Perspectives

Whither Urban Renewal? Thus, if one thought that urbanisation in

India is producing problems, the real big
wave is yet to hit, and our cities are as
yet unprepared for this eventuality.
The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission is an There are two ways of responding to
ambitious programme to build infrastructure in India’s cities and this. One is to try and stop it from hap-
pening (or at least slow it down – which
towns. However, the mission does not sufficiently recognise that has been the policy of government so
the core urban deficit is not the lack of infrastructure but the lack far).3 The other is to accept that “our
of local self-governance. urban economy has become an important
driver of economic growth [and]…the
PARTHA MUKHOPADHYAY e g, cities like Jamshedpur and Gangtok, bridge between the domestic economy and
listed as eligible for JNNURM, do not yet the global economy” and that “urbanisation

T
he common minimum programme have elected local bodies, which is a pre- is a relentless process, which has come to
(CMP) committed the UPA govern- condition for eligibility. stay and has to be factored into all our
ment to “a comprehensive pro- Over the next seven years, a major developmental thinking and development
gramme of urban renewal and to a massive portion of the outlay on JNNURM will be processes”4 and prepare to manage the
expansion of social housing in towns and in the form of central grants. Two ques- consequences. One should also recognise
cities, paying particular attention to the tions arise in this context. First, do we that Indian cities grow because they have
needs of slum dwellers”.1 In apparent really need to focus national resources on poor people, who lubricate and drive urban
pursuance of this objective, the govern- our cities and second, if so, is JNNURM growth and also keep it manageable and
ment of India launched the Jawaharlal the right way of focusing it? relatively inexpensive. Over 81 per cent
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission of urban male slum dwellers are literate
(JNNURM) on December 3, 2005. Characteristics of as compared to 86 per cent of all urban
JNNURM aims to create “economically Indian Urbanisation residents and about three-fourths of them
productive, efficient, equitable and respon- are workers compared to about two-thirds
sive cities” by focusing on “(i) improving Over 1991-2001, our urban population of all residents. Further, there are strong
and augmenting the economic and social rose by about 68 million, to 284 million links between rural and urban incomes
infrastructure of cities; (ii) ensuring basic (see the table). Of this, only 20 million that go beyond remittances. Rao et al (2004)
services to the urban poor including was migration from rural areas. The con- shows how urbanisation enhances and
security of tenure at affordable prices; trast with China, where migration accounts stabilises agricultural incomes by provid-
(iii) initiating wide-ranging urban sector for 90 per cent of the increase, is striking. ing a market for diversified agricultural
reforms whose primary aim is to eliminate Global experience indicates that rapid production. It can also raise income for
legal, institutional and financial constraints economic growth results in agglomera- rural labour, e g, the ratio of wage income
that have impeded investment in urban tions with large populations and high levels to total income for Chinese farmers has
infrastructure and services; and (iv) strength- of poverty. So, if growth is to continue risen from 13.2 per cent in 1985 to 30.4
ening municipal governments and their at the current high levels, India will have per cent in 2001 [Angang et al 2003]. This
functioning in accordance with the pro- to learn to live with many “big and poor requires attention to local transport links
visions of the Constitution (seventy-fourth) cities”. These will be resource intensive, and, over time, investment in rural edu-
Amendment Act, 1992”.2 It is divided into as all big metropolises are, but even more cation, beyond simple literacy (79 per cent
two submissions, one for urban infra- so since they will lack the ameliorative of rural literates have a sub-secondary
structure and governance and other for concerns for environment that tend to education, compared to only 58 per cent
basic services to the urban poor, which appear only at higher levels of income. of urban literates). To summarise, the rise
will be administered by the ministry for
urban development, and urban employ- Table: Urbanisation in India and China
ment and poverty alleviation respectively. Popn Urban Change Increase Urban Migration Other Natural
JNNURM will support 63 cities, which Growth Popn in Urban in Urban Growth to Urban Urban Urban
include seven 4-million plus mega cities (Per Cent) (2001) Share Popn Rate Areas Increase Growth
(in Million) (Per Cent) (in Million) (Per Cent) (Million) (in Million) (Per Cent)
(the four metros, Ahmedabad, Bangalore
and Hyderabad), 28 million plus cities, China 1990-01 11.4 450 9.9 (36.1)# 157 53.5 141 (90.0)* 16 5.3
e g, Indore, Jamshedpur and Pune and 28 India 1991-01 21.5 285 2.2 (27.8)# 68 32.6 20 (28.6) 58** 16.2

