,L OGI C

PART I
BY

w. E. JOHNSON,M.A.
FELLOW OF XING'S COL!EGE, CAMBRIDGE, SIDGWICtr LECTURER IN UORAL SCIBNCE IN TIIE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

ndnra pel el mA rd Alxedc

DOVER PUBLICATIONS, INC.

r72

CHAPTERX

173

architect,or in the classhypocrite? If this questionis answered in the negative it must be on the ground that, in some senseof the term'exist'which is not appropriate to classes, Mr Pecksniff does not and never did exist, and hence he cannot count as one when we are enumeratingthe members comprisedin any given class. Furthermore,sincethe numericalpredication'at least one'is highly indeterminate and could be in this or that case replaced by the relatively determinate 'at least n' where z stands for this or that number, the affirmation that 'the class C exists' is only a specialand less determinatecaseof the affirmation that 'the classC comprises at least z items,'and the number n cannot be counted as such unless all the n items erist, The conclusiontherefore follows that the senseof the word 'exist'when predicatedof a class is dependent upon that of the word 'exist'when predicatedof an item or individual indicatedby a proper or uniquely descriptive namet.
I This contention is directed against the position held in the Princiy'ia Matlumatica, where E ! is ultimately defined in terms of f,, whereasin my view tr is to be ultimately defined in terms of E !

C H APT ER XI
THE DETERMINABI,E \

$ r. Irs this chapter we propose to discussa certain characteristicof the adjective as such, which perhaps throws the strongest light upon the antithesis between it and the substantive. Here it will be appositeto consider the traditional account of the principles of logical division where a class (of substantives)is represented as consistingof sub-classes. This processis governed by the following rules: (r) the sub-classes must be mutually exclusive; (z) they must be collectively exhaustiveof the class to be divided; (S) division of the classinto its co-ordinatesub-classes must be basedupon solneone 'fundamentum divisionis.' The first two of these rules may be said to be purely formal, and do not raise any problemrofimmediate interest; bur the technical term fundamentum divisionis-though perhaps readily understood by the learnel-i5 ssgu4llyintroducedwithout explicitaccountof its connection with, or its bearing upon, ideas which have entered into the previous logical exposition. To illustrate the notion we are told, for instance,that, when a classof things is to be divided accordingto colour, or to size,or to some other aspect in which they can be compared,then the colour, size, or other aspect constitutes the fundamentum divisionis. Now although,grammatically speaking, words like colour and size are substantival,they are in

r74

CHAPTERXI

THE DETERMINABLE

T75

fact abstract names which stand for adjectives; so that the fundamentum divisionis is, in the first place, an adjective, and in the second,an adjective of the particular kind illustrated by 'colour' when considered in its relation to red, blue, green, etc. Superficially this relation appearsto be the sameas that of a singleobject to some classof which it is a member: thus two such propositions as'Red is a colour'and'Plato is a man' appear to be identical in form; in both, the subject appears as definite and singular, and, in both, the notion of a classto which these singular subjectsare referred appearsto be involved. Our immediate purpose is to admit the analogy, but to emphasisethe differences between thesetwo kinds of propositions,in which common logic would have said we refer a certain object to a class. I propose to call such terms as colour and shape deterrninablesin relation to such terms as red and circular which will be called determinates;and, in introto examinethe distinction ducingthis new terminology, between the relation of red to colour and the relation of Plato to n an. To predicate colour or shay'eof an object obviously characterises it lessdeterminatelythan to predicate of it red or circular; hence the former adjectives may be said negatively to be indeterminare comparedwith the latter. But, to supplementthis negative accountof the determinable,we may point out that any one determinable such as colour is distinctly other such a determinable than as shape or tone; i.e. colour is not adequatelydescribed as indeterminate,since it is, metaphoricallyspeaking,that from which the specific determinates, red, yellow, green, etc., emanate; while

from shapeemanate another completely different series of determinates suchas triangular, square, octagonal,etc. Thus our ideaof this or that determinablehas a distinctly positive content which would be quite inadequately represented by the word 'indeterminate.' Further, what have been assumedto be determinables-e.g. colour, pitch, etc.-are ultimately diferent, in the important sense that they cannot be subsumed under some one higher determinable,with the result that they are incomparablewith one another; w_hile_itis the essenrial nature of determinatesunder any one determinable to be comparablewith one another. The familiar phrase with ,belongingto 'incomparable'is thus synonymous different determinables,' and 'comparable' with ,belonging to the samedeterminable'; not that this is the actual meaning of the terms, but that enquiry into the reason for the comparability or incomparability of two qualities will elicit the fact tha! they belong to the same or to different determinablesrespect ing to' is also more usuallyr in relation to its class: rye significanceof the relation '' in one caseto a determinate in the other to an individual and its class. If it is asked why a number of different individuals are said to belong to the same class, the answer is that all these different individuals are characterisedby some the same adjective or combinationof adjectives. But can the same reason be given for grouping red, yellow and green (say) in one classunder the namecolour? What is most prominently notable about red, green and yellow is that they are different, and even, as we may say, opponent

