UNCLASSIFIED

HISTORICAL MONOGRAPH
ARMY ORDNANCE SATELLITE PROGRAM

Paul H o S a t t e r f i e l d David S. Akens

Approved f o r r e l e a s e by:
i'

B r i g Gen, USA Commander

P u b l i s h e d by:
ABMA H i s t o r i a n 1 November 1958

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SECURITY S e c t i o n s 793 and 794.

This document contains information a f f e c t i n g the national defense of the United S t a t e s within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, T i t l e 18, U.S.C.

Its transmission or the r e v e l a t i o n of i t s contents i n any

manner t o an unauthorized person i s prohibited by law.

PREFACE The following81/ pages c o n t a i n high p o i n t s of Amy Ordnance s a t e l l i t e h i s t o r y , beginning w i t h s c i e n t i s t s Hermann Oberth and Robert Goddard a f t e r World War I. S t i l l t o be w r i t t e n i s a d e t a i l e d , t e c h n i c a l account. However, a l o n g and h e l p f u l s t e p i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n i s t h i s history's contemporary, c a l l e d E x p l o r e r s

In O r b i t ,
The

t e c h n i c a l l y o r i e n t e d s t u d y prepared by V i t r o Engineering Company f o r t h e Army B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Agency.

Development Operations D i v i s i o n , ABMA, a s w e l l a s t h e

ABMA H i s t o r i c a l S e c t i o n have c o p i e s of t h i s V i t r o Study on

file.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE L I S T OF APPENDICES

ii
iv

I,
11, 111,

GERMANY ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND AND WHITE SANDS HUNTSVILLE

1
36 46 83

APPENDIX

- iv

LIST O F APPENDICES Shipment of Outstanding German S c i e n t i s t s , 21 J u l y 194f T r a v e l Orders, 1 5 September 1945 P r e s s Release War Department, October 1, 1945 Changing of Code Word nOVERCASTw, 1 9 March 1946
A V-2 S a t e l l i t e Drawing, 1946

A 1946 Space S t a t i o n Drawing

Drawing of a S a t e l l i t e O r b i t , 1946 Termination of Procurement Phase of P r o j e c t P a p e r c l i p , 5 September 1947 German S p e c i a l i s t s i n t h e United S t a t e s , Summary as of 1 8 June 1947 Russian Comments t o t h e American S a t e l l i t e P r o j e c t , 29 October 1957 EXPLORER I Excerpts from Compilation of M a t e r i a l s on Space and Astronautics JUPITER Nose Cone Recovery Army~GainingV i t a l Space Assignments, E d i t o r i a l Army's Mission i n Space i s Expanding, E d i t o r i a l The EXPLORERS Ahead of Schedule, E d i t o r i a l In M y Opinion, E d i t o r i a l Statement by S e n a t o r Sparkman t o t h e P r e s s , 1 5 October 1958 Department of Defense Release

LIST O F APPENDICES ( ~ o n d t) Statement by General Medaris Concerning N A S A Statement by D r , von Braun Concerning N A S A S t , Louis Post Dispatch, E d i t o r i a l S t , Louis Globe Democrat, E d i t o r i a l In M y Opinion, E d i t o r i a l
J U N O I M i s s i l e Payload J U N O V Booster Program-ARPA 14-59
L '

C l u s t e r e d and S i n g l e Engine Designs Tankage Designs P a r a l l e l S t a g i n g Design f o r J U N O V Conventional Staging Design f o r J U N O V

J U N O V Booster on ABMA T e s t Stand

A i r T r a n s p o r t a b l e Booster

Parachute Recovery of J U N O V Booster

I . GERMANY
The Army's satellite program really began with the fiction-like story of Professor Hermann Oberth, "father of 1 astronautics," Born in Hernannstadt, Transylvania, in 1894, this soft spoken and mild mannered theorist entered the University of Munich in 1913, A Jules Verne fan all his life, Oberth wrote his doctorate thesis on space travel; to judge his reception one can imagine a doctorate student of today writing a thesis on flying through the air with superman wings, His thesis failed, though later published in German it proved a sell-out in first and second 2 edition, Crammed with formulas, the book's popularity suggests that German scientific temperament was already attuned toward space travel,

Citation of the American Rocket Society to Prof. Oberth in 1956, said: "The intellectual forces set in motion by Prof, Oberth are largely responsible for the present high state of rocketry, missile technology, and astronautical research," Occasion was the presentation to Prof, Oberth of the G. Edward Pendray Award, now in possession of Prof, Oberth. Die Rakete a den Planetenrgumen pl he Rocket Into Interplanetary Space), Munich, 1 9 2 r Interviewed for this monograph in Sept. 1958, Prof, Oberth looked up busily from his drawing pencils and board at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, explaining in broken English how some Agency employee had borrowed and lost his only copy.

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I n America, w h i l e P r o f e s s o r Oberth i n Germany emphasized space t r a v e l , s c i e n t i s t Robert H, Goddard emphasized r o c k e t s , o r t h e means of g e t t i n g i n t o space, Oberth was a dreamer, a t h e o r i s t , who e a r l y t a l k e d of s a t e l l i t e s t a t i o n s ; Goddard was more immediately p r a c t i c a l , i n t e r e s t e d i n r o c k e t s , t h e means of g e t t i n g t h e r e , Oberth's book begins w i t h v e h i c l e s " t h a t w i l l n o t f a l l back t o e a r t h ; furthermore, they w i l l even be a b l e t o 3 l e a v e t h e zone of t e r r e s t r i a l a t t r a c t i o n , ' D r , Goddard took out p a t e n t s and wrote mainly f o r s c i e n t i f i c j o u r n a l s ; h i s e a r l y work began w i t h a s e a r c h f o r "a t h e o r y of r o c k e t a c t i o n w which would r a i s e "recording a p p a r a t u s beyond t h e range f o r sounding balloons,,,P
/

Goddard

published l i t t l e concerning space t r a v e l i t s e l f , a t one p o i n t f i l i n g such t h i n g s i n a f r i e n d ' s s a f e , marking them:

5

"To be opened only by an optimist,"

The foreword of a l a t e r Goddard book s a i d :

"There

i s evidence t h a t t h e German r o c k e t engines followed

Dr.

Goddardts work v e r y c l o s e l y from t h e time of publi-

c a t i o n of h i s f i r s t Smithsonian r e p o r t i n 1919 u n t i l h i s

I *bid
-

Introduction, Robert H, Goddard, Method of Reaching Extreme A l t i t u d e s , Washington, D, C, ( p u b l i s h e d by Smithsonian ~ n s t i t u t e ) , p* 1, Ralph E, Jennings, "Father of RocketryStt Space J o u r n a l , Vol, I, NO, 2, Spring 1958, p, 6,

d e a t h e w b However, ABMA German s c i e n t i s t s s a y t h i s i d e a

i s e r r o n e o u s , t h a t " t h e r e was n o t a Goddard p u b l i c a t i o n

i n t h e l i b r a r y a t PeenemandeSn o r , i f t h e r e was, '*no one 7 seemed t o c o n s i d e r i t e n German m i s s i l e s u c c e s s was due 8 almost e n t i r e l y t o German s c i e n t i f i c temperamenteW Prof. Oberth d i s c l a i m s t h e Goddard i n f l u e n c e .

H i s 1923 book

r e f e r r e d t o Goddard because he "had r e c e n t l y r e a d of him i n newspapers and I wanted t o know t h a t o t h e r s experimented with space t r a v e l .

W e d i s a g r e e d o n p r o p u l s i o n systems, D r , ,,9 b 1 ( Goddard minimizing l i q u i d p r o p u l s i o n f o r space t r a v e l ,

6. 7.

8. 9. 10.

Robert H e Goddard, Rocket Development, New York, 1948, Foreword by H a r r y F. Guggenheim, p. x i . "1 h e a r d o n l y of D r . Goddard a f t e r coming h e r e ( t o t h e U. s.)," s a y s M r . Eberhard Rees, who worked d i r e c t l y under von Braun a t Peenemcnde, and l a t e r as h i s deputy a t ABMA. "But I d i d h e a r much of Oberth." Interview a t ABMA, 1 9 Sept. 1958. I n t e r v i e w w i t h M r . Helmut Hoeppner, A s s i s t a n t t o Prof. Oberth, AEMA Research P r o j e c t s L a b o r a t o r y , 1 6 S e p t . 1958. I n t e r v i e w w i t h Prof. Oberth, 1 6 S e p t , 1958. A somewhat poor t r a n s l a t i o n of a n Oberth l e t t e r t o I n t r o d u c t i o n 3 Guided M i s s i l e s , Goddard appeared i n p u b l i s h e d by t h e A n t i a i r c r a f t A r t i l l e r y and Guided 1 . M i s s i l e School, F o r t Bliss, Texas, Apr. 1953, p. 1 Here i t i s i n p a r t : V e a r Sir: Already many y e a r s I work a t t h e problem t o p a s s over t h e atmosphere of o u r e a r t h by means of a r o c k e t . When I was now p u b l i s h i n g t h e r e s u l t of m y examinations and c a l c u l a t i o n s , I l e a r n e d by t h e newspaper, t h a t I am not alone i n m y i n q u i r i e s and t h a t you, d e a r S i r , have a l ready done much i m p o r t a n t works a t t h i s sphere. I n s p i t e of my e f f o r t s , I d i d n o t succeed i n g e t t i n g y o u r books a b o u t t h i s o b j e c t . T h e r e f o r e , I beg you, d e a r

L a t e r , t h e German w S o c i e t y f o r Space Travel,"

of

which Oberth w a s a n e a r l y member, r e q u e s t e d s c i e n t i f i c 1 1 information from D r . Goddard b u t was r e f u s e d , I n g e n e r a l t h e r e was l i t t l e space information exchanged between c o u n t r i e s p r i o r t o t h e end of World War 11, There were a few people i n a few c o u n t r i e s who had t h e J u l e s Verne v i s i o n and began experimenting, But t h e s e ,

except i n Germany, worked i n s o l i t u d e , sometimes even 12 secrecy. Not u n t i l 1926 o r 1927 d i d Prof, Oberth h e a r of H u s s i a T s Ziolkovsky, who a q u a r t e r c e n t u r y e a r l i e r used l i q u i d f u e l s on t h e same premise as Oberth, nbecause of t h e i r h i g h e r exhaust v e l o c i t i e s o w But where most s c i e n t i s t s worked a l o n e , i n Germany they formed a r o c k e t s o c i e t y , ARMA

German s c i e n t i s t s emphatically deny t h a t such i n d i c a t i o n s of m i s s i l e emphasis stemmed from a V e r s , a i l l e s T r e a t y looph o l e allowing them t o p r a c t i c e on guided m i s s i l e s . Before

S i r , t o l e t them have me, A t once a f t e r coming out of m y work I w i l l be honored t o send i t t o you, f o r I t h i n k t h a t only by common work of t h e s c h o l a r s of a l l n a t i o n s can be solved t h i s g r e a t problem, Yours v e r y t r u l y Hermann Oberth, Student Hath, Heidelbergn This l e t t e r was w r i t t e n e a r l y i n 1922, I n May o r June 1922, Oberth r e c e i v e d a copy of GoddardTs 1919 r e p o r t d i r e c t l y from t h e a u t h o r ,

1 1 . W i l l y Ley, Rockets, M i s s i l e s , and Space Travel, New . 133. York 1951. D 12. l n t e r v i e w e w i t h prof. Oberth, 1 6 Sept. 1958,

Peenemhde t h e r e seems t o have been a s p i r i t of space t r a v e l r a t h e r t h a n guided m i s s i l e work. T h e i r pre-World War I1 Even today, though

w r i t i n g s emphasize space t r a v e l concepts.

under Army s u p e r v i s i o n as a t ~eenemGnde, German s c i e n t i s t s contend w i t h such charges. Outsiders, including other

s e r v i c e s , sometimes c a l l them nspace t h e o r i s t s w r a t h e r than o r "hand t o o l i n g t h e o r i s t s , " implying a n 13 ABMA i n t e r e s t i n d e s i g n r a t h e r t h a n production. After SPUTNIK, understandably, such charges lessened. Even t h i s " m i s s i l e makers,"

monograph r e v e a l s t h a t t h e Army now b u i l d s s a t e l l i t e s . But 14 As in b e f o r e SPUTNIK I A B M had no s a t e l l i t e mission. Germany d u r i n g Peenemiinde, s c i e n t i s t s might y e a r n f o r space b u t g r o c e r i e s came w i t h " m i s s i l e moneyow The Army Ordnance M i s s i l e Command, organized seven months a f t e r SPUTNIK I, wrote t h e f i r s t g e n e r a l mission d i r e c t i v e allowing AEMA a s a t e l l i t e v e n t u r e , even though s e v e r a l EXPLORERqs o r b i t e d 15 p r e v i o u s l y on s p e c i a l o r d e r s , Laymen i n 1923 g r e e t e d Oberthqs book more f a v o r a b l y t h a n d i d s c i e n t i s t s , who f o r t h e most p a r t ignored o r b e l i t t l
it.

There was no n r e c o i l i n spacem some s a i d , and anyway,

m t h e most powerful e x p l o s i v e known could n o t even l i f t i t s

13. 14. 15.

The w r i t e r heard t h i s charge s e v e r a l times a t t h e E v a l u a t i o n S t a f f , A i r War College, Maxwell, APB. Ord. Corps Order No. 3-56, 19 Jan. 1956, H i s t , Off. files. See Ord, Corps Order No. 16-58, 1 J u l y 1958, H i s t , Off, f i l e s . ry " -dA+
r,#i

,'T'

J ! 'in344

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own weight t o a g r e a t e r h e i g h t t h a n about 400 k i l o m e t e r s (250 miles)," They d e r i d e d Oberth" g a s o l i n e propulsion,

unknowing t h a t i t s exhaust v e l o c i t y was h i g h e r t h a n any 16 Another e a r l y Oberth i d e a w a s a s o l a r high explosive, mirror orbiting the earth, Such a m i r r o r would change

l o c a l c l i m a t e s , c r e a t e o r prevent storms, and w i n c a s e of

w a r , burn c i t i e s , explode ammunition p l a n t s , and do damage

l7 Today Oberth knows of l i t t l e t o t h e enemy g e n e r a l l y e m

backing f o r t h i s m i r r o r i d e a more v a l i d concept,

b u t m a i n t a i n s i t v s a n even

V3ince I f i r s t d e s c r i b e d t h e g i a n t

m i r r o r i n 1923,w he w r i t e s , i n Man I n t o Space," much h a s been s a i d and w r i t t e n about it--some of it wrong,,,, day be a r e a l i t y , of i t r i g h t b u t most

--

I am c e r t a i n t h a t m y space s h i p w i l l one
The c r i t i c s o b j e c t t o i t s s i z e o o 0 6 0m i l e s

i n diameter w i t h a n a r e a of 70,000 sq, km (27,000 sq, m i l e s ) 18 Oo.o But Oberth e x p l a i n s t h a t m i r r o r s as l a r g e as t h i s need n o t be b u i l t a t f i r s t - - o n l y l a t e r , Oberth" 1957 book c o n t a i n s l e s s s p e c t a c u l a r i d e a s

b u t none show h i s e a r l y s a t e l l i t e i n t e r e s t as t h e n m i r r o r i n spaceow

-

W i l l y Ley, Rockets, M i s s i l e s , and Space Travel, pp, 110-1120 170 I b i d o , p. 338, Also, Hermann Oberth, I n t o Space, Originally p m s h e d New York, 1957, pp, 110-112. i n Germany i n 1954, 18, Hermann Oberth, Man I n t o Space, pp, 97 and 98,

16,

Meanwhile, Russia as early as 1882 was flexing "space muscles.~ In that year Fedor Kibaltschitsch, revolutionary, murdered Czar Alexander, and KibaltschitschTs last request before execution was that a committee of scientists, technicians, and military people study his "rocket aircraft

planson The committee put its findings in a secret document, not opened anti1 after the revolution of 1917, which revealed the committee's agreement with Kibaltschitsch that "reaction motors were the only way for achieving high velocities for 19 However, the committee had also decided space travel," that the present state of the art did not permit actual realization of Kibaltschitsch~splans,

in Petersburg, and its vague description of a reactionI\ propelled aircraft inspired the Russian scientist KO Eo Ziolkowsky to study rocketry and space travel, Ziolkowsky,

In 1895 a small booklet by A0 Po Feodoroff appeared

perhaps father of rocketry in Russia, in 1895 published his first scientific studies on rocketry and space travel, call20 The articles ing them Dreams Of ' I & Earth And The Skz,

19, Excerpts from A, B . Scherschevsky, Die Rakete fuer Fahrt und Flug, Berlin-Charlottenburg 2 1929, Hist, Off. files, translated in Sept, 1958 by MrsoFriedrich Saurma, A B ~ . 20, Ziolkowsky antedated Oberth and Goddard, but at first had little impact, "After Germany's rocket s u c ~ e s s , ~ Oberth says, "the Russian people remembered how great

emphasized centrifugal acceleration and high velocities to counteract gravity, In 1903 the Russian magazine Science

Survev printed his article "A Rocket into the Cosmic S p a ~ e , in which he submitted the results of his first exploratory work on space ships, The article suggested the use of liquid fuel rockets and control by jet vanes, In 1911 the bulletin of the Technical University of

&, Vol, 11, published plans by Leningrad Wosduschn~.

Ao Gorochof for a so-called reaction airplane using crude oil and compressed air to fuel, At the same time Friedrich Arthurowitsch Zander in Moscow began work on a winged space ship. In April 1925 the Military Air Academy in Moscow established a Central Committee to study rocketry in co21 operation with the Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute,

was Ziolkowsky, That he was. In the foreword of his book published in 1924 it was said: ?Why must we learn from another country what began in our own, concerning information which died and was forgotten by lack of Russian interestOvttInterview with Prof. Oberth, 24 Oct, 1958. Professor W, P, Wetschinkin headed this Institute and membership included Me J o Lapirof-Skoblo, Ko E, Ziolkowsky, Tschigitar Zagut, N o A, Rynin, D o No Seyliger, F o A, Zander, A. Gorochof, A, Ao Kotenlnikof, and A, L . Tschischevsky, The objective of the committee was coordination of research work in Russia and foreign countries, promoting independent research work, publicity, and studies of military application, The Institute held a contest for the best design of a rocket with a range of 100 kilometers at about the same time that an Interplanetary Society began in Moscow0

Following Ziolkowsky, Goddard, and Oberth p u b l i c a t i o n s , t h e world began t o look toward space, About 1926,

a f t e r a r e p r i n t i n g of Ziolkowsky a r t i c l e s , a "space t r a v e l s o c i e t y u formed i n Moscow, s i g n i f i c a n t mainly because of

i t s s p e c t a c u l a r name:

W o r l d Center of A l l I n v e n t o r s and

S c i e n t i s t s o n But i n June 1927 a p r o f e s s i o n a l space s o c i e t y formed i n Germany, Verein - -- f-. i i r Raumschiffahrt -(society f o r
. -

Space ravel), known as VfR, 22 t a t i o p t o join,

and Oberth accepted a n i n v i -

P r i o r t o Peenemende Geman r o c k e t development c e n t e r e d mainly i n VfR, t h e o t h e r major i n t e r e s t being Oberthvs 23 More e x p l a n a t o r y - -Ra-=.schiff-&rttc second book, W z e zur than t h e 1923 book, t h i s one a l s o added a n important l a s t chapter: "The E l e c t r i c Space Ship;" it was h i s t o r y v s f i r s t
-

s c i e n t i f i c t r e a t i s e on e l e c t r i c s p a t i a l propulfsion,
24
- .

o r use

of similar t y p e charges ( e i t h e r + o r -) t o r e c o i l from each o t h e r and t h u s cause movement, I n a 1958 a r t i c l e prepared

f o r t h e Army Information Digest Prof, Oberth advocated j u s t p between an e a r t h t h i s t y p e p r o p u l s i o n f o r a space s h i 25 s a t e l l i t e aq& a l a n d i n g c r a f t t o Mars,

22, 23, 24, 25,

W i l l y Ley, Rockets, M i s s i l e s , and Space T r a v e l , pp, 116-117, H e m m Oberth, W e ~ ez u r Raumschiffahrt, Munich, 1929, I n t e r v i e w , 1 8 Sept, 1958, w i t h Oberth and Hoeppner, "Beyond Gravity," Amv Information Dinest, Oct, 1958, pp, 29-30,

Besides OberthTs book in 1929 a film company whetted German space-mindedness with the movie' Frau -im ~ o n d ~ ( ~ i r 1 in the
MOO~),

Oberth was the pictureTs scientific advisor,

but time and resources prevented a rocket launching to publicize the film's premiere, On the brighter side Oberth in 1929 became President of the German Space Society 26 VfR, with its 870 members, Oberth met von Braun in 1930, through the kind offices of Willy Ley. "OberthTs assistants included myself,"

writes Dr. von Braun, "Rudolph Nebel and Klaus Riedel. Nebel was later to direct the Raketenflugplatz (rocket airdrome) while Riedel was to be in charge of testing at 27 PeenemUndeOm Young von Braun, also busy with "my student engineering work at a Berlin locomotive shop," joined VfR and helped Oberth produce nthe first appearance in Germany of the liquid fuel rocket motor as a full-fledged, officially recognized and attested member of the family of internal 28 combustion engineson This in August, 1930,

Willy Ley, Rockets, Missiles, and Space Travel, PO 131, 27, Kenneth W, Gatland, Project Satellite, NYC, 1958, "From Small Beginnings," by Dr. Wernher von Braun, Ch. I, p . 20. 28. Dr, Wernher von Braun, Ibid., pp, 20-21.

26.

S h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s , money d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r c e d Oberth t o resume a t e a c h i n g job i n Rumania, but h i s s t u d e n t s continued space r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t s , Outside B e r l i n , C i t y F a t h e r s allowed f r e e use of 300 a c r e s , a former ammunitions a r e a , As t h e i r f i n a n c e s Von Braunvs

dropped, t h e i r space-earnestness r o s e ,

f r i e n d , Rudolph Nebel, a t one p o i n t t a l k e d a concern i n t o g i v i n g them welding wire, because of immediacy of space travel, They t h e n o f f e r e d i t t o a welding shop, i n Similar

exchange f o r a hunan welder, which t h e y needed, improvising was common.

Yet t h e donors demanded r e s u l t s and t h e young scient i s t s had y e t t o g e t a r o c k e t i n t o t h e a i r , Renewed

a c t i o n r e s u l t e d i n a f i r i n g a t t e m p t i n October 1931, onl o o k e r s paying a mark each but saw only a r o c k e t limp halfway up i t s l a u n c h e r and s i n k p e a c e f u l l y i n t o p o s i t i o n again, The w s p e c t a t o r s r e t i r e d i n some doubt a s t o whether But "within a few The pencil-shaped

t h e admission f e e should be returned," weeks, launchings became commonplace, rocket,,,would

s l i d e smoothly out of t h e l a u n c h e r r a i l s

and climb t o 1,000 o r 1,280 f e e t , Then a small parachute 29 Leaping from a motor c a r would emerge from t h e t a i l , " t h e s c i e n t i s t s would g r a b t h e r o c k e t , l i k e a f o o t b a l l , before

it hit the ground, Thus, cars chased rockets, powered by similar propulsion systems, except that rockets carried their oxygen as well as their gasoline, Historically famous Peenemsnde actually began with the spring of 1932, Though the young rocket scientists

might be disinterested in Versailles Treaty loopholes, the German Ordnance Department was not. To meet the German

scientists came three Ordnance Department representatives, dressed as civilians, These were "Colonel Professor Karl Becker, Chief of Ballistics and Ammunition, the Colone19s ammunition expert Major von Horstig, and Captain,,,Walter 30 Dornberger in charge of powder rockets for the Army," The visitors concentrated on "thrust balance (data) during

30, Here is written 21 Apr, Dr. von

an interesting account of this meeting, by Daniel Lang for the Yorker Ma azine, 1951, p, 83, following an interview wit Braun,

"One day in the spring of 1932, a black sedan drew up at the edge of the Raketenflugplatz and three passengers got out to watch a rocket launching, 'They were in mufti, hut mufti or not, it was the Armyst von Braun said to me, 'That was the beginning, The Versailles Treaty hadn't placed any restrictions on rockets, and the Army was desperate to get back on \ its feet, We didn't care much about that, one way or the other, but we needed money, and the Army seemed willing to help us, In 1932, the idea of war seemed to us an absurdity, The Nazis weren't yet in power, We felt no moral scruples about the possible future abuse of our brain child, We were interested solely in exploring outer space, It was simply a question with us of how the golden cow could be milked most

static firing and on such meagre diagrams as we could lay before them.,,, Great was our satisfaction when Nebel

signed with them a contract for the sum of 1 , 0 0 0 marks, contingent upon a successful firing of MIRAK 11, at the 31 Army Proving Grounds of KummersdorfeW A subsequent launching in July 1932 sent MIRAK I1 up only 200 feet, and to Ordnance experts it appeared too unpredicatable for meeting their long-range weapon needs, After many unsuccessful visits by Nebel, von Braun called upon Colonel Becker, Becker at last agreed to limited support of the missile project, if the work would be done away from public view, under Army supervision, Need for funds overcame reluctance to Army authority and so the scientists agreed, choosing von Braun to represent them as a civilian employee at the Army rocket section,
32

Using a somewhat modern

successfully,~ After the appearance of the black sedan, the golden cow supplied the members of the Verein fur Raurnschiffahrt generously with equipment, proving grounds, and skilled workmen," 31. Dr, Wernher von Braun, "From Small Beginnings," ope cit., pa 24. 32, The Air Force Historian on the proving grounds during the CROSSBOW experiments wrote this for Atlantic Monthly in 1951: V h e n Dornberger assumed command of the German Armyg s new experimental station at Kummersdorf, early in 1931, he was instructed by General Becker to offer three alternatives to key members of the Spaceship

i n v e n t o r e s concept of "sub-contracting f o r a s many p a r t s

as possible,"the

r o c k e t e e r s i n December 1934 succeeded i n

launching two A-20s t o a h e i g h t of

13 m i l e s ,

The m i l i -

t a r y was pleased, purse s t r i n g s loosened, and many good and bad t e s t s of t h e A-3, A-4, and A-5 r e s u l t e d .

Meanwhile, H i t l e r r o s e i n Germany, and H i t l e p favored t h e Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe, i n t u r n , v i s i t e d t h e A m y V s

r o c k e t works, o r d e r i n g a r o c k e t engine developed f o r t h e Heinkel 112, F i r s t s t a t i c t e s t s , i n t h e summer of 1935,

%mazed and pleased t h e Luftwaffe; immediate work began on an all-rocket f i g h t e r , The Luftwaffe a l s o suggested a j e t -

a s s i s t e d t a k e o f f d e v i c e f o r heavy bombers, and o f f e r e d f i v e m i l l i o n marks f o r i n c r e a s i n g t h e b u i l d i n g f a c i l i t i e s and t h e complement of only 80 people.

B a t t h e Army countered

T r a v e l Club, They could t u r n over r o c k e t p a t e n t s and cease work; t h e y could be j a i l e d ; i f good enough, t h e y could be absorbed i n t o t h e Armyes r o c k e t programen Von,Braun accepted t h e l a t t e r , "The hardheaded c a p t a i n and t h e blue-eyed wonderboy became, w i t h t h e h e l p of capable and l o y a l a s s i s t a n t s , n o t only t h e t r u e p r o g e n i t o r s of t h e i d e a l long-range weapon but, i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d , t h e a c t u a l f o r e r u n n e r s of B t h e journey i n t o s p a c e . V h e i p work on t h e V-2 w i l l s t a n d f o r a l l time as one of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y f s g r e a t e s t t e c h n i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c Joseph Warner Angell, "Guided contributionson M i s s i l e s Could Have Won," A t l a n t i c Monthlx, Dec, 1951, 1 , P a r t I, p. 1

--

by a p p r o p r i a t i n g eleven m i l l i o n marks f o r t h e r o c k e t e e r s t o 33 " s t a y Armyow "In t h i s manner our modest e f f o r t s , whose y e a r l y budget had never exceeded 80,000 marks, emerged i n t o what t h e Americans c a l l t h e t b i g time,' Thenceforth m i l l i o n 34 a f t e r m i l l i o n flowed i n as we needed i t o n Von BraunTs p a r e n t s helped i n t h i s search f o r l a r g e r accommodations, s u g g e s t i n g t h e Peenemtfnde a r e a o I n A p r i l 1937 a n amazed

and g r a t i f i e d group of r o c k e t e e r s t r a n s f e r r e d i n t o t h e large installation, A t Peenemfide t h e r e developed propulsion, personnel, and p u b l i c i t y subsequently v a l u a b l e t o t h e U, So A m y w s

s a t e l l i t e program,

Peenemunde included t h e German A i r

33,

34.

