army Chief and later as
Secretary General of Pakistan Peoples Party. This General had been removed from
command for mishandling operation in Dacca on 25 March 71. Although there must
be the record of number of army personnel made prisoners gleaned from Strength
Returns sent to GHQ from HQ Eastern Command but was there any record of

others, is not known. Hence, purposefully the actual number of POWs remained a
deliberately created mystery. How this figure of ninety three thousand was concocted
and what were the motives can be judged from the fact that India took just two
weeks to pick up these prisoners from different parts of East Pakistan and placed
them in three provinces i.e.Bihar, Uttar Pardesh and Madhia Pardesh but their
repatriation was arranged over eight months (starting September 1973 and
completing by April 74) by design to ensure that persons of any of the fighting units
did not get together after repatriation and distributed all over the Army. The total
strength of armed forces personnel can be worked out from the Order of Battle of
formations and units in East Pakistan as on 3 Dec 71 annexed with this narrative
(Annex C).
Starting from Naogaon on Indian military trucks on 01 Jan 1972, we reached Malda,
a District Headquarters in West Bengal the same evening. Here we found that other
units in our sector were also coming in to a temporary camp before boarding trains
for different destinations in India. Our train was formed and before moving, the Indian
officer in charge pleaded with us not to attempt escapes en route. His main
argument was that we were in transit for going to Pakistan and any such attempt
would be futile. He promised not to close shutters of train compartments and not
causing us any discomfort. Most of us believed Indians because it seemed so
logical. The war having ended, apparently there was no need to keep the prisoners
in India. Move to Pakistan through India by trains also seemed most practical. It was
after about three months when we realised that we were in for a long time.
Our group was brought to Ranchi, in Bihar Province of India. As we detrained at
railway station, we found the attitude of Indian officers completely different from what
we had experienced in East Pakistan. They were harsh and mean in their conduct.
At first we were little surprised but soon got adjusted to it. On reflection we realised
that the Indians exemplary conduct in East Pakistan was a deliberate effort to save
them of any problem during our transit which their hostile attitude would have
provoked. They were very sweet and nice till we reached India. On reflection, all of
that appeared to be so well planned by our enemies down to minute detail.
After staying at Ranchi camp for about two days, where 34 Punjab officers were also
there, some prisoners were moved to another camp at Ramgargh, about forty
kilometres away from Ranchi. I along with Captain Afreen were part of this group
against our request that we should be allowed to remain with officers of our unit
whom we had not met since August 71, my Company having been detached to
command 205 Brigade.
The camp at Ramgarh, as at other places, was made by converting barracks of other
ranks of the Indian Army into prisoner cages. Barbed wire was erected around a
group of three to four barracks to make a cage. The whole cantonment was
converted into prisoner camps which were numbered. Ramgargh camp was number
25. There were about three hundred officers at Ramgargh camp, kept in two cages

each comprising three/ four barracks. Initially we were provided with tubular cots
which the Indians kept withdrawing as punishment and reissuing, a continuous
process for over two years. Cook houses were established inside the cages where
our unit cooks were employed, provided with rations authorised to soldiers. It was
Dall and chappati during day and meat/ vegetables with chappati in the evening,
apart from morning and afternoon tea. Life in the camp started with recounting the
events and exchanging notes with other officers.
The reality of losing half of the country weighed heavy on everyones mind
particularly when every unit that encountered the enemy, fought with courage. The
incidents of unparallel gallantry were many but it all went to waste. The units of the
three under strength Divisions deployed to defend every inch of East Pakistan had
soon been isolated and bypassed, the Indians reaching undefended Dacca in less
than two weeks. The available troops, if deployed according to the strength and
capacity, could have defended Dacca and its surroundings for considerable length of
time, giving adequate chance to the international community to work out a ceasefire
but that was not planned by our conspirators.
It was after about three months that we realised that we were not in transit to
Pakistan as initially told by Indians. This was a different ballgame altogether. As the
events unfolded later, our new ruler in remaining Pakistan wanted to consolidate his
power before he could get the prisoners back. It was very frustrating, considering
that there was no justification for Indians to keep us because war had ended and we,
upon release could not participate in any ongoing operations. The uncertainty was
causing great anxiety to everyone. Those who were married and had been away
from their families and children since March 71 and even earlier were in a more
agonising situation. They all took it with fortitude and exceptional grace not giving
Indians any feelings of being low on morale, denying enemy the pleasure of seeing
us in low spirits. Indian administrative staff of the camp would make all possible
efforts to maintain a calm and peaceful atmosphere but an overall attitude of
defiance by the prisoners would result in frequent tension.
During the few early months when we still believed Indians about us being in transit,
two officers from our camp made good their escape and reached Pakistan. Major
Arjmand Malik (Artillery) and Major Abdul Qadir (Armoured Corps) both serving with
the Special Services Group (SSG) made use of fog one early morning to cross over
the barbed wire fences. On reaching Pakistan they wrote a letter that they had taken
five days to reach Pakistan. By now the other prisoners also started considering
escape realising that our repatriation was uncertain and we were in for a long time.
The Indians had marked all our clothes with thick black lines for distinction but some
of us succeeded in keeping a pair without marking in case we could get away.
Organised into pairs, those who were keen to escape started their preparation by
physical fitness routine. My company officer, Captain Afreen paired himself with
Captain Akbar Niazi, 8 Baloch, with whom he had an affiliation since their joint raid
on rebels positions at the base of Titulia salient in Pachagarh area in July 71.

Captain Akbar Niazi was a courageous person inclined to rashness while Afreen had
a remarkable sense of balancing courage with prudence. During operations he
always strived to kill the enemy without causing casualties to own men. Careful
planning and audacious execution always got us intended results.
After a few months in the camp, an underground tunnel was started using some
improvised tools of digging and concealing the excavated earth. It was a slow
process. In our camp, the tunnel was detected by Indians after a few weeks of work.
As we later learnt that almost during same time period tunnels had been started in
most other camps but all except one were detected. The one successful was at
Fatehgarh Camp from where Major Nadir Pervez, awarded SJ as 2 nd Lieutenant
during Rann of Kutch skirmishes in April 1971, his cousin Major Tariq Pervez (later
Lieutenant General) and some of their colleagues made good their escape and
reached Pakistan. The other option of escape was to jump over barbed wires when
visibility was poor due to fog. Major Arjmand and Qadir had done it when we were
thinking of being in transit. It was intriguing as to how they had thought of escaping
at that time. Later on Major Qadir was caught spying for India. After doing his Staff
Course at Quetta, he was posted to one of the Brigades as Brigade Major but was
caught while still on joining time as he was already under surveillance. Major
Arjmand had reportedly left the Army and had gone to USA or somewhere out of the
country.
It so happened that for about two years there was no fog despite changing seasons
since last fog that enabled escape of two officers from our camp. The escape party
would prepare themselves every evening and keep waiting throughout the night if
visibility conditions permitted approaching the barbed wires. After initial couple of
months, the Indians, constantly working to improve security arrangements had
erected various strands of wire between and outside the cages. Anyone making
escape attempt had to negotiate three to four strands of wire obstacles. One of these
was more formidable in height and strength. In extreme frustration, Captain Niazi
and Afreen attempted to throw an improvised weight on electric wires expecting to
cause electricity failure thus creating opportunity for escape. For doing it, they had to
cross two strands of barbed wire which they did in the early part of one night in full
view of other prisoners who helped them by engaging the guards into petty talk. But
their attempt failed and they had to cross back the two barbed wire strands causing
great anxiety for everyone about their safety.
After repatriation of prisoners started in September 73, one day a light fog appeared
early morning. Eight officers who included the impatient pair of Niazi and Afreen
attempted escape. Working in pairs, they crossed the first two strands of wire to
enter into adjacent empty space. From here they had to cross the high wire posing
main obstacle. Niazi and Afreen were first ones to cross that obstacle at one point.
As they approached the last strand, they were suddenly confronted by two Indian
guards, an NCO carrying a sub machine gun and a sepoy carrying rifle. Despite
raising hands and shouting not to fire, the Indians opened fire killing Captain Akbar

Niazi at the spot. Captain Afreen ran sideways between the two strands of wire
followed by Indian rifleman firing from outside the wire. One had experienced many
unusual happenings during long struggle in East Pakistan but this was most
extraordinary. Afreen, being fired at from such a close range, crossed back over the
main wire with some difficulty but was not hit except a very minor bruise on his
thumb. One of the bullets being fired at him hit and killed one of our NCOs who was
looking out of his window. Indians alerted by fire, came in strength and got hold of all
those who had crossed over the two strands of wire. These included Captain Pervez
Akmal, Engineers, later my brother-in-law, progressing in his career to become a two
star General. Captain Afreen was caught and was being taken to the spot where
Niazis body was lying to be shot when an Indian officer ordered to hold him for
questioning. This fortuitous intervention again saved Afreens life.
Some notable visitors who came to visit us in our camp were Mr. Younus Khan
'special' advisor to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. This man from Charsadda was
related to our Sarhadi Gandhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He tried to talk to us on
relations between our countries but we were not prepared to listen to him and he had
to leave without giving us his lecture. Another visitor was Major General Shah Beg
Singh, who being in charge of the Mukti Bahini force was responsible to organise,
train and launch that force into East Pakistan. He, after retirement, had associated
himself with Sanat Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and was killed by Indian Army during
storming of the Golden Temple by the Army.
Repatriation of prisoners started in September 73 spread over a period of eight
months, and was completed by April 74. While the Indians took two weeks time to
gather the prisoners from all over East Pakistan and put them in three provinces i.e.
Bihar, Uttar Pardesh and Madhia Pardesh over better part of cow belt in India, a vast
area more in expanse than Pakistan, our government took eight months to repatriate
the prisoners. About fifty persons would be taken from one camp and equal number
from other camps in the area forming a train of about three hundred people. A great
hype was created in Pakistan by Bhuttos government about its achievement in
getting the prisoners released. This repatriation was delayed to help Mr. Bhutto in
consolidating his hold in New Pakistan and it was planned to ensure that the men of
fighting units get no chance to get together.
With lot of fanfare arranged at Wahga border, these prisoners would be received and
after brief questioning for a couple of days at Lahore sent on leave for two months.
After expiry of leave, they would assemble at one of the reassembly camps
established at Kharian and Quetta. They would be interrogated for their stay in India
and also asked to record their accounts of actions in East Pakistan. After about six
weeks they would be posted to different units of their groups because their own units
were yet to reform, being re-raised in 1975 after a gap of one year on completion of
the repatriation. The rank structure and service brackets laid down for units being reraised made sure that the personnel of original fighting units could not get together.

When I was posted back to 34 Punjab on its re-raising in June 1975, I found that only
about thirty people from the unit who were serving in East Pakistan were posted
back. Rest got scattered all over Pakistan in different units and had no chance to
serve together again. Some of them had been sent home with alacrity. The policy
was that anyone asking for release should not be given time to reconsider his
decision and should be packed off very next day of his making the request. A special
term, returnees had been coined for us. Sarcastic comments from men like you
have come back after giving away half of the country were enough for an already
traumatized returnee to ask for release. There was no arrangement for providing
psychological assistance, so essential to cope with changed environments. General
Tikka Khan, future Secretary General of Z A Bhuttos Pakistan People Party was
head of the Army supervising return of the prisoners, covering lies and implementing
devious plans of his master. Pakistan Army lost some of its best experienced war
veterans, tested and tried during a prolonged war, due to deliberate mishandling
intended to get rid of them. On my return to 34 Punjab, I learnt that Sepoy Durez and
Sepoy Akram of my Company were posted to different units and had gone home
eventually. I did not get a chance to meet these brave men, a desire unfulfilled.
As the fate would have it, the main characters who had staged this tragic drama
causing large number of deaths and destruction met violent deaths. Mr. Z A Bhutto
was hanged by his chosen subordinate after being kept in prisons death cell for
quite some time increasing his agony. One of his sons, Shah Nawaz, died in
mysterious circumstances in France. The whole family had gathered there and all of
them were present in the house where they found Shah Nawaz dead in a room. His
elder son Murtaza was killed by police in front of his house at Karachi when his sister
Benazir was prime minister of Pakistan. Benazir, twice removed from the office of
prime minister on charges of corruption, got killed causing so many deaths first in
Karachi blast which she survived and then in Rawalpindi when she was aspiring to
assume power once more. Sheikh Mujib was brutally murdered by his own Army
along with his entire family except one daughter in his Dacca home. Indira Gandhi
had to bear the pain of her son Sanjeys death in a plane crash, and then she herself
as prime minister was murdered by her guards. Later her other son Rajiv, as prime
minister while visiting Tamil Nadu province, was assassinated in a blast by a female
suicide bomber. Gen Yahya remained in confinement for a few years and later
became forgotten and ignored.
Some people keep demanding official apology from the Government of Pakistan to
the people of Bangladesh for atrocities committed by Pakistan Army in 1971. Such
demands reinforce the lies created and propagated by Pakistans enemies. At one
time Mr. Imran Khan, our cricketer hero of yester years also asked for similar
apology. In his statement he said that while in England in 1971 he was told by his
friends about the atrocities of Pakistan Army but when he went to Bangladesh in
1989 he experienced love and affection of Bangladeshis. That is the reality. One

must believe what one experiences and not necessarily what one is told. In 1971,
majority of the Bengalis also felt the severe pain of losing Pakistan at that time.
If anyone is interested to know about atrocities committed during 1971, he should
start with finding out the number of non Bengalis living in East Pakistan on 1 Jan
1971, how many were left on 01 Jan 1972 and what happened to the rest. Pakistan
Army totalling about thirty two thousand men, after reinforcements were flown by air
tasked to restore normalcy, was too disciplined a force to have committed atrocities.
In her recent book titled Dead Reckonong Ms Sharmila Bose, an Indian has tried to
explore the facts. Her narrative gives a picture closer to reality. In the first place there
was no need of taking military action if Mr. Bhutto had accepted election results and
allowed Awami League to form government which was their right. Blaming Pakistan
Army and not the rulers who use or misuse this vital organ of State is playing into
hands of those forces who are constantly working to downgrade Pakistan Armys
image and demoralise it to reduce its effectiveness.
Main points of the appalling tragedy could be summarised as:

Bengal was a different country in all respects. Its language, culture and the
distance, over one thousand miles of hostile Indias territory separating it from
West Pakistan, were important factors in creation of Bangladesh. The
decision to dismember Pakistan, however, was not taken by Bengalis. The
decision was taken and implemented by West Pakistani rulers of Pakistan.

The people of Bengal had gone more than half way to remain part of united
Pakistan. In the first constitution adopted in 1956 after deliberations spread
over a period of about nine years since inception of Pakistan, Bengalis
accepted the arrangement of parity despite being more in numbers.

The constitutions of Pakistan (of 1956 and 1962) did not provide workable
arrangements between the two wings to keep the country united in which both
wings could enjoy considerable freedom in internal matters and in distribution
of resources. Despite that even if differences could not be bridged creating
the crisis of that magnititude, then there was always a peaceful way to part
ways through a negotiated settlement, if the leadership was sincere with the
interests of people of the country.

Although 1970 Elections gave clear overall majority to Sheikh Mujibs Awami
League, he could not form the government. Mr. Z A Bhutto who had won
seats in Punjab and Sind stopped his party members from attending the
National Assembly Session called at Dacca on 3 March 71, and threatened
other members from West Pakistan with physical violence (breaking their
legs) preventing them to do so. This act created the crisis which led to break
up of Pakistan .This was perhaps deliberate given the scheme was already
prep for dismemberment.

Elections were held in December 1970/ January 71 and after considerable

delay Assembly session was called for 03 March 1971. The elections were
initially scheduled in Oct 70 but were postponed due to cyclone which badly
affected coastal areas in East Pakistan. Delay in elections caused unrest and
further delay in calling Assembly session after the elections resulted in large
scale agitation and disturbances in East Pakistan. This turmoil turned into
lawlessness and loss of State writ in the province, particularly when the
Assembly session scheduled on 3 March at Dacca was called off without
giving fresh date.

After yet another costly delay, military action to overcome virtual anarchy was
taken on 25 March 71, starting in Dacca and later expanded to other areas as
the troops arrived from West Pakistan to restore order. This action resulted in
open rebellion.

It was a political problem for which military action was no solution. The military
commander in East Pakistan, Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan
refused to undertake the operation. He was removed and replaced by
Lieutenant General Tikka Khan who was willing to act on orders.

In East Pakistan there was one Infantry Division comprising four brigades,
instead of normal three brigades of Pakistan Army. Authorized strength of a
Division in those times was about fifteen thousand all ranks. Seven infantry
battalions of this Division were from the East Bengal Regiment (EBR) who
joined the rebels. EBR Training Centre located at Chittagong had about two
and a half thousand people who revolted. About thirteen thousand men of
the para military East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) had also revolted. Bengali troops
part of other units, substantial in numbers had to be disarmed, downgrading
effectiveness of those units in East Pakistan.

Troops of the Division were scattered all over East Pakistan confined to their
locations since the start of non cooperation movement in 1st week of February
71. Their supplies had been cut off and they were virtually prisoners living in
great tension and hardship. When military action was ordered, the troops from
Dacca Cantonment started with indiscriminate firing by tanks in the city of
Dacca on 25 March 1971. In two days over one thousand people were killed
in the city. The city was almost deserted when additional troops started
arriving from West Pakistan.

Two Infantry Divisions less their heavier elements like the armour regiments,
artillery and some other integral elements were flown from West Pakistan to
undertake the operations. Basically infantry units of these two Divisions were
flown in to reinforce East Pakistan garrison.

The initial phase of operation starting from Dacca to reach the borders on
different routes was completed by fourth week of April 71. In this phase, all
the columns starting from Dacca were opposed by well sited ambushes at
successive positions. This pattern suggested Indian involvement in planning
and presence of some of their men physically supporting the rebels,
comprising units of East Bengal Regiment (EBR) and the men from the para
military East Pakistan Rifles (EPR).

As operations by freshly arrived troops commenced from Dacca to reach out

to the borders and link up with isolated troops, the pace of movement was
severely restricted due to blowing up of bridges and culverts on numerous
streams on the routes. Vehicles were not available to expedite movement nor
could be used due to the obstacles thus created. It was marching on foot right
up to the borders which took time, this phase ending by last week of April.

During the period between February and April when there was no State
control in the province, atrocities and massacre of non Bengali population was
committed by criminal gangs at massive scale in different parts of the country.
Hundreds of thousands of people were brutally killed, the women molested
before being killed.

Allegations of this kind of mass murder and molestation of women were soon
levelled against the Army which is the greatest falsehood; the main point of
vicious propaganda campaign by Indians during the conflict. As would be
evident from the narrative, the Army troops in Dacca Cantonment started
operation to secure Dacca Airport for receiving reinforcements. In breaking
their siege, these troops carried out indiscriminate firing in Dacca City on the
night of 25 March 71 resulting in death of civilians which was most regrettable.
For bungling up this operation, both the Generals responsible i.e. Major
General Khadim Hussain Raja and Lieutenant General Tikka Khan were
removed from command and replaced by Major General M Rahim Khan and
Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan (AAK) Niazi respectively. Later Tikka
Khan and Khadim Raja were rewarded by Mr. Bhutto in his new Pakistan by
making Tikka Khan the Army Chief and after retirement Secretary General of
his Party. Khadim Raja was given diplomatic assignments.

After this action which secured Dacca Airport for landing of troops coming
from West Pakistan, the arriving troops were formed into columns to proceed
towards borders in different directions. These columns met resistance in the
form of ambushes laid by rebels from EBR and EPR troops aided and
coordinated by Indians. The civil population along the routes of movement of
these columns avoided contact except when a town was reached. In the
towns, people came out on the roads waving Pakistani flags and informed that
the miscreants had left the place "Malaoon log bhag gia.

The Army thus did not find those people who needed to be killed for their
crimes of mass killings and rape of non Bengalis which they had committed
during February, March and April when there was no government control in
the country. These people safely reached India, keeping about twelve hour
time gap from the Army columns marching towards borders. The general
population was not indulging in any subversive activity to evoke violent
response.

After reaching the borders, express orders constantly hammered were to

"restore normalcy". Formations and units were given vast areas of
responsibility to restore peace and normal conditions. The period from end of
April up to June passed without much opposition except that a few areas
could not be cleared because of their peculiar locations. Focus of the Army
during this period was to restore confidence of the population to resume
normal activity.

By the month of June, rebels, organised by Indians into a force called Mukti
Fauj (Bahini) started their sabotage activity, planting mines on the tracks,
blowing up small bridges/ culverts in areas close to the borders. Also by this
time Indians started shelling our posts in the border areas.

Rebels operations did not escalate to a scale which could disrupt normal
activity of the civilian population. The common people were not supportive of
rebels seeing that the Army was not interfering in their routine affairs and was
striving to restore peaceful living conditions.

The people of East Pakistan had voted for Awami League who promised to
get them maximum autonomy based on a six point formula. The people had
not voted for breakup of Pakistan. While a small segment of population was
actively engaged in fighting Pakistan Army, much larger numbers of Bengali
young men were working as volunteers with the Army to counter sabotage
activities by rebels and to deny them sanctuaries.

Movement in an area afflicted with insurgency environments needs special

arrangements like moving in groups to deal with possible attacks and
ambushes. No such need was ever felt throughout the period after clearance
of opposition in the initial phase ending by last week of April 71. Till end of the
war we could move in single vehicles never fearing or facing any threat from
the population. Even during war, the civilians protected Major General Nazar
Hussain Shah, GOC 16 Div, saving his party from being captured by Indians.

Our main concern was to ensure that rebels/ Mukti Bahini were denied
establishing sanctuaries within our respective areas of responsibilities. To that
end there was constant effort to reach out to the people, hold meetings and
reassure the population that they had support of troops against any threat or

intimidation from rebels. Because of these efforts, which kept us on the move
most of the time, rebel activity was confined to areas near the borders in acts
like laying mines on Katcha tracks, blowing up small culverts etc. Main threat
while moving in the area was from land mines laid by rebels on tracks along
borders.

By end April 71, government writ had been restored in East Pakistan, creating
conditions for resuming political process. Unfortunately the Government of
Pakistan under General Yahya Khan was in a state of paralysis and had no
intention to solve the problem. People around him like Z A Bhutto who saw no
chance of coming to power in united Pakistan were working for breakup of the
country to secure chance of ruling left over part of Pakistan.

Rumours or langar gup since August was that GHQ considered these three
Divisions in East Pakistan as written off. It was taken as a joke by naive junior
officers like me but it proved true.

The doctrine that defence of East Pakistan laid in West Pakistan never
materialised. The offensive planned from West Pakistan to capture vital space
in Indian Punjab, thus relieving pressure on East Pakistan was never
launched.

On declaration of war by Pakistan on 3 December, news was deliberately

spread through command channels that Pakistan Army had captured Jammu.
This joyful news proved wrong resulting in greater disappointment. Such
cheap tactics by callous rulers caused unnecessary frustration.

Indian invasion came from three directions i.e. west, east and north. From
south, the sea was completely dominated by Indians and the ports of East
Pakistan effectively blockaded.

General A A K Niazi, the commander of troops in East Pakistan acted on

orders of GHQ to defend every inch of land, a most unrealistic directive. This
directive did not allow him to deploy available troops to counter invasion which
had become very clear when Indian troops had completed their
concentrations on three sides of the borders by October 71.

Disobeying orders is a dilemma at the time of crises. I have two examples

which will elaborate the point. Chittagong was to be occupied as fortress by
troops deployed in the sector in counter insurgency role after withdrawal from
border areas. Special Service Group (SSG) troops deployed on the borders
with Burma had a chance to cross over to Burma when they were ordered to
come back to Chittagong for fortress defence. These highly trained troops are
not meant to be used for static defences. In our POW Camp No 25 located at
Ramgarh near Ranchi in then Bihar province, Major Saeed (later DIG Police)
a famous commando would blame his Company Commander Major Iqbal

(later Brigadier) for the ordeal of becoming a prisoner of war. Major Iqbal had
stopped him from crossing over to Burma when he had already boarded a
speed boat at Kaptai Lake to cross over. Major Iqbal could not disobey the
orders from Brigadier Atta Muhammad at Chittagong. Conversely Major Asif
Ali Rizvi of my unit posted to EPCAF at Coxs Bazar on the border with Burma
crossed over to Burma when he felt isolated from Chittagong. He reached
Pakistan and was awarded with gallantry award of Tamgha-e-Jurrat (TJ).
However, when POWs came back, Brigadier Atta made a point that the officer
be prosecuted for disobeying orders to reach Chittagong and so Major Rizvi
was deprived of the award.

In hindsight one can say that a man of General Niazis rank should have taken
decisions according to the situation confronting him, particularly when nobody
at GHQ was listening to him and his problems. Nevertheless the way he was
singled out, demonized, punished and deprived of earned pension was part of
the plot to put entire blame on him and the Army by Mr. Bhutto and his team.
The man who had restored State control over the country in just three weeks
of taking command of troops in April 71, creating conditions to resume political
process was held responsible for horrendous crimes of others responsible for
breakup of the country. This is very unfair.

The Indian invasion came through our deployment for the counter insurgency
operations, our troops scattered in penny packets all over East Pakistan. Like
water flows through terrain avoiding high ground, the Indians, containing our
positions where confronted, bypassed these positions and reached
undefended Dacca. Eastern Command plans to fight from strong points and
fortresses did not materialise as readjustment of positions to occupy and
convert towns and cities into defensive positions could not be carried out.

The Indians had complete mastery of the skies which facilitated their move to
a large extent.

Indians mostly avoided fighting to clear defensive positions wherever they

came across, bypassing such positions to continue with their move. Wherever
they tried to fight through the defensive positions, they suffered heavy
casualties and failed to overcome resistance. I have given example of 34
Punjab positions south of Birganj on Thakurgaon Dinajpur road and that of
fighting in the area of 205 Brigade in Hilli sector which I know of and was a
participant.

Had the positions of available troops in East Pakistan been adjusted to

counter Indian invasion, Dacca could have been strongly defended by taking
up positions north of it between the two rivers. Besides this, Chittagong area
could also be effectively defended because of its layout, its long border with
Burma and the mountainous tribal areas inhabited by friendly tribes. In this

scenario the extended line of communications of Indians reaching to contact

our defences could be severely disrupted by the Bengali young men working
with the Army as volunteers. Such a situation would have resulted in a totally
different outcome.

Chittagong area could still be part of Pakistan if bulk of non Bengali

population, now languishing in slums of Dacca for so long, was shifted to the
area in the months of September to November 71. With friendly tribes and
common Bengali people not supporting break up of Pakistan, this was a
viable option even if rest of East Pakistan had to become Bangladesh. But
men at the helm of affairs even in Eastern Command lacked that vision.

On 16 December 71 the message received on wireless nets by the units

scattered all over the country, was that of ceasefire. The units were told to
concentrate at specified locations subsequently.

As we concentrated at different locations after the 'ceasefire' we were told

that since we will be in transit for move to Pakistan through India we were to
hand over our weapons to Indian Army. It was after sometime in Indian camps
that we realised that we were in for a long time.

The Indians treated us with utmost propriety till we landed inside India in their
camps, a wise step on their part to complete move without trouble. After
reaching their camps, they were mean and ruthless, killing anyone trying to
escape as it happened in Camp 25.

Mr. Bhutto along with his delegation stormed out of UN Security Council
session instead of discussing a Polish Resolution which asked for ceasefire
and transfer of power to elected representatives in East Pakistan. Earlier he
had delayed his arrival in New York for attendance of crucial Security Council
proceedings by two days when he stayed in CIA headquarters in Switzerland
being 'indisposed'. He delayed his move to New York only to allow Indian
troops to further close in on undefended Dacca.

Polish Resolution would have averted surrender and its consequences but
Bhutto was not sure of his position when orderly transfer of power to
Bangladesh by a political settlement was done by Yahyas government.
Bhutto wanted to ensure surrender of troops in East Pakistan to get Yahya
dislodged from power making room for him.

In an article carried by April-June 2012 issue of Criterion Quarterly, Mr. A G

Noorani observed that had the Security Council resolution come into force, it
would have resulted in the withdrawal of troops to the status quo ante bellum,
not a single prisoner of war would have been taken, there would have been
no surrender of Pakistani troops to the Indian command, there would have

been no Simla Accord, and the Ceasefire Line in Kashmir would have stayed
put.

Similar views were expressed by Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari in his book A
Journey to Disillusionment as well as in the May 25, 1974 issue of a Karachi
based weekly Outlook. Bhuttos dramatic walkout from Security Council was
welcomed with a sigh of relief in New Delhi. In their study titled War and
Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh professors
Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose wrote: Several key figures in India could not
understand why Pakistan did not readily agree to the proposal, since it would
have left India in a most difficult and compromising position.

Earlier in November just before the War, Mr. Bhutto led a delegation to China
where the Chinese Prime Minister Mr. Chou En Lai after detailed deliberations
spreading over two whole nights and in consultation with Chairman Mao Tze
Tung gave specific line of action in these words,
"DO NOT PRECIPITATE WAR AS THE WORLD OPINION IS TURNING
AGAINST INDIA. IF NECESSARY, TRADE TERRITORY FOR TIME."

Mr. Bhutto in his briefing to President Yahya Khan after the visit did not
convey this specific advice by the Chinese leaders. (Details in Air Marshal
Inamul Haq Khan's account at annex B). Pakistan did the opposite to escalate
conflict by declaring war with India, launching air raids on 3 December 71.

Total strength of the prisoners was not more than about forty thousand. About
thirty two thousand were from the Pakistan Army and the rest from the civil
armed forces i.e. three Scouts and four Rangers Wings, some Mujahids,
Policemen and very few civilians. The Order of Battle of Pakistani forces in
East Pakistan as on 3 December 71 is given at the end of this narrative
(Annex C).

The figure of ninety three thousands prisoners of war was concocted to

malign, degrade and vilify Pakistan Army. The prisoners were kept in India till
Mr. Bhutto could consolidate his hold on his New Pakistan. General Gul
Hassan who helped bringing Mr. Bhutto to power did not contest these
figures. His successor Tikka Khan also towed the line as he remained
intimidated by Bhutto to be handed over for war crimes trial demanded by
Bangladesh in the list of 195 persons. Tikka Khan was succeeded by Zia ul
Haq, another character working for outside interests who ruled for a long time
to obscure the picture of past events.

Repatriation of Pakistani POWs was deliberately spread over about eight

months whereas Indians had only taken two weeks to collect these troops
from all over East Pakistan to place them in various camps over wastly spread
areas. Repatriation was arranged in a manner which ensured that the

personnel of those units who served in East Pakistan could not get together
and rise in revolt knowing what Mr. Bhutto had done to Pakistan.

Repatriation of prisoners was trumpeted to be a very big achievement of Mr.

Bhutto to deceive the people. But those of us affected knew and some
thought of doing something to get him. They were apprehended and punished
through a court martial conducted by Major General Zia ul Haq (later
President). After Bhutto was hanged by Zia, reportedly one of those punished
told Zia that this was what they wanted earlier and that Zia had realised it late.

To cover up the tragedy, a commission headed by Justice Hamood Ur

Rahman was formed with limited mandate. Like all commissions, it served
Bhuttos purpose by assuaging public sentiment at the time. Statements
recorded by the Commission were in conflict with facts narrated by prisoners
on their repatriation after over two years. Their statements exposed Bhuttos
role, hence the Commissions proceeding were never made public. By then
Bhutto was firmly in power.

Mr. Yuri Bezmenov, a former agent of USSRs spy agency, the KGB, in his
interview gave details of the plan for break up of Pakistan, creating Mukti
Bahini gangs; admitting that there was no popular Bengali uprising but an
orchestrated terrorist subversive plan by Indian spy agency, RAW and KGB.
According to him Pakistan was dismembered due to a massive conspiracy by
India, Russia and the US where terrorist gangs were used for subversion to
stage a rebellion. According to him the traitors who sided with the KGB and
RAW were to be killed in the end once their usefulness was over. Mujib ur
Rahman was killed by his own Army four years later. Z A Bhutto and Indra
Gandhi also met similar fate. This interview is available at
Yuri Bezmenov Soviet Subversion of Western Society 7/9
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NY4al5PyeNE&feature=youtu.b

Dismemberment of Pakistan, once the largest Muslim country of the world

which made rapid economic and overall progress in a very short period of
time and enjoyed great prestige in the comity of nations is a very tragic story.
The break up was orchestrated by global powers through India supporting
Mujeeb, Bhutto and their accomplices. Even now the common people in
remaining Pakistan continue to suffer at the hand of rulers, who are pawns of
global corporate interests, crippling countrys economy threatening our
survival as a state.

