Vill THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN FORMALIZED LANGUAGESt+ INTRODUCTION Tux present article is almost wholly devoted to a single prob- lem—-the definition of truth. Its task is to construot—with reference to a given Janguage—a materially adequate and formally: correct definition of the term ‘irue sentence’. This prob- lem, which belongs to the classical questions of philosophy, raises considerable diffioulties. For although the meaning of the term ‘true sentence’ in colloquial language seems to be quite ciear and intelligible, all attempts to define this mean- ing more precisely have hitherto been fruitless, and many in- vestigations in which this term has been used and which started with apparently evident premisses have often led to paradoxes and antinomies (for which, however, a more or less satisfactory solution has been found). The concepi of truth shares in this respect the fate of other analogous concepts in the domain of the semantics of language. The question how a certain concept is to be defined is cor- rectly formulated only if a list is given of the terms by means of which the required definition is to be constructed. If the definition is to fulfil its proper task, the sense of the terms in this list must admit of no doubt. The question thus naturelly arises: What terms are we to use in constructing the definition of truth? In the course of these investigations I shall not negiect to clarify this question. In this construction I shall not make use +} Brerrosrarmcaz Nore. This article was presented (by J. Eukasiewicz} to the Warsaw Scientific Society on 21 March 1981. For reasons beyond the author's control, publication was delayed by two years. The arricls appeared in Polish in Tarski, A. (73). A German translation was published under the title ‘Der Webrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen’, in Studia Philosophica, vol. 1 (1936) (reprint dated 1935), pp. 261-406; it is provided with a Postecript in which some views which had been stated in the Polish origina! underwent a rather essential revision and modification. The present English version is based upon the German translation. For earlier publications and historical information concerning the results of this work see p. 154, footnote, p. 247, footnote, and the concluding remnarxs of the Postscript,VIL CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN FORMALIZED LANGUAGES 153 of any semantical concept if I am not able previously to reduce it to other concepts, A thorough analysis of the meaning current in everyday life of the term ‘true’ is not intended here. Every reader possesses in greater or less degree an intuitive knowledge of the concept of truth and he can find detailed discussions on if in works on the theory of knowledge. I would only mention that throughout this work I shall be concerned exclusively with grasping the intentions which are contained in the so-called classiex! con- ception of truth (‘true—corresponding with reality’) in contrast, for example, with the wilitarian conception (‘true—in a certain respect useful’).} The extension of the concept to be defined depends in an essential way on the particular language under consideration, The same expression can, in one language, be a true statement, in another a false one or a meaningless expression. There will be no question at all here of giving a single general definition of the term. The problem which interests us will be split into a series of separate problems each relating to a single language. In § 1 colloquial language is the object of our investigations. The results are entirely negative. With respect to this language not only does the definition of truth seem to be impossible, but even the consistent use of this concept in conformity with the laws of logic. In the further course of this discussion I shall consider ex- clusively the scientifically constructed languages known at the present day, ie. the formalized languages of the deductive sciences. Their characteristics will be described at the beginning of § 2. It will be found that, from the standpoint of the present problem, these languages fall into two groups, the division being based on the greater or less stock of grammatical forms in a particular language. In connexion with the ‘poorer’ languages the problem of the definition of truth has a positive solution: there is a uniform method for the construction of the required 1 OF. Kotarbitiski, T. (37), p. 126 (in writing the present article I have repeatedly consulted this book and in many pointa adhered to the terminology there suggested).154 CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN FORMALIZED LANGUAGES vill definition in the case of each of these languages. In §§ 2 and 3 I shall carry out this construction for a concrete language in full and in this way facilitate the general description of the above method which is sketched in § 4. In connexion with the ‘richer’ languages, however, the solution of our problem will be negative, as will follow from the considerations of § 5. For the languages of this group we shall never be able to construct a correct definition of the notion of truth.t Nevertheless, everything points to the possibility even in these cases—in contrast to the language of everyday life—of introducing a consistent and correct use of this concept by considering it as a primitive notion of a special science, namely of the theory of truth, and its funda- mental properties are made precise through axiomatization. The investigation of formalized languages naturally demands a knowledge of the principles of modern formal logic. For the construction of the definition of truth certain purely mathemati- cal concepts and methods are necessary, although in a modest degree. I should be happy if this work were to convince the reader that these methods already are necessary tools even for the investigation of purely philosophical problems. §1. Tam Conozpr or Truz SEnTENcE iN EvERYDAY OB CotLoquia, LancuacE For the purpose of introducing the reader to our subject, a consideration—if only a fleeting one—of the problem of defining truth in colloquial language seems desirable. I wish especially } This wes communicated to the Society of Sciences in Warsaw by J. Luka- siewicz on 21 March 1931. The resulta it contains date for the most part from 1929. I have reported on this, among other things, in two lectures which I gave under the title ‘On the Concept of Truth in relation to formalized deductive systems’ at the logical section of the Philosophical Society in Warsaw (8 October 1930) and at the Polish Philosophical Society in Lwéw (15 December 1930), a résumé of which appeared in Tarski, A. (73). For reasons unconnected with me the printing of this work was much delayed. This enabled me to supplement the text with some rather important results (cf. p. 247, foot- note). In the meantime a résumé of the chief results has appeared in Tarski, A. (76). + Regarding this statement compare the Postacript.