176

CHAPTERXI

THE DETERMINABLE

T77

to oneanother; is there any (secondary) adjectivewhich analysisrvould reveal as characterising all these different (prirnary)adjectives? In my view there is no such (secondary)adjective; in fact, the several colours are put into the same group and given the same name colour, not on the ground of any partial agreement,but on the ground of the special kind of differencewhich distinguishes one colourfrom another; whereas no such difference existsbetween a colourand a shape. Thus red and circular are adjectivesbetweenwhich there is no relation exceptthat of non-identity or otherness; whereas red and blue, besides being related as non-identical, have a relation which can be properly called a relation of differencg where difference means more than mere otherness.(Whatis here true of colour is true of shape, pitch, feeling-tone, pressure, and so on: the groundfor grouping determinatesunder one and rhe samedeterminable is not any partial agreementbetween them that could be revealedby analysis,but the unique and peculiar kind of differencethat subsists between the severaldeterminates under the samedeterminable, and which does not subsist between any one of.them and an adjectiveunder some orher determinable.)If this is granted, the relations assertedin the two prbpositions 'Red is a colour' and 'Plato is a man,' thoughformally equivalent,must yet be contrastedon the ground that the latter but not the former is basedupon an adjectival predication. For the lattLr is equivalentto preiicating the adjective'human'of 'Plato,'while, without denying that some adjectives may properly be predicated of (the adjective)red, yet the proposition,Red is a colour, is not equivalent to predicating any adjective of red.

$ z. Bearing in mind this distinction,the question arises whether what are called abstract names can be divided in the sameway as concretenamesinto singular and general; in other words,whether adjectivescan be divided into these two classes. The answerseemsto be that adjectives can be divided into two classesmore or less analogous to the singular and general which disbut that the two different kinds of tinguish substantives, adjectives are preferably distinguished as determinate and indeterminate. When, in consideringdifferent dethe predicationof oneadjective greesof determinateness, is found to imply another, but not conversely,then the former we shall call a super-determinateof the latter and the latter a sub-determinateof the former. Thus the relation of super-determinate to sub-determinate meansnot only that the former is more determinate than the latter, but also that the predication of the former would imply that of the latter. A simple example can be taken from the determinable 'number': thus 7 is super-determinate to 'greater than 3' ; the adjective determin'greater than 3,'though nbt itself asamnaana able, may be called determinable,inasmuch as it is not but capableof !9iqg furthel demerely indeterminate term_i-nsdin the sensethat it generatesa definite series of determinates. To illustrate more precisely rvhat is tn."tti by ;g.n.t"tes'; let us take the determinable 'less t h a n 4 ' ; t h e n ' le s st h a n 4 ' g e n e r a t e s' 3 ' a n d ' z ' a n d ' r ' in the sensethat the understandingof the meaning of the former carrieswith it the notion of the latter. Now no substantive class-name its members generates in this way; take,for instance, apostles of the under'the Jesus,' standing of this class-name carries with it the notion

r78

CHAPTERXI

THE DETERMINABLE

T7g

'men summonedby Jesus to follow him,' but it does not generate'Peter and John and Jamesand Matthew etc.,' and this fact constitutesone important difference betweenthe relationof sub-determinate to super-determinate adjectivesand that of general to singular sub</ stantives. is brought $ 3. Another equallysignificantdifference in out by consideringthat aspectof substantive-classes which-to use the terminology of formal logic-increase by decrease of extension. of intension is accompanied The phrase 'increase of intension' conjures up the notion of adding on one attribute after another, by the logical processcalled conjunction; so that, taking ib, g, r, to be three adjectives,increasein intensionwould be illustrated by regarding y', q, r conjoined as giving a greater intension than p, g; and ?, q as giving greater intension than P. We have now to point out that the determinationof adjectivalpredicationwhich increased leadsto a narrowing of extensionmay consist-not in adjectives-but in of conjunctionof separate a process the process of passing from a comparatively indeterminate adjective to a comparativelymore determinate adjectiveunder the samedeterminable. Thus there is of increased a genuinedifferencebetweenthat process determinationwhich conjunctivally introducesforeign by which without inand that other process adjectives, so to speak,the numberof adjectives, we define creasing, them more determinately. In fact, the foreign adjective which appearsto be is really not introadded on in the conjunctiveprocess, duced from outside,but is itself a determinateunder another determinable, present from the start, though

suppressed in the explicit connotarionof the genus. We propose to use a capital letter to stand for a determinable, and the correspondingsmall letter with various dashes to stand for its determinates. Thus. in passing from the genus y' to the species pg, we are really passingfrompQ to ?{; or again the apparentincreaseof intension from ? to ?g to pqr is more correctly symbolisedas a passing from ?8R to pgR to ?qr. In the successive process of dividing a summumgenus into the next subordinatesub-genera, and this again into sub-sub-genera, the summumgenus ought to be representedby a conjunctionof determinables, sayPQRST; the generanextsubordinate tothis,bypQRST,p'QRS T, etc., and the genera next subordinateto the Pt'QRST, first of these by y'gRST, pg'RST, pq"RST, and so on down to the in_7tma species representedby determinates. Thus:
PQRST-