Most s o u r c e s a g r e e t h a t from t h i s p o i n t , t o t h e end 1 , funds poured i n t o t h i s r o c k e t of World War 1 p r o j e c t , H i t l e r t s r o l e i n t h i s whole t h i n g , however, i s nebulous, and would r e q u i r e a g r e a t amount of res e a r c h t o c l a r i f y , No two s c i e n t i s t s a t A B U a g r e e concerning him, though he w a s much i n t h e f o r e f r o n t even a t PeenemiInde, I n p u b l i c a t i o n s , t h e y c o n s i s t e n t l y regard him w i t h dis-favor, I n p r i v a t e , t h e y seem t o regard him as c o n s i d e r a b l y more p r a c t i c a l t h a n g e n e r a l l y thought, A t any r a t e , H i t l e r w a s a Peenemiinde e n t h u s i a s t from 1942 on, and b e f o r e t h a t he caused no s e r i o u s c u r t a i l m e n t t h e r e , For d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of H i t l e r e s i n t e r e s t i n r o c k e t s , read: Joseph W, Angell, "Guided M i s s i l e s Could Have Won," A t l a n t i c Monthly, Dec, 1951, p, 10-12; Kenneth W, Gatland, P r o j e c t S a t e l l i t e , pp, 40-42; Daniel Lang, aA Reporter A t Large," The New Yorker, Apr, 21, 1951, p, 83; and Walter Dornberger, V-2, New York 1954, pp, 98-108, Dr. Wernher von Braun, =From Small Beginnings," ope c i t , , pe 32,

Force (~uftwaffe)and the A m y (~ehrmacht) ; the V-1 nbuzzbombw and the V-2 rocket originated there, In each case the "Vn stood for Vergeltungswaffe, Vengeance Weapon, a popular designation suggested by the Ministry of Propaganda, The V-2 rocket, identified as the 8-4, was equivalent to the "Mn numbers of the standard ordnance terms; it became famous after the Luftwaffe failed to subdue Great Briand the Wehrmacht stood s t * e d and Moscow. at the gates of Stalingrad

Then Witler *#becamedesperate and ordered an 35 all out effort in the development of the A-4," After the successful A-4 launchings that began at Peenemffnde in October 1942, the British Intelligence Service became interested, this as early a$ May 1943, In

August 1943 the Royal Air Force launched a large scale raid, ~eenemundesuffering 815 casualties. The raid de-

stroyed the test stands and assembly hangers; yet mass production of A-49s began in October 1943 only one month after Hitler" deadline of 1 September, Also in 1943 a

Peenemhde Planning Committee decided to establish three plants: a Southern Plant to be divided between Vienna-

Neustadt and Friedrichshafen; a Central Plant in the southern Harz mountains, near Nordhausen; and an Eastern 35, Historv of German V-2 and "O~erationPaper Clip,= OML, 1958, Capt, Rudolph Nottrodt, p, 1, Hist, Off, files.

P l a n t i n L a t v i a , n e a r Riga,

By J u l y 1944 t h e E a s t e r n P l a n t

f e l l i n t o S o v i e t hands; t h e p l a n t i n Vienna w a s damaged by A l l i e d r a i d s t o such an e x t e n t t h a t only p a r t i a l assembly was p o s s i b l e t h e r e ; and t h e F r i e d r i c h s h a f e n P l a n t a l s o s u f f e r e d s e v e r e l y from a i r a t t a c k s , Thus t h e C e n t r a l P l a n t By

remained a l o n e t o do most of t h e assembly work,

September 1943 t h e production of A-4Qs f o r r e s e a r c h purposes reached about 20 m i s s i l e s p e r month, By t h e f a l l of 1944 So f o r e i g n workers

t h e r e was a c r i t i c a l need f o r manpower,

and p o l i t i c a l and w a r p r i s o n e r s began t o work under s k i l l e d German employees, t h e C e n t r a l P l a n t u t i l i z i n g 9,000 f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s of 10,000 employees, On 6 September 1944 t h e f i r s t t a c t i c a l A-4 was launched a g a i n s t England--from

a mobile unit,--though such

From 16 August t o

m i s s i l e s l e f t much t o be d e s i r e d .

February 1945, 3,000 went t o f i e l d u n i t s , and of t h e f i r s t thousand i n s p e c t e d , 339 were d e f e c t i v e and r e t u r n e d t o t h e f a c t o r y , and about 5 p e r c e n t of t h e remaining 661 d i d n o t r i s e a t a l l o r tumbled a f t e r take-off, However, a f t e r

October 1944, 85 p e r c e n t of t h e launchings were s u c c e s s f u l , 20 p e r c e n t r e a c h i n g t h e s p e c i f i e d t a r g e t , and t h e remainder doing c o n s i d e r a b l e damage, By t h e WarQsend, t a c t i c a l u n i t s

had launched 3,300 8-49 s,

36

Meanwhile, a f t e r 1944 ~ e e n e m k d eoperated i n confusion, Exhausted workers t r a i n e d i n c l o s e combat and

s t r e e t f i g h t i n g and r e c e i v e d many d e c o r a t i o n s i n c l u d i n g D i s t i n g u i s h e d S e r v i c e s Crosses, t o b o l s t e r morale, They

made p r e p a r a t i o n s t o keep from t h e approaching S o v i e t s any information which might h e l p i n r e e o n s t r u e t i o n of t h e 37 8-40 ~ e e n e m h d eevacuation began i n t h e f i r s t month of 1945, personnel going t o t h e s o u t h e r n Harz mountains and t h e C e n t r a l P l a n t , 5,000 employees t r a n s f e r r i n g under extremely d i f f i c u l t c o n d i t i o n s , Amid a i r a t t a c k s , t r a i n s

t r a n s p o r t e d personnel over bombed t r a c k s and b r i d g e s , A r r i v i n g f i n a l l y a t t h e i r new s i t e , t h e personnel made prompt p l a n s f o r a n i n c r e a s e i n m i s s i l e production t o 600 monthly by September 1945,

36,

37,

I b i d , , pp, 2-3, W e l l b e f o r e t h e end of t h e War we were averaging a thousand V-29s p e r month, a f i g u r e which didn" v a r y 1 0 p e r c e n t , d e s p i t e bombingson I n t e r v i e w w i t h M r , E r n s t Lange, A B U , 22 Oct, 1958, The l e a d e r s a t Peenemirnde were p r a c t i c a l and perhaps decided t h i s e a r l y t o keep m a t e r i a l from victor, i n o r d e r t o be i n a b e t t e r b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n , Capto N o t t r o d t , i n h i s r e p o r t prepared f o r Maj, Gen, H o N, Toftoy a t RSA, s a y s t h a t a f t e r 1944 only @ i r r e s p o n s i b l e elements w i t h i n Germanyu t r i e d t o continue, I b i d , , pa 3,

During t h i s time Russia c a p t u r e d ~ e e n e d n d e and fought f o r B e r l i n , S h o r t l y bef o ~ teh e American Amy

occupied t h e Harz mountain and c a p t u r e d t h e A-4 production p l a n t , German SS t r o o p s took about 5 0 0 t o p guided missile s c i e n t i s t s and t e c h n i c i a n s t o s o u t h of Munich, supposedly f o r e l i m i n a t i o n t 6 prevent t h e i r c a p t u r e by A l l i e d f o r c e s , However, e v e n t s moved s o s w i f t l y t h a t time r a n o u t b e f o r e t h e Nazis could carny o u t t h e i r d a s t a r d l y plan, 39
SS

38

o f f i c e r s d i d o r d e r t h r e e l a r g e t r u c k s and t r a i l e r s of documents t o an abandoned mine i n t h e Harz mountains, h i d t h e m a t e r i a l and b l a s t e d t h e mine s h u t , U, S o Amy a n i t s n o t f i n d i n g t h e hidden boxes u n t i l A p r i l 1945, The ex-Peenemiinde s t a f f , t o t h e i r moment of c a p t u r e , "continued t h e i r s c i e n t i f i c d i s c u s s i o n s D n i n t h e c o a r s e 40 of which "the H E W S I1 weapon w a s f i r s t conceivedom They had recognized A-4 t a c t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s from t h e

s t a r t , knowing t h a t m a x i m u m range could be l i t t l e more

t h a n 300 km, reached a g a i n s t London from launching s i t e s n e a r The Hague, So t h e r e s e a r c h e r s e a r l y thought of two-

38,

39, 40.

"It i s s t i l l considered p o s s i b l e , i f n o t probable, t h a t t h e SS Troops a c t u a l l y meant t o do t h i s , A s a y s M r , Helmut Hoeppner of t h e ABMA S t a f f , I n t e r v i e w 22 Sept, 1958, H i s t o r v of German V-2 a O p e ~ a t i o nPaper C l i p a m Capt. ~ u X l ~ t p, ~ 5 , t , Guided M i s s i l e Research A J @ Development, probably p r e p a ~ e m 5 2 by Hoffman A0 Birney a t F o r t Bliss, unnumbered, H i s t , Off, f i l e s ,

s t a g e r o c k e t s , s u g g e s t i n g a m i s s i l e (A-lo), w i t h a b o o s t e r of 200,000 l b , t h r u s t c a r r y i n g a modified 8-4 r o c k e t t o 41 more t h a n 100 m i l e s a l t i t u d e , There t h e b o o s t e r would f a l l away, t h e A-4 c o n t i n u i n g under i t s own propulsion, Another suggestion f o r i n c r e a s i n g range w a s use of t h e A-4 as b o o s t e r f o r a two-stage m i s s i l e , t h e second s t a g e u s i n g athodyd (ram j e t ) propulsion, This n t ~ a n s a t l a n t i c

t y p e r o c k e t w never advanced beyend t h e planning s t a g e , Though m i s s i l e s were ~eenem&de*s b u s i n e s s , t h e r e a r e i n d i c a t i o n s t h e r e s e a r c h e r s thought o f t e n of space flight, Opinions d i f f e r as t o how much "space f l i g h t However, von Brann

planningn t h e r e was a t Peenemznde,

w r i t e s t h a t "An unbiased v i s i t o r t o t h e planning group

a t Peenemiinde would have heard l i t t l e , i f anything,

d i s c u s s e d which r e l a t e d t o o t h e r m a t t e r s t h a n reaching i n t o space,,,, For t h e war-conscious o f f i c i a l s , t h e o b j e c t

of t h e A-9 w a s explained as a n e x t e n s i o n of t h e range, t o almost double t h a t of t h e A-4,= He added t h a t project

drawings f o r A-9 showed a p r e s s u r i z e d c o c k p i t i n p l a c e of t h e war-head; t h e r e w a s a l s o a t r i c y c l e l a n d i n g gear,

As

r e s t r i c t e d as we k e p t t h e s e drawings from t h e Ordnance

41,

Ibid,

The r e p o r t s a y s a n200,000-ton t h r u s t , "

visitors, we computed that the A-9 was capable of carrying 42 a pilot a distance of 400 miles in 17 tninutesoA The above suggests more interest in space flight than missiles, again a charge sometimes leveled at ABMA researchers, Writes an Air Force historian, from officially approved Air Force history: "There is some substance in

the charge later brought by antagonists in the A m y and the SS, that both Dornberger and von Braun were guilty of having used huge sums of military funds as a means of fostering their planetary and interstellar goalsaR The accomnt adds that in his later writings wDornberger admits Qthat from the beginning we wanted to go into s p a ~ e ~ , ~ And that he did not hesitate to say, of the work he directed before 1939: was the teamwo~kof fantically together for

inspired and inseparable eomrades,,,linked

life and death and devoted to one single idea,,*the goal 43 set our generation, the trip Qw apace and to the starsoQa

42, 43,

Dr, Wernher von Braun, "From Small BeginningsDW op, eit, pp, 47-48, Joseph W, Angell, Wuided Missiles Could Have Won,a , 31, Several Atlantic Month1 , Dec, 1951, Part I,, p members of t e USAF Air University Evaluation Staff studied the article before SPUTNIK I, perhaps again with the idea that the aArmy was way out there in space flight

There seems t o be substance t o t h e charge t h a t German r o c k e t e e r s from Oberth t o ABMA, sometimes openly and sometimes submerged, maintained a l o n g range g o a l of o u t e r space f l i g h t , Meanwhile, Americans wanted t o l e a r n of r o c k e t s o 1956 Cen, Toftoy wrote i n t h e Army I n f o r m a t i o n Digest2 aThere i s no q u i c k e r way t o s t i m u l a t e i n t e r e s t i n a new 44 America weapon t h a n t o disccmqw i t i n u s e by t h e enensyea and t h e world discovered German use of &ided m i s s i l e s i n 1943, and f e v e r i s h i n t e r e s t r e s u l t e d , True, as e a r l y as In

1917 t h e U o So Army A i r S e r v i c e experimented w i t h p i l o t l e s s a i r c r a f t o r " f l y i n g bombs,n and D r , Robert He Coddard

l a t e r experimented w i t h Army r o c k e t s ,

.But n o t u n t i l World

War I1 d i d American Army Ordnance, o r any o t h e r Army Ordnance, do much w i t h military r o c k e t r y ; and n o t u n t i l t h e C e m n guided missile d i d o t h e r German m i l i t a r y men do much w i t h guided m i s s i l e s , veloping a "V-1 There were U, S, proposals f o r de-

typen m i s s i l e , as e a r l y as 1941, b u t i t

was a f t e r t h e bupz bomb a t t a c k s on England t h a t t h e War

45 Department i n i t i a t e d t h i s p r o j e c t o n Before t h e s e

44. 450

Maj. Gen. H. N, Toftoy, "Army M i s s i l e development^" Amv Information Digest, Vole 1 1 , No. 22, Dec, 1956, p. 10, I b i d O bP O 22,

23 a t t a c k s Army m i s s i l e p r o g r e s s c e n t e r e d mainly i n t h e Army

A i r Force's Azon and Razon ( r a d i o and r a d a r guided bombs)

both of which s a w only l i m i t e d s e r v i c e i n World War 1 1 , The Army's r o c k e t a c t i v i t y began showing l i f e l a t e i n 1943 w i t h o r g a n i z a t i o n of a Rocket Branch which provided f o r c e n t r a l management of r o c k e t s i n t h e same manner as small arms, a r t i l l e r y , ammunition, and tanks, A t t h e same

time, Ordnance r e q u e s t e d C a l i f o r n i a ' s J e t Propulsion Laboratory t o s t u d y development of long-range surface-tos u r f a c e guided m i s s i l e s , $3,300,000 I n May 1944 Ordnance placed a

c o n t r a c t w i t h JPL f o r g e n e r a l r e s e a r c h on

guided m i s s i l e s , i n c l u d i n g r o c k e t p r o p u l s i o n and snpersonic I n l e s s t h a n a y e a r a c o n t r a c t went t o 46 and i n February General E l e c t r i c f o r t h e HERMES p r o j e c t aerodynamics,

46,

Major R e Be S t a v e r , something of a B i l l y M i t c h e l l i n advocating r o c k e t r y and u t i l i z a t i o n of German scient i s t s , s a i d of t h e HERIBS p r o j e c t : "There h a s been a tendency of t h e Ordnance Department t o p l a c e a c o n t r a c t such as t h i s and then, n o t only t o assume t h e e n g i n e e r s assigned t o t h a t p r o j e c t t o be ' e x p e r t s ' b u t a l s o t o r e l y on t h e i r opinions as such, Truly, n o t one person on t h e whole HERMES p r o j e c t can be c a l l e d a rocket 'expertT,,, They a r e now where t h e Germans were i n about 1935,, , (and) w i t h t h e p r e s e n t Ordnance program p l a c i n g a l l of i t s r e s e a r c h and developments w i t h o r g a n i z a t i o n s o u t s i d e t h e Amy, no r e a l experience w i l l e x i s t w i t h i n t h e Ordnance DepartThe Future of Ordnance in Jet-Provulaion, ment,,," Maj, Re Be E v e r , Ordnance 1 7 Dec, 1 9 q Department, ARGMA Technical L i b r a r y f i l e s ,

fl-m,

1945 t o t h e B e l l L a b o r a t o r i e s f o r t h e N I K E project,

47

Late

i n 1944 Ordnance b u i l t a wind t u n n e l a t t h e Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and f o u r y e a r s l a t e r one a t JPLo I n 1944

t h e Army e s t a b l i s h e d White Sands Proving Ground, a r o c k e t t e s t i n g range a d j a c e n t t o F o r t Bliss, and i n October 1945 a t F o r t Bliss i t a c t i v a t e d t h e 1 s t Guided M i s s i l e B a t t a l i o n , The U o So c o n t r a c t w i t h German s p e c i a l i s t s a f t e r World War I1 r e s u l t e d from f a r - s i g h t e d i n i t i a t i v e by both Army Ordnance and t h e s p e c i a l i s t s themselves, Certainly,

f l u s h e d w i t h v i c t o r y , i t took more t h a n o r d i n a r y f o r e s i g h t f o r Ordnance t o pursue German s c i e n t i f i c knowledge on a 24-hour a day b a s i s , and it r e q u i r e d as much f o r e s i g h t f o r t h e German s p e c i a l i s t s t o formulate a master p l a n f o r s e l l i n g s c i e n t i f i c s e r v i c e t o t h e Americans,

I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o =pin-pointm t h e American who f i r s t

thought of P r o j e c t PAPERCLIP, t h e code name f o r t r a n s f e r t o t h e U, So of German guided m i s s i l e s p e c i a l i s t s ,

W e can

a t l e a s t be s u r e i t was someone who b e l i e v e d i n "to t h e

v i c t o r belongs t h e s p o i l s n r a t h e r than " t h i s i s a war t o

47.

Ordnance Department Guided M i s s i l e Program, 1 3 Mar, 1947, DD, V - 1 t o V I I - 1 and V I I I - 1 t o IX-1, Rocket ~eveioiient Division, ABHA Technical Documents Library.

25

end a l l wars."

N e i t h e r P r e s i d e n t Eiaenhoweres Crusade

&

Europe nor t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defensees d i a r y covers t h e 48 subject.

It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t two y e a r s a f t e r PAPERCLIP
began, P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower r e c e i v e d a b r i e f i n g concerning

i t s o r i g i n and mission, 49

The b r i e f i n g o f f i c e r ( o f t h e

War Department General S t a f f ) t o l d Eisenhower t h a t t h e

o r i g i n a l impetus behind P r o j e c t PAPERCLIP began n e a r t h e end of 1944 when B r i t i s h and U. So military o r g a n i z a t i o n s This p l a n

c o l l a b o r a t e d i n t h e plan known as ECLIPSE.

would implement t h e U, So S t a t e DepartmentQa SAFEHAVEN p r o j e c t m f o r t h e c o n t r o l of G e m n i n d i v i d u a l s who might c o n t r i b u t e t o a r e v i v a l of t h e German war p o t e n t i a l by subversive a c t i v i t i e s i n f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s a f t e r t h e war." Subsequently, t h e U. S, "sought o u t t h e most s t r a t e g i c a l l y

importantw c e n t e r s o"f German s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, and analyzed " t h e t h r e a t t o world s e c u r i t y involved i n t h e

48.

49,

E u r o ~ e , Doubleday f3 Dwight D, Eisenhower, Crusade Co,, I n c , , Garden C i t y , N. Y e 1948, Also Walter Millis, E d i t o r , F o r r e s t a l D i a r i e s , Vikinn P r e s s , N . Ye 1951, "Outline f o r B r i e f i n g General Eisenhower on German S c i e n t i s t E x p l o i t a t i o n Program," Tab A, 1 1 Mar. 1947, Conference f i l e s , S p e c i a l Explo Br., M I D , WIGS, Wash. C i t e d i n Y a r r i e t Buyer and Edna Jensen, H i s t o m of AAF P a r t i c i a t i o n in P r o i e c t P a p e r c l i ~ ,& 1945=&&itation of German s c i e n t i s t T ~ u ~ . 1948, 3 , Research S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , Maxwell APB, Ala, . .
REGRAD~C)
//--

A.

r y ::!TI

proper and permanent c o n t r o l over a l a r g e group of German s c i e n t i s t s , and t h e problems involved i n achieving e i t h e r 50 proper b r permanent c o n t r o l i n Germanyew I n May 1945 Supreme Headquarters, AEF, cabled t h e P o l i c y S t a f f of t h e War Department General S t a f f f o r p o l i c y i n s t r u c t i o n s toward c o n t r o l of s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l res e a r c h i n Germany, The Chief, M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i g e n c e

S e r v i c e , WDGS, promptly answered with a w s i t u a t i o n e s t i m a t e w on "Long Range P o l i c y on German S c i e n t i f i c and Technical

Meanwhile, along w i t h i n t e r e s t among t o p U o So off i c i a l s , t o p Army men were advocating t h e use of German s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, Major General H o
J o

Knerr, U, So

S t r a t e g i c A i r Forces, says t h a t he e a r l y recommended t o L t , General Carl Spaatz, USSTAF, t h a t t h e "&IF make f u l l use of t h e e s t a b l i s h e d German Technical f a c i l i t i e s and personnel b e f o r e t h e y were destroyed o r d i s o r g a n i z e d o w Knerr a l s o d i s c u s s e d t h i s s u b j e c t w i t h t h e Honorable Robert
A o

L o v e t t , A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of War f o r A i r , d u r i n g

50, 51,

I$'$',

WDGS, Wash., SCU-394, t o Chief, P o l i c y S t a f f , WDGS, Wash,, 1 5 May 1945, both P o l i c i e s on German S c i e n t i s t f i l e , S p e c i a l Exple B ~ o , MID, W D G S , Wash, C i t e d from I b i d , , po 4 0
22 May 1945 ( S ) ; Cable, SHAEF-S88111,

Ibid,

Chief, MIS, f o r D i r , of I n t e l l . ,

his first visit to the European Theater in April 1945, Kncrr advocated to Lovett that the U, S, begin immediate exploitation of knowledge and experience of the German scientists, bringingtheir families with them to the United States, nnot only for the mental stability it would give the men to know they were safe,,,but to prevent,.,their 52 being taken hostage iq the scientistsT absenceOD Foremost among the individuals who closely supervised Project PAPERCLIP was nMister Rocketan the then Colonel
H . N . Tofiafly.

nAt the close af World War 11, when many

officials wishfully chose to ignore the possibility of another global conflict, Toftoy advised, exhorted* begged, and hounded government officials to recognize the neces53 As leading sity of building an arsenal of rocket^,^ officer in Operation PAPERCLIP, Toftoy called Washington in May 1945 and receiving no answer flew personally to

52,

Interview with Major General H, J, Knerr, Secy, Gen,, Air Board, Hq,, MF, 24 Apr. 1947, Cited in Ibid,, p, 5, Also see Ltr, from Joseph W, Angell, Jr,, Asst, Chief, USAF Hist, Div, to David S, Akens, Chief, ABMA Hist, Sect,, 3 Oct, 1958, ABMA Hist, Off, files, 53, Bob Ward, wToftoy Kept America in World Missile Racesn ofintsville Times, 19 June 1958, The Times article also says t m o f t o y "was personally responsible for getting some 130 key German missilemen into the Inforgaatioa Di est, under the title country,a "Men Of TheThe Missi e Command,@ 0 c h 8 , p . 61, says of Toftoy: nHe recommeeded bringing to this country German scientists and engineers who had pioneered in rocketry,

-T

request transfer to this country of some 300 German scientists and technicians, He managed to get 127 German 54 scientists and technicians here, Working for young Col. Toftoy (now Ma j, Gen,

of toy)

on Project PAPERCLIP was Maj, James P, Hamill of Ordnance Technical Intelligence, Not only did Col, Toftoy and

Major Hamill pursue Project PAPERCLIP where directed, but

54. ~ O t h e rtop Army men early advocating use of enemy resources included Maj, General Gladeon M, Barnes, Chief of Research and Development, I n 1942 he instituted a plan for getting technical information from theaters of operations to be used in U, S, research and development, The General persuaded Army Intelligence that trained Ordnance observers could collect data on enemy equipment, and in the last year of World War I1 intelligence staffs recruited additional men for Enemy Equipment Intelligence, Also there was Brig, Gen, Henry B, Sayler, Theater brdnance Officer. In Europe where Allied invasion of the continent gave access to German factories, laboratories, and experimental stations General Sayler realized before D-day that captured German correspondence, laboratory equipment and records, as well as interviews with war prisoners,,,would give valuable knowledge of enemy development plans and methods, Acting on General Sayler's suggestion the Chief of Ordnance assigned technical specialists to the task, and in October 1944 the first group began work, The resulting information was assembled by a Joint BritishAmerican Agency, the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-commit tee (CIOS) with headquarters in London. Constance M, Green, Barry C, Thomson and Peter C, Roots, Washington 1951, Ordnance De~artment Plannin Munitions for War, pp, 262-266, Hist, Off,

29 apparently beyond authorization they took material from under the Russian's noses at the valuable Nordhausen Plant, In an article entitled "How We Let The Missile Secrets Get Away," Major Hamill is quoted: wWe knew about the

Nordhausen plant long before we took it, The written orders I received indicated that Nordhausen was to be in the Russian zone and that all plans and equipment were to be left for the Soviet, These orders originated at a very high level, Unofficially and off the record I was told to remove as much material as I could, without making it 55 obvious that we had looted the placeea This U, S, official softness toward Russia resulted indirectly from a plan by the European Advisory Commission in November 1944, made up of Russian, British and American . So). representatives (Ambassador John 6, Winant for the U Gen, Dwight Do Eisenhower signed the plan in Berlin on 5 June 1945, and it stated: factories, plants, shops,

research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, patents, plans, drawings and inventions,,,will be held intact and in good condition at the disposal of allied

55.

Peter Van Slingerland, wHow We Let The Missile Secrets Get Away," Look Magazine, 4 Feb, 1958, po 23,

representatives for such purposqs as they may prescribe," The decree did not state which allied representative, and apparently it did not refer to German personnel, Those were days of crucial bargaining amid distrust,

56

headed by U . S, desire that Russia intervene in the Pacific. On April 26 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Order 1067, directing General Eisenhower to Hpreserve from destruction and take under your control records, plans, documents, papers, files and scientific, industrial and other information and data belonging to,.,Geman organi57 zations engaged in military researchen Again the order apparently did not imply German scientists and technicians, Meanwhile, there was lack of unanimity among our own Armed Forces as to what to do even with U, S, missile development. Within the Armed Forces, missile projects were

"running around loose and being furthered by anyone ag58 gressive enough to take the ball and runen The U . S, Armyts History of World War 11, states:

' A &

Forces and

56, 57, 58.

Ibid, Ibid, I World War Constance McLaaghlin Green, U, S, A m & 11, Washin-gton, D, C,, 1955,-Ch: VIII, p , 234, quoting Brig, Gen, Richard C, Compland, Ordnance Officer assigned as liaison at Army Air Forces Headquarters in Washington,

Ordnance Department, as w e l l as t h e NDRC,

had f o r months

been pursuing i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of t h i s t y p e of weapon. German u s e of "buzz bombsw and l a t e r of t h e deadly V-2 r o c k e t s , about which s p e c i a l i s t s i n t h e United S t a t e s already knew a good d e a l , sharpened awareness of t h e urgency f o r work i n t h i s f i e l d . .

obviously t h e d u p l i c a t i o n of re-

s e a r c h o r t h e withholding by one group of d a t a u s e f u l t o 59 t h e o t h e r must stop.w Of extreme s i g n i f i c a n c e i s t h e i n i t i a t i v e of t h e German s p e c i a l i s t s themselves toward j o i n i n g t h e United States, Here w a s an example of t h e s c i e n t i f i c e l i t e of a

d e f e a t e d country n o t only s u r r e n d e r i n g en masse, b u t making d e f i n i t e ?lam f o r such s e v e r a l months b e f o r e d e f e a t , group c o n s i s t e d of some 400 of Germanyes t o p s c i e n t i f i c "brains," n o t d i e h a r d Nazis b u t a cohesive group w i t h a Major H a m i l l This

c a r e f u l l y considered p l a n f o r s u r r e n d e r , explained i t t h i s way i n 1951.

"That guy up t h e r e wants

t o go t o t h e moonsw h e s a i d , t a k i n g as a n example von Braun, 60 w i t h o f f i c e above h i s .

*
59. 60.