Back Home to a New Pakistan

Back Home to a New Pakistan
The process of repatriation of prisoners started in Sep 1973 and was spread over a
period of eight months concluding in April 1974. Prisoners were picked up from
different camps to form a train for repatriation on a certain date. Announcements of
names of prisoners who were to be part of next train taking the prisoners home was
keenly awaited with expectations and hope. Not being included was cause of
disappointment and I felt this many times as my name came in the second last train
in April 1974. Our journey was planned in a manner that travel through Indian Punjab
was during night reaching Attari by early morning. The train compartments windows
were also kept shut so that we could not see the countryside during day part of the
journey. De-training at Attari and move to Wahga border post was arranged in the
mornings. Elaborate reception arrangements were laid out at Wahga by Pakistan
Army, Corps Commander Lahore receiving returning prisoners.
I landed up on the soil of New Pakistan one morning in second week of April 1974.
On crossing the border I got strange feelings of being in a different world. After
having suffered hardships and humiliation for so long, a sudden change of being
liberated and welcomed was rather difficult to absorb. After spending about three
days at reception camp in Lahore Cantonment I, like others, was given leave for two
months. On reaching home in the village, people there and from surrounding areas
kept visiting to congratulate my safe return. They seemed genuinely happy and
showed lot of love and affection. This continued for a couple of days. All those who
returned home were given very affectionate welcome, people gathering at bus
stands hours before expected arrival of returning prisoners. The respect and
affection shown by people of the area may seem strange to readers of younger
generations, fed with false picture of the tragic happenings by rulers of new Pakistan.
But people at that time understood the role played by rulers who had put a small
force in an untenable position. Despite acts of unparalleled gallantry at unit and
individual level, the outcome could not be any different. Prolonged stay as prisoners
in India also increased concern creating compassionate feelings for the prisoners.
After spending two months leave, I reported at re-assembly camp at Quetta for
detailed debriefing and further disposal. Another such camp had been established at
Kharian. Here we were made to write detailed account of our actions. Adjusting to
changed environments was taking time as long detention had taken its toll. For
example crossing a road became an ordeal. It seemed as if while crossing the road
one would be crushed by approaching vehicles. The judgments of time and space

had gone wrong. Market prices of various items of daily use seemed unrealistic. At
Quetta I went to a shop to buy an ash tray. I could not reconcile to the price
demanded for a plastic ash tray and came back without buying it. Since it was a
necessity then, I went again next day to buy it at the asking price. We took time to
become normal without any professional help from the State or the Army.
After a few weeks at re-assembly camp we were given movement orders to join
different units where we were posted. I was posted to 53 Punjab located at Kharian,
the old station from where I had gone to East Pakistan. Since my unit, 34 Punjab did
not exist at that time because units that were in East Pakistan were not immediately
re-raised, we the returnees were posted to different units. Two of my other unit
officers, Majors Khurshid Ahmad Mallal and Nisar Hussain Bukhari were also posted
to 53 Punjab. My company officer Captain Afreen was posted to 2 Punjab, also
located at Kharian.
Move to Dera Bugti
As I was trying to adjust to the routine of cantonment life, an unexpected order
disturbed that process. The Brigade of which 53 Punjab was a part, was ordered to
move to Dera Bugti in Balochistan. We moved to Dera Bugti via Kashmore and Sui.
One of the units was placed at Kahan in Marri tribal area and two units in Bugti tribal
area. 53 Punjab with its headquarters at Dera Bugti, located in an old abandoned
dilapidated fort which only had mud walls standing, placed my company along with
another company commanded by Captain Muhammad Javed (later Major General)
at Pathar Nullah on the route Dera Bugti Kahan. This place was close to the
boundary between Bugti and Marri tribal areas, a place called Doi Wadh. Near the
company location was a nullah with two to three feet running water. During
operations inside Marri tribal area, we found perennial streams with crystal clear
water full of fish. We learnt that tribal people were under the impression that fish in
those streams was not an edible item. Our mosquito nets became a convenient gear
to catch the fish easily that we ate with relish during our stay.
My company was tasked to provide protection to Oil and Gas Development
Corporation (OGDC) people working on a site called Muhammad Lath, about fifteen
kilometres away from Pathar Nullah. For their movement, Road Opening Day (ROD)
procedures had to be followed every day by deploying troops on a defile and some
other places on the route to avoid any hostile action against OGDC workers. One
day when Brigade Commander, Brigadier Jalal, nicknamed Baba Thand visited
Pathar Nullah, I suggested that my company and the OGDC workers should be
moved onto the site to avoid considerable effort and resources on daily movement.
The suggestion was accepted and I was ordered to move to the work site. The
OGDC people were waiting for the oil rig to be brought to the site and had no work
except some digging to pitch tents for living. They had good quality tents, larger in
size as compared to those of ours. We had bivouacs, one each for two men and
small forty-pounder tents for officers. Initially the OGDC junior workers had problem

in shifting to the site because at Pathar Nullah camp they were indulging in small
business. Their vehicles made frequent trips to Kashmor, bringing necessary
provisions for sale to the local people. They resorted to writing some complaining
letters against me and I had to give explanations for things like arresting and
detaining their men. Gradually they adjusted to the new realties. My company officer
Captain Shahid organised the work of erecting walls on four sides of our camp with
stones available in the area. Soon we had a small walled compound ready. This
place is now known as Pir Koh Gas Field after drilling operations succeeded in
discovering gas reserves. The name has been chosen because a holy man is buried
in that area, a place known as Ziarat Pir Suri.
After sometime, my company was shifted to a place called Sangsila west of Dera
Bugti, a small mud fort located in a wider valley. A stream of considerable size made
its way through a low hill north of the fort. Here, the water had made a pool; where
according to local tradition the depth of water was said to be unfathomable. Anyway,
the water was abundant but unfortunately was wasted, not being used for irrigation.
There were remnants of an unsuccessful effort to build a small dam for irrigation
during the Ayub Khan era when Nawab Akbar Bugti was under detention but the
project was abandoned as soon as he was released, obviously he never wanted that
kind of development in his area. In fact the tribal people were also not keen to raise
crops, nor had much knowhow about agriculture which demanded some hard work.
They were content on grazing goats and sheep which did not demand labour and
they had ample time for playing some musical instrument and asking Hal Ahwal, with
anyone passing through the area. According to their custom, this Hal Ahwal had an
elaborate procedure. The men had to narrate all the happenings which they had
gone through or heard about since their last meeting with each other which could be
after a long time. Obviously there was a lot to talk about and they had ample time at
their disposal to spend on such activities. I had observed that the population was
very sparse and their living and requirements were very simple. Despite availability
of water in some streams which could be harnessed, vast tracts of cultivable lands
were lying unutilised except for grazing purposes.
Later, we undertook search operations deep into mountains following Sartaf Nullah
in Marri tribes area north of Kahan. This area also had adequate water in perennial
streams but was not utilised for irrigating the fertile virgin lands. Except for Kahan
and its surroundings there was hardly any population.
Bugti tribe had further seven sub tribes headed by their Waderas. Nawab Akbar
Bugti was from Raheja branch settled in and around Dera Bugti. One of the sub
tribes, the Massuris did not accept Akbar Bugti as their tribal head; they had
differences since the time of his father. Another sub tribe, the Kalpars settled around
Sui were also not under any influence of Nawab Bugti, mainly because they had jobs
with the Sui Gas installations thus becoming economically independent and getting
out of shackles of tribal system. In fact at that time (1973-74) it was only about forty
households who were supporting the Nawab and would obey his commands. His

position was only strengthened when successive governments gave large amounts
of royalty for the newly developed Pir Koh Gas field, the money which he never used
for welfare of his tribe. Earlier, the royalty from Sui gas fields was also used by Bugti
brothers in patronizing vibrant night life of Karachi in fifties and sixties.
Akbar Bugti claimed to have killed his first man at the age of twelve, died a violent
death in a cave in Marri tribal area in Aug 2006. Proclaimed as Commander-in-Chief
of a terrorist group known as Balochistan Liberation Army, was waging war against
the State of Pakistan, his force firing rockets on gas installations and carrying out
sabotage activities like blowing up railway and power lines. When his position was
detected and a party comprising four officers led by a Colonel of the Pakistan Army
approached him to persuade him to come out of the cave, an explosion resulted in
instant death of those officers while Akbar Bugti also got killed. A man who had
enjoyed a prestigious position in Pakistan in various capacities should not have
succumbed to machinations of such terrorist groups sponsored by foreign powers
working against the interests of the State. May be his old age blurred his judgment.
In any case it was a most tragic event. I vividly recollect memories of having
conducted him on a tour of Cooli Camp in Quetta Cantonment. One afternoon, when
I was Colonel Staff of 41 Division, I got a message that the Governor, Mr. Akbar
Bugti wanted to visit Cooli Camp to see the barrack where he had been detained
during Ayub Khans rule. I met his party at Seven Streams roundabout, a famous
landmark in the cantonment and conducted him to the area. Although Cooli camp
was still largely in the same dilapidated shape, he could not exactly locate the
barrack where he remained in confinement. He departed after having a cup of tea in
the Divisional Officers Mess located on Staff College Road. His voice was
surprisingly meek compared to his large frame. He had other peculiarities which I
noticed at different occasions, for example while sitting at a large dinner table in
Quetta Club, instead of sharing prescribed menu, he got his own food served to him
comprising Dall and Chappatis with lot of green chillies as his salad. At another
occasion, while listening to Farida Khanum the famous Ghazal Singer of the time, at
Serena Hotel Quetta, he sat good part of the night without getting up even once
although he was consuming a lot of water from a jug placed before him. People like
me, much younger to him, could not continue sitting unmoved like him. He was a
remarkable man who regrettably lost his bearings in old age, and his tragic end was
indeed a sad news.
Coming back to events of 1974, sitting in wilderness at Sangsila I began to have very
disturbing thoughts. Although the unrest, for which Army had been deployed in
Baluchistan at that time, was confined to two very small pockets, the Marri tribal area
and some area around Wadh/ Khuzdar, the impression given throughout Pakistan
and the world was that province of Balochistan, almost forty five percent land mass
of Pakistan, was in revolt against the State of Pakistan. Because of my recent
catastrophic experience in erstwhile East Pakistan, I knew how a small group with

support from outside powers could achieve objectives far beyond their capabilities as
it had led to break up of Pakistan.
In April 1975, 53 Punjab was ordered to move back to Kharian as it had come under
caderisation scheme where its manpower had to be shed to other units, keeping only
a skeleton staff as an economy measure.
53 Punjab, later re-designated as 18 Sind, had very well trained and competent
junior leaders, the JCOs and NCOs. Raised by Lieutenant Colonel Hafeez Ur
Rahman, my CO in East Pakistan in earlier part of 1971, this unit was now being
commanded by Major Jamil Masud (later Brigadier) as an officiating CO. The unit
performed assigned tasks most successfully without suffering casualties except four
people wounded in a road accident. The unit used to provide food to poor people
from its unit cook houses wherever it moved and established its camps. This and
other practices like sacrificing animals before undertaking any move or operation
seeking Allahs blessings contributed to safety and success of the units actions
which of course were undertaken with meticulous planning.
In my later tenures in the province of Balochistan spanning over a period of about
eight years, I had the chance of traversing whole length and breadth of this vast
land. My observation is that Pashtuns, living in areas east and northeast of Quetta
have utilised the land and available water resources to the optimum level because of
their hard work. The areas inhabited by Baloch tribes are vast tracts of unutilised
lands except some pockets like Mastung, Qalat, Khuzdar and Panjgur/ Turbat, the
later known for very good quality dates. The Baloch population grouped with Brahuis
occupying Kalat plateau, Medes (like Nausherwanis having affinity with Siestan in
Iran) mainly inhabiting Kharan, Jats and Lassi living in Las Bela and surroundings
and people of Arab origin in coastal areas of Makran, would not tot up to be more
than three million people. While the hinterland remains devoid of population the
habitations are mainly concentrated in small towns.
After coming back from Baluchistan, I was posted to my parent unit, 34 Punjab, as it
was re-raised in April 1975 at Okara, a new cantonment still under construction. I
joined the unit in June 75. Out of the manpower we had in East Pakistan, only about
thirty people rejoined, the rest readjusted in other units during the preceding year
while a good number had gone home. Training to integrate manpower from other
units, introducing them to the drills and procedures of an R&S unit was started in
earnest under the officiating CO Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Mohammad Saeed
Azam Khan, who was a Company Commander with the unit during the 71 War. After
spending about a year with the unit I was posted to South Waziristan Scouts (SWS)
at Wana, the Agency HQ of South Waziristan.

South Waziristan
By early autumn 1976, I reached Wana via Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Jandola and
Sarwakai, the names which became quite familiar later because of the operations
against the terrorists entrenched in tribal areas. Wana is located in a wide fertile
valley with pleasant summers and cold winters. The Scouts camp was spread over a
vast area. Enclosed in its five-feet high walls were offices, barracks for troops,
Officers Mess, officers family accommodation, some family quarters for the troops
and horse stables etc. Life in Scouts was much different than the regular Army. The
dress was baggy trousers and long shirt of a special rough cloth of dark grey colour
known as militia. Because of this dress the whole force is called militia by general
public. The footwear was of local design, a chappal of brown colour and the
headgear was beret in normal use while for ceremonial occasions a very colourful
Pugree, made from starched cloth woven around a round cap in a particular way,
was used. The organizational structure was made up of Wings comprising different
platoons. These platoons were formed on tribal basis. Each platoon had its Tribe
(Qoum) Commander responsible for the administration and discipline of his platoon.
If someone lost a rifle or some piece of equipment, the Platoon Commander was
responsible to make good that loss on the principle of collective responsibility. Thus
the job of officers posted from Army for about two years was mainly in operational
role. Overall it was a very effective force.
The SWS Officers Mess had a small library containing some old books that I relished
reading throughout my stay. One of the books I found was Seven Pillars of Wisdom
by T E Lawrence, the famous Lawrence of Arabia who was employed by British
intelligence to instigate Sharif Hussain of Mecca to revolt against the Ottoman Caliph
during First World War, consequently redrawing the map of Middle East. The
peculiarity of that copy of his book was that it was signed by the author as T E Shaw
and presented by him to the Mess during his visit. After completion of his mission in
Middle East, he had been sent to these tribal areas as Corporal T E Shaw serving
with the Royal Indian Air Force but basically doing the same job he was expert at.
Governance in the tribal areas was based on a very simple structure. Overall in
charge of the Agency was the Political Agent (PA), an officer of the central
government carefully selected for his experience, maturity and suitability, to manage
the unruly tribes. He worked through tribal elders known as Maliks representing their
sub tribes. The affairs were decided in meetings known as Jirga of theses tribal
Maliks presided over by the PA. He had his assistants to help in administration and
the Levis Force, enrolled from local tribesmen, performed normal police functions.

Scouts were a backup force for the PA to enforce his decisions when use of such
force became indispensable.
I did not stay long in the SWS. Before joining I had appeared in the Staff Course
Entrance Examination. Its result was announced in late October or November and I
was required to join the course at Quetta by mid December 76. During this brief
period a significant event was the visit of Prime Minister Mr. Z A Bhutto to the
Agency. He had started his tour of the tribal areas from the north, most
inauspiciously. The Assistant Political Agent overseeing his reception arrangements
at the helipad in Bajaur Agency got killed in a bomb blast just before his landing on
the first day of his extended tour. In South Waziristan, coming from the north, he was
first to land at Ladha, in the heart of Mehsud territory, have lunch there and then
move to Wana for night stay. At both places he was to address selected group of
people. As Second-in-Command of the SWS, I along with five platoons of Scouts
was to provide security at Ladha. A couple of days before the event I moved to
Ladha Fort located on the edge of a flat area. It overlooked a fertile valley below to
the east and had a small ridge running west of the flat area. In mountainous terrains,
such pieces of flat land are few. A small, strongly built fort was occupied by a small
detachment of Scouts for its care and maintenance.
On the morning of the appointed day lot of people started gathering on the ridge
overlooking helipad area and the venue for lunch. Although political staff had
conveyed that no one will carry weapons and only invited people will come to the
lunch, arranged in an open ground outside the fort, all of them were armed against
instructions. Scouts deployed on the ridge tried to stop them leading to exchange of
heated arguments and some scuffles. Here the Political Agent, Mr. Abdullah, astutely
intervened and made the tribesmen to agree that only those invited may come down
to the venue after depositing their weapons with Scouts deployed at the ridgeline
while rest of the people were to remain seated on the ridge if they did not want to go
back home. It was a very tense situation but admirably well handled by the PA, a
wise and courageous man well respected for his honesty and simple living. He later
rose to higher ranks in bureaucracy working as Chief Secretary of the Frontier
Province (NWFP).
Around noon two large helicopters arrived at the helipad. Mr. Abdullah, the PA and I
received Mr. Bhutto and brought him to the lunch site where tables and chairs had
been laid out under a Shamiana. Mr Bhutto made a brief address to the invitees, had
a chat with few people and in quite a relaxed mood had his lunch followed by deep
puffs at his cigar. Mr. Naseerullah Babar the Governor was nudging him to depart
but he took his time to enjoy his cigar. After he left the place, tribesmen watching the
proceedings from the ridge, could not be controlled anymore by Scouts. They rushed
to lunch site raising very loud shrieks and took away whatever was left of the meal
along with some utensils. My troops packed up and returned to Wana by the
evening.

Before Mr. Bhuttos arrival the instruction given to us about one of his idiosyncrasies
was that in his presence no one will stand with his back turned towards Mr. Bhutto
for up to at least one hundred yards because he gets annoyed otherwise. Here his
behaviour was akin to despotic Kings of old times and certainly not of one claiming to
work for poor people of Pakistan.
The dinner started with a bang. As soon as Mr. Bhutto got out of his room moving
towards the venue for dinner arranged in an open ground at southeast corner of
Wana Camp, a rebel group started firing towards the camp from nearby hills. It was
promptly retaliated from our towers and posts in the area and it soon subsided.
Although it was no real threat but it created quite a stir, underscoring that things were
not normal in the Agency. It was learnt that firing had been done by brother of Maulvi
Noor Muhammad, leading a small group who had taken to the hills against
incarceration of Maulvi Noor Muhammad. This person had entrenched himself as a
prayer-leader in a mosque in the Bazar outside the Camp and was causing trouble
by his instigative sermons against the administration during congregational prayers.
When he was considered too troublesome, for making the locals his ardent followers,
the whole bazaar was demolished after proper warnings and time given to vacate the
area. Noor Muhammad was tried and as per the decision of Jirga, he was sentenced
to ten years of imprisonment. His brother, with a small band had become an outlaw
thereafter.
Mr. Bhutto left Wana next morning and we resumed our normal routine after some
excitement generated by the visit. The Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Faqir Gul
Khattak, an artillery officer was a mysterious character. He was a soft spoken person
but exceptionally vindictive. To avenge some earlier grudge against one of the Wing
Commanders commanding Sarwakai Wing, Major Allah Bakhsh Piracha, he
constituted an inquiry on very frivolous charges like the officer not attending parade
on time, using official jeep for fishing trips to a nearby stream etc. The Commandant
spent good part of a day consulting a JCO and a Sepoy from that Wing in his office
making up the story based upon which that Sepoy gave an application against the
officer. I was detailed to conduct an inquiry. Seeing the charges, I suggested to the
Commandant to call the officer and ask him about these charges which he may
otherwise admit and there may be no need of any inquiry. He was reluctant to do
that initially. Anyway, Allah Bakhsh was called to explain his position. Although it did
not merit inquiry, I was told to move to Sarwakai along with other members to
conduct the inquiry. It was during proceedings of this inquiry at Sarwakai Fort that I
was given the good news of being selected for the staff course. I was filled with joy in
finding an escape from such intrigues. Of course our findings cleared the officer from
all charges and I left without meeting the Commandant who was on his usual
extended tour of Peshawar.
Since my services were seconded to Scouts, a force of Ministry of Interior, orders
were received for my posting to 9 Punjab located at Quetta. I had to report to 9

Punjab from where I would be given movement orders to join Command and Staff
College Quetta.
By early autumn 1976, I reached Wana via Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Jandola and
Sarwakai, the names which became quite familiar later because of the operations
against the terrorists entrenched in tribal areas. Wana is located in a wide fertile
valley with pleasant summers and cold winters. The Scouts camp was spread over a
vast area. Enclosed in its five-feet high walls were offices, barracks for troops,
Officers Mess, officers family accommodation, some family quarters for the troops
and horse stables etc. Life in Scouts was much different than the regular Army. The
dress was baggy trousers and long shirt of a special rough cloth of dark grey colour
known as militia. Because of this dress the whole force is called militia by general
public. The footwear was of local design, a chappal of brown colour and the
headgear was beret in normal use while for ceremonial occasions a very colourful
Pugree, made from starched cloth woven around a round cap in a particular way,
was used. The organizational structure was made up of Wings comprising different
platoons. These platoons were formed on tribal basis. Each platoon had its Tribe
(Qoum) Commander responsible for the administration and discipline of his platoon.
If someone lost a rifle or some piece of equipment, the Platoon Commander was
responsible to make good that loss on the principle of collective responsibility. Thus
the job of officers posted from Army for about two years was mainly in operational
role. Overall it was a very effective force.
The SWS Officers Mess had a small library containing some old books that I relished
reading throughout my stay. One of the books I found was Seven Pillars of Wisdom
by T E Lawrence, the famous Lawrence of Arabia who was employed by British
intelligence to instigate Sharif Hussain of Mecca to revolt against the Ottoman Caliph
during First World War, consequently redrawing the map of Middle East. The
peculiarity of that copy of his book was that it was signed by the author as T E Shaw
and presented by him to the Mess during his visit. After completion of his mission in
Middle East, he had been sent to these tribal areas as Corporal T E Shaw serving
with the Royal Indian Air Force but basically doing the same job he was expert at.
Governance in the tribal areas was based on a very simple structure. Overall in
charge of the Agency was Political Agent (PA) an officer of the central government
carefully selected for his experience, maturity and suitability to manage the unruly
tribes. He worked through tribal elders known as Maliks representing their sub tribes.
The affairs were decided in meetings known as Jirga of theses tribal Maliks presided
over by the PA. He had his assistants to help in administration and the Levis Force,
enrolled from local tribesmen, performed normal police functions. Scouts were a
backup force for the PA to enforce his decisions when use of such force became
indispensable.
I did not stay long in the SWS. Before joining, I had appeared in the Staff Course
Entrance Examination. The result was announced in late Oct or Nov and I was to join

the course at Quetta by mid Dec 76. During this brief period a significant event was
visit of Prime Minister Mr. Z A Bhutto to the Agency. He had started his tour from the
north, most inauspiciously. The Assistant Political Agent overseeing his reception
arrangements at the helipad got killed in a bomb blast just before his landing on the
first day of his extended tour in Bajur Agency. In South Waziristan, coming from the
north, he was first to land at Ladha, in the heart of Mehsud territory, have lunch there
and then move to Wana for the night stay. At both places he was to address selected
group of people. As second in command of the SWS, I with five platoons of Scouts
was to provide security at Ladha. A couple of days before the event I moved to
Ladha Fort located on the edge of a flat area. It overlooked a fertile valley below to
the east and had a small ridge running west of the flat area. In mountainous terrains,
such pieces of flat land are few. The small, strongly built fort was occupied by a
small detachment of Scouts for its care and maintenance.
On the morning of the appointed day lot of people started gathering on the ridge
overlooking helipad area and the venue for lunch. Although political staff had
conveyed that no one will carry weapons and only invited people will come to the
lunch, arranged in an open ground outside the fort, all of them were armed against
instructions. Scouts deployed on the ridge tried to stop them leading to exchange of
heated arguments and some scuffles. Here the Political Agent, Mr. Abdullah, astutely
intervened and made the tribesmen to agree that only those invited may come down
to the venue after depositing their weapons with Scouts deployed at the ridgeline
while rest of the people were to remain seated on the ridge if they did not want to go
back home.
In the morning on appointed day, although political staff had conveyed that only
invited people will come to the lunch arranged in open ground outside the fort and
that no one will carry weapons; lot of people started gathering on the ridge
overlooking area of helipads and the venue for lunch. All of them were armed against
instructions of Political Agent. Scouts deployed on the ridge tried to stop them
resulting in exchange of arguments and some scuffles. Here the Political Agent, Mr.
Abdullah, intervened and made the tribals agree that those invited will deposit their
weapons with the Scouts deployed at the ridgeline and come down to the venue.
Rest of the people who were not invited were to remain seated on the ridgeline if
they did not want to go back home. It was a very tense situation but admirably well
handled by the PA, a wise and courageous man well respected for his honesty and
simple living. He later rose to higher ranks in bureaucracy working as chief secretary
of the Frontier Province (NWFP).
At appointed time, around noon two large helicopters arrived at the helipad. Mr.
Abdullah, the PA and I received Mr. Bhutto and brought him to the lunch site where
tables and chairs had been laid out under a Shamiana. Mr Bhutto made a brief
address to the invitees, had a chat with few people and in quite a relaxed mood had
his lunch followed by deep puffs at his cigar. Mr. Naseerullah Babar the Governor
was nudging him to depart but he took his time to enjoy his cigar. After he left the

place, tribal people watching the proceedings from the ridge, could not be controlled
anymore by Scouts. They rushed to lunch site raising very loud shrieks and took
away whatever was left of the meal along with some utensils. My troops packed up
and returned to Wana by the evening.
Before Mr. Bhuttos arrival the instruction given to us about one of his idiosyncrasies
was that in his presence no one will stand with his back turned towards Mr. Bhutto
for up to at least one hundred yards because he gets annoyed otherwise. His
behavior was akin to despotic Kings of old times and certainly not of one claiming to
work for poor people of Pakistan.
The dinner started with a bang. As soon as Mr. Bhutto got out of his room moving
towards the venue for dinner arranged in open ground at south east corner of Wana
Camp, firing by a rebel group started towards the camp from nearby hills. It was
promptly retaliated from our towers and posts in the area and it soon subsided.
Although it was no real threat but it created quite a stir, underscoring that things were
not normal in the Agency. Firing had been done by a brother of Maulvi Noor
Muhammad, leading a small group who had taken to the hills against incarceration of
Maulvi Noor Muhammad. This person had entrenched himself as a prayer leader in a
mosque in the Bazar outside the Camp. He was causing trouble by his instigative
sermons against the administration during congregational prayers. When he was
considered too troublesome making the locals ardent followers, the whole bazaar
was demolished after proper warnings and time given to vacate the area. Noor
Muhammad was tried and as per decision of the Jirga, he was sentenced to ten
years of imprisonment. His brother, with a small band had become an outlaw who
fired on the Camp on that occasion.
Mr. Bhutto left Wana next morning and we resumed our normal routine after some
excitement the visit had generated. The Commandant, Lt Col Faqir Gul Khattak, an
artillery officer was a mysterious character. He was a soft spoken person but
exceptionally vindictive. To avenge some earlier grudge against one of the Wing
Commanders commanding Sarwakai Wing, Major Allah Bakhsh Piracha, he
constituted an inquiry on very frivolous charges like the officer not attending parade
on time, using official jeep for fishing trips to a nearby stream etc. For this the
Commandant had spent good part of a day with one JCO and one Sepoy from that
Wing in his office making up the story based on which that Sepoy gave application
against the officer. I was detailed to conduct an inquiry. Seeing the charges, I
suggested to the Commandant to call the officer and ask him about these charges
which he may otherwise admit and there may be no need of any inquiry. He was
reluctant to do that. Anyway, Allah Bakhsh was called to explain his position.
Although it did not merit inquiry, I was told to move to Sarwakai along with the team
members to conduct the inquiry. It was during proceedings of this inquiry at Sarwakai
Fort that I was given the good news of being selected for the staff course. I was filled
with joy in finding an escape from such intrigues. Of course our inquiry findings

cleared the officer from all charges and I left without meeting the Commandant who
was on his usual extended tour of Peshawar.
Since my services were seconded to Scouts, a force of Ministry of Interior, orders
were received for my posting to 9 Punjab located at Quetta. I had to report to 9
Punjab from where I would be given movement orders to join Command and Staff
College Quetta.

Reverting Back to Khakis

Quetta
I reached Quetta by second week of December 76 and reported to 9 Punjab where I
remained for a few days before joining the course starting 16 December 76. This
course is the first filter separating officers who have to progress in their careers or
otherwise. First is the entrance examination held every year to select a specified
number of officers from the 8-12 years service bracket. Those who go through the
course are graded in different shades which are taken as a yardstick for their further
postings to career or non career appointments affecting their further progress in the
army. I did the course without exerting much despite frequent advice of some of my
peers. At the end I was posted to the best operational appointment for a major in the
Army, Brigade Major of an infantry brigade. Overall it was a good time well spent in
enjoying the facilities which the College provided. Families also remained engaged in
different activities and the weekly cinema screening some good films. Giving evening
motorcycle ride to little Yaman, my son, was another pleasurable activity which I
would enjoy even at the cost of studies which otherwise I wanted an excuse to avoid.
Sialkot
After completing the staff course at Command and Staff College Quetta, I joined 104
Brigade at Sialkot as Brigade Major (BM) in January 78. The Brigade was being
commanded by Brigadier Javed Majid, an Armoured Corps officer (20 Lancers).
When postings were announced in the main hall of the college by Military Secretary
Branch representative, I was told by some of my peers that I was in for a big trouble.
They informed me that Brigadier Javed Majid had put four officers, Platoon
Commanders at PMA, on adverse report when he was a Battalion Commander at
the Academy, a very unusual happening. That he was very demanding, arrogant and
a harsh person. On joining the Brigade at Sialkot I told the Commander about my
lack of experience in staff duties having remained away from normal routine since
1971. Contrary to what I was told, he was very patient to guide me initially about the
ongoing work, after which I made sure that he does not find any cause of concern or
complaint. Other two staff officers of the Brigade were, Major Javed Iqbal,
Punjab/Sind my platoon mate from PMA as Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter
Master General (DAA&QMG) and Captain Sajjad Akram, Baluch General Staff
Officer Grade-III (GSO-3) who rose to the exalted rank of Lieutenant General in the
Army. This young officer was sharp, energetic and assertive to the extent that staff of
Brigade units felt uncomfortable in dealing with him. The level of trouble can be
gauged by an event when in an eighteen-paged redress of grievances against
Brigade Commander by Lieutenant Colonel Salahuddin CO 44 FF, half of the pages
contained references to GSO-3 as a cause of complaint. However, in senior ranks I
found the officer to be a forceful and successful commander.

Brigadier Javed Majid was an officer of the old school, that class which was
becoming rare even in those days when Army was still not afflicted with viruses
introduced by General Zial ul Haq who had started his misrule just recently i.e. in
1977. The Brigadier, a clear headed, smart, sharp and exceptionally confident
person was an epitome of a model army officer. He would come to the office in his
own car, an old Volkswagen and would use the official vehicle, mainly jeep, only
when visiting units on official duties. He would not use any extra manpower in his
house. If his batman went on leave for some days he would not ask for his relief,
doing without a batman for that period. On his posting out from Brigade at the end of
1978, I asked him for his needs for the packing etc. He told me to give him one man
from Brigade HQ, not getting any help from under command units. One evening, as I
visited him at his house, he was engaged in packing a holdall with help of the person
provided to him, pressing the holdall from one side with his knee. A stylish, well
groomed officer from a respectable family, he had no inhibitions in doing physical
work himself unlike most others. I had the chance of serving with this team for one
year i.e.1978 after which there were changes due to normal postings on completion
of tenures.
Brigadier Javed Majid was replaced by Brigadier Nafees Ahmad, an artillery officer
who unfortunately died due to a heatstroke during a march back to cantonment on
conclusion of summer collective training in 1979. He had been in command for just
about six months. A refined, decent and well groomed officer, he had served on the
best career appointments including a stint at the Staff College as Directing Staff.
During about six weeks summer collective training near Sialkot, he was exposed to
heat which he did not seem to have suffered earlier. The accumulative effect of
those six weeks of exposure resulted in his getting a heatstroke while marching in
company of the GOC, Major General Shah Rafi Alam leading a column of 28 AK, a
unit in our Brigade. It was late evening when during march Captain Ayub Uppal,
GSO-3 accompanying Brigadier Nafees noticed signs of attack and called for an
ambulance. He became unconscious while en route to CMH and died by next
morning. His tragic and unexpected death left a very depressing effect from which
we recovered after considerable period of time.
Major Javed Iqbal, who was a great company, platoon mate and friend from PMA,
was replaced by Major Abdul Qayyum Qureshi, AK. Captain Sajjad Akram was
replaced by Captain Ayub Uppal, Baluch, another very fine officer, diligent and
methodical in his work. After the demise of Brigadier Nafees, Lieutenant Colonel
Zafar Dogar, CO 44 FF became acting Commander. He had transformed 44 FF from
a lethargic, inefficient set up to a very efficient unit within a very short span of time. I
once asked him as to how he had done that? His recipe was to go around the whole
area of the unit first thing in the morning, pulling up people for any lapse on their
part. He was man full of energy and enthusiasm. Alas he also died later due to a
heart attack while commanding a Brigade at Landikotal. Service in the Brigade with

three different commanders was a valuable experience and a very pleasant one. In
September 79, I was posted back to 34 Punjab at Okara.
Okara
When I rejoined the unit at Okara after my tenure at Sialkot with 104 Brigade, 34
Punjab was being commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hameed, popularly
known as Hameed Jan. The unit was performing border duties at Sulemanki
Headwork where during winters it was a very enjoyable stay. As Colonel Hameed
Jan, still a bachelor, was fond of shikar, we would spend lot of time in duck shooting
over the vast reservoir of water attracting lot of migratory birds. I saw a flock of
'Surkhabs' for the first time. The officer in charge of Rangers Wing located at the
Headwork was also a keen shikari, so the area around the headwork had turned
into a game reserve for senior officers and guests of the Ranger officer.
On coming back to Okara Cantonment, I got leave during summers of 1980 for a trip
to Northern Areas where Major (later Major General) Parvez Akmal, my brother-inlaw was posted. Along with my family I reached Gilgit. Pervez had arranged our trip
to Hunza which on first sight was a disappointment because my concept of beautiful
mountains lay in their being lush green while in these high mountains the sight was
entirely different. The mountains were devoid of vegetation and the valleys had trees
like poplar which do not provide much aesthetic satisfaction when you have seen
better forests like those in Murree and Galiat. I took some time to appreciate the
beauty of snow over mountains like Rakaposhi and other peaks. Nonetheless, it was
a pleasant change from the hot weather of Okara.
On promotion to the rank of a Lieutenant Colonel in September 1980, I took over
command of 34 Punjab. It was a singular honour to command a unit which one had
joined as a young officer and had fought counter insurgency operations in East
Pakistan and 1971 War. Being a Reconnaissance and Support (R&S) unit, it was
part of Divisional Troops and not under any brigade like standard infantry battalions.
14 Division, re-raised at Okara, was then being commanded by Major General
Tassawar Hussain Shah, an Armoured Corps officer. While I had settled down in
command and the unit was coming into a well knit and efficient set up, orders for
move to Quetta were received.
Quetta for a longer stay
The unit moved to Quetta, as part of 16 Division re-raised at Quetta, by a special
military train travelling at leisure given least priority by Railways in their movement
plans. Some of our families were also travelling with us, the children enjoying the
journey, observing hustle and bustle at the railway stations and seeing exotic places
like the Landsdown Bridge on Indus connecting Rohri and Sukker, high bridges and
dark tunnels through Bolan Pass. On reaching Quetta, the unit was lodged in
dilapidated barracks of Cooli Camp. The officers accommodation was most
inadequate causing administrative difficulties.

The Division was being commanded by Major General Fahim Haider Rizvi, who had
commanded 32 Punjab in East Pakistan during the 71 war. He was a very
hardworking and diligent officer who would stretch things to undesirable limits most
of the times. His honesty and hard work came to fruition when after retirement he
was employed to make the Army Welfare Trust, starting from scratch with very
limited means into a large profitable organisation.
At Quetta, the unit got into routine training as part of the Divison in a possible
offensive role. Training area for field excercises extended from the field firing ranges
west of Baleli to southwards towards Sheikh Wasil and towards west across
Ghazaband Pass. Here the wide valley between two mountain ranges provided ideal
ground for joint excercies with the armour regiment of the Division, then 20 Lancers,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jamshed. On conclusion of one such exercise it
was a great spectacle to watch 44 tanks of 20 Lancers rushing through the valley in
a simultaneous dash to assigned objective. Even in those days there were
instructions not to go near the the large village of Gulistan, the ancestral place of
Abdul Samad Achakzai and his clan.
During this period of command of 34 Punjab at Quetta I was once detailed as
President of a Special Military Court constituted to try a high profile murder case. A
man had been killed in the Bazaar of Dalbandin town in broad daylight. His case was
brought to the notice of President General Zial ul Haq during his visit to Dalbandin
who directed that the case to be tried by a military court. The Court comprised of
three persons. Besides myself, there was one Major Khalid Usmani, Signals from the
Army and one civilian Magistrate, Mr Jogizai. The accused was being defended by
an able lawyer Mr. Munawwar Mirza who later served as Advocate General of
Baluchistan and then as a judge in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The government
side was represented by Mr. Sardar Dur-e-Yemen an able police prosecutor. As the
proceedings progressed, evidence against the accused was inconsequential despite
the fact that the man had been murdered in broad daylight in a bazaar with hundreds
of the people present. Only one person came out with the statement that he had
seen the man stabbing the deceased but the stabbing mans back was towards the
witness and face towards the other side. On such evidence no court would give a
sentence to the accused because the prevailing law gives the befit of doubt to the
accused. In this case the doubt was created by the witness in stating that the mans
back was towards him so he could not see the face.
My brush with the judicial system left me deeply distressed over its inherent flaws
and flagrant manipulation by its practitioners who more often than not flout the whole
system in favour of criminals using its many loopholes.
Another earlier encounter had only served to reinforce this recent experience when
in 1970, during General Yahyas Martial Law period I was a member of a Special
Military Court. Our court convened at Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) was to try a horrible
case of rape. Some policemen of the Khurrianwala Police Station had raped a girl in

the premises of the Police Station. The case was thoroughly publicised in the
national newspapers and was thus given to the military court. As the hearing
progressed we found that there was no evidence except one unconvincing witness.
His statement was that while he was sitting behind a fence, he heard cries of the girl
being raped in the open space marked for offering prayers in the Police Station.
Even the affected girl denied the incident when called to the Court. The Courts
President, my CO, Lieutenant Colonel Hafeezur Rahman, facing a dilemma, decided
to take the court to girls house to ascertain the truth. There the poor girl came out
with the story of how she was taken to the Police Station and raped by five
policemen throughout the night. Our Court recommended fourteen years Rigorous
Imprisonment to each policeman and sent the proceedings to the convening
authority for confirmation as per rules. We were shocked when the proceedings were
received back for promulgation of sentence, General Tikka Khan, the Punjab Martial
Law Administrator had mitigated the sentence to just two years simple imprisonment
for each criminal.
The existing judicial system is criminal friendly and needs basic changes where the
judges should be tasked to ensure provision of justice instead of merely disposing of
cases as presented before them and avoid hiding behind devious and crafty clauses
to let off obvious offenders.
On completing two years in command, I stayed on in Quetta being posted as GSO-1
(Training) at HQ 12 Corps. With experience of staff work at the Brigade earlier, I felt
most comfortable in working in the Corps HQ. Brigadier (later Major General) Zahoor
Malik a most competent, firm and demanding officer was Chief of Staff, the Corps
being then commanded by Lieutenant General Khushdil Khan (KK) Afridi.

