MFR Nara - t8 - Faa - Cooper Joseph - 9-22-03 - 01140
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9/11 Document ArchiveMFR Nara - t8 - Faa - Cooper Joseph - 9-22-03 - 01140
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
®
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview. with
Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator.
Type of event: Interview
Date: Monday, September 22, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Cominission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045]
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown
NOTE: Please refer to the interview recording for a complete account.
Joe Cooper has been with the FAA since 1991 at Area B, and has been with the TMU
since 1999. At TMU Cooper generally manages traffic flows and considers TMU to be
the "hub" of traffic for Boston Center. The ZBW TMU communicates with ZBW sectors
and coordinates what is ongoing in ZBW airspace with the TMUs of other national air
centers. Cooper identified TMU positions as departure spacing, en route spacing, arrival
flow, military coordinator, and severe weather management. The en route spacing
coordinator is responsible for the "metering" of air craft - at about 38 crossing into a new
air space per hour. The military coordinator is responsible for clearing airspace for
military training purposes. Al Trav is the term used when the military makes an "altitude
reservation" - they receive these reservations when they plan on using an air "track" for
mid- flight refueling. Reservations for this space can be done through Herndon Command
Center. Herndon also handles any national severe weather coordination. Cooper never
deals with the ROC or the WOC.
On 9111, Cooper first heard from Pete Pesquili in Area B that AA 11 had lost
communication capabilities and radar. The next step was for one of the TMU personnel
to contact company. Cooper remembers thinking it odd that an air carrier would loose
both at once. TMU pulled the call sign for AA11 to monitor the flight. Controllers were
alerted to move air craft away from the possible route of AA 11 since the altitude was
unknown, and the last registered altitude was FL 290. At that point Area C told TMU that
AA11 was a possible hijack. Terry Biggio told Bob Jones to "pull the tapes" (the record
of communication between the pilots and the ATC). AA 11 veered to the right. The
primary target had been tagged, so the data block of the last known information stayed
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with the primary. At first, with only three factors, NaRDO, no transponder and serious
course deviation Cooper thought AAll had experienced serious electrical damage. But
after the hard left tum and the confirmation of a hijack through the cockpit
communication, there was no doubt in Cooper's mind.
Dan Bueno asked Cooper to call for military assistance. Cooper began speaking with
Huntress at approximately 123754UTC. He asked Huntress to send Fl6s out of Otis Air
Force Base. Cooper did not know the physical location of Huntress (Rome, New York).
Cooper asked Bradley to stop departures headed towards New York when AAII was
roughly five miles south of Albany. When speaking with the military, Cooper believes he
spoke with Sergeant Powell. Cooper was unaware of any specific military exercises that
were taking place on 9111. Cooper believes there was a lack of understanding on the
military's part on the FAA definition of "primary target", but he was eventually able to
give the military a rough latitude and longitude coordinate. Cooper thought they might
vector an aircraft from the Falcon Axe area that is composed of airspace 7,000 ft to
49,000 ft. Cooper believes that Collin Scoggins asked the military about height finding
capability to be used on AAII.
Cooper stated that Terry Biggio was on a conference call that included New York Tracon
and ZNY. He does not believe those calls were recorded, but the hotline on the New York
side may have been recorded. They were still attempting to locate AAII when Terry
Biggio told the TMU they lost radar contact with AAII, and shortly after that one of the
facilities personnel told the TMU a plane hit the WTC. Cooper went to the TV at the
facilities and Cooper immediately knew it was AAII.
Cooper was caught in "disbelief', but he then immediately thought of the strain on his
controllers who were attempting to slow down traffic. ZNY then called and informed
ZBW of a possible second hijacking and that ZNY airspace was being shut down.
Cooper stopped all departures flight planned through ZNY. He then heard of the second
hit on the WTC. He immediately realized that control in order to keep the planes still in
the sky was all he could do. He told Dan Bueno that maybe they should call ATC Zero.
Bueno said to do it, and they sent out the GI message for a ZBW ATC Zero. They
reviewed more of the audiotape and Biggio relayed the "we have some planes" through
the conference call. The Pentagon then got hit and Herndon called for a National Ground
Zero.
Cooper discovered that UALl75 was also a Boeing 767 headed to LAX. The TMU
decided to check for planes in the air that were also flight planned from Logan to LAX.
They found Delta Flight 1989 and immediately informed Cleveland Center.
NEADS was called and the TMU asked what to do with military aircraft airbound and
not responding to the attacks. NEADS announced that all military aircraft not on mission
would return to base.
The facility manager then ordered everyone evacuate ZBW except for one supervisor per
area, one controller per area, and two TMU personnel.
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Cooper is clear that any suspicion of another airborne threat the DEN line is the absolute
first place to report to. It is open at all times. Cooper is not aware of how he would get the
military involved except to use the DEN line.
NOTE: Cooper provided Commission staffwith a personnel account of the events of 9/11
through his perspective.
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