-... In this way we represent from the outset the nature of the ultimate individuals under the summum genus, jointly by the determinables as being characterisable PORST, while any genus or speciesisrepresented by these same determinables, one or more of which are replacedby determinates. This meetsa criticismwhich has often been directed against the formal accountof the inversevariation of extensionand intension,since we see now that the samenunaber of adjectivesshould bc usedin giving the connotationof the wider as of the n;rrrower class. To illustrate these symbols from a botanicalclassification of plants: let the determinable

pqEsr

Nfsr p-4 Fsr-psCsr

p'gEr

p"Ahsr. .. .. .. .

r8o

CHAPTERXI

THE DETERMINABLE

T8T

P stand for the number of cotyledons,I for the disposition of the stamens,R for the form of the corolla, S for the attachment of the petals and sepals,and 7 for the divisibility of the calyx. Then PORST represents the summum genus 'iblants'as describableunder these five heads, but otherwise undetermined in character. Then !, /, ?", might stand respectively for having no cotyledons,having t, and having z, thus representing the defining characteristicof eachof the three classesacotyledon, monocotyledon, and dicotyledon-by the y'QRST, /QRST, y''tQRST Again {, y', 9", symbols might stand respectivelyfor the stamens being under, around or upon the carpels,thus representingthe three sub-divisions-hypogynous, perigynous,epigynous-of dicotyledons, asy'ttgRsT, /"7'RST ?"!"RSZ Taking regular and irregular to be the two possible forms of corolla, then the next sub-division under y'"y'RST will be y'"gtrST and p"y'r'ST. Again s and.y' may stand respectively for separability and inseparability of the calyx and corolla, and yield the further sub-divisions, sayy't'g'rsT, p'tgtr(7. The calyx may contain only one part or 3 or 4or 5 or 6, and if these are represented respectivelyby t, t', t", t"', /"', a relatively determinate characterisation is finally symbolisedby p"gtrstt"' t^y. There are cases for which a modification of this general scheme is required. The casesare those in which one particular sub-division is definable by the absence of an element upon which the predication of other determinables depend,while in the sub-divisions co-ordinate with this the elementin questionis present. For example, the class of plants called acotyledons might be definedby the absence of any corolla,etc.,and

hence such variations as that of the form of the corolla or the disposition of the stamens,etc., are inapplicable to this particular sub-division. * v $ +. Now adjectives under the same determinable are related to one another in various ways. One relational characteristic holds in all cases; namely that, if any determinate adjectiv.echaracterisesa given subsJfntive, then it is impossible that any other determinate under the same determinable should characterise tHe same substantive: e.g. the proposition that 'this surfaceis red' is ihcornpatiblewith the proposition'this (same)surfaceis blue.' It has been usual to modify the above statement by adding the qualification-at the same time and at the same place; this qualification applies where the substantive extends through some in which period of time and over some region of space, case the existent substantive, having temporal or spatial parts, may be said to be extended. For this reason the qualification would perhaps better be attached to the substantive itself, and we should say that, where opponent adjectivesare predicated,referenceis made to different substantives,since iny one part of an extended substantive is existentially other than any other part" of many determinatesunder A secondqharacteriptig the same determinable is that the di&renselhgt$nen one another; in which we may say that the differth'ere .te """et a and e is greater than that between a ence between and b; e.g. the difference betwien red and yellow is greater than that between red and orange. In this case the several determinates are to be conceived as

p"i{e d,et*."{$rllggs: aiflg5"n, "orgt -of so that if a, b, c, are three determinates,