Army Hajj Contingent 1984

While serving at the HQ 12 Corps, I was most fortunate to get the chance of
performing Hajj, a religious obligation, as part of Army Hajj Contingent in 1984. The
Army had introduced a scheme of sending a small contingent of the Pakistan Army
to perform Hajj every year travelling by road. The contingent of about one hundred
and forty persons comprised of all ranks of the Pakistan Army including about fifteen
officers.
Our contingent assembled at Rawalpindi and after necessary preparations started its
journey on 29 July 1984. The route to be taken was through Iran, Turkey, Syria and
Jordan to reach Saudi Arabia. The shorter route i.e. from Iran to Iraq and Saudi
Arabia was not available because of ongoing war between Iran and Iraq during that
period. Our convoy consisted of four large buses, a jeep and a small ambulance
vehicle. Elaborate reception arrangements had been made, senior officers of the
garrison receiving the contingent with usual military fanfare, the bands in attendance.
This special treatment continued throughout the journey in Pakistan as well as the
countries through which it passed. The convoy was escorted by the civil and military
police of host countries from Rawalpindi to Tabuk in Saudi Arabia. A date wise
progress on journey of the contingent is briefly recounted as follows:

29 July 84 From Rawalpindi to Lahore via Kharian. Raining throughout the

day. Very pleasant weather. Night stay at Lahore.

30 July 84 Lahore to Multan via Faisalabad, Jhang, Shorkot, Kabirwala.

Main road i.e. Lahore Sahiwal Multan road in bad shape needing repairs.

31 July 84 Stay at Multan and visits to Mazars of Hazrat Sheikh Bahauddin

Zakria, his grandson Hazrat Sheikh Rukne Alam, Hazrat Shah Shams
Sabzwari Tabrezi.

01 August 84 From Multan to Sukker via Bahawalpur Rahimyar Khan.

Lunch at Rahimyar Khan. A hot day. At Sukker, a non garrison town, 27
Punjab made excellent arrangement for the night stay attending to minute
details. I was to command this excellent unit a year later.

02 August 84 Sukker to Quetta via Sibi where we stopped for lunch. Sibi
was not as hot as could be expected. Starting from Sukker at 6 AM we
reached Quetta by7 PM. Were received and addressed by the Corps
Commander.

03/04 August 84 Stay at Quetta for rest and maintenance of vehicles.

05 August 84 From Quetta to Dalbandin. Night stay under arrangements

Kharan Rifles.

06 August 84 Left Dalbandin early and after having tea at Nokkundi,

reached Taftan by 1500 hrs for crossing over to Iran. Reached Zahidan for
night stay. Were lodged in some hostel.

07 August 84 Reached Kirman in the evening. Had lunch in Mahan in the

premises of Shah Niamatullah Walis Mazar. Commanders jeep overturned
15 km short of Kirman due to the driver dosing off. It rolled down from the
highway into a considerable depth. No one got injured although the jeep was
severely damaged and left there.

08 August 84 Reached Isfahan in the evening. Lunch in the area of a

mosque in Yazad.

09 August 84 Stayed in Isfahan in the Arty Centre. Visited the famous

Mosque of Shahs of the Safavid period, now renamed Masjid e Imam. Also
saw Masjid e Sheikh Lutfullah and the main polo ground in the same vicinity.
Also were taken to Gulistan e Shuhada. Offered fateha. A large number of
very young people are buried here as apparent from the photographs
displayed on every grave. These young men have died during the ongoing
war with Iraq and activities of Mujahidin e Khalaq a counter revolutionary
organization.

10 August 84 From Isfahan to Qazvin. Passed through Tehran in the

afternoon.

11 August 84 From Qazvin to Tabriz, road passing through beautiful

mountainous area. Had lunch on the roadside in a clump of trees. Stay in
Tabriz comfortable except bathrooms most inadequate.

12 August 84 From Tabriz to Agri in Turkey, crossing the border in the

afternoon. At the borders a very large concentration of vehicles awaiting
clearance. Our crossing was very smooth. Had lunch on the Iranian side of
the borders and parted with the Iranian Liaison party led by Col Ali Larijani
who made untiring efforts to make our journey through Iran smooth. Brig
Trimzi (Artillery) our Defense Attach also remained with us to help us during
the journey. On the Turkish side we were received by our Military Attache Col
Jilani, (Artillery). The terrain from borders to Agri was similar but the crop
pattern was different and so were the people who looked more open and
happy. At Agri, Lt Cols and above were lodged in Ordu Evi which was very
comfortable. The General Officers in the area came to meet the party.

Some impressions while travelling through Iran were that after the fall of
Shah, Raza Shah Pahlavi as a result of a revolutionary movement led by a
religious leader Ayatollah Imam Khomeini in 1979, Iran was going through
difficult times. A war with Iraq was causing lot of casualties to the young men.
The economy was suffering due to war and the hostility of western world. As
we entered Iran from Zahidan we found the roads very good with parking
places made at frequent intervals. From Zahidan to Kirman the road passes
through hot, arid region with hardly any vegetation. This area, the province of
Iranian Baluchistan-Siestan is sparsely populated. The terrain is just like our
area of Naukundi Taftan. From Kirman onwards to Isfahan climate was a bit
cooler. There were fruit gardens particularly of Pistacho along the route to
Isfahan. This region is like our Quetta but the valleys are more open and the
mountains not so high. The whole areas seem under populated with vast
stretches of land lying waste. The revolution had one most visible effect that
women were wearing chadors a large piece of cloth covering the women
from head to tows. We did not see any woman with her head uncovered. This
was a complete change from the period of Shah when the dress code
particularly in the cities was known to be largely western. People like to get
out in the open places and parks. In fact on our first day of entering Iran as
we travelled northwards from Taftan in the afternoon we saw a few families
enjoying picnic in a clump of poplar trees. They had spread mats under the
thin shade of these trees. To us it was a strange site because we do not
consider poplar trees shady and suitable to serve as picnic point. But as we
moved on we found that the area up to Kirman was devoid of vegetation and
such clumps of poplar trees provided whatever shade they could. North of
Kirman the terrain changed and as we progressed in our journey towards
north and North West there was abundant vegetation and orchards
particularly in the valleys around Tabriz. Overall impression is that the war
was causing large casualties of young men and the adverse effect on
economy had taken away the happiness and affluence from the Iranian
society. One could see large number of incomplete building structures
waiting for better times to be completed.

13 August 84 Started from Agri in the morning, had tea at Pontos and lunch
at Tetvan on the western end of Van lake. Stopped at the Mazar of Hazrat
Owais Qarni to offer Fateha and reached Diyarbakir late in the evening. This
was a longer leg of journey passing through the Kurdish area where Army is
deployed to deal with the unrest.

14 August 84 Stayed at Diyarbakir. Were lodged in Ordu Evi a very

comfortable place. Had a round of the city which still retains parts of the old
outer walls intact. Visited Mazar of Hazrat Suleman bin Khalid bin Walid.

15 August 84 Started for Gaziantep. Had lunch at Urfa the birthplace of

Hazrat Ibrahim (AS). Visited Gulzar e Ibrahimi where he was thrown into fire
by King Nimrud. Also saw the cave where he was reportedly born. Water of
the spring in the cave is known to have healing effects for diseases. Reached
Gaziantep in the evening and lodged in the Ordu Evi. Had dinner arranged
with local dignitaries.

16 August 84 Started from Gaziantep and crossed the border into Syria.
Visited Mazar and Mosque of Hazrat Zakria at Halb (Allepo). Visited Mazars
of Hazrat Khalid bin Walid and Hazrat Umar bin Abdul Aziz at Homs.
Reached Damascus late in the evening and were lodged in the officers club
in the city. Being weekend, the people were enjoying western style music and
dancing in the club.

17 August 84 - From Damascus to Maan in Jordan. Very well arranged lunch

at Zarqa. Night at Maan was chilly and arrangements inadequate to cope
with it. Tasted very bitter coffee served in small cups.

18 August 84 From Maan to Tabuk. Five hours spent on the border

crossing where the Saudis checked everything in the luggage and the buses
very thoroughly. Before that the border crossing so far i.e. from Pakistan into
Iran, from Iran to Turkey, from Turkey to Syria and from Syria to Jordan had
been a big party at every crossing with tea, coffee and snakes laid out on the
respective sides of the countries and the military bands playing.

At Tabuk stayed with the Pakistani Brigade designated as Khalid bin Walid Brigade,
then being commanded by Brig Mehboob Alam. The facilities provided to the Brigade
in this specially built separate cantonment were very good. The officers however
were unhappy because they were away from their families for a long time. Lodged in
Ziafa their guest house, this was the best accommodation I had the chance to live in
so far. Large room with best quality thick slabs of marble, onyx used in the bath
room, elegant furniture and fittings and heavy expensive crystal decorations made it
very special facility. According to the officers this was nothing as compared to the
guest houses in use of Saudis which were far more lavish and luxuriant.

19 August 84 The comfort of the accommodation and the facilities could not
be enjoyed because of continuous coordination meetings and other
organizational activities. Visited Masjid e Rasul (SA) at Tabuk.

20 August 84 Started from Tabuk in the morning and reached Madina tun
Nabi (SA) at night. Here we were lodged in a building whose only advantage
was that it was closer to the Masjid e Nabvi. Six to nine persons were
occupying one room and the hygienic conditions were deplorable.

21 August 84 In the morning offered first prayers in the Masjid e Nabvi

(SA). The main mosque was difficult to approach because of great rush. We
got the place under the sheds outside the main mosque.

At about 10 AM I presented myself at the ROZA-E-RASUL Sallallaho

Alaihe Wassallam. With utmost humbleness I praised Allah Almighty for
His great kindness in affording me this opportunity. The feelings I had
while offering Salat-o-Salam at the Roza cannot be described in words.

Ejaz Akmal had asked his friends in Medina to see me. Mr Sarwar with
another person came to see.

22 August 84 After Isha prayers visited Shuhada Uhad graves and the
site of battle and 6xMasajid made on the site of Battle of Khandaq on the
names of Sahaba e Kiram, Hazrat Abu Bakar, Hazrat Omar, Hazrat Ali,
Hazrat Salman Farsi and Hazrat Fatima tuz Zahra. Also visited Masjid e Zu
Qiblatain.

23 August 84 - Routine of prayers and Ziarat. Not feeling well because of bad
throat.

24 August 84 Greater rush in the Mosque at the time of Juma prayers.

25 August 84 Ziarat e Rauza and prayers

26 August 84 Ejaz Akmal came from Jeddah. Spent a very good day in his
company visiting his friend in the city.

27 August 84 Prayers and Ziarat

28 August 84 Forty prayers completed at Masjid Nabvi. Mr Ghafoor of

Mehran Hotel took us for outing/drive. His reference was given by Col Fateh
Malik.

29 August 84 Purchased some gift to be taken back for officials.

30 August 84 Presented at the Rauza Nabi (SA) to offer last Salat o

Salam of current journey as on way back we did not plan to stop at Medina.

31 August 84 Started from Medina at about 08:15 AM. Stopped at Bir Ali to
get into the state of Ihram for performing Umra. Reached Mecca
Muazzama around 4 PM but took a long time to reach the accommodation
because the vehicles had to pass through hundreds of thousands of people
moving in the area of Haram. Offered Asr, Maghrib and Isha prayers at the
place we were lodged and started for Haram which was about two kilometres
away at midnight. Entered the Haram from Bab-e-Fatah (old Bab e
Salam). The sight of Kaaba was stunning and for some time I stood in
awe forgetting the world around me. This was the place we had been
turning our faces to since childhood during our prayers and here I was,
a humble creature physically present to see it. It took some time to
recover my senses and we started the process of performing Umra with
utmost feelings of reverence. At this time there was not much rush during
the Tawaf, the seven rounds around Kaaba and Sai, the walk between Safa
and Marwa, so we performed all Manasik of Umra with deliberation and
ease. Stayed in Haram till after Fajar prayers and then returned to the
lodging.

01 September 84 Stayed in lodging during the day and went to Haram for
Maghrib prayers. After Magrib prayers did Tawaf in the peak rush hours to
get the feel of it. Stayed till after Isha prayers.

02 September 84 Went to Haram in the later part of the night at about 2:30
AM and remained there till after Fajar prayers. During day prepared for the
next days move to Mina. It was decided that move should be between 1 to 2
AM when our buses can be brought from parking avoiding traffic jam.

03 September 84 Moved to Mina at about 03:30 AM and reached without

stopping or getting into traffic jam a real surprise considering the scale of
movement towards Mina that day when everyone was to move to Mina. It
was mainly due to our Guide Mr Ashraf, a student at the Medina University
detailed with the contingent, who because of his experience with earlier
parties advised on the timings of the move. Camp at Mina was well
organized. We established our cook house, a deviation from earlier practice,
which served us well. This was advised by Ejaz Akmal when he came to see
me at Medina. Weather was quite hot.

04 September 84 - (9th Zil Haj) Moved to the

late in the morning on the advice of Mr Ashraf
AM without difficulty. Stayed at Arafat till after
event of Haj. Effort to reach Masjid-e-Nimra
prayed in the area of our tents.

Night 4/5 September 84 Statrted move from Arafat at about 8.30 PM

towards Muzdalfa and soon got into traffic jam. Covered 4 kilometres in two

plain of Arafat starting a little

our guide and reached by 11
sunset. This stay is the main
was not successful and we

hours. Spent rest of the night at Muzdalfa picking up pebbles for throwing at
the Satans later during the process of Rammi.

05 September 84 (10th Zil Haj) Started from Muzdalfa for Mina after Fajar
prayers covering the distance of one and half kilometres in about two hours.
A party was sent on foot to the slaughter house for offering Qurbani
(sacrifice) of animals on behalf of all of us. The party confirmed to have
completed the process at slaughter house after which we had our heads
shaved (the ritual of Halaq). Rammi the symbolic stone throwing on the
Satan at three sites in Mina was also done on first of the three days of this
process. Tawaf e Ziarat, the third essential act to complete the Haj was done
in the afternoon by some members of the party. Rest of us went for it on the
next day. It is to be done during the three days stay at Mina on 10, 11 and 12
Zil Haj.

06 September 84 (11th Zil Haj). Went for Tawaf e Ziarat in the morning and
did Rammi in the afternoon.

07 September 84 (12th Zil Haj). A very tough day. Prepared for move to
Mecca and went for Rammi by mid day. The rush at first Jamra was crushing.
Started from Mina at 4 PM for Mecca but could not enter the city despite
trying different routes /approaches. Finally by 2330 hours decided to stay in
the buses for remaining part of the night outside the city.

08 September 84 Entered Mecca city in the morning at about 0730 hours

and reached our lodging which was crowded because another group of army
persons had also landed there. There was some unpleasantness because
one Colonel Sultan refused to vacate a room despite being told by Brigadier
Ahsan Bhatti his group leader. Ejaz Akmal came at about 11 PM and took me
to his place in Jeddah.

09 September 84 Stayed with Ejaz during the day. One Mr Ashiq Qureshi
and his wife were also staying with Ejaz. We kept roaming in the markets till
10 PM hours because the lady guest wanted to see some fancy fittings for
her house. Purchased toys for children. Ejaz dropped me back to Mecca by
about 1 AM during the night 9/10 Sep.

10 September 84 Nothing significant.

11 September 84 Spent the day inside Haram offering prayers and

performed Tawaf e Wida after Isha prayers.

12 September 84 Return journey started. Left Mecca around 7 AM and

after delays at a number of check posts reached the area of Khyber after
bypassing Medina. Stayed in a roadside camp established by some road
construction/maintenance company. The place was manned by Pakistanis

who were very happy to be our hosts. The person in charge hailing from
Kalarkahar/Bochal area remained awake throughout the night and kept
serving us very good tea. He and his colleagues were thus kept very busy
because half of our contingent was having stomach trouble. We had taken
our meal from a roadside stall in Khyber area which comprised bread, cheese
lying open in a large tin and cold drinks. This food was cause of trouble.

13 September 84 Reached Tabuk in the evening just before Maghrib

prayers.

14 September 84 Stayed in Tabuk. This was rest and maintenance day and
we were greatly helped by our hosts the Pakistani troops in that cantonment.
Risaldar Nawaz from our neighbouring village Akwal came over to meet and
also three young men from my village, Hayat, Ghulam Rasul and Ijaz Hyder
met and presented a Rado wrist watch, a very gracious and thoughtful
gesture. Risaldar Nawaz had given me a prayer mat and Capt Dr Khizer from
Akwal; although not present, had left a present (wall clock).

15 September 84 From Tabuk to Amman after crossing the border. Were

lodged in a small hotel in the Zarqa Cantonment.

16 September 84 Conducted tour to see display of equipment and a field

hospital in Zarqa cantonment. Reception by our Ambassador, Dr Ihsan
Rashid in the evening. Dr Ihsan an educationist informed that literacy rate in
Jordan was high. 37% of population was in the educational institutions. The
country has no oil or other significant resources but the manpower resource
is well organized. There was hardly any crime in the population of 2.4 million.

17 September 84 Busy day. Visited Jordan River Valley, Dead Sea and
Mazars of Hazrat Maaz bin Jabal, Shurhabil bin Hasana, Abu Ubaida bin
Omar Aljarrah, Zarrar bin Uzwar all famous and familiar names of the early
period of Muslim history. Also saw the place of the prophet Hazrat Shoaib.
Dinner by our Defence Attach, Group Captain Jawaid Ahsan.

18 September 84 From Amman to Damascus. Visited Mazar of Sayeda

Zainab and the graves of a large number of Sahaba e Rasul (SA) including
both the Moazzins of the time of Prophet (SA) Hazrat Bilal and Hazrat
Abdullah bin Rawaha in Damascus graveyard. Visited the famous Banu
Ummaya Mosque, earlier it was St Pauls Church. Prophet Hazrat Yahyas
Mazar is inside the Mosque. Outside the Mosque visited the Mazar of Sultan
Salahuddin Ayubi. Visited industrial exhibition in the evening. Stayed in the
officers club.

19 September 84 Started from Damascus early for Gaziantep crossing over

to Turkey by about 4 PM. In the evening sumptuous banquet by the local
Corps Commander for officers at the Ordu Evi where we were staying.

20 September 84 From Gaziantep to Diyarbakir. Stay at Ordu Evi.

21 September 84 Stay in Diyarbakir. Visit to the local Bazaar.

22 September 84 From Diyarbakir to Agri. Dinner with the General Officer

who had done his staff course at Quetta in 1959 and remembered about old
days at the Command and Staff College. Very comfortable stay in the Ordu
Evi.

23 September 84 From Agri to Tabrez crossing the border into Iran. Tabriz
is the main city in a beautiful and fertile valley. The weather was rather chilly.

24 September 84 An unfortunate incident occurred just before journey

started in the morning. When we got onto our vehicles and were lined up for
move, an NCO, Havildar Muhammad Sharif of Medical Corps complained of
pain in his stomach. He had complained of pain earlier also during the
journey and was given an injection by the medical team travelling with us.
The medical officer Major Yousuf told a nursing assistant to give him another
injection. As soon as he was administered the injection his condition
worsened and he died within minutes. Apparently, nursing assistant
mistakenly gave a wrong injection while the medical officer failed to check it
negligently. Our Defence Attach and the Iranian Liaison Officers made
arrangements to send the body to Pakistan. After some delay we resumed
our journey passing through a very fertile valley to reach Tehran in the
evening.

25 September 84 Stayed in Tehran in a hostel. The officers from the

contingent were conducted to the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Iranian
Armed Forces to call on the Commander in Chief of the Army. The Iranian
Army, fighting the Iraqi Forces for so many years by then did not have any
General Officers. The Army was being commanded by Brigadier Zaheer
Nejad, a retired and recalled officer. Under the GHQ were divisions
commanded by the officers of the rank of Colonels. The importance given to
our contingent can be gauged from the fact that two officers of the rank of
Colonels remained with us during our travel through Iran in our onwards as
well as on return journey. Col Ali Larejani senior of the two was a very
energetic and pleasant person.

In Iran as a routine, the contingent on arrival at the destinations for the night stay
was first addressed by the local authority figures; mostly religious leaders. Their
main thrust was the justification of their cause to fight Iraqi aggression. Our leader,
Brig Akram in his reply would always dilate upon the need of stopping the fight
between the two brotherly Muslim countries. This stance of not condemning the Iraqi
aggression was somewhat frustrating to our hosts but that was Pakistans official
line.

Went to Bazar for a short while but it was mostly closed because of their weekly off
day. The shopkeepers of the few shops which were open did not seem to like us as
was evident from their attitude. In the evening we were taken to witness a
demonstration about the war. This was arranged by the Pasdaran who are real
strength of the Iranian Revolution. At the site of demonstration a model of the battle
of Majnun island was depicted which the Iranians had taken back from Iraqis
recently. It was very impressive demonstration of use of fire power and skills to
overcome different kinds of obstacles.

26 September 84 From Tehran to Isfahan. Night stay comfortable

especially after Tehran.

27 September 84 From Isfahan to Kirman the longest leg of journey, about

700 kilometres. Reached late in the evening after long lunch break and a
Pistachio buying break at Rafsanjan where some people went to Bazar and
rest of us waited in the buses. This area is famous for growing Pistachios.
Felt like nearing home, Quetta being four nights away.

28 September 84 Stay in Kirman. Friday prayers offered in the citys Jamia

Mosque after having visited an exhibition and Kunj e Ali Museum, a public
bath complex of the old times and the covered Bazar which was mostly
closed because of Friday being holiday. The Bazar has very artistically
designed arches.

29 September 84 From Kirman to Zahidan. Long speech session on arrival

and a little shopping in Zahidan Bazar.

30 September 84 Crossed over to Pakistan at Taftan. The contingent

received by the IGFC, Major General Mohammad Akram. After having lunch
at Nokkundi, reached Dalbandin in the evening. The road between Taftan
and Nokkundi about 80 miles is the worst patch. In fact there is no road. It is
a un metalled track. Night stay at Dalbandin.

01 October 84 From Dalbandin to Quetta.

02-03 October 84 Stayed at home with family. Yaman, Adnan and Omar
were very excited about the toys. Number of people came to meet.

04 October 84 From Quetta to Sukker after having lunch at Sibbi.

Comfortable night stay under arrangements 27 Punjab.

05 October 84 From Sukker to Multan. Haversack lunch at Rahim Yar Khan

and tea at Bahawalpur. Travel on the Pakistani roads now seems hazardous
and road conditions looked deplorable after having travelled on the good
roads in other countries. Parking sites, road signs and distant indicators
could be arranged without much expenditure.

06 October 84 Stay at Multan. It was 10th of Muharram. Stayed in the room.

07 October 84 From Multan to Lahore via Faisalabad. Convoy stopped at

Shahkot Rest House from where the leader and few other persons went to
deceased Havildar Sharifs home near Sangla Hill to offer Fateha and deliver
his belongings and some money collected by the delegation to the family.

08 October 84 Stay at Lahore. Had lunch with Aslam Bhais family at their
home in Qila Gujjar Singh.

09 October 84 Started from Lahore for Rawalpindi. Lunch at Kharian. Met

Brigadier Javed Majid, my Brigade Commmander at Sialkot after a long time.
Reached Rawalpindi by 5 p.m. Sarfaraz Bhai, Zafar Bhai, Kukku and little
Rabia had come to receive. Yousuf had come from village to know the
programme.

10 October to 15 October 84. Dispersal process including recording of the

court of inquiry of the Jeep accident in Iran and visit to village in 12/13 Oct.

16 October 84 Back to Quetta to spend some leave and resume duties.

Some overall impressions about Iran have been mentioned earlier. In Turkey we
travelled through the south eastern part of the country which is not very well
developed. Some parts of the roads we traversed were just dusty tracks. The area is
inhabited by mainly Kurds an ethnic group spread over, rather divided in three
countries i.e. Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The people were very friendly towards us
particularly the older lot as we experienced when we had the chance to visit the
Market in Diyarbakir. For the first time I saw the Olive trees.
Travelling through Syria was journey through history, the old historical cities like
Aleppo, Hamas and particularly Damascus, the oldest inhabited city of the world.
The countryside is fertile and well populated. The main road we travelled on was in
fairly good condition. Jordan again was very rich in the historical sites particularly the
Jordan River Valley which we visited on our return journey.
In Saudi Arabia the marked difference was the condition of the roads. The broad
multi lane roads facilitated travel to great extent. We spent about three weeks in
Saudi Arabia. Haj is a tough physical exercise particularly during the summers
because of intense heat. However with the spirit of a sacred undertaking it becomes
easier to go through the physical discomfort particularly for the younger and fit
people as we were at that time. If one considers the difficulties of people performing
Haj in earlier times when they had to travel on foot, on horses and camels' one can
appreciate the changes and comforts brought into our journeys and facilities which
are improving day by day. However there is always room for comment. Our
accommodation at Medina was very near the Mosque but not very clean. Only two
bathrooms were available for seventeen men and four ladies. The person

responsible for maintaining the building was stubborn and mean. General attitude
observed was that the local people were arrogant towards Pakistanis but were
scared of the Iranians who came for Hajj in more organized manner. At Mecca the
accommodation was clean and the owner very cooperative but the place was away
from Haram and we could not offer all our prayers in Haram. The overall
arrangements by the Saudi Government were elaborate to manage about 2.5 million
people performing Haj.

Shikarpur and Thereafter

After serving in HQ 12 Corps for about two and a half years, in May 1985 I received
posting orders to command 27 Punjab, deployed in Sind. This was an unexpected
posting for me. As I leant later, I had been picked up by Lieutenantt General
Muhammad Aslam Shah, Commmander 4 Corps to command this unit with which he
had strong affiliation having commanded it on promotion from Major to Lieutenant
Colonels rank. As Chief of Staff of 10 Corps Rawalpindi, at the time of coup by
General Zia ul Haq against Bhuttos government, he got 27 Punjab at Rawalpindi as
part of 111 Brigade. The unit was then given the responsibility to guard Rawalpindi
Jail where Mr. Bhutto was detained and ultimately hanged. In 1985, the unit was
deployed in upper Sind, with its HQ at Larkana. In an unfortunate incident, the unit
lost five of its officers at the hands of dacoits. The officers were travelling in a
vehicle, unarmed against the instructions and laid down procedures from Dokri, a
place about 20 kilometers from Larkana to have dinner at the Bn HQ then at
Larkana. They got got stuck in a roadblock laid by dacoits busy in looting vehicles
on the road. Not realising the danger, they got into a situation where dacoits opened
fire on them and killed them. Because of this tragic incident it was decided to replace
the CO.
I joined 27 Punjab in first week of May 85 at Shikarpur where Bn HQ was then
located in a rest house, its companies spread at different places. An interesting,
rather comic situation developed when I tried to take bath after arrival to freshen up
after train journey from Quetta to reach the unit. As I poured water from the bucket it
was unbearably hot. Wrapping towel I came out of bathroom and asked the staff that
probably geyser was on and they should put it off. Enjoying my ignorance they
advised me that it was not the geyser but the sun which caused my discomfiture. I
was to fill up the bucket and wait for at least one hour for the water to become
bearable.
Brigadier Moin ud Din Haider, (later Lieutenant General and Governor of Sind) then
the Bde Commander, in his initial briefing at his headquarters in Larkana told me few
very unpalatable things; of cavalier attitude of officers towards discipline in the unit
which was disturbing. Companies of the unit were widely spread, deployed in Garhi
Khairo and Kandhkot. The Battaion HQ was moved from Shikarpur to Jacobabad
shortly after my joing the unit. Here I had a chance of seeing the residence of
Bridadier General John Jacob who gave present name to a small town Khangarh
from where he operated to secure the newly established borders of British India in
mid nineteenth centuray. He was a remarkable man who despite his very busy life of
fighting skirmishes on the frontier which included raids right up to Dera Bugti, could
also spare time to think of inventions like a large clock which was till surviving and
functional at his residence now in use as the Deputy Commissioners House. Having
lived without raising a family, he is buried in the city alongside the main road leading
towards Quetta.

I undertook visits of different places in the units area of responsibility meeting

deployed troops, getting the feel of conditions in interior Sind, the Province I was to
serve in again later.
Lahore
In the meantime orders were received for the unit to move to Lahore as part of 10
Division/ 4 Corps. By August 85 the unit moved to Lahore. It did not take much time
for the unit to regain its lan due to change of command and posting of some of its
officers serving elsewhere back to the unit. With Maj Raja Haider as 2 IC, Majs
Javed Iqbal, Waqar Raja, Javed Manj, Ibrar as company commanders and Capt Asif
Alvi as Adjutant, I did not have much problem in getting the unit back to its very high
standard of competence level in training and sports. Ibrar, a national level sportsman
in his younger days, was instrumental in winning a number of Divisional level
competitions. Australian Army Chief visited the unit busy in carrying out training and
was impressed by the standards.
The unit was made responsible to maintain Lahore Garrison Golf Club, its course,
the fairways and greens yet in its initial stage of development which required lot of
work to be done. Just a few weeks after this task was assigned, the President,
General M Zia ul Haq decided to play golf on this course along with the Corps
Commanders on their dispersal after a conference at GHQ. For me as Secretary of
the club, it was an unfamiliar task. In this I was greatly helped by CO 23 FF, Lt Col
Mansur Hamid (later Brig), who earned my everlasting respect.
Once a Bara Khana, (meal on special occasions to be consumed by all ranks of the
units together at one place) was arranged by unit on the occasion of 6th Sep
celebrated as Defence Day. The meal was arranged for all the Punjab Battalions
stationed at Lahore Cantonment which at that time were six in number, making a
fairly large gathering. Just before start of the evening, I was informed that the
Governor of Punjab, Makhdoom Sajjad Hussain Qureshi was also to join on the
occasion. During get together at Garrison Club in the afternoon, the Governor had
been invited by senior retired Punjab Regiment officers, who among others included
redoubtable Azam Khan former Governor of East Pakistan to attend the function.
The function lasted till quite late in the evening, everyone enjoying the occasion. I
was greatly impressed with pleasant small talk by the Governor in his chaste
Seraeki, music to the ears.

Quetta, once again

By end of 1987, I received posting order as officiating Colonel Staff of HQ 19
Division at Mangla. Before I could move out, this order was cancelled and instead I
was to move to HQ 41 Division located at Quetta on the same appointment.
Brigadier Bilal Ahmad, FF, who was Chief of Staff 4 Corps at Lahore, was posted on
promotion to command the newly raised 41 Division. He had known me in command
of 27 Punjab at Lahore and wanted me to be his principal staff officer. He got my
posting to Mangla cancelled and instead I had to move to Quetta.
I reached Quetta and assumed new responsibilities. The Division was in its raising
process. Basically the HQ and some of supporting and service units were being
newly raised. Two existing brigades and some artillery units were placed under
command of the Division and later a new Brigade HQ was raised. The Division was
lodged in the accommodation vacated by 16 Division that moved to a newly
established cantonment at Pano Aqil. Soon our new Division was to participate in the
largest exercise with troops held by the Army under General Aslam Beg. The
exercise named Zarb e Momin was held in the Thal desert in area between Rivers
Indus and Jhelum. A few months after the exercise, the Division was again to move
to upper Sindh for a special task assigned by the Army. Within a span of about eight
months the Division had to move through Bolan Pass thrice which is a very taxing
exercise for staff coordinating those moves.
The Division was moved to upper Sind in summer of 1990 to counter a very grave
internal security situation. One day, when GOC was away to Rawalpindi, I received a
call from GHQ, Military Operations Directorate that the Division was to move on
training to upper Sind immediately. This was an unusual order because the Division
was not planning to do any training during that summer having recently participated
in the large scale Army exercise spanning over couple of months. I got in contact
with the GOC to apprise him and discuss employment scheme of troops in different
places. Brigadiers Imtiaz Shaheen and Nisar were sent to Larkana and Sukkur
respectively using small aircrafts for liaison with civil authorities. The troops started
moving out by trains the next day and move was completed most swiftly in about
three days time, our railways rising to the challenge as always on such occasions.
Out of the two Brigades available, one commanded by Brigadier Imtiaz Shaheen was
placed in Larkana Division, the other commanded by Brigadier Nisar placed in
Sukkur Division and the Divisional Artillery (Brigadier Baqir Shah) placed at Nawab
Shah, thus covering the area which was the responsibility of 16 Division for internal
security duties. Because of tension with India, 16 Division had been deployed on the
border and was not available for dealing with unrest in its rear areas. We placed our
Division HQ at Sukkur.
Reason for sudden move of our Division was revealed on arrival in the area. The day
our troops started reaching their assigned areas, resident of a village comprising
about forty houses of non Sindhis in Khairpur district had been forced to vacate their

houses. A day before, a number of shops of non Sindhis had been burned in
Jacobabad/Shikarpur districts. It was Benazirs first government when there were
complaints of non Sindhis, particularly Punjabis being evicted from the Province.
Press reports indicated opening of camp for such people by district administration of
Rahim Yar Khan. As troops arrived in the area, this practice stopped. An officer,
Major Nadeem, Field Security Section was sent to confirm the report about camp in
Rahim Yar Khan. He came back with information that at the check post located on
the boundaries of Sind and Punjab, district administration Rahim Yar Khan was
maintaining record about the evicted people coming by road using trucks loaded with
their luggage. Since 1st January of that year (1990) till 1st week of June, over twenty
thousand families had been forced to leave Sind. Photocopy of a page from the
record showed details like the number of people, from where they were coming and
where they intended to go, the truck number etc.
The civil administration was at a loss on arrival of troops because they had not asked
for troops in aid of civil power as is the practice in dealing with unrest beyond control
of other law enforcing agencies. In fact the administration and the provincial
government were involved in ethnic cleansing, which had started gaining
momentum. Having evicted such families who were living scattered in upper Sindh,
now the attacks on settlements of ethnic non Sindhis were started. Had it been
allowed to continue, the settlements in lower Sindh, in districts like Sanghar and
Badin would also have been evicted. Reportedly when Gen Aslam Beg the COAS
was asked by Prime Minister as to why troops had been moved in the area, his reply
was that since 16 Div, responsible for internal security duties in the area was
deployed in their battle locations on borders because of tension with India, there was
a need to keep the lines of communications and logistic bases secure which were
getting disturbed by increasing unrest.
On arrival in the area, HQ 5 Corps at Karachi started asking for the situation report.
Since the GHQ had moved us on training, there being no request from the civil
government for troops in aid of civil power, it created confusion initially as the
Division was part of 12 Corps at Quetta. HQ 5 Corps responsible for the internal
security duties for the province of Sindh provided us with the three types of lists. One
was regarding the dacoit gangs operating in different areas, a fairly comprehensive
list with names of gang leaders, gang members and their areas of operations. From
the list one could make out that it was a very elaborate set up covering whole of
upper Sindh which in the names of dacoits was actually a force capable of
converting into insurgent force. The second list given was that of Patharidars a term
used for protectors of these dacoit gangs. This included all big landlords like Jatois,
Pagaras, Mahars, Mumtaz Bhutto and others. It was a well known fact that these big
landlords were patronizing criminals for use against their disobedient and
unmanageable tenants, the Haris, a tool used to terrorize people in the area. The
third list was that of the Al Zulfikar (terrorist) organization. This list included names of
people, the leaders in different areas and members of their teams. This again was an

elaborate set up mainly comprising young, educated Sindhis, some of whom had got
training in India for sabotage activities. Our intelligence officer had succeeded in
getting the picture, revealing that groups of ten to twelve people would travel in boat
from Karachi, disembark at nearest point on the Indian coast from where they were
taken to a small town named Bhoj in area opposite Tharparkar. There in a training
course of six weeks they were trained in sabotage activities like blowing up railway
lines, oil and gas pipelines, and target killings etc. According to information,
thousands of Sindhi young men had got the training and they were waiting for
weapons to be given and the tasks assigned. This information was also reported in
the press after few months when some members of the organization were caught
near the borders and interrogated. As revealed by the informant, Benazirs
instructions to the party workers during her visits to Larkana were not to cooperate
with the Army.
While the move of our Division thwarted Benazirs government plans of ethnic
cleansing, driving out non Sindhi families from Sind, her government was also under
pressure due to rampant corruption. Although not brought out in public, the fact that
her government was involved in ethnic cleansing and she was privy to the plans of Al
Zulfikar fully supported by India contributed to her governments removal. It was
most ironic that the people of Pakistan were looking up to Benazir to make Pakistan
a politically stable and economically prosperous country but she was found wanting
in her capacity to provide that leadership rather conversely, she was working to
destabilise the country Her government was soon removed and fresh elections
resulted in the change at the centre as well as Sind where provincial government
was formed by Jam Sadiq Ali. The government under President Ishaq Khan helped
political parties with funds to defeat PPP in elections. Later Air Marshal (Retd)
Asghar Khan who had gone into election alliance with Benazirs PPP got a case
registered against the Army Chief for distributing funds to political parties. The real
reasons for removing PPP government and efforts to deny the Party winning
following elections were not made public even by the Supreme Court who disposed
of that case many years later.
I had earlier spent some time in Sind in command of 27 Punjab and had seen
conditions of poor people of the area. This stay of about seven months from May to
December 1990 gave me further insight. The poor people of Sind, particularly the
Haris, tilling lands were being exploited by three different categories of oppressors.
The first one was Wadera the landlord, the other class was Police and yet another
group was those of dacoits who could do anything with the lives of poor people, their
womenfolk and their meager resources. Dacoits were living off the land in control of
vast area on both side of the Indus River, known as Kacha bounded by flood
protection bunds. During a chance to fly low level in a small military aircraft from
Sukker to Karachi, I observed that these bunds were placed at considerable distance
from the water line, encompassing very large tracts of fertile land. This land had
been distributed to big landlords in the form of Shikargahs, the private game

reserves. The chunks of lands spreading in kilometers were known as Ketis, like Keti
Jatoi, Keti Bughieo and Keti Bhutto etc. The meaning of the Keti, I was told by the
locals, was that the land which could not be measured. It was true that these chunks
of land could not be measured because of change in course of water running
through the area.
The landlords owning these vast lands would do a very small investment on the
rulers by inviting them in winters for shikar (hunting). Generally two such parties
were arranged during the season; one for the top men of civil bureaucracy and
another for top generals of the armed forces. The hunting party would start in the
morning in an area where partridges or other birds were preserved and most of the
timed placed after procuring from other places. The shikaris (hunters) would move in
a linear formation towards the direction where birds were expected to be. Another
party of workers, mostly Haris of the landlord, would move to drive the birds towards
direction of Shikaris. A very sumptuous lunch would be arranged on the site. By
evening the party would wrap up and disperse. This arrangement was enough for the
host to enjoy patronage of most influential people in the government.
The vast lands bounded by flood protection bunds formed at unreasonably wider
distance are a great asset which if used purposefully, can bring prosperity to the
poor people tilling these lands. In 1991 from Bunji I wrote to Mr. Mushahid Hussain
Syed, advisor to then Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif to distribute lands to poor
Haris in Sind. I assume it was on this suggestion that soon a scheme was launched
to distribute land measuring twelve acres to landless Haris. Major General Sikandar
Hayat, a serving Army officer, was made in charge of the scheme which was later
discontinued with the fall of Nawaz Sharifs first government.
Major General Bilal Ahmads frequent trips back to Quetta were not liked by senior
leadership and he was replaced by Major General (later Lieutenantt General)
Muhammad Akram considering the sensitive nature of the job which required a
serious and dedicated professional.
By end of the year 1990, having spent three years with 41 Division as its first Colonel
Staff, I was posted as Commandant Northern Light Infantry (NLI) Regimental Centre
located at Bunji near Gilgit. I joined the Centre in first week of December 1990.