other sub-million cities, which are either Notes: Figures in brackets are percentages.
state capitals or cities of particular cultural, # share of urban population in total, 2001. * migration as a share of increase in urban population.
** See Kundu (2003). This includes about 13 million due to newly classified towns, expansion in
historical or tourist significance, such as area and merging of towns, which is removed for calculating the natural urban increase in the next
Pondicherry, Gangtok, Shillong and Ujjain. column. Chinese urbanisation data is often criticised for not clarifying the extent of growth due to
JNNURM is still an evolving programme, reclassification.

Economic and Political Weekly March 11, 2006 879

of big cities in India is an inevitable cross-subsidisation”8; (e) reform land and the state government is to make up the
consequence of growth, but these cities are management with the repeal of the Urban balance. For urban transport projects, the
productive, even if poor, and also have Land Ceiling and Regulation Act central share can be even higher. In the
strong existing and potential linkages to (ULCRA), reduction in stamp duty, re- case of basic services to the urban poor,
rural areas. The choice is between retard- form of rent control, streamlining of build- the central share ever for the larger ULBs
ing urbanisation by slowing down growth ing approval, transparent procedures for is to be 50 per cent (there is no increase
or accepting the challenge of managing the conversion of agricultural land, comput- for the other cities) and the contribution
urbanisation consequences of rapid growth erising property titling and land registra- of the state and the ULB are clubbed
such that the benefits from growth are tion; (f) conserve water resources through together, i e, if the state is willing to
optimised. laws for rain water harvesting and the use provide the necessary funds, the ULB
Indian cities do not as yet have the fiscal of recycled water and finally; (g) under- need not raise any resources, beyond a
strength to cope with this test. This is in take “structural reforms” (an open descrip- minimum stipulated beneficiary contri-
part due to their limited taxation powers tion which is another example of an bution of 12 per cent (10 per cent for
due to insufficient decentralisation and evolving JNNURM) and encourage public- weaker sectors).
inadequate use of user charges5 . Further- private-partnerships (PPPs) to improve Central funds would be released as grant
more, their administrative capacity is low services and reduce cost. to the state governments who have the
because the cities have not been expected The other leg, i e, provision of additional flexibility to disburse it to ULBs or
to take major decisions. As such, both the central assistance for infrastructure, is to parastatal agencies as a soft loan or grant-
political leadership and bureaucratic be based on a city development plan (CDP). cum-loan or grant, taking care to ensure
machinery have a low profile compared, The CDP is aimed at helping the ULB to that 25 per cent of central and state grant
for example to China, where many mem- (i) develop a vision for its city; (ii) ascertain put together is recovered. At the end of
bers of the central leadership have served the gap between existing infrastructure the JNNURM, this recovery can be con-
as mayors of major cities, and consequently and investments; and (iii) set out priorities, verted to a state urban infrastructure fund.
do not attract suitable talent. Thus, the sequencing and timelines for undertaking The first instalment of 25 per cent will be
challenge is to manage rapid urbanisation various reforms and specific investments, released on signing of the MoA. The
with limited financial and administrative including the means of financing them. balance amount shall be released upon
capacity. Hence, an intervention that The two legs are joined by the execution receipt of the utilisation certificates sub-
