Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters, (FAA HQ)
Type of event: Interview with Darlene Freeman
Date: Thursday, April 8, 2004
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: 10th Floor, FAA HQ, Washington, D.C.
Participants - Non-Commission: Brook Lewis, Chief Consul Office, FAA
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown
Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

Freeman began her career with the FAA in 1977 as a staff attorney in the Office
of the Chief Consul. She moved to Eastern Region as consul (1985-1987), then returned
to Washington FAA Headquarters and worked on a project titled "Impact 88". She
became Deputy Director for Civil Aviation Security (1988-1990) - with an operations
group that handled hijackings - then worked with Civil Aviation Standards. After this she
worked with Aviation Safety, then with Aviation Standards.

In 2000 Freeman became director of Safety and Special Studies for the Deputy
Administrator, which is the position she held on September 11, 2001 (9/11).

Freeman is now Director of Corporate Learning and Development in the Human

Resources department.

Freeman believes the position of hijack coordinator would be designated to

whoever is in charge of an operation; but from her time in security she knows that
protocol dictates the head of Civil Aviation Security as the hijack coordinator. She further
commented that she believes the hijack coordinator document lagged changes made
during management reconstruction.

On 9/11 Freeman was working on a new ATO (Air Traffic Organization) project
that would entail a FAA Chief Operating Officer, and reported to Monte Belger, the
Deputy Administrator.

9/11:

She was in her office in the deputy administrator's suite and she saw the broadcast oh
AAL 11 strike the World Trade Center (WTC) from a nearby television. She does not

Commission Sensitive
 Commission Sensitive

remember if they had reported it as a smile fire. She was still in the same area, and about
to leave when another person told her that the towers had been struck a second time.

She heard Monte Belger ask his secretary to call for an American Airlines
representative. At this point Freeman had not been asked to assist in the situation. She
returned to her office and turned on her own television. She did not spend the entire day
at Headquarters, but went home after the Pentagon attack.

September 21,2001:

Freeman was asked to put together a briefing book for the Administrator to use in
a September 21, 2001 hearing. Freeman received guidance and consul from the Office of
the Chief Consuls office, particularly Mary Walsh.

The briefing book was "ideas about things that could be responsive." David
Cannoles participated in this effort from an Air Traffic standpoint. Jim Slide, at National
Air Traffic was involved with this effort as well, and Freeman commented that he would
be the best person to speak with regarding the development of the FAA timeline. She
does not recall Dan Diggins being involved, but does recall David Gidge, Mike Morse,
Terry Kraus, Leo Boen, and May Avery.

Freeman commented that developing a timeline for notification to the military

was not part of her specific assignment, but that she does recall it as part of the process.
She developed contacts with the military and NORAD, and requested from them
documents that would be needed to develop the detailed chronology that was used in the
briefing book. She recalls that Jeff Griffith was speaking with "some of the military
people" to facilitate this project.

She believes that David Cannoles is responsible for developing the chronology for
the FAA. She believes they consulted a document timeline from NORAD, which was "a
piece of paper that did not look very official at all." She was shown a copy of the Sep 20
2001 notifications to the military and ultimately concluded that it may have been the
same "piece of paper."

She did not support the contention that contact with either Col Atkins or the Air
Traffic Services Cell qualified as a formal or even sufficient notification to the military.
She was focused on contact with NORAD.

Freeman commented that when the 18 September 2001 NORAD Press Release
went public she was surprised that NORAD had put together a timeline so quickly
without reviewing the document thoroughly with the FAA. She believes that NORAD
had 0838 for notification on AA 11 whereas they had developed a 0840 time.

Freeman does not "remember the issue of a debate" between NORAD and the
FAA, but she does remember the Deputy Administrator directing her to compare
timelines and note inconsistencies.

Commission Sensitive
 Commission Sensitive

Regarding the contention over the 0843 timeframe published by NORAD as the
time for notification on UAL 175, Freeman recalls discovering that this was the time that
New York Center (ZNY) asked their Military Operations Specialist (MOS) to notify the
military, but she did not believe this constituted a time that could be published.

Freeman does not know why the FAA document has no notification time for
American Airlines Flight 77 but that the NORAD document does.

Freeman stated that the NMCC was "at some point on the net" with the FAA,
beginning at roughly 0920, and that this initiated communication constitutes notification
for AA 77 and UAL 93. She does not know what she compared the NORAD Press
Release to, but she believes it was a number of documents including the work done by
Air Traffic.

Freeman commented that the various sources of information, and the fact that Air
Traffic developed their own timeline document, kept her from bringing the incongruities
in the documents to the attention of Air Traffic.

Freeman explained that logs for the FAA Washington Operations Center should
reflect the time for NMCC presence on the net.

Commission staff received the impression that David Cannoles and Tony Ferrente
were extremely involved in the process of developing the timeframe, and presented
Freeman with the information from which she built the FAA timeframe.