N a t i o n a l Defense Research Committee, Ibid., pa 234, Daniel Lang i n t e r v i e w w i t h Maj, James P. H a m i l l i n 1951 a t RSH. C i t e d i n & ~ o r k e r Marrazine, Apr. 21, 1951, "Reporter A t Large," Daniel Lang, p. 81.

Talks with German specialists at ABMA, during preparation of this monograph in 1958, indicate that much reproducible material was destroyed, so that wwe could m k e ourselves wanted as well as our worken In an interview in 1951 Dr, von Braun said: wThe ( ~ e ~ m a nHigh ) Command and The Army

the Ministry of Armament wanted us to move west,

Corps commander defending Pomerania wanted us to stay and help him, In the end, we decided for oursel~es,~ As to why he expected the West to be eager for them, von Braun added: "It all made sense, The V-2 was something we had

and you didnst have, Naturally, you wanted to know all 61 about itom After their trip to the mountains to await capture by Americans, the specialists stood ready from early April until almost the middle of May, No one suspected they were

there, Meanwhile, "Hitler was dead, the war was over, an armistice was signed--and the hotel service was exeellent," 62 Finally, on May loth, 1945, von Braun grew tired of waiting and sent his brother Magnus down the mountain on a bicycle in search of the American A m y , A GI in the valley directed him to a Counter Intelligence Corps headquarters

61, Daniel Lang interview with von Braun, Ibid,, pp, 868 7 0 62, Ibid,, PO 87* REGPA"[D i g 2 & L a p 2 py
. _I

PI:;"

_ 0

L.

-&&..r

/d $A. /93-7 -

b14

/sh a

33 in a nearby village, The result was that "Approximately 150 of the best scientists and technicians.,,after pre-

liminary interrogation and background investigations by U, S, intelligence,,,were offered five year contracts to come to the United States and work for Uncle SamOH The United States promised to provide housing for the families remaining in Germany "until arrangements could be made to bring them to the United States at a later datea We also guaranteed to protect their families from die-hard Nazis who considered them traitors for agreeing to work for a 63 former enemy," Transports brought to the United States 100 nearly complete V-ZOs, together with a large collection of plans, manuals, and other documents, Three hundred carloads of material went from Nordhausen to Antwerp to the United States, In June 1945, while evacuating remaining scientists and families (24 hours before the Russians arrived), the U, S, found five trunks filled with Dr, DornbergerVs notes, hidden in abandoned salt mines, Later, one of the 63, History of German V-2 and moperation PAPER CLIP,n 1958, p, 6, Capt. Rudolph Nottrodt, Executive Officer, OML, Hist, Off, files,

German s p e c i a l i s t s s a i d :

nWe probably g o t a complete s e t

of plans, b u t t h e Russians probably g o t a n e a r l y complete s e t too, You know, w i t h t h i n g s l i k e plans, you always

make copiesOtF Before l e a v i n g Nordhausen, U , S, f o r c e s debated blowing up t h e p l a n t , b u t s i n c e t h e y lacked t h e a u t h o r i t y , t h e y f e l t f o r c e d t o l e a v e i t f o r Russian c a p t u r e a few hours l a t e r ,
Dr.

Dornberger s a i d some of

t h e machine t o o l s left -in Nordhausen were unique i n t h e world, and e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e p l a n s f o r t h b A-9/~-10 may 64 have helped 1 5 t o 20 p e r c e n t i n b u i l d i n g t h e SPUTNIKS, Von Braun a g r e e s t h a t t h e Russians g o t much m a t e r i a l and t h a t "the United S t a t e s g o t t h e b e s t of our group,
.-

The Americans looked f o r b r a i n s , t h e Russians f o r hands. The Russians have a g r e a t many production e n g i n e e r s who c a n make wonderful c o p i e s of V-29s. The American approach

h a s been t o s e e t h e whole b u s i n e s s as a f i e l d f o r development, t o t r y f o r something b e t t e r than anything made

w

a t ~ e e n e m k d ew .

Grottrupp, anh e x c e l l e n t e l e c t r o n i c s

and guidance c o n t r o l man, went over t o t h e Russians, but

64,

P e t e r Van S l i n g e r l a n d , "How W e Let The M i s s i l e S e c r e t s Get Away," Look Magazine, 4 Feb, 1958, pa 23,

he awas t h e only one of t h e i n n e r c i r c l e a t ~ e e n e r n s d e 65 66 who d e l i b e r a t e l y went qver t o t h e Russians,"

65.

66,

Daniel Lang i n t e r v i e w w i t h Wernher von Braun a t R S A i n 1951, C i t e d i n New Yorker Magazine, A p ~ o21, 1951, pp, 89-90, L a t e r i n t h e i n t e r v i e w von Braun mentioned h i s "Mars P r o j e c t n novel. nBut what about t h e moon?" he was asked, "Mars i s more of a ehallenge," von Braun r e p l i e d , "It would t a k e two hundred and s i x t y days t o g e t t h e r e , To t h e moon it9 only a hundred h o u r s o n He h e s i t a t e d momentaril y e Then he spoke w i t h an i n t e n s i t y he had n o t shown a l l evening, "Personally, though, I r d r a t h e r go t o t h e moon t h a n t o Mars, even i f t h e t r i p i s s h o r t e r , " he s a i d , "After a l l , a journey t o t h e moon i s unquestionably a p o s s i b i l i t y , , , Spaceships w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be used by everybody, A l l t h i s m i l i t a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of r o c k e t s - - i t g s only a p a r t of t h e p i c t u r e , A means t o and endow I b i d , , pp, 91-92, L a t e r G r o t t r u p p r e t u r n e d t o Germany and wrote a n a r t i c l e "In The Shadow of t h e Red Rocket," Contrary t o e a r l i e r opinion, m t h i s a r t i c l e makes i t c l e a r t h a t InterGrottrupp d i d n o t d e l i b e r a t e l y go t o Russia," view w i t h M r . E r n s t Lange, and l a t e r w i t h M r c F r i t z H e Weber, ABMA, 23 Oct, 1958,
REERA?-i ?? 2 ,-- r~
"
T'

PI.

ABERBEEN PROVING GROUND AND WHITE SANDS

The first seven of the G e m a n specialists arrived in this country at Fort Strong, New York, 20 September 1945, the Army taking them from there to Aberdeen Proving Ground, 1 Here they helped process German guided missile Maryland. documents captured after the collapse of the German armies, With the help of these specialists Aberdeen segregated, translated, evaluated, and catalogued over 40 tons of reports, charts, and drawings, a glance,,,could The specialists "often at

classify a document as important or

trivial, Such speed was possible, because often these men were working with documents which they themselves wrote or Uelped compile," Meanwhile, 120 German specialists ar-

rived at Fort Blisso Texas, and White Sands Proving Ground, to be joined by the first seven specialists at the conclusion of the Aberdeen project, late 1945,
2

l, Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theatre, TO, 15 Sept, 1945, KCRC files, Kansas City, Mo. These first seven to arrive were Wernher eon Braun, Erich W e Neubert, Theodor A, Poppel, August Sehultze, Eberhard Rees, Wilhelm Jungert, and Walter Schwidetzky. 1958, ~ 2. History of German V-2 and mO~erationP a ~ e r c l i p , pp. 7-8. Capt, Rudolph Nottrodt, Executive Officer, OML, Hist, Off. files,

These first years in the United States contained various disappointments for the specialists, which at times must have hampered their assistance to U, S, ~eseareh, There was the matter of sorting 40-tons of documents and at White Sands the firing of "rusty, dried-out V-2'saM considerably inferior to the big-time research of Peenernhde. Frankly, said von Braun in 1951, mwe were disappointed with what we found in this country during our first year or so, e ' d At Peenemcnde, w been coddled, Here you were counting
3

pennies, Your armed forces were being demobilized and everybody wanted military expenditures curtailedOw

One of the leading military figures in bringing the specialists to this country wrote in December 1945: "The German group was guaranteed the privilege of exchanging mail and small packages with their families located in the army housing projeet at Landshut, Bavaria,,,, Unless this situation is rectified immediately, serious trouble may The German group all signed contracts result,.,, written in English, This contract stipulated that in the United States they would be furnished room and board,,,, As stated to the undersigned by one of the German engineers, if these charges continue, it would appear that the word of even several American officers cannot be relied on," The report continued elsewhere: "The writer knows most of the German group and can say without fear of contradiction that there is only one basic incentive which has led this group to come to the United States--the future possibility of carrying

3,

Daniel Lang interview with von Braun, the k w Yorker, 1951, op, cit,, po 89.
REGKADED _

, EY R!:T

on research and development 8 s citizens of the United States, To come to the United States and know they were all to be returned at the end of one year really offers them absolutely nothing," And "At times, the handling of this group has not been satisfactory, that is from the undersigned's viewpoint as well as the Germans, When these men began work at Aberdeen they were put in charge of an A m y private,., As yet no really concrete plan for the utilization of this body of expert personnel has been made known,,, It took considerable effort to persuade many of the German group to come to the A Peasonable program should United States,,,, be instigated, and not one just to help in one way or another ith the firing of a few V-2's in New Mexicoen1 There were 1,136 German and Austrian specialists and dependents in the United States under Project PAPERCLIP on 18 Hay 1948; 492 were specialists and 644 were dependents* Of the 492 specialists, 177 were with the Army, 205 with the Air Force, 72 with the Navy, and 38 with the Department of C o m e e but under Army custody,
5

It is interesting
I

that the largest single group of specialists was with the

4 ,

This interesting 1945 report by an Ord, major who "feels qualified if not obligated to present his viewsw is entitled The Future of Ordn ce In Jet-Propulsion, __Pf 17 Dec. 1 9 4 5 T s e e p , 1 2 and @ c osure A, Hajor R, B e Staver, Ord, Department, ARGMA Technical Library files, 5 , Volume && Appendix to Historv of USAF Participation & Pro'ect Pa ercli , K g , 1948, E n m h r e e pages of P I L * & Strength Report ,"Research Studies ~hstitutefiles,

39

4 6 at Air Force and the second largest with the Army, 1

Wright Field and 121 at Ft, Bliss,
b

White Sands Proving Ground, in addition to having top personnel from ~eenerniindeas well as 300 freight-earloads of V-2 components, was an ideal testing range, A flat,
0 miles, the range had isolated desert area, about 125 by 4

the worldss most massive building, the firing site block houseo However, before either White Sands or the transported V-2gs, there was rocket activity in the West, California

Institute of Technology fired 24"Private Am rockets from Camp Irwin Reservation near Barstw, California, 1-16 December 1944, Within the next four months, by 15 April 1945, CIT fired 17 =Private Fn rockets, these from White Sands Proving Ground,
7

Thus, the first rockets to rise

6, "At Fto Bliss, however, was a cohesive group, representing most of top echelon at PeenemZndeem Interview with Walter Wiesman, A B M , 13 Oct, 1958, Wiesman, one of the Germans, was at Ft, Bliss in 1948, West of Peenemiindeqs top echelon came to the U, So Amy,.rather than elsewhere," further explains Col, W, Jo Durrenberge nbecause the U, So Army desired the Qwhole team,$ and ebscause of Colonel Toftoyqs ability to get along with peopleen Interview with Col, W, J, Durrenberger, AOMC, 27 Octo 19586 7, Of this seventeen, two were dwnmies, for testing the launcher and boosters,

from White Sands were n o t V-Zfs, b u t American C I T = P r i v a t e 8 F'so" The n P r i v a t e n m i s s i l e s were p a r t of P r o j e c t ORD-GIT (Ordnance-calif o r n i a I n s t i t u t e of ~ e c h n o l o g y, ) ngranddaddytr of t h e Armyrs guided m i s s i l e p r o j e c t s , B r o j e e t ORD-CIT

a c t u a l l y began i n 1936 a t C I T , when a small group of res e a r c h e r s began designing r o c k e t s f o r h i g h - a l t i t u d e r e s e a r c h work, This l e d t o t h e f i r s t mass-produced h e p i c a n
rOr

take-off u n i t (JATO),

followed by a u t h o r i z a t i o n from

Major General G, M, Barnes t o go ahead w i t h a high a l t i t u d e rocket project, The l a t t e r was i n January 1944, and t h e

r o c k e t p r o j e c t s under t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n became known as 9 I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e wPriva&ew rockets, P r o j e c t ORD-CIT,

*
8,

J e t A s s i s t e d Take-Offo

90

Rocket Development D i v i s i o n , R&D S e r v i c e , O f f i c e , Chief of Ordnance, Ordnance Department Guided M i s s i l e P r o ~ r a m , 1 3 Mar, 1947, Chapter I V , ARGMA Technical L i b r a r y f i l e s , The Future Of Ordnance &g & P r o ~ u l s i o n , 1 7 Dee, 1945, p, 8, Maj, R, B, S t a v e r , Ordnance Department, BRGMA Technical L i b r a r y f i l e s , Major S t a v e r added: "The w r i t e r can speak w i t h some knowledge of t h e f a c t s as i t w a s he, who i n December 1943, f i r s t reeonmiended t o General Barnes and Colonel R i t c b i e t h a t t h e O R D G I T p r o j e c t be undertaken, Under t h e circumstances it appeared l o g i c a l a t t h a t timeoa

Project ORB-CIT included "Wac Corporalsw and nCorporals,w rockets which earned the following history as of 31 March

"Wac Cor oral, Firings of the booster unit for t e Wac Corporal eommenced at White Sands Proving Ground in September 1945, with the first complete missile being fired in October 1945, A total of seventeen (17) of the complete missiles (including booster) have been fired to date, In addition, seventeen (17) of the booster rocket units, some with and some without dummy Wac Corporal missiles, have been fired, Firing of the last three missiles was conducted by the 1st AAA Guided Missile Battalion, Initial development tests are now considered to be complete, Twenty-five (25) of the missiles are to be made for the Signal Corps, and an additional fourteen (14) are to be constructed for further ORDCIT test requirements, Preparation of drawings for this production is now under way at Douglas Aircraft Company,

6 9 -

wCor~oral, Fabrication and testing of the components of the No, 1 prototype of this missile are being pushed to enable the first round to be fired in May of this year, The critical components $ t continue to be the tanks, The first unit of & metering equipment for the missile has been comleted and is now being calibrated, Sixty-three 63) motor and vane test runs have been made, the last test being of the mo r which will be used in the Number 1 missileen f8

10, Ordnance Department Guided Missile Pro~ram~ 13 War, p e n t Division, 1947 Chapter IV-3, Rocket RUD iervice, Office, Chief of Ordnance, ARGNb Technical Library files,

The = P r i v a t e A and Fn m i s s i l e s c a r r i e d i n s t r u m e n t s f o r r e p o r t i n g only on m i s s i l e behaviour and hence t e s t e d m i s s i l e design, Ordnance next scheduled a WAC CORPORAL

m i s s i l e f o r e x p l o r i n g atmosphere a t a n a l t i t u d e of 100,000 feet, Since i t would go h i g h e r t h a n t h e PRIVATE, d e s i g n e r s

tagged it CORPORAL, A f t e r t h e f i r s t 1 0 WAC CORPORAL f i r i n g s , t h e new r o c k e t proved i t s e l f capable n o t only of 100,000 f e e t , but 1 1 And of t h e subsequent WAC of 230,000 f e e t a l t i t u d e , CORPORAL f i r i n g s b e f o r e 1948, t h e seventh one reached 240,000 f e e t , t h e e i g h t h one 206,000 ( t h e c h u t e opened and Ordnance recovered t h i s one almost i n t a c t ) , and t h e l a s t 12 one, on 1 2 June 1947, reached 198,000, Meanwhile, e a r l y i n 1946 White Sands r e a d i e d i t s f i r s t V-2qso The schedule c a l l e d f o r f i r i n g about two V-20s a

month, w i t h NO, 1 a s t a t i c t e s t a t White Sands on 1 4 March

1 1 , I b i d , , unnumbered t a b l e "General Conclusions A f t e r S e r i e s of F i r s t 10 Wac Corporal F i r i n g s , " Chapter I V , 12, Amv Ordnance Department Guided M i s s i l e Propram, 1 Jan, 1948, p, 35, Office, Chief of Ordnance, A R G U T e c b i c a l Library f i l e s ,
WAC CORPORAL t i l t e d t h e s c a l e s a t 660 pounds; f o r propulsion i t used a n a c i d - a n i l i n e motor capable of developing 1,500 pounds t h r u s t f o r 50 seconds, The m i s s i l e , u t i l i z i n g a RTiny T i m N b o o s t e r f o r i n i t i a l t h r u s t , l i f t e d v e r t i c a l l y from a 100-foot tower, Ibid., PO 21,

U\<C,~A'L~,-,L~

1946,

13

There were a l t o g e t h e r 52 V-2 f i r i n g s from White

Sands Proving Ground and F l o r i d a M i s s i l e T e s t i n g Range, t h e l a s t one on 28 June 1950, Rocket NO, 17, 1 7 Deoember

1946, reached t h e h i g h e s t a l t i t u d e , 116 m i l e s , and NO, 1 6 14 With on 5 December 1946 t h e l o n g e s t range, 111,l m i l e s , t h e s e f i r i n g s . 0 r d n a n c e l e a r n e d t o handle and f i r e l a r g e m i s s i l e s , and t o experiment w i t h d e s i g n s f o r f u t u r e r o c k e t s and ground support equipment, The most h i s t o r i c achievement of t h e WAC CORPORAL was U M P E R t h e p a r t i t played i n February 1949 i n l i f t i n g t h e B m i s s i l e , which s e t a l t i t u d e and v e l o c i t y r e c o r d s which stood f o r h a l f a dozen y e a r s , The B U M P E R m i s s i l e r e s u l t e d from t h e need t o check t h e o r i e s and provide d a t a on m u l t i - s t a g e r o c k e t f l i g h t i n c l u d i n g ( 1 ) t h e s e p a r a t i o n and i g n i t i o n of t h e second s t a g e r o c k e t i n h i g h l y r a r e f i e d a i r , ( 2 ) t h e s t a b i l i t y of

13,

14,

Ordnance Department Guided M i s s i l e Program, 1 3 Mar, 1947, Chapter VII-3, Rocket Development Division, RGD S e r v i c e , O f f i c e , Chief of Ordnance, ARGMA Technical L i b r a r y f i l e s , F i n a l Report, P r o j e c t Hermes, V-2 M i s s i l e Proaram, General E l e c t r i c , Report NO, 852 A0510, Sept, 1952, c i t e d i n W i l l y Ley, Rockets, M i s s i l e s , and Space Travel, p, 460,

a second s t a g e m i s s i l e launched a t extremely high v e l o c i t i e s and a l t i t u d e s , ( 3 ) t h e aerodynamic e f f e c t s a t high Mach numbers o b t a i n a b l e i n no o t h e r way a t t h a t time, The B U M P E R m i s s i l e s , c o n s i s t i n g of a V-2 with i t s nose modified t o accommodate a WAC CORPORAL, repr-esented t h e combined e f f o r t s of Army Ordnance, JPL, Douglas A i r c r a f t , and General E l e c t r i c , The f i r s t full-powered f l i g h t

was e n t i r e l y s u c c e s s f u l .

On 24 February 1949 t h e WAC

CORPORAL t r a v e l e d upward a t a speed of 5,000 mopoh, t o a h e i g h t of 250 m i l e s , Thus t h e Army was f i r s t t o send an The f l i g h t l a s t e d

o b j e c t o u t s i d e t h e e a r t h v s atmosphere,

1 2 minutes, n e c e s s i t a t i n g a d i r e c t i o n a l c o r r e c t i o n of several miles t o adjust f o r the earthus rotation. I n 1947 t h e Army cooperated w i t h t h e Navy i n t h e experimental f i r i n g of a V-2 from t h e deck of t h e U,S,S, Midway, The m i s s i l e , n o t o r i g i n a l l y designed t o counter-

a c t a s h i p ' s motion a t launching, took o f f i n an e r r a t i c manner, b u t d i d prove t h a t l a r g e b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s could be s u c c e s s f u l l y launched from s h i p s , One V - 2 f a i l e d t o respond t o i t s p r e s e t f l i g h t p a t h and passed over E l Paso and over J u a r e z where a f i e s t a was i n progress. F o r t u n a t e l y i t impacted on a b a r r e n h i l l ,

White Sands o p e r a t i o n s h a l t e d pending a complex and

e f f e c t i v e s a f e t y system, c o n s i s t i n g e s s e n t i a l l y of a combin a t i o n of r a d a r t r a c k i n g w i t h automatic p l o t t i n g boards, p r e c i s e and continuous e l e c t r o n i c impact p r e d i c t i o n , backed up by v i s u a l o b s e r v a t i o n through a sky s c r e e n on which 15 s a f e t y l i m i t s appeared, The V-2 program conducted a t White Sands Proving Ground c o n t r i b u t e d much t o t h e r a p i d postwar p r o g r e s s i n the missile field, The Amy f i r e d many m i s s i l e s i n col-

l a b o r a t i o n w i t h s c i e n t i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s seeking d a t a on t h e upper atmosphere and t h e e f f e c t s of cosmic r a d i a t i o n , phase became s o important t h a t t h e Navy developed i t s
V I K I N G m i s s i l e t o continue t h e work a f t e r t h e supply of 16 V-2ss was exhausted,

This

15. 16,

General Toftoy, Amy Information Digest, Dec. 1956, 1 , No, 12, p. 25-27, ARGMA Technical L i b r a r y Vol, 1 files, Throughout t h i s e a r l y h i s t o r y t h e Wavy p a r t i c i p a t e d i n r o c k e t a c t i v i t i e s a t White Sands, The Proving Ground's f i r s t h i s t o r y h a s t h i s t o say of Navy cooperation: "In t h e f a l l of 1945, t h e C P s & & o f Ordnance (had) i n v i t e d t h e Chief of t h e Bureau of Ordnance of t h e Navy, through t h e O f f i c e of t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e Navy, t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e a c t i v i t i e s a t White Sands Proving Ground, This i n v i t a t i o n was v e r y f a v o r a b l y r e c e i v e d i n t h e Navy and, as a r e s u l t , t h e Bureau of Ordnance and Bureau of Aeronautics j o i n t l y accepted and made a v a i l a b l e funds from both bureaus t o augment t h e f a c i l i t i e s a t t h e Proving Ground, The concept of t h i s acceptance and augmentation was d e f i n i t e l y t o avoid d u p l i c a t i o n and t o provide a d d i t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s s o t h a t t h e p o t e n t i a l v a l u e of t h e Proving Ground, f o r a l l m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s , was g r e a t l y enhanced,@- H i s t o r v of A c t i v i t i e s , White Sands Provin Ground, Las Cruces, l e w Henic o, ~ v ~ ~ e ~ 9 OCO H i s t o r i c a l B r , f i l e s

:. i ;,i"issiFi
18

8 . ?

111, HUNTSVILLE Redstone Arsenal By 1950 the Armyas mushrooming missile program was in serious need of a central location and adequate facilities, Fto Bliss Research and Development had performed its original mission of firing V-2's

(A-Yw s) , of initiating studies

on long range rocket propelled missiles of all types, and of rendering all possible assistance to the Army, Navy, and industrial organizations engaged in rocket or guided missile 1 researcho In September 1949 Fto Bliss officials, after in2 specting Huntsville Arsenal, proposed a guided missile center in the area, and transfer of White Sands missile experts to it, The Secretary of the Army approved on 28 October 1949, and on 21 March 1950 the Adjutant General issued the movement directive,
3

1, The original mission is stated in Memo, Asst. OCO to CO, RQD Service Sub-office, Fto Bliss, 28 Peb. 1946, subj, : Mission RaD Service Sub-Offiee, Ft, BUSS, Kansas City Record Center files, 2, Huntsville Arsenal was a $70,000,000 Chemical Corps installation constructed during WW 11, Inactivated later, t'he area became part of Redstone Arsenal, ARGMA Historical Summarv, 21 Oct, 1958, p, 4, ARGMA Hist, Off. files, 3 . Executive Office Diary, April 1950, Redstone Arsenal Historical files, Ibid,, p, 8,

It was a significant move, By November 1950, 500

military personnel, 130 German specialists, 180 General Electric contractor personnel, and 120 Civil Service employees transferred from Fto Bliss to Redstone, With them came the scientific and tooling equipment all of which would soon contribute toward the famed REDSTONE System,
4

Meanwhile, the Army missile program flourished, considering that from 1944-1950 Ordnance received only 17 percent of the total guided missile funds authorized the Army, Navy, and Air Force combined, The CORPORAL followed the WAC CORPORAL and PRIVATE series, as research test vehicles, General Electric was firing its H E W S 8-1 interim surface-to-surface mi.ssile, moving along with its HERMES AT2, and working hard on the longer-range, high-performance and extremely accurate H E W S A-3, LACROSSE, initiated at Cornell Aeronautical

Laboratories by the Navy for Marine Corps use against strong points, transferred to the Army by Joint Chiefs of Staff action and progressed out of its study phase into experimental design,

A s time went on, r e o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e Armyvs m i s s i l e

I

program became necessary f o r s e v e r a l reasons: new atomic warheads developed; funds a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Amy became l i m i t e d ; and t h e u n s e t t l e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n i n t e n s i -

\
,

f i e d t h e urgency of o b t a i n i n g o p e r a t i o n a l m i s s i l e s . HERMES was a f f e c t e d t h e most,

Project

Ordnance c a n c e l l e d HERMES A - 1

as a weapon and suspended H E W S A-2; t h i s l e f t only t h e

A-3 as a major e f f o r t a t General E l e c t r i c , Responsibility

f o r t h e H E W S C - 1 study went t o Redstone Arsenal and

'

became t h e REDSTONE p r o j e c t ( d e s i g n a t e d i n t h e i n t e r i m as 5 ~aj o r ) , During t h e Korean a c t i o n t h e requirement f o r a s u r f a c e t o - s u r f a c e m i s s i l e became s o u r g e n t t h a t t h e CORPORAL res e a r c h v e h i c l e w a s "crashedn as a n i n t e r i m weapon system;

i t could be o p e r a t i o n a l sooner t h a n t h e more r e f i n e d HEWS,

5,

"The M A J O R w i l l be a b a l l i s t i c r o c k e t w i t h a range of 75-150 m i l e s , a warhead weighing 6,900 pounds, and an i n e r t i a l guidance system a c c u r a t e w i t h i n 150 y a r d s i n Since t h e i n i t i a t i o n of P r o j e c t range and azimnth,,,, MAJOR, Redstone Arsenal h a s been reorganized and t h e Ordnance Guided M i s s i l e Center h a s been designed as t h e Guided M i s s i l e Development Branch of t h e Technical and Engineering Division, The personnel and f a c i l i t i e s f o r P r o j e c t MAJOR have n o t been a f f e c t e d by t h e reorgani z a t i o n o n Progress Rpto NO. 1, XSSM-G-14 (NAJOR) M i s s i l e , 1 Jan, 1951--30 Sept, 1951, ABMA U i s t , Off,

By 1951 the Army determined that its surface-tosurface requirements could be met by a family of guided missiles consisting of CORPORAL, HERMES A-3, and a proposed REDSTONE, These were to be the carriers of three

different sizes of warheads, but later when two warheads satisfied the Army requirements and funds beeame.extremely short the Army regretfully terminated the H E W S program, Postwar developments of new and greatly improved solid propellants for rocket engines at JPL and Redstone Arsenal gradually placed them in a competitive position with liquid propellants for guided missile use, both as to performance and to size, Fipst flight tests of a large solid-propellant motor were made in the HERMES RV-A-10 test vehicle,
b

A m y Ballistic Missile Agency The Army established the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Redstone Arsenal on 1 February 1956, thus taking a still more important step forward in space capability, The new agency took with it (physically only a few miles) the Arsenales Guided Missile Development Division plus the

6, A m y Information Digest, Dec, 1956, Vol, 11, NO, 12, pp, 31-32, ARGMA Technical Library files,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
.-

A r s e n a l t s REDSTONE M i s s i l e mission,

Even more important,

t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e Army, through t h e Chief of Ordnance, d e l e g a t e d t o t h e new agency u n p a r a l l e l e d a u t h o r i t y i n t h e T h i s unique, d i r e c t 7 f i x i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y v i r t u a l l y e l i m i n a t e d delay, Apart from t h e age o l d argument of c i v i l i a n v e r s u s m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l s , t h e r e a r e s p e c i a l reasons f o r ABMA 8 s a t e l l i t e success a g a i n s t d i f f i c u l t odds, With t h e organi z a t i o n of t h e Amy B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Agency on 1 February 1956, Geman m c r e a t i v e wgenius joined Ordnance nproductionn genius i n a n o r g a n i z a t i o n granted powers perhaps unprecedented i n m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y , To say t h i s i s t o g i v e no development and procurement f i e l d s ,

7, 8.