responds to these gaps is sorely needed, of a tripartite memorandum of agreement ject to achievement of milestones agreed
but is JNNURM the one that we are (MoA) between state governments and the in the MoA.
looking for? ULBs (including parastatal agencies where In each state, a steering committee, which
necessary) and the government of India, will be assisted by a state level nodal
Basic Features of JNNURM which will indicate the state and ULB’s agency (chosen by the state), would decide
commitment to specific milestones for the and prioritise projects under JNNURM.
The JNNURM walks on two legs – one legal, institutional and financial reform The composition of this steering commit-
of reform of legal, institutional and finan- conditions mentioned above. tee, chaired by either the chief minister or
cial constraints and the other of providing Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) for the the housing minister and comprising
funding for infrastructure building. The identified investment projects would be ministers, mayors, MLAs and secretaries,
reforms are separated into mandatory and submitted along with the MoA. These DPRs has been prescribed in the JNNURM
optional,6 which apply to both state and would be scrutinised by the technical wings guidelines. For infrastructure projects, the
urban local bodies (ULBs). They can be of the ministry or, if necessary, by state level nodal agency will also submit
conveniently grouped into a set of key specialised/technical agencies before be- quarterly monitoring reports to be reviewed
objectives. In addition to (a) decentrali- ing considered for sanction by a central by designated central government officers
sation through implementation of the 74th sanctioning and monitoring committee and CSMC. The monitoring of reform
amendment and assigning to or associating (CSMC) in the ministry of urban deve- implementation would be outsourced to
elected ULBs with city planning, which lopment, chaired by the relevant secretary specialised agencies. In the case of basic
is a state level reform condition, the other and comprising solely of officials in the services to the urban poor, “the schemes
conditions seek to (b) increase participa- central government and the chairperson of of health, education and social security
tion and transparency, through accounting HUDCO.9 Projects of urban renewal, water will be funded through convergence of
reform and e-governance at the ULB level,7 supply including sanitation, sewerage, solid schemes and dovetailing of budgetary
and a public disclosure law and commu- waste management, drainage, and urban provisions available under the programmes
nity participation law at the state level; transport including roads would be ac- of respective sectors (health, human re-
(c) increase ULB revenue through reform corded priority by the CSMC, as would source development, social justice and
of property tax and levy of reasonable user projects with private sector participation. empowerment and labour, etc), but will
charges and reduce cost with the help of Larger ULBs (cities with a population also be monitored by the ministry of urban
VRS, so as to recover full O&M costs; above 4 million) are expected to contribute employment and poverty alleviation”.
(d) improve services to the poor through (this can be in the form of loans from This is an innovation in inter-ministerial
budget earmarking, enhancing security financial institutions) 50 per cent of the co-ordination!
of tenure at affordable prices, and total cost, while the other million plus On completion of JNNURM, the cities
earmarking of land for the economically cities need to contribute only 30 per cent. are expected to have (a) a city-wide frame-
weaker and low income categories in The central government would contribute work for planning and governance,
all housing projects “with a system of 35 per cent and 50 per cent respectively (b) transparent and accountable local

