He Who Seeks Equity

Must Do Equity






Kalyani Pandya
12A057
Gujarat National Law University


Sunanda Sahoo
12B148
Gujarat National Law University

Assisted by :
Mrs. Garima Goswami
Faculty of Law
Gujarat National Law University


INTRODUCTION

The term equity is derived from the latin expression Aequitas Aequuas, connoting the
sense of levelling or equalisation. Etymologically equity implies fairness; right as founded on
the laws of nature; recourse to principles of justice to correct or supplement law or sprit of
justice which enables the laws to be interpreted rightly.
1


According to Aristotle
Equity is the correction of law where it is defective account of its generality. It is equity to
pardon human and to look to the law giver and not the law; to the spirit and not to the letter;
to the and not to the action; to the whole and not to the part; to the character of the actor the
long run, and not the present moment; to remember the good rather than evil the good that
one has received rather than the good that one has done, to bear being injured; to wish to
settle a matter by words rather than deeds; lastly to prefer arbitration to judgements for the
arbitrator sees what is equitable and but judge only by the law, and for this an arbitrator was
first appointed in order that equity might flourish.


The term equity is used in diverse ways and connotes a variety of senses. In its popular
parlance it signifies natural justice, equality and fairness and implies that a an shall do unto
others as he would be done by. In this sense however, it has no juridical significance for
unkindness and ingratitude o other moral wrongs clearly fall outside the scope of equity.
2


Equity is the system of law which, prior to the fusion of law and equity affected by the
Judicature Acts, 1873 and 1875, was administered in the Court of Chancery. Equity,
technically is that portion of equity the larger sense of natural justice, which though of such a
nature as to admit properly of its being judicially enforced, was omitted to be enforced by our
common law courts- an omission which was supplied by the Court of Chancery.
3




1
Principles of equity with trusts and specific relief
2
Ibid
3
Principles of equity with trusts and specific relief
DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITY

Equity was developed two or three hundred years after the common law system did to resolve
disputes where damages were an unsuitable remedy and to introduce fairness into the legal
system. The distinction between "law" and "equity" is an accident of history. The law courts
or "courts of law" were the courts in England that enforced the king's laws in medieval times.
There the King's Judges, educated in law rather than theology, administered the realm's
universal law.
4


The common law was deficient in the following three aspects
1) Remedy was not available in all cases and many wrongs remain unaddressed.
2) The relief granted by common law court was not adequate.
3) The common law was very formal and cumbersome. The procedure was defective and
unsatisfactory.

To address these problems equitable jurisdiction emerged in England. Persons who could not
get adequate relief to the shortcomings of the common law began to present come to the
Court of Chancery.















4
S Worthington, Equity (2nd edn. OUP, Oxford 2006) p. 8.
EQUITY UNDER INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM

In India the common law doctrine of equity had traditionally been followed even after it
became independent in 1947. However in 1963 the "Specific Relief Act" was passed by the
Parliament of India following the recommendation of the Law Commission of India and
repealing the earlier "Specific Relief Act" of 1877. Under the 1963 Act, most equitable
concepts were codified and made statutory rights, thereby ending the discretionary role of the
courts to grant equitable reliefs. The rights codified under the 1963 Act were as under:
5


Recovery of possession of immovable property (ss. 58)
Specific performance of contracts (ss. 925)
Rectification of Instruments (s. 26)
Recession of Contracts (ss. 2730)
Cancellation of Instruments (ss. 3133)
Declaratory Decrees (ss. 3435)
Injunctions (ss. 3642)

With this codification, the nature and tenure of the equitable reliefs available earlier have
been modified to make them statutory rights and are also required to be pleaded specifically
to be enforced. Further to the extent that these equitable reliefs have been codified into rights,
they are no longer discretionary upon the courts or as the English law has it, "Chancellor's
foot" but instead are enforceable rights subject to the conditions under the 1963 Act being
satisfied. Nonetheless, in the event of situations not covered under the 1963 Act, the courts in
India continue to exercise their inherent powers in terms of Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, which applies to all civil courts in India. There is no such inherent powers
with the criminal courts in India except with the High Courts in terms of Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Further, such inherent powers are vested in the Supreme
Court of India in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India which confers wide powers
on the Supreme Court to pass orders "as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause
of matter pending before it.
6



