Operational Reactor Safety

22.091/22.903

Professor Andrew C. Kadak Professor of the Practice

Lecture 19 Three Mile Island Accident

Primary system

Pilot operated relief valve Secondary System

Emergency Cooling Pump Feedwater line

Pressurizer
Figures Hemisphere. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

Figures Hemisphere. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

Davis Besse Event: September 24, 1977 - 9:24 PM

Power Level 9% Transient initiated - Loss of feedwater to steam generator Temperature increased in reactor Water level in pressurizer increased Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) opened PORV did not close but stuck open Reactor Automatically Shutdown Emergency Feedwater pumps automatically started Primary coolant system cooled and shrunk
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Primary system

Pilot operated relief valve Secondary System

Emergency Cooling Pump Feedwater line

Pressurizer
Figures Hemisphere. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse..

Event Sequence Continued

Primary circuit pressure dropped rapidly

Coolant leakage out of PORV Coolant shrinkage (cooldown)

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) automatically starts to provide more water Operators monitoring water level in pressurizer which was changing until with ECCS water level became normal. Operators shutdown ECCS cooling water system However PORV still open - small break loss of coolant accident
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Event Sequence Continued

Since PORV was open - pressure kept dropping reaching saturation pressure of coolant which allowed the water to boil - forming steam voids which caused the pressurizer water level to rise. 22 Minutes later, operators determined that there was a continuing primary coolant leak and closed the block valve downstream of the pressurizer. Operators then restored cooling water by ECCS and water make up system of reactor and returned reactor to normal shutdown condition.

Consequences

Core damage accident avoided by timely operator action. NRC, Babcock and Wilcox and the utility investigated the incident Neither NRC nor the nuclear steam supplier - B&W shared this information with other B&W plants or the rest of the industry. 1975 Rasmussen (MIT Prof) Report analyzed probabilistic risks (PRA) of nuclear plants

Conclusion - small break LOCAs are dominant accident contributors NRC and critics did not want to use PRA is safety determinations
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18 MONTHS LATER

March 28, 1979

Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Three Mile Island What Happened and Why ?

Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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What Is Three Mile Island ?

TMI is a two unit nuclear plant site in Middletown, Pennsylvania Unit 1- 792 Mwe: Unit 2 - 880 Mwe Babcock & Wilcox Designed PWR 2 Steam Generators - once through 4 Main Coolant Pumps Condensers cooled by Cooling Towers

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Primary system

Pilot operated relief valve Secondary System

Emergency Cooling Pump Feedwater line

Pressurizer
Figures Hemisphere. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

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Steam Generators

B&W Once Through Steam Generator

Recirculating U Tube Steam Generator

Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

Reactor Shutdown Signals

Overpower High Temperature Outlet High Pressure Reactor Building Pressure Low Pressure Power imbalance/flow Reactor Coolant Pumps ARTS - anticipatory reactor trip system
(not at TMI) - for feedwater and turbine trip for Integrated Control System)

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Precursors
TMI Unit 2 - Newest Unit on Site Small coolant leak in the pressurizer relief valve raises temperature downstream of valve which drains into the drain tank Operators unaware that two valves on emergency feedwater valves were closed following maintenance (were supposed to be open). Small blockage in a transfer line for demineralizer resins which could not be cleared.

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Initiation

Plant operating normally at 97% power 4:00:37 (AM) loss of condensate flow due to a condensate pump trip (shutdown).

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Key Sequence of Events

Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Bubble Trouble

Hydrogen Production

Due to zirconium water reaction Radiolysis Boiling Why or why not ? Why missed in analysis ? What was missing in the approach ? NRC - Industry

Oxygen generation due to

Possible explosive mixture ?

Was reactor vessel in danger of exploding ?

Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Figures Hemisphere. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

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Inside TMI Reactor Vessel Post Accident

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1979

Today
Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Public Health and Environmental Consequences

Studies by EPA, Health and Human Services, DOE, NRC and the State of Pennsylvania Thousands of environmental samples Conclusions

Average dose to 2 million people in area < 1 mrem Max dose at site boundary full time - 100 mrem Natural background in area - 100-125 mrem/yr 1 Chest x-ray - 6 millirem

No adverse Health Effects

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Lessons Learned (Good)

Water helps even if core is severely damaged Vessel did not fail even with molten core in the bottom No energetic steam explosion Most fission products contained inside Containments work

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Lessons Learned (not so good)

Inadequate operator training - formed INPO Instrumentation needs upgrading - did it Added Safety Parameter Display System Added new instrumentation

Reactor Water Level Post Accident Sampling System

Added Shift Technical Advisor to all shifts Emergency planning needed upgrading - done Focused attention on severe accident research Need new operator emergency response procedures - critical safety functions - done Risk focus should not be on Large Break LOCA but more likely events Use of Probabilistic Risk Analysis to understand safety of plants not just depend on regulations
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Courtesy of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. Used with permission.

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Bottom Lines

Precursors are important indicators of problems need to be addressed not ignored Industry Complacency is a risk. Attention to detail and understanding how plants work is vital On-line risk monitors very helpful in gauging plant status Knowledgeable and well trained staff and engineers very important Management and Safety Culture hugely important to safe operations.
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Homework

Read Rogovin Report Executive Summary

Analyze event from the perspective of why the accident happened and why it became a such serious problem. (Beyond the obvious of failing to recognize the open PORV). Given your experience in the simulators (recall that the simulator you were in did not represent control rooms of the 1970s).

Consider operator training Regulations Technical response Knowledge Control room Design and instrumentation Fundamental design of reactor Management culture

Read Steam Generator Report for background on designs

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22.091 Nuclear Reactor Safety

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