Lure of Mountains

Bunji
Northern Light Infantry Centre is located at Bunji, about 55 kilometres south of Gilgit.
Bunji, a small place on eastern bank of Indus River, was the last outpost of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir till mid nineteenth century. From then on it served as staging
point for launching further incursions by Kashmiri forces towards Gilgit. Apart from
Gilgit, other small states in those inaccessible mountainous areas, like Nagar and
Hunza towards east of Gilgit bordering China and Punial, Askoman and Yaseen
towards west were independent states ruled by local rulers. By mid nineteenth
century the Kashmiri forces after some struggle succeeded in wresting control of
Gilgit. After sometime the British decided to occupy this area to counter possible
Russian incursions into this region. The British abandoned their first attempt of
establishing residency at Gilgit but again towards the end of nineteenth century
British Residency at Gilgit was re-established. Gilgit was taken on lease from
Maharaja of Kashmir from where the British expanded their control over Hunza and
Nagar after some tough fighting. This lease period was yet to be completed when the
momentous event of Independence of the sub continent from British rule took place
in 1947.
I recollected the tale of Subedar Abdul Rahman; senior JCO of my company when I
joined 34 Punjab deployed on the ceasefire line in Dewa - Batala opposite Chamb
Sector in June 1966, who marched from Jammu to Bunji as a young man, a Lance
Naik in 6 J&K Regiment. I had listened to his adventures which seemed so distant
evoking romance of his exciting journey through difficulties and travails of traversing
high mountains passes on foot. There was no mechanical transport in use in those
days on the route taken by their unit to cross Burzil Pass and ultimately reach Bunji.
From here the secrecy of plans to move further to Gilgit by his Muslim Company,
commanded by Captain Hassan Khan, without knowledge of his CO resurfaced in
my memory on reaching Bunji. It was from Bunji that a company of 6 J&K, marched
towards Gilgit to join Gilgit Scouts, thus starting the liberation movement in Northern
Areas. The 6 J&K, had its HQ and two companies, a Muslim Company commanded
by Captain Hassan and a Sikh Company comprising mostly recruits, located at Bunji.
Its other companies were deployed at Skardu and elsewhere in Baltistan. The
Scouts numbering a little less than six hundred were being led by their Subedar
Major Babar Khan, who had made the Commandant, a young British officer named
Major Brown, ineffective. Joined by Captain Hassans company, this force arrested
Brigadier Ghansara Singh, the Governor sent by Maharaja of Kashmir to take over
control of Gilgit, declared independence and started their campaign to liberate
Northern Areas from Dogra rule.

Major Brown was replaced by Major Aslam Khan (later Brigadier) as commandant
Gilgit scouts who established himself at Bunji where he raised more forces and
organized the liberation campaign sending forces to Baltistan and Astore sectors. A
man with exceptional organizational abilities and drive he made vital contribution in
liberating vast areas from Dogra rule. His role although is not given due recognition
in the local lore. His memory however, remains preserved in the form of Shangrila a
holiday resort near Skardu where he is buried along with his wife. He had selected
this spot where he could form a small lake and then moved a fuselage of a crashed
aircraft laying over sand dunes near Skardu Airport. He used wooden logs as rollers
to move this aircraft for about twenty kilometres on a dusty track and then furnished
it into a two bedroom lodging facility. Remaining infrastructure was built around that
aircraft later.
Reaching Bunji in the month of December was an adventure. An officer from the
Centre, Captain Ghulam Muhammad Awan, had been sent by outgoing
Commandant, Colonel Ashraf Hussain Shah to Rear HQ, Force Command Northern
Areas (FCNA) at Chaklala to contact and accompany me in my travel to the Centre.
First we tried to travel by air but the flights were not operating because of bad
weather. For air travel one had to get up early in the morning and reach the airport
before sunrise. There, as it happened often, after waiting for a couple of hours one
was told that flight would not operate because clouds had appeared in area of Nanga
Parbat blocking the valley through which PIA Fokker aircrafts, with maximum ceiling
of about eighteen thousands feet, had to pass through. The adverse weather
conditions would develop suddenly making air travel most uncertain. Going to the
airport and coming back disappointed was a routine exercise. It happened with me
twice during that tenure in Northern Areas that our aircraft took off, flew for some
time and then had to land back at Islamabad airport because of unexpected cloud
cover around Chilas.
Abandoning the option of air travel after some unsuccessful efforts, we started by
road on the Karakorum Highway (KKH). It was last week of December and before
leaving Chaklala we did check up the road condition ahead which was reportedly
clear. During the travel it started raining and by the time we reached Chattar Plain
we found that we could not go any further because of heavy snowfall blocking the
road. We had to abandon this effort and came back to where we had started. Yet
another option was to travel by helicopter going to Gilgit if one could arrange a seat
in it. Ultimately this option worked and we landed at the helipad of NLI Centre Bunji
one fine morning in late December 1990.
Colonel Ashraf Hussain Shah, a Punjab Regiment officer and a course mate from
PMA briefed me about the organization. He had worked hard to improve conditions
at the Centre. During his tenure, Chief of the Army Staff, General Aslam Beg and
some other senior officers visited the Centre. Before that hardly any senior person
would visit the place because of this being on the wrong side of Indus river across
KKH, linked through a suspension bridge. Another reason was the Commandants

who were mostly passed over for promotion like me, were hardly interested in
receiving any visitors. Colonel Ashraf had been posted to the Centre with a special
consideration. Before him Colonel Muhammad Aziz, had gathered around him few
officers who like him were active participants in activities of the Tablighi Jamaat.
Unfortunately during that period sectarian tension had developed in Gilgit resulting in
clashes between Sunnis and Shias. A private force, a Lashkar comprising Sunnis
marched from Kohistan district towards Gilgit causing destruction of several houses
of Shias in villages along the way before it was stopped just south of Gilgit. Word
spread that while passing through Bunji, the Lashkar had been provided with
weapons and ammunition by NLI Centre and some thought that Commandant had
actually joined the Lashkar. Although untrue, this was a very negative perception.
Colonel Aziz was posted out and replaced by Colonel Ashraf Hussain Shah.
The sectarian tension between predominant Sunni population of Pakistan and the
Shias exacerbated during the period of Zia ul Haq when religious seminaries were
funded and used to recruit fighters for war against the Russians in Afghanistan.
There was no state control over the movement on our western borders, nor any
restriction on movement of Afghan nationals within the country. Although refugee
camps had been established but very large number of Afghan nationals of every
ethnic and sectarian dispensation were free to move anywhere they liked. A large
number had got them registered as Pakistani nationals due to lax procedures in
giving national identity cards before the present system of registration by NADRA
was introduced. In Northern Areas, external forces were involved using their local
agents to disturb peace in that strategically important area on our borders with
China. According to reports, posters distributed in the area by rival groups to fan
hatred using abusive and derogatory language against each other were printed in a
distant Multan in the same press, a clear indication on the common source of funding
and people involved in fomenting trouble being the same. One important player in
this game got killed in Gilgit due to personal enmity during my tenure. His removal
from the scene and simultaneously our efforts in reaching out to motivate ex
servicemen and the common people helped in reducing intensity of the trouble for
quite a few years afterwards.
With this sectarian background, my posting created ripples in the concerned circles,
a Sunni replacing a Shia Commandant, of which I learnt a little later. In Pakistan
Army, sect of a person was never a consideration. Before Pakistans involvement in
the fight against Russians in Afghanistan, there was hardly ever a case of sectarian
dispute in the country, the Sunnis facilitating Shias annual Muharram processions by
making arrangement for provision of milk and sharbats on well defined routes from
where processions had to pass through the towns and cities. In Northern Areas,
there were four different sects i.e. Shias, Ismailis, Sunnis and Nur Bakhshis living
peacefully for ages. The Sunnis were mainly in Chilas District, the Shias
predominantly in Baltistan and Nagar, the Ismailis in Hunza and Punial and Nur
Bakhsis, small in number in some parts of Baltistan. In Gilgit, people of every sect

were residing in the town. During the years of sectarian tension, at start of summers
every year a vehicle would suddenly appear in the main bazaar spraying bullets
resulting in killing of some persons. That was enough to spread terror and the whole
tourist season would go without much business because of the effects it created
nationwide. The terrorists were never caught by local police.
Winter months were generally a lull period, when except for essential training
activities and routine there was nothing much to do. It was a good opportunity to get
acquainted with the place, environment and problems before summers which is a
busy period. On the occasion of Eid, I asked Subedar Major (SM) about
arrangements for Eid prayers. He told me that there was no such practice in the
Centre of offering Eid prayers; Sunnis joined the villagers of Bunji in their village
mosque and the Shias and Ismailies went mostly to Gilgit. I told the SM to make
arrangements for offering Eid prayers centrally at one place, an unprecedented
event hitherto. It was most satisfying that persons of all four sects prayed together
and continued to do so on all subsequent occasions of Eid during my stay there. In
my monthly address to troops during Durbar, I would conclude the proceedings by a
word of advice to all that sects were created because of political reasons and not
due to any religious consideration, and sectarian differences were always exploited
for political reasons. This message and some more efforts had a very positive effect
to reduce tension in the area.
Centre Commandant enjoyed a prestigious position in the entire area because he
could give employment to a large number of young men each year. Being successor
of the Scouts, the Centre was also responsible to look after interests of retired
persons of Gilgit Scouts, Northern Scouts and Karakorum Scouts which had merged
to form the NLI Regt. These people, advanced in age, were quite influential in their
communities. They proved very useful in joining our effort to overcome sectarian
tensions in the area. The Centre, under the direction of Major General Zahir ul Islam
Abbasi, Commander FCNA, organized nine ex servicemen rallies in different valleys
ending with a grand rally at Gilgit. The aim of holding these rallies was to go to the
people, listen to them, exchange views and explain to them that violence in the name
of religion was un-Islamic and most undesirable. These rallies were very well
attended and would last for a whole day. General Abbasi with his vast knowledge
and patience to listen was very good at arguing the case and would convince the
audience about his point of view. Most difficult to convince were, the people from
Darel and Tangir valleys who joined the rally at Chilas. They were adamant in
sticking to their point of view not heeding to reason. At the end of these rallies,
committees would be formed to counter the menace of sectarianism in their
respective areas. This proved successful and for a number of years the area
remained peaceful till new factors and new players emerged on the scene later.
The Centre was otherwise having a very close contact with the ex servicemen of the
old Scouts and the NLI Regiment. They were invited to the Centre for annual
functions and provided with expenses on these trips. They were also provided with

financial assistance whenever someone applied for it in a dire need. Such

applications were quite frequent and were always attended to.
During my tenure of two and a half years at the Centre from January 1991 to July
1993, I had a chance of serving under the command of three General Officers, as
Commanders FCNA are also the Inspector Generals (IGs) of NLI Regiment. When I
joined the Centre, Major General Irshadullah Tarar was the IGFC. He had very
practical approach to deal with problems of his operational area particularly the
Siachin Sector. He laid emphasis to hold and maintain already established posts on
those heights and avoid establishing more posts which were difficult to maintain and
could not provide any tactical advantage. According to him additional posts would
serve no purpose as the Indians, already in advantageous positions, were
adequately blocked to come down further west into our area from their heights.
Some ambitious commanders at Brigade level had indulged in such fruitless, rather
damaging exercises mainly for personal glory. One of them, when he was about to
complete his tenure in Astore sector captured a few huts at Dalunag across the line
of control and got his gallantry award by projecting it as a major operation. He left the
place but the consequences of that misadventure were heavy on the unit deployed in
Shaqma area because Indians sitting on the heights above Dalunag would not allow
any supply to pass through from that area.
Major General Zahir ul Islam Abbasi replaced General Tarar during second half of
1991. General Abbasi, as a Brigadier had worked as our Defence Attach at
Pakistan Embassy in India. He was roughed up by Indian intelligence people and got
injured when according to them he was meeting with some persons in Dheli city to
obtain documents from them. He was prematurely reverted to Pakistan. Having
strong Jehadi inclinations, he supported a plan worked out by Brigadier Masood
Naveed Anwari to establish a new post in Siachin Sector. This was against the policy
of previous Commander FCNA who was for maintaining the existing posts. A
reconnaissance party under command an officer was sent to explore the route and
determine location of establishing the post. The officer, a Captain, on return told that
establishing a post in that area was not feasible because the route to it would be
passing in front of Indian posts. He was dubbed a pessimist and the plan was not
abandoned.
One morning I was picked up from Bunji helipad to travel along with General Abbasi
in connection with the ex servicemen rally I had arranged at Skardu. The General
had to first visit forward troops and then join the rally. I was dropped at Gamba
helipad in Skardu and the General proceeded ahead. About mid day he returned
visibly shaken and dejected. It transpired that he had gone to address the troops of
1 Azad Kashmir (AK) Battalion before they were launched to secure a height for
establishing the post. The route to reach the height where post was to be established
was in effective firing range of Indian posts dominating the approach. As 1 AK
reached within range of Indian weapons, it came under intense fire resulting in large

scale casualties to the unit. It included eight officers who were killed. Brigadier
Anwari tried flew to find out progress in his helicopter. Although before that day the
helicopters were considered safe because no weapon had been found effective
because of peculiar weather conditions, Brigadier Anwaris helicopter was hit by the
Indians, causing his instant death besides the two pilots. In all eleven officers
including the Brigadier lost their lives. Total casualties of the unit were over one
hundred persons killed and wounded including their CO who was wounded. All this
happened within just about one hours time; the catastrophic result of misplaced
ambitions and follies of senior commanders. General Abbasi was removed from
command and posted at GHQ, from where he reportedly planned to kill all the Corps
Commanders during their periodic conference. He was tried along with some army
officers and sentenced to imprisonment.
General Abbasi was replaced by Major General Fazal e Ghafoor, known for his
diligence and hard work. Having served in the area earlier as Brigade Commander at
Astore, he had good understanding of problems in the area and focused to address
those with considerable success. Basic requirement was to maintain troops deployed
on the front in most abnormal and trying conditions.
The debilitating struggle in Siachin area is a great tragedy for troops of both the
countries being deployed on those heights. Troops are deployed at altitudes which
the mountaineers consider as their life time achievement to scale, spend few
moments to raise flags and get photographed. Long term deployment of troops has
caused tremendous hardships and miseries resulting in loss of limbs and damaged
health of so many people. How this conflict started is a sad reflection on Indian
decision making process. This episode was narrated to me by Lieutenant Colonel
Manzoor Hussain, Engineers, associated with the Alpine Club of Pakistan for a long
time. I was told that one Indian tour operator dealing with trekking expeditions in the
mountains in Laddakh area had his brother posted as commandant of the Indian
Army High Altitude Training School, near Leh in Laddakh. The tour operator asked
his brother to explore western side of the Siachin Glacier for taking trekking
expeditions if possible by using trainees at the school for the exploratory task.
That is how the Indians started coming in this area during summers in late seventies.
Since this area was left un-demarcated beyond a certain point considered to be
uninhabitable, there was no presence of Indian or Pakistani forces in the area.
Movement was only possible in summers with special equipment and training. An
Army SSG team was sent to confirm the reports of Indian incursions. In 1980 while
on a visit to Gilgit I met the team leader staying in the NLI Officers Mess on return
from the expedition. The team confirmed reports of Indians visiting the area, as they
saw signs of their presence through litter, used tin food cans etc.
The Indians in their seasonal expeditions started descending the Saltoro Range and
came in contact with our civilian population, the local police being informed with

proof of Indian currency. This created alarm and it was decided to place troops on
the passes on Saltoro Range.
In 1984, before start of summers, Director Military Operations (DMO) at the GHQ,
Brigadier Ghulam Muhammad Malik along with Brigadier Ajmal, Commander 62
Brigade at Skardu went up in a helicopter to have a look around Saltoro Range to
determine places where troops could be deployed. As they reached the area, their
helicopter was fired upon by Indians who had occupied passes much before start of
the normal movement season in that area. This was an utter surprise, a most
unexpected happening and an indication that the Indians had access to information
of our plan, thus pre-empting Pakistan Army in occupying the area. In haste, our
Army totally unprepared to operate on those heights placed few units of the NLI
Regiment and regular infantry units opposite Indians posts, obviously at
disadvantageous positions. Since troops were not equipped for the climatic
conditions, nor trained or acclimatized, we suffered lot of casualties because of frost
bite and other adverse effects of high altitude, till appropriate clothing and equipment
was provided and operating procedures streamlined which took time.
Bunji was very hot in summers particularly for those who would approach it from the
Astore valley; the only route to Gilgit region from the Indian sub continent till a route
was opened through Babusar Pass and later making of the Karakoram Highway
(KKH). The old route started from Kashmir valley passing over Kamri and Burzil
passes to descend into Bunji Das. Das is plain areas on banks of rivers as known in
local parlance. British officers who wrote their accounts described this heat very
explicitly in catchy phrases, some of these I would use in opening of my briefings to
visitors with desired effect to create interest in what I had to say subsequently.
The Centre had created lot of attraction for visitors which was fully exploited by
FCNA to impress the Army Chiefs. In 1992, General Asif Nawaz visited. After seeing
the training and administrative facilities, he decided to bring the Prime Minister for a
visit. All our preparations to receive the Prime Minister on 17 August 92 were wasted
because weather remained blocked for that whole week. Next year i.e. in 1993,
General Abdul Waheed, the new Army Chief visited the Centre with his family. When
I started to brief him in my office, he interrupted me to call his young son to listen to
the interesting quotations of the British about Bunji upon their descent from Astor
valley to the place.
Chief Instructor, Lieutenant Colonel Riaz Mahmood Bajwa, Punjab Regt, had spent
about seven years in the Northern Areas, first as Commandant of FCNAs Battle
School at Kalamdarchi (KD) Fort and then a long inning at the Centre from where he
ultimately retired. He had developed a training facility on mountain craft techniques
for the recruits which included among other things, Australian style rappelling in
which a man would be seen quickly descending facedown towards the ground. Since
the rope he was using was not visible from a distance, this sight was most exciting
rather frightening. For visitors, the demonstration was laid on a side of a mountain

close to firing ranges of the Centre. General Asif Nawaz initially did not seem
interested to see the demonstration after lunch but once he was persuaded to
witness it, he was so impressed that he wanted to bring the Prime Minister to visit
the Centre.
Other attraction was Centres Officers Mess, a small old Rest House, with well
maintained lawns covered by a number of old and majestic Chinar trees. It was a
treat to spend moments of leisure under their thick shade. The lawns were bordered
with fruit trees including peaches, plums, apples, pomegranates, apricots and very
fine quality almonds. I experimented with introduction of a fine quality black cherry
which was not planted earlier considering the climate unsuitable. The quality of
cherry from village Nomal northeast of Gilgit is considered to be the best which we
planted at the Centre and the project proved to be a success. Construction of the
new officers mess on a parallel spur continued during my tenure along with a
personal interest of laying out expansive terraces filled with fruit trees and Chinars
for shade around it. It was almost complete when I left in July 1993.
Meetings of the Mountains
Opposite Bunji across the River Indus is Jaglot, a flat area at two different levels, the
KKH passing through the lower plain and village located at higher elevation. Area
Bunji Jaglot forms a bowl surrounded by mountains. One day looking at mountains
while sitting in the mess lawns, I realized that I was looking at three different
mountain ranges, a unique phenomenon only possible to witness from this, Bunji
Jaglot, area. The mountain range east and south of Bunji was western end of the
Himalayas, which culminated on the eastern bank of Indus River. The cliffs we were
using for training on the mountain craft techniques at the NLI Centre, were the
western end of that great mountain range. Nanga Parbat, the killer mountain in
western Himalayas rose to its majestic peak south of Bunji. Looking towards north
one could see the southern end of Karakorum Range confined between the
confluence of Indus and Gilgit Rivers just north of lower Jaglot. Looking towards west
across the Indus River one could see the eastern end of Hindu Kush range which
rose from the western bank of Indus River, crossed parts of northern Pakistan before
entering Afghanistan. The thought of witnessing such a unique geographical
phenomenon was very exciting. I formed a team of officers comprising Lieutenant
Colonel Riaz Mahmood Bajwa, Captain Dr Tariq, our Medical officer who belonged
to Bunji village and Captain Aurangzeb, our Education Officer to select a suitable site
on the KKH from where this unique geographical phenomenon could be conveniently
witnessed by travellers. Colonel Bajwas team selected a site where a properly
worded plaque was erected. One consideration for selecting the present site was to
enable travellers to physically see waters of both rivers, Indus and Gilgit at their
confluence, separating the three mountain ranges. This spot does not have very
large space for parking vehicles but the waters of both rivers cannot be seen from
any other point where the plaque could be fixed. It attracts the attention of tourists en
route to Gilgit and discerning travellers find it a compelling stop.

Figure 1. The place from where three monumental mountain ranges can be witnessed

This team also erected a monument at the site of a historic battle about midway
between Jaglot and Gilgit titled Ambush Site. This place, known as Bhup Singh Ki
Pari, was a narrow path between the mountain and Gilgit River where an invading
Sikh force of about twelve hundred men under Bhup Singh was ambushed by the
Ruler of Gilgit in mid nineteenth century. According to local lore only two persons
escaped by jumping into the Gilgit River and reached Bunji, the last post of the State
of Kashmir.
The team of officers at the Centre, about twenty two in all from different infantry
regimental groups jelled well as a team. Luckily I was assisted by Lieutenant Colonel
Bajwa who, out of twenty four hours, would hardly spend about six hours in his room.
He was always up and available to everyone. We could organize big functions
smoothly; our main strength in this was the ingenuity and resourcefulness of Captain
Ghulam Muhammad Awan. He had exceptional abilities in administrative planning,
attention to detail and ability to motivate people to work long hours cheerfully,
producing admirable results. I have mentioned about the visits of the two Army
Chiefs which went very well due to hard work by such officers.
The annual COs conferences were mega events in which the ex servicemen would
also be invited requiring arrangement of their night stay. Yet another event which
evokes pleasant memories was Colonel of the Battalions Installation Ceremony of
27 Punjab at Gilgit. This unit which I had commanded earlier was located at Gilgit,
then being commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Waqar Raja. The unit decided to hold
installation ceremony of their new Colonel of the Battalion, Lieutenant General
(retired) Muhammad Aslam Shah at Gilgit. I being an ex CO sought permission from
FCNA to invite units guests to the Centre for an evening. The programme included a
game of Golf, dinner and a cultural show displaying folk dances of different valleys of
Northern Areas. The permission was granted with some reservations about move of
the VIPs during night. Lieutenant General Naseer Akhtar, Comd 5 Corps was also
amongst the guests, being Colonel of the Punjab Regiment at that time. It was one of
the most pleasant evenings where all participants enjoyed every moment of their
short stay. The graceful regional dances performed by handsome men, attired in
traditional dresses, moving to the exquisite local tunes were a treat to see. Folk
dance practice among soldiers of NLI was a daily routine. After having completed the
days work, men would be free to enjoy their leisure time, the musicians playing their
instruments, a morale booster for the troops relaxing after hard work.
Polo is played in Northern Area with its own rules which are different from the rules
applied elsewhere. This game of kings and king of games is a passion in those
areas. The game lasts for one hour divided into two equal halves with a short break.
There are six players on each side who cannot be replaced. Gilgit had a polo
ground, known as Shahi Polo Ground on western end of the main bazaar. At that
time three departments were patronizing this expensive game in Gilgit. They were
NLI Centre which had two teams, the seniors and the juniors, the Police and the
Northern Areas Public Works Department (NAPWD). Every year two tournaments

were organized by the local administration. During my stay at Gilgit the NLI senior
team remained unbeaten. Our players like Bulbul Jan were heroes in the areas. Polo
tournament at Shandhur between Gilgit and Chitral teams started during that period.
In this tournament Gilgit Team remained winner during the initial years. Playing polo
at that high altitude would sometime result in death of horses during play.
In early 1991, when my family was lodged in Gilgit Mess upon arrival there, my sons
decided to do some horse riding. They went to stables and asked for the ride. The
attendants, without realizing that the boys could be novices, allowed the eldest,
Ahmed Yaman to ride a horse called Lahori, the naughtiest of all. As soon as Yaman
took the seat, the horse went into gallop jumping over the wall. Yaman hit a tree and
fell down with bruises on his face and arms. However this did not deter the boys and
they later enjoyed the facility learning to control horses.
In 1991, the Centre had only few barracks in the training wing to accommodate
about four hundred recruits against the authorization of twelve hundred. These
barracks were also made on self help basis. Due to procedural impediments the
budget allocation for construction would lapse because the paper work like project
estimates etc by concerned offices at Gilgit would not be completed and approved in
time. For two years I had to send an officer to Defence Ministry in the last week of
June to save lapse of funds, getting special permission to carry forward the
allocations. These efforts initiated the process of construction which continued after I
left. Mechanical transport was also a problem and we did not get any vehicles
against the deficiency. Considering that lot of senior officers had started visiting the
Centre for whom arranging suitable vehicles was difficult, I relocated the Helipads
near the monument and planned the events in such a way that the need to use
vehicles was minimized.
Another feature added was laying out a Golf Course, the first in Northern Areas.
Before my arrival at the Centre, Lieutenant Colonel Bajwa, a keen golfer, had laid out
a mini course of three holes to remain in practice. With experience of maintaining
Lahore Garrison Golf Course as its Secretary while commanding 27 Punjab in 1985 87, I developed a nine hole course, a massive work done by recruits of the Centre
over a period of about six months. According to Bajwa, when Lord Curzon visited
Gilgit as a member of the British Parliament much before becoming the famous
Viceroy of India, he carried his golf kit to enjoy a few shots in exquisite surroundings
of Gilgit area, the first man to do so.
The Centre was sharing irrigation water from the nullah coming from mountain on
our east with the villagers of Bunji. As water channel passed through the village,
water theft by villagers was a continuous complaint. The problem was minimized by
effective monitoring arrangements and constructing few large size reservoirs/ ponds
through manual labour on self help basis for storing water for use according to
needs.

I had to undertake lot of travelling during these two and a half years. Whenever there
was a need to come to Rawalpindi in connection with official duties, I never had the
luxury of availing air travel facility because invariably the weather would not permit
that. I had to take road journey a number of times on the KKH which at that time was
not in a bad shape as it deteriorated later. The time taken from Bunji to Rawalpindi
would be about twelve hours. I was told by the drivers that my predecessor, Colonel
Ashraf once took about nine hours from Bunji to complete this journey when the road
had just been completed and road conditions were at their best.
I had started a project of converting some NLI properties in the area into tourist
resorts. A few places were indentified and some work started before I was posted
out. The places were Naltar, where two barracks were made usable for living by the
visiting families. At Passu couple of small rooms were converted into guest rooms.
Another place was Rattu where a small old rest house was located near the High
Altitude School. I had planned to convert the Gupis and Kalamdarchi Forts into
tourist complexes but these ambitious, although workable plans did not materialize
as I was posted out on completion of my tenure. This idea had come a little late
when I had about one year left of my tenure.
I undertook a tour of Azad Kashmir to visit NLI units deployed on Line of control. This
took me to Nosehri in the Neelam valley, could not go beyond because of blockage
of road due to Indian firing, the Pandu peak, Sankh, Kailler and Rakh Chikri, the
whole trip lasting about ten days. This was my first visit to these areas of Azad
Kashmir. Earlier I had stayed and travelled in Bhimber sector and Samani valley
area which climatically were no different than the Pothohar region. Travelling in
Kashmir during the summers was a pleasant experience particularly when one was
on the heights and roads reasonably good.
In July 1993 after spending about two and half years at Bunji, a very busy and
eventful time at the Centre, I was posted to Adjutant Generals Branch, GHQ as
Deputy Director, Personnel Administration Directorate. I have very fond memories of
the people of Northern Areas whom I found hardworking, honest and dedicated
soldiers. Their only requirement was to be recognized and owned. On direction of
the FCNA, General Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi, I wrote a paper on converting the NLI
Regiment into a regular regiment of the Pakistan Army. The units which were
deployed against Indians were being commanded by the officers who did not belong
to those units and would never come back to them after completing their two year
tenures. This was a most undesirable arrangement for the units facing our enemy.
The paper was presented by me at HQ 10 Corps. This matter remained dormant till
the Kargil misadventure of 1999, when decision to form NLI Regiment as sixth
infantry group of Pakistan Army was taken.

Retirement and Post Retirement Years

A Year at GHQ
At the time of posting to GHQ, which I joined in the first week of August 1994, I was
expecting three years tenure at the last leg of my military service. This was for the
first time in my service that I had been posted in Rawalpindi. It was an unpleasant
surprise when I received a letter that I will be retiring within one year because the
relaxation of two years in service previously granted to officers of my rank had been
withdrawn. Working in the Personal Administration Directorate (PA Dte) in the
Adjutant General Branch as Deputy Director Personnel Administration, the year was
mostly spent in visiting some Recruiting Offices and the Records Offices for their
periodic inspections.
It was interesting to have a glimpse of working in the GHQ. Notes and summaries for
major decisions could be initiated from the lowest level. I came to know from the old
civilian staff working since long in the Directorate that they were instrumental in
scrapping short term induction scheme which was introduced after the 1965 war. In
this scheme soldiers in General Duty trades in the Army were enrolled for four years
after which some selected men were retained and the rest were discharged. This
was an excellent scheme which provided the Army with young manpower. After
some years it would have reduced pension budget to a great extent. The flimsy
reason given by the staff at GHQ was that they were faced with lot of paper work in
regularizing cases which occurred due to oversight at the regimental centres and
needed GHQ approval. This scheme which had tremendous benefits in educating
and grooming young men, creating jobs, a young looking army and many overall
benefits for the society ended for very petty reasons.
I also initiated a proposal that the Army Corps of Clerks (ACC) should be disbanded.
A large number of postings of the personal assistants of senior officers ordered by
the Directorate were not being implemented. My reason for doing away with a
separate organization was that personal assistants (PAs) could be provided by
respective regiments and corps to their senior officers; hence there was no need to
keep a separate set up. The point was taken up at appropriate forums and the
clerical corps, a legacy of the British Indian Army was disbanded.
I finally retired from the Army on 1 August 1994 after completing age and service
limits, fifty two years and twenty eight years respectively. Looking back it seemed a
long journey covering mostly hard and difficult times. But overall it was a great life of
adventure lived by an infantry officer of the Pakistan Army in turbulent times with
zest and a sense of satisfaction to have done ones duty with dedication and honour.

Experience with MES

Just before retirement I applied for jobs in the Army administered organizations
according to laid down procedures but found that the jobs were not easy to get. After
remaining in without some job for over a year, I landed up getting a contract from
Military Engineering Service (MES) for construction of a building at Shinkiari. This
project, which was a block of family quarters for soldiers, resulted in considerable
financial loss to me apart from wasting two years in extensive travel between
Rawalpindi and Shinkiari. On completion, the local SDO of MES in charge of that
project asked me that Colonel were you not aware of such matters? Did those who
were giving you this contract not know what they were doing to you? The contract
was given at low rates and my inexperience compounded the loss.
Dealing with the MES gave insight into deep routed corruption in the department.
Every paper had to go through about nine hands and all were to be given envelopes
containing their share of commission on payment of bills. The amount was between
fifteen to thirty percent of the total contract amount depending on type of contracts,
the maintenance contracts paying more commission/ bribe. While interacting with the
department I found that yearly budget for pay and allowances of the staff of Garrison
Engineer (GE) Abbotabad was more than annual maintenance budget. This was a
huge wastage of funds at the cost of maintenance.
In early eighties a study was done at the Army level asking comments from
formations about MES department. Almost every field formation recommended doing
away with the department, but nothing changed. The system at that time was so
centralized that all contracts worth a reasonable amount were awarded by the GHQ,
forcing travel for the contractors from Karachi, Quetta and other far off places.
Since construction and maintenance work is done by the contractors, there is no
need to have an elaborate MES set up throughout the country. The garrison
commanders with the help of staff at Station Headquarters can manage the
requirements of construction and maintenance according the designs suitable for
local climatic conditions instead of forcing a design all over the country irrespective
of peculiar local needs. This department is causing considerable damage to the
State and providing sub standard services to end users, but apathy and inertia at the
decision making level continues retention of this wasteful department.