5
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_(legal_concept)#India
6
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_(legal_concept)#India
HE WHO SEEKS EQUITY MUST DO EQUITY

Meaning:
The maxim means that to obtain an equitable relief the plaintiff must himself be prepared to
do equity, that is, a plaintiff must recognize and submit to the right of his adversary. Even
though the system of equity got evolved in England, Scriptures of Islam also inform us to be
conscientious:
Woe to those who stint the measure:
Who when they take by measure from others, exact the full;
But when they mete to them or weigh to them, minish
7

It also gives a meaning that to obtain an equitable relief the plaintiff must himself be prepared
to do equity that is, a plaintiff must recognize and submit to the right of his adversary.
8
It is
applicable only for people who will come forward if they themselves are in an issue wherein
they are just and fair while functioning.
If one needs the exact full measure, you must be prepared to reciprocate. As said in the case
of Deeks v. Strutt
9
, a court of law cannot impose terms on the party suing. If he is entitled to
a decision, the law must take its own course; but the practise of the Chancery Court was
different in that while giving equitable relief it imposed such terms on the applicant which are
agreeable to the conscience because equity acts on the principle of conscience of the party.
In fact, the maxim lays down a bare abstract principle, what those terms could be was left to
the discretion of the court. Snell
10
therefore points out that: This is a rule of unquestionable
justice, which however, decides nothing in itself, for you must inquire first what are the
equities which the defendant must do, and what the plaintiff ought to have
Also, equitable remedies are discretionary and the court will not grant them if it feels that the
plaintiff is unworthy, notwithstanding that prima facie he has established an equitable right or

7
Titus and Keeton, The range of Ethics, (1972), 379.
8
Rita&Reza, http://lawcare87.blogspot.in/2012/05/maxims-of-equity.html (last accessed on March 23, 2014).
9
101 ER 384.
10
Snells principle of Equity, 30.
interest. The maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity, are aspects of this discretionary
quality. It should not be supposed that the discretion is entirely unfettered.
11

As Lord Romilly MR explained in Haywood v. Cope
12
, the discretion of the court must
exercise according to fixed and settled rules; you cannot exercise a discretion by merely
considering what, as between the parties, would be fair to be done; what one person may
consider fair, another person may consider very unfair you must have some settled rule and
principle upon which to determine how the discretion is to be exercised.
This maxim therefore, refers to the plaintiffs further conduct.

















11
The Maxims of Equity,
http://catalogue.pearsoned.co.uk/assets/hip/gb/uploads/M02_EDWA3458_10_SE_C02.pdf (last accessed on
March 23, 2014).
12
(1858) 25 Beav 140.
APPLICATIONS AND CASES
This maxim has many applications. The maxim can be applied in the following ways

i) I llegal loans

According to the maxim, if a person has taken illegal loan he must pay back the loan before
relief is given in favour of him.
In the case Lodge v. National Union Investment Co. Ltd.
13
, the facts are as follows.
B borrowed money from M by mortgaging certain securities to him. M was an unregistered
money-lender. Under the Money-lenders Act, 1900, the contract was illegal and therefore
void. B sued M for the return of securities. The court refused to make an order except upon
the terms that B should repay the money which had been advanced to him. This decision was
based upon the principle of this maxim. There was some criticism levelled against this case
that is it does not lay down any wide general principles. It has been distinguished on certain
points which are discussed hereunder.


If B had asked merely for a declaration that the mortgage was void, he could have obtained
the relief without repayment of the amount, because that is not an equitable relief but a legal
one that is available under the Act. Moreover B by suing M in detinue or trover couls have
also recovered the securities without repayment. Comparing this case with Chapman Case
14

one can easily find out the difference between a legal and equitable remedy. In both the cases,
the plaintiff had borrowed some money from the defendants who were not registered under
the Money-Lenders Act. In the case of Lodge, the plaintiff did ask for a declaration (legal
relief) , and this was refused, except on his fulfilling a condition attached by the Court, which
it was competent to impose.