880 Economic and Political Weekly March 11, 2006

services with e-governance in core func- livelihood opportunities, such as the to repeal the ULCRA, has led to fears of
tions and modern and transparent budget- outsourcing of solid waste collection to capture by the “land mafia”. The “land
ing, accounting, financial management women SHGs by ULBs in Andhra Pradesh mafia” has prospered by exploiting the
systems, and (c) financially self-sustain- and Kerala. scarcity of land, which is often an admin-
ing (through reforms to major revenue Before lamenting the introduction of istrative artifice, and their ability to have
instruments) agencies for service delivery private participation in urban services deviations approved from often unenforce-
to provide a basic level of urban services, through PPP, it is important to recognise able land use regulations and city plans.
especially to the poor. that most expenditure on urban capital The approach so far has been to abandon
investment is already executed by the the older and inner cities and for the
Will JNNURM Succeed? private sector, usually through the use of development authority (usually a state and
small item-rate civil works contracts. The not a ULB entity) to acquire land to develop
The JNNURM has been criticised, e g, use of such contracts allows the private new urban areas. This benefits the “land
by Raghu (2005), for a adoption of a neo- sector to escape accountability, for it bears mafia”, who are able to corner adjacent
liberal reform trajectory and forcing uni- little responsibility for the facility after land in anticipation of development. Not
form policy conformity among ULBs construction. More often than not, water only does this lead to tension between the
through an executive instrument, overrid- and sewerage treatment plants lie unused, city and those whose land is being acquired,
ing efforts at different types of decentrali- consume much more electricity than ex- it also increases the cost of service because
sation in various states. A major objection pected, and roads are pitted with potholes. only limited benefits of agglomeration are
is to the effort to move towards full cost The already strained budgets of the ULB realised. The alternate option of allowing
recovery, commercialise urban and civic bear the burden of increased maintenance mixed development in existing older urban
services, introduce private participation cost and the citizens bear the burden of bad areas, is likely to weaken rather than
and make land management flexible. It is service. By contrast, in a PPP, the private strengthen the hold of the urban “land mafia”.
useful to consider these in detail. operator is contractually bound to bear the Another concern of some commentators,
The cost recovery of infrastructure risk of service provision and its revenue like Kundu (2003), is the growing concen-
through user fees is sometimes seen as an flows depend on meeting pre-specified per- tration of urbanisation, which is now
anti-people measure. However, without formance parameters. Used wisely, it can focused in the more developed states. To
user fees, infrastructure will have to be be a strong tool for increased accountabil- some extent, with the onset of liberalisation
paid for through taxes. State level taxes ity and better service provision, especially and the greater freedom afforded to market
are usually regressive and thus fall dis- to the poor since private providers are forces in economic choices, e g, industrial
proportionately on the poor. The use of more responsive to financial penalties as location, a certain increase in concentra-
general state taxes to finance the provision compared to public providers. Furthermore, tion is to be expected as agents respond
of infrastructure in urban areas, especially the introduction of private participation by exploiting the benefits of agglomera-
to the non-poor,10 is particularly egregious brings a higher degree of oversight from tion economies. What should be avoided,
because taxes collected from the poor are regulators,11 media and more importantly, however, is a flight to the more developed
spent to provide subsidised services to consumers, who are unfortunately, other- urban areas that is driven not by their
those who have the ability to pay. It is wise blasé about poor service delivered by economic pull, but because the lack of any
necessary to realise that the non-poor need publicly-owned authorities. viable alternative in the less developed
to pay for provision of urban services The effort must therefore be to ensure areas pushes economic activity away.
through property taxes and user fees – not that this additional tool of accountability JNNURM, by focusing on all the million-
just for commercial sustainability, but does not become blunted. One wonders, plus cities, makes such push-driven pri-
also for equity. A concomitant benefit of however, if JNNURM’s approach to PPP macy less likely, which will improve the
imposing higher financial charges on is tokenism. For all the emphasis on “ef- options for economic activity at these
households that have high levels of con- fective linkages between asset creation and non-traditional locations.
sumption is to help conserve resources asset management”, the focus on DPRs to So, if these concerns are misplaced, can
such as water and help to increase envi- be submitted with the MoA, and utilisation it be expected to be a success? Unfortu-
ronmental sustainability. certificates for monitoring projects, lead nately, there appear to be other problems,
While the poor can be provided one to suspect that their approach is still which are fundamental to the implemen-
subsidised services, many residents of low- mired in the bog of civil works contracts. tation of JNNURM.
income slums, can meet the costs of O&M Monitoring is extremely important if the To begin with, there is a basic disquiet
(and sometimes even more). User fees at private sector has to have the right incen- with reform conditionality based financ-
this level will not only give them a stronger tives. With credible oversight, long-term ing. First, if the same agency is responsible
voice as a revenue contributing consumer, concessions combining investment and for both monitoring the progress of reform
it will also safeguard against the deterio- operations and management can be effec- and for financing, the tendency is to
ration of the network, which forces them tive for water supply, wastewater and solid emphasise one objective or the other and
to go to alternatives at much higher cost. waste treatment, roads, transport services usually, the financing objective gains
Experiments have now started with inno- and service level agreements can be used prominence. When that happens, condi-
vative payment models targeted to poorer for citizen interfaces. Such management tionality is no longer credible since money
residents. In this, community models has major implications for human resources will be disbursed even though conditions
cannot only improve the level of urban at the urban government level. are not met, as has happened with, for
services, e g, metered water supply to Allowing mixed development of ULBs example, the World Bank.12 Hence, to stop
slums in Bangalore, they can also provide in JNNURM, along with the requirement inappropriate projects from happening, it