Visit to UK
9 August 2002 was a very special day for my family. On this day my youngest son
Ahmad Omar graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK with
singular honour of getting the Overseas Sword of Honour and Best in Academics
and Military Subjects Award. He is first Pakistani to get the two coveted awards. I
along with my wife had been specially invited to attend the occasion and we stayed
in UK for two weeks. On reaching Heathrow Airport we found Omar with his civilian
friends Dr. Noman and Hamza waiting for us. Another party, Mr. Waqar with his
brother had also come to receive as recommended by General Pervez Akmal. One
of his subordinates in OGDCL, Mr. Iftikhar Abbasi had his family in London who were
informed of our visit. We stayed one night with them and next day moved to a hotel
in Camberley where Omar could meet us conveniently from the Academy.
On the day of passing out parade we were first invited to Governor House,
residence of the Commandant in Academy premises. Our Hotel booking ended a
day before passing out parade day and we could not find accommodation in the few
hotels in that small town. We were told that available lodgings were booked by
people who were coming from other places to attend the ceremony, their main
attraction being evening function in the mess. We contacted Dr Noman who took us
to his home in London suburbs and next morning along with Hamza drove us to the
Academy.
At the Commandants house after having tea and small chat with chief guest of the
occasion and few selected guests, that included our High Commissioner invited
because of a Pakistan cadet getting the coveted awards, we were conducted to our
seats on the parade ground. The parade was quite a lengthy affair, main difference
from our parade being that chief guest took lot of time reviewing the parade which
included his talking to some cadets. When called for the award, Omar gracefully
walked up to the chief guest who had a brief chat with him before handing over the
prestigious sword. Our feelings of pride and happiness at that moment are beyond
words to describe.
After the parade and award ceremony we were conducted inside their main building
for lunch. Sitting opposite the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg on the dining table with
our Ambassador on my left and the Chief Guests wife on my right, I was wondering
on how it is that from dusty environs of Kufri, I had landed up in that company. I was
in a state of euphoria and I still savour the feelings of that memorable day. The
Commandant Major General Peter Trousdell was profuse in his praise for Omar. So
was his Company Commander who was very keen to meet us to convey his feelings.
It was a matter of great delight and pride for us; with Allahs blessings our son made
that possible with his dedication and hard work.
After dispersal from the Academy in the afternoon on 9 August, we were taken to
Birmingham by Mr. Afzal, a cadet at the Academy. His family hailing from Gujar

Khan was settled in UK. We stayed with his family for about three days and then
returned to London for taking our flight back along with Omar. At London, Iftikhar
Abbasi and his mother Mrs. Surayya Abbasi were waiting for us having returned from
US. We had earlier stayed at their home for a night in their absence. Iftikhar took us
around London showing important landmarks of the great city. Earlier Dr. Noman
had taken us to visit some places, including Edgware Road where I enjoyed large
puffs of Shisha for the first time.
As we landed at Islamabad Airport early morning, a pleasant surprise awaited us.
Major General Pervez Akmal had arranged an elaborate reception in VIP lounge of
the Airport where whole family had gathered.
My other sons, Ahmad Yaman and Ahmad Adnan both elder to Omar have also
given me great pleasure and pride who stand out for their ability, integrity and
achievements in their selected fields. Yaman joined my unit 34 Punjab after
graduating from PMA. Adnan is a fighter pilot flying the latest F-16 fighter jets. Both
have excelled in their operational tasks and during their courses and assignments
overseas earning respect and honour for themselves and Pakistan. My daughter, still
in school, is working to emulate her brothers.

Kirghizstan
First few years of the twenty first century saw a boom in the property market. I also
met my expenses through small investments in property. Another venture which I
undertook was an investment in Kirghizstan. My brother-in-law, late Ejaz Akmal
suggested that doing investment in that country with smaller amount as compared to
Pakistan would give better returns. He had visited Bishkek, the capital, stayed a
couple of months with a Pakistani acquaintance from D I Khan. The project decided
to be established was opening a restaurant in partnership with a Pakistani, Mr. Zahid
who was already well established in restaurant business. He, in partnership with
others was running two restaurants, one named Golden Bull situated near the
Presidency and another at a main road nearby.
Named Pizza Inn, our small restaurant with about forty seats started business in the
winters of 2004/ 2005. It was a success from day one. The restaurant served about
five selected dishes and did not serve or allow consumption of alcohol in it. It was
second such restaurant in the city, the other being a Turkish one. In this connection I
visited Bishkek in the summers of 2004 and after assessment and discussion
provided the required amount. Again in February 2005 I visited to see the functioning
of the restaurant. On these visits I stayed in that country for two weeks each time.
During the first visit I undertook a trip to Issyk- Kul Lake, the famous landmark on the
old Silk Route linking Chinese Turkistan with Central Asian region. It is well
developed and most visited holiday resort of the country stretching along the western
side of the vast lake, the facilities mostly owned by the people from Turkey who also
had big share in the restaurant business in Bishkek.
Since there was no direct flight from Pakistan to Bishkek, I had to use the services of
China Airline. This required a visa for China because two days stay was forced at
Urumchi before boarding another plane from there to Bishkek. The return journey
also involved same arrangements of staying at Urumchi the capital of Sinkiang
province before reaching Islamabad. During stay at Urumchi I took a guided tour to
visit the city particularly down town area where most of the local Muslim population,
the Uyghurs are concentrated.
During the second visit, I boarded a cargo plane from Karachi to reach Bishkek. This
service was being operated by a Kyrgyz national on bi-weekly basis from Karachi.
Since Mr. Zahid had come to Pakistan and was using this flight, he had arranged my
travel with him. It took us about four hours to reach Bishkek. On return journey I
came via New Delhi, staying within the airport premises for about five hours before
boarding Air India flight for Lahore which took about forty minutes of flight time. After
successful running of the restaurant for about one year, differences developed
between Ejaz Akmal and Mr. Zahid ending the partnership and the business. Ejaz
Akmal came back to Pakistan and died shortly afterwards.

Working with ERRA

On 8 October 2005 an earthquake of 7.62 magnitude on the Richter scale caused
extensive damage to life and property in parts of Kyber Pakhtunkhaw (KP) and Azad
Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K). It virtually paralyzed the organisational structure of
nine districts; five in KP i.e. Abbotabad, Mansehra, Battagram, Shangla, Kohistan
and four districts i.e. Muzaffarabad, Neelum, Bagh and Rawalakot in AJ&K.
An area roughly 30,000 Sq Km was affected leaving 73,338 dead and 128,304
severely injured. 3 million people were rendered homeless and about 600,000
houses destroyed. Road infrastructure, educational and health facilities and
government buildings were extensively damaged. As immediate response, the
Pakistan Army was inducted into the area to start relief operations.
The people of Pakistan, overawed with the scale of this tragedy responded with
overwhelming support, eager to help in whatever way they could, reaching out to the
area to help the Army busy in recovery and relief work. Pakistan, at the time was
providing vital assistance to the US and NATO countries in their war in Afghanistan.
It was mainly for this reason that the country got prompt response from international
community to deal with calamity. Loads of materials, expert teams and fleets of
helicopters started arriving to help organise the relief work. Although an organisation
at the national level, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) existed, a
new organisation Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA)
was established to deal with consequences of the disaster.
ERRA developed into a very elaborate organisation. Work was divided into different
sectors categorised into clusters like direct outreach to the communities (Rural
Housing, Livelihood and Social Protection sectors) Social Services (Health,
Education and Water and Sanitation sectors) Public Infrastructure (Governance,
Power, Telecommunications, Transport and Tourism sectors) and Cross Cutting
Themes (Disaster Risk Reduction, Environmental Safeguards and Gender Equality).
A total of nearly 13000 (thirteen thousand) projects were identified to be repaired and
rebuilt.
The manpower was gathered from the government departments, the Army and
mostly from the private sector. A large number of consultants, both local and
international, were hired at exorbitant remunerations to assist in working out
strategies and provide technical assistance to the organisation. Apart from the
organisation at the national level, similar organisations were created at the Province
level as implementing agencies. At the districts level District Reconstruction Units
(DRUs) were created to undertake the work. It all required large expenditure on the
administration provided with Land Cruisers, Prados and other expensive vehicles to
numerous Director Generals looking after their sectors at different tiers and other
appointment holders. An elaborate set up for monitoring and evaluation was created

to monitor construction progress and measure the outcomes and impact of ERRA
interventions.
The flagship program which met outstanding success was in the Rural Housing
Sector. With the owner driven approach; the owner of a destroyed house was
provided with funds at four different stages of construction. His work was checked by
the Army teams at every stage to make him eligible for next payment. Thus six
hundred thousand two room houses were completed in a comparatively short period
all over the affected area. Work on remaining sectors particularly the construction of
Education and Health facilities progressed at low pace according to the normal
government procedures of the respective line departments.
Considering the slow pace of construction through normal procedures, I suggested
to the Deputy Chairman, Lieutenant General Sajjad Akram, a dynamic commander
who achieved good progress despite severe impediments, that the schools in the
villages should be constructed by adopting Community Driven Approach. My reason
was that if the villagers could construct their two room houses, they could also
construct five to eight rooms primary and middle schools in their villages within very
short time and with very less money as compared to the government construction.
This proposal was vehemently opposed by the bureaucracy during ERRA board
meetings for obvious interests.
The concept of District Government Complexes was introduced where all the
departmental offices of district administration and their residential quarters of the
staff were to be housed in one building complex. One such complex was completed
at Muzaffarabad with the help from Government of Turkey, a Turkish company
completing the work in a short span of about two years. Work on such projects in
other districts was abandoned for lack of funds/ interest.
I worked in the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Wing of the Authority for over two
years (June 2008 Sep 2010) in the social survey group measuring the outcomes
and impact of ERRAs interventions in the affected area. During the period I along
with our group, attended two short courses; one for five days and another for three
days at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) concerning the M&E
processes and technical report writing. The surveys conducted and the results were
reflected in the periodic/ annual reports and the impact assessment reports. It was a
very good experience to learn about the working in the development sector.
Frequent travel by the international community experts and the US Helicopters
extensive flying was good familiarization experience with the area for them. This
perhaps helped the US aviators in conducting successful navigation and operation
deep inside Pakistan during the night on 2 May 2011 reaching Abottabad to raid
Osama bin Ladens hideout.
One very obvious fact was that the reconstruction and rehabilitation work which
should have been done through the normal working procedures of the respective

provincial, state and district governments, a new organization was created

substantially increasing overhead expenditure. It was duplication of efforts and
expenses. In addition a large number of consultants, including international
consultants were hired at very high remunerations who only contributed in writing
voluminous reports portraying rosy picture of various interventions although results
on ground were not as good as reflected except for the rural housing programme.
Another aspect which came to light was that work of the non government
organisations (NGOs) was below par, most of them doing sub standard work and
leaving the projects incomplete.
About foreign consultants I had an observation earlier. Some years back I had
invested money with a contractor responsible to carry out some repair work on
Sohawa-Chakwal road. The contract was worth 2.5 million rupees to repair small
patches of the road. To indentify those small patches for repair a foreign consultant
was working with his office located in a house in Islamabad. He had further hired the
services of a retired senior officer, a Lieutenant Colonel of Pakistan Army Engineers
Corps to assist him along with the support staff and transport etc. His emoluments
and expenditure was six times more than the cost of projects he was supposed to
provide services for, during the year. That year he had only two projects; each worth
2.5 million Pak rupees. Actual identification and marking of the patches to be
repaired, which was the job of overseer of concerned department, were done by the
contractor himself. The Consultants representative visited only once and felt
satisfied with the work. This consultant was working in Pakistan for more than nine
years by then and must have continued afterwards also. He had spent eight years in
Sind before coming to Punjab to offer his services. I asked the Punjab Government
Secretary of Communications, Brigadier Shadab Ali Khan, and course mate of mine
from the Pakistan Military Academy about this consultant. He replied that the Punjab
government had not asked for him. He had been imposed on the department. This I
feel is a small example of how our country is being exploited by the so called donors
who get ingress deep into our affairs by employing their people who keep stashing
millions into their own accounts out of the allocated funds.
Some observations on working with ERRA are;

The plans for dealing with natural disasters adopting measures for disaster
prevention, risk reduction and mitigation of effects should be worked out at the
district level as each district has peculiar conditions prone to different kinds of
disasters.

The Provinces should coordinate and supervise the works to ensure that
workable plans are in place and in case of disaster the district governments
are supported in their needs.

At the Central government level, organisation like the NDMA should mainly
focus on funds allocation from central government to the districts and
coordination with international donor organisations and international NGOs.

Ad-hoc organisations tend to convert into permanent features as it is evident

from the fact that ERRA is still functional (2013) although its mandate was for
three years. This is despite the fact that another national level organisation,
the NDMA is in place and actual work on ground is being done according to
normal government procedure with full involvement of respective government
departments. This is not duplication but triplication resulting in wastage of
efforts and resources.

International agencies should not be given unlimited access to sensitive areas

for obvious security concerns. The extensive helicopter flying by US Army in
the area and combing of the area by persons of western countries accessing
large data on different aspects collected by our survey teams was undesirable
to say the least. The area affected by the earthquake was of special interest
to the US and India for allegedly having training camps for the Kashmiri
Mujahideen. Although nothing was found but it certainly was questionable to
give unlimited access to foreign forces. Targeting a house by US helicopters
deep inside Pakistan would not have been that easy had the US helicopter
pilots not done flying in the area earlier.

I have shared some of the experiences of my life. Like every concerned citizen I find
enough reason to be disconcerted considering the scale of mismanagement and
malice of our ruling class, yet I sanguinely await divine intervention for providing us
with better leadership to steer the course of our nation on the road to progress,
prosperity and peaceful living. Our unique variety of terrain, climate, abundant
resources and above all very important geo-strategic location makes the task much
easier. My views on various issues are reflected in the following chapters.

PART II OPINION(s)

Conflict with India

In 1947 when British left the Indian Sub Continent divided into the two independent
states of India and Pakistan, the question of princely states numbering five hundred
and sixty two was left to the discretion of their rulers; to join either of the new states
or to remain independent. This caused conflict between India and Pakistan on the
question of the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad (Deccan) and some other
small states like Junagarh and Manavadar. Both countries went to war in 1947-48 in
Kashmir which resulted in a stalemate. The matter was taken to the United Nations
by India where it is still waiting to be resolved.
Relations between the two countries started gradually improving till the 1965 war
between the two countries reversed the process. This war changed the fate of our
rapidly progressing country to that of failures, defeats, dismemberment and a
continuing struggle for existence as a state.
Pakistan, after experimenting with parliamentary system in the fifties resulting in
unstable short lived governments, had stabilized under the presidential form of
governance. The country under the leadership of President Mohammad Ayub Khan
was making rapid progress in industrialization, building of infrastructure,
multipurpose large dams and overall peace and prosperity for the people of
Pakistan. The country enjoyed unprecedented respect amongst the nations of the
world. The efforts towards regional cooperation were successful in reaching
agreements, like the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) between
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.
Because of this internal strength, relations with India had improved to an extent that
President Ayub Khan offered India for a joint defence treaty against any external
aggression to the sub continent. The contentious issue of sharing of waters of the
Indus Basin had been resolved in 1960. During the India- China skirmishes on their
borders in 1962, Pakistan did not pose any threat to India. In 1964, Mr Jawahar Lal
Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister sent the prominent Kashmiri leader Sheikh
Abdullah, to discuss the possibility of resolving Kashmir dispute with the Pakistani
leadership. Unfortunately while Sheikh Abdullah was holding talks in Pakistan, Mr.
Nehru died. Sheikh Abdullah had to abandon his talks and returned to India.
Just after few months of Mr. Nehrus death the devilish game of initiating conflict with
India was started by machinations of Mr. Z A Bhutto, the foreign minister in Ayub
Khans cabinet. His aim, which he would share with some top men in his ministry,
was to remove Ayub Khan by fighting a war with much larger neighbour India which
obviously would result in a defeat. That, he claimed was the only way to get rid of
Ayub Khan as a first step to reach his goal of grabbing power. The plan as it
unfolded was; first there were skirmishes in the Rann of Kuch in the south in April
1965. At that time there was only one Division in Sind and Baluchistan with its
brigades located one each at Quetta, Karachi and Hyderabad. This spread and

paucity of troops precluded taking any offensive action against India. However, the
Brigade located at Hyderabad then being commanded by Brigadier Iftikhar Janjua
(later Major General who died in a helicopter crash in Chamb area during 1971 War)
was used to conduct an operation in the area which escalated tensions. The small
scale operation was given a great hype of a resounding victory and it resulted in
mobilisation by both the countries, moving their forces close to the borders.
Having succeeded in creating conditions, Mr. Bhutto persuaded the President to
allow sending some infiltrators into Kashmir Valley to help initiate an uprising which
will force the UN to take up this dormant issue. The President was assured that
Kashmiri people were ready for an uprising and that the problem will not escalate
beyond the confines of Kashmir, a disputed area. The President gave his consent
with a remark, Defreeze Kashmir, on the note presented to him. Once this move
was initiated, the events gained their own momentum to disastrous results. Pakistan
Army was under strength and not ready for war with India. General Musa, then
Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army, wanted at least two more divisions raised if
the country was to go to war with India but he was assured of a limited involvement
confined within Kashmir. While Pakistan never recovered from the effects of this war
in a slide towards the abyss, India emerged stronger and continues to gain strength
because of timely support from Pakistan to overcome her problems.
The man who initiated this conflict ultimately succeeded in grabbing power in 1971
after another war with India and dismemberment of Pakistan of 1947. His plans to
rule for long were disrupted due to his own follies although his daughter and son in
law did rule new Pakistan at different intervals putting the people in greater
difficulties due to their unbounded corruption and misrule.
Pakistans Role in Strengthening India as a State
India is a geographical term and was never a country as aptly described by Mr.
Winston Churchill in one of his speeches in 1931 in these words, India is a
geographical term. It is no more a country than the Equator. The largest empire
created by the legendary Asoka did not extend south of the Ganges valley, the cow
belt. His efforts to venture south ended at the battle of Kalinga in present day Orissa
state where seeing the killings he renounced further conquest and converted to
Buddhism. Later on great ruling dynasties including the formidable Mughals ruled
only part of the sub continent. Emperor Aurangzeb, sixth in line of the Mughal
dynasty, after whom Mughal rule started collapsing, died fighting in his quest to
conquer South India.
The British created a semblance of unity after they consolidated their hold on the sub
continent, but their system of control was ingenious and benevolent. The sub
continent was part of their global empire ruled from London. When the British left the
sub continent in 1947, apart from the areas directly under British control, there were
five hundred and fifty two states of varying sizes comprising one third of the total

area and one fourth of the population of the sub continent. These were ruled by
hereditary rulers, independent in all respects except that they could not establish
diplomatic contacts with other countries. Also there were vast tribal areas spread all
over the subcontinent enjoying complete autonomy. The sub continent was never
one country; its unity was always deceptive.
In 1947 when the British left, India had leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Mr. Jawahar
Lal Nehru, Sardar Patel and other experienced men on the Indian scene during the
ensuing period. A man of great calibre and charisma, Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru as
Prime Minister fully exploited the semblance of Indian unity created by the British to
form the modern Indian state. Congress party, well organised all over the sub
continent striving to get independence from British rule was Nehrus tool to wield
political influence all over the sub continent. Soon after independence large parts of
the new country, particularly the eastern parts like Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram,
started their struggle for independence from Delhi. The main regional political party
in South India, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) was demanding an independent
nation for Dravidians called Dravida Nadu consisting of areas that were covered
under Madras Presidency. At one time there was armed resistance in twelve
different areas against the central authority.
This internal turmoil was managed by the Indian rulers through initiating skirmishes
on the Sino-Indian borders in 1962. After a great hype of having very good relations
with China, and oft repeated slogans of Hindi-Cheeni Bhai Bhai this was a complete
reversal in policy. The actions on both extremities of the long mountainous borders
were initiated by the Indians and a great hype of external threat created with the
basic aim of managing internal conflicts. The DMK changed its stance with this
contrived threat from China in 1962 and suspended its demand for independence
and supported Indian government for raising funds for the war. When the war ended,
nationalistic feelings were so strong that DMK gave up the separate Dravida nation
demand altogether. India also managed to get substantial material support from the
western powers led by US who were eager to get ingress into this vast country.
After Nehrus death in 1964, when our disputes with India were well on the way to
resolution, Pakistan got into skirmishes with India in Rann of Kach area in lower Sind
during the month of April 1965. This was followed by sending infiltrators in the Indian
Occupied Kashmir which resulted in September 65 War with India. As narrated
earlier, this war was initiated by the machinations of rabidly ambitious Mr. Z A Bhutto
who wanted to weaken and remove Ayub Khan in his efforts to gain power which he
ultimately did after another war with India in 1971 and separation of East Pakistan.
The outcome of our wars helped India to overcome internal problems suppressing
resistance to manageable levels. India also used brute force with impunity to
suppress discontent by killing thousands of their people. As narrated by the Indians
in their casual talk during our stay as prisoners of war, about five to six thousand
people had been killed in one of the state agitating during that period. Later the scale

of killing went up; about twenty five thousands in Punjab and nearly one hundred
thousand in Kashmir.
Jawar Lal Nehru ruled India for seventeen years. After a gap of some years his
daughter Indira Gandhi assumed power in India. During her rule Pakistan was
dismembered, the eastern part becoming Bangladesh when the Indian forces
invaded East Pakistan in December 1971. She met violent death at the hands of her
own guards. Her son Rajiv Gandhi, following her as prime minister also met similar
fate, meeting a brutal death while holding the throne. The dynastic rule of Nehru
family for a long duration gave India the much needed political stability.
Barely two decades ago, after 1996 general elections in India no single party could
form a government in India. The coalitions cobbled together also could not stay
together which resulted in three elections within those many years. Here again
Pakistan came to Indias rescue by launching the Kargil misadventure in 1999.
General Musharraf, the Pakistani Army Chief without permission from the
Government, not even consulting senior commanders ordered occupation of some
vacant Indian posts on the mountain peaks overlooking Kargil in occupied Kashmir.
These peaks were occupied by indian troops during summers and vacated during
winters as their normal seasonal routine. The skirmishes brought both countries to
the brink of an all out war. The war hysteria created by India helped them in
overcoming internal discords. Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, who had been ousted earlier
just after 13 days as Prime Minister, could now complete his full tenure and their
system was again back on the rails. On our side the civilian elected government with
two third majority headed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif was replaced by Musharrafs rule for
over eight years causing severe damage to Pakistans progress as a democratic
country. While the Kargil episode destabilised and weakened Pakistan morally
materially and diplomatically, it helped India overcome internal discord thus resuming
the road to political stability and economic progress.

The Stranglehold
United States of America (USA or simply US) is vast country with abundant
resources and a vibrant, enterprising population gathered from all over the world
during last few centuries since this country was accidentally found by the Europeans.
The country is being run under a unique system nowhere practiced in any other
country of the world. Money supply to the US government is controlled by the
Federal Reserve, a private Bank owned by small invisible elite who have forcefully
guarded this control. US Presidents like Abraham Lincoln, James A Garfield and
John F Kennedy who tried to get the country out of their stranglehold were physically
eliminated. The Capitalist elite, which can be termed as Global Capitalists
Establishment (GCE), the owners of banks and global mega businesses, have
effective control over decision making by the US government and these decisions
are meant to create more money by acquiring and controlling material resources of
the world even if it needs to waging wars. To serve their needs, US forces have been
used during last one hundred years all over the world including two world wars.
Occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq are recent examples. Their interests have
worked against well being of the common man all over the world in cluding the US
itself. The Occupy Wall Street Movement started in September 2011 manifests
frustration of US citizens against large multinational corporations influence over
decision making in the US but their voices remain feeble and ineffective.
Having used the US power for over a century, the GCE are shifting their operations
into China and India, the two countries with major concentration of human
population. Having used US strength to maximum advantage, they are now into
fresh pastures to pursue their interests.
US Influence over Pakistans Policies
The pattern adopted by US, working for capitalist's interests to control resources in
different regions of the world is to place chosen men at the helm of affairs in
countries of their interests. The US administration thus gains very deep, all pervasive
influence in the target countries which they cultivate through overt and covert means.
In his book Confession of an Economic Hit Man published in November 2004 and
his interviews John Perkins has explained the methodology adopted to control ruling
elites of the target countries which otherwise is no secret as we can see in our
country.
As Pakistan emerged on the world map soon after culmination of the Second World
War, the pre war pattern of global controls by imperialist forces was changing into a
bipolar world. While the Soviet Union expanded its influence in Eastern Europe and
some African and Asian countries, USA replaced the British in assuming leading role
in other parts of the world. Communist China was another force aligned with the
Communist bloc. As the US, after Second World War was striving to contain
Communist threat, the newly established state of Pakistan landed into its fold against

spread of Communist influence in the region. Pakistans geographic position was

most important to contain the Communist bloc, its western wing being in the
proximity of China and Russia and the eastern wing located in the South East Asian
region under threat of the Chinese influence.
The first Pakistani Prime Minister Mr Liaqat Ali Khan chose to visit distant USA
instead of availing invitation from the USSR which could have strengthened our
position in the region, a step in wrong direction which proved fatal to our existence in
1971. After his assassination in 1951, the bureaucrats like Ghulam Muhammad and
Iskandar Mirza assumed control of the country. They developed deep links with US
government functionaries to the extent of contracting matrimonial relationships, the
US Ambassadors daughter marrying the son of Mr Iskandar Mirza in 1954. Since
the interests of Pakistan were fundamentally at odds with those of the US interests,
the Pakistani rulers have caused greatest damage to Pakistan by following American
policies in the region. The US wanted to keep Pakistan weak and pliable, causing its
dismemberment when the country started making progress at unprecedented pace
in early sixties.
Three persons, Z A Bhutto, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf, have most devastative
role in altering course of the country from glorious path to present abysmal state.
Zulfikar Ali (ZA) Bhutto
Pakistan was well on road to rapid progress in early sixties after having overcome
teething problems of earlier years. The 1965 War with India derailed that progress
putting Pakistan into a tailspin from which it never recovered. The initiator of this
derailment was Mr Z A Bhutto who influenced events in the short history of this
country in most negative way. Born in Bombay and educated in US he came to
Karachi after Pakistan came into being and started cultivating contacts with rulers.
Sharp, handsome and articulate, he soon succeeded in courting favour of Mr
Iskandar Mirza. His burning ambition was to rule a country. Since he could not rule
the whole of Pakistan he triggered events which led to break up of Pakistan. His
desire to rule a country irrespective of its size was manifest in his lament heard by
Mr Qureshi, a jail staff who was present with him during his last moments that he
should have become life president of Sindhudesh instead of getting prisoners back
from India.
American intelligence agency CIA, the main tool of capitalist interests works on
talented people who undertake their studies in the US. This includes armed forces
personnel who attend courses in US institutions as brought out by Lieutenat General
Shahid Aziz in his recently published memoirs. They use such persons to pursue
their global agenda. Mr Z A Bhutto was one such man. With unbounded ambition
and gifted with ability to agitate and arouse masses, he aspired to rule a country.
Since he could not foresee his success in united Pakistan because Bengal having
larger population where he could not get ingress, he worked to weaken Pakistan and

ultimately to dismember it creating space for himself in a part of Pakistan. His first
target was to remove Ayub Khan from power. Acting on a lesson from Kutalias
Earthshastra that if the minister wants his ruler to be weakend he should get the
state into war with the neighbouring state, Mr Bhutto was prime mover in initiating
armed conflict with India in 1965 as narrated in some detail in earlier chapters. He
was the man who remained with the President General Yahya Khan in Dacca till the
orders to take military action were issued on 25 March. He moved out of Dacca after
the President had left, seeing that the action by the Army had started on the night of
25 March 71 which would lead to break up of Pakistan.
As Foreign Minister he would stay in CIA facilities in Switzerland during his visits
abroad. Tasked to attend UN proceeding during the 71 war, he broke his journey in
Switzerland. Here while his delegation stayed in a hotel, he himself stayed for two
days in the CIAs castle, away in the mountains on the excuse of being indisposed.
He waited for the progress of Indian forces moving towards Dacca which the CIA
could provide him precise information. He moved to New York at his leisure and
stormed out of Security Council proceedings which were suggesting ceasefire. He
made sure that ceasefire is not agreed to and the troops in East Pakistan are made
to surrender.
Z A Bhutto ultimately became ruler of a dismembered Pakistan which was once a
strong, prosperous, liberal and peaceful country enjoying great prestige in the comity
of nations as the largest Muslim country of the world.
After taking over the country Z A Bhutto destroyed a vibrant and thriving industry by
nationalising it, weakened the civil services by taking away legal protection and
introducing parallel induction of Party workers in the civil services. Overall he created
an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. He was the first Pakistani ruler to open
Swiss account for stashing away money taken as donations from foreign countries
on different excuses. A despicable character who took sadistic pleasure in
dishonouring respectable families; the details of those stories then in circulation are
unprintable. His role in breakup of Pakistan was known to the people at that time
when the events were happening. But after a passage of time he is eulogized as a
great hero by a section of Pakistani population, some beneficiaries of his corrupting
the systems and mostly poor and downtrodden people who got exploited by a false
slogan beliving that a man could provide them food, clothing and shelter.
He was removed from the political scene and physically eliminated when no longer
required, the fate of such persons working for the powerful forces. His corrupt
descendents and followers continue to plunder the country, the Party rightly being
called Pakistan Plundering Party.

General Zia ul Haq

Mr Bhuttos successor, General Zia ul Haq was another character who worked for
US interests. When he was elevated to the slot of Army Chief by Prime Minister Z A
Bhutto, it came as complete surprise. He was at seventh position in order of
seniority. The general expectation in the Army was that either General Akbar or
Majid Malik would be the next Army Chief considering their seniority and merit. But
Zia, an unknown figure in the Army was most unexpected. Earlier when seconded to
Jordan in the rank of Brigadier, he participated in Jordanian operation to dislodge the
Palestinians from Jordan. He was to face court martial for his role in that incident on
return but was saved by General Gul Hassan, another controversial character who
later helped Z A Bhutto in assuming power.
Zia ruled the country for about eleven years. During this period the USSR invaded
and occupied Afghanistan. Resistance against Russian occupation was organized
using Pakistans tribal areas as bases. The US and rulers of some Arab countries
provided support with weapons and funds to help Afghan resistance movement.
Young men from other Muslim countries like Osama bin Laden also joined
Mujahedeen fighting against the Russians who were forced to vacate Afghanistan
after about ten years of their occupation, paying very heavy price as this war resulted
in disintegration of the USSR. General Zia was disposed off on 17 August 1988
when his very safe and stable American made military aircraft crashed near
Bahawalpur. He died along with the American Ambassador and a number of senior
military officers including General Akhtar Abdul Rahman the ex ISI boss responsible
to conduct the war against Russians.
During his rule, the internal situation of the country worsened in terms of sectarian
tensions, spread of narcotics and illegal sophisticated weapons. Over five million
Afghans crossed over to Pakistan, some of them were provided shelter in the camps
established for them but there was no control of their movement. This caused
enormous multifaceted problems which continue to aggravate our internal security
situation to this day.
Ten Years of Musical Chairs
After Zias death Pakistan went through political instability as no civilian government
could complete their normal tenure. Benazirs and Nawaz Sharifs governments were
removed twice in turn on charges of corruption and misrule in a decade of civilian
rule. The American and Saudi Ambassadors were deeply involved in making and
breaking the governments.
While my assessment of Mr Nawaz Sharif as a leader follows in succeeding
paragraphs, about late Benazir Bhutto less said the better. Her actions to sabotage
national interests as mentioned in a previous chapter and her husbands collecting
commissions in deals at the Stats expense were main reasons for removal of her
governments. Her judgement of people is manifest in her selecting Asif Ali Zardari as

her husband. Before marriage Asif Zardari was involved in petty financial crimes to
make a living. His major breakthrough in such crimes came from the incident in
which his group got explosive tied to leg of an expatriate, one Mr Bukhari, took him
to the bank and got the money which that man wanted to invest in Pakistan. Benazir
and Zardari duo put Pakistan into deep crises through their deals for getting hefty
kickbacks at the cost of countrys interests. Changing the ratio of electricity
generation from cheap hydro power to expensive imported furnace oil through
Independent Power project (IPP) deals, extracting huge amounts as kickbacks was
one such action by the duo that has put Pakistan in deep economic crises.
General Pervez Musharraf
In 1999, General Musharraf removed the prime minister and took over government
declaring martial law. During his about eight years rule, the Americans occupied
Afghanistan. Musharraf provided them all the facilities they asked for like air bases,
air corridors and logistic support through the country using road network from
Karachi port to Afghanistan.
Earlier in 1999 as Army Chief he had launched Kargil operation without consulting
even the Corps Commanders. This operation helped the Indians to overcome
internal discord enabling them to form stable government which they were unable to
do since 1996 even after repeated elections. The results of this operation in Pakistan
were disastrous as the civilian government was replaced by Musharrafs dictatorial
rule. Kargil strengthened India and eroded Pakistans image as a stable nuclear
state weakening its position in the world as subsequent events unfolded.
It may not be mere coincidence that before momentous events of the Iranian
Revolution and Russian occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 General Zia ul Haq had
been placed in position. Similarly before the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2011,
General Musharraf had taken over the country removing the civilian government.
Placing their men in control of Pakistan before predictable changes, the US indulged
in playing its game in this region. Zia, with religious pretensions was selected to
confront the Godless Russians and later on Musharraf a liberal engaged to facilitate
US in dismantling Mujahideen networks after removing religious Taliban
government in Kabul.

After Musharraf
After Musharraf, the team of rulers led by Mr. Asif Ali Zardari came to power through
a formula worked out by the US in consultation with UK and some Arab rulers. The
appointments were finalized at and announced from the US embassy in Islamabad.
The best qualifications of the new rulers were their being convicted on crimes of
financial misappropriation and dishonest practices. Mr Zardari had been convicted by
a Swiss Court for financial crime and Yousuf Raza Gilani had spent a few years in

jail after conviction on charges of enrolling people in government service against

rules. Our political class endorsed these appointments unanimously, putting the best
amongst them at the top positions.
In their five years term completed in 2013, Zardari group has robbed the country of
prosperity and the common citizen of whatever comfort one enjoyed earlier. There
are severe shortages of electricity and gas resulting in closing of industries. The rail
network has almost stopped functioning, the national airline near collapse and other
state enterprises under heavy debts and defaults. The rulers have plundered the
country unabashedly accumulating and increasing their assets in foreign countries. It
is the culture of Peoples Party as evidenced during their two earlier short tenures led
by late Benazir Bhutto to make quick buck, get booted out and exploit that sentiment
of their being victims who could not deliver because of being removed before
completing their terms. This government has done its best to get forced out of power
so that they can again go to the public as victims but the forces that brought this
team into power needed them to continue their rule, putting the country in oxygen
tent, at the mercy of international financial institutions.
At the Brink
Continuous rule by corrupt rulers have brought our resource rich country to a state
where bulk of its population is living below poverty line. The country has been almost
paralysed due to extreme shortage of electricity created due to policies adopted
during last so many years. Planning a wrong energy mix by Benazir Bhuttos
government put our country on wrong path in meeting its energy needs. Her
government signed fourteen agreements in one go during her second tenure for
installation of independent power projects (IPPs) based on imported furnace oil and
natural gas. The terms of these agreements were most detrimental to Pakistans
interests. Whereas one unit of electricity was being produced by our Water and
Power Development Authority (WAPDA) from hydal sources at the rate of less than
one rupee, the agreements with private companies were made at the rates going up
to fifteen rupees per unit. Other terms like even if the project did not produce
electricity, government was to make payments for a certain generation capacity of
the plant. Developing hydal power which has great potential in providing cheap
electricity was completely ignored politicizing projects like Kalabagh Dam. Similarly
utilising indigenous coal resources to produce energy was also completely
disregarded. Domestic oil and gas exploration was stalled, some areas in
Balochistan made unsafe for working of exploration companies. Substantial
quantities of natural gas available in the existing fields were also not added into the
system. All this was in the interest of international oil cartels and the governments
new plans for making agreements like the infamous Rental Power Projects and other
such ventures, the deals which provided hefty commissions easily stashed away in
foreign banks.

Signing of gas pipeline agreement with Iran in the last days of Zardari government is
at much higher rates. India opted out of the project mainly because of higher price of
gas being demanded. Unless these rates are reduced our future domestic production
of gas will also not balance the gas rates. It seems a repeat of the IPPs agreements
signed by Peoples Party governments which they made some decades earlier.
Lack of power and the cost of available energy have severely reduced industrial
production making it uncompetitive in the international markets because of increased
cost of production, forcing most of the industries to close down resulting in large
scale unemployment. Another related policy to benefit global oil and banking cartels
is import and use of private vehicles instead of improving public transport. This has
resulted in large scale oil imports demanding large amounts of foreign exchange.
Here the international financing institutes have come into play, International
Monetary Fund (IMF) dictating financial policies.
Enormous amounts of loans were taken from international financial institutions
during these five years, roughly equal to accumulated amount taken during previous
fifty years. There is nothing on ground to show where these huge funds have been
spent. The country is spending almost half of its earnings in paying interest to these
institutions.
Global Capitalists interference and bankruptcy of our political class manifested in
throwing up two convicted persons to rule our country as stated earlier; one
convicted by Swiss courts for money laundering and the other spending five years in
jail for his illegal acts as Speaker National Assembly in previous government.