In the case Lewis v. Plunkett
15
, it was held that when a mortgagor is in possession of
mortgaged property and the mortgagees right is time-barred then the mortgagor can recover
the title deeds from the mortgagee without repaying the loan. This added a new dimension to

13
(1907) 1 Ch 300
14
Chapman v. Michaelson, (1909) 1 Ch 238
15
1937 Ch 306.
the position as it stands at present which goes to support the pronouncement of the decision in
Kasmus case
16
thst lodge does not lay down any wide and general principle.

ii) Doctrine of Election

Stating the gist of the doctrine succinctly it may be said that where a donor A gives his own
property to B and in the same instrument purports to give Bs property to C, B will be put to
an election, either to retain his own property and reject the benefit under the instrument or to
accept the benefit granted to him by the donor, and allow the gift of his own property made
by A to C to take effect. But in no case can B choose to keep the benefit granted to him and at
the same time retain his property referred to in the instrument.

As Maitland puts it, he who accepts a benefit under a deed or will or other instrument must
adopt the whole content of that instrument, must conform to all the provisions and renounce
all rights that are inconsistent with it. This position is expressed as one cannot both
approbate and reprobate;
17
benefits and burdens go together; one cannot blow hot and cold
in the same breath; and that one cannot have the cake and eat it too. As Snell puts it equity
fastens on the conscience of a person who is put to election and refuses to allow him to take
the benefit of a disposition contained in a will, the validity of which is not in question, except
on certsin conditions.
18


iii) Consolidation of mortgages

When a person has become entitled to two mortgages from the same mortgagor, he may
consolidate these mortgages and refuse to permit the mortgage to exercise his equitable right
to redeem on mortgage unless and until the other is redeemed, i.e., unless there is
simultaneous redemption of all. This is called equity of consolidation.

This is naturally on the principle that he comes into equity must do equity. It is to be noted
that if the mortgagor exercises his legal right to redeem within the time mentioned in the deed
this doctrine does not apply but when this time has passes, only the equitable right to redeem

16
1956 AC 359.
17
See Maitland: Lectures on Equity, p.287
18
Snells Principles of Equity, p.484
remains to which this maxim will apply. This right of consolidation now exists in England
but after the enactment of the Law of Property Act, 1925, it can exist only by express
reservation in one of the mortgage deeds.
19


iv) Notice to redeem mortgage

Notice to a mortgagee to redeem ones mortgage is an equitable right of the mortgagor.

v) Wifes equity to a settlement

There was a time in England at Common Law the wife could not old independently any
property. This was the effect of marriage. Legal existence of the wife so to say merged into
that of her husband, the husband consequently becoming the absolute owner of her moneys,
goods and chattels, things in action and estates.
20
But the equity saw injustice in this situation
and therefore departed from the Common Law principle in three cases by recognising the
wifes equity to a settlement, recognising the wifes right to a separate estate in certain
circumstances, and by putting fetters on the wifes right to alienate that separate property or
disabling her to anticipate future income called the restraint on anticipation.

When, therefore, a husband sought the aid of the Chancery Court to obtain possession of his
wifes equitable property to which he was entitled in right of his wife, the courts refused to
assist him unless he accepted the terms and conditions imposed by the equity courts in order
to compel him to make a reasonable provision for her and her children. But now, as Snell
notes, under the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, a married
womans property is no longer her separate property but is simply her property; and it
belongs to her in all aspects as if she were a feme sole, with same rights of ownership and
disposition, whether inter vivos or by will, as an unmarried woman or man.
21
This illustration
has therefore become obsolete and of academic interest only.

vi) Equitable Estoppel

19
See Section 93 of the Law of Property Act, 1925.
20
Snells Principles of Equity, pp. 513-514
21
Ree v. Huges, 1946 KB 517
This concept at Common Law, which was confined in the beginning to various formal
matters, was later expanded by equity courts which covered in its sweep any representation of
existing facts, whether by words or by conduct which was acted upon by a person before
whom it was made and the maker of the representation was not allowed to go back upon it.
Later on this doctrine of equitable estoppels was expressed in two forms called promissory
estoppels and proprietary estoppels.