Economic and Political Weekly March 11, 2006 881

is important to bring the due diligence on broad parameters. Thus, if a city were supporting capital works. The relationship
exercised by financial institutions (who serious about effecting a change in its between the central government, state
admittedly will only consider the financial planning and project identification and government and the ULB is similar to that
appropriateness of the project) to achieve development process, it is unlikely to be of a refinance institution, a lending insti-
separation of financing and conditionality able to prepare a CDP and submit DPRs tution and a borrower, rather than that of
and the JNNURM is doing this to some in the next few months, for a good cadastral three levels of government working in
extent. Second, at the other end, a strong survey itself would take some time, even tandem to provide services to urban citi-
conditionality focus may filter out good if done expeditiously. By contrast, CDPs, zens. Even the composition of committees
interventions with the potential to benefit for cities such as Indore, have reportedly at the state level to decide on projects is
the poor, from happening in unhelpful cleared the state approval process and have specified by guidelines issued by the central
environments. This is an admittedly more been sent onward to the central govern- government.17 Rather than building genu-
risky strategy (for it is difficult to sustain ment for consideration.14 It is difficult to ine decision-making capacity at the ULB
even well-designed approaches in such envision how sensible DPRs can be pre- level, the impression created by the
environments) but, if successful, can lead pared without an accurate cadastral. How- JNNURM project approval process is still
to the establishment of institutions that are ever, business-as-usual DPRs are possible that “centre knows best”.
insulated from their environment – and and the JNNURM, by ignoring the need As an example, consider the JNNURM
can, by their very presence and activity, for a good cadastral appears to encourage mission objective to plan development such
create a constituency for positive change. this. This appears to be a dangerous trade- that “urbanisation takes place in a dis-
Third, a salutary lesson from World Bank’s off in favour of speed of implementation persed manner”. Indian cities are much
conditionality experience is that reform is over the quality of infrastructure invest- less dense than other cities elsewhere in
unlikely if there is no strong intrinsic ments.15 This may be an example of the the world [Bertaud and Malpezzi 2003].
constituency for change. If so, the primary bias towards financing mentioned above. Since the fixed cost of service provision
benefit of conditional finance is that they However, it is not that JNNURM cannot per unit area can be spread over a larger
provide a means by which reform-minded be operationalised until cadastrals are number of consumers, some amount of
ULBs can distinguish themselves from completed. Not all types of projects are “concrete jungle” may be more cost-effec-
others by being able to publicly commit critically dependent on such information. tive to provide essential services in dense
to a set policy measures. Given the ten- For example, installing sewerage treatment areas as compared to dispersed settlements.
dency of financiers to relax conditionality, plants at the outfall of existing nullahs may A significant part of urban renewal is to
such commitment can be measured by its possibly be a sensible project requiring redevelop existing areas and equip them
willingness to meet certain preconditions limited data to justify. Similarly, the long- with the kind of infrastructure that is needed
before disbursement. It is here that term contracting out of maintenance for to cope with higher densities, e g, wider
JNNURM’s principle of MoA before roads that form the core transport corridor roads, electricity, water and sewerage lines
money is important, but its strength is is also possibly a good decision in terms that can bear a heavier load, etc. But the
diluted since ULBs are permitted to com- of investment priorities. But, planning any guidelines convey the impression that this
mit to a schedule of implementation rather major transport investment or investment decision on density is not the domain of
than undertake up front reform. However, in water distribution or sewerage collec- the ULB but that of the central govern-
in what follows, we will consider issues tion networks would be much better if the ment. On the ground, if ULBs are allowed
that go beyond these concerns and focus relevant decision-makers had access to to decide, some may increase density
on issues relate more to implementation. accurate information. A benign interpre- while others will not. This decision
The beginning of any sensible planning tation of this neglect of data is that would ideally emerge out of a construc-
exercise is good data. The investment JNNURM continues the hoary Indian tive debate between proponents on either
programme of JNNURM is critically tradition of decision by Delphi rather than side, in the context of local conditions.
dependent on the quality of the CDP. As by data. Nurturing such decision-making capacity
of today, few ULBs (Bangalore is a not- is critical to the sustainability of the urban
able exception) have a digital cadastral ‘Centre Knows Best’ renewal process.
map13 of reasonable accuracy and none Some would argue that it is premature
have a process of updating it, were such A less charitable interpretation would to talk of decentralisation when the central
a map available for such a process would argue that, despite the call for decentrali- government is providing most of the fi-
require a complete digital property titling sation, the short shrift being given to the nance. But, while own sources of revenue
and computerised land record registration CDP reflects, in part, a tendency of the for ULBs are an integral accompaniment
– one of the objectives under the JNNURM. central government to arrogate the respon- to decentralisation of authority, it is im-
The creation of such a map in any major sibilities of the ULB. The focus of portant to remember that the need for
city is not expensive (of the order of a few JNNURM is more on the provision of the financial devolutions from state and even
crore rupees), but it is beyond the budget infrastructure projects, rather than the central governments arise because the
of any preparatory support from JNNURM. strengthening of municipal governments, Indian tax collection system is centralised
Thus, a ULB has either to spend its own which incidentally is the last of four at the state or central level, unlike for
money or go through the quasi-subterfuge objectives in JNNURM. A reading of the example, China, where the city collects the
of proposing to commission a cadastral as emerging documentation from JNNURM16 taxes and sends it up the administrative
part of a property tax enhancement project. seems to indicate the implementation of hierarchy.18 In this context it is important
In the absence of a cadastral, the CDP the programme looks no different from a that the central support be viewed less as
submitted by the city can only be based standard centrally sponsored scheme for a handout, and more as an entitlement and