---

H i s t o r y of Armv B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Agencx, 1 Februam-30 June 1956, NOV, 1956, p, v i i i , A B M ~ i s t O , ff, files. Those t o become more and more aware of t h i s included, , ' as w e l l , a i r c r a f t o r i e n t e d c i v i l i a n agencies, On 1 August t h e B r i t i s h magazine F l i g h t and A i r c r a f t Engineer editorialized: "Their ( u , So Armyv s ) t o t a l expenditure on r e s e a r c h int o r e - e n t r y problems and nose-cone d e s i g n and cons t r u c t i o n can probably be a s s e s s e d a t s e v e r a l m i l l i o n d o l l a r s , I n c o n t r a s t , t h e UeSoAoFe have s p e n t about one hundred times a s much on s i m i l a r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ; t h e nose-cone c o n t r a c t s w i t h Avco and General E l e c t r i c a l o n e amount t o $111,308,359 and $158,000,000 r e s p e c t i v e l y , Doubtless t h e U , S, A i r Force w i l l s i m i l a r l y achieve success w i t h t h e problem, b u t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e U, S. Army have done s o f i r s t shows c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t t h e b i g g e s t man does n o t always winen

bouquets to anyone, for it may be remembered that after World War I1 the Army was walking a somewhat lonesome path, World War I1 had validated nair powerom and the A m y Q s main claim to "air powera was the German missile scientists, which it had under contract, So the main wonder is that

the Axmy took as long as it did in creating a special organization to best utiliee German creativeness and Ordnance productivityo In organizing ABMA the Secretaq of the A m y delegated the Commanding General, A B U , through the Chief of Ordnance, wpractieally every authority in the development and procurement fields which could be delegated by the Secretary under the provisions of law and Department of Defense regulatfons, In effect, this,,,virtually eliminated delay exeept,,,in

securing funds and approvals from the Department of Defense levelsong In addition, the Army transferred to the Agency ntop A m y expertsDm which helped assure a high calibre of work at the agency, as well as assure close liaison between the producer and the user, in this case liaison between the Agency (producer) and the military requirements specialists (user) Historv Armx Ballistic Missile , 30 June 1956, p, ix, Hist, Off, files,

9,

1 ; Febmaw--

Esprit de corps became the Agencygs trademark; commonplace remarks of visitors were "there seems to be a sense 1 0 This sense of mission herem as8 wpeople are in a hurryon of urgency was perhaps intrinsic in the coupling of creative and production experts, who were informed enough to be afraid for the West, Also involved was the fighting spirit of a small team, which was the A m y v s lesser role after World War XI, a factor whieh undoubtedly fanned the flame, And there was the personal magnetism of ABMAvs military leadership, which demanded that nschedules be met, no matter what the sacrifice, The Agency, inadvertently perhaps, strengthened its sense of urgency by under-staffing rather than overstaffing its personnel complement, This meant movertime," which itself suggested urgency, and reassured its employees and other Huntsville citizens that if funds ever grew short the first to suffer would be wovertime,m not employeesv positions. The above points became axiomatic at the Agency, Less well known was the role of the Agencyvs Missile Firing

10, In 1958 Secretary of A m y Brucker visited ABMAo Perhaps comparing to other installations he visited, he spoke to newsmen eoncerning ABMAas unusual sense *of urgencyen

Laboratory,

During 1958, when t h e Navyss VANGUARD s u f f e r e d

s i x s p e c t a c u l a r f a i l u r e s and t h e A i r Forcees THOR-ABLE exploded a f t e r seventy-seven seconds of a much p u b l i c i z e d f l i g h t toward t h e moon, t h e ArmyDs JUPITER o f t e n earned t h e newspaperDs s o b r i q u e t of w o l d f a i t h f u l o n For explanation, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e common ones mentioned above, an ABMA employee s a i d : M F L

"The f o r g o t t e n men i n t h e whole t h i n g a r e Those f e l l o w s , during a f i r i n g down i n F l o r i d a , Other

people,

check every m i s s i l e f u n c t i o n and t h e n do i t again,

m i s s i l e f i r i n g teams a r e much l e s s experienced i n t h i s k i n d of t h i n g ; t h e A m y , b e f o r e i t pushes t h e button, makes s u r e 1 1 i t c a n do what i t s a i d i t can doow General Medaris exp l a i n e d it t h i s way t o a Congressional i n v e s t i g a t i n g committee: noo,we f i n d o u t everything we need t o know

through t e s t s on t h e ground, i n t h e l a b o r a t o r y , on t h e s t a t i c t e s t s t a n d , and we look a t f i r i n g t e s t s as simply a 12 v e r i f i c a t i o n of t h a t which we b e l i e v e we a l r e a d y know,"

M i s s i l e F i r i n g Laboratory, t h e segment of A B U res p o n s i b l e f o r f i n a l checkout and f i r i n g of ABMA m i s s i l e s

1 1 , I n t e r v i e w w i t h J o Ho Draughon, Chief, Review B r , , ABMA Cont, Off,, 1 3 Sept, 1958, 12, Department of Defense Appropriations For 1958, Washington m 5 7 , p. 1508, Subcommittee Of t h e Comm i t t e e On Appropriations, P a r t 11, H i s t , Off, f i l e s , L a t e r , t h i s Subcommittee asked D r , von Braun what he expected t o l e a r n from going t o t h e moon, I n answeri n g , von Braun quoted Farraday, who w a s once asked about

Im~ortantSatellite Decision ABMA came into being during the time of the famous wDRBITER decision," It will be remembered that in

September 1954 Dro von Braun published a paper entitled "The Minimum Satellite Vehicle Based Upon Components Available From Missile Development of the Army Ordnance Corpsow This detailed engineering plan indicated that the A m y 13 could launch a satellite, with hardware then available, Such belief on the part of the A m y led it to suggest a ~ the result was joint undertaking with the ~ a v ~ , 'and 15 However, Project ORBITER came to an Project ORBITER0

his research on electrical induction, W h a t is the purpose of a newborn baby? We find out in time," Ibid D p01525, 13, Project ORBITER, 19 Sept, 1956, p, 7, ABW, DODO Hist. Off, files, 14, Previously, in 1954, the A m y expressed desire that the Navy and Air Force join it in a mutual satellite program, the Navy initially to provide tracking stations at sea, The original concept was to orbit a 5pound inert slug about 2 feet in diameter, using a 4stage rocket with a REDSTONE booster and clustered LOKI rockets, The Navy agreed, but the Air Force declined such a program because of interest primarily in long range studies of heavier satellites, See Ltr,, Chief, GMDD Ord, Msl Labs, RSA, to Chief, Aeromedical B r . , Air Research C, Dev. Command, no subj., 23 D ~ c , 1954* Hist. Offo files, 15, This project, estimated to cost $17,700,000, actually used a half million dollars only, this money paying for preliminary design and engineering work, and some Into hardware experimentation on components, Inuni~s Missile Pro~rams, Washid ton 1958, p, ittee on Armed Services, Uni ed States senate, Part 11, Hist, Off, files:
-O

abrupt halt in 1955 in a surprising turn of events,

It all

began when the Air Force and the Naval Research Laboratories themselves began offering impressive new proposals for orbiting satellites, proposals supported by detailed theoretical statistics. the Amy" These proposals, as compared to

simpler plan, suggested use of radically new and,

for the most part, untried components to produce an instrumented satellite vehicle, Honorable Donald Quarles, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Researeh and Development, appointed a scientific panel, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, to study these proposals, There is continu-

ing speculation as to why this panel scrapped the ArmyDs REDSTONE plan in favor of the ill-fated VANGUARD program, Certainly, the Army had no representative on the panel, Perhaps the best to be said for the panelDs decision was its disunity, Chairman Homer Jo Stewart taking the lead in a stlcag minority report that represented two members against a five-man majority, In addition to Stewart,

serving on the panel were Draws Richard Re Porter, C, C, Furnas, C, C, Lauritsen, John 16 and Mro Go Ho Clement.,
B o

Rosser, Joseph Kaplan,

1 6 .

Report The Ad Hoc Advisom Groua & Special Capabilities, Office of the Assto Secretary of Defense, Dashington, August 1955, pp, i-17, Hi-st, Off, files,

UNCLASSIFIED

In August 1955 the Department of Defense R & D Poliev Council approved recommendations of the Ad Hoe Committee, This Council consisted of Mr, Trevor Gardner and Lt, Gen, Putt, of the Air Foree; Mr, Marsh and General O8Meara, of the Department of the A m y ; Mr, Smith and Admiral Briscoe, of the Department of the Navy; and Mr, MartinD MI-,Newbury* 17 and Drc Mae ey of the Department of Defense, Several days after the Couneil recommendations, OCO

( R B I ) )

wrote to ASD (RWI), pointing out what it considered

errors of fact and reasoning in allowing the VANGUARD 18 This attempt failed, program to replace Project ORBITER, however, and the VANGUARD program continued withrct any of the nationf$ lesding Geman scientists, #Were you prohibited at that time from going further?" Senator Eates Kefauver inquired of General Medaris in a 1958 Congressional hearing, mThere was no statement of p~ohibitlon,~ Medaris

17, Project ORBITER, 19 Sept, 1956, p, 7 ABMA, DODO Also J Hoe Adviso Grou On S eeial Ca aRe ort The & & e s , mice r t e Aug0 1955, Hist, Off, files, 18, Memo for Assto Secy, of Defense (R&D) from Assto Chief of Ordo, 15 A u ~ ,1955, subj,: Seientifie Satellite Program; Rpto8 "Comments to a Few Statements Contained in Majority Response to Minority Statement in Ad Hoe Committee Advisory Group ReportDn 17 Aug0 1955; and Rpt,, GMDD, OML, RSA, subj,: "Comments on Projeet SLUG," 17 Bugo 1955, A11 filed in Cont, Off, files,

dd~*~*

answered, =The decision was made that the national satel\

lite effort would be the VANGUARD effort, and no funds were 19 available for any further work, and no appeal for anyow With the A m y ruled out of the satellite project, ABMA shifted its ORBITER designs and hardware into a program for testing re-entry nose cones, It was "quickly evident that the same engineering design and the preliminary hardware work that had been done with this half million dollars under Project ORBITER could now be put to useom General Medaris explained further, 'Project ORBITER envisioned a four-stage missile, the first being the REDSTONE booster liquid, and the second, third, and fourth being clustered solid-propellant rocketsow By loading the fourth stage wwith sand instead of powder,,,this wouli give a test of the multiple-stage rocket for use in testing the nose cone in recovering one,,,, The result was the

firing in September of 1956 of the famous or infamous Missile 27,, ,(which) described a ballistic trajectory of about 3,330 miles in range, and, of course, in doing so 20 achieved an altitude of about 600 mileson

19, Inauirlv Into Satellite Missile Pronrams, Washington 1958, p, 1699, Committee On Armed Services United States Senate, Part 11, Hist, Off, files,

Meanwhile, in May 1956 the Special Assistant for Guided Missiles, Secretary of Defense, refused an OASD/R@D 21 request, presented originally by ABMA, that ABMAws JUPITER C re-entry test vehicle be an alternate to VANGUBRD. In writing to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Research and Development, Department of the A m y , the Special Assistant stated that wwithout any indications of serious difficulties
in the VANGUARD program no plans or preparations should be

initiated for using any part of the JUPITER or IbEDSTONE 22 program for scientific satellitesow Technical information from ABUQs missile programs went eontinuously to the Navy VANGUARD Project, On 29

January 1957 the Chief of Research and Development, Department of Army, requested A B U information on satellite 23 U8e of JUPITER-C missiles, On 1 February 1957 ABMA answered that the A m y satellite eonld accommodate the instrumentation of the FTrWGUmD payload but not the sphere 24 itself; and in April 1957 ABMA proposed to Chief, R@D,

23, 24,

Presentation to Ad Hoe Study Group on Special Capabilities, 23 Apr, 1956, Hist, Off, files, Ltr, Deputy Asst, Secy,, Off, of the Asst, Secy, of Defense, to Lt, Gen, James M, Gavin, Chief of RBD, 15 May 1956, subj,: A m y Capabilities for Scientific Satellite, Hist, Off, files, TT, CG, ABMA, to Chf,, RBD, D/A, 31 Jano 1957, Gent. Off, files, TT, CG, ABMA, to Chf,, RBD, D/A, 1 Febo 1957, Conto Off, files,

Department of Army, t h a t i t o r b i t , as a backup f o r VANGUARD, 6 s a t e l l i t e s w i t h JUPITER4 t y p e v e h i c l e s , each s a t e l l i t e weighing about 1 7 pounds, The p l a n c a l l e d f o r o r b i t i n g t h e

f i r s t s a t e l l i t e n o t l a t e r t h a n September 1957, and t h e second one by end of CY 1957, t h e program t o t a l i n g about 25 18 million dollars, However, on 7 May 1957 R&D, Department of Army, r e i t e r a t e d t h a t t h e r e was no p l a n a t p r e s e n t f o r having ABMA backup VANGUARD, On 21 June 1957

General OpMeara v i s i t e d ABMA w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n from t h e Department of Defense t h a t ABMAQs mission was n o t s a t e l 26 lites, A s a r e s u l t , General Medaris on 3 June d i r e c t e d r e c a l l of an ABMA s a t e l l i t e c a p a b i l i t y r e p o r t requested a few weeks e a r l i e r by D r , Hagen, "In v a r i o u s languages our f i n g e r s were ~ l a p p e d , ~ explained General Medaris, "and we were t o l d t o mind our own b u s i n e s s , t h a t VANGUARD was going t o t a k e c a r e of t h e s a t e l l i t e problem, W e followed i n t h e s p r i n g and summer of 1957 w i t h 2 s h o t s w i t h t h e scale-model nose cone, t h e f i r s t of which we were unable t o recover, i t f e l l t o o f a r away from t h e t a r g e t a r e a , b u t t h e second of which went d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e t a r g e t a r e a , was recovered, and was t h e one t h a t was shown, w a s t h e nose cone t h a t was shown by t h e P r e s i d e n t , , , , w

25,

26,

Memo f o r Record, P l a n s B r , , C ~ n t eO f f ABMA, 24 A P ~ O 1957, subj,: P r o j e c t 618, Cont, Off, f i l e s , and Coat, O f f , R p t o D P r o j e c t 618 Program--Budget Requirements, 9 APP, 1957, Memo f o r Record, Deputy Chief, R a D , 22 June 1957, subj,: Conversation w i t h Gen, Medaris a t MA, 21 June 1957, H i s t , Off, f i l e s ,
0 ,

Senator Kefauver, nDo I understand then, General GedarisL that in September 1956 you had the hardware, the capability, and you proved that you had it by firing a satelliteF General Medaris, "This is correct; yes, sirow

Senator Kefauver, "And you had the satellite ready?" General Medaris, "Yes, sir, We did not have scientific instrumentation in it because we were outside of the scientific program, We did have tracking instrumentationoooreadyOg Senator Kefauver, "Now, were your plans since the directive of November 1957, to go ahead? Are you going to use substantially the same hardware you had available for the satellite back in the fall of 1957?" General Medaris, "Exactly the same hardware except the satellite itself, the small orbiting portion ahead of the fourth stage will now be repackaged and will contain the scientific experiments of the IGYo This is the only difference,a27 After Russiaes successful SPUTNIK I launching, 4 October 1957, Secretary of the A m y Brueker wrote the Secretary of Defense again offering Army services in orbiting a satellite, "The first JUPITER4 attained an altitude of 650 miles and a range of over 3,300 miles," wrote Secretary Brucker, wWe have already proven the 27, Inauirv Into Satellite & Missile Proprams, Washington 1958, pp, 1700-1702, Committee on Amed Services United States Senate, Part 11, Histo Off, files,

UNCLASSIFIED

- -lt

t h r e e most d i f f i c u l t s t a g e s OF a Four-stage s a t e l l i t e v e h i c l e o n S e c r e t a r y Brucker went on t o s a y t h a t t h e Army would r e q u i r e "four months from a d e c i s i o n d a t e t o t h e f i r s t launching of a m i s s i l e designed t o p l a c e a s a t e l l i t e i n orbit, Over t h e p e r i o d of a y e a r t h e Army would be W e would r e -

prepared t o launch up t o s i x such v e h i c l e s ,

q u i r e a t o t a l of $12,752,000 of non-Amy funds f o r t h i s purposeow S e c r e t a r y Brucker added t h a t p r i o r t o t h e f i r s t launch of a JUPITER s a t e l l i t e t h e Army eould p o i n t out, i f d e s i r a b l e f o r psychological purposes, " t h a t we have a l r e a d y t h r e e s a t e l l i t e t e s t v e h i c l e s ( t h e JUPITER-CVs f i r e d i n t h e JUPITER p r ~ g r a m ) ~ , He s t a t e d f u r t h e r t h a t t h e Amy wwould continue t o cooperate w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s c i e n t i f i c i n s t r u 28 mentation p r e s e n t l y planned f o r VANGUARD," When t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense responded by r e q u e s t i n g t h e Army t o r e s t u d y i t s proposal f o r supporting VANGUARD, S e c r e t a r y Brucker wrote t h a t wwe recommend t h e launching of a JUPITER-C s a t e l l i t e i n February and a n o t h e r i n A p r i l , These would g i v e u s t h e b a s i c knowledge which would h e l p u s t o p l a c e a VANGUARD sphere i n o r b i t i n June," To g i v e added

28,

Memo, Secy, of t h e Army t o t h e Secy, of Defense, 7 Oct, 1957, subj,: S o v i e t S a t e l l i t e , H i s t , Off, f i l e s ,

UNCLASSIFlED
:,P

a s s u r a n c e he suggested t h a t p l a n s i n c l u d e a f o u r t h sateLl i t e t o o r b i t i n September 1958, The f o u r - s a t e l l i t e

p r o j e c t , known a s P r o j e c t 416, included o r b i t i n g of V A N G U A R D i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n , and t h e program would c o s t $16,2 29 million,

A t a meeting on 25 October 1957 t h e Homer

Committee unanimously endorsed P r o j e c t 416,

J o

Stewart

Then on 8

November 1957 t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense d i r e c t e d t h e Amy t o prepare t o a t t e m p t two s a t e l l i t e launchings during March 1958, On 1 5 November 1957 ABMA was a u t h o r i z e d t o o b l i g a t e 30 A few days l a t e r $3.5 m i l l i o n f o r t h i s purpose, S e c r e t a r y Brucker recommended t o t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense t h a t t h e Army launch t h e f i r s t s a t e l l i t e on 30 January i n o r d e r t o make m o d i f i c a t i o n s , i f necessary, f o r one t o be launched on 6 March 1958, This would provide t h e most

assurance f o r a ~ u c c e s s f u llaunching of a s a t e l l i t e by t h e 31 The - DeMarch 1958 d a t e announced by t h e P r e s i d e n t , partment of Defense r e a d i l y agreed, a d e c i s i o n t h a t ended

29. 30, 31,

Memo, Secy, of t h e Army t o t h e Seey, of Defense, 23 Oct, 1957, subj.: A m y Support of t h e VANGUARD Program, H i s t . Off, f i l e s , ABMA Cont, Off., Review B r , , S a t e l l i t e Information, notebook, d a t e d March 1958, Tab Ho Memo, Secy, of t h e Army t o Seeye of Defense, 20 Nov, 1957, subj,: S c i e n t i f i c S a t e l l i t e Program, Cont. Off, f i l e s ,

UNCLASSIFIED

the SPUTNIK I and Project ORBITER era, in which Russia launched the worldws first satellite while the U, So did an unexpected turn from ORBITER to BMGUARlb. Questioned by the Senate subcommittee during this era between the SPUTNIKvs and EXPLORER I, General Medaris said, concerning the Amyss readiness to launch satellites: w,,,being obviously a Government instrumentality we do not need to make contractual changes in order to make a change in our program, and therefore all that is required to meet the day-to-day exigencies of a fast-moving development program is that I make up my mind, "If somebody asks the question and I can give them an answer, it can be done 5 minutes later, , =And by having, as we have there, accesso ! i the complete ramification of resources .: as well as decision elements that are required to do these things, we just cut out aPP the falderal, if you want to put it in simple terns,, ,, is nothing for US to select somebody and tell him what to do and get him underway in a weekvs time,,,, ft Senator Kefauver, "Then, as I take it, in the research or in the first stage, you have there the heads of all the divisions where decisions can be made by pulling them in for a conferenceon General Medaris, "That is rightow

Senator Kefauver, "Whereas if a research contract is placed with, say, Company A, then that company has got to get Company B, Company C, Company D, and Company E all together, That takes time,

UNCLASSIFIED

"And t h e n where t h e r e a r e changes i n p l a n s o r d e c i s i o n s t o be made, t h e Company A man has g o t t o then g e t i n touch w i t h Companies B , C, D, and E a t d i s t a n t places--'t General Medaris, mThat i s
correct,,,, w

S e n a t o r Kefauver, "In o t h e r words, no one i n d u s t r y would have a l l t h e groups t o g e t h e r t h a t you have down t h e r e o n General Nedaris, "No, sir, And, i f t h e y had them, t h e y would have them i n d i f f e r e n t p l a n t s s c a t t e r e d around over t h e country; whereas, a s D r , von Braun h a s s o a b l y put it, t h o s e d e c i s i o n s a r e made over t h e intercom, I can f l i p 6 keys and I can t a l k t o 6 l a b o r a t o r y c h i e f s and I can g e t a n answer, They a r e a l l r i g h t t h e r e o n Senator Kefauver, "Then, as I understand it, you o r i e n t your c o n t r a c t o r l i k e you d i d w i t h Chrysler, and as soon as t h e manufaetnring i s t o be done, t h e y can move r i g h t i n o w General Medaris, W e l l , t h e y come r i g h t i n a t e had them b r i n g i n , when we t h e beginning, W s t a r t e d on JUPITER; t h e y s e n t a hundred people down t h e r e o n Senator Kefauver, "Now l e t u s t a k e j u s t a n average o p e r a t i o n , Your system and t h e o t h e r system, how much would you say you e u t t h e l e a d time by t h e way you operate?"
1 t h i n k , given e q u a l q u a l i General Medaris, " t y and e q u a l complexity of t h e system, t h a t we t a k e a y e a r f f a s a minimum on f i e l d i n g of t h e system,,,. 13%

F i v e EXPLORERS JUPITER-C 29, The success of Russia's SPUTNIK I i n -

flamed world imagination, b u t now i t s h e a r t responded a s 32, In~uiw I n t o S a t e l l i t e & M i s s i l e Pronrams, Washington 1958, p p ~ 1 ~ - 1 7 1 3 0
EY F i ! T

this country's Army did what it had claimed it could do, Within four months after SPUTNIK I, BBMA's JUPITER-C 29

on 31 January 1958 lofted EXPLORER I nwhen the chips were downsw after bad weather postponed launching on 29 and 30 January, Special fuel, UDMH-Deta, raised the engine thrust

from a normal 78,000 to 83,000 pounds, Called EXPLORER I upon its successful launching from Cape Canaveral at 2248 hours EoSoTo, the 30,8 pound satellite, including instruments, was a U, S o contribution to the Internati~nalGeophysical Year, At 220 miles altitude,

lowest point of orbit, the satellite reached a velocity of 18,500 miles per hour, At apogee, 1,700 miles altitude, 33 fhere was a velocity of 15,400 miles per hour, For scientific purposes the satellite carried aloft

a cosmic ray measuring device, a gauge for determining

cosmic dust, themo&eters, and telemetry equipment consisting of Microlock and Minitraek transmitters, One

transmitter battery had a life expeetaney of two weeks; the other transmitter had two months expectancy, Estimates of

the life expectancy of the satellite were as low as 10 34 years and high as 20,

33, 34,

DOD, A B M Rpt., 24 Mar, 1958, subj,: Firing Test Rpt, JUPo C Msl0 29, Hist, Off, files, DOD, ABMA Rpt,, 26 Feb, 1958, subj,: Artificial Earth Satellite 1958-Alpha, and Beroball, Eval, Test Flight JUP, C-29, DA Memo #321, 1 Mar, 195B Off, f i l e s ,

UNCLASSIFIED
,/

Although Florida saw EXPLORER I launched, the city of Huntsville, Alabama, staged its greatest celebration to date, And at Huntsville ABMA employees interrupted their evening to drive onto the base for the occasion, As was customary with firings, but especially this one, teletype from Cape Canaveral gave ABMA Headquarters a second-bysecond account of countdown and orbiting procedures. In Florida was Maj, Gen, Medaris and several top ranking members of his staff, Dr, Wernher von Braun, in Washington for a Congressional hearing, stayed informed from there, Around midnight, Huntsville time, President Eisenhower officially announced Americaes first satellite, There was national celebrations but probably nowhere like Huntsville, where automobile honking and street dancing continued late into the night, In addition to the primary tests of this flight, secondary tests included testing of solid propellant stages and their payload and testing of proportional spatial control, JUPITER-C 26, Less successful than EXPLORER I, but also under less demanding circumstance, was EXPLORER 1 1 ' s failure to orbit from JUPITER-C 26, fired on 5 March 1958,

UNCLASSIFIED*
-/(

1328 hours EoSoTo

Lift-off was normal and the missile

closely followed the predicted trajeetory as indicated by optical, DOVAP, Beat-Beat, and radar tracking, Proper attitude was maintained and second and third stage ignition occurred, The missile wasto place an 18,83 pound instrument payload in orbit around the earth as a contribution to the International Geophysical Year, included in the payload were: The scientific instruments

(1) Cosmic ray counter of

the State University of Iowa; (2) Erosion gauges to determine the cosmic dust for the Air Force Cambridge Research Center; ( 3) Thermometer for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory;

(4) Microlock instrumentation for tracking by microlock

dopplerg and (5) Antennae for telemetering of scientific 35 data using minitrack instrumentation, The first stage performed satisfactorily, LOX depletion occurring approximately 7 seconds before the predicted cutoff time of 149,l seconds, However, the electronic tracking system indicated the proper velocity of stage one was not obtained,

35, S M Lab, Rpt, No, DSD-TM-4-58, 23 May 1958, subj,: JUP, C, Mslo RS-26 Thermal Environment Analysis Sys, Rpt,, Hist, Off, files,

UNCLASSIFIED

I g n i t i o n of t h e second s t a g e occurred a t 390,41 seconds of f l i g h t time; 394,4 seconds had been p r e d i c t e d , The f o u r t h s t a g e d i d n o t f i r e , causing t h e s a t e l l i t e t o The Army's second s a t e l l i t e a t t e m p t t h u s ended i n 36 failure, JUPITER-C 24, However, on 26 March 1958 JUPITER-C 24, fall,

standby replacement f o r JUPITER-C 26, placed EXPLORER I11 . i n orbit, It went from Cape Canaveral, F l o r i d a , a t 1238

hours E o S o T o 3and i t t o o c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Geophysical Year, The 31-pound s a t e l l i t e c a r r i e d a l o f t an

18,53 pound s c i e n t i f i c payload, E l e c t r o n i c t r a c k i n g and t e l e m e t r y r e c o r d s i n d i c a t e d a s a t i s f a c t o r y launching, except t h a t EXPLORER I11 o r b i t e d 37 w i t h g r e a t e r e c c e n t r i c i t y than p r e d i c t e d , EXPLORER I11 had t h e same t y p e c a r r i e r v e h i c l e a s EXPLORER I,

I t s i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n , however, included a
This

m i n i a t u r e t a p e r e c o r d e r , n o t on t h e f i r s t s a t e l l i t e ,

r e c o r d e r made i t p o s s i b l e t o c o l l e c t r a d i a t i o n information' throughout t h e e n t i r e o r b i t , and then r e t u r n t h e information

36, 37,

Aeroball, Lab, F l i g h t Eval, B r , , DA Tech, Note No0 108, 2 Apr, 1958, H i s t , Off, f i l e s , TT, Direr MFL, PAFBB t o CG, ABMB, 29 Mar, 1958, subj.: Data Rpto on F l i g h t T e s t of JUP. C M S ~ O24 (EXPLOmR 111), H i s t , Off, f i l e s .