Estoppel is a principle which precludes a party from alleging or proving in legal proceedings
that a fact is otherwise than it has appeared to be from the circumstances. Apart from estoppel
from record and estoppel by deed, a promissory estoppel arises where a party has expressly or
impliedly, by conduct or by negligence, made a statement of fact, or so conducted himself,
that another would reasonably understand that he might act in reliance thereon, and has so
acted, that the party who made representation is not allowed to allege that the fact is
otherwise that he has represented it to be.
22
The doctrine has been known by various names:
promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel and new estoppel or estoppel in pais
(by conduct).

It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named as
promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel.
23
It has,
as matter of fact, transcended these limits and gained new dimensions in recent years. The
full implications of this new kind of estoppel are yet to be spelled out. It is a principle that
advances the cause of justice.

It was Mr. Justice Denning, in England, who first rescued the doctrine from obscurity in
Central London Property Trust Ltd.
24
, and laid the foundation for its applicability in
Robertson v. Minister of Pensions
25
reiterating and expanding the scope of its application
even to the Crown in Howell v. Falmouth Board Construction
26
in the following words:-
(1) That the assurances intended to be acted upon and in fact acted upon were binding, and

22
Bhagwati,J., in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409
23
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409

24
Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., (1956) 1 ALL ER 256
25
LR (1949) 1 KB 227
26
LR 1951 AC 837
(2) That where a government department wrongfully assumed authority to perform some legal
act, the citizen is entitled to assume that it has that authority.

There must be necessary factual foundation for the application of the doctrine. It depends
upon the facts of each case whether there was a representation or not. The representation
must be unambiguous and clear and there must be a nexus or a connection between the
representation and action whereby the plaintiff alters the position. It should be noted that this
doctrine is limited to public law area
27
and the petitioner praying for relied must have his
hands clear and must prove that equity is in his favour. The doctrine has its basis in justice to
an individual and though often described as a rule of evidence, more correctly it is a principle
of law. Justice here prevails over truth.


Application in I ndia of estoppel
Originated in equity, first pressed into service by Calcutta High Court
28
in1880 and thereafter
by the Supreme Court
29
in 1951 and onwards till today the doctrine had been applied in
various cases and fields, especially in the field of public law. The starting-point of such
application may be considered to be the case of Collector of Bombay v. Municipal
corp.,Bombay
30
, wherein the view was expressed by Chandrashekhar Aiyar J., that holding
out of the promise by the Government was binding on the government and that a court of
equity must prevent the perpetration of legal fraud. Anglo-Afghan case
31
, a leading case on
the point accepted this view in 1968. T was in the case that Shah, J., applying the principle
against the Government exploded the doctrine of executive necessity as a defence.
He observed:
Under our jurisprudence the government is not exempt from liability to carry our the
representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and
undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by