IB2

CHAPTERXI

THE DETERMINABLE

I83

necessarily assuming a certain serial order, which develops fgg the idea of what may be called 'adjectival betweenness.'lThe term 'between' is usedhere in a fa\ miliar metaphortical sense derived from spatial relations, and is figuratively imaged most naturally in spatialform.) Thus if b is qualitatively betweena and c, and c qualita-tively betweenb andd,and so on, the whole serieshas its order directly {gggrminedb;r the nature of the adjectives themselves. The further distinctions amongst seriesas interminable or as cyclic, and again of series of more than one order of dimensions, lead to logical complexities which need not be entered into here. Suffice it to say that this characteristic,which holds of so many determinates, gives significance to another well-known rule for logical division: diuisio nonifaciat saltum: one meaning of which appears to be that we contemplate not merely enumeratinga set of coordinate sub-classes, but enumeratingthem in a certain order. The rule pretbat the order in which.the sub-classes are enq-s"q11b_qg meratedshould correspondto the order of 'betweenness' predicableof their differentiating characteristics. The order of betweenness which characterises the determinatesjust consideredmay be either discrete or continuous. I n the caseof discreteseriesthere is one determinate that can be assignedas next after any given determinate;but, in the caseof a continuousseries,a determinate can always be conceived as between any two given determinates,so that there are no two determinateswhich can be said to be next to one another in the serialorder. Itfollowsfrom this account of continuity that, between any two determinateswhich may be said to have a finite adjectivaldifference,may be interpolated

an indefinite number of determinateshaving a finite difference,and this number becomesinfinite as the differseries encesbecomeinfinitesimal. Amongst continuous further differencesbetween the interminable and the cyclic, and again between those of one or more order of dimensions, hold as in discreteseries. The reference here to determinablesof higher or Iower dimensionrequiresexplanation. Our familiar example of colour will explain the point: a colour may vary accordingto its hue, brightness and saturation; so that the precise determination of a colour requires us to define three variables which are more or less indeof co-variation; pendentof one anotherin their capacity but in one important sensethey are not independentof one another, since they could not be manifestedin separation. The determinable colour is therefore single, though complex, in the sense that the several constituent charactersupon whose variations its variability dependsare inseparable. 'x $ S. Returning to the conceptionof the absolutely determinate adjective, we have to note an important distinction between absolutely determinate and comparatively indeterminatepredications. The distinction may thus be formulated: If, of two substantivesthe samedeterminate adjective can be predicated, then all the adjectivesand relations definable in terms of the determinable,that can be predicated of the one, could be predicatedof the other. But i{, of two substantives the sameindeterminate adjective can be predicated,then only certain of the adjectivesand relations definable in terms of the determinable, that can be predicated of the one, can be predicated of the other. To illustrate

r84

CHAPTERXI

THE DETERMINABLE

I85

first the case of an indeterminate predication; Iet us take the numerical adjective 'greater than 7'; then of any collection of which this numerical adjective could be predicated,other adjectivessuch as 'greater than 5' and 'greaterthan 3'could also be predicated;but some collectionsthat are r greater than 7'such as the apostles, are greater than r r and divisible by 4 for instance, whereas other collections that are'greater than 7,'such as the muses,are less than r r and are not divisible by 4: hence it is only someof the numericaladjectivesthat are predicableof the musesthat are also predicableof the apostles,although the adjective 'greater than 7' is predicable of them both. Turning now to the caseof determinatepredication; i{, instead of defining a collection by the indeterminate adjective 'greater than 7j we had defined it by the determinateadjective'rwelve,' then any numericaladjective that is predicable of one collectionof twelve, say the apostles,would be predicable of any other collection of twelve, say the months of the year or the sons of Israel; for example,'greater than r r,' 'divisible by 4,' 'a factor of 96.' What we have here seento hold of determinate and indeterminate number holds of any other determinable. The case of colour lends itself easilyfor illustration on accountof the specific names which have been assigned to its determinates: thus,if the coloursof two differentobjects are the same shade gf yellow, then though these two objects may differ in any number of other respectssuch as shape and size, yet we may say that any colourproperty of the one object will agree with the colourproperty of the other; if the colour of one is more brilliant or less saturatedthan the colour of an orange,

then the same will hold for the colour of the other. In fact, whatever sensational determinable we take, whether it be colour, or sound,or smell, the determinate characterisationsunder any such determinable would lead to the sameforms of generalisationthat have been developed by science only in the sphere of quantity. It is agreed that in the sphere of senseperception,differences of quality strictly speaking hold only of the mental or sensational, and that the physical can only be defined in quantitative terms. Thus in the WeberFechner experiments the experient judges of equivalence or difference in the intensity or quality of his sensations, with which are correlatedquantitative differences in the stimuli. The attempts that psychologists have made to discover formulae of correlation between the stimuli on the one hand and the sensations in a.qualion the other hand show that determinatengss tative or intensive scalecarriGivJtii it the same logical of magnitudefor consequences as doesdeter.rninateness Furthermore deterphysically measurablequ-angr-t-ies. minateness in either caseis,only approximatelyattainable,whether we rely upon the immediatejudgments of perception or are able to utilize instrumentsof measurernent. The practical impossibility of literally determi. nate characterisationmust be contrastedwith the universally adopted postulate that the charactersof things which we can only characterisemore or less indeterminately, are, in actual fact, absolutely determinate'.
I The notion of the Determinable will U" ,t ot{fn hter chapters to have importance in a large number of applications.