.
. "'i

/a 2

1 7 d

to earth upon signal as the satellite passed over ground stations, EXPLORER IIIQs battery-powered transmitters had a life expectancy of about two months, The tremendous sweep of EXPLORER 111's somewhat eccentric orbit, from 117 to 1,740 miles above earth, made 38 it asplendid for cosmic ray researchon EXPLORER I11' s
, perigee was the closest to earth of any satellite, U, S

or Russian, orbited to date,

Though the satellite entered

the unusual orbit, it outlasted its two-month batteries, thus furnishing all the data planned, During its lifetime the satellite swung closer to Earth at the rate of several hundred feet a day, By early

June both transmitters ceased to function reliably; but scientists had learned that cosmic radiation at higher altitudes was considerably more intense than anticipated, They also learned that atmospheric density was several times greater than that predicted in pre-satellite calculations, As for temperature, scientists discovered that man can control space vehicle temperature within limits acceptable for human survival, JUPITER-C 44, Four months to the day after EXPLORER
111, EXPLORER IV went into orbit, 26 July 1958, Weighing

38, Dr, James A, Van Allen is quoted in Redstone Rocket, 9 Apr. 1958,
L
l

UNCLASSIFIED

38,43 pounds, it went from Cape Canaveral, like its two predecessors, EXPLORER IVBs instrumentation was oriented toward checking corpuscular- radiation at extreme altitudes and latitudes, The findings of previous EXPLORERws prompted such investigation, indicating that high eorpuscular radiation intensities were much greater than anticipated at high altitudes, EXPLORER IV carried four radiation counters, as compared to the single counters in I and 111; it thus could provide many times the aeeurate counting rate, As with I and 111, the State University of Iowa designed the counters, and JPL and the Naval Researeh Laboratories furnished communication equipment, Because of the extra radiation counters in EXPLORER IV the Agency could not include a tape recorder, as in EXPLORER 211, or the micrometeorite and temperature cxperiments of EXPLORER'S I and 111, As it was, both EXPLORERvs 39 IV and V carried unusually heavy instrumentation. To have it cover most of the earthes surface, the Agency also increased the incline toward the equator of EXPLORER IVts orbital plane (and planned the same for v ) . 40

Explorers, 25-30 August 1958, p, 8, DP, Wernher von Braun, Speech before International Astronautical Federation, Amsterdam, Hist, Off, files, 40, Interview with Dr, Ernst Stuhlinger, ABMA, 5 N O V ~ 1958,

39,

On 6 Oct,ober 1958 Naval Research Laboratories received the satellite's final signals, though it would remain aloft about 8 months more, Already its more than 900 round trips had supported the high radiation findings of EXPLORERQs I 4 1 and 111, JUPITER-C 47, EXPLORER V, with a mission similar to EXPLORER IVBs, failed to orbit, though once more JUPITER-C lived up to its newspaper nickname "Old ReliableDn for all four stages functioned properly, The trouble came when the wbooster continued to accelerate and hit the upperstages some 12,5 seconds after separation, There were at 42 least two collisions thereafter,,,, n JUPITER-C 49, This missile, in support of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, had the mission of lofting a new kind of satellite, a foil-covered inflatable sphere developed by NACAo However, neither the balloon nor its

41, TT, from Research Dept, of Physics, State Univ, of Iowa, to Dross von Braun and Stuhlinger, ABMA, 20 Aug0 1958, subj,: Report on 1st Two Weeks Radiation Measurement, EXPLORER IV, ABMA Central Files. The TT said, in part:
"EXPLORER I and I11 results are being confirmed by detectors on EXPLORER IV,,,the radiation has been found to vary both in quantity and quality with latitude and altitudes," 42, Memo, Deputy Commander to Commander, ABMA, 3 Sept, 1958, subj,: Supplement to Post Firing Reports, JUNO I Missiles 44 and 47, A B M Central Files,

c o n t a i n e r o r b i t e d , though t h e JUPITER-C vehf c l e f u n c t i o n e d p r o p e r l y , once a g a i n proving i t s e l f "Old R e l i a b l e , " The balloon, i f s u c c e s s f u l , would have i n f l a t e d i t s e l f from a 35,s pound s a t e l l i t e payload, t h u s t e s t i n g t h e s u r v i v a l of a l a r g e sphere i n space and providing psychol o g i c a l advantage f o r t h e n f r e e worlden JUPITER-C 49 s s a t e l l i t e payload c o n s i s t e d of t h e aluminized p l a s t i c sphere, a p r e s s u r i z i n g b o t t l e f o r f i l l i n g t h e balloon w i t h n i t r o g e n , a l o w - p o w e ~( 1 5 m i l l i w a t t ) Mieroloek-type t r a c k i n g beacon w i t h two t e l e m e t e r i n g channels f o r s one weekus nominal l i f e t i m e , and a small p r o p e l l a n t motor f o r providing amkiek i n t h e apogeen

technique,

This l a t t e r would k i e k

t h e s a t e l l i t e i n t o a more c i r c u l a r o r b i t o and hence prolong

its life,

A 1 1 of t h e s a t e l l i t e payload w a s i n a e y l i n d r i e a l

s h e l l only 50

long and 7 i n c h e s wide,

43

Both t h e

s h e l l and t h e balloon would c o n t i n u e i n o r b i t , w i t h t h e b a l l o o n slowly dropping i n t o lower e l e v a t i o n , The o r b i t i n g d i f f i c u l t y began t e n seconds b e f o r e t h e second s t a g e i g n i t e d , f o l l o w i n g a n i g h t f i r i n g from Gape
'

*
43,

I n t h i s l o c a l expression, apogee r e f e r r e d t o upper p o r t i o n of o r b i t , n o t n e c e s s a r i l y h i g h e s t p o i n t , Addendum g Develo~ment Funding Plan POP P~o.;iect One, ARPA Order N J , 1-58, & Amended, 1 5 May 1958, 1 1 J u l y 1958, p, 1, H i s t , Off, f i l e s ,

--

Canaveral, 22 August 1958, It was first reported that the mMicrolock Transmitter may have broken off and separated at 110 seconds, which is the time a steep increase in 44 vibration was indicated,,,. tt This changed later to "oscillations building up in the front part of the missile, perhaps causing the total upper stage assembly to break

1
1

There was much press coverage of both the firing and the unusual disappearance, Previous A m y policy had with-

held information of satellite attempts until after launching, but the press was fully alerted for this one, Change of Army policy in terms of advanee publicity came at a time when the National Aeronauties and Space Administration was demanding the transfer to NASA of ABMA scientists, and also at a time of "wide openn Air #oree publicity con8

ceming its various launchings, Future ABMA Satellites Two lunar and one earth satellite missions were on ABPiAVs schedule after 1 November 1958, The Advanced Re-

Several weeks earlier Army PI0 began a nTruth Campaignm concerning Army missiles,

44, TT, Dir,, MFL, Patrick AFB, to CG, ABMA, Redstone

Arsenal, 23 Aug, 1958, subj,: Post Firing Report-JUPITER Missile CC-49, Hist, Off, files. 45, Interview with Dr, Ernst Stuhlinger, ABMA, 5 Nov, 1958.

UU./

3 h d 1 7 ~ 9

UNCLASSIFIED

'

s e a r c h P r o j e c t s Agency had r e q u e s t e d t h e two l u n a r probes 46 on 27 March 1958, On 27 March t h e Government p u b l i s h e d a summary of C o n g r e s s i o n a l l u n a r h e a r i n g s , which s a i d i n p a r t : wThe e a r l y ( l u n a r ) experiments which should t a k e p r i o r i t y a r e , i n g e n e r a l , t h o s e which g i v e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e moon as a whole, r a t h e r t h a n about t h e p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t of impact, These w i l l r e v e a l t h e most a b o u t t h e p r o c e s s e s by which i t was formed, i t s p a s t h i s t o r y , and s o f o r t h , and w i l l be most u s e f u l i n p l a n n i n g f o r subsequent experiments,,,, tt m,o,,Although i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o p r e d i c t how q u i c k l y man himself w i l l f o l l o w h i s e x p l o r i n g i n s t r u m e t s i n t o o u t e r spaee, t h e i n e v i t a b l e cuknin a t i o n o h i s e f f o r t s w i l l be manned s p a c e f l i g h t and h i s l a n d i n g on t h e nearer p l a n e t s , It i s c l e a r t h a t h e c a n d e v e l o p t h e a b i l i t y t o do t h i s , and i t i s h a r d t o c o n c e i v e of mankind s t o p p i n g s h o r t when such a tempting g o a l i s w i t h i n r e a c h ,

"The a t t a i n m e n t of manned s p a e e f l i g h t , however, cannot now be v e r y c l e a r l y j u s t i f i e d on p u r e l y r a t i o n a l grounds, It i s p o s s i b l e , a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e , t o d e s i g n equipment which w i l l do t h e s e n s i n g needed t o e x p l o r e s p a c e and t h e p l a n e t s , Mobile v e h i c l e s c o u l d be d e s i g n e d t o l a n d and c r a w l a c r o s s t h e f a c e of each of t h e s e d i s t a n t worlds, measuring, touching, l o o k i n g , l i s t e n i n g , and r e p o r t i n g back t o e a r t h a l l t h e i m p r e s s i o n s g a i n e d , They could be remotely c o n t r o l l e d , and s o c o u l d a c t l i k e hands, eyes, and e a r s f o r t h e opera t o r on e a r t h , Moreover, such pobots c o u l d be abandoned w i t h o u t a qualm when t h e y r a n o u t of f u e l o r broke down, "Though a l l t h i s c o u l d be done i n p r i n c i p l e , t h e r e may be a p o i n t a t which t h e complexity of t h e

46,

L t r , from M r , Roy M e Johnson, Advanced Research P r o j e c t s Agency, t o CG, ABMA, 27 Mar, 1958, subj.: ARPA Order #1-58, H i s t , O f f , f i l e s , ,

machine to do the job becomes intolerable, and a man is found to be more efficient, more reliable, and, above all, more esourceful when unexpected obstacles ariseo, , "47 JUPITER 11, JUPITER 11, the first lunar probe, was scheduled to go about 5/8 December 1958, JUPITER llss fifteen pound satellite would measure cosmic ray intensities to very high altitudes, as well as provide a "dry runn for camera equipment in a moon satellite,

JUPITER 1 4 , Tentatively, JUPITER 14, to launch the second A m y lunar probe, would go in February 1959, its
7

15-pound satellite then photogpaphing the moon, and the image returning to earth by telemetry, At no time did scientists expect this to be easy, but by the fall of 1958 there was growing apprehension as to difficulties that might really be involved, Prior to its third unsuccessful lunar try, 8 November 1958, the Air Force emphasized "one to twenty-five odds against suecessom

The preface JUNO, rather than JUPITER, is sometimes used when referring to ABMA satellite and space vehicles, When thus used, the designation JUNO I refers to JUPITER-C missiles and JUNO I1 to nonalphabetized JUPITER missiles that launch satellites,

47, Compilation of Material Qg Space and Astronautics NO, 1, March 27, 1958, pp, 37, 44 Special Comm, On Space and Astronautics, United States Senate, ABMA Technical Documents Library files,

UNCLASSIFIED

E a r l i e r ABMA Commander Brig, Gen, John A, Barclay spoke of accuracy problems f a c i n g A B W s c i e n t i s t s , and o t h e r s , i n t e r e s t e d i n reaching t h e moon, nCut-off v e l o c i t y of t h e

l a s t p r o p u l s i o n s t a g e must be a c c u r a t e t o w i t h i n one p a r t
i n one thousand," listeners. General Barclay t o l d D e t r o i t , Michigan
7

"The i n j e c t i o n a n g l e of t h e v e h i c l e i n t o t h e
.

e a r t h - l u n a r e l l i p s e must be a c c u r a t e t o w i t h i n one-fourth of a d e g r e e o w And without mcontinuous aiming of t h e launching p l a t f o r m and continuous changes i n t h e i n i t i a l t r a j e c t o r y program, t h e i n s t a n t of f i r i n g must be timed

t o w i t h i n one o r two seconds because t h e e a r t h i s a rapidl y r o t a t i n g f i r i n g p l a t f o r m and t h e moon i s a r a p i d l y moving 48 target," Prof. Hermann Oberth, r e t u r n i n g t o Europe i n November 1958, informed t h e worldvs p r e s s of extreme odds f a c i n g l u n a r and o t h e r probes u s i n g conventional spaee v e h i c l e s . JUPITER 16, The l a s t Agency-scheduled s a t e l l i t e , a s The v e h i c l e ,

of 1 November 1958, was f o r March 1959,

-."-

payl~ad~arryin IG gY JUPITER 16, would o r b i t a 60-pound

experiments, whose t e s t s would i n c l u d e cosmic r a y i n t e n s i t y , e f f e c t s of s o l a r r a d i a t i o n on t e r r e s t r i a l atmosphere, and

48.

M i s s i l e s and S a t e l l i t e s , 1 2 May 1958, pp. 7-8 D e t r o i t speech by Brig, Gen, John A, Barclay, H i s t , Off. f i l e s ,

daily value of input to the atmospheric heat engine, Like

its predecessor earth satellites, JUPITER 16 would go from Cape Canaveral, Florida, Larger Vehicles and Larger Satellites, In September the nation's press gave wide coverage to an wArmy plan for constructing a super-booster roeket engine," for orbiting a manned satellite, It followed a Defense Department announcement of a "$2 million Army eontract award for a mammoth booster with an aim of "lacing very large

payloads into orbitotn It was believed that the booster, wmissilemenss term for the first stage of a multi-stage rocket, will have a thrust of 1$ million pounds--approximately eight times more powerful than any existing propulsion unit in America's roeket arsenaloooo The announee-

ment of the Army contract said the super-booster will consist of already tested rocket motors packed into a 4 9 single unit," This program became the A ~ m y ~ JUNO s V Booster Program, under ARPA Order 14-59, dated 15 August 1958,

49, "Super Rocket Engine Order Stirs question^,^ Birminerkarn News, Birmingham, Ala,, Sept, 13, p, 1, For an official summary of this JUNO V Booster Program comparing single engine designs and the proposed 1i million pounds thrust, see Appendix, this monograph,

UNCLASSIFIED
.

"

Amy Ordnance M i s s i l e Command

Organization of t h e Amy Ordnance Missile Bonunand, 31 March 1958, u n i f i e d ABMA and a p p r o p r i a t e Ordnance

agencies, t h u s improving A

space c a p a b i l i t y ,

A s mention-

ed i n a n e a r l i e r c h a p t e r , Amy Ordriance M i s s i l e Commgnd wrote t h e f i r s t g e n e r a l mission d i r e c t i v e allowing ABMA a s a t e l l i t e v e n t u r e , though s e v e r a l EXPLOURUswere o r b i t e d 50 pr&ously, on s p e c i a l o r d e r s , The new Command oi.ganization c o n s i s t e d of t h e Army Rocket and Guided M i s s i l e Agency, 'White Sands M i s s i l e Range, and J e t Propulsion Laborat

1 as A B U ,

ABMA Commander Maj, Gen, J , B, Medapis became AOMCus f i r s t

Cozhander, N a t i o n a l Aeronautics and ~ & e eA d m i n i s t r a t i o n L a t e i n October 1958 N A S A Chief To Keith Glenn n r e q u e s t e d from t h e Amy i t s ABMA s c i e n t i s t s and engineers, p l u s a l l ~ e Propulsion t Laboratory f a c i l i t i e s , This

r i v a l l e d S e c r e t a r y WilsonBs w200 m i l e range l i m i t a t i o n m i n t h r e a t e n i n g Amy space c a p a b i l i t y ,

50,

Chapter I, po 5,

Earlier, Dr, Wernher von Braun and Dro E m s t Stuhlinger amongothers signeda November 1957 proposal for "A National Mission to Explore Outer SpaeeOw The proposal read, in part : "In the interest of human progress and our national welfare, it is proposed that a national project be established with the mission of carrying out the scientific expl~rationand eventual habitati~nof outer space, It is imperative that the Nation do so to increase its scientific and technological strength,,,, nTo carry out the objectives of the stated mission it is recommended that a National Space Establishment be created, This establishment in carrying out its mission shall have the authority, responsibility, and accountability to conduct the theoretical, experimental, developmental and operational work necessaryo making best of the academic, industrial and military resources of the Nation,.,. #It is essential that the National Space Establishment be scientific in nature and in concept and be under civilian leadership and direction, It should be organized within the executive branch of the Government taking full.adcount of the requirements of the Department of Defense in the field of space research and engineering to insure that the National Space Establishment contributes its maximum to the national security, The esstablishment should be staffed and operated on the basis of a salary and wage scale suitable to its needs,,,, "The Rocket and Satellite Research Panel is absolutely convinced that there are compelling reasons for our Nation to undertake the scientific exploration and habitation of outer space,,,, *#TheRocket and Satellite Research Panel has devoted itself for the last 1 0 years to pioneering

the Nation's effort in the research exploration of the threshold of space, The panel is dedicated to continuing these activites and looks forward to participating in th actual aeeomplishment of the stated mission,,,, n81 Less than two months later, General Medaris had this to say before the Preparedness Investigating Subeonunittee of the United States Senate: General Medaris, nI cannot in eonscienee endorse an independent agency, I believe that at the present state of the development of missiles, techniques, technology, and the number of people and teams that are available and capable of doing it, that there is no need for erecting a separate agency with operating characteristics outside the Defense Department for doing this job,

nI believe sincerely that the best method for achieving it is that there must be someone responsive only to the Secretary of Defense,,,who through the medium of a very small staff can carry out the necessary job of assigning these p r ~ j en ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Mr, Vance, "When you say Qassigning these projects,' do you mean assigning them to the various services? A m y , Navy, and Air Force?" General Medaris, "Assigning them to the various services and agencies already in existence that can do the best job on it, There is no crippling there, I could not function in ABMA tomorrow were I removed from the framework of the Army support, I could not function, If you took A B M as it exists, and I think it is a cracking fine outfit, and you put it out someplace by itself, I would have to double its size tomorrow, and I would not add one dollar's worth of productive effort,

51,

-9.58,

Material & Space and Astronautics NO, pp, 14-16, ~ p e c i a ~ o m On , Space z d Astronautics, Unite Corn ilation

A,

=I would have t o do t h a t i n o r d e r t o provide i t w i t h t h e b a s i c l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e Government atmosphere t h a t a r e provided f o r me by l i v i n g i n s i d e of t h e Amy system, and by being a b l e t o c a l l on o t h e r elements of t h e Army and of Army c o n t r a c t o r s and of Army r e sources f o r t h e work t h a t I need done, t h e ass i s t a n c e t h a t I need, and being a b l e t o r e c e i v e from t h e Department of t h e Amy t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e support, a l l o t m e n t of personnel, and t h i n g s t h a t I require, , , ,

"There a r e no r e s o u r c e s i n t h i s eountpg t h a t p r o p e r l y can be taken o u t f o r nothing b u t space work, This i s improper, and i f you d i d s o you would c r e a t e a degree of confusion w i t h r e s p e c t t o o t h e r t h i n g s t h a t have t o be done t h a t you would be a y e a r and a h a l f g e t t i n g over,
=I t h i n k t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n of a n o p e r a t i n g agency a p a r t from t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense, o r as an o p e r a t i n g agency even w i t h i n t h e O f f i c e of t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense i f i t i s made an o p e r a t i n agency, and supposedly a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y s e l f - s u f i c i e n t , and s o on, w i l l c r e a t e a conf u s i o n t h a t w i l l s e t our program back a y e a r , ~ 5 2

P r i o p t o t h i s , 1 4 December 1957, General Medaris appeared b e f o r e t h e Space and A s t r o n a u t i c s S p e c i a l Committee of t h e United S t a t e s Senate, of h i s remarks: "Does he ( ~ e n e r a ~ l e d a r i s )a g r e e w i t h General Gavinos view t h a t s a t e l l i t e s should be given g r e a t e r p r i o r i t y than b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s ' ? He would n o t want t o l i m i t i t t o s a t e l l i t e s , PpiorTty should Here i s a Government swnmary

52,

I n a u i r e I n t o S a t e l l i t e & M i s s i l e Programs, Washington 1958, p, 1710, Committee On Armed S e r v i c e s United S t a t e s Senate, P a r t 11,
, C Y r\"T"P'
ITY OF

always be on the furthest thing out, The priority should be on the attainment of a space capability at the earliest possible date, nSatelPites and ballistic missiles have many basic techniques, they cannot be separated, Divorcement of the two impedes botheooo RHe does not agree with the recommendation for an independent agency, One individual must be charged with responsibility, If that individual is charged with setting up an organization we will impede the program, We already have too many eommittees and commissions,,,, w53 It was understandable that the Army didnQt want to lose its ace group of Geman specialists who played such an impressive role on its satellite team, an A m y team of "producing scientistsw and %sing were making themselves known, ordnanceOw The EXPLORERBs

J Space and Astronautics 53, Compilation of Material O No, 2, March 27, 1958, pp, 6-7, Special C o m , On Space and Astronautics, United States Senate,

UNCLA

SS

FiED

A P P E N D I X

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject :

Orders ( Statistical Codo PDT).

To:

C i v i l i m s Conscrned.

WAR

DEPKRFT~ENT

Bureau of P u b l i c R e l a t i o n s PRESS BWCH RE 6700 Tel. B r s . 3425 and 4860

October 1, 1945
I k r u [ E D I A T E
,

R E L E A S E OUTSTANDING GERMAN SCIENTISTS BEING BRQUGHT TO U . S .

The S e c r e t e r y of War,hae approved a p r o j e c t whereby c e r t ~ i n outstanding German s c i o n t i s t s and t e c h n i c i ~ n sa r e being brought t o t h i s country t o ensure t h a t we t a k e f u l l ~ d v ~ n t e g of e t h o s e s i g n i f i c p n t developments which a r o d s d

v i t a 1 t o our n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .
I n t e r r o g a t i o n end e x ~ n i n a t ' i o nof documents, equipment and f e c i l i t i e s i n t h e a g g r e g a t e a r e b u t ono means of e x p l o i t i n g G e r m n p r o g r e s s i n s c i e n c e s n d technology. I n o r d e r t h a t t h i s country nsy b e n e f i t f u l l y from t h i s r ~ s o u r c ea

number of c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d s c i e n t i s t s and t c c h n o l o 3 i s t s p r e b e i n s brought

J ..

t o t h e United S t a t e s on

-.

8
. I

v o l u n t a r y b ~ s i s . Thzse i n d i v i d u a l s h w e been

chosen from thoso f i e l d s where German p r o g r e s s i s of s i s n i f i c a n t irnportance t o u s and i n which t h e s e s p e c i a l i s t s have played a dominant r o l e . Throughout t h e i r tempo'rary s t a y i n t h e United S t a t e s t h e s e Ocrnan s c i e n t i s t s and t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s w i l l be under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e War Uepprtment b u t w i l l be u t i l i z e d f a r a p p r o p r i a t e r i ~ i l i t n r yp r o j e c t s of t h e Arniy end Navy.
A

DISTRIBUTION:

Aa, Af, B , Da, Dd, Dm, N ,

4:30 P.M.

m1

CorPrnding OIL1ara1, A i r Matorim1 Carrnd, Wright F i e l d , w o n , Ohia -. Atterrtioa: InteLlMwa, T-2

&ad

2. Tha previously attached t o W B U S T rpr not oolpro. and riU now attach t o PILPWCLIP.

1 . 0 . HARBOLD Brig. Con., U.6.A. Chief, Air InforrutIan Dirlrlon Office of Arr't Chief. of Air Staff - 2

C o p y

Oil3AB-DV

2ussia.n Commentst o the imerican S a t e l l i t e Project

1. T!;e undcrsigncd, while a t t e n d i z g the Zighth Congress of the Internatio~al i3.stronautical Federatioil i n Barcelona, Spain, had t h c opportur-ity t o meet n e n b w s of t h e Russian dclcgation t o tllc Congress. The hcad of the delegation, Professor Lcoi~idSedov, nndc son: c a m m t s regarding the k ~ c r i c a n S a t e l l i t e P r o j e c t w!licl~ a r e rzportcd i n t h i s t~exormdun. The conversatiors betwecr, Prof. Scdov 2nd the udersigndd wzrc held in G c m n , l!otes of t h e t a l k s f wdre w r i t t e n Lxncdiatcly a f t c n n r d s . While thoy nay n o t be e n t i r e l y accurate i word hy word, tlx opinions and thoughts expressed by Prof, S d o v a r c r c f l ~ c t c d prescilt durine SOW of t h e I , i'o~.lle very c l o s e l y by tlicse notes, tk, ; t a l k s (See T r i p &port by I-i. 1:oelld).
T!~is nenora~dur.: i s f c r O f f i c i a l Use Oaly, I f parts of it should be pu3lished, t h e p u b l i c a t i c n n u s t nc;t contain the n m e s of Prof. S C ~ Oo V r the undtrsigned,
2,

I!O E S O I J TLKS ' JITII PXOF, S30V GI! '7 1JD 8 OCT 57 G! SI;XSU)iL, SPLII!

a strange design f o r your S a t e l l i t e c a r r i d r , It ms ccnplicatcc!, Thc d c v e l o p x n t t h e d i f f i c u l t t o dcvolop, a:~d very r.:ar:iild. whit!, ~ G L : a l l c t t e d t o the p r c j c c ~ appcnred ~::uch too short. :n>y did you t r y t c b u i l d soncthing c n t i r o l y new, i n s t e a d of t-!:i:~,: ; ' x u * cx:211mt eagincs f r o r ~ your n i l i t a r y projects, such 2 . s t h e 732STY)IZ o r tF.6 I:U:? You would !law saved so r.luch t i t x , not speaking of t r o u b l ~ s and noney, This desi- would have siven y c aLso ~ 3 very good growth p o t e n t i a l , w!xrcas the V l i J G U i A I w i l l always be l i a i t e d t o about 20 l b s , Opls wants 3 design b a w d on one of t o !lave uGre w i g h t i n a S a t z l l . i t e , your b i cncinzs ~ wculd h a w given you t h t , f.ftcr a l l , we ar.2 only a t the b ~ g k l n i n gof a x w and w r y g r e a t dcvclop.l~.nt. !Xly did ycu m t c h o s e t h i s vcry : l a t u r d , strzijht-forward app-onch? Iihy d i d D r , von 3raun s e l c c t t L i s o t h e r design instead?
' ! c could nevcr ui?ddr~t;~X! why YOL? pe~;$\? pick32 such

T J r , vox llraui~? I:e did not decide t h i s , !:c i s not a ner.iber of t!x VIJiCULXl C o i i ~ i t t d e ; i;; f a c t , he i s even n o t a c o n s u l t m t G r 3;l a d v i s e r f o r t!:c h.ierican VI;IIGUfdD S s t c l l i t e .

~ro~:l '~ l z v eloved t o be, c s ycu > r c ? n b l y cz-i knn:i::e, a d 3!t he was !s:pt busy wit!: btI!er a s s i ~ u x n t s ,wl;ili: t ? . 'iii!C-UL.5 ~ Project ms ~ i v c t-o~ tLe ;:avy.
: : i ?

'..is teau iroulcl Icva lovci: it tm,

Ii? our Cowtry, vre zavc t:io C a t e l l i t s i r o j e c t I i g h c s t p r i c r i t y , 3ecause wz considcrcl It t o be of v t r ~ i i s tin;>ortllizcc, 1 1 i t only f o r s c i e n t i f i c r e a s r ; : ~ ~'3 , 11t f r o x tLe 2 o l i t i c n l - ? - i ~ ~ l e , Jd f e l t t h t it was r e a l l y a i ; s t i o ~ a l t,,roject of tl:e f i r s t ordw. .k s t a r t e d our S a t c l l i t e ?rcjject l e s s thx-1 trio years ago*, 2~1d lie concerztrated GUY b e s t f o r c e s o..?. i t . ;!e t00Ii t!i~C : ~ ~ ~ I I C wc S had fror.: ,ntLcr pxqmis, whicli t ~ c l~mw t ! i o r m ~ ~ > l ya>d , we canbined t1;en wit!: other well-prova~ C0T~~OnClits. .!e v c r l : ~ d succesdcd, Ir; p z r t i c u l a r , vrz very hzrd u n t i l we f i r ~ a l l y avoided m y novel &sip-s a s f a r a s possiClz, but ratEer m d e tlle a p p r o a ~ !a~ s l o ~ i c a and l s t r a i ~ l i t - f ra s c o ~ i l 2 be. .fly ~ a t u r a l choice, d i d you :lot do the s a x ? It vonld :lave been t ! c and you were i ; ; ;LIT exccl1c:t y o s i t i c ~ with . a l l your r ~ i s s i l a s . j ' f t e r a l l , S r , vo:~ 3rat-n has dale mcl: a.i: o u t s t a t d i K g d e v e l o p x n t i" b t l s h e s s cver since. job wit;: .$!-is e a r l y V-2, a d ::3 !AS '~WZI

Our S a t e l l i t e grot!!, wor:.d i i z very c l o s e c ~ o ? c r a t i o i i:ri-th s e g m x t s of the :'.me6 Forces, 5 u t t k e p G q was Lldeycn dext ecough t o ndie decisions of i t s own. Y : x coopcratim was always e x c c l l c n t , t'i.ep s u p p o r t d each otEcr i l ? cl p r f e c t way, t o sped: of. Ctllcrwise ve could :lot TILzrew.s ao f r i c t i o ~ ? t ir- sue!. a s h o r t ' t i i 3 1 ~ . !.ave acLieved t'x s n c c e s s f c l develop.~si: Yol: w i l l be abl2 t o w~cierstm?tl-iis from your am ~ x ~ e r i e n c c , I quess,

i t on t h ell6 cf 1955, i.e. c"-fter t:x ?resident had This p~ts a r x o v x e d o w project, 3 ; ' i 9fter ? ; ' L s t a r t e d i t s ~ior!:!