27
Jasjeet Films (P) Ltd. v. DDA, AIR 1980 Del 83.
28
Ganges Mfd. Co. v. Sourujmull, ILR (1880) 5 Cal 669.
29
Collector of Bombay v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. AIR 1951 SC 469.
30
Ibid.
31
Union of India v. Anglo-Afghan Agencies AIR 1968 SC 718.
it, nor claim to be the judge its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of
the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen.
Public bodies are as much bound by the principle as private individuals. In Century spinning
& Manufacturing v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council
32
, the principle was applied to a public
body because the court ordinarily would not allow different standards of conduct for the
people and the public bodies. Similarly in case of purely executive funtions of the state
33
, in
regard to schemes of administrative nature and administrative directions and orders the
doctrine has been applied. Therefore, not only the public bodies but in cases of universities ,
municipality and trust and wherever there is manifest injustice the doctrine has been pressed
into service.
The decision in Anglo-African case
34
, thus came to be followed in many other areas. The
principle however, found its power exponenet by Bhagwati, J., in Motilal Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd. v. State of U.P.
35
At this juncture it should be notes that the authority of this case was
sough to be shaked by another case wherein it was observed that in the Motilal decision was
not in accordance with the view consistently taken by the Supreme Court in Gofrey
Philips
36
. In J it Ram v. State of Harayana
37
which takes a slightly different view and holds
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available against the Exercise of executive
functions of the State and the Sate cannot be prevented from exercising its functions under
the law. The court said that considering both the decision we are clearly of the view that what
has been laid down in Motilal Sugar case represents the correct law in regard to the doctrine
of promissory estoppel and we express our disagreement with the observations in the Jit
Ram case, to the extent that they conflict with the statement of the law in Motilal Sugar am
introduce reservations cutting down the full width and amplitude of the propositions of law
laid down in that case.
This view was fully endorsed in a recent case of Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. Lotus
Hotels (P) Ltd.
38
The Corporation first sanctioned a loan of Rs. 29lacs to Lotus Hotels for
construction of a hotel by creating an equitable mortgage. The plaintiff relying thereon

32
(1970) 1 SCC 582.
33
Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) 2 SCC 673.
34
Supra fn. 11.
35
(1979) 2 SCC 409.
36
(1985) 4 SCC 369
37
(1981) 1 SCC 11, 37.
38
(1983) 3 SCC 379.
proceeded to act and execute the project, but subsequently the Corp changed its mind and
refused to disburse it. Relying upon the decision in Motilal Sugar
39
, The Supreme Court
rules that the Corp was bound by its promise and must discharge its statutory duty; the
decision in Jit Ram
40
, could not save the Corporation. This is because when the officer acts
within the scope of his authority under a scheme and enters into an agreement and makes a
representation and a person acting on that representation puts himself in a disadvantageous
position, the Court is entitles to require the officer to act according to the scheme and the
agreement or representation. The officer cannot arbitrarily act on his mere whim ignore his
promise on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity or change the conditions to
the prejudice of the person who had acted upon such representation and put himself in a
disadvantageous position














39
(1979) 2 SCC 409.
40
(1981) 1 SCC 11,37.
Recognition in India
Most of the equitable principles and rules have, in India, been embodied in the statute law
and has been made applicable to the extent of the provisions made therein. The provisions of
equity in Indian statute books might have their source in common law or in equity or in an
adjustment between the two, is immaterial. Statutory recognitions of the principles of equity
are found in:
1) The Indian Contract Act, 1872;
2) The Specific Relief Act, 1877;
3) The Indian Trust act, 1882;
4) The Transfer of Property Act, 1882; and
5) The Indian Succession Act, 1925.
1) Indian Contract Act : Indian Contract Act, under Section 19-A of the Indian Contract Act
contracts entered into under undue influence are voidable and therefore a party to a contract
who had the option of getting the contract declared void will have to return the benefits so
obtained of getting the contract declared void will have to return the benefits so obtained to
the party from whom he obtained it under such contract. This is but proper, because one
cannot benefit twice
41
. One cannot opt out of the liabilities of a contract and at the same time
retain the benefits which he obtained from some such contract.
42

In Mohari Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose
43
, as an infants contract was void, no directions for
repayment were made because as decided in Tahal Singh v. Bisseswar Lal
44
, it is not every
case in which a man has benefitted by the money of another, that an obligation to repay the
money arises.. to raise an equity of that kind there must be an obligation express or implied to
repay/ Thus the maxim works here satisfactorily.