882 Economic and Political Weekly March 11, 2006

it is precisely this that central and state As noted earlier, given the state of data of must look for it in the political processes of
finance commissions seek to achieve. our cities, environmentally sensible democracy. As mentioned earlier, a salutary
Furthermore, for those who argue for projects, like sewerage treatment plants lesson from World Bank’s conditionality
stronger conditionality and a simple but are perhaps among the few least likely to experience is that reform is unlikely if there
significant financial incentive, it may be become stranded. is no strong intrinsic constituency for
difficult to impose too many conditions change. The beginnings of such a constitu-
on ULBs until they acquire sufficient Conclusion ency are already evident in many cities,
authority, i e, after the state decentralises but it is as yet out of the mainstream agenda of
the administrative machinery. For example, It is evident that our cities do not have political parties, where the current electoral
APRDP-type incentive payments (as used adequate infrastructure. That is merely the system, focused at the state-level, produces
in the electricity sector) for own revenue symptom. The disease is that they do not political leadership and an agenda that is
increases or reduction in unaccounted have a government that can enable the more reflective of the rural electoral base.
for water (UFW) may not be useful if citizens to decide to provide themselves But, just as panchayati raj has come to be
the ULB has only limited revenue sources the infrastructure they need and the financial seen as essential for better rural gover-
(as a result of inadequate decentralisation powers to pay for it, if they so decide. In nance, it needs to be appreciated that the
by the state) or if the water supply system an ideal situation, an elected ULB would core urban deficit is not the lack of infra-
in the ULB has been constructed and is base its investment programme on a data- structure but the lack of self-governance,
being managed by a state-level water rich CDP, work out the financing mix of as envisaged in the 74th amendment to the
utility, outside the administrative control taxes (including statutory devolutions from Constitution. Until that happens, the legacy
of the ULB. the state finance commissions) and user of JNNURM, focused as it currently is on
It would therefore appear that there is fees based on their citizen’s response and infrastructure provision, may unfortunately
no substantial case for continuing with participation. They would be supported by be limited to water and sewerage treatment
the current slow and measured pace of a cadre of professional urban managers, plants that remain unused, and iconic metro
decentralisation in JNNURM. There are at who will be capable of responding to the railway systems that do not address the
least two other areas where the design of expressed wishes of the urban citizen. The transportation needs of the poor. One hopes
JNNURM leaves a feeling of discomfort. role of the state and central governments to be proven wrong. EPW
Consider its attitude towards the poor. would be to provide additional funds,
Is separating JNNURM into two sub- especially for specific projects of regional Email: [email protected]
missions, one on urban infrastructure and or national importance and transitional
governance and the other on basic services support for the ULBs as they take on move Notes
to the urban poor a matter of administrative to full self-governance.21
necessity, given the political need to have While it may be utopian to expect this 1 “Urban renewal”, which came to be associated
two separate ministries? Or does it separate transition to happen overnight (as other with the redevelopment of inner city neighbour-