C?Ji2-3 SU33,JTCT : 3.esiz.1 Corxx-:ts t o t!:e

2S Gcto5er 1957
:~crica-Z I a t e l l i t e f'roj 2ct

?lic!:t w i t l - . :.I&Yw~ ve:iclcs t o o t k r $ x L c t s i s roc!.et t o tl:e ;is02 i s 1:lucl: s t i l l 2 yrn'xr of ;rears off, c l o s z r . ; k x e d C a t. e l l. i t a s w i l l soo:? 5e acl;ie172c!, too. .Jc . ! 3 a r e jl-l.st n t t1.e Se~innl;lg, k'r:t tLe s t z r t !:as bzen nade. ' ix ..:rssia a r e i z a ;':oar? positlo-:, s i l c e ve havz cow de;.lorstrated o w c a > z 3 i l i t i e s Y a d t k solc-:&less of our dcsi3:s. I k l y doors. w i l l be OF;: t o us xow 2s f a r a s Govar:-meat suy3crt goes, 3ut n c t e r a l l , vo::. 3rnt- :--' ,,s proven !:is o u t ~ t ~ i ~ <ciai;~ x3 gi l i t i e s ? . vor 2rau.i 10s-C years of 15 y:ars a;o, with Iiis 'J-23 3v.t 3 extrenely v a l m b l e time, I:e nay r.-ot r e a l i z e it hiilself y e t , kt I : =.I svre t!;at :-.c :!ill soo~:.
'.!ell, s y c e
LA

I could i;lagi!..e t L a t te :.as ttat fealjllp too, 5 u t as a r u l e a s c i e r t i s t , evcii. :?be:- LC: i s corrvinced, c a m o t f o r c e n 2 o l i t i c a l decisioil,
~ r e s p o n s i b i l i t y begk.83 3ut t'xt i s o x x t l y w!1ere t ! scicr.tistvs but they ilcst be L : f orr:led a r d persuadzZO It i s not enough t5at a clan i s a good s c i e n t i s t and a~ e q e r t i n !-is f i e l d ; 5e n u s t s ~ e a l ;up a d tal;: a i ~ dtall;, u n t i l the success i s ac! ievecl, & . e s::ould ! e in 2ussia had t o tzllc ?lot r e s t m t i l t h y a r e convhced. very mucl before our higher-ups verc coilv51ced, but I,^ d i d it. Of course our ! - i g k r a u t l l o r i t i e s Lad t h e b a s i c x-idcrstar.di;lz f o r the trenecdovs ir,lportaace of a s c i e n t i f i c o r t e c l u ~ i c a l S r von Braun clef i i l i t e l y a c h i e v m e ~; t maybe yours j u s t dono t :lad t h e r e s g o i x i b i l i t y t o s ~ c a l :up a i d pcrsw0e those who have -lot d have l c f t t h i s r e s p n s i b i l i t y t o tile tl:e paver, ;:e ~ ; ~ o u l I I i l i t a r y , because t h i s i s :lot t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , It would be u n r c a l i s t i c t o expect ar-y i i i i t i a t i v e from t h e i r side. It was def initel.: von Drallr? s r e s ? o n s i b i l i t y , and h i s d~?t.y,
Cr" course the Iii,n,ker-ups do ;lot Ixow by t;lei.lselves,

. .

DO

you f e e l t h a t the r c c o p i t i o n a s d the standing of s c i e : ~ t i s t s in Xussia i s s a t i s f a c t o r y ?

not, Sut t h h g s a r c Several years ago, it was d e f i ~ i t e l y I should say t h a t now we have no difficulties Ciffelxxlt now, p e r s c a d i q t l z higher av.t11orities of t h e t : l i n ~ swe deem of the necessary. They have all e x c e l l e n t ~ r d e r s t m d i n g requireneilts, and a l s o cf t!lc g r e a t p o t e : ~ t i a l value, of s c i e n t i f i c research ad developnent work. strumentation? 3oes your s a t e l l i t e c o n t a h s c i e i ~ t iifc k?

:!e prepared o s r f i r s t s a i ; c l i i t e o::ly f o r o p t i c o l and radio ; . . t!;is sh:Lke forn, it w i l l give 1.s Zveu i tracl:L:g. hvaluablo s c i e n t i f i c h f on;lation. 1 . k d i d :lot \?a:.:t t o c o q i i c s t e 12 t e r a i l , t!i~ trai;lii:c of tAc f i r s t l a u l x ~ i i ~ l~ r1 , c~ecessarily. the l a i x c ; . i n ~crews ifas o m of t5e major poixts of t::e f i r s t l o c a c h h g , The i~e:rt s a t e l l i t e w i l l coctai:: s auuber of instruli,ient-s f o r c o m i c rags, s o l a r rzdiatior:, i x t c o r s , etc. Yor h o w w h t Icil~dsof mast?:-one::zs can be :.ndc with a s a t a i l i t c . The :xs:t oi- w i l l be !yeavier t::a t L e f i r s t .

I donqt

ow.

i s t o a S a t e l l i t e rocket.
LLrc t!:ere

Yell, you 1z:ov yourself !loxi clooc a iIoon roc::et 1 thini: t!iere may be o x sooc.

ei~ougi;y o m y p h y s i c i s t s x d erlgincers i a n:!ssia t o ! ? f i l l yaw evcr-.k1creasi:-:3 ;lee L

i:~ ti-is a r e a
it127

longer.

l x~ n Low did yot: achi3ve t h i s ? 3y !:i&ller Fay, o r by ~ i v h t , r e c o s ~ i t i o zu d a higher s o c i a l st;~;:Chy,, o r by e f f i c i e r i t gropa~xk? iTo, j u s t by k,crcasing the nuriber of schools, a i d by kip-ovi;lg the q u a l i t y of t!:e teachers. Elis alone a t t r a c t e d so many yow:~ s t d e n t s t1,at w e a r e no laager worried a503t s c i e a t i s t s er~de n ~ i n c e r s . :.fiat inprcssial did you o b t a h of the Lklited S t z t e s w ! ! e ; : v i s i t e d your colfeap.es over t h e r e ? you

i a e r i c a i s very b e a c t i f v l , a::d very iapressivc. The l i v i n g s t a x d a d i s -anarkably high. But it i s very o5vious t h t the average inerica-i cares ollly f o r 15s car, kis hcr?c. a d h i s P, f a c t , r e f r i g e r a t o r , ::e 5as no sease a t a l l f o r h i s xatio;;. Govement, yes; but t h i s i s there e x i s t s no r a t i o n f o r hi!. alxmys sometl-hp: tmsiei?t z d evasive. i h t i o c , no. ::e a l s o ? . a s r.0 se:-,se f o r g r e a t ideas which t a k a s ions a s a i11?:1'3er cf years t o achieve, and w:.ich do not pay off i m i ~ e 6 i a t e l y . Ile j u s t does not f e e l s t t r a c t e d by t!lem, a;,d even >as xot mud- txdersta;?ding f o r them. Xussians do! J e l l , you c e r t a i n l y !XIOW what I r.lem, because you a r e a Ponner Gemarz.

Prof. Sedov mentioned r e p e a t e a y t h a t !le and I d s collcagues consider Dr. von Gram a s t h e foremost rocket developer in ! e i s w e l l i n f omed about the V-2 and the RDSTOI?Z, t h e world, : and f a i r l y w e l l about JU?I=T aild 'CiO2. It w a s completely

3IST?,IZUTICI! :

32TST SEt.LII;GE S c i e a t i f i c 2 T e c h i c a l Co;?sultx: t Chief, ' d a i s o ~ 3rmch, ~ Control Cffice Chief, Intelligence 3 Security 2zpvty X r e c t o r , 3 e v e l o p e n t 0 y r a t i o r . s 3 i v i s i o n Ci r e c t o r , Guidance 3 Control LaSoratory X r e c t o r , Structtlres 3 :iecl~ar-ics',aborrstor;r 3 i r e c t o r , i,eroballi.stics LaSoratory ': c ! : i r g 2 !;azdling Laboratory Xrector,h Director, Tabricatio:~ Laboratory 3 i r e c t o r , Comp?tation LaSoratory X r e c t o r , System Lnalysis 9 :?eliability k S o r a t o r y 3 i r e c t o r J i l i s s i l e ?irir.lg 'ha5omtory X r e c t o r , T e c h i c a l Liaison Croup Llirector, Test LaSoratory ';kch~ics Laberatory Chief, Prelimhary, ?sei,~. Sec+,iox, S t r u c t - n c s t

EXCEli PTS From

BOMMITTEE ~ ~ 1 ~ x
AND ASTRONAUTICS No. 1

COMPILATION OF NATERIALS ON SPACE

SPECIAL COMNITTEE ON SPACE AND ASTRONAUT1 CS UNITED STATES SENATE Eiphtv-Fifth Congress S e c o n d Session

I l a r c h 27, 1958

COMPILATION OF MATERIALS ON SPACE AND ASTRONAUTICS

SECRETARY NEIL H. MCELROY (November 27, 1957) The newly created post of manager of antimissile and military space project developments has not been filled. He would pull under a single manager the actual operatin units for research and development in antimissile field and in sate ite and space applications field. The missile head has enough to do without taking in the antimissile job. The antimissile chief would take over from the service. His a~it~horit y would be through the Secretary of Defense. The kind of satellite applications to be supervised in the newly created post arc not the type which are in the IGY. The latter would continue with Mr. Holaday. Dr. Killian can make a real contribution if he improves coordination in various research activities in Government, such as National Science Foundation, NACA, and Atomic Energy Commission. l i a n y things in basic or "upstream" research will be undertaken by the D o n , because they obviously havc military potentialities. Should there be a Secretary of Science? H e has not given it careful coiisideration. H c thinks we do not havc as much guarding of secrets within military departments as many people have been led to believe. I t should not be tolerat cd. Had they known thc sputniks were to be launched we would have clone things diflerently. The United States satellite effort has been governctl, not by the Defense Department but the Scientific Cominittec. Spiit~iiksurprised him. If he had been privy to the intelligence knowledge he would not have been so surprised.

$.

(December 14, 1957) Early or ill the mitltllc of 1955 the Army had proposed along with the Navy a proposal for lauriching a satellite, called Projcct Orbiter. On August 3, 1955, tllc Stewart committcc approved thc Vanguard project and Project Orbiter mas stopped. Project Orbit,er con tern plated using the Jupiter-C missile. This is not a Jupiter a t all. I t is so named because of thc fact that the missions that it has had l ~ a v c been missions in the Jupiter program. It coilternplated thc use of the Redstone as the booster missile with upper stages of propellents. The outgrowth of this Project Oribiter became the reentry test vehicle for the Jupiter program. The Oribiter proposal was for a satellite weighing 19 pounds. The first flight of the Jupiter-C test vehicle was in September 1956. This was flown actually in the satellite configuration although the fourth stage was not loaded. I n the meantime the changes necessary to put the head aboard were being engineered. The test was successful. The Jupiter-C flew 3,000 miles. Then there mere two reentry flights. The second was fully successful; the nose cone was recovered.

The Army has hardware that was prepared for the reentry program which becomes the basis for launching the satellite the Army has been directed to launch. There is a limit to their authority to engage in research beyond the definitive program on which they arc engaged. This must be corrected because if you wait until the time when you can envisage a final product to go ahead and break the barriers and develop all the pieces that go into that product, you are going to be late and you will never get caught up. The way to correct the situation is to go ahead with research on a primary element that contributes to an advanced weapon system so that when you can see from the whole state of the a r t that you can haye a new weapon, you already have the advances made in the subordinate areas. For example, one of the great holes in missiles is that there is no big thrust engine. In the summer of 1956 such an engine was recommended-of 220,000-pound thrust. I t was turned down. At North American there is i ~the i engineering stage an engine of much greater thrust. The engines being developed are for existent weapons. There are none being developed for future weapons. The North American pro'ect should be carried out on a crash basis. d h e v were turned down on the rocket engine because they couldn't prove *itwas needed for the Jupiter. We should always have as an objec~tivesomething that is out of reach. The Jupiter program was impeded because there was a great debate over whether toheArmy needed it or not, and this took time. The rate of output was limited nlso. Half of thc amount recommended was approved. The apportionments were "always protested by reclamas." With the inauguration of the Jupiter program and the requirement for Rcdstoiie missiles as flight-test vellicles to support Jupiter, the firings of Redstone were accelerated. The program is proceeding at optimum speed now; the future "roll on" of the program is half the level it should be. People came down to see that thc orders not to launch a satellite \\-ere followed. Does he-agree wit11 General Gavin's view that satellites should be given greater priority than ballistic. missiles? He would not want to limit it to satellites. Priority should always be on the furthest thing out. The priority should be on the attai~lment of a space capability a t tlie earliest possible date. Satellites and ballistic missiles liave many basic techniques, they cannot be separated. Divorcement of the two impedes botL They were divorced in the Vanguard program. They were not divorced in their satellite program because Jupiter weapons hardware is being used to launch the satellite. What is necessary for maximum progress in the missile and satellite field is to liave a few long-rnnge objectives that we would stay on and these must be 10 to 15 !-ears ahead of things we believe we can do in 15 years. At tlie least we must have a year's program a t a time. We will lose the race if we have short-term objectives. If Project Orbiter had been approved, the satellite could definitely liave been launched bv now. I t would not have interfered with the ballistic-missile progr&.

COMPILATION OF MATERYALB ON SPACE AND ASTRONAUTICS

The Jupiter powerplant could be used succeesfullp to launch a satellite. . Work on satellite, rather than impeding ballistic missile, would result in derivative information for both projects. * ' The same test vehicle, the same missile that we use to launch the test nose cone, requires only a return to its original state and the addition of a couple of minor components to become a satellite carrier. The difference is in how to use the guidance system. You must take risks in research. Basic research should be adequate to solve the roblems 15 years away; the intermediate research is for tools we wil use 6 to 10 years from now. The actual development of an end product is devoted to y h a t you will need 2 or 3 years from now. He does not agree with the recommendation for an independent agency. One individual must be charged with responsibility. If that individual is charged with setting up an organization we will impede the program. We already have too many committees and commissions. There is an adequate staff for research in t,he DOD now. Early and firm tlccisions arc necessary a i d 3- to 5-year-project basis are needed.

12

CORIPILATIO1: O F MATERIALS O N SPACE AND ASTRONAUTICS

(December 14, 1957) The Russians are definitely ahead in the ballistic missile and satellite fields. Unless we get an engine with a large thrust we will be behind in the general field of control of outer space. The Silberstein Committee recommended that such an engine be developed. The recommendation was not followed. "It disappeared in the Department of Defense," Many people think we should not build large ICBM's, inasmuch as the payloads are becoming lighter. Hence they think there is no need for n large engine. But if you want to establish control of outer space by manned vehicles you will need large engines. He joins in the belief that control of outer space is as importat, if not more so than the ballistic missile. The great need is to put the program on an even keel. The lack of money has a great effect. Long lead times are involved. He agrees that the U. S. S. R. has the means for sending an atomic or hydrogen warhead anywhere in the world. The reason is that Sputnik I1 weighs 1,280 pounds and that the "carrier" that brought it up there can carry about 4,000 or 5,000 pounds over an ICBM range with tlia t same missile. Why is it essential for the United States to control or a t least be in outer space as quickly as the Russians or anyone else? A satellite of the weight of Sputnik I1 would be entirely capable of carrying a combination of optical and television equipment to use as a powerful reconnaissance instrument. You could store the pictures such as a reconnaissance satellite takes over enemy territory and you can play these pictures back while over friendly territory. In addition there is a bombing capability from orbital vehicles. These may be vehicles capable of changing their orbital data or their orbital behavior so as to interfere with possible enemy countermeasures and "since planes can drop bomb on any point of the earth with a very high accuracy." There will always be an optical line of sight between the uiding orbital vehicle from which the bomb is detached and the born itself and ultimately as both go around the earth, the target will also appear in view of that orbital vehicle so that a t the end when it comes to homing in or aiming exactly a t the target itself you have a line of sight between the bombing vehicle, the bomb and the target. Such orbital bombing is even applicable to moving targets. He a rees that if the Russians should control outer space with satellites be ore we do this country would be in mortal danger. I f you put a sufficient amount of orbital decoys into an orbit you can saturate a radar system. The IRBM and ICBM pro ams deserve the highest priority. B u t with the teams we have avai able today we can get a space rogram going. Many of our guided-missile people are available. whole Navaho team is standing by. A National Space Agency could be set up either under the Secretary of Defense or as an inde endent agency. He is thinking of $1.5 billion a year additional. $he job would be to get a man into space on a r e t u m b l e basis in 5 years and to build a space station in 10.

TR~

The IGY effort could be incorporated into the National Space Agency he is suggesting. The space medical program would be transferred to the National Space Agency. The satellite could be used as an efficient communications carrier. There would be no better or more reliable weather information service than from a satellite. The weather could be influenced. The Space Agency should be a separate one. He fears the services will jockey for position again. Cooperation between the services has been excellent. But irresponsible statements hurt. Some instigate service rivalry. Curiosity should be the motivating power in research and it is curiosity that makes him want to go to the moon. H e can fire s satellite weighing many times the weight of the Vanguard or our Jupiter-C still within the IGY. I f the Russians chose, and they had the hydrogen warhead, they could put a hydrogen bomb on top of the Capitol. The sputniks show a capability in the uidance area also. In principle he approves bringing miss1 e-satellite space program under an independent civilian commission. The question is whether things have not advanced to the point that there would be such delay and upheaval that we would hurt our IRBh'l and ICBM programs. He agrees there is need for a permanent and competcnt staff in DOD to provide leadership to applied and basic research. Also that R. and D. should be on a 3- to 5-year basis. Also that contractors should have more leeway to plan technical decisions. Also that lead time be reduced by early and firm decisions. Also that overtime restrictions be eliminated. The satellite stays up when the centrifugal force in its curved trajectories equal to .the ravitational pull of the earth. He guessed that the Eussians will try to shoot a t the moon. With their rocket they can probably carry a 100- to 300-pound payload to the moon. The ICBM's have a basic capability of orbiting a 1,000-pound satellite but the vehicles have riot been tested. I f the services approved he would be for putting IRBM's and ICBM's in a separate agency. I f a new space agency were set up you would not have one man over both space and missiles programs if the missiles program remained in

.k

DOD.

He agrees that ultimately the ideal setup would be the consolidation of all space and military effort under one man.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE: INTRODUCTION TO OUTER SPACE THE WHITEHOUSE, March 26, 1968.
STATEMEKT BY THE PRESIDENT
111 connection with a study of space science and technology made at my request, the President's Science Advisory Committee, of which Dr. James R. Killian is Chairman, has prepared a brief introduction to outer space for the nontechnical reader. This is not science fiction. This is a sober, realistic presentation prepared by leading scientists. 1 have found this statement so informative and interestin that I wish to share it with all the people of America and, indeed, wit all the people of the earth. I hope that it can be widely disseminated by all news mediums, for it clarifies many as ects of space and s ace technology in a way which can be helpfu to all people as t e United States proceeds with its peaceful program in space science and exploration. Every person has the o portunity to share, through understanding, in the adventures which ie ahead. This statement of the Science Advisory Committee makes clear the opportunities which a developing space technology can provide to extend man's knowledge of the earth, the solar system, and the universe. These opportunities reinforce my conviction that we and other nations have a great responsibility to promote t'he peaceful use of space and to utilize the new knowledge obtainable from space science and technology for the benefit of all mankind.

F,

P.

INTRODUCTION TO OUTER S P A C E

An explanatory statement prepared by the President's Science Adwisory Committee What are the principal reasons for undertaking a national s ace program? What can we expect to gain from space science s n l e x ploration? What are the scientific laws and facts and the technological means which it would be helpful to know and understand in reaching sound policy decisions for a United States space program and its mana ement by the Federal Government? This statement seeks to provi e brief and introductory answers to these questions. I t is useful to distinguish among four factors which give importance, ur ency, and inevitability to the advancement of s ace technology. %he firat of these factors is the qmpelling urge o man to explore and to discover, the t,hrust of curiosity that leads men to try to go where no one has one before. Most of the surface of the earth has now been exploref, and men now turn to the exploration of outer space as their next objective. Second, there is the defense objective for the development of opclq technology. We wish to be sure that space is not ueed to endanger

our security. If space is to be used for military purposes, we must be prepared to use space to defend ourselves. Tliirtl, there is the factor of national prestige. To be strong and bold i11 space technology will enhance the prestige of the United States among the peoples of the world and create added confidence in our scientific, technological, industrial, and military strength. Fourth, space technology affords new opportunities for scientific observation and experiment which will add to our knowledge and understanding of the earth, the solar system, and the universe. The determination of what our space program should be must take into consideration all four of these obiectives. While this statement deals mainly with the use of space lor scientific inquiry, we fully recognize the importance of the other three objectives. In fact, it has been the military quest for ultra-long-ran e rockets that has provided man with new machinery so powerful t at it can readily put satellites in orbit, and, before long, send instruments out to explore the moon and nearby planets. In this way, what was a t first a purely military enterprise has opened up an exciting era of exploration that few men, even a decade ago, dreamed would come in this century. W h y satellites stay u p The basic laws governing satellites and space flight are fascinating in their own right. And, while they have been well known to scientists ever since Newton, they may still seem a little puzzling and unreal to many of us. Our children, however, will understand them quite well. We all know that the harder you throw a stone the farther it will travel before falling to earth. If you could imagine your strength so fantastically multiplied that you could throw a stone a t a speed of 15,000 miles per hour, it would travel a great distance. I t would, in fact, easily cross the Atlantic Ocean before the earth's gravity pulled it down. Now, imagine being able to throw the stone just a little faster, say about 18,000 miles per hour; what would happen then? The stone would again cross the ocean, but this time it would travel much farther than it did before. I t would travel so far that it would overshoot the earth, so to s eak, and keep falling until it was back where it started. Since, in t is imaginary example, there is no atmospheric resistance to slow the stone down, it would still be traveling at its original speed, 18,000 miles per hour, when it had,got back to its starting oint. So,around the earth it goes again. From the stone's point o view, it is continuously falling, exce t that its verv slight downward arc exactly match- the curvature o the earth, and so it stays aloft, or, as the scientist would say, "in orbit," indefinitely. Since the earth has an atmosphere, of course, neither stones nor satellites can be sent whizzing around the earth a t treetop level. Satellites must first be lifted beyond'the reach of ahmospheaic resistance. It is absence of atmospheric reaistance, plus apeed, thclf r n a b the satellite possible. It may seem odd that weight o r mas8 h~ f a feather w m hdeased nothing to do with a satellite's orbit. I a 10-ton satellite, the 2 would stay together, fdlowing the esme i n the airless void. There is, however, e B t v&tlg$,pf lrtmoep ere xv&Ww~ will even a few hundred miles above the, eart and &use %hefeather to spiral inward toward the earth sooner than the

I'

F&

' i t s 1

COMPILATION O F MATERIALS O N @PACE AND ASTRONAUTICS

47

satellite. I t is atmospheric resistance, however slight, that has set limits on the life of all satellites launched to date. Beyond a few hundred miles the remaining trace of atmosphere fades away so rapidly that tomorrow's satellites should stay aloft thousands of years, and perhaps indefinitely. The hlgher the satellite, incidentally, the less s eed i t needs to stay in orbit once it gets there (thus the moon's spee is only a little more than 2,000 miles per hour), but to launch a satellite toward a more distant orbit requires a higher initial speed and greater expenditure of energy. The Bhruat into space Rocket engineers rate rockets not in horsepower, but in thrust. Thrust is 'ust another name for push, and it is expressed in pounds of force. k h e rocket gets its thrust or push by exhausting material backward. I t is this thrust that lifts the rocket off the earth and accelerates it, making it move faster and faster. As everyone knows, it is more difficult to accelerate an automobile than a baby carriage. To place satellites weighing 1,000 to 2,000 pounds in orbit requires a &st-stage rocket engine or engines having a thrust in the neighborhood of 200,000 to 400,000 pounds. Rocket engines able to su pIy this thrust have been under development for some time. For aunching a satellite, or other space vehicle, the rocket engineer divides his rockets into 2, 3, or more stages, which can be dropped one after the other in flight, thus reducing the total weight that must be accelerated to the final velocity desired. (In other words, it is a great waste of energy to lift one huge fuel tank into orbit when the t4nk can be divided into smaller tanks-eacll acka ed in its own stage with its own rocket motor-that can be eft be nd as they become empty.) To launch some of the present satellites has required rockets weighing up t o 1,000 times the weight of the satellite itself. But it will be "possible to reduce takeoff weights until they are o d y 50 to 100 times that of the satellite. The rocket's high ratio of gross weight to payload follows from a fundamental limitation in the exhaust velocities that can be achieves by chemical propellents. I f we want to send up not a satellite but a device that will reach the moon, we need R larger rocket relative to its payload in order that the h a 1 stage can be accelerated to about 25,000 miles per hour. This speed, called the escape velocity, is the speed with which a projectile must be thrown to escape altogether from the gravitational pull of the earth. I f a rocket fired at the moon is to use as little fuel as v i b l e , it must attain the escape velocity very near the beginning of its trip. After this eak speed is reached, the rocket will be gradual1 slowed~ by the earth7 s pull, but it will still move fast enough to reac the moon m 2 or 3 days. lk? moon as a goal Moon expIoration will involve three distinct lev& of difficulty. The first would be a sim le shot at the moon, ending either in a hard lrnding or a ckcliog of $e moon. Next in dficulty would be a'soft landing, & most I di$(;ult of all would be a soft landing followed by

P t

a &e re-

carrier wou/d. bere to ia&da,

'Ppa.prg$m?JW a ~ ~ 1 1 p Wh D shot might be a small instrument camm~ aislJat t o a sat&te. For tbe more difficult eoft landing,.the
~ hpart l

tam@&

of ib payload, a "retrorocket"

48

COMPILATION OF MATERIALS O X SPACE A S D ASTRONAUTICS

(a decelerating rocket) to provide braking action, since the moon has no atmosphere that could serve as a cushion. To carry out the most difficult feat, a round trip to the moon, will require tthat the initial payload include not only retrorockets but rockets to take off again from the moon. Equipment will also be required aboard to get the payload through the atmosphere and safely back to earth. To land a man on the moon and get him home safely again will require a very big rocket engine, indeed--one with a thrust in the neighborhood of 1 million or 2 million pounds. While nuclear power may prove superior to chemical fuels in engines of ~ n u li-million-pound t thrust, even the a tom will provide no shortcut to space esploration. Sending a snlall instrument carrier to SIars, althou h not requiring much more initial propulsion than a simple inoon s ot, would take the problems of a much longer travel time (8 nlonths or more), ~11d navigation and final guidance are formidable. A ,messagefrom Mars Fortunately, the exploration of thc moon and nearby planets need not be held up for lack of rocket engines big enough to send m m and instrument carriers out into space and home again. Much that scientists wish to learn from satellites and space voyages into the solar system can be gathered by instruments and transmitted back to earth. This transmission, it turns out, is relatively easy with today's rugged and tiny electronic equipment. For example, a transmitter with a power of just 1 or 2 watts can crsily radio information from the moon to the earth. And messages from hlars, on the average some 50 million to 100 million miles awa :it the time the rocket would arrive, can be transmitted to earth wit less power than that used by most commercial broadcasting stations. I n some ways, indeed, it appears that it will be easier to send a clear radio message between Mars and Earth than between New York and Tokyo. This all leads up to an important point about space exploration. The cost of transporting men and material through space will be extremely high, but the cost and difficulty of sending information through spare will be conlpara tively low. Will the results justify the costs? Sil~cethe rocket powerplants for space exploration are already in existence or being developed for military need, the cost of additional scientific research, using these rockets, need not be exorbitant. Still, the cost will not be small, either. This raises an important uestion that scientists and the general public (which will pay the bi 1) both must face: Since there are still so many unanswered scientific questioris and problems all around us on earth, why should y e start asking new questions and seeking out new problems in space? How can the results possibly justify the cost? Scientific research, of course, has never been amenable to rigorous cost accounting in advance. Nor, for that matter, has exploration of any sort. But if we have learned one lesson, it is that research and exploration have a remarkable way of payin off-quite apart from the fact that they demonstrate. that man is a ive and insatiably curious. And we all feel richer for knowin what explorers and ~ich we live. scientists have learned about the universe in uT

