MFR Nara - T9 - Lapd - Lapd 1 - 7-21-03 - 00725
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9/11 Document ArchiveMFR Nara - T9 - Lapd - Lapd 1 - 7-21-03 - 00725
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9/11 Document Archive9/11 " Personal Privacy
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-UNCLASSIFED-
\ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
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Type of event: Interview
Date: 07.21.01",
Special Access Issues: Not applicable
Prepared by: Emily 'W,alker1 transcribed by Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 9
Location: Telephone, Los Angeles
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Participants - Conunission: Emily Walker
NOTE: INTERVIEW FOR NON-ATTRIBUTION 1 OFF THE RECORD
Body:
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\.Question 1: Who do you recommend from JTIF as primary targets for interviews?
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1) 19/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive I
2)9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive
3) Tom Corrigan, NYPD retired;
4) Ken Maxwell, Jetblue, VP of security, FBI retired;
5) Jack Cloonan, ABC News Consultant, FBI retired; and
6) Key individuals mentioned in his book, The Cell.
\ \ Question 2: What in your view was the main problem leading to 9/11?
\I IThe CIA erred. They had key evidence that could have made a difference.
\ Question 3: Biggest failure post-9111?
..1 __ ...IThe biggest failure after 9111 was to bring rapid change to DC. The RudmanlHart Commission
(1997 -2001) had been sitting on the shelf. After 9/11, President Bush dusted it off and implemented the
first recommendation in the Executive Summary - set up Homeland Security Czar. They picked Ridge as
a political favor for having won Pennsyl vania but skipped over qualified candidates. This was a hugely
critical time and it was a big mistake. For one year they had no staff and no authority. The Czar was
meant to develop a master intelligence plan internally but a plan has not been developed or funded.
Question 4: Is there a smoking gun?
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L-_ lrhe June meeting between FBI and CIA when the CIA brought information and photographs of a
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Malaysiameeting qualifies. They knew Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. Tenet had tasked CIA to
find any po\~ntial threats in and outside the US who could be the source of the intelligence supporting a
future attackin the US. The CIA had received photographs and other intelligence from the Malaysia
meeting of Al ~,aeda. At that point - when we knew of the meeting - we had a time bomb on our hands
and the CIA kne'-Yit. CIA met with the FBI but did not give them enough information to help find the
group in the US. The FBI had an idea - some of the people had appeared from the Cole bombing but they
were prohibited by r~,~from searching on Google (ai Idid while working with 20/20) and thus were
not able to find that th~ "scoop" was available (on-line credit.cards, addresses, real names, etc.). It was
too late by August wheh\~,h,.
e FBI finally received infonnatiou':from the CIA to access the available online
information. .
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Further, pre-91l1 Tenet w~s\cOmingfrom a lower post - a bur¢:aucrat,a risk adverse official and did not
push the Agency. Post-9fIl a:~.~gloves came off and he receive¥ the go-ahead to do what he had to do.
It's been more successful, exa~pled by the arrests in Pakistan. ~ut the US historically has never been
able to catch the "big guy" - Castro, Quadaffi, Hussein, Osama.\
Question 5: What would be some··~.estpractices of LA that we could bring to the NY hearings?
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1) ROOf-t~p,,~,vacuation-It is a law th~~requires helicopter pads fn every building over 20 stories in LA.
LA has 15 heil~?pters with the LAPD aad the fire department ha~ more.
But there were d~ff~rent issues with the ~C. Prior to 1993 they locked the roofs to prevent security
breaches from thrill 'S~~kers (tight rope walk~rs and hang-glidersj.After 1993, when evidently there was
a...
roof-top evacuation at ih~"WTC, they set up ~ystem of locks that\could be opened with a key card or
electronically. When the pl~e severed the build..ing, the wires wer9 cut and the key pad could not work,
so roof doors could not be opened. \,
Also, the transmission towers were on the top of one of the buildings so no helicopter could have landed.
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2) Fast track evacuation procedures 'aI:~ in developme.~t in LA, Evett week fire, airport, harbor, etc. get
together for briefings so they stay on the..~~. e page. ~.~"lS are also bring practiced. This could be a good
focus for best practices.
ADDITIONALL Y:
He volunteered on the private sector:
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Joe Dunn, currently ofUBS Warburg, was in NYPD in\)~,arge'o..fthet\PPLE program which was the link
between law enforcement and the private sector pre-9/11. Tb:isprogram was set up after 1993 to
• communicate threats to the private sector. It was in effect on ~fl..lMdQelieves that messages were
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sent on blackberries and pagers regarding who should evacuate, where they should go, and the status of
the airports, bridges and tunnels. LAPD is now all equipped with Nextel pagers.
1) I ~greed to contact Emily regarding LA best practices; and
2) j He will meet additional 9111 teams.
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