The Present Set Up

A family actively involved in mega businesses working with international partners
and also ruling a country is lethal combination against resources of that country and
its people. As result of general elections held in May 2013, Mr Mian Muhammad
Nawaz Sharif has formed government at the Centre replacing Papkistan Peoples
Party and its Allies Government. Sharif family is actively involved in business in
Pakistan as well in other countries. Thier arrangement to run the government is also
on the pattern of dynastic rule. No country in todays world claiming some kind of
democratic credentials will be ruled by a man as head of the national government,
his brother as head of a province large enough to contain more than half of the
countrys population, a daughters father- in- law as finance minister. To top all this
other important portfolios have been given to a particular clan from Lahore and
surroundings. Even the dictators in Pakistan could not match such arrangement.
About Nawaz Sharif, my observations although from short encounters in late eighties
remain unchanged, rather get reinforced due to his conduct during later years. On 6
Sep 1985, when he had taken over as Chief Minister of Punjab few months back, he

was to lay floral wreath at the monument of Major Aziz Bhatti, Shaheed, Nishan- eHaider at BRB Canal east of Lahore. I was to host him on that short military function.
Before his arrival, a car load of his cronies arrived. From their conversation in
exchanging notes I could make out that each of them had made a few crores rupees
in some deals in those few months of their being close to the new Chief Minister.
(Crore rupees was a very big amount in those days). Nawaz Sharif arrived and was
straightaway conducted to lay wreath, a short ceremony, over in about fifteen
minutes time. Those cronies got closer to him when he was leaving. He was barely
audible while talking to them, giving impression of an insecure person, unsure about
himself and his position. On another occasion he was brought along to Lahore
Garrison Golf Club by the President, General M Zia ul Haq who took him around the
course trying to teach him golf. My unit, 27 Punjab was responsible to develop the
newly laid golf course, and I, as Secretary of the Club was told by my seniors to
follow the two at a reasonable distance. I was amazed at the patience of General Zia
ul Haq who made Nawaz Sharif hit the balls a number of times from one spot before
moving forward to take next shot. I could not make out what was real purpose of
undertaking such seemingly useless exercise by the President. Being in the
profession of dealing with men, my observation was that Nawaz Sharif was a dumb,
meek person, easy to exploit, although I would stay short of a Punjabi word used by
General Musharraf for him.
Jokes invented, although not true, reflect the bent of mind of target persons. In the
backdrop of reports of getting huge kickbacks and commissions in mega projects, a
famous joke invented goes as follows. On inaguartion ceremony of a major road
completed with lot of fanfare, a sycophant suggested that the chief guest performing
opening ceremony should be given the title of Sher Shah Suri, the Second. Curious,
the chief guest asked asked, Who was Sher Sha Suri? When he was told that Sher
Shah Suri was a King of India who laid the Grand Trunk Road covering his Kingdom
from Peshawar to Bengal spanning thousands of kilometres; spontaneous remarks
attributed to the chief guest were that Sher Shah Suri must have made lot of
money.
Nawaz Sharif was picked up by a person of intelligence community, Lieutenant
General Ghulam Gilani Khan who had been heading the Inter Services Intelligence
Agency (ISI) during Z A Bhuttos period. As Governor of Punjab, Lieutenant General
Ghulam Gilani asked Mian Muhammad Sharif, a business man from Lahore to get
his family into political field. Mian Sharif (Abba Ji) spared Nawaz Sharif to be
inducted into politics being of no use to him in running his business. Later his brother
Shabaz Sharif joined him to use political positions in expanding their businesses by
robbing banks and state resources. They have become enormously rich with
properties and businesses in UK, Saudi Arabia and linkages with Indian tycoons like
Ambanis. On Mr. Nawaz Sharif becoming prime minister of Pakistan, someone
asked Mian Sharif to cap their business activities. Mian Sharif reportedly told the

interlocutor that the time of doing business had come now (In Punjabi he said
business da vela te hun aaya).
Mr Shabaz Sharif is projected as man of action doing great service to the people of
Paunjab. It is a big farce. A close look at his actions reveals that in initial years of his
becoming Chief Minister, his elder brother being the Prime Minister, Shahbaz did
bring improvement in functioning of the provincial government. That was made
possible by his harsh attitude towards the government servants, insulting them in
public and threatening them of punishments. But that approach, good enough to run
a small private factory cannot be applied to State apparatus for long. Leaders are
supposed to inspire people, not scare them to demand work. He has lost his charm
long time back specially when he put his sons into business of robbing the poor
people. Before getting into poultry business, prices of chicken were around fifty to
sixty rupees per kilogram which suddenly jumped to one hundred and fifty rupees
per kilogram when Hamaza Shahbaz came into business with his controlled sheds.
His other sons ventures have increased prices of milk in the market. This is apart
from what they are doing at mega ventures in collaboration with international players.
The law and order situation and Punjab governments writ can be easily judged from
the fact that the day Benazir was murdered in Rawalpindi on 27 October 2007; about
five persons moving with Nawaz Sharifs convoy were killed on Islamabad Highway
where a posse of Kalashnikov carrying criminals are stationed at Khokhar Hotel right
in Rawalpindi suburbs. Nothing happened to Khokhars. Emboldened to gross limits,
one of this land grabbing mafia boss killed a woman in presence of police provided
for her protection on a small piece of her land under litigation. Still nothing moved till
recently when Chaudghry Nisar Ali as Minister of Interior has intervened to settle
score with Malik Riaz of Bahria Town who in cahoots with Khokhars in land grabbing
ventures. People of Punjab are at the mercy of criminals and mafia bosses after
Shahbaz Sharifs long rule over the province. The governance systems have been
effectively converted to serve personal whims of rulers and mafia bosses, not
working to serve the ordinary citizen.
No country in todays world claiming some kind of democratic credentials will be
ruled by a man as head of the national government, his brother as head of a
province large enough to contain more than half of the countrys population, a
daughters father- in- law as finance minister. To top all this other important portfolios
have been given to a particular clan from Lahore and surroundings. Even the
dictators in Pakistan could not match such arrangement.
Imran Khan A New Hope
Another person who has emerged on the political scene during the general elections
held in May 2013 is Mr. Imran Khan. After remaining in political wilderness for about
sixteen years, his party Tehrik-e-Insaf suddenly got a very enthusiastic response
from the public. On the day of polls, people old and young who had never bothered

to votes earlier got out of their homes early in the morning to polling stations.
Maximum votes by these new voters particularly in the cities were cast for Imran
Khans party who claimed to bring about fundamental changes in the system of
governance, provision of justice and involving people to make decisions by
empowering the local governments. The party has formed government in the
province of Kyber Pakhtun Khaw (KPK) and enough seats in the National Assembly
to act as effective opposition.
Imran Khan failed to realise the reasons for sudden surge in his political fortunes
which became evident when his political meeting in Lahore held on 30 Oct 2011 got
unpredented response. Even a naive person could see that the conditions of general
public had been made so miserable by five years misrule of Zardari group at the
center and Sharif brothers in Punjab that people were highly scared of their retaining
power if they did not get out to vote. Zardaris Party was raising fearful slogans like
Next turn, again Zardari (Translated in Urdu it is much more frightening AGLI
BARI, PHIR ZARDARI). It was fear of Zardaris Party and not merely love for Imran
Khan that his Party got so many votes.
However serious deficiencies have come to light in the capacity of political decision
making by Imran Khan. So far he has proved to be a man of limited understanding of
political animals who ill advised him on basic issues and he succumbed to their
advice. He faltered in showing faith in strength of his programme for change which
could draw votes. Instead he went for electables.
Yet he is a man on the countrys political scene who has the potential to lead our
nation back to path of progress and stability if he understands his limitations and can
correct himself quickly from his recent mistakes. His success would lie in taking bold
decisions on some fundamental changes in the state structure like question of
provinces, integrating tribal areas into mainstream, reforms in judicial system and
delegating power, resources and responsibilities to the local governments. Imran
Khan should exploit his strength in giving vision and motivating people, leaving
implementation to a dedicated team instead of getting into minor details of day to day
working and verbal duals with people and institutions.
In his insistence on dialogue with the terrorists, he fails to realise that the terrorists
are mercenaries killing for money supplied by powers controlling them. There is a
need of dialogue with those powers that are playing this game of putting pressure on
Pakistan to succumb to their dictates and possible fragmentation of Pakistan if their
demands are not met. Here again Imran Khan is the man who can get better deal for
Pakistan because of his lack of inhibitions in dealing with western elite. He has lived
a good part of life in them and will not be overawed in their presence; like our other
politicians who remain deferential, if not scared from the white skinned bullies
dealing with our government.

Pakistan is in a very strong geographical position to benefit from the emerging global
and regional situation. With its present boundaries, the country can facilitates
movement in all directions between Eurasian land mass, the Indian Sub Continent,
Middle East and emerging markets of the African continent. If Pakistan Government
formulates and pursues a policy of providing energy and trade corridors through its
territory, the country will get ready support from the interested powers to stabilize
and overcome unrest. Reported plans to create international strategic corridor
through Baloch inhabited areas of Balochistan would leaving India out of the loop of
rail and road links. Any effort to further dismember Pakistan will thus obstruct inter
region movement creating conflicts and impediments in conducting global
businesses which the interested powers would want to avert.
Such are the issues where Imran Khan should concentrate on negotiations, the
results of which can give Pakistan a stable government, free to implement internal
reforms and availability of resources to improve the lot of common citizen.
Except for Jamaat-e-Islami which has small following spread all over the country,
rest all are regional parties and groups who can make their contribution at the
provincial and local government level.
Dr Tahir ul Qadri
Dr Tahir ul Qadri, a religious scholar based in Canada has also given a strong call
for change. So far he forms a pressure group. If the two leaders can work together
on an agreed agenda, it will be possible to bring about desired change to meet
peoples aspirations and needs.

11 Sep 2001 and its Aftermath

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the world saw an awfully bizarre scene on
their TV screens. Two commercial airliners were shown colliding with the upper
portion of two tall building in Manhattan, New York and the buildings falling down; the
whole process being covered by cameras. Witnessing the pattern of collapse, it
seemed to be a clear case of controlled demolition of those buildings. Another less
tall building adjacent to the two towers also collapsed after few hours without any
external force being applied which is clear indication that these building had been
prepared for controlled demolition by placing explosives at appropriate points. There
was news of four large passenger aircrafts having been being hijacked and used for
attacks on these buildings known as Twin Towers and other two for attack/collision
with Pentagon and the White House. The Pentagon building was shown being
attacked. The attacks were blamed to have been carried out by hitherto unknown
organization Al Qaida led by Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Arab living in
Afghanistan. There were number of questions on the version being given by the
Bush Administration and it looked like inside job making an excuse to go for control
of energy resources of the Central Asia and Middle East as it transpired later.
This incident commonly known as 9/11 resulted in US occupation of Afghanistan
followed by her occupation of Iraq. The set of rulers in the US at that time were led
by Mr. George Bush as president and Dick Cheney as vice president. They were
working for the interests of Wall Street establishment, keen to have control of energy
resources of the Middle East and particularly Central Asian region which had
recently come out of the Russian control. Earlier the elder Bush, father of the George
Bush in his four year term as US President had brought US forces in Middle East
initiating the Gulf War. To initiate this war, services of Iraqi president, Mr. Saddam
Husain were used. This man had earlier been used against Iran when he ordered
Iraqi forces to invade Iran starting a prolonged war between the two countries
causing large number of deaths on both sides. The Iranians ultimately threw out the
Iraqis from their territories at great cost. The purpose of checking possible spread of
influence of the Iranian revolution was successfully achieved. Mr. Saddam was now
instigated to invade Kuwait. His action provided the US then ruled by elder Bush to
bring in US forces to occupy Arabian Peninsula. Mr. Bush could not win his second
term in office. After a gap of eight years of Bill Clintons presidency, George W Bush
became president of the US resuming the programme which his father had left
unfinished.

Af-Pak Theatre
After 9/11, the US occupation of Afghanistan supported by contingents from the
NATO forces caused tremendous hardships for Pakistan. General Musharraf, who
had usurped power by removing Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif, easily gave in to
US demands. The US got all the support in using Pakistans territory, its roads, air
bases and air corridors for their occupation of land locked Afghanistan. Pakistan has
so far suffered about forty thousand civilian persons killed in bomb blasts and over
five thousands soldiers killed during the operations against the terrorists operating
from their bases in tribal areas and Afghanistan. The operations are still continuing
(2013). These terrorist have been organized and are being funded and assisted by
the Indians who established their consulates in Afghanistan near our borders for this
purpose. At one stage these people established parallel government in vast areas of
Malakand region with threats to reach Islamabad. The Pakistan Army dislodged
them from the vast mountainous areas in 2009 in a swift operation carried out with
great skill, audacity and sacrifices to remove the threat. This feat, which no Army of
the present day world can match and must have surprised our enemies, overturned
the whole game the US was playing with Pakistan. Their aim to take out our nuclear
assets on the pretext of Islamabad going into the hands of Taliban was effectively
checked. The US was reported to have kept their force ready in the Gulf area to act
in such eventuality when Pakistani Taliban posed threat to take over Islamabad. It is
presumably for this purpose, denuclearization of Pakistan, that the Pakistani Taliban
are being supported from the US occupied Afghanistan.
Although no one from Pakistan was accused of involvement in the 9/11 incident,
Pakistan came under attack by the US using drones and organisations like Tehrik - e
- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) supported from US occupied Afghanistan. Using the
derogatory term Af-Pak, Pakistan was bracketed with Afghanistan as a theatre of
war. Pakistan had earlier supported the US against USSR occupation of Afghanistan
suffering considerable losses in the process. The general public in Pakistan did not
nurture any anti US feelings till Pakistan came under attack from the US drones and
terrorist organisations mushrooming after the US occupied Afghanistan.
Mission Achieved
US military intervention in our region starting with Iraqs invasion of Kuwait and
resulting chain of events was based on deceit and unabashed lies. The propagated
cause of this intervention had no relevance to actual agenda i.e. twin goals of
controlling energy resources of Iraq and Central Asia as well as eliminating possible
threats to the State of Israel. After decades of bloody conflict US has achieved
success to a large extent. The Iraqi Army, first strengthened by US to contain spread
of influence of revolutionary Iran in early eighties, which could pose threat to Israel,
has been completely destroyed. Iraq has been destabilised to an extent that there
are more chances of its fragmentation than recovery towards a normal functional
state. The other States of the region already having made peace with the State of

Israel, possible threats to Israel have been effectively eliminated. Long term
contracts on extremely favourable conditions have been secured to exploit the vast
oil resources of Iraq creating a monopoly to exclude other competitors.
By occupying Afghanistan, the vast energy resources in Central Asian states have
been blocked for exploitation by creating anarchy in Afghanistan. At the moment it is
a partial success. Efforts to denuclearise Pakistan have failed so far but the country
has been put into serious economic and internal security problems.
After the 9/11 incident when the Americans occupied Afghanistan, Lieurenat General
Hamid Gul, ex ISI boss gave a statement that,
"9/11 is an excuse, Afghanistan is staging point and Pakistan is the target".
In Urdu language it reads like,
"9/11 bahana hai, Afghanistan thikana hai our Pakistan nishana hai'
After over a decade this has proved to be the case. The only impediment in US
designs is the tenacity and resilience of the Pakistan Army in dealing with the forces
unleashed against Pakistan from the US occupied Afghanistan. The Tehrik e Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) a motley group of criminals is being supported by the CIA, assisted
by the Indians encamped in Afghanistan. In Baluchistan another set of organisations
with their bases in Afghanistan are active in their terrorist activities. A consistent
effort is being made to malign our intelligence agencies, Army and other law
enforcing agencies like the Frontier Corps in Baluchistan to demonise them and
downgrade their effectiveness.

Taliban

The oft repeated claim by various quarters that Pakistan through its intelligence
agency, the ISI, created a new force in Afghanistan called Taliban who established
government in Afghanistan is simply not true. When Mullah Omar removed check
posts established by the petty warlords in suburbs of Qandahar, the intelligence
people in Pakistan had no knowledge of who was Mullah Omar and what was
happening. It was after some time that the cause of uprising against the criminal
warlords came to light. I now cannot recollect the name of the gang leader in
Qandahar (they were so many) who was openly parading boys he was keeping to
cater for his despicable unnatural carnal desire. One day Mullah Omar, prayer leader
in a small mosque was approached by a man lamenting that his two daughters had
been picked up by a warlord. Mullah Omar accompanied by the girls father went to
the ruffians place, admonished his guards and persuaded them to rescue the girls.
With the help of those guards Mullah removed check post on the road where they
were collecting money from those passing by. That is how the movement of Taliban
started. As the people were in great distress at the hands of warlords, they joined
Mullah Omar as he started to clear the check posts around Qandahar first and then
gradually moved on till he wrested control of Kabul.
Mullah Omar was not a Talib, which means a student in religious seminary, but a
veteran of resistance against the Russian occupation of his country in earlier
decades. Those who joined him were also no more Talibs or Taliban, plural of Talib,
a term used for students of religious seminaries. These people had long past the
stage of getting religious education which they would have completed as children
and young boys. The term Taliban is being wrongly used for mainly the ethnic
majority Pushtuns in Afghanistan, who are resisting occupation of their country by
US and NATO forces.
'Tourist' or terrorist
The understanding by Mullah Omar of the world around him can be judged from an
interesting quote by General Zia ud Din during his TV interview on a private
Pakistani channel. According to the General when he, as head of Pakistani
Intelligence Agency met Mullah Omar on the eve of impending US invasion of
Afghanistan, Mullah Omar told him that the western media was calling him Tourist.
The General then clarified that they were calling him Terrorist which was very
dangerous and derogatory.
Mullah Omars government which came to be known as The Taliban Government
was recognised by only three countries i.e. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE.
Pakistan had done so; rather it could not have done otherwise, because of its long

and porous border with Afghanistan. Pakistan had recognised every government in
Kabul, starting with that of King Zahir Shah, precisely for this reason because the
country could not afford tension on its western front when its long eastern border
with India was not secure. Afghanistan under Zahir Shah was the only country which
opposed Pakistans entry into the United Nation Organisation. Pakistan however
remained focused to maintain workable relations with Kabul.
Taliban Government brought a semblance of order eliminating infighting among
numerous warlords, effective drug control and end of crime through harsh and
deterrent punishments. They were being cultivated by the Americans to allow oil and
gas pipelines giving contracts to a group of companies led by UNOCAL. For this the
US authorities hosted some Taliban leaders in Washington but the deal could not get
through due to intransigent attitude of the Afghan leaders. Apprehending failure to
exploit energy resources due to Taliban government in Kabul, alternative plans to
remove them were initiated which resulted in US occupation of Afghanistan. It was
failure of Taliban leaders to understand the implications of denying capitalist
interests which caused turmoil in our region resulting in widespread destruction. Had
they accommodated the demands of western oil cartels, we could have been saved
of our present travails. But Taliban leaders were men with very limited abilities who
lacked understanding of the consequences of their intransigence.
Pakistans influence over Taliban Government was very limited, if any at all. Some
people like one notorious Riaz Basra and his group committed crimes and murders
in Pakistan and fled to Afghanistan. Taliban government did not apprehend them to
hand over to Pakistan. After 9/11 Pakistan did try to persuade Taliban leaders to
agree with US demands but they were adamant and uncompromising on their stand.
A participant of one such meeting narrated that when pressed to see the
consequences of such defiance, Mullah Omar told that for Afghans, half loaf of bread
(which they were eating at the time) was enough to survive and if there was any
problem for Pakistan they could do nothing about it.
Taliban Government despite many objections to their way of functioning by the
western world brought peaceful conditions, eliminating crime in the area under their
control. They effectively stopped cultivation of poppy, a feat never achieved by any
other government in Afghanistan. Their resistance to hand over Osama Bin Laden
to US without proof of his involvement in 9/11 tragedy, gave the US excuse to
occupy Afghanistan; replacing Taliban government with that of Northern Alliance, a
group of non Pashtun tribes mainly living in northern parts of the country.
After over a decade of occupation causing great miseries to the people of the region
including Pakistan, the US has succeeded in effectively blocking exploitation of
energy resources by rivals. After their proclaimed drawdown by mid 2014, the
country is likely to fall back to the state of infighting of 1980as it did after withdrawal
of the Soviet forces from the country.

The Regional Context

Reviewing our journey since Independence in 1947, one gets amazed as to how our
early rulers formed alliances with the west against the Soviet Union and China. A
cursory look at the map would suggest otherwise. Whether it was the established
personal contacts with the British, the ease in communicating with the the British and
Americans in English, this policy resulted in breakup of Pakistan even before the
country had completed its first twenty five years of existence. Ignoring regional
realties and shying away from the communists, we harboured Masonic Lodges,
preferring to be enslaved by the rapacious practitioners of western capitalism.
Pakistan despite its abundant resources and enviable geographical position remains
at the mercy of World Bank, IMF etc. Pakistani rulers have acted as pawns in the
hands of Wall Street establishment through their agents, the American
administration. Our finances are controlled by their nominees and employees.
Our geographical location, which gives us a unique opportunity to act as trade and
energy corridor between the vast expanses of the Eurasian land mass, most
populous regions on earth i.e. India and China, the oil rich gulf region and the
emerging markets of the African continent, have not been exploited.
Russia, spreading over vast expanses of Eurasia, needs all weather warm water
ports in the open seas. Her earlier efforts to reach the Arabian Sea by applying force
failed. While the Czarist Russia got exhausted north of Aamu Darya, its successor,
the Soviet Union, after lapse of considerable years invaded Afghanistan but had
to retreat with disastrous consequences. With this experience of application of force
having failed, it is time to forge relationships on the basis of mutual benefits which
are there for everyone in the region.
Today's Russia, asserting her influence in the region can take the lead in carving out
a corridor of trade and commerce through the Central Asian states, Afghanistan and
Pakistan to reach the resource rich South Asia and emerging markets of the African
continent. China and Pakistan are already working to develop a trade corridor
between Western China and Pakistans coast on Arabian Sea.
The differences and conflicts between the countries of the region will get resolved if
an effective mechanism of drawing mutual benefits through trade and commerce can
be put in place. Basically US presence in the region is also to eliminate resistence in
creating trade and energy corridors and its interests can be catered to. As we can
recollect, had the Taliban government in Kabul agreed to the terms of UNOCAL,
representing global energy cartel, US physical occupation of the country could have
been avoided. Taliban representatives invited and lavishly entertained in the US
failed to understand impact of their refusal inviting war to soften up Afghanistan for
implementing plans without opposition.

Time to reap rewards

Pakistan played major role in creating New World Order. The global powers
manipulating world events first arrested Pakistans unprecedented progress in early
years by getting the country into war with India, using their most effective operative,
Mr Z A Bhutto. While this conflict helped India to mange internal dissentions and
unrest, Pakistan got dismembered.
Strategically located New Pakistan was then used to dismantle USSR and the
alternative system of economy. While General Zia was installed to facilitate Global
Capitalist interests in dismantling Soviet Empire, General Musharraf was brought in
to consolidate those gains by occupying Afghanistan and the Middle East. War, the
mother of all big businesses was unleashed in the region for material gains. Example
of just one item, OIL prices before the war and later will suffice to explain the point.
Who has made colossal gains from war and turmoil in the region?
The managers of global capitalist system owning banks, oil companies, armament
industries and all big businesses in the world have used US power to their purpose
for over a hundred years having effective control over the US policies and decisions.
With expanding influence all over the world, they will be no more dependent
exclusively on the US power in coming times. Till recent times the Capitalist system
had limited access to a good part of the world aligned with Communist/Socialist
system of economy. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact countries, China and India were out
of the Capitalists hold. This has changed with the demise of Soviet Union, China
opening up to corporate influences and India converting from Socialist to Capitalist
mode.
Pakistans role in facilitating contacts between US and China during General Yahyas
brief rule and then joining to fight war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan, was
pivotal in enabling Capitalists global control to create the 'New World Order'. Having
expanded their operations into China, India and Russia, the Wall Street
Establishment is now in a position to influence policies in China and India, the most
populous countries of the world and Russia the dominant power on Eurasian scene.
For their operations, energy and trade corridors will be needed between Russia,
Central Asia, China, Indian Sub Continent and emerging markets of the African
Continent.
Pakistan with its present boundaries facilitates movement in all directions. If Pakistan
Government formulates and pursues a policy of providing energy and trade corridors
through its territory, the country will get ready support from the interested powers to
stabilize and overcome unrest. Reported plans to create international strategic
corridor through Baloch inhabited areas of Balochistan would be one dimensional
venture leaving Indian Sub Continent out of the loop of rail and road links. Any effort
to further dismember Pakistan will obstruct inter region movement creating conflicts

and impediments in conducting global businesses which the interested powers would
want to avert.
Pakistan is in a very strong position to benefit from emerging global and regional
situation by facilitating inter region and global trade. Vital economic interests of the
global and regional powers will help in resolving conflicts between countries of our
region like Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India to facilitate smooth
operations of trade routes and protection of energy pipelines from Central Asia to
India.

The Fallacey of Armys Rule

Pakistan Army remains under criticism for its role in assuming power in Pakistan, not
allowing political governments to function, disrupting political process. The term
Armys Rule is, however grossly misleading as it does not reflect true disposition of
the governance system when Army Chiefs assume power and their inspiration to do
so. Their decisions to remove civilian governments are personal, incited, goaded and
facilitated by politicians and welcomed by general public at the times when these
decisions have been taken during the past. Role of Army as institution in governance
of the country under Army generals who assumed power at different times in the
country was very limited at the initial stages of these take overs; a small force used
to occupy a few buildings in the capital. The Generals soon consolidated their
position; getting overwhelmingly positive response from public, politicians,
bureaucracy and the judiciary.
A general impression among the public which has considerable weight is that our
rulers, civilians or military are appointed by the US to facilitate implementation of
their policies in the region. The examples of picking up a quasi fundamentalist
General Zia ul Haq to confront Godless Russians and later liberal General
Musharraf to dismantle Jihadist network formed to fight against the Russians
illustrates the point. The latest example is that of 2008 elections, when name of Mr.
Yusuf Raza Gilani was finalised during meetings at the US Embassy in Islamabad,
ignoring much expected Mr. Amin Fahim then heading Pakistan Peoples Party. So it
would be more appropriate to say that civilians or military, our rulers are appointed
by the US, rather the Global Capitalists Establishment.
Briefly reviewing the past, when President Ayub Khan took over control of the
Government of Pakistan, the country was already under martial law imposed by Mr
Iskandar Mirza, the President of Pakistan; soon removed because of his continuing
intrigues. Ayub Khan ruled for over ten years, putting off his uniform after two years
of assuming power and ruled as a civilian Head of State for rest of the period. Except
for a few senior officers inducted in his government, the Army had nothing to do with
governance of the country. A new constitution was adopted replacing parliamentary
system with the presidential system. While the national and provincial parliaments
played their role of essential law making, the central and provincial bureaucracy
played pivotal role in administration, the task which they performed effectively.
If a test of good governance is the level of comfort and ease in lives of common
people, Ayub Khans era was the best period for people of Pakistan. His Himalayan
blunder of drifting into war with India due to machinations of his foreign minister
adversely affected his personal health and control over affairs of the State. During
his last months in office he was virtually a prisoner, isolated and made ineffective by
General Yahya Khan who took over the Government in 1969.

General Yahya, in his two tumultuous years organised general elections which
resulted in breakup of the country when politicians refused to accept election results.
After breakup of the country in December 1971, Z A Bhutto assumed power as
Civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator in his New Pakistan. In about seven years of
his rule he had created conditions where the Armys one star generals came to a
stage of refusing to obey orders given by Army High Command. In Lahore three
Brigadiers refused to use troops under their command in dealing with agitation
triggered by rigging in elections. Bhutto, after getting the country dismembered, went
after everything good the country had achieved till then. He nationalised the thriving
industries putting government officials to run industries with obvious results. He
severely eroded the prestige and efficiency of civil services by inducting his party
workers in the services. He created a new internal security force, the Federal
Security Force (FSF) putting people of questionable credentials in forming this force
used to harass his opponents.
In the Armed forces he upgraded posts of Naval and Air Force Chiefs to four star
ranks equal to that of the Army, ignoring the fact that ranks in the armed forces are
based on the force they command. The Navy, with about twenty thousand personnel
was rightly being commanded by a two star Admiral and the Air Force with about
forty thousand strength commanded by a three star Air Marshal. The Army
comprising about three hundred thousand persons then was commanded by a four
star General. A new post, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was created
along with its headquarters, the post required to be rotated between the three
services in turn. This was basically to downgrade importance of Army Chiefs
position. It is to the credit of services chiefs during all these years that the armed
forces are working in harmony despite efforts to cause dissentions in creating an
unnecessary organisational structure.
After about seven years stint of Mr. Z A Bhutto, General Zia ul Haq assumed power
in Pakistan. In hindsight it becomes evident that Zia ul Haq was brought in by global
capitalist interests to confront the Russians in Afghanistan and block expansion of
Iranian revolution, both events happening in 1979, about one and half year after the
man chosen to deal with the outfall was put in place. Pakistan provided critical
support to Afghans in their fight against Russian occupation of their country. As a
result Pakistan had to face multiple threats, series of devastative explosions resulting
in large scale deaths and destruction. Pakistan had also to support a very large
number of Afghan refugees, at one time estimated to be over five millions,
aggravating the countrys economic, law and order, drugs and illegal weapons
problems which have become endemic, defying control even after passage of over
three decades. Zia initiated financial malpractices. Like bribing legislators by placing
large funds at their disposal in the name of development projects which was not their
job, he placed unaccountable funds at the disposal of senior Generals of the Army,
smearing clean and honest working within Army. Generals like scholarly E H Dar and
some others quietly left prematurely finding the change stifling.

After Zia was eliminated, a decade of civilian rule saw two political parties led by
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif taking turns in short stints. Political leadership
proved unequal to the daunting tasks faced by the country. Both leaders did not
display maturity in their conduct demanded by their exalted position, nor were they
correctly advised from within their parties which did not develop into institutions.
Their musical chairs ended when General Musharraf assumed power in 1999 by
removing Nawaz Sharifs government.
General Musharraf ruled for about nine years, getting support of a group of
politicians who were previously allied with Nawaz Sharif. As the events unfolded
soon after his taking over, he like Zia ul Haq, was also chosen by the global powers
to support them in their plans to control energy resources of the region by occupying
Afghanistan. As Army Chief, he did immense damage to interests of Pakistan,
helping India by launching Kargil misadventure. India which could not form a
government despite repeated elections after 1996 got their political system stabilised
after Kargil. The timings of Indian general elections during these years reveal real
cause of Musharrafs action. Elections were held in AprMay 1996 but as the
coalition government formed could not stay in power due to dissentions, the process
had to be repeated in Feb- March 1998. The government formed after these
elections also became unstable. India again went into countrywide electoral process
in Sep-Oct 1999, just after Kargil war (MayJul 1999) which stabilised the new
government to complete five years. Organising general elections at such brief
intervals in a country like India, a sub continent rather than a country, with population
of more than one billion is not a normal happening. India was faced with a very grave
situation of instability and possible fragmentation into different parts with simmering
discontent since independence. External threat posed by Pakistan was fully
exploited by the Indians, generating unprecedented media hype to overcome internal
discord.
After the 9/11 drama created as an excuse for the US to occupy Afghanistan,
Musharraf placed all the resources and facilities required by global powers at their
disposal. Pakistan Army was deployed on the western borders fighting against
terrorist groups created and supported from Afghanistan. India established their
support bases in the form of consulates near our borders with Afghanistan to help
these terrorists. The fight still continues causing Pakistan immense losses in men
and material, has destroyed our economy and caused incalculable damage to
interests of Pakistan. Security installations throughout the country remain targets,
attacked many times with considerable damage. Federaly Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), Balochistan and Karachi are particularly affected, remaining parts of the
country also having lost peaceful living conditions for the citizen. Pakistan lost its
prestige during Musharrafs rule despite being a nuclear power.
The role of Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf in working for global powers interest
becomes easier to understand by reading Lieutenant General (retired) Shahid Azizs
book published in 2012. While doing courses in the US he narrates US Defence

department persons asking him to work for them with the incentive that his interest
will be looked after as being done for selected officers of friendly countries. He also
mentions an officer from Peru doing course with him trying to persuade him to meet
a senior person of Free Masons with similar, rather better incentives. It is obvious
that Shahid Aziz was not the only person offered with the choice. It was a normal
practice by US operatives to work on promising people in all spheres of our decision
making bodies to serve their interests.
Armys Response to Challenges
Having briefly gone over the role of Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf who ruled
Pakistan, not by any requirement or demand from within the Army they were
commanding, let us recount challenges faced by Army and its performance during
the past.
Kashmir, 1947-8
Pakistan Army was in the process of its formation when it was required to support
Kashmiri freedom fighters. Some volunteers from tribal areas joined the fight forming
groups called Lashkars using Jhelum valley route to Kashmir. They stopped short
of Srinagar and lacking required discipline, indulged in looting and other crimes
against the people of Kashmir. Some such Lashkars comprising people mainly from
Soon - Sakesar Valley area were stopped at Sialkot by the local civil administration,
not allowing them to cross over towards Jammu where Kashmiri Muslims got killed in
large numbers at the hands of Dogra forces. Had this force reached Jammu and
severed Kashmirs ground link with India, an entirely different situation would have
emerged in favour of the people of Kashmir.
The British General in command of Pakistan Army refused to send the Army into
Kashmir when ordered by Governor General to do so. At a later stage some Army
units went into action in Kashmir and performed their assigned tasks successfully.
Indo-Pakistan War, 1965
Pakistan Armed Forces are organised to defend territorial integrity of the country.
They are not constituted to undertake invasions of neighbouring countries, their role
basically defensive and not offensive. President Ayub Khan understood this fact very
clearly yet he drifted into war with much larger India by initiating armed conflict under
the circumstances described earlier in the narrative. It was Z A Bhutto, the then
Foreign Minister, who wanted to weaken Ayub Khans position and ultimately remove
him by involving Pakistan Army in fighting with much larger forces of India. Pakistan
Army despite being outnumbered displayed remarkable courage and fighting skills to
stop Indian offensive forces in capturing their objectives.