COMPILATION OF MATERIALS ON SPACE AND ASTROSAUTICS

49

I t is in thesc terms that we must measure the value of launching satellites and sending rockets into space. These ventures map have practical utility, some of which will be noted later. But the scientific quest ions come first. The 2iew from a satellite Here are some of the things that scientists say can be done with the new satellites and other space mechanisms. A satellite in orbit can do three things: (1) I t can sample the strange new enviro~~ment through which it moves; (2) it can look down and see the earth as it has never been seen before; and (3) it can look out into the universe and record iriformation that can never reach the earth's surface because of the intervening atmosphere. The satellite's immediate environment at the edge of space is empty only by earthly standards. Actually, empty space is rich in energy, radiation, and fast-moving particles of great variety. Here we will be exploring the active medium, a kind of electrified plasma, dominated by the sun, through which our earth moves. Scientists have indirect evidence that there are vast systems of magnetic fields and electric currents that are connected somehow with the outward flow of charged material from the sun. These fields and currents the satellites will be able to measure for the first time. Also, for the first time, the satellites will give us a detailed three-dimensional picture of the earth's gravity and its magnetic field. Physicists are anxious to run one crucial and fairly simple gravity experiment as soon as possible. This experiment will test an Important prediction made by Einstein's general theory of relativity, namely, that a clock will run faster as the gravitational field around it . is reduced. If one of the fantastically accurate clocks, using atomic frequencies, were placed in a satellite and should run faster than its counterpart on earth, another of Einstein's great and daring predictions would be confirmed. (This is not the same as the prediction that any moving,clock will appear to a stationary observer to lose time-a prediction tlmt physicists already regard as well confirmed.) There are also some special questions about cosmic rays which can be settled only by detectin the rays before they shatter themselves against the earth's atmosp lere. And, of course, animals carried in satellites will begin to answer the question: 'What is the effect of weightlessness on physiolo ical and psychological functions? (Gravity is not felt inside a satellite ecause the earth's pull is precisely balanced by centrifugal force. This is ust another way of saying that bodies inside a satellite behave exact y as they would inside a freely falling elevat.or.) The satellite that will turn its attention downward holds great promise for meteorology and the eventual improvement of weather forecasting. Present weather stations on land and sea can keep only about 10 percent of the atmosphere under surveillance. Two or three weather satellites could make a cloud inventory of the whole globe every few hours. From this invent,ory, meteorologists believe they could s ot large storms (including hurricanes) in thew early stage4 and chart t eir direction of movement with much more accuracy than a t . Other instruments in the satellites will measure for the rst time how much solar energ is falling upon the earth's atmosphere and .how much ia reflected an radiated back into space by clquds, oceans, the continents, and by the great polar icefields.

rmen

It is not generally appreciated that the earth has to send buck into space, over the long run, exactly as lnucll heat energy as it receives from the sun. If this were not so, the earth would either heat up or cool off. But there is an excess of income over outgo in tlw tropical regions, and an excess of outgo over income in the polar regions. This imbalance has to be continuously rectified by thr activit of the earth's atmosphere which we call weather. By ookin a t the atmosphere from the outside, satellitcs wilt provide the Erst real accounting of the energy imbalances, and their consequent tensions, all around the globe. With the insi h t gained from such studies, meteorologists hope they may improve ong-rangc forecasting of world weather trends. Finally, there are the satellites that will look not just around or down, but out into space. Carrying ordinary telescopes, as well as special instruments for recording X-rays, ultraviolet, and otlwr radiations, these satellites cannot fail to reveal new sights forever hidden from observers who are bound to the earth. What these sights will be, no one can tell. But scientists know that a largc pnrt of all stellar radiation lies in the ultraviolet region of the spectrum, and this is totally blocked by the earth's atmosphere. ,41so blocked are other very long wavelengths of light of the ki11c.l usually referred to as radio waves. Some of these get through the so-called radio window in the atmosphere and can be detccted by radio t~clescopes, but scientists would like a look a t the still longer waves that cannot penetrate to earth. Even those light signals that now reach the mrth can be rec*ordtvi with brilliant new clarity by satellite telescopcs. All existing photographs of the moon and nearby planets are smeared by thc same turbulence of the atmosphere that makes the stars tminklc. I'p above the atmosphere the tfwinkling will stop, and we should bc u1)lc to see for the first time wliat Mars rcally looks like. And wc shall want a really sharp view before launching the first ro~lietto llars. A closeull' o f the moon While these satellite observatioils are in progress, o thcr roc kc t s will be striking out for the moon with other killds of instrurncl~ts. Photographs of the back or hidden side of the moon may provc quitc unexciting, or they may reveal some spectucular new feature now unguessed. Of greater scientific in terest is the qucs tioil whc tller or 110t' the moon has a magentic field. Sincc no oilc knows for surc why tlw earth has such a field, the presence or absenco of one on the moo11 should throw some light on the mystery. But what scientists would most like to lcarn from u cdoscup study of the moon is something of its origin and histor)-. Was it originally molten? Doesit now have a fluid core, similar to tlw earth's? Ant1 just what is the nature of the lunar surface? The answer to these ailti many other questions should shed light, direct'ly or intlircctly, on the origin and history of the earth and the surrounding solar system. While the moon is believed to be devoid of lifc, even the simplcst and most primitive, this cannot be taken for granted. Somcb sci~ntists have suggested that small particles with the propertiw of life-germs or spores-could exist in space and could have clriftcd onto the moon. If we are to test this intriguing hypothesis we must be careful 1101 to contaminate the moon's surface, in the biologicd scnsc, beforch~lcl.

There are strong scientific reasons, too, for avoiding radioactive contamination of the moon until its natural1~acquired radioactivity can b'e measured. *. * * and on to Mars The nearest lanets to earth are Mars and Venus. We know quitc enough about fars to suspect that it may support some form of life. To land instrument carriers on Mars and Venus will be easier, in one respect, than achieving a "soft" landing on the moon. The reason is that both planets have atmosplieree that can be used to cusiiion the final approach. These atmospheres might also be used to support balloons equipped to carry out both meteor010 cal soundings and s general photo survey of surface features. The enusian atmosphere, of course, consists of what appears to be a dense layer of clouds so l l from earth. that its surface has never been seen at a Remotely controlled scientific expeditions to the moon and nearby planets could absorb the energies of scientists for many decades. Since man is such an adventurous creature, there will uiidoubtedly come a time when he can no longer resist going out and seeing for himself. I t would be foolish to try to predict today just when this moment will arrive, I t might not arrive in this century, or it might come within 1 or 2 decades. So much will depend on how rapidly we want to expand and accelerate our program. According to one rough esti~natc it might require a total investment of about a couple of billion dollars, spent over a number of years to equip ourselves to land a man on thc moon and to return him safely to earth. Tihe satellite radio network Meanwhile, back at earth, satellites will be entering into the everyday affairs of men. Not only will they be aiding the meteorologists, but they could surely-and rather quickly-be pressed into service for expanding worldwide communications, including intercontinental television. At present all transoceanic communication is by cable (which is costly to install)' or by shortwave radio (which is easily disrupted by solar storms). Television cannot practically be beamed more than a few hundred miles because the wavelen ths needed to carry it will not bend aiound the earth and will not ounce off the region of the atmosphere known as the ionosphere. To solve this knotty problem, satellites may be the thing, for they can serve as high-flying radio relay stations. Several suitably equipped and properly spaced satellites would be able to receive TV signals from any point on the globe and to relay them directly-or perhaps via a second satellite-to any other point. Powered with solar batteries, these relay stations in space' should be able to keep working for many years. ~ldi!ita,ryapplications of space technology The development of militar rockets has provided the technological base for space exploration. f t will probably continue to do so, bccause of the commanding military importance of the ballistic missile. The subject of ballistic missiles lies outside our present discussion. We ask instead, putting missiles aside, what other military applications of s ace technology can we see ahead? are important, foreseeable, military uses for space vehicles. These lie, broadly speaking, in the fields of communication and recon-

rer re

naissance. To this we could add meteorology, for the possible aclv m e s in meteo~olsgSiea1 science yhich have already been described would have military implications. The use of satellites for radio relay links has also been described, and it does not take much imagination to foresee uses of such techniques in long-range military operations. The reconnaissance capabilities of a satellite are due, of course, to its position hiqh above the earth and the fact that its orbit cai~ies it in a predictable way over much of the globe. Its disadvantage is its necessarily great distance, 200 miles or more, from the surface. A highly magnifying camera or telescope is needed to picture the earth's surface in even moderate detail. To the human eye, from 200 miles away, a football stadium would be a barely distinguishable speck. A telescopic camera-can do a good deal better, depending on its size and complexity. I t is certainly feasible to obtaiu reconnaissance information with a fairly elaborate instrument, information which colild be relayed back to the earth by radio. Much has been written about space as a future theater of war, raising such suggestions as satellite bombers, military bases on the moon, and so on. For the most part, even the more sober proposals do not hold u well on close examination or appear to be achievable a t an early A t e . Granted that they will become tecll~lologically possible, most of these schemes, nevertheless, appear tu be clumsy and ineffective ways of doing a job. Take one example, the satellite as a bomb carrier. A satellite cannot simply drop a bomb. An object released from a satellite doesn't fall. So there is no special advantage in being over the target. Indeed, the only way to "drop" a bomb directly down from a satellite is to carry out aboard the satellite a r0~ke.t launching of the msgnitude required for all irltercontinental missile. A better scheme is to give the weapon to be launched from the satellite a small push, after which it will spiral in graclually. But that means launching it from a moving platform halfway around the world, with every disadvantage compared to a missile base on the ground. In short, the eanth would appear to be, after all, the best wea ons carrier. ~ g i is s only one example; each idea has to be judged on its own merits. There may well be important military applications for space vehicles which we cannot now foresee, and developments in space t e c h d o g y which open up quite novel possibilities. The history of science and technologv reminds us sharply of the limitations of our vision. Our road to future strength is the achievement of scientific insight and technical skill by vigorous participation in these new explorations. In this setting, our appropriate military strength will grow naturally and surely. A apace timetable Thus we see that satellites and space vehicles can carry out a great variety of scientific missions, and a number of military ones as well. Indeed, the scientific opportunities are so numerous and so inviting that scientists from m a y countriep will eertsinl want to participate. Perhaps the International Geophysical Year w$ eu est a model for t k ftt'ternatja-jhration of space iti gea&iui decades t o come. The timetable on the following page suggests the approximate order in which some of the scientific and technical objectives mentioned in this review may be attained.

I F

COMPILATION O F M A T E R I A L S O N SPACE A N D ASTRONAUTICS

53

The timetable is not broken down into years, sinm there is yet too much uncertainty about the scale of the effort that will be made. The timetable simply lists various types of space investigations and goals under three broad headings: "Early," "Later," "Still Later."
Scientijic objectives
--

Early

Later

Stlll later

1. Physics .-...----....-------. . 1. Astronomy . . . . . . . .. -.-..... 1. Automated lunar exploratlon. 2.Automated planetary explora2. Oeophyalca ---..-... - - - - - - - 2. Extensive conlmunlcatlons. - - t Ion. 3. Human lunar exploratlon and 3. Meteorology--......---------3, Blology...-..---.-.---------..-. return. 4. Mlnlmal Moon contract---. .- 4. Sclentlfic lunar Investlgatlon. - - And muph later stlil: Hvloap planekry explor@lon. 5. qIQir&al plOpetsly oonbgct.. . 6.9 xpeffmeatal oppqtpicat1ons. 6 . Human Bight in orblt ...-..--.. 6 . Spa@ physiology-- ---.-.----

In conclusion, we venture two observations. Research in outer space affords new opportunities in science, but it does not diminish the importance of science on earth. 'Many of the secrets of the universe will be fathomed in laboratories on earth, and the progress of our science and technology and the welfare of the Nation require that our regular scientific programs go forward without loss of pace, in fact a t an increased pace. I t would not be in the national interest to exploit space science a t the cost of weakening our efforts in other scientific endeavors. This need not happen if we plan our national program for space science and technology as part of a balanced national effort in all science and technology. Our second observation is prompted by technical considerations. For the present, the rocketry and other equipment used in space technology must usually be employed a t the very limit of its capacity. This means that failures of equipment and uncertainities of schedule are to be expected. I t therefore appears wise to be cautious and modest in o w predictions and pronouncements about future space activities -and quiet<lybold in our execution. R. KILLIAN, Jr., Chairman. Dr. JAMES Dr. ROBERT F. BACHER. 0 . BAKER. Dr. WILLIAM V. BERKWER. Dr. LLOYD Dr. HANSA. BETHE. W. BRONK. Dr. DETLEV Dr. JAMES H. DOOLITTLE. Dr. JAMES B. FISK. P. HASKINS. Dr. CARYL B. KISTIAKOWSKY. Dr. GEORGE Dr. EDWINH. LAND. M. PURCELL. Dr. EDWARD Dr. ISIDOR I. RABI. Dr. H. P. ROBERTSON. A. W E I B ~ . Dr. PAUL B. WI~ESNER. Dr. JEROME Y &IC. 'Dr. HERBERT Dr. JERROLD R. ZACHARIAS.

P u b l i c Information Off i c e U . S . Army Ordnance M i s s i l e Commend Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

JUPITEX N O S E CONE RECOVERY A f u l l - s c a l e JUPITER IRBM nose cone was s u c c e s s f u l l y recovered i n t a c t by t h e U . S. Navy one hour and 30 minutes a f t e r t h e m i s s i l e was launched A.M., EST, on 17 J u l y 58. from Cape Canaveral, F l o r i d a a t 4 ~ 0 5
It was t h e second recovery of an undamaged JUPITER IRBM cone. The Army B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Agency achieved t h e f e a t f i r s t on 18 May 58, r e p e a t i n g t h e success of August 1957 when a s c a l e model cone c a r r i e d by a JUPITER C was recovered.

Three r e c o v e r i e s confirm t h e adequate p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d t h e weapon s y s t e m ' s warhead by t h e cone developed by ABMA w i t h a s s i s t a n c e of t h e C i n c i n n a t i , Ohio T e s t i n g and Research L a b o r a t o r i e s , The recovery package i n s t a l l e d i n t h e - c o n e was provided by Cook E l e c t r i c Co., Evanston, I l l . O n hand t o w i t n e s s t h e h i s t o r i c launching by t h e ABMA M i s s i l e F i r i n g m C ; Brig. Gen. Laboratory were B r i g . Gen. J . M. Colby, Deputy Conrmander, A J . A . Barclay, ABMA Commander and D r . Wernher von Braun, D i r e c t o r , Developmen Operat i o n s Division, ABMA. The Navy's cooperation was a g a i n o u t s t a n d i n g . The USS Egcape, guided by Navy a i r c r a f t which saw t h e cone 8r i t r e e n t e r e d t n e atmosphere, ho i t aboard and r e t u r n e d it t o t h e San Juan, P . R . Naval Base from ~ h i c hi t w i l be a i r l i f t e d t o t h e Arsenal. JUPITER was flown over t h e approximate f u l l range of t h e IRBM. !)1STRIBUTION: "A"

' ( ~ e m o v efrom a u l l e t i n Board J u l y 25)

JUPITER-C,

satellite launching vehicle for Explorer, is backed into Arm

Army Gaining Vital Space Assignments

V

O n Jan. 31, 1958, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency p u t t h e first United States satellite i n t o orbit a n d thereby filed its claim t o space research a n d development. Since then, ABMA has been given important assignments in t h e nation's space proeram such as: Mar. 5, ~ ~ e n c < l a u n ~ h e ~ E x p l o 11. r e r a satellite carrying rocket. o n top of hleclia'nical failure' in ignition system the Redstone, according to von Braun, of last stage rocket prevented satellite could be placed a rotating, cvlindrical trom going into orbit after good initial launcher, containing three clustcrs of trajectory. small, solid propellant Loki rockets. Mar. 26, ABMA launched Explorer T h e Lokis, then under development. 111. successfullv ~ l a c i ~third i e U. S. satel- were desired because of their short burnlite in orbit ( ~ A i ~ u a r v went d into orbit ing time, about 0.8 sec. T h e plan was hlarch 17). for the Redstone to start the vehicle on Mar. 27, Advanced Research Projects its trajectory. After two minutes, the Agency authorized ABMA "to u"der- Redstone engine would be cut off as the t A c onc, and possibly two, lunar propellant .tanks started to go dry. A probes" and "to launch two, and few seconds later, the Redstone would possibly three, earth satellites." Satel- be separated, and the last three stages litcs will be continuation of Explorer plus the satellite would continue to program with some modifications in coast upward. both the satellites and in tlie carrier Aligned by Air Jet rockets. May 2, Army awarded $2,850,000 Just before the final stages reached contract to California Institute of Tech- tlie apex of their trajectory, compressed ~ ~ o l o gfor y rescarcli on nioon project. air jets would align the vehicle horiRcar Admiral John E. Clark, deputv zontallv. At apex, about 200 mi. up, director of ARPA, said he hoped to see the spin-stabilized clusters of Lokis sdtcllite orbiting the moon before end would be fired, in .order, to bring the vchicle from a speed of around 6,000 of 1958. Satcllitc \vill be carried bv Juno mis- n ~ p h . to orbital velocitv of 18,000 mph. silc, probably a combination.of ABMA's At this point, the vehicle has no guidJupitcr and components of the Van- ance, and it was believed that the inguard, or other missiles. cremental velocity would have to be produced almost instantaneously for the Project Orbiter satellite to go into a circular orbit. The Arm!) actually began its preparaThis was the reason von Braun tions for thc space age long before tlie wanted the Lokis with their very short first Explorcr took to the air. It was burning times. Further analysis, howduring the first part of 1951 that the ever, showed that the firing time wasn't ~nitialplan began to take shape. as critical a factor as first believed. So Soon after tlie Rcd5tone had pro\.en \\lien the larger, more powerful Ser~tself in flight tests, Dr. \\'ernher von geant rocket engine came along, it was Braun, now dircctor of ABXIA's D c w - used in place of the Loki. Adoption of olmcnt Operations Di\-ision, started the Sergeant significantly reduced the toying \\.it11 the idea of using the 200- number of solid propellant rockets mi. ballistic missile as the first stage of necded. This, in turn, meant an easier
'

engineering job and increased reliability, i.e. fewer chances for failure in flight. While the idea was still in the planning stage, von Braun was introduced to Cmdr. George Hoover of the Office of Naval Research. O N R wanted to initiate a satellite projects based on existing hardware. It liked \,on Braun's ideas and offered to put up the necessarv money. Mai. Gen. H . N. Toftoy, i t that time commanding general of Red-

SPIN

"bucket" and first-stage nose for Explorer vehicle at Reynolds Metals plant.

--

AVIATION WEEK, June 16, 1958

Remove from bulletin boards after 15 August 1958

Arw-ledmton.

An.n.1.

11..

0 SATELLITES

EXPLORER is prepared for spin test. Upper stages are rotated to 700 rpm. in check-out.

sisted of t n o main parts: the body unit which held the guidancc m d control c r p i p n ~ c n tin addition to the warhead, and the thrust unit Ivhich contained the propellant tanks and rocket enginc. T o get the additional ~ e l o c i t y rc-

quired for re-entry, the engineers Icngthcnctl the thrust unit and inserted larger propellant tanks. 'I'Ilis increated the burning time b!- almost 50%. I'1ic.n. two. tpin-stahilizcd clusters of scaled-down Scrgemt roclcts Ircrc subEXTERNAL Z M R G h X E

INTERNAL TEMP

( I & '

SKETCH BY

u r m XImauYOVL*d

EXPLORER Ill instnlnrcnts measure cosmic ray intensity, ten~perature, meteor particles.
AVlATlCN WEEK, June 16, 1958

DISTRIRUTICN:

SPACE AGENCIES

Army's Mission in Space Is Expanding

Army, which put t h e first U. S. satellite into orbit, has been authorized base who are not part of the AOMC by Advanced Research Projects Agency t o undertake one, a n d possibly two, table of organization are Rohm & Haas lunar probes a n d also t o launch two, and possibly three, earth satellites. T h e and 'Thiokol, which do work on solid satellites will be Explorers or variations thereof a n d t h e rockets used will popellants for ARGMA. Combined support for all AOMC groups will cost be modified JupiterCs. about $1 37 million next year. T h e Army's proposal t o place a man in a capsule atop t h e Redstone missile and send him u p t o a n altitude of 150 mi. is still under consideration White Sands by t h e Defense Department. But this experiment is not tied in with t h e White Sands Proving Ground, comArmy's space work, declares Maj. Gen. John Medaris, Chief of Army Ordnance ~nandcdby Maj. Gen. W. E. Laidlaw, Missile Command. Rather, it will be part of a separate series of experiments is located in south central New Mexico. concerned with transporting men by missile-not through space, but from Its main mission is providing integrated mngc facilities for flight testing of misone point o n earth t o a n o t h i r . This "men-by-missile" program would The creatlon of this new command siles under development by all three be more closely associated with special (see chart, p. 92) is designed to en- services. In addition, it conducts labforces operations. The idea is to get able the Army to exploit its missile c a p oratorv tests of Army missile compoa small number of specialists such as a abilities as fast and as fully as possible nents and carries out independent engimedical aid or demolition team to a key by placing all the resources in this area ueered testing of complete Army mispoint at a specific time "with the as- under one commander along with the sile systems before they are released for surance that they won't be clobbered by lesponsibility for all the decision-mak- field use. AOMC estimates White the enemy on the way in." ing required to bring a misslle from an Sands will spend $70 million next year. Jet Propulsion Laboratory, located idea to a field-proven weapons system. Separation Impossible This new command extends from Actually, it is impossible to separate California to Cape Canaveral, Fla. with missile or weapons work from space the management headquartered in projects, Gen. Medaris declares. Tech- Huntsville, Ala. Commanding general nical problems for both are closely of AOMC, Gen. Medaris, reports diillterlocked; there are many fruitful op- rectly to the Chief of Ordnance on rouportunities for cross-pollination of tine research and development projects. ideas; variety makes the work of the re- For special priority-weapons or space searchers more challenging. projects, there are direct access lines beArmy has no intention of trying to tween Medaris on one end and, on the keep space and weapons projects dis- other, the Secretary of the Army, the tinct, either in its own facilities or Army Missile Committee, and the Adamong outside contractors. The recent vanced Research Projects Agency. placement of the Pershing contract Under Medaris and his command with the Martin Co., contrary to some headquarters staff come Redstone Arsespeculation, does not signify any change nal, Army Ballistic Missile Agency, ill the Army's arsenal concept nor is it Arniy Rocket and Guided Missile part of any plan to give weapons work Agency, White Sands Proving Ground, to private industry in order to keep and Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Army scientists free for space work, says Gen. Medaris. As an ordnance man- Non-Ballistic Responsibility ager, he is interested in maintaining a ARGMA, which is the new group, reasonable workload balance between has taken over the responsibility for industry and government. At present, ncn-ballistic weapons formerly held by the balance in the Army's missile work Redstone Arsenal. These weapons inruns about 70% to industry and about clude Sergeant, Corporal, Honest John, 30% in-house. The average division is Little John, Nike Ajax, Nike Hercules, closer to 82% for industry to 18% in- Nike Zeus, Lacrosse, land-based Talos, house. Dart, Plato and Hawk. At present, Right now, the Army is running ARGMA, which is under the command about 80 static firings a month at Red- of Brig. Gen. John G . Shinkle, has the stone Arsenal. Most of these are part largest bud et of all AOMC subgroups. of weapons programs. Space programs In 1959, for example. ARGMA will constitute only a very small percentage spend approximately $180 million on of current work. From here on in, lesearch and development and perhaps Gen. Medaris expects to see an increase another $800 million on production In both the over-all missile work and and procurement. the percentage represented by space Redstone Arsenal, the physical home projects. base of AOMC, is now essentially a T o better handle its ra~idlvex~and- post command. Under the direction of ing missile work, the. ~ r m )r&ntly re- Col. Keith T . O'Keefe, it is responsorganized its Redstone Arsenal complex. ible for the housekeeping of the 40,000Effective Mar. 31, 1958, the Army Ord- acre arsenal reservation and for providnance Missile Command came into be- ing support to ARGMA, ABMA and ing after about 15 months in the gesta- the Ordnance Guided Missile School. JUPITER-C, carrying Explorer, takes off tion period. Besides OGMS, other tenants on the from Cape Canaveral, Fla.
AVIATION WEEK, June 16, 1958

Remove from b u l l e t i n boards a f t e r 15 August 1958

Dr. Wernher von Braun Director, Development Operations Division U. S , Army Ballistic Missile Agency Redstone Arsenal, Alabama THE EXPLORERS Ninth Annual Congress International Astronautical Federation Amsterdam, The Netherlands 25-30 August I958 Events of the past ten months since this Congress last convened in Barcelona have given special meaning to these meetings of the International Astronautical Federation. History-making demonstrations of advancing rocket technology have focused the attention of people everywhere on the International Geophysical Year and the concerted effort of scientists from all over the globe to obtain more information about our home planet and the open spaces around it.

It is therefore a propitious time for this assembly, which is broadly of many nations interested representative of the scientific and engineering in the limitless areas beyond the earth. I believe I speak for all of us assembled here in this room when I say that for many months we felt a deep regret that the International Geophysical Year will be concluded all too soon. We knew in our hearts that it would indeed be tragic if we failed to continue the world-wide research program initiated under the IGY which hss rendered mankind such convincing and heartening proof that even in times of tension and crises the world" scientific community can work together for the mutual good. And as protagcnists of the grandiose concept of flight into outer space we a11 knew that it would be an incorrigible mistake and a severe setback for all astronautical endeavors and programs if we failed to make further use of the world-wide network of observation stations established for the IGY effort. It was thus with a feeling of infhite relief and gratitude that we learned that during the recent meeting of the national representatives of the International Geophysical Year in Moscow it was resolved to continue the most important phases of the IGY program through the corning calendar year. I strongly recommend that this assemblage exert its good influence to ensure the vigorous continuance of this effort with the objective of providing a continuous permanent basis for a close international cooperation not only in spirit but also in the ' practical phases of astronautical projects.
As a preamble to my discussion sf one portion of the space programs of the United States of America, I quote a statement by President Eisenhower,onMarch 26, 1958. On that date the President made public a presentation by his Science Advisory Comnittee entitled "Introduction to Outer Space." In doing so, Mr. Eisenhower said: "This statement of the Science Advisory Committee makes clear the opportunities which a developing space technology can provide to extend man's knowledge of the earth, the solar system, and the universe. These opportunities reinforce my conviction that we and other nations have a great responsibility to promote the peaceful use of space and to utilize the new knowledge obtainable from space science and technology for the benefit of all maqkfnd."

