This document discusses strategies for combating internal data insecurity. It notes that more data than ever is being created and stored, growing exponentially each year. However, data breaches are also increasing, with 92% of stolen records coming from database servers and 48% of breaches caused by insiders. The challenges of threats, compliance requirements, and new opportunities are making data security more complex and costly. A defense-in-depth approach following principles of least privilege and multiple security layers is recommended to protect data throughout its lifecycle from various threats both internal and external.
This document discusses strategies for combating internal data insecurity. It notes that more data than ever is being created and stored, growing exponentially each year. However, data breaches are also increasing, with 92% of stolen records coming from database servers and 48% of breaches caused by insiders. The challenges of threats, compliance requirements, and new opportunities are making data security more complex and costly. A defense-in-depth approach following principles of least privilege and multiple security layers is recommended to protect data throughout its lifecycle from various threats both internal and external.
Michael Muite Technology Consulting Team Leader, Kenya Oracle Confidential 2 More data than ever Source: IDC, 2008 1,800 Exabytes Growth Doubles Yearly 2006 2011 Time Magazine, July 6, 2011 Time Magazine, July 6, 2011 Target of Data Breaches 2010 Data Breach Investigations Report Type Category % Breaches % Records Database Server Servers & Applications 25% 92% Desktop Computer End-User Devices 21% 1% 2010 Data Breach - Investigations Report Insider Threats are Real
Endpoint Security Vulner- ability Manage- ment Network Security Email Security Other Security Database Security Identity Management
How do I control insiders? Can I report on anomalous behavior? Can I prevent intrusions? Can I ensure proper controls around privileged access? 48% Caused by Insiders 92% Stolen Records From Database Servers 86% Hacking Involve Stolen Credentials Higher Costs Than Ever User Management Costs User Productivity Costs Compliance & Remediation Costs Security Breach Remediation Costs It Adds Up $ Threats Attacks Improper Access Infrastructure Scaling Compliance Tougher Regulations Intrusive Audits Costly Burdensome Reporting Opportunities Social Identity Mobile Access Cloud Computing Massive Web How do you tackle these Simultaneously Encryption and Masking Privileged User Controls Multi-Factor Authorization Activity Monitoring and Audit Secure Configuration Monitor and Block Middleware Applications User and Role Management Access Management Virtual Directories Rights Management Identity Governance Comprehensive Compliance Mgmt. Centralized Policy Administration Access Management Track and Audit Content and Usage Database Security Infrastructure Security Hardware Accelerated Encryption Secure Key Management and Storage Strong Workload Isolation Secure Service Delivery Platforms Infrastructure Applications Middleware Databases Information Oracle Security Inside Out Oracle Confidential 11 Encryption and Masking Privileged User Controls Multi-Factor Authorization Activity Monitoring and Audit Secure Configuration Identity Management Databases Applications Content Oracle Security Inside Out Infrastructure User Provisioning Role Management Entitlements Management Risk-Based Access Control Virtual Directories Information Database Security Key Princples Least Privilege By default, users/consumers should be denied access so that being able to access data or functionality must be a conscious decision Users should be granted access to functions and data based on their roles and/or attributes, i.e., based on needs rather than enabled by default. A review of a user's access rights should be performed when the user's attributes change, such as when the user changes roles. Similarly, access rights must be revoked when a user leaves to organization. System access to data stores, other systems, and networks should be granted only to the extent required for proper operation. Statement Users and other consumers of resources must operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. Rationale Security risks increase with the amount of access a user or resource consumer is granted. Risks can stem from misuse of privilege, un- intentional destructive actions, compromised accounts, etc. I m p l i c a t i o n s
Key Principles Defense in Depth Multiple security perimeters must exist between public networks and protected resources Access between perimeters must be restricted such that only traffic from known systems, ports, and protocols can pass Communication between perimeters must be restricted so that a connection cannot span multiple firewalls Security must be designed such that access to protected resources requires an attacker to breach more than one security control Each computing and database platform must be able to inject security controls into the processing chain Statement Failure of a single component of the security architecture must not compromise the entire IT environment. Rationale There are many different types of threats to protect against, therefore one should strive to minimize risk by adopting a multi-layered, multi- pronged defense. I m p l i c a t i o n s
Existing Security Solutions Not Enough Application Database Administrators Data Must Be Protected in depth Applicatio n Users Malware Key Loggers Espionage Phishing SQL Injection Social Engineering Web Users Data Database Security Defense-in-Depth Prevent access by non-database users for data at rest, in motion, and storage Increase database user identity assurance Strict access control to application data even from privileged users Enforce multi-factor authorization Audit database activity, and create reports Monitor database traffic and prevent threats from reaching the database Ensure database production environment is secure and prevent drift Mask sensitive data in non-production environments