Indo-Pakistan War, 1971

The events of 1971 related to Armys operations in some parts of East Pakistan have
been described in detail in this narrative. It would help readers to understand true
nature of the tragedy. Results of 1970 general elections were not accepted by
Bhutto-Yahya duo and the resulting agitation in East Pakistan suppressed by using
Army. A force called Mukti Bahini organised by the Indians started their sabotage
activities by June 71 in border areas but their reach was limited. The general public
had not voted for breakup of Pakistan and did not support Indian sponsored terrorists
in establishing sanctuaries in the interior areas. The population of Bengal was not
involved in hostile acts against the Pakistan Army. Dismemberment of Pakistan was
work of rulers in West Pakistan who accelerated the process by declaring war on
India on 3 Dec 71 against specific advice from Chinese leadership as explained in
preceding chapters.
A small force, three under strength divisions totalling about thirty two thousand
troops, was abandoned in East Pakistan to be captured by the Indians. Preposterous
allegations were made against this force which performed heroic deeds at the
individual and unit level against Indians but ultimate result was according to the
plans of perpetrators of that horrendous crime.
Siachin 1984
In 1984 the Indians occupied Siachin glacier located in vast glaciated areas left
unmarked on the Line of Control in disputed territories of Kashmir, being inhabitable
by human beings. Pakistan Army was forced to respond to stop Indians descending
into inhabited areas of Baltistan. Operating on heights ranging from eighteen
thousand to twenty thousand feet above sea level has caused very large casualties
to troops because of frequent avalanches, falling into crevices, frost bite and other
disabilities related to living in abnormal climatic conditions. At the initial stage of
deployment of troops in emergency, lack of special clothing and equipment
increased our losses.
Occupation of glaciated areas is a great folly and crime against global environment,
cause of deep concern frequently voiced by environmentalists at global level. Indian
intransigence is impediment in reaching an agreement to vacate these heights by
both sides; a sad reflection on Indian decision making process where a high altitude
Indian tour operator was able to cause this human disaster as explained in the
narrative. Viewed from another angle, continued state of confrontation with Pakistan
posing external threat has helped India to retain its integrity as a country. Not
resolving disputes with Pakistan, therefore in Indias interest.
Kargil 1999
General Musharraf as Army Chief decided to occupy certain posts opposite Kargil in
disputed area of Kashmir which were vacated during winters by the Indians and

reoccupied during summers as a routine. From where Musharraf got this inspiration
to launch his private was is a matter of conjecture. There are claims and counter
claims as to the extent of this action being known to the government or otherwise.
However senior officers of the Army, the Corps Commanders who form decision
making body in formal meetings were kept in the dark, the plan known to a few
individuals only. The action evoked violent Indian response putting the two nuclear
armed countries at the brink of all out war. External threat helped India to stabilise
their political situation, forming stable coalition governments which they were finding
difficult to form despite repeated elections. Here it is suffice to say the Army troops
used during the operation displayed remarkable courage during fighting despite
being left without logistic support.
Operations in FATA, Swat, Malakand 2004 - 2013
US occupation of Afghanistan in 2001 pushed Al-Qaida linked fighters belonging to
some Central Asian and Arab countries into Pakistan tribal areas on our western
borders. Pakistan was forced to send its Army into tribal areas hitherto manned by
para military Scouts who needed to be reinforced. The terrorists gained control over
tribal areas particularly in North and South Waziristan by eliminating local elders, the
Maliks and established sanctuaries luring young boys to carry out suicide attack in
Pakistan. Army operations in South Waziristan successfully eliminated most of
these human bomb factories reducing incidents of suicide attacks. The terrorist
shifted to other locations to continue their operations.
In 2009, a situation had developed when Islamabad was being threatened to be
occupied by the so called Taliban according to our adversaries game plan of
denuclearizing Pakistan. Pakistan Army was tasked to dislodge Taliban terrorists
who had entrenched themselves in the vast mountainous area of Malakand Division,
had reached northern end of Tarbela Dam reservoir and were threatening
Islamabad. Large numbers of religious seminaries in Islamabad were another source
of supplying manpower to support Taliban in case they could reach the capital.
Some of their sponsors were gleefully waiting to occupy Islamabad providing
opportunity to global powers for action to denuclearize Pakistan. There were reports
of foreign forces ready to undertake the mission, conveniently placed across the
Gulf. Inside the country, particularly Islamabad and surroundings there was large
scale presence of organizations like Blackwater; over four hundred houses in
Islamabad hired to lodge these groups. The situation was grim, the task daunting
and consequences of failure devastating. The terrorists had taken a few years to
come into such threatening position. uninterrupted by the provincial government led
by sympathizing Mullahs and Musharraf led central government who had abdicated
their responsibilities; allowing some rascals to operate their own radio stations
spitting venom and terrorizing the public in their occupied areas.
Armed with clarity of purpose defined by the national parliament reflecting national
will, the security forces took just about three months to dislodge the terrorists from

vast mountainous areas by imaginative plans worked out by competent generals,

executed by the officers and men employed with unmatched velour. No Army of
present day world can equal the performance demonstrated by Pakistan armed
forces that completed this operation in amazingly short time. Large scale casualties
of young officers signify intensity of fighting, the success ensured by the young
leaders leading from front. With known capability of airlifting one infantry battalion at
a time, a three times more force was lifted by helicopters to put on heights occupied
by the terrorists. Helicopter pilots who started their machines before dawn switched
these off by almost midnight, the limit of human endurance stretched too far. Only
Pakistanis could do it. This operation neutralized our adversaries attempt to
denuclearize Pakistan for the present. Their efforts will continue, demanding
constant vigil and counter measures to prevent it.
The Army deployed on the western borders is doing hard fighting against desperate
terrorists with suicidal mindset entrenched in difficult mountainous terrain. These
operations, if documented, will be valuable lessons in small unit actions and counter
insurgency operations in worst possible environments. The spirit, audacity and skill
in dealing with situations shown by the Pakistans security forces which includes the
Army, the Civil Armed Forces (CAF), the Police, the intelligence agencies and the
Pakistan Air force have thwarted diabolical plans of the global powers to
denuclearise Pakistan.
Armys Strength
Pakistan Army, being a volunterr Army draws the best Pakistanis in each category of
its rank and file. Structure of the Army, rather the armed forces is built upon the
principle that everyone in chain of command obeys order of the chair irrespective of
the man occupying it. This is the cardinal factor without which no force can retain its
cohesiveness. Pakistan armed forces remain a disciplined force by obeying orders of
the command and have a robust internal accountability system which remains largely
intact, recovering from some malpractices creeping in during the period of Zia and
Musharrafs rule. The crucial element in maintaining an effective fighting force,
however, is the public support which despite focussed and sustained smear
campaigns, Pakistan Armed Forces enjoy. Without public support the forces cannot
perform their assigned tasks successfully.
Centre of Gravity
Pakistan Armed Forces remain Centre of Gravity of the country for mainly two
reasons. The first reason is our location in a volatile and disturbed region and
rectangular geographical configuration forming long borders with the neighbouring
countries. This necessitates maintaining strong, well trained armed forces. The
numerical strength of forces is determined keeping in view the strength and
capabilities of the armed forces maintained by neighbouring countries. Pakistan is
forced to maintain credible deterrence against possible aggression, a defensive

posture with no capability of undertaking invasion of its neighbours. The second

major reason which burdens the Army with extra commitments is that other State
institutions have failed to develop to a standard, capable of meeting their
responsibilities. Bureaucracy, the backbone of administration is politicised, the
economy despite enormous potential remains in tatters, judiciary has failed in
providing justice to the society, the parliamentarians remain slaves of the party
leaders and the political class has not produced a single statesman.
The Army instead of being the last line of defence is immediately inducted to deal
with abnormal situations like natural disasters because the organisations formed to
deal with such situations have failed to take up their responsibilities. The public looks
towards Army in helping them in matters which are basic responsibility of the local
and provincial governments like maintaining law and order. Calls by the public for
involving Army to deal with killings of persons from Hazara community in Quetta
(2013) and situation in Karachi where the political parties forming the government
patronise armed gangs for target killings and other crimes puts increased strain on
the Army already stretched thin on ground. Our enemies have successfully created a
situation where our Army has got committed into fighting within our own country.
Relentless efforts to demoralise and degrade its fighting abilities are being made
through various means including a strong section of media, particularly social media
spreading hopelessness and despair.
It is a universal fact that in every country there is an Army, if not its own, from some
other country. It is because of strength and fighting abilities of our Armed Forces,
drawn from the best of young Pakistani volunteers that our country has been saved
from meeting the fate of Afghanistan, Iraq, Lybia, Egypt and Syria during the present
times of great turmoil in the region. The people of Pakistan have to remain vigilant
against our enemies focussed efforts to erode fighting potential of our armed forces.
Otherwise we may be condemned to bear presence of foreign forces on our soil, as
we have seen in our neighbourhood and the consequences of such calamity.

Overcoming Unrest in Balochistan

Balochistan, about 44% landmass of Pakistan, area wise its largest province, is
sparsely populated. Only about 6 million people are living in its vast expanses
because of peculiar geographical conditions although population statistics continue
to be contested by the two major groups, the Pushtuns and Balochs for obvious
interests. Broad distribution of population is that the Pushtuns are living in the
northern and eastern parts contiguous to the tribal areas of Khyber Pukhtunkhaw
(KPK) extending west from South Waziristan Agency. Other parts of the province are
inhabited by Balochs, Barohis, Nowsherwanis (ancient Medes from Iranian plateau)
and Makrani people. Quetta city is mainly inhabited by Pushtuns, a group of Hazara
tribe and settlers from other parts of the country. Some Baloch families have also
moved in western part of Quetta valley during early seventies. There is lot of ethnic,
linguistic and cultural diversity amongst the people living in the Province.
The Province experienced occasional unrest in parts of it since 1948. History of this
unrest starts with Khan of Kalats brother, Mr Abdul Karim Khans disagreement with
his brothers decision to accede to Pakistan. It remained confined to a small area
around Kalat and died down soon without affecting other areas or tribes. During the
early seventies, parts of Marri and Mengal tribes following their Sardars; Mr Khair
Bux Marri and Atta ullah Mengal created unrest in their respective areas when Mr. Z
A Bhutto came to power in what was left of Pakistan after the 1971 war with India.
An Army operation was launched in 1973-4 by Mr. Bhuttos government in Marri
tribes area and around Wadh Khuzdar where a part of Mengal tribe was creating
unrest. The situation was soon brought under control. The Province enjoyed peace
for a few decades till the US landed in Afghanistan. Since then we are faced with
unrest spreading to most parts of the Baloch inhabited areas of the Province.
Considering the present alarming law and order situation in Baloch inhabited areas
of the Province and particularly Quetta, those of us who saw very peaceful and
pleasant environments are at loss to understand why the situation was allowed to
deteriorate to such an extent. My association with the Province spans over a period
of eight years at different intervals in three decades; from the sixties to late eighties. I
first visited Quetta in early Sep 1960. At that time it was a small, well laid out clean
city. The cantonment was spread out in eastern part of the valley and the city, re-laid
after devastating 1935 earthquake, occupied centre of the valley. Main market of the
city was Qandhari Bazaar, the famous fruit market at one end of the Bazaar.
Bicycles were main means of movement. Immaculately turned out men mainly
Pushtuns attired in their traditional dress with Kullah/turbans and waistcoats moved
about in the city on their decorated Raleigh and Humber brand bicycles. The
population in the city was mainly Pushtuns, the Hazaras and the settlers from Punjab
and other parts of pre partition India who came at the time of laying the railway
network by the British during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There was no

Baloch population in the city except houses of some tribal Sardars. The Baloch
tribal families were brought to Quetta when Sardar Atta ullah Mengal became Chief
Minister of the Province in early nineteen seventies.
My next visits to attend courses at the Infantry School were in 1967 and 1969 both
times during the pleasant summers. There was no provision of fans in the living
rooms nor were these needed. It is much later, during late eighties that the weather
changed to necessitate not only fans but the air conditioners. Jinnah Street had a
couple of cafes, some drug stores, general stores and a Chinese restaurant located
at the end of cantonment limits and was mainly frequented by the army officers and
their families doing courses at the Staff College and Infantry School. One could see
a few large American Convertible cars with their hoods open being driven by sons of
some tribal chiefs while Sardar Ata ullah Mengal, Nawab Akbar Bugti and Sardar
Khair Bux Marri would be seen strolling in the cool afternoons on the pavement of
Jinnah Street. Nawab Akbar Bugti was tall and handsome, a very impressive man.
Quetta was a very peaceful city with efficient police and hardly any crime. It was after
the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and Mr. Bhuttos actions of removing Sardar Atta
ullah Mengals government followed by his military action in parts of the Province
that conditions in Balochistan gradually deteriorated to present deplorable state.
My next short stay at Quetta (Jun-July 1974) was in the re-assembly camp set up for
the returning prisoners of war from India. A few months after that I again landed in
Bugti-Marri tribal area with the unit I had been posted in. This stay ended in April
1975 but I had to come back repeatedly to Balochistan at different times (1976-77),
(1981-85) and (1988-90). My stay in Balochistan in different capacities gave my
ample opportunity to travel the length and breadth of the province witnessing the
transformation from once peaceful conditions to present unrest.
Balochistans problems stem from wrong policies of the Governments at the Centre
and are compounded by incompetence of provincial governments. In areas inhabited
by Baloch tribes, the central government has pandered to the wishes of few
individuals, the tribal Sardars giving them funds to keep peace in their respective
areas. The effort to reach out to the people and work for meeting their basic needs
has not been attempted, retaining and strengthening the Sardari system in Baloch
areas.
The hard working Pushtuns being egalitarian society have remained unaffected by
unrest in other areas of the province. They are involved in agriculture and trading
activity, making judicious use of available resources, producing good quality fruit in
some areas. The Baloch mostly are still living a pastoral life tending to livestock with
some exceptions like oasis of Panjgur-Turbat date plantations. Population along the
coastal area spreading to about five hundred kilometers is mainly engaged in fishing
activity to sustain their livelihoods.

The sparsely populated, resource rich Baloch inhabited areas of the province remain
a lucrative target of the world and regional powers. First the Russians had cultivated
Baloch young men who kept displaying emblems of Azad Balochistan on their car
plates but the Russian physical thrust from the north petered out in Afghanistan. Now
the US occupying Afghanistan and having strong presence in the Gulf and Arabian
Sea is fomenting insurgency in these areas from bases in Afghanistan where the
Indians have joined the effort to support elements working for Azad Balochistan. A
plan of creating international strategic corridor is to gain effective leverage on
exploitation of Central Asian energy resources.
Our Army, under attack from domestic front, is already committed in operations
within our own country. Apart from FATA, the troops from Malakand Swat have not
yet been relieved by the civil administration. Propagating that there is Army operation
in Balochistan is to give a wrong twist to the prevailing situation; where the Frontier
Corps (FC) an Interior Ministry force, is being employed by the provincial
government. Provincial Government since 2008 comprises of almost all the tribal
leaders. All of them are either ministers or advisors with no opposition in the
assembly. They have failed to bring peaceful living conditions in the province
because of disinterest and incompetence; some of the ministers accused of being
involved in the crimes like abduction for ransom.
Nawab Akbar Bugtis tragic death is being used as a fresh cause to spread unrest.
But there are a number of questions. Who persuaded the aged Nawab to go into a
cave in Marri tribal area which is otherwise off limits to Bugtis due to tribal feuds?
Who were projecting him to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Balochistan
Liberation Army, raining missiles on gas installations, damaging rail and power lines?
And most important is that those Army officers, who died with him in that cave, were
they wearing suicide jackets to blow up themselves? Who triggered that explosion in
the cave? A man who claimed to have killed his first man at the age of twelve died a
violent death in circumstances of his own choosing. With him he caused death of
many others. Projecting him as a hero or a victim is to distort the facts.
Problem in Balochistan can be easily overcome if effective steps are taken to reach
out to the common man to meet his essential needs. The main grievance against the
Centre is that Balochistans resources have been exploited without giving due share
to the Province. The example is of Sui gas which was discovered in early fifties but
living conditions in the area did not improve. Government was giving money to the
tribal leader instead of reaching out to the people to improve their conditions. The
tribal leader, Mr Akbar Bugti never spent that money on the people of the area
because he never wanted change in status quo which would challenge his authority.
If even a fraction of that amount was spent to improve conditions of the people, all
the basic needs of people would have been met and the area transformed with all
modern facilities provided for. The money was mostly spent on patronizing night
clubs in Karachi by Bugti brothers in fifties and sixties when Karachi was enjoying a
vibrant night life comparable if not better than Beirut in those times.

This practice of enriching individuals continued by successive governments; the

present government has recently (2012) provided two hundred and fifty millions
rupees to each member of the provincial assembly for development work in their
areas. As there is no check on the manner of spending this money, it mostly goes
into personal coffers of the members instead of any benefit to the communities.
To overcome the unrest, there is a need to make some basic changes in pattern of
governance particularly in the Baloch inhabited areas. Following measures will
resolve the problems;

The whole Province should be declared A Area. Large parts of the Province
under the administration of Sardars with their own forces, the Levis
responsible for law and order in B Areas should be brought under normal
policing and judicial system.

Local Governments must be made functional without delay to involve the

people in governance. This will erode influence of separatist elements
depriving them of their main propaganda theme.

Each union council should be allocated a reasonable amount as non lapsable

grant on yearly basis to be spent by the communities according to
Community Development Methodology. If Rupees ten crore are allocated to
each Union Council, this amount comes to fifty seven billion for the 567 union
councils of the Province. It can be easily made available from the 179 billion
budget of the province for the financial year 2012/13.

The old scheme of establishing about six small army cantonments in the area
must be revived. Mere placing of Army in the area will help in stabalising law
and order situation, deter any adventurism by foreign forces, make social
services like health and education accessible and contribute to overall
economic progress for the people of these areas.

Part of income from mineral resources of the Province should be spent in the
area from where these are extracted. This will meet the major demand of
people of the area.

To counter external forces stoking unrest in the area, there is need to build up
regional linkages with Russia, Central Asian states, Iran, Afghanistan, China
and India for developing trade and energy corridors benefitting the region.

The Question of Provinces in Pakistan

Pakistan, the largest Muslim country of the world could not maintain its integrity
mainly due to inequality of the size of provinces and unresolved regional concerns.
In 1971, it was fragmented into two parts just before completing twenty five years of
its existence. Remaining Pakistan continues to face the same problems with
increased complexity.
Sitting in a small mud fort at Sangsila in the wilderness of Bugti Tribal agency in
early 1975, I used to ponder over the fact that while the unrest was confined to Marri
Agency and some area around Wadh Khuzdar, two small pockets of the vast
province of Baluchistan, why was it being projected as revolt of the whole Province
against the State of Pakistan. Having been repatriated from India shortly before that
and having first hand knowledge of how a small active group could achieve its
objectives with outside support, the thought was most disturbing.
Background of the Present Provinces
In 1947 when Pakistan came into being, the large province of Bengal was being
divided, its eastern part becoming erstwhile East Pakistan. Punjab, stretching from
Indus to Jumna and then ruled by the Unionist Party government who were not in
favour of Pakistan, was also being divided, its western portion becoming part of
Pakistan. The Frontier Province less tribal areas was going through referendum on
the issue of joining Pakistan or otherwise. Baluchistan had multiple arrangements of
governance i.e. British ruled areas, tribal agencies, different states like Kalat,
Kharan, Mekran, Lasbela and others. It got the status of province much later. Only
Sind province existed in its present form and its assembly passed the resolution to
join Pakistan. The provinces were, therefore, unequal in sizes of population and
geographical expanse which needed to be addressed by the new country.
Unfortunately that was not done, aggravating the problem which has defied solution
so far.
In 1956, when the first Constitution worked out by the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan was adopted after much deliberation and delay, the present day Pakistan
was one of its two provinces. It was effectively administered by a Governor assisted
by a small team of ministers. No change was made in this set up in the second
constitution adopted in 1962. Life in the late fifties and early sixties when this
arrangement was in place was the only period when bulk of the population of this
country lived in peace and relative prosperity as there was almost 100%
employment. It was a liberal, tolerant, happy and contended society till the 1965 War
with India and its aftermath which disrupted Pakistans progress as a model for third
world countries.
Just before the elections of 1970, General Yahya Khan the President/Chief Martial
Law Administrator, whose decisions were bereft of logic or reason because of his
well known shortcomings, ordered fragmentation of the Province into four parts. At

that time there was no popular demand for this break up except for some nationalist
elements particularly Wali Khan group. This decision was a surprise for the common
man who was only familiar with the demand of adult franchise instead of a small
number of Basic Democrats electing the President.
Today, those who harp on the theme of federation and federating units need to
revisit our not very distant history. Pakistan was not formed by any 'federating units
if we refer back to the conditions in 1947. Repeated use of term 'federation' by many
people over the last few years is ominous development. This makes it easier for our
enemies to further fragment Pakistan if a provincial assembly is bribed to pass a
resolution to cecede from Pakistan. To forestall such possibility there is need to
make basic change in our constitution to reslove the issue.
1973 Constitution
After 1971 war when we lost East Pakistan, a new constitution was adopted in 1973.
This constitution was adopted more because of pressure of prevailing environment
resulting from breakup of the country rather than merit of the document itself. The
assembly which passed this constitution had no mandate to frame a constitution.
The members had been elected for the National Assembly of Pakistan who refused
to attend Assembly proceedings, forcing a crisis which led to breakup of Pakistan.
After that break up, a constituent assembly should have been elected through fresh
elections to frame constitution for the new country but that was not done. Those
people who had no mandate to frame constitution and were guilty of contributing to
break up of Pakistan framed a flawed constitution. This document left many things
undecided for the future in the form of concurrent list etc. According to some people
Mr Z A Bhutto wanted to change it into presidential form for which he went into early
elections to get two third majorities in the parliament. His scheme failed due to
rigging and the consequences. Now this document is only good for unending debate
on its interpretations.
The Problem
The 1973 constitution did not provide solution to the genuine concerns on the
inequality of the size of provinces and other problems posed by different nationalist
groups within the country. The political government formed in 1973 soon clashed
with two provinces, the NWFP (now KPK) and Baluchistan, dissolving provincial
governments and imposing governors rule in these provinces. This was followed by
an armed uprising by Marri and Mengal tribes in two small parts of Baluchistan. The
government was ultimately overthrown by the Army in 1977. The constitution could
not prevent successive martial laws nor could it save its initiator from the gallows
despite its article 6.
If we study the systems of other developed and developing countries of the world,
we will find that we are unique in maintaining a governance system which can only
lead to misrule. It is a system designed for paralysis which we are experiencing. No

country, roughly equal to Pakistan in geographical and population size throughout

the world, has so large provinces with such a large number of legislators, ministers,
advisors, chief ministers, governors etc creating a class of oligarchs, who rule for
personal gains at the cost of common citizens interests.
The Solution
Whereas large unequal provinces provide a cause to secessionist elements
facilitating their work in fragmenting the Country, small size provinces, like in
Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and other medium size countries of the world; would
effectively eliminate the threat of further disintegration of Pakistan. Nigeria, facing
religious based secessionist war in Biafra Region in 1960s solved this problem by
forming smaller provinces. A look at the administrative divisions of some other
countries would give a clear insight:-

Country
Afghanistan
Iran
Iraq
Bangladesh
Egypt
France
Germany
Indonesia
Italy
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Poland
Saudi Arabia
Spain

Area (Sq km)

647,500
1,648,195
437,072
147,570
1,001,449
547,030
357,021
1,919,440
301,230
324,220
803,940
300,000
312,655
1,960,582
504,782

Population
32,738,755
70,472,846
28,221,181
153,546,901
80,335,036
59,765,983
83,251,851
230,512,000
57,715,625
4,525,116
167,762,049
92,681,543
38,625,478
23,513,330
40,077,100

Sri Lanka
Sudan
Switzerland
Syria
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom

65,610
2,505,813
41,290
185,180
514,000
163,610
780,580
603,700
244,820

21,128,773
36,992,490
7,301,994
19,747,586
65,493,298
10,102,000
67,308,928
48,396,470
59,778,002

Provinces/States
34 provinces
30 provinces
18 governorates
6 divisions
26 governorates
26 regions
16 states
30 provinces
15 provinces
19 counties
4 provinces
80 provinces
16 provinces
13 provinces
17
autonomous
areas
8 provinces
25 states
26 cantons
14 provinces
76 provinces
21 governorates
81 provinces
24 provinces
114 counties

The solution of our problems lies in making basic changes in the administrative
infrastructure of our country aimed at effective governance responsive to the needs
of common citizen. These changes are outlined in the following paragraphs.

District Governments
Basic unit of governance should be the present DISTRICTS. The system of district
governments should be strengthened, laying down clear responsibilities for meeting
basic requirements of a citizen like food, shelter, education, health, security and
justice at the local level. In any case, citizens problems should not go beyond the
district level. Provision of timely justice should be ensured to maintain order and
counter extremism in the society. Senior judges placed at the Union Council level
should be made responsible to dispense justice instead of disposing of cases
acquitting the accused persons because the evidence produced before them is
inadequate or nonexistent. For this, the rules of business need to be changed, the
judge reaching out to the victim rather than the victim struggling to get justice. The
District governments should be provided with required resources and made
accountable to ensure efficient functioning. The responsibilities, delegated down to
local level, must stop people committing suicide and selling children due to hunger.
The Union Council should be hub of all development and administrative activities
provided with resources. The present administrative set up at the district level is
adequate to carry out the outlined tasks.
The Provinces
Smaller provinces, named after principal cities should be formed, almost equal in
size of geographical expanse with limited role of providing support to the district
governments. In these provinces there is no need of provincial assemblies, the
ministers, advisors and chief ministers. The provinces should be headed by
governors assigned with a limited clearly specified role of supporting the district
government in maintaining law and order and provision of justice. For this purpose,
the governors assisted by a small staff team will select, enroll, train and provide
police and judicial staff to the districts. The laws are made by the National
parliament. There is no need to make laws at different tiers increasing the number of
law makers, a class of parasites devouring national resources.
The Central Government
The central government should retain ten to twelve ministries responsible to
formulate and implement national level policies, rest all the responsibilities being
passed on to provinces and the district governments.
The Tribal Areas and Northern Areas
The Tribal Areas should be integrated into the new system as districts, eliminating
their status of tribal agencies. Similarly the Northern Areas should also be integrated
in the new system keeping in view the aspiration of the people, who liberated those
areas and joined Pakistan. The reason to keep them in limbo because a plebiscite in
Kashmir was in sight during the past, no longer exists.

The Parliament
The National Assembly and the Senate should concentrate on their job of legislation,
deliberate on national issues to help the government in formulating and
implementing sound, well considered policies.
Role of the President
The Parliament should elect a suitable person as the President whose main
responsibility should be to ensure that judicial infrastructure in the country functions
effectively providing timely justice to the citizens. He should appoint suitable persons
as judges at different tiers and supervise their performance. His chain of functioning
will be through the provincial governors appointed by him with limited role as defined
in preceding paras.
Presidential versus Parliamentary form of government
Disillusionment with the inept and corrupt political governments which came into
power at intervals between the dictatorial rules has raised doubts on the suitability of
parliamentary form of government itself. Debate on the need of doing away with our
present form of government and going back to the Presidential system continues.
Although any system can work well if the people running it are honest and
competent, the parliamentary system is comparatively better as it can have effective
checks and balance in exercising power. In the Presidential form, the powers are
concentrated in the person of the President whom it becomes difficult to remove if he
fails to perform his job well. In the Parliamentary system, if the parliament elects a
suitable person as President who is vested with well defined responsibilities mainly;
of ensuring that judiciary is functioning effectively to provide justice to the society, it
creates a desirable check in exercise of power by the executive.
Advantages
The proposal to strengthen district governments, to form small equal provinces sans
assemblies with a limited role in governance and a lean central government as
outlined above, will bring about following major advantages:

It will eliminate the cause of acrimony and discontent among

regions.

The central government, unburdened from mundane routine affairs will be

able to concentrate on formulating and implementing national level policies
more effectively.

It will end duplication of responsibilities between different levels causing

confusion and despondency in governance. At present, if we take one
constituency of a national assembly seat, there is one member of National
Assembly (MNA) and two to three Members of Provincial Assemblies (MPAs)

the

different

supposed to make laws for the citizens. Practically they hardly do anything
except interfering in the functioning of district governments to improve their
position for next election and amass assets. Eliminating one tier, that is at
provincial level and redefining the role of legislators at the national level, will
help in effective functioning of district governments.

It will bring the desired level of political stability. The parties winning national
level elections will be able to form stable governments at the centre without
having to make compromises to form provincial governments.

It will meet the demands of sub national groups, eliminating threats of further
breakup of the Country as experienced in 1971, by removing causes of
discontent, neutralising propaganda themes like hatred against Punjabis,
developed by our adversaries for a long time.

Disturbances and discontent in an area would be isolated, promptly

addressed and problems easily resolved without affecting other areas.

The role of Governor of the provinces to support the district governments in

maintaining law and order by providing required force and in dispensation of
justice by maintaining judicial infrastructure, will establish inherent checks and
balance, restricting chances of district governments in going overboard.

Responding to the aspirations and genuine needs of the people of Pakistan,

facilitating them in solving their problems at local level and ending acrimony
on divisive issues, will act as catalyst to our progress and strengthen us as a
nation.

Method to Affect Change

The change can be brought about by following methods:a. The Parliament can affect the change by mustering required majority to
make constitutional amendment.
b. The change can be made by holding a referendum on the subject.

New Provinces Suggested

The present provinces of Pakistan are cause of political instability and potential
threat to the countrys survival as explained. Having considered the matter in detail,
a list of suggested provinces based on administrative considerations is being given
below. In this ethnic identities do not change and any opposition or resistance on this
account will be merely playing politics and not be justified. A Sindhi will remain a

Sindhi if he is part of Sukker, Hyderabad or Larkana Province and so would be other

nationalities which do not change due to forming smaller provinces named after
principal cities. However, the reasons for bringing about this change will have to be
explained to the public through well articulated, effective campaign.
These provinces will be headed by governors with a limited, clearly defined task of
supporting the district governments in maintaining law and order and provision of
justice. The governor will be assisted by a small staff team to do the job. There will
be no need of assemblies, ministers, chief ministers and advisors at the provincial
level. Thus the numbers of law makers will come down from present about twelve
hundred to about four hundred and forty two i.e. limited to the strength of Senate and
National Assembly. The actual governance would be at the local government level, a
citizens problems being solved at local level; in any case not going beyond the
District.
Tribal Agencies and Frontier Regions will be absorbed in to the adjoining new
provinces as districts. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Status quo is to be maintained till
conflict on this issue is resolved through negotiated settlement with India.

Malakand
Hazara
Dera Ismail Rawalpindi
Khan
Faisalabad
Multan
Sibi
Panjgur
Larkana

Peshawar
Gujranwala
Bahawalpur

Kohat
Lahore

Dera Ghazi
Khan
Naseerabad
Quetta
Kharan
Kalat/Khuzdar Bela/Awaran Mekran
Hyderabad
Mirpur Khas Gilgit

Bannu
Sargodha
Zhob
Chaghi
Sukker
Sakardu

Reducing number of ministries at the Centre and eliminating ministries at the

provincial level will render a large number of government employees surplus. Some
of them would be absorbed in the new provinces and the district governments but
most will have to be given golden handshake. Initially for some time they may have
to be kept on the pay roll without work till their disposal is finalised.
The above proposal is summarised as:

Strengthen district governments by providing them required resources and

making them responsible to ensure that a citizens basic requirements like
food, shelter, education, health, employment, security and justice are met at
local level, his problems not going beyond the district in any case.

The present large unequal provinces are replaced with small equal provinces
sans assemblies and ministries. Such small, equal provinces named after
principal cities are headed by governors with specific mandate of supporting

the district governments by selecting, training and providing police and judicial
staff to the districts. The governor is assisted by a small team and there is no
need of assemblies, ministers and chief ministers etc. Tribal areas and the
Northern Areas are integrated in the new system.

The Centre retains only ten to twelve ministries, dealing with matters of
national concern. Rest all responsibilities are transferred at the district level.
The National Assembly and the Senate concentrate on their job of legislation,
rather than the members interference in the affairs of local governments.

In 1973/74, the unrest in Baluchistan was confined to Marri tribal area and a small
pocket of Mengal tribe living in area Wadh near Khuzdar. The whole Pashtun belt,
the coastal belt, the vast areas of Chaghi, Kharan, Turbat, Panjgur, and the plains of
Sibi, Nasirabad were not interested or affected in any way. If the provinces had been
formed on the lines suggested above, the problem could not have aggravated to
present proportions. In the smaller administrative units the grievances could easily
be addressed, troubles and trouble creators isolated and matters resolved.
Considering that the Baloch inhabited areas of Balochistan are not densely
populated, the government could meet the requirements of the population by directly
reaching out to the communities, helping them in sustainable livelihood programmes,
planned and implemented by the district governments, instead of doling out money
to local influentials.
Pakistan of 1947 could not survive even for twenty five years. Remaining Pakistan
continues to face threat of further disintegration mainly due to unaddressed concerns
of different regions. The proposal suggested in preceding paragraphs provides a
comprehensive solution to resolve our basic problem which must be done without
further prevarication to put Pakistan on the path to stability, peace, progress and
prosperity.

Local Governments and Community Development

Our major political parties have never been interested in making the local
governments effective for the fear of losing their influence when the problems of
communities start getting resolved with ease at local level. The political party leaders
enjoy their powers through highly centralised and personalised dispensation of these
parties. They are fearful of eroding their influence when the local governments are
provided with resources and made to function effectively. It is for this reason that the
local bodies have functioned under the much maligned dictatorial rule, starting with
President Ayub Khans Basic Democracy to Zia ul Haqs Local Bodies and
Musharrafs Local Government Ordinance 2001.
Since every new government scrapped old systems instead of building upon them,
there was no continuity to consolidate the local government system. The latest effort,
the Local Government Ordinance 2001 introduced during Gen Musharrafs regime
produced mixed results. In those districts where the Nazims worked with some
degree of honesty, there was visible improvement in the area. Since the programme
was discontinued soon as the political government took over, the full benefits of this
system could not be realised nor its results correctly measured.
Effective Local Governments
To carry the process forward, there is need to build upon the Local Government
Ordinance 2001. A major shortcoming in this ordinance is lack of laying down clear
responsibilities to meet essential needs of the people. The present Union Councils,
provided with adequate resources should be made a hub of catering to basic
essential needs of the people by adopting Community Development Methodologies
which must ensure;
Sustainable Livelihoods. No citizen should die of hunger, not forced to sell children
or commit suicide. Although every citizen is responsible to earn livelihood for himself
and his dependents, when a person finds it difficult to meet his responsibilities he
needs help. Widows, orphans, old people unable to work and persons with
disabilities must be helped to meet their essential needs of life.
Given the responsibility and provided with resources in the form of grants and local
taxes, local governments must devise solutions according to their peculiar
circumstances. For example, in Punjab, Sind and parts of KPK where agriculture is
basic means of sustenance, the local governments can organize cooperatives like
small dairy and livestock projects making people shareholders with initial investment
through grants or soft loan, thus not hurting self respect of the people. In large parts
of Balochistan raising livestock and horticulture with input from experts will increase
employment and incomes.

There would be a need to emphasis on the people that if they face any problem,
President or Prime Minister is not supposed to take notice. The solutions to their
problem must be sought at local government level.
Shelter. Every family must have suitable shelter. Housing even at the village level
must be planned to save fertile agricultural land going to waste.
Health, Hygiene and Sanitation The local governments should be responsible for
providing essential health , hygiene and sanitation services including provision of
clean drinking water at the local level. Every citizen must get medical cover in time of
need. A comprehensive health policy at the national level would cater to the needs of
population by providing basic health units and hospitals at appropriate levels.
Education The local governments should ensure that every child, male or female,
in their respective area is provided basic education and chance to pursue higher
studies/technical education. Performance of teachers and educational institutions
must be monitored.
Security. Peaceful atmosphere must be ensured by cubing criminal activity in the
area using the local police. The local councillors must know every person living in
their area of jurisdiction. No Osama like terrorist should remain sheltered amongst
our population.
Conflict Resolution and Provision of Timely Justice. Prompt and timely justice must
be provided to victims of any crime committed. A complete reversal of present
judicial process is needed to ensure that a judge provides justice and does not
dispose of cased as presented before him.
Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Work of all the NGOs and other
organisations/ institutions on poverty alleviation measures and provision of social
services must be made part of overall plans of the local governments. No NGO
should be allowed to work without permission of the local governments.
Countering Extremism. To maintain peace, the local governments must have control
of the mosques ensuring that no hate speech is delivered from the pulpit. In Islam
there is no appointment of Imam Masjid. The prayers are to be led by elders of the
community. Till the professional/paid Mullahs are made to find some other job, their
activities should be monitored. The only paid staff for the mosque should be those
who are to keep the premises clean and maintained.
Role of State Employees. Role of state employees The Establishment must be
clearly specified. Broad parameters would be that while the decisions are made by
the elected government bodies, the Establishment is used for implementing
decisions, keep records and provide continuity in functioning of the institutions.