Commission Sensitive
 Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Headquarters
Type of event: Interview with Darlene Freeman
Date: April 20, 2004
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Headquarters Building, Washington, D.C.
Participants - Non-Commission: Brook Avery, Chief Consul Office, FAA
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown
Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

This is the second interview conducted by Commission staff with Freeman.

Commission staff addressed Freeman's efforts to reconstruct a timetable for FAA

notification of the military as to each of the four hijacked aircraft. Monte Belger assigned
Freeman this task.

Freeman recalls the NORAD press release from 9/18/01. Once this was released
Belger asked Freeman to compare the times in that document with the times held by the
FAA.

Commission staff presented Freeman with four documents for reference in the
interview: 1) the NORAD press release (9/18/01); 2) the timeline represented in the FAA
Summary of Air Hijacks (9/17/01); 3) the notifications to the military document (9/20/01)
Freeman prepared; and 4) the NEADS MCC Tech log (9/11/01).

Freeman clarified that she drafted the entire 9/20 dated document, and that she
had never seen the MCC Tech log before it was represented to her at the pervious
interview.

Freeman tasked Air Traffic (AAT-20) with gathering the information and
documentation from internal FAA and from the military for her work on the notification
time table.

Freeman does not recall specifically speaking with Jeff Griffith about the
information that was compiled, but she is aware that Jeff Griffith was tasked by Belger
and Garvey to be the specific contact point with the military in their efforts to develop an
accurate timeline. Freeman did not take part in any discussions stemming from Griffith's

Commission Senstive
 Commission Sensitive

efforts, or discussions regarding a conflict in the timetables between the FAA and
NORAD.

Freeman commented that some of the information presented by the FAA on

timetables is based on controller accounts; in particular, regarding the difference in the
timelines (9/18 and 9/20) between 8:40 and 8:38, she decided that the military time was
most likely more accurate than the FAA time.

Freeman does not recall a significant discrepancy in the information related to

FAA notification of the military of flight UAL 175. Freeman did note that there is
confusion displayed in the documents by an 8:43AM notification time on UAL 175, as
represented in the 9/18 document. Freeman commented that the transcripts did not appear
to indicate a problem with UAL 175 at 8:43AM, and thus it struck her as unusual. She
believes that this time frame may be indicated in a ZNY (New York Center) log at some
point between 8:49 AM and 9:05 AM. [Note: Commission staff believes the ZNY log
indicates an 8:43 AM time as when the ZNY Military Operations Specialist (MOC) is
notified of UAL 175. The MOS is not a military position, and this exchange does not
constitute notification of the military, or a request for fighter escort.]

Freeman explained that the only entry on the 9/20 sheet that indicates a
notification to the military of AAL 77 is at 9:24AM, and is sourced back to a NEADS
document, not an FAA document. The FAA represents in the 9/17 document that the
Great Lakes Region notified the Washington Operations Center (WOC) that they had lost
track of AAL 77. Freeman concluded that there was no documentation on the FAA side
of notification to the military. She commented that a net that she believes was established
on 9/11 was the source of notification by the FAA to the NMCC of the hijacked flights.
Freeman commented in regard to AAL 11 that there is evidence of specific notification,
and that as each flight is examined in sequence there is less and less information referring
to notification. When addressing this, the FAA came to the conclusion that the net had
become the notification point to the military, and exact times of notification were not
compiled during this "continuous communication."

Freeman stated she "would have focused on the first notification" and that "What
I assumed was happening on the net was a continuous passing of information once it
started." She did not have the benefit of the MCC Tech log, and was building herproduct
off the NORAD press release. Commission staff represented to Freeman that FAA
investigators did have the MCC Tech log in possession, and referred to that in their
compilation of the 9/17 document.

Freeman explained that her efforts examined the universe of information within
the FAA for notification times. [Note: Freeman may have examined the universe of FAA
materials, but the timeline she compiled relies heavily on non-FAA source material.]

Freeman asked WOC staff to "check their logs" for information recorded from
"the net". She learned in this process that the net initially set up on 9/11 was internal to
the FAA [the Tactical Net]. Freeman commented that "later" the Primary Net was

Commission Senstive
 Commission Sensitive

established. She looked for FAA communication to the NMCC on the Primary Net.
Freeman had no pre-existing understanding of these nets. She believes the Primary Net
was established during the time "that UAL 93 was taking place", and stated "We believe
that the military was on the net at the time that UAL 93 was occurring, so we believe that
they new about it because it was discussed on the net. I have a recollection of the NMCC
seeing something - that NMCC 'came up on' the net." Freeman never saw a tape
regarding this. She believes she did speak with "someone" from security discussing the
difference between the two nets, and the roles between Security and the WOC.

Freeman does not recall asking specifically if there were tapes of the Primary net.
She recalls examining the logs possessed of the WOC.

Commission Senstive