hoods, has often been criticised for the
the poor and the city by failing to recognise countries are discovering in an international relocation of the poor and powerless, without
them as an integral part of the urban context!), and while it may be unwise to adequate thought to alternative opportunities
economy and reflect the old mindset that immediately hand over all decision- for these communities. The CMP is sensitive to
the rich need infrastructure the poor need making to an elected ULB with patently this aspect for it goes on to say “Forced eviction
amelioration? It is particularly worrying to little capacity, we can surely trust our demo- and demolition of slums will be stopped and
while undertaking urban renewal, care will be
note that, though JNNURM does refer to cratic ethos a bit more. Managing a big and taken to see that the urban and semi-urban poor
security of tenure as a key reform, putting poor city requires voters to have the po- are provided housing near their place of
in place mechanisms to ensure the continued litical will and the ability to punish. The occupation”.
supply of low cost housing19 does not appear right to information and public disclosure 2 Preface to the JNNURM Toolkit. See http://
to be of high priority, beyond a misplaced laws should help in this process www.urbanindia.nic.in/moud/programme/ud/
jnnurm/Preface.pdf
suggestion for financing through “cross- (JNNURM’s own document dissemina- 3 A sophisticated version promotes dispersed
subsidisation”. This lack of thought is also tion policies are a good beginning22 ), but urbanisation, but by many standards, e g,
evident in designing a uniform central currently, the urban voters cannot vote out Henderson (2003), India is already quite
share of grant (i e, 35 per cent) for all large the real decision-makers for their locality, dispersed, with only a quarter of the urban
cities, regardless of their population com- since the critical decisions are still being population in the million-plus cities. Indeed,
it may be at a sub-optimal level of primacy for
position, which varies from over 50 per taken at the state level. A clear and short its level of development. Trying to design
cent slum population in Mumbai to less road map to genuine participative demo- urban growth in India such that they reflect
than 1 per cent (!) in Patna.20 However, cracy in the ULB where a strong and pow- small and genteel European towns is not only
the proposed single-agency (MoUEPA) erful elected government is responsible for unlikely to succeed, it may also not be desirable
monitoring mechanism can be a singular its own successes and failures is what is as it implies dispersed provision of urban
infrastructure, which may not be affordable at
institutional innovation. needed for sustainable urban renewal. this stage of India’s development.
Finally, beyond a desultory nod to sus- It is this fundamental transformation in 4 Quotes are from the prime minister’s speech
tainable development, there is little men- governance, where it is conceivable that at the inauguration http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/
tion of environmental issues in JNNURM. a politician would rather be mayor of content.asp?id=235. See also Mohan (2006).
However, the prioritisation of water, sew- Bangalore than chief minister of Karnataka, 5 ULBs are particularly disadvantaged because
land taxation invites relocation to the periphery,
erage, solid waste and transport projects which will bring sustained urban renewal. leaving few factors of production to tax as
holds out hope that better sense may pre- Such change is unlikely to emerge from the capital is already internationally mobile and
vail during the project preparation process. bureaucratic processes of government. One labour has low income. Between 2001-02 and