2) Transfer of Property Act Under the Transfer of Propert Act, Section 35 embodies the
principle of election which rests on the principle of approbate and reprobate as it in

41
Subhas Chandra Das v. Ganga Prasad AIR 1967 SC 878.
42
Section 64 and 65 : Indian Contract Act.
43
(1903) 30 CAL 539.
44
(1875) 2 IA 131.
Scotland
45
, meaning thereby that a man shall not be allowed to approbate and reprobate. This
principle in India rest on forfeiture while in England it rests on compensation. A party who
elects against the document has to compensate the disappointed done and the rest he can
retain; while in India the refractory donees interest is forfeited.
In Devan v. Habibunnissa
46
, which was under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act
where land was purchased under genuine sale deeds by different person from a common
vendor, out of a large plot of land and where there were allegations of encroachment by one
against the other, the Supreme Court directed that the Shortfall of land was to be suffered by
both the parties in equal proportions in order to safeguard their interest. And this was on
equitable considerations arising under the maxim.
Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act is also based on this maxim and enjoins that he
who seeks equity must do equity. It explains the position of a person with a defective title
who makes improvements on the land in his possession believing that is absolutely entitled to
it. But when the rightful owner who has a better title , evicts such a person from the property,
he will have to pay for the improvements as on the date of eviction
47
on the principle that he
did not stop the person in possession from making improvements. Thus the owner is estopped
by his conduct. It will be interesting to note here the difference between Section 115 of the
Indian Evidence Act and Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the former it is based
on the true owners conduct, while the latter is based on the belief that the person making
improvements. Section 51 requires the true owner to do equity by aying for improvements.

For this section to apply the following conditions must be satisfied:
48

1) The person claiming compensation should not be a trespasser, but a transferee.
2) He should believe in good faith that was absolutely entitled to properly either as a done or as
a purchaser.
3) He should have made improvements.
4) The person attempting to evict must have a better title.

45
Snell, Snells Principles of Equity, 484.
46
1987 Supp SCC 688.
47
J. Narayan Rao v. Basavarayappa AIR 1956 SC 727.
48
Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) LR I HL 129.
3) Specific Relief Act and Indian trusts Act The maxim is illustrated also in Sections 30 and
33 of the Specific Relief Act and Sections 62 and 86 of the Trusts Act.
Under Section 30 of the Specific Relief Act a court may require arties rescinding a contract to
do equity by restoring, so far as may be, any benefit which he may have received from the
other party, and to make any compensation to him which justice may require
49
. Under Section
33, a court has power to require benefit to be restored or compensation to be made when an
instrument is cancelled or is successfully resisted as being or void or voidable.
Moreover, it is perfectly open to a court in control of a suit specific performance, to extend
the time for deposit. The specific performance, said the Supreme Court, is an equitable relied
and he who seeks equity can be put on terms to ensure that equity is done to the opposite
party even while granting the relief. The final end of law is justice and so the means to it too
should be informed by equity. That is why he who seeks equity shall be equity. In this case
the assignment of the mortgage is not a quietness discharge of the vendors debt as implied in
the agreement to sell but a disingenuous disguise to arm herself with a mortgage decrees to
swallow up the property in case the specific performance litigation misfired. To sterilise this
decrees if necessary equity to which the appellant must submit himself before she can enjoy
the fruits of specific performance
50
.
Similarly , under section 62 of the Indian Trusts Act, where a beneficiary seek a declaration
of trust or retransfer of trust property wrongfully bought by the trustee, the court will impose
upon him an equitable condition to repay to the transferor and consideration received by the
transferee under a rescindable contract.
4) Civil Procedure Court In Clerk v. Ruthnavaloo
51
, it was decided that equitable set-off can
be pleaded in India. Conditions for a legal set-off are considered in Order 8, Rule 6 of the
CPC.




49
Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch 45.
50
Kalpana Sarawathi v. P.S.S. Soma Sundaram Chettiar (1980) 1 SCC 630.
51
(1865) 2 Mad HCR 296.

LIMITATIONS

1) The maxim only applies where the party seeking of the Court asks for equitable relief and not
purely legal rights even through a court of equity.

2) The maxim is applicable where the equity is ought or awarded to the defendant relates to the
subject matter of the suit one the same thing, or grows out of the controversy before the
Court. Thus it is not permissible for the defendant to say in relation to a demand of a debt that
the plaintiff has injured or trespass or on other accounts foreign the thing in demand that
bound to breed great confusion.