Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41106 September 22, 1977
LITEX EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
GEORGE A. EDUVALA, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS Departmentof Labor and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
(F.F.W.), respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
F. F. Bonifacio, Jr. for respondent FFW.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Reynato
S. Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz for respondent George A. Eduvala, etc.

FERNANDO, J.:
In this and certiorari and prohibition proceeding, what is sought to be nullified is
an Order of respondent George A. Eduvala, the then Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, requiring that a memorandumm election be held
among the members of the Litex Employees Association, petioner labor union, to
ascertain their wishes as to their wishes as to their affiliation with respondent
Federation of Free Workers. It is the contention of petitioner Union that there is no
statutory authorization for the holding of such a referendum election. That is the
decisive issue in this comtroversy. In support of the competence of respondent
public official, Article 226 of the Present Labor Code is cited. It reads thus: "The
Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the the regional
offices of the Labor shall have and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiation
or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and disputes, grievances of probe arising from or affecting labor-
management relations in all workplaces, whether natural or non-agricultural,
except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance Procedure
and/or voluntary arbitration."
1
The comment of the then Acting Solicitor General,
now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., treated as
the answer,
2
maintained that the wording of the above provision sustains the
authority thus challenged. There is considerable persuasiveness to such a view. It
would be an unduly restrictive interpretation them if a negative answer were
Seven to the question posed. It would be oblivious to the basic end and aim of
the pant Labor Code to confer on the Department of Labor and its bereaus the
competence to pass upon and decide labor controversies and thus minimize
judicial intervention. There is no legal basis for nullifying such order.
This later dispute originated from a petition of respondent Federation of Free
Workers filed with the Bureau of labor Relations against petitioner labor Union to
hold a referendum among the members of the union for the of determining
whether they desired to be affiliated with such Federation. It was alleged that a
"great majority" of the members of the union desired such affiliaion, but that its
President, a certain Johnny de Leon, was opposed. The contention of petitioner
Union acting through its counsel was that only about 700 out of more than 2,200
employees of the company had manifested their desire to affliate with the
Federation and that a substantial number of such had since then repudiated their
signatures. It also raised the point that what was sought was a certification
election which was not proper as there was a certified collective bargaining
agreement between the union and the company. The Compulsory Arbitrator,
after a careful study of the pleadings, reached the conclusion that the truth of
the matter could best be assertained by a referendum election. Respondent as
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of labor Relations affirmed. Hence this petition
directed to this Court, as a jurisdictional question is raised.
The petition, as noted at the outset, lacks merit.
1. Article 226 of the New Labor Code cannot be misread to signify that the
authority conferred on the Secretary of labor and the officials of the Department
is limited in character. On the contrary, even a cursory reading thereof readily
yields the conclusion that in the interest of industrial peace and for the promotion
of the salutary constitutional objectives of social justice and protection to labor,
the competence of the governmental entrusted with supervision over disputes
involving employers and employees as well as "inter-union and intra-union
conflicts," is broad and expensive. Thereby its purpose becomes crystal-clear. As
is quite readily discernible where it concerns the promotion of social and
economy rights, the active participation in the implementation of the codal
objective is entrusted to the executive department. There is no support for any
allegation of jurisdictional infirmity, considering that the language employed is
well-nigh inclusive with the stress on its "and exclusive authority to act." If it were
otherwise, its policy might be rendered futile. That is to run counter to a basic
postulate in the canons of statutory interpretation. Learned Hand referred to it as
the proliferation of purpose. As was emphatecally asserted by Justice Frankfurter:
"The generating consideration is that legislation is more than composition. It is an
active instrument of government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that
laws have ends to be achieved. It is in this connection that Holmes said, 'words
are flexible.' Again it was Holmes, the last judge to give quarter to loose thinking
or vague yearning, who said that 'the general purpose is a more is a more
important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may
lay down.' And it was Holmes who chided courts for being apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law when those words import a policy that goes
beyond them."
3
What is intended by the framers of code or statute is not to be
frustrated. Even on the assumption that by some strained or literal reading of the
employed, a doubt can be raised as to its scope, the 'immitation should not be
at war with the end sought to be attained. It cannot be denied that if through an
ingenious argumentation, limits may be set on a statutory power which should not
be there, there would be a failure to effectuate the statutory purpose and policy.
That kind of approach in statutory construction has never recommended itself.
4

2. Nor has petitioner made out a case of grave abuse of since the matter involved
is a dispute as to whether or not the members of petitioner labor union had
decided, contrary to the wishes of its president, to join respondent Federation.
What better way could there be of ascertaining the truth there than to hold the
referendum election. The guarantee of fairness as to whether there is accuracy
depends on the impartiality and neutrality of the Bureau of Labor Relations. There
is nothing in petitioner's submission to indicate that such would not be the case.
Under such circumstances then, petitioner labor union could not be held to allege
that there was an abuse, much less a grave abuse, of the discretionary authority
vested in such office. It suffices to take note of how often this Court, after a careful
consideration of the issue involved, had rejected such a contention in
certification cases, analogous, if not similar in character. Invariably, the
imputation that the holding of an election for the purpose of determining with
exactitude the wishes of the employees concerned as amounting to arbitrary
exercise exercise of a power had been rejected.
5

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. This decision is immediately
executory.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
The respondent public officer has sufficient authority, under the labor Code, to
conduct the referendum aforementioned.
AQUINO, J., concur:
Because the instant case was rendered moot by the 1975 petition of FFW for a
certification election among the employees and workers of Lirag Textile Mills, Inc.
If a certification election will be held, a referendum is not necessary.

Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
The respondent public officer has sufficient authority, under the labor Code, to
conduct the referendum aforementioned.
AQUINO, J., concur:
Because the instant case was rendered moot by the 1975 petition of FFW for a
certification election among the employees and workers of Lirag Textile Mills, Inc.
If a certification election will be held, a referendum is not necessary.
Footnotes
1 Article 226 of the New Labor Code (1974).
2 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and
Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz.
3 Frankfurter, Of Law and Men, 59-60 (1965).
4 Cf. Ty Sue v. Hord 12 Phil, 485 (1909); United States v. Toribio, 11-D
Phil. 85 (1910); Riera v. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105 (1919): Commissioner of
Customs v. Caltex Phil., Inc., 106 Phil. 829 (1959); Sarcos v. Castillo, L-
29755, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853; Automotive Parts & Equipment Co.,
Inc. v. Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248-1 Lopez v.
Commissioner of Customs, L-28235, Jan. 30,1971, 37 SCRA 327;
Matabuena v. Cervantes, L-28771, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 284;
Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner of Customs, L. 28463, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA 269; Lozano v. Romero, L-33245, Sept. 30, 1971, 41
SCRA 247; Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v.
Court of Industrial Relations, L-30623-33, April 11, 1972, 44 SCRA 350.
5 Cf. United Employees Union v. Gelmart Industries v. Noriel, 67 SCRA
267; Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor
Relations, 69 SCRA 132 (1976); Federacion Obrera v. Noriel, 72 SCRA
24 (1976); U. E. Automotive Employees and Workers Union-Trade
Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services v. Noriel, 74 SCRA 72
(1976); Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations,
L-41288, Jan. 31, 1977; Today's Knitting Free Workers Union v. Noriel, L-
45057, Feb. 28, 1977; Benguet Exploration Miner's 4575, June 20, 1977;
Rowell Labor Union v. Ople, L-42270, July 29, 1977.