The requirements of the community should be met by adopting a holistic, all

encompassing, integrated approach by adopting the process of community
development practices as outlined in succeeding paragraphs.
Local Government Elections
Elections for the local governments are responsibility of the Election Commission of
Pakistan. Holding of local bodies elections at one time demands large scale
administrative and logistic arrangements. To facilitate holding these elections in a
transparent manner, these elections should be staggered district wise, completing
the process in a province in a couple of weeks. The elections must be held on nonparty basis which will help electing the best suited people from all parties who can
deliver results in community development work.
Community Development
Community development is a broad term applied to a structured intervention that
gives communities greater control over the conditions that affect their lives.
Exhaustive literature is available on the practices, experiences and results of
community development efforts all over the world since last about two hundred
years.
In Pakistan a successful model of community development is available in the form of
Agha Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) in Gilgit-Baltistan area. Efforts by
the Government to replicate that model have not succeeded mainly due to lack of
commitment and other inadequacies.
Without going into the details of this very vast subject, suggested methodology to
implement community development projects is as follows:

Community development should be the main responsibility of the local

governments to be planned and supervised at the union council level.

The development programmes should cover the rural areas as the urban
areas are being adequately managed through the civic bodies.

Village is taken as unit for community development (CD) programme.

The programme covers essential aspects of the community needs like

sustainable livelihoods, water and sanitation, health and education etc.

A motivator/CD professional at each union council equipped with the

background knowledge and leadership capacity is tasked to initiate the
process. Overall coordination will be at the District level. Local Government
Ordinance 2001 provides for such appointment at the Union Council level.

The CD professional arranges meetings of the villagers to discuss their

needs. Lot of motivation and skill will be needed to make this first step a

success considering the quality of our human capital mired in ignorance,

jealousy and feuds. Once this first step meets success further process will
become gradually easier.

The villagers are asked to discuss their needs and suggest solutions/plans
and financial estimates to meet the needs.

The plans should cover the arrangement of funds as to how much will be
contributed by the community and how much funds can be arranged from
external sources.

Each household contributes an amount to undertake the project. This gives

the community sense of ownership of the project and will contribute to its
sustainability.

Based on the discussions the plans for different projects are finalised starting
with smaller, easier to accomplish and less expensive projects.

Implementation of the projects is undertaken by the community through local

contractors in a transparent manner to eliminate any chance of financial
irregularity.

The village management committee/ citizen community boards (CCBs) are

entrusted with the responsibility for maintenance and sustainability of the
project.

The NGOs interested to work in the area should coordinate their activity
through the respective Union Councils to integrate their work towards overall
objectives of the development effort.

The responsibility to ensure that essential needs of the population like food, shelter,
health, education, security and provision of justice are being met should be the
responsibly of the local governments. Union Council should be hub of all
development activity, overall coordination being done at the District governments
level.

Provision of Justice
The prevalent system has completely failed to provide justice to the citizens. Even in
the recent wave of terrorism, the terrorists who kill dozens of people in broad day
light have not been punished because the system is criminal friendly. Rather it is
contributing to protect criminals resulting in increase of all kinds of crime. Taking an
example if someone is murdered, his traumatised family is required to approach the
police to lodge the report. If they succeed in doing so they are subjected to police
inquiry. It is up to police to prepare the case for trial in the courts whether they do it
right or leave lacunas to be exploited later. When this stage is reached the aggrieved
party is required to find a suitable lawyer to plead the case before the judge. The
judge is not concerned with provision of justice. He is only concerned with the
evidence presented to him. This evidence mostly is not there because who would
earn enmity of criminals? All this process requires lot of money which the aggrieved
parties mostly cannot afford. The justice or injustice has virtually to be bought. Thus
the system has completely failed to deliver justice.
This system must be replaced as suggested in the following lines:

High powered judges are posted at the Union Councils in rural areas and a
cluster of Wards in urban areas. These judges should be empowered to
decide the cases of murder and other crimes of serious nature.

They should be assisted by specially trained investigation team(s) for carrying

out on the spot investigation and the lawyers paid by the state to assist them
on legal points if required during the trial stage.

When a crime occurs in the area, it should be promptly reported to the Judge
office open twentyfour hours by the local councillor. Failing to report an
incident within specified time should be crime liable to punishment.

The judge on getting the information should send his investigation team to the
crime scene. He may also visit the area to meet people if he considers it
necessary.

The investigation teams should prepare a summary of evidence based on

which the trial should commence without wasting time.

Local police, tasked to assist the Judge are used to apprehend the criminals.
They do not have any role in investigations.

The judge should be made responsible to provide justice for which he is

employed. The victims should not be made to buy justice, a double tragedy,
and virtually no justice despite an elaborate infrastructure provided by the
State.

Cases of criminal nature should be decided by the judge himself. There is

need to introduce punishments given in the Holy Quran for the serious crimes
like murder. This step will drastically reduce crime from the society. For cases
relating to property and financial transactions, the judge should form tribunals
to decide the cases promptly. Members of these tribunals should paid
honorarium from the State funds.

Epilogue
So much remains unsaid, unwritten and unknown because people, the characters of
this continuing drama of life are generally disinclined to make the effort. For me it
was a difficult undertaking but as I stated at the outset, as victim of the rulers crimes,
spending over two years in Indian POW camps for no fault of mine, my aim was to
expose lies about East Pakistan situation in 1971 which the villains spread to befool
our people.
The people of my generation have failed to contest the falsehood propagated by our
rulers to shield their crimes. Our young generation is keen to know the truth. I have
made an effort to tell what I saw and experienced. My target audience is our younger
generation and not my peers who are guilty of living with the falsehood, the learned
ones contributing to reinforce lies.
Pakistan of 1947 did not survive even for its first twenty five years of emerging on the
world map. The main characters involved in breakup of the country and the reasons
for their diabolic schemes have been given in the account. Remaining Pakistan,
despite being blessed with abundant natural resources, variety of terrain, manpower
of great talents and unique geographical position to draw enormous benefits;
remains under threat of further disintegration because of corrupt and incompetent
leaders working for global capitalists interests.
The global capitalist elite working through US administration have deep influence in
our countrys affairs. After our last general elections in 2008, nomination of the
person who was to be our Prime Minister was announced from the premises of US
Embassy in Pakistan. Our finance ministers have been mostly nominated by global
banking sector from within their own employees. Living in the Indus River basin, we
are being served drinking water by Nestle and Pepsi and the largest portion of
annual national budget goes in debt servicing to the banks.
A silver lining in the present dismal conditions is appearing on the horizon which is
likely to help the country to stabilise and make progress. The global capitalist
interests, owning banks, oil companies, armament industries and all big businesses
in the world are now in a position to influence policies in China and India, the most
populous countries of the world and Russia the dominant power on Eurasian scene.
They are well placed to overcome impediments in exploiting the natural resources of
the world, particularly the Central Asian region at this point in time. For their
operations they need energy and trade corridors between Russia, Central Asia,
China, Indian Sub Continent and emerging markets of the African Continent.
Pakistan with its present boundaries serves the purpose for movement in all
directions.

Converging interests of Russia, China and India driven by Wall Street

Establishment to maintain conducive environments for trade in the region will help
Pakistan to overcome internal problems.
A burning desire for change felt by bulk of our population particularly the youth, will
force the political leadership to correct themselves. A sincere, honest leadership will
find regional environments favourable to put Pakistan back to path of progress,
stability and peace.
Having served the country for best part of my life, I pray for survival of Pakistan as a
peaceful, prosperous and stable country; ending with the beautiful words of an Urdu
verse by late Mr. Ahmad Nadim Qasmi praying to the Almighty Allah that life should
not be a crime or a burden for even a single person of my land.
Khuda Kare Kay Mere Ik Bhi Hum Watan K Liye,
Hayat Jurm Na Ho Zindagi Wabal Na Ho
(Ahmad Nadim Qasmi)

Annex A
List of 34 Punjab Officers in East Pakistan
The officers who served with the unit during the counter insurgency operations and
the War with India during the period from April to Dec 1971 are listed below. These
were the men, each one of them towers of strength for men under their commands, a
fine and courageous lot who proved equal to the task during grave dangers.

Lt Col Hafeez ur Rahman CO till Jul 71

Lt Col Amir Muhammad Khan CO

Maj Muhammad Hafeez Raja 2IC

- 2nd OTS ( Senior to the COs,
had joined the unit at Transit Camp Karachi in April 71)

Maj Muhammad Saeed Azam Khan

28th PMA,

A Coy

Maj Khurshid Ahmad Mallal

28th PMA

B Coy

Capt Nazir Ahmed

(promoted Maj in Jun 71)

Capt Nisar Hussain Bukhari

(promoted Maj in Jun 71)

Capt Zahidul Islam, SJ - 36th or 37th PMA, joined the unit at Thakurgaon for a
short period before he got posted out to 18 Punjab where he earned his SJ

Capt Jawaid Anwar Cheema

38th PMA - Adjutant

Capt Muhammad Jamil -

12th War Course

Capt Shafiq Sarwar Malik

40th PMA - QM

Capt Muhammad Ijaz

14th War Corse

Capt Mian Bux Baloch

15th War Course

Capt Muhammad Afreen

Capt Zahid Nawaz Janjua

Lt Moin Nawaz Warraich

43rd PMA

Lt Abdul Waheed (Shaheed) -

22nd War Course

2/Lt Abdul Ghafoor (Shaheed) April 71, first day of the operations

8 th PMA
- 11th PMA

2nd War Course

2nd War Course

C Coy

D Coy

16th War Course

19th or 20th War Course?

23rd War Course, Martyred on 11th

Lt Muhammad Saeed Tariq (Shaheed)

Shahadat on 13 Dec 71 at Panjbibi

Lt Qaswar Naseer

2/Lt Syed Muhammad Arif

2/Lt Ghulam Abbas

2/Lt Salman Syed Muhammad

24th War Course, Embraced

44th PMA
45th PMA
46th PMA
47th PMA

The officers of the unit who were serving in East Pakistan during that period in other
formations were:

Maj Muhammad Safdar 6th PMA, HQ Eastern Command as DAAG

Capt Muhammad Zafar Khan 37th PMA in Scouts

Capt Asif Ali Rizvi 3rd War Course, serving in East Pakistan Civil Armed
Forces (EPCAF) at Coxs Bazar. He escaped becoming POW by crossing
over to Burma, was awarded TJ, but on repatriation of POWs Brig Atta
Muhammad Malik made out a case on him that he should have come to
Chittagong as per orders. He was divested of the award.

Capt Mehboob Ahmad 6th War Course Sta HQ Chittagong

Annex B

EXTRACTS FROM
An informal account by Air Marshal Inam-ul-Haque Khan (Retd), HJ, Former Air
Officer Commanding East Pakistan,
Saga of PAF in East Pakistan 19718
"President Yahya Khan held fair and free elections in December, 1970 in which
Awami League of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman won a majority largely due to his Six-Point
manifesto. National Assembly was to hold its first session in Dacca on 2 nd March,
1971. It was, however, sabotaged by vested interests of West Pakistani
establishment and some leading politicians, who were not willing to accept a
Bengali-led government. Postponement of National Assembly strengthened the
secessionist movement in East Pakistan, duly supported by India. Violent civil
disobedience ensued throughout East Pakistan immediately, resulting in casualties
including death of students in a Dacca hostel due to shelling. Army was forced to
retreat to cantonments for avoiding bloodshed. The situation was bad demanding
careful and intelligent handling. After about a week, when the disobedience had
simmered down, Yahya and advisors reached Dacca and held final talks with Mujib
on around 20th March for a couple of days. It was then agreed that Yahya will retain
the Presidency and, honouring the outcome of election, he will transfer power to
Mujib. Yahya, vacillating as ever, swayed by the ill-advice of leading politicians of
West Pakistan and his own military junta, to sort out these bloody Bengalis,
resorted to use force in starting on 25th March, 1971, instead of implementing
political solution reached with Awami League a complete betrayal of trust.
After the war, the Government of Pakistan established a Commission headed by
Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan Mr Hamood-ur-Rahman with just and
truly needed Terms of Reference to look into political, economic, social,
administrative, bureaucratic, military, etc, causes and factors which led to the
debacle. Later, the government of the day and civil establishment, apprehending
incrimination, restricted the Terms of Reference and confined these to only the
military factors, thus making armed forces the scapegoat for all the misdeeds of past
and present rulers, political leaders and the establishment. Hamood-ur-Rahman
Commission (HRC) gave their verdict on East Pakistan debacle in 1974, but the
report was never shown to us who underwent interrogation. Some years ago,
Declassified portions of HRC report text 28 published by DAWN on February 4,
2001 dealing with the role of PN and PAF, which came to my notice recently. A few
statements therein needed clarification. In this saga, inter alia, I have given the
rationale of some of our actions which fell short of HRC approval.
8

Available at http://imranhkhan.com/2009/11/17/saga-of-paf-in-east-pakistan-1971/

Army on Shaky Grounds ..

During this period of early April 1971, Army units kept on pouring in from West
Pakistan by PIA, flying around Sri Lanka. PIA Boeings were faster and had a quick
turnaround. These troops arriving Dacca had only their rifles with them, leaving
behind weapons such as machine guns, mortars, etc. They had no training,
whatsoever, in jungle or guerrilla warfare. They were ill-dressed for the terrain of
East Pakistan. Instead of gum boots or ammunition shoes, they had only the cheap
brown Bata canvas shoes, which might have been suitable for PT but not for jungle
warfare. They had only light parkas to protect them from incessant rain. One had to
see the gear of Indian soldiers, what with gumboots, proper leather shoes, raincoats, etc. We felt sorry for the plight of our soldiers. On reaching Dacca, they were
immediately rushed to far-flung posts strung along the border, in a strange, hostile
environment. .
The situation in East Pakistan remained adrift throughout summer, with minor
skirmishes with Mukti Bahini, and a few cases of bombing/blasting railway line,
bridges, etc. PAF continued with air support and rescuing troops whenever they
were in a fix. A PAF C-130 transport airplane stayed in Dacca for the first two
months, rushing troops where ever needed in an emergency, operating most
professionally from remote strips.
Pak Army continued the defence of fixed posts all along the border till the very end.
The GHQ in Rawalpindi was giving false hopes to our Eastern elements and, we
constantly heard of silly reports of reinforcements by Yellows from North and Whites
from South (aircraft carrier). War Orders for forces in East Pakistan had clearly
stipulated gradual retreat to Dacca Bowl on opening of hostilities. This was totally
ignored, which might have helped a better outcome, as will be shown later. This
policy of holding onto the posts along the border resulted in considerable casualties
to our troops.
Nobody Listening
In 1971, during my couple of visits to West Pakistan, it was shocking to see a life of
fun and frolic at parties, totally oblivious of the war-like situation of their brotherly
Wing. The adage that a General has to feel the heat of battle for proper decisions
was meaningless, given the distance between the two wings which was warping a
correct appreciation of the situation and thereby, decisions. This distance of 1,000
miles across India was further multiplied three times due to via-Colombo routing after
over flights had been denied by India, following a self-staged hijacking of an Indian
Airlines aircraft.
By third week of April, Mukti Bahini insurgency was almost routed, providing an
opportunity to resolve the issue politically the only method to keep Pakistan intact,
to some extent. In the third week a high level delegation visited Peking. On return
they stopped at Dacca. Our Foreign Secretary Mr Sultan Muhammad Khan was a

member of this team. I knew him from China where he was our Ambassador in 196668 and I was the Air Attach. I met and told him that a breather is available for
serious resolution of the issue. He replied Bhai wahan (meaning Yahya and his
coterie) to koi sunta he nahi aisi (logical) baat.
The Government did appoint a helpless Governor Malik, without any authority; it was
just a smoke screen for a political solution, a very difficult issue requiring hard
decisions. The situation kept on drifting with no decisive act by Pakistan in sight. On
the other hand, Indians were seriously preparing for war, along with full diplomatic
propaganda about a large number of Bengali refugees in India, atrocities by Pak
Army in East Pakistan etc. They were concurrently giving training, arming Mukti
Bahini and launching military actions against us. With dry weather suitable for
military offensive approaching in Bengal, Mrs Gandhi Prime Minister of India was
itching and looking for an excuse to attack.
In November, a mission comprising of the Services Chiefs and led by Chairman PPP
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited Peking. The Foreign Secretary S M Khan, being an old
China hand, was also a member of the team. On its return, the team briefed
President Yahya Khan but excluded Sultan Muhammad Khan. In 1974, on my return
to Pakistan from a POW Camp at Jubbulpore in India, I met S M Khan and asked
him about the teams visit to China just before the war. He related that Prime Minister
Mr Chou En Lai met the team at dinner. According to Mr Khan, Mr Chou En Lai
continued the whole night with his analysis of world opinion regarding the developing
situation in the Sub-Continent, especially with respect to Indian aims. This meeting
continued till the morning, when Mr Chou said he will discuss the matter with
Chairman Mao Tse Tung and meet the team again at dinner. In the evening Mr Chou
En Lai further elaborated all the related factors and, by morning he summed it up in a
brief gist. Mr Chou, in his arguments and analysis, made somewhat of a pyramid of
these from ground upwards, ending up at the apex with a concise plan of action. For
our team it was,
DO NOT PRECIPITATE WAR AS THE WORLD OPINION IS TURNING AGAINST
INDIA. IF NECESSARY, TRADE TERRITORY FOR TIME.
Being a civilized person, he formally added at the end, total friendship and support
for people of Pakistan. The leader of Pakistani team offered no words of thanks or
gratitude. Being an ex-China hand and seasoned diplomat, S M Khan took upon
himself to thank the PM for his very apt and useful advice. Sooner they came out of
meeting, Bhutto rebuked him for thanking the Prime Minister for advice, and said
Sultan, what do these Chinese know of Indo Pakistan affairs. S M Khan said at
once that he was not sure as to what message will be conveyed to Yahya Khan.
When I enquired from S M Khan as to what message was actually conveyed to
President Yahya from this last China trip, he said that he was not taken to the
Presidency, but General Peerzada was present in the briefing to the President and I
could ask him. This I did, who confirmed that Bhutto only conveyed general remarks

of Mr Chou En Lai about friendship and support for people of Pakistan; the specific
advice for not precipitating war was intentionally not conveyed. Clearly, the PPP
leader had his own agenda, which he could not achieve in 1965
Aftermath
During the summer before the war, the Chinese Counsellor came to my office,
emphasizing the need for a political solution rather than military. But the visit by IG
Police, East Pakistan along with Commissioner Dacca during the war was strange to
say the least. Knowing fully all the shortcomings, conditions and handicaps, they
surprisingly said, So Air Commodore your army is incapable of defending the
country. This was most unbecoming of these high officials and I nearly threw them
out. Later both, after foregoing their Pakistani citizenship, approached the UN
representative for shelter in Hotel Pearl Continental (declared as neutral area), but
the request was rejected, forcing them to stay in the Cantonment. Ironically, after the
war one of them became Secretary Interior, Government of Pakistan!
The war lingered on with assurances of aid from North and South. The policy of fixed
defence along the border was henceforth to continue, no retreat to Dacca Bowl, as
stipulated in War Plan, was to be attempted officially. Diplomatic efforts were also
being made in and outside UN with some solution like retaining both East and West
Pakistan intact within a Confederation. It was not to the liking of the PPP leader,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who wished for a quick unconditional defeat in Dacca at the
earliest. That is why the War Plan of retreating to Dacca Bowl was not allowed, as it
may have prolonged the war and delayed surrender, allowing more time for a
possible peaceful resolution, retaining the integrity of Pakistan. When detailed to
lead the mission to UN, he took his own sweet time enroute, hoping for an early
surrender in the mean time. In the Security Council he played the drama of scornfully
tearing the notes pertaining to the only sensible Polish Resolution and walking out
angrily. He had put up a similar drama in UN Security Council in 1965 when he
dashed out after calling the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh a dog. S M Khan,
who was the High Commissioner in Canada at the time and was a member of the
delegation, had to follow him. On getting out of the chamber he turned to S M Khan
and said dekha sain kaisi acting keeti hey. This time in 1971 it was an encore. That
walk-out ended all hopes of one Pakistan
Before 16th December, hardly any Bengali was visible anywhere, but from that
morning onwards they started pouring in large numbers from nowhere onto the
airfield, streets and were present in great number at this ceremony. Mukti Bahini
were thrashing and killing non- Bengalis even during the ceremony while nearby
Indian troops made no attempt to stop the carnage. A small group of Mukti Bahini
approached and addressed me, ignoring the Indian Air Commodore (my escort)
standing beside me, and said thank you Sir for liberating us from the Pakistani
barbarians. When I replied that I am one of those barbarians, they got perplexed
and slipped away.

For a couple of days after surrender, the Indian GOC of the formation investing
Dacca allowed us to retain our arms, as the Mukti Bahini had started sniping at our
personnel in our Camps. Our men retaliated and killed a few snipers. This could
have flared into a serious problem, so I went to the Indian GOC for restraining the
Mukti Bahini from provocative shooting. The Indian GOC was occupying the office of
General Niazi, sitting on his chair while Niazi was sitting on one side and, without
any remorse, telling jokes and laughing. On my request, the Indian GOC called in
Brig Shahbeg Singh and asked whether the Mukti Bahini could be restrained.
Shahbeg hurriedly consulted Tiger Siddiqui, (Commander, Tangail Mukti Bahini) who
was standing in the veranda outside, and reported back that they would not be able
to comply. The GOC then ordered Shahbeg to accompany me to the Base, where
the latter contacted the Officer Commanding of an Infantry Battalion to sort out the
sniping. On reaching the office, the Battalion Commander was called in and
assigned the task. During this period Shahbeg Singh told me that he was in charge
of Mukti Bahini training and organizing in Agartala Sector. He had made many trips
into East Pakistan and Dacca prior to war. His last trip to Dacca was on 3 rd
December, masquerading as a rickshaw driver with his small beard flowing and
balding head covered with a white maulvi cap. Shahbeg Singh also offered me safekeeping of any jewellery or fire arms that I may have had. I had none. As luck would
have it, he was promoted and posted as GOC Jubbulpore where our camp was
located. Later, after retirement, he became the Military Advisor to Sikh militant
politician Jarnail Singh Bhindrawaley. When Bhindrawaley threw a challenge to the
authority of Union Government, a strong-willed Mrs Gandhi ordered an attack on the
sacred Golden Temple at Amritsar in 1984. Shahbeg Singh who was killed by Indian
troops during the attack.
On 15th December, while driving, I was stopped by a bearded, well-dressed
gentleman who turned out to be the Chief Flying Instructor of Dacca Flying Club. He
was famous for his flying prowess throughout India. He enquired of me whether it
was true about the surrender. On my confirmation he tore at his beard and clothes
and said what will happen to the Biharis now. His apprehensions turned out to be
correct, as can be seen from the squalid conditions of camps where they have been
living ever since, under very adverse conditions. Urdu-speaking Biharis never
integrated with the Bengalis and retained their own language, culture and traditions.
They always considered themselves as true Pakistanis which they proved by their
loyalties till the end, incurring the wrath of locals. Biharis were relatively better
educated than Bengalis, and were also technically qualified, thus running railways,
telephone and telegraph and other technical services. They were, however, all along
considered as traitors for their open support to West Pakistani troops and civilians.
After the war, Biharis justifiably expected to be repatriated to Pakistan. Barring a
handful, no Pakistan Government permitted their repatriation. This reprehensible
treatment in disowning patriotic Pakistanis would remain a blemish on Pakistan.

The night 15/16th December, 1971 was traumatic and hectic to say the least. Army
helicopters were flying out to Burma in the early hours. An injured General was also
a passenger on one, without the knowledge of General Niazi who was annoyed by
his departure. Niazi wanted all the six General officers to accompany him, a logic
which is difficult to understand. There were three Pak Army Divisions in East
Pakistan, hence only General Officers should, at best, have remained with him.
Offering three additional trophies to the Indians was not called for.
On repatriation to Pakistan, I was told by none less than the Chief of Air Staff of PAF
that the sole purpose of going to war was to extricate West Pakistanis safely across
India, therefore no meaningful operation against India was undertaken. This was not
understood or acceptable to highly patriotic and professionally outstanding officers
such as Brigadier F B Ali or Group Captain A M Sikander who rightly blamed Yahya
for the breakup of Pakistan. Several of these officers were tried by General Court
Martial (GCM) for engineering a conspiracy against the State.
Mercifully, later the PAF did a better job of treating its repatriated POWs. It
prematurely retired only once officer while most went on to continue their careers
successfully. The Army POWs were, however shabbily treated, on grounds that they
had been brain washed. (Italics mine)

The Villains
It is true that the seeds of hatred had been sown a long time ago. This hatred was
nurtured over the years due to arrogant, callous, unjust, bigoted, short-sighted, and
disdainful policies of the West Pakistani establishment and self-serving politicians.
Seeds of such hatred were sown right in the beginning, when Urdu was declared the
official language of Pakistan, ignoring the rich Bengali language and culture of the
majority. In such a sorry milieu, it is not easy to vilify individuals, but the actions of
three actors are far too obvious to be overlooked.
I had little respect for Sheikh Mujib since I met him once in Los Angeles in 1957 at a
dinner in his honour given by two Lahori brothers who were students in University of
Southern California. I too was attending a course in USC. He was then an important
politician holding the post of Secretary General of Awami League under Mr
Suhrawardy. During dinner I was expecting him to speak on national issues facing
Pakistan, politics, current and international affairs etc, but I was shocked to hear him
talk mostly about women. Shaikh Mujib was neither an intellectual nor a man of
principles; he was simply a loud-mouthed rabble rouser. Hard core policies and
decisions were made by the hardliner Tajuddin sitting in Calcutta, with his coterie. In
the sixties, Mujib was fully involved in Agartala Conspiracy. He was declared
innocent on the urging of some of our well meaning leaders so that he could attend a
round table conference chaired by Ayub Khan, as he tried desperately to hold on to

power. This action by Ayub made Mujeeb an overnight hero in the eyes of Bengalis
who had doubts about his involvement in the conspiracy.
Yahya Khan blundered naively in permitting Sheikh Mujib of Awami League to fight
election of Dec 70 on the basis of his notorious Six Point manifesto. However,
Yahya should have accepted the outcome of elections once held fairly and legally.
He blundered again by not ensuring holding of Assembly session on 2 nd March at
Dacca as planned, and handing over the government to the majority party,
regardless. One thing is certain; Mujib once in power would NEVER have seceded
from Pakistan for bringing about Bangladesh. Any one opposing holding of this
session or instigating and threatening members who wished to attend, should have
been arrested for sedition or at least isolated, for defying the writ of the government.
Yahya foolishly kept on vacillating from one party to the other till he was led into a
trap by Bhutto, convincing Yahya to commit yet another blunder on 26th March 1971.
Military action suited Bhutto, as he would have never been able to form a
government once the parity of seats between the two wings was fairly but unwittingly
abolished, giving more seats to East Pakistan on population basis. Yahya Khan also
abolished One Unit system of each wing, thus reviving provincial rivalries. In doing
so, a nave and simpleton Yahya undid what was achieved with great effort, viz
parity of members in National Assembly, so graciously accepted by East Pakistanis.
Yahya committed his last blunder in initiating the war which appalled Chinese and
other friendly countries, but pleased some of our leaders. Most happy was that
woman Mrs Indira Gandhi, since she was frantically looking for an excuse to undo
the unity of Pakistan"

Annex C
Order of Battle
Location of Pakistani Units in East Pakistan on 03 December 1971.
Pakistan army started to work on a plan of defence against a possible Indian attack
from July 1971. At that time, 3 infantry divisions held responsibility for the province:
the 9th (Maj. Gen.M H Ansari, HQ Jessore) looking after the area south of the
Padma River, the 16th (Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah, HQ Natore) responsible for
the area north of Padma and west of Jamuna rivers and the 14th (Maj. Gen.Abdul
Majid Qazi, HQ: Dhaka) looking after the rest of the province. The original plan was
based on a series of exercises, known as Titumeer, which were held during 1970
1971. It was revised several times and approved in October 1971. General Niazi had
created 4 ad hoc infantry brigades and 2 ad hoc infantry divisions regrouping the
available troops before final order of battle was devised.
The final order of battle prior to December 3, 1971 was:
Eastern Command Headquarters Dhaka
GOC: Lt. General A A K Niazi
COS: Brigadier Baqir Siddiqi
Commander Artillery: Brig. S. S. A. Kashim
Commander Armor: Col. Bakhtier
Commander Engineers: Brig. Iqbal Sharif
Commander Signals: Brig. Arif Reza
Commander Medical Service: Brig. Fahim Ahmed Khan
Advisor: Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali
Units under HQ Control:
**6th Engineer Regiment
**10th Engineer Regiment detached to various locations
**11th Engineer Regiment - Lt. Col Sarwar
** 43rd Light Ack Ack Lt. Col. Mohammad Afzal
** 19th Signal Regiment
**3rd Commando Battalion (less elements)
**Army Aviation Squadron #4 Lt. Col. Liaqat Bokhari
Dhaka Defence Scheme (adhoc)
Brig. Kasim (North): Dhaka Cantonment & Tongi area
Brig. Mansoor (East): Munshiganj & Narayanganj
Brig. Bashir: Dhaka city proper

EPCAF HQ and Sector units:

o

Police and Razakars

Pakistan Air Force CO: Air Commodore Enamul Huq

**No. 14 Squadron Tail-choppers: 20 F-86 Sabers
**Training unit: 3 T-33
Pakistan Navy CO: Rear Admiral Mohammad Sharif

4 Gunboats: PNS Rajshahi, Comilla, Sylhet and Jessore

o

1 Patrol Boat: PNS Balaghat

17 armed boats

Naval Marines Captain Zamir

36 Ad hoc Infantry Division

CO: Maj. Gen. M. Jamshed Khan HQ Dhaka
Area of Operation: Dhaka, Tangail and Mymensingh districts

93 Infantry Brigade: Brig Abdul Qadir Khan HQ Mymensingh

o

83 Independent. Mortar battery

31 Baluch Jamalpur

33 Punjab Mymensingh

71 Wing WPR Kishorganj

70 Wing WPR Bijaipur

14 Infantry Division
OC: Major General Abdul Majid Qazi, HQ Brahmanbaria
Area of Operation: Sylhet and Northern Comilla districts

31st Field Artillery Ashuganj Brahmanbaria - Shamshernagar

88 Independent Mortar Battery Sylhet

171 Independent Mortar Battery Comilla

Sylhet

202 Adhoc Brigade: Brig. Salimullah

o

31 Punjab Sylhet

91 Mujahid Battalion Sunamganj

12 Azad Kashmir Sylhet

Also: Wings of Tochi, Thal and Khyber scouts

Maulavibazar

313 infantry Brigade: Brig. Iftikar Rana

o

22 Baluch Kalaura

30 Frontier Force Shahshernagar

91 Mujahid (minus elements) & Tochi Scouts Sherpur

Brahmanbaria

27th Infantry Brigade: Brig. Saadullah

o

33rd Baluch Kasba

12th Frontier Force Akhaura

2 Troops of M-24 Chaffee Akhaura

1x Anti Tank Platoon 34 Punjab (R&S)

39 Ad hoc Division
OC: Maj. Gen. Rahim Khan Chandpur
Area of Operation: Comilla, Feni and Northern Chittagong

53rd Field Artillery Comilla

Comilla

117th Infantry Brigade: Brig. Sheikh M.H. Atif

o

30 Punjab Saldanadi

25th Frontier Force Mainamati

12th Azad Kashmir Comilla

Feni

53rde Infantry Brigade: Brig. Aslam Niazi

o

15th Baluch Belonia

39th Baluch Laksham

23rd Punjab Mean Bazar

21 Azad Kashmir - Laksham

Ramgarh

91st Ad hoc Brigade: Brig. Mian Taskeenuddin HQ Chittagong

o

24th Frontier Force Ramgarh

Chakma and Mizo troops

EPCAF 11th and 14th Wings

Chittagong

97th Independent Brigade: Brig. Ata Mohd. Khan Malik

o

48th Baluch Chittagong

2 SSg Commando - Rangamati

60th Wing Rangers Ramgarh

61st Wing Rangers Coxs Bazar

Naval Contingent

46th Light Ack Ack Battery

16th Infantry Division

CO: Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah HQ: Bogra, then Natore
Area of Operation: Rajshahi, Bogra, Dinajpur, Rangpur and Pabna
Districts
**29th Cavalry less elements Rangpur

48th Field Regiment Thakurgaon

80th Field Regiment Hili

117th Mortar Battery Kurigram

Saidpur

23rd Infantry Brigade: Brig. Iqbal Shaffi

o

25th Punjab Lalmanirhut

26th Frontier Force Dinajpur

48th Punjab Nilphamari

8 Punjab Rangpur

34th Punjab (less one company and one anti tank platoon)
Thakurgaon

86th Mujahid Gaibandha

Bogra

205th Infantry Brigade: Brig. Tajammul Hussain Malik HQ: Bogra (Tac HQ
Chatni in 4 FF area)
o

32nd Baluch Ghoraghat

4 Frontier Force Hilli

8 Baluch Jaipurhut

C Coy 34 Punjab (R&S) at Hilli/Panjbibi

Nator

34th Infantry Brigade: Brig. Mir Abdul Nayeem

o

32nd Punjab Nawabganj

13th Frontier Force Sapahar/Patnitola

Rajshahi

Rajshahi Ad hoc Brigade[8]

9th Infantry Division

CO: Maj. Gen HM. H. Ansari HQ Jessore
Area of Operation: Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali
districts

3rd Ind. Armoured Squadron Jessore

55th Field Artillery Satkhira and Chaugacha

49th Field Artillery Chuadanga

211th Independent Mortar Battery Chaugacha

Jhenida

57th Infantry Brigade: Brig. Manzoor H Atif

o

18th Punjab Darshana

50th Punjab Jhenida

29th Baluch Kushtia

Squadron 29th Cavalry Kushtia

Jessore

107th Infantry Brigade: Brig. M Hayat Khan

o

22nd Frontier Force Benapole

38th Frontier Force Afra

6th Punjab Jessore

21st Punjab Satkhira

15th Frontier Force Jessore

12th Punjab Jessore

Khulna

314th Ad Hoc Brigade: Col. Fazle Hamid

Total number of units of the different arms/services

Above details taken from the Wikipedia, are summarised below;
Armour Regiment - 1
Infantry Battalions -34 (31xregular Infantry battalions and 3x R&S battalions)
Artillery

Field regiments 6

Mortar Batteries 7

Engineer Battalions 3
Signal battalion 1
Para military forces
East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF) raised in place of East Pakistan Rifles
(EPR) Approximately 6000 local persons. These people being locals joined their
families as the war ended. They did not become prisoners of war.
Scouts 3 Wings
Rangers 4 Wings
Mujahids 2 battalions (mainly local persons)
Navy 4xGunboats, 17x armed boats and some marine personnel
PAF One Squadron

The Number of Prisoners of War

The much exaggerated figure of 93000 prisoners of war is absolutely false. Actual
number of prisoners could not be more than forty thousands; a likely figure of 39000
inverted to 93000 which have stuck. Considering the authorised strength of the units
which is never complete and about 15% attrition, the approximate breakdown is:

Army 32000 (authorised strength of a regular infantry battalion

was 798 and that of R&S battalion 686. Considering that
authorised strength is never complete and taking out people away
from units on extra regimental employment and an average of 15%
casualties which could not be made up, a regular infantry battalion
was left with about 650 people on the average and R&S battalions
left with about 550 persons. The strength of artillery and armour
units is almost half of the infantry battalions. This I am calculating
on plus side)

Navy and PAF 1500

CAF troops including Policemen 4000

(EPCAF persons being local, did not surrender having joined their
families)

Civilians Exact number can be found out from the list of prisoners
if it is available with some government department. There were

very few civilians who included some senior government officials,

crew of two merchant ships and very few families.
Total Number of Prisoners of War, including civilians could not be even half of what
was propagated. The Army, under General Gul Hassan for first few months of
Bhuttos rule and then under General Tikka Khan, the future Secretary General of
PPP after retirement, never clarified the figures.
The Indians took two weeks (01 January to 15 January 1972) to pick up the
prisoners from different parts of East Pakistan and placed them in various camps in
Bihar, Uttar Pardesh and Madhia Pardesh, a very vast expanse of land. While
starting their move from respective locations, the prisoners were told that they were
in transit and would be moving to Pakistan. After keeping them for over two years in
Indian camps, the prisoner were repatriated in small numbers spreading the process
for about eight months starting September 1973 and ending by last week of April
1974. It was arranged in a manner that the men from fighting units could not get
together. When the units were re raised after one year of the completion of
repatriation process i.e. by mid 1975, very few of their original manpower could come
back to the units.