Economic and Political Weekly March 11, 2006 883

 2002-03, their revenue (both own and total) 18 During the initial period of post-1978 reform
declined by over 15 per cent and consequently, cities like Guangdong and Shanghai were
expenditure, including revenue expenditure, allowed to keep very high shares of revenue
declined by over 12 per cent. collected. See Wong (1997).
6 The nomenclature of mandatory and option 19 For example, in relocating existing slums, it
reform is misleading since both have to be is important to focus on building neighbour-
implemented over the duration of JNNURM. hoods instead of simply building houses. A
The schedule of implementing mandatory neighbourhood, along with appropriate
reforms has to be pre-specified by the state in financial and administrative mechanisms for
its MoA while the timing of optional reforms allotment of housing, decreases the probability
is flexible within the seven-year duration of that the persons would re-sell a subsidised
the mission. allotment and reestablish a slum. Furthermore,
7 Technology is critical to planning and the continued supply of low-cost housing that
monitoring, e g, digital cadastral for land use is usable by the poor is an issue of land
and property taxes, planning for road management, transport networks and financial
improvements based on traffic flows, etc. mechanisms to target subsidies, all part of
8 The guidelines for the two JNNURM sub- overall urban governance.
missions are available at http://muepa.nic.in/ 20 Besides, the challenges in each ULB will be
programs/bsup.pdf and http://urbanindia.nic.in/ different. In some, special effort will be needed
moud/programme/ud/jnnurm/ to reach water, sanitation, health and education
guidelines_jnnurm.pdf. Unattributed quotes are to the slums, in others the general service
from them. delivery mechanism will do. Decisions as to
9 The CSMC chaired by the secretary (urban the mix of user fees and taxes and extent of
development) would comprise the secretary community development will also differ from
(urban employment and poverty alleviation), the one ULB to another.
principal adviser (housing and urban develop- 21 ULBs should be able to decide the extent of
ment) in the Planning Commission, the joint public transportation, the choice of mass rapid
secretary and financial adviser, the chief planner, transit systems, whether high capacity bus
Town and Country Planning Organisation, systems or metro rail, and use the transport
Adviser, CPHEEO, chairman and managing networks to try and shape what their city looks
director, HUDCO and the joint secretary (urban like. They should have the capacity to decide
development) as member-secretary. whether to build flyovers or hire better trained
10 The urban poor rarely benefit from these traffic police instead. To finance all these, they
services. According to the Census of 2001, less should have, for example, the ability to tax
than half (49.7 per cent) of urban households gasoline purchase in the ULB.
have a drinking water tap within premises, even 22 See http://urbanindia.nic.in/moud/programme/
less have a water closet (46.1 per cent) and just ud/jnnurm.htm and http://muepa.nic.in/rti/
over a third (34.5 per cent) have closed drainage. rti_index.htm
11 Monitoring is extremely important if the private
sector has to have the right incentives. With
credible oversight, long-term concessions References
combining investment and operations and
management can be effective for water supply, Angang, Hu, Hu Linlin and Chang Zhixiao (2005):
wastewater and solid waste treatment, roads, ‘China’s Economic Growth and Poverty
transport services and service level agreements Reduction (1978-2002)’ in Wanda Tseng and
can be used for citizen interfaces. Such David Cowen (eds), India and China’s Recent
management has major implications for human Experience with Economic Growth, Palgrave
resources at the urban government level. Macmillan.
12 See World Bank (1998), which argues that the Bertaud, Alain and Stephen Malpezzi (2003): ‘The
effort of donor agencies “buy reform”, by Spatial Distribution of Population in 48 World
offering assistance to clients that were not Cities: Implications for Economies in
otherwise inclined to reform, has failed. Transition’, University of Wisconsin at
13 A cadastral survey is one on a scale sufficiently Madison, Centre for Urban Land Economics
large to accurately show the extent and measure- Research.
ment of every field or other block of land. Henderson, J V (2003): ‘The Urbanisation Process
14 See ‘JNNURM okays City’s Development and Economic Growth: The So-What Question’,
Plan’, Hindustan Times (Bhopal editon) January Journal of Economic Growth, 8, 47-71.
29, 2006. http://hindustantimes.com/news/ Kundu, Amitabh (2003): ‘Urbanisation and Urban
5922_1611101,0015002100020000.htm Governance’, Economic and Political Weekly,
15 Another issue is that the CDP is not at the level July 19.
of an urban agglomeration, but at the level of Mohan, Rakesh (2006): ‘Managing Metros’,
city. At this time, JNNURM is not contemplat- Seminar, January.
ing any institution to coordinate the CDPs of Raghu (2005): ‘Urban Renewal Mission: Whose
ULBs in a single urban agglomeration. This Agenda?’ People’s Democracy, December 4,
is likely to become a problem sooner than later. Vol XXIX, No 49.
16 See http://urbanindia.nic.in/moud/programme/ Rao, P Parthasarathy, P S Birthal, P K Joshi and
ud/main.htm D Kar (2004): ‘Agricultural Diversification in
17 There is some limited attempt to ensure that India and the Role of Urbanisation’, IFPRI-
the capital works being financed emerge out MTID Discussion Paper No 77, November.
of a consultative process (including a national Wong, Christine P W (ed) (1997): Financing Local
advisory group headed by a technical adviser Government in the People’s Republic of China,
drawn from civil society) and the projects are Oxford University Press.
focused on addressing key gaps in public World Bank (1998): Assessing Aid: What Works,
transport, water and sanitation and providing What Doesn’t and Why, Oxford University
services to the urban poor. Press.

884 Economic and Political Weekly March 11, 2006