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How The NSA Pinpoints A Mobile Device

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/12/15/most-widely-used-cellphone-encryption-can-easily-be-cracked-by-nsa/ https://twitter.com/LeakSourceNews

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2K views

How The NSA Pinpoints A Mobile Device

http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/12/15/most-widely-used-cellphone-encryption-can-easily-be-cracked-by-nsa/ https://twitter.com/LeakSourceNews

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LeakSourceInfo
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR Description of Information b. (U) In association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence.

Classification/ Markings SECRET//COMINT Reason 1.4(c) Declass


20291123

Remarks

A3. (S//SI) The fact that NSA targets, collects, and processes GSM (encrypted or unencrypted). A4. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can collect GSM calls through the global telecommunications infrastructure. B. (U) EQUIPMENT B1. (FOUO) Commerical and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc., when not running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and not associated with a SIGINT system. B2. (S//SI) Commercial and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc, when running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and associated with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. C. (U) PROCESSING C1. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process unencrypted GSM. C2. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process encrypted GSM when the cryptovariable is known. C3. (TS//SI) The fact that NSA can process encrypted A5/1 GSM when the cryptovariable is unknown.

SECRET//COMINT

1.4(c)

20291133

(U) No additional details.

SECRET//COMINT

1.4 (c)

20291123

UNCLASSIFIED/ FOUO

N/A

N/A

(U) No association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence.

SECRET//COMINT At a minimum

1.4(c)

20291123

SECRET//COMINT REL
AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA!

1.4 (c)

20291123

SECRET//COMINT REL! 1.4 (c)


AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA

20291123

At a mimimum
TOP SECRET// COMINT REL!

1.4 (c)

20291123

(U) Details may require protection via a special access

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR Description of Information b. Technical reports (TACREPs or Klieglights) F3. (S//SI) Reporting locations of GSM users in: a. SIGINT product --country --city --VLR Global Title --Location Area Code --Cell ID --Latitude/Longitude b. Technical reports (TACREPs or Klieglights) --country --city --VLR Global Title --Location Area Code --Cell ID --Latitude/Longitude F4. (S//SI) Any reporting from GSM Short Message system (SMS) messages 1.4(c) SECRET SECRET SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT 1.4(c) SECRET SECRET SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT at a minimum. 1.4(c)
20291123 20291123

Classification/ Markings SECRET//COMINT at a minimum

Reason 1.4(c)

Declass
20291123

Remarks

May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source.

20291123

May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source.

May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source. A GSM handset in relationship to a GSM Cell tower should be portrayed in a 2-3 KM ellipse estimate that takes into consideration urban and rural environmental dependencies (power, terrain and interference). GEO periodically issues a geospatially presented (ArcView,

!"#$%&'&(#!)*#+,-./)/&012#1..',1.3# G1. (S//SI) The fact that GSM Cell Towers can be used as a physicalgeolocational reference point in relation to a GSM handset of interest: SECRET//COMINT 1.4(c)
20291123

G2. (S//SI) The fact of a singular SIGINT GSM handset metadata point with no exact timing

SECRET

1.4(c)

20291123

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR

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