H think all sf us will heartily sub~cribeto that statement of principles. Lt is within that context that the United States Army has provided the launching vehicles which placed the EXPLORER earth satellites in orbit with the primary objective of obtaining useful scientific data about the spatial environment. That data has been made available, without restriction, to the scientific community f the Army Qrdnance Missile C m a n d , the U. S. National Academy of by elements s Sciences and the International Geophysical Year Committee. We are continuing our cooperative effort to explore space with interested segments of the scientific fraternity.
I want also to use this opportunity to extend my congratulations to the representatives of the Soviet Union for the technological feats they achieved in recent months, beginning with the launching of Sputnik I on the 4th of Qctober, 1957, and culminating in the launching of Sputnik I11 on May 15, 1958. We a11 appreciate the derivative values of competition which can be extremely beneficial in wholly peaceful scientific endeavors such as the larsncf!ing of setellites for the exploration of the environment o f outer space. And I should like to say to our Soviet colleagues that we shall certainly coctinue to be up there with you, n c i r e ambitious undertakings collecting all the data we can in preparation for even r which will follow in due course. My presentation concerns the scientific earth satellites of the EXPLORER series and thefr launching vehicles, and will be illustrated with a number of slides. In this effort we received major assistance from two sources: the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of California Institute of Technology and the State University of Iowa. The Air Force Cambridge Research Center also participated. So did many opher individuals and agencies, including the Vanguard Project of the United States Navy, primarily in tracking and data reduction aspects.
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Let me first talk about the carrier rockets for our EXPLORER satellites. We call these carrier rockets JUPITER-C, because we have used these rockets in support of the development of a bigger rocket called the JUPITER. As Figure 1 indicates, the JUPITER-C rocket consists of a modified REDSTONE rocket serving as first stage and a three-stage cluster of solid propellant rockets placed in a spinning tub which was mounted in the nose of the first stage. The entire JUPITER-C thus has four stages

The standard REDSTQNE Missile operates with a thrust of 75,000 pomds and burns alcohol with liquid oxygen as the oxidizing element. For the EXPLQRER missions we enlarged the first-stage propellant tanks and selected another fuel, known as hydyne, to replace alcohol. Hydyne is a development of the Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation Company, our power plant contractor. It yields f r m 10 to 15 per cent more specific impulse than does alcohol and can be used in an engine designed for alcohol and liquid oxygen without major modification. We actually increased burning time as well as thrust, boosting the latter to 83,008 pounds or 8,000 pounds above the usual REDSTONE thrust. The total weight of the high-speed clusters in the nose of the JUPITER-C iS substantially less than the payload weight of the REDSTONE Missile. As a

with some extra propellants for the first stage. The instrument compartment sits atop the tank section and is separated from the latter after first-stage power cutoff. It acc~nunodatesthe guidance and control equipment for the first-stage flight phase and a spatial attitude control system for horizontal alignment of the separated nose section with the spinning tub when it passes through the apex of its trajectory. The objective is to aim a d fire the high-speed clusters prior to apex so that at injection the satellite would be traveling in exactly horizontal direction. The firing procedure for the JUPITER-C was as follows: The missile takes off vertically under its thrust of 83,000 pounds. During the 155 seconds burning time of the first stage, it is tilted into a trajectory which is approximately 40 degrees inclined to the horizon at cutoff. A few seconds after cutoff, the booster - with that I mean the combined tank and engine section of the first stage - is separated from the instrument compartment. This is done by igniting six explosive bolts which secure the compartment to the front end of the tank section of the first stage. Wrapped around these bolts are six coil springs which have been pre-loaded during the assembly procedure. At the moment the tiny powder charges destroy the bolts, the springs exert a gentle push on the instrument compartment and separate it cleanly from the booster. The velocity increment imparted to the instrument compartment by sudden expansion of the coil springs is in the order of 2.6 fps. We did not apply a refined cutoff for the first stage of EXPLORER I. Instead we used the so-called depletion technique, This weans simply that shortly before the expected burn-out time we energized two contacts. These contacts sensed the pressure in the fuel and the liquid oxygen pump discharge lines. Whichever of these two pressures dropped to zero first triggered a relay which, in turn, closed both propellant main valves controlling the flow into the combustion chamber. In other words, we simply used the instant at which one of the two propellant components depleted to shut the engine down and get a clean cutoff. Cutoff occurred after 157 seconds in EXPLORER I, two seconds later than expected. Simultaneously a timer was triggered which activated the separatjon mechanism 5 seconds later. This prevented the runup of the booster into the instrument compartment as a result of gradual thrust decay. In a near-perfect vacuum such as the missile encounters at a cutoff point 58 miles above earth's surface there is no abrupt thrust decay. While the thrust drops quite abruptly to a fraction of its original level, further thrust decay is slow because all the gas in the combustion chamber, plus whatever fuel and liquid oxygen is trapped between the valves and the combustion chamber will expand or after-burn. This will exert a small but noticeable gost-cutoff impulse on the booster. Since only the weak spring forces separated the instrument compartment from the booster, we had to ensure that the booster would not collide with the instrument compartment after separation due to this residual thrust. For this reason we allowed the complete missile to coast about 5 seconds and permitted the

thrust to decay completely down to zero before actual separation occurred. From the point of separation, the two portions of the missile coasted through a vacuum trajectory until approximately 404 seconds from take-off. The apex was nearly attained at this time. During the free coasting period, between 157 and 404 seconds, the spatial attitude control system aligned the instrument compartment into an exactly horizontal position with respect to the earth's surface. This was accomplished as follows: The same gyroscopes which had controlled the missile up to the cutoff point by means of jet vanes now (after separation) would control a system of compressed air nozzles which were mounted in the tail of the instrument compartment. The reaction thrust of these air nozqles tilted the entire nose section, complete with the spinning cluster of high-speed rockets, into the horizontal direction. The tilt actually occurred substantially faster than the tilt of the trajectory itself. We turned the nose section into the horizontal position relatively fast in order to give the residual errors sufficient time to decay. Thus we obtained the highest possible degree of accuracy in the horizontal alignment by the time apex was finally reached. Due to our relatively crude cutoff technique, based only on propellant depletion, it was impossible to predict exactly the time at which the apex would be attained prior to takeoff. It was for the same reason impossible to determine exactly and in advance the horizontal distance the missile would have traversed between takeoff point and apex. Because of the curvature of the earth and because the high-speed rocket launcher must be in exactly horizontal position over the local horizon, it was necessary to introduce some auxiliary tracking means to furnish additional data during the flight. Only by catching the moment o of apex and by accurate alignment of the spinning tub would it be possible t ignite the high-speed stages in the right direction necessary to obtain orbital flight. Three independent methods were employed to determine the instant of apex as precisely as possible. First, the missile was tracked by radar. The radar plot was used to predict the instant and point in space at which apex would be reached. Second, we had an accelerometer in the missile which, by means of telemetry, relayed to the ground the velocity build-up of the first stage. Cutoff velocity was then fed into a simple ground computer which predicted the instant of apex transit. Third, standard Doppler tracking network furnished the same information. The results obtained with these three independent apex prediction methods were introduced into a small calculator which enabled us to evaluate the quality of the three inputs. For example, if one prediction was based upon readings of poor quality, it could be disregarded or its value in determining the average would be reduced to about 20 per cent of the weight of the other methods. We could thus determine a rather reliable average of the apex predictions. The

average was then employed to set a timing device which dispatched a radio t was this signal which fired the second stage, signal to the missile. I All this had to be accomplished in the four-minute interval between cutoff and apex, of course. We did not want to fire the second stage exactly at apex but slightly prior to this instant. The second, third and fourth stage had burning times of about 5 seconds each and several seconds elapsed between firing one stage and burnout of the previous stage. Total elapsed time between firing the second stage and fourth stage cutoff was about 24 seconds. Firing of the second stage, therefore, had to occur prior to the predicted apex point. With this lead time the vertical velocity component of the high-speed cluster would be exactly zero at fourth stage cutoff. The fourth stage appears at the right side of Figure 1. This is the stage which orbits. It consists of a single 6-inch solid rocket loaded with high energy propellant. The black-and-white striped unit on top of it is the instrumented satellite itself. The entire EXPLORER unit; that is, the empty shell plus the instrumented satellite, weighed 30.8 pounds. The forward portion alone weighed 18.8 pounds and the empty shell weighed l2 pounds. The EXPLORER fourth stage assembly is 80 inches long and 6 inches in diameter. Similar rockets but with a slightly different propellant were used in the second and third stages. The second stage consisted of a ring of 11 of them. Inserted into this ring was the third stage consisting of three rockets. The single rocket making up the fourth stage sat atop the third stage. Figure 1 also shows the orbit obtained with EXPLORER I. The perigee altitude of 225 miles and apogee of' 1594 miles corresponds to a period of revolution of 114.78 minutes. From post-launch tracking data, we learned that the angle under which the fourth stage entered orbit was, in respect to the local horizon, as little as 0.81 degrees off, which we thought was a remarkable accuracy in view of the many factors contributing to this error. However EXPLORER I would still have orbited had the error been as high as 4 degrees. Thus a comfortable safety margin was available so far as accuracy requirements for apex attitude alignment were concerned. The satellite carried two transmitters. The low-powered transmitter in the nose is the same kind as the high-powered one located further aft, but it operates on one-sixth of the power level, radiating only 10 milliwatts instead of 60. I t is fed by the same type mercury batteries but since they have about the same capacity in terms of ampere hours as those connected to the high-powered transmitter, they were expected to furnish about six times more lifetime. The high-powered transmitter thus had an expected lifetime of two weeks, while the battery power supply for the low-powered transmitter was expected to last for 2 to 3 months. The first task of both transmitters was to provide signals for the tracking of the EXPLORER; to prove, that is, that the satellite was in orbit. The high-powered

transmitter could be received with any customary VHF receiver but the low, powered one required more sophisticated, narrow band-width receiving equipment. Specifically, the latter could be received only by the microlock ground stations developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the Army and by the minitrack network established by the Navy, consisting of a long string uf stations stretching from North to South approximately along the 65 locgitude west of Greenwich. The stations provide a line across the North and South American continents which must be passed by any object orbiting at any moderate inclination to the equatorial plane. The minitrack network will receive any satellite transmission, I provided it employs the right frequency, once per orbit and record the time of passing. In addition to the task of providing a tracking tool, the transmitters also telemeter to the ground scientific information collected by the satellite. The telemetered data from EXPLORER 1,consistedof measurements of temperature, micrometeorites, and cosmic rays in space. Three temperature gauges were carried in the nose and the cylindrical portion of the outer shell to determine outer skin temperatures, and one inside the instrument compartment,.behind the high-powered transmitter, to measure the temperature of the heat-insulated instrument package as compared to the outer skin. For its second test objective EXPLORER I carried several instruments designed to determine the abundancy of micrometeorites in space and to determine how they, or tinier particles commonly referred to as cosmic dust, affect the satellitevs surface. Three different instruments were employed. One was a microphone amplifier mounted in the satellite's hull. This would register the impact of a micrometeorite and amplify it. A scale of two circuits was used to switch the frequency of a subcarrier oscillator. Meteorite impact was observed through frequency changes. Dr. Bohn of the Jksearch 1nsti.tute of Temple University in Philadelphia developed this piece of equipmenr. In addition to the microphone there was a micrometeorite erosion gauge, consisting of two instruments in one. A portion of it consisted of 11 wires of extremely brittle metal which were imbedded in an insulating surface. A voltage was applied to the 11 wires in parallel. Each time a micrometeorite struck and broke a wire, the total number of wires connecting the plus and minus busbar would be reduced from 11 to 10, or 10 to 9, or 9 to 8, and so on that the resistance would increase in distinct steps. This change in resistance would be indicated on a sub-carrier oscillator. Two wires were put out of commission on the first orbit of EXPLORER I. ' W e believe now that they went out during the vehicle's ascent through.the atmosphere. Apparently the density of micrometeorites in outer space, at least outside of recurrent meteor swarms is not as high as anticipated. The rosion gauge was prepared by Dr. M. Dubin of the Air Force Cambridge Research Center. Final results of the micrometeorite tests will be issued by the Air Force Research Center while Iowa State University will publish the results of cosmic ray measurements.

The third, and most important experiment, was performed by a Geiger counter, compactly packaged and assembled, which was developed by the State University of Iowa under Dr, James Van Allen. The purpose of this counter was to determine the intensity of cosmic primary radiation in outer space. You will recall that the diameter of the EXPLORER cylinder is only six inches. The total weight of the instrumentation performing all three experiments in EXPLORER I was a mere 10.83 pounds. From this inauspicious springboard there developed a major scientific discovery in physics, which was completely confirmed by the data collected with EXPLORER 111. The first analysis of the results of Dr. Van Allen's cosmic ray probe proved fascinating and bewildering. EXPLORER 1's radiation counts ran about 30 to 40 per second some 200 to 300 miles above southern California, as had been predicted.
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But the count climbed to more than 35,000 per second at the highest altitudes of both EXPLORER I and EXPLORER 111 when they were over South America it was and adjoining waters. This figure could possibly have been higher impossible to tell, because the instruments were completely overwhelmed at this extremely high and unexpected cosmic ray count.

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Due to existing weight limitations the EXPLORER I counter could report only the number of impinging cosmic primary particles within the counter's sensitivity level. Unable to differentiate between the energy levels, it could not catalog the total . into heavier and lighter, or faster and slower cosmic particles. Moreover, with EXPLORER I we could record impingments only while the transmitter was in direct line of sight with at least one receiving ground station. Since the major portion of the earth is covered with water, or not covered by microlock or minitrack receiver stations, we lost most of the telemetered information over areas where no receiving stations existed. For more complete data gathering EXPLORER 111 carried a tape recorder which stored information acquired throughout the entire orbit and reported it, on command, when the satellite passed over a suitably equipped receiving station. This is a small magnetic tape recorder driven by a spring with a little batterypowered electric step motor which wound the spring continuously. A coded radio signal flashed to the satellirr! from the ground triggered a relay which unlatched' the tape reel so that the spring drove the tape through the playback pickup within about 5 seconds. Within this period the transmitter, turned bn by the same relay, plsyed back to the ground whatever had been recorded on tape during the last orbit. To conserve power the transmitter was turned off afcer relaying the tape information. Since the little step relay continued winding the spring, the unit would again play back two hours or so later, after the next orbit. Each time the tape was played back, it was simultaneously cleaned for new information. Consequently the process of recording, storing and playback continued as long as the battery lasted. The system functioned perfectly. The presence of an exceptionally high particle impingment rate was indirectly

concluded from a rather sudden, and complete absence sf telemetered pulses while near the apogee of the orbits. The instruments were carried m i to altitudes in excess of 1100 kilometers. As it was inconceivable t h a t there existed an area void of any cosmic ray count, this temporary absence of any pulses was interpreted as signifying a blanketing of the Geiger tube by a very dense radiation field. Calibration of the equipment in the laboratory indicated that such complete blanketing of the Geiger tube would require a counting rate of at least 35,000 impacts per second. It was further concluded that only a small portion of these rays could be of high energy classification, identified as cosmic reys, and that most of the count was made up of a little-known low-energy type, presumably either electrons or protons. There was no way to determine their source, whether the particles came from the sun, or from interstellar space. The instrumentation in EXPLORERS IV and V was designed to investigate this exciting radiation phenomenon more closely, To permit the maximum exploitation of our relatively small carrier, the micrometeorite and temperature experiments carried in EXPLORERS I and I11 were ~liminated. Even the tape recorder in.EXPLORER 111, that permitted the storage of information gathered throughout orbit for release in toto at a single receiving station, was sacrificed. Weight reductions in the upper two stages of the JUPITER-C launching vehicle, combined with the use of more powerful propellants, permitted an addition of seven pounds of instrumentation in EXPLORERS IV and V, bringing the total satellite instrumentation weight up to 18.26 pounds. All the instrumentation, devoted to this one experiment, was designed to break down the radiation count into levels of intensity. Four separate radiation counters were carried instead of the single counters in EXPLORERS I and 111. Two Geiger-Mueller tubes, similar to the one each flown in the earlier satellites, were complemented by two scintillation counters. One each of the tubes and scintillators was shielded with lead to eliminate dzta below certain energy levels. The shielded counters would respond only to high-energy particles, while the unshielded counters were expected to detect everything. Also, the unshielded scintillation counter had special pickups which could further differentiate between energy levels. The new instruments in EXPLORERS IV and V were capable of detecting radiation accurately up to the range of 60,000 particles per square centimeter per second, which is several thousand times greater than the capacity of the equipment used in EXPLORERS I and 111. The satellite instrumentation for EXPLORERS IV and V was designed, assembled and tested under the supervision of Mr. Josef Boehm of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. Dr. Van Allen's institute again furnished the counters and, for telemetry, we used Jet Propulsion Laboratory's proven microlock system.

The highly elliptical orbits bands planned for EXPLORERS IV and V were calculated to cover most of the earth" surface. Their orbital inclination with respect to the equator was 50 degrees compared to the 35 degrees of EXPLORERS I and 111. When I was preparing this paper, Eh'T~T.ta!~EIP IV was still sitting on its launching pad, and EXPLORER V was still in t : ~ e checkout hangar. In the meantime, you will have learned from the newspapers whether or not they have been successful. This much about our scientific objectives. Other speakers will cover the scientific data obtained from the EXPLORERS more fully. Let me now return to the firing operations proper. Figure 2 shows an elongated REDSTONE booster mounted on a flatbed trailer as it is loaded into a Douglas Globemaster aircraft. The first stage was shipped in two pieces to the launching site in Florida; booster and instrument compartment separately. Both were carried on the same flight. The slide indicates how the booster was protected by tarpaulin. Figure.3 reveals the loading of the instrument compartment. Figure 4 shows the booster in the Army flight preparation hangar at Cape Canaveral, site of the Atlantic Missile Test Range. Note the :ins, to which the air rudders have not been attached. This also shows the nozzle exit of the rocket motor for the first stage and the mounts for the jet vanes which control the missile during first-stage flight. The jet vanes for the JUPITER-C caused us some concern for a while. Most of the testing of the rocket engine with the hydyne fuel had been conducted by Rocketdyne at its own California facility while the testing of the jet vanes to determine compatibility was conducted by our Army Agency in Huntsville, Alabama. We were concerned about the combined effect of extended burning time and higher exhaust velocity upon the vanes, since erosion might have reduced our control below the minimum level. It developed that the new fuel er0de.d the standard jet vanes far less than alcohol. The extended burning time achieved by using hydyne also required an enlargement of the hydrogen peroxide tank for the engine, simply to keep the turbine running for that extra period. This modification was provided by Rocketdyne. Figure 5 shows the instrument compartment of the first stage, which is bolted to the top flange of the booster by six explosive bolts. Numerous cables and tubes connect the instrument compartment and booster. All have quick-disconnect couplings so that at separation the plugs separate and the lines part quickly and easily. For a research project such as EXPLORER I, with its relatively simple guidance system, access doors were eliminated and the entire cover had to be lifted to service the instrument compartment,.,.

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missiles and rockets, October 6, 1958

Ahead of Schedule
The politics of an election, of defense streamlining, and o f big industries dependent for survival on Government contracts, are beginning to affect our missile programs in a dangerous way. The Administration-interested in balancing the budget-is trying hard to find ways and means of cutting defense expenditures. Already there has been some talk about killing the Titan ICBM as a weapons system. The President himself has been led to believe that some of our missile programs actually are ahead of schedule, and this thinking has been relayed to the public in recent months. With an apparent record of semi-successful ICBM and IRBM test shoots, with a series of small satellites in orbit, and with a vast hunk of glamorous publicity about the X-15 and other sophisticated Air Force projects, the Administration might succeed in convincing the tax-payers that the nation has caught up with our potential enemies. A short while ago, Dr. Simon Ramo was quoted as having said we already have caught up with the Russians in the ICBM field. The current feud between advocates of the Nike Hercules and the Bornarc as our standard anti-aircraft weapon also has added to the confusion and has made the public think we are wasting money on duplicate systems. It becomes obvious to the taxpayer that the Nike-Bomarc "duplication" is bad for the country and for our defense planning. It is too bad this idea has become so firmly fixed in the public mind. O f course, the Bomarc and the Nike Hercules are different systems designed for daerent defense tasks; one for longrange area defense, the other for close-in city defense. It is good that Defense Secretary McElroy has had the foresight and courage, despite political pressure, to make the decision to continue both of these programs. It is obvious that we have taken the wrong approach to many missile programs. It is equally obvious that such an approach has produced little operational hardware, but that it has-neverthel e s - c r e a t e d a vast knowhow and sound engineering experience which will help us advance rapidly. in the future. Today, however, we cannot afford to think that any of our missile programs are ahead of schedule. We must realize that while the best technical approach might not always be the best policy, those who make the policy must know the best technical answer. So far, very few of our policy makers have known the best technical answers, simply because the entire field of missilery is too new and unexplored. This means that a great deal of industrial research and development-and sometimes what may appear to be duplicating research and development-must take place before we can expect to get any upto-date systems into truly operational status. For example, to many defense planners it now appears crystal-clear that the Atlas and Titan weapons systems are being outdistanced by the Polaris-type system, and that the latter is the logical one to be pushed to the extreme. But two years ago it just wasn't so. At that time the liquidpropellant ICBM was termed the ultimate weapon. We now know that the complex underground bases required for the ICBMs cannot possibly be built and operated in secrecy, while a submarine is very difficult to detect. Furthermore, permanent ICBM bases, which are vulnerable, cannot be constructed for the amount of money and effort that are required for the equivalent in nuclear submarine missile striking power. This has become a controversial issue and certainly one that the Air Force doesn't like. Even many conservative Navy planners still don't quite understand the soundness of the Polaris concept. We must face the fact, however, that such change-overs in science and engineering breakthroughs will continue until missilery becomes a science that we have mastered fully. Until then, we cannot afford to cut expenditures and we certainly cannot afford to assume that we are ahead of schedule, because our planners have no means of knowing the best technical answers. The only thing that we can think of that might be ahead of schedule is the Russian missile program-ahead of our schedule.

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In My Opinion . . .
U.S. Army now faces the greatest space age challenge yet, lunar space construction. But unless Army leaders d o something about it soon, the role of the Army is likely to fade away quickly in the space era. Many Washington officials now admit we must begin to think sincerely about establishing lunar bases. This k i d of research and construction task-traditionally and logically-is a job for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. With its vast experience and with the backing of the Signal Corps and the Missile Ordnance Command, the Corps of Engineers should establish a special research group for space base development. Working closely with industries in the architectural-engineering area, plans should be made now for our first automatic military lunar stations. These, obviously, will be small packages in the beginning, but within ten years they will become bigger and will contain manned observers. i t should not be necessary at this point to repeat anything about how hard Russia is pushing her lunar base program. I n this base research area, in spite of great enthusiasm on the part of such outstanding planners as Brig. Gen. Homer A. Boushey, who repeatedly has stressed the importance of the use of lunar basest for rei~!iarciry purposes in a future war. The Corps of Engineers must act now to get the blessing of Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, Chief, Research and Development, and move ahead, possibly funded by ARPA. The Army has s d e r e d badly from poor public relations in the missile program. Army's loss to the USAF in the IRBM roles and mission battle was mainly a result of poor public relations planning. McElroy's modification of Wilson's stubborn ruling limiting the distance of Army missiles is proof enough. The oldtime Army conservatism will not get the soldiers anywhere in the space race. The Air Force now is advancing at full speed to become the No. 1 service in the space age. One year ago a directive was circulated among top A F officials ordering them not to imply in speeches, press releases, etc. that the USAF was pushing space flight. The word space flight was not to be mentioned. Today,-three-star USAF generals hint the Air Force some day will become the U.S. Space Force. This should convince Army leaders that change-overs and breakthroughs constantly will take place. What was good yesterday may not be so good tomorrow. The Army certainly must show more vigor and foresight if it expects to take an active part in our conquest of space. We do need the Army in this big struggle. But Army leaders must wake up and do something about it. A .lunar base research and development program must be started now. And industry must be invited to participate.

. . . The

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missiles and rockets, October 13, 1958

STATEMENT BY SENATOR S P A R K M A J J T O THE PRESS 15 O(=rOBER1958

I have been greatly concerned with t h e re2orts out of Washington r e l a t i n g t o t h e proposed s h i f t of a part of t h e famed Reds-tone team t o the new space agency. Thia team consists of both m i l i t a r y personnel and c i v i l i a n personnel which has demonstrated t o the world i t s efficiency and i t s effectiveness i n research and development i n the missile f i e l d , t h e a n t i missile f i e l d and i n space exqAoration. To break it u2 now as it seems t h i s proposal would do, could have s e r i o w e f f e c t s on our t o t a l defense program and i n our determined e f f o r t t o overcome our lag i n the miqqile f i e l d . Not enough authentic information ha8 been made avaLlable t o determine just what would be done but from what has come out it seeins not t o have been well planned and t o hold m a y serious and dangerous implications.
I stand ready t o do ~ d i a tI can i n t h i s continuing f i g h t t o protect the program t h a t has been so well developed here a t Redstone Arsenal and t o maintain t h e world's greatecst team i n t h e type of research and development t b a t has been carried on here.

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WASIIINGTON, D . C

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The Department o f Defense i s s u e d t h e f o l l o w i n g

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s t o p p r o d u c t i o n of e i t h e r t h e THOR o r JUPITER Both a r e b e i n g produced a t p r e s e n t t o

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:u:.?c t i < a r l y d e p l o y n e n t s c h e d u l e s .

"No d e c i s f o n between t h e two IRBM weapons systems w i l l be made u n t i l t h e

conplerior. of i n t e l n s i v e s t u d i e s which a r e now i n p r o g r e s s . "

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a.c? ~ . v 2 . c e d.to o p e r a i e t h e g i a n t m i s s i l e i n t h e f i e l d , i s i n t r a i n i n g now a t

Rcdst~w A r s e n a l , Alabama.

Remove from b u l l e t i n b o a r d s a f t e r 1 5 O c t .

15 October 1958

This i s not t h e f i r s t occasion when rumors and d i s t o r t i o n s have a f f e c t e d t h e Army's missile a c t i v i t i e s . Our people a r e becaning inured t o t h i s s o r t of t h i n g a s a n u n f o r t u n a t e but seemingly recurxant annoyance.

I b e l i e v e t h e p o s i t i o n taken by t h e President, a s reported by t h e p r e s s today, c l a r i f i e s t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n . It is apparent t h a t any proposal involving t h e Army missile team w i l l r e c e i v e c a r e f u l study and e v a l u a t i o n before any d e c i s i o n is reached. I am s a t i s f i e d t h a t a n a l y s i s of a l l t h e f a c t o r s w i l l n o t r e s u l t i n a c t Fon d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of our people and t h e n a t i o n .

W e w i l l continue work a s u s u a l t o advance t h e m i l i t a r y and s c i e n t i f i c programs assigned t o u s and t o i n s u r e t h e i r s u c c e s s f u l accanplishment. That is what i s expected of us. W e have no i n t e n t i o n of doing anything less.

J . B. MEDARIS Major General, U S A Carmanding

DISTRIBUTION : "S" Each c i v i l i a n employee t h i s i n s t a l l a t i o n

l5 October 1958

Dr. Wernhcr voa Braun, Director, Development Operations Division, Army B a l l i s t i c H i s r i l e Agency, isrued the f o l l w i n g rtatement t h i s morning in answer t o prerr querier:

"1 believe t h a t the misrile development teraP organized under the U.S. Army'r rponuorrhig and direction haa won recognition as a national asret through demonutrated capabilitier in the weapons and rpace fields. "The only question v h k h should be aeked fa how can t h i s t e r n best rethe nation? Un&r the prerent Army management the teum develops

mapans ryrteme for defenue and u t i l i z e r military hardware t o conduct r c i e n t i f i c rpace programs.
I believe t h a t the dual e f f o r t haa been

e n t i r e l y rucceriful--the r e r u l t r rpeak for theamelver.

"It would reem raorething l e r r than prudent t o r i s k the dirrolution

of ouch an &met a t a time when national recurity and prertige demand a unified e f f o r t t o achieve and maintain rupreanacy in rocket and space technologier

."

"B" plus 525 cyr t o A B W

.
"

ST. IX)UIS POST DISPATCH October 17, 1958

1
I

The Army's concern over a report t h a t the crack ba14i8tic m i r r i l e s t a f f a t Huntsville, Alabama should be s p l i t up is understand&le QVen though President Eisenhower says a decision has not been made, The t a l k of t r a n s f e r r i n g Army experts A S A i s bound t o cause anxiety, The expertq a t Huntrville posress an unt o the N equaled record and have produced three of the four e e t h , r a t e l l i t e r apd several missiles including the J u p i t e r . .*. About 85 percent of the s t a f f is working on mirrile trrrponry of advanced and urgent character and the r e s t a r e engaged in outer 8p8Ce p r o f e c t r , The new Space Adininistration which is concerned with almost e n t i r e l y a m m i l i t a r y p r o j e c t s i s accused by the Army of t r y i n g t o carry out a r a i d that would wreck the Anny missile, s a t e l l i t e and space ship program.
' 1

The Army a l s o believes t h a t i t s government-owned prmn81 ryrtem, which is contrasted t o the A i r Force syatem of contracting with p r i v a t e f-, is l i k e l y t o be wiped out oz!'crippled. Thia feeling is not an unrauonrbla one,.
A i r Force motives

History 4nd same circumetanues give credence t o tha Army faelingr t h a t the are wrapped up in the plans t o t r a n r f a r roar of 'iha r t a f f a t Huntsvhl1.e.
1

I
I

Certainly men l i k e the famous Dr. von Braun, who i r f i r r t in &rything in reu a r c h valdr t o the NASA as he is t o the Amy and because there a r e no experinncod u t r b a a u t i q engineerr, it is the s c f m t i s t s and engineers working i n rocketry t ~ u h n l q w eand rueh &fFe$dst h a t are g o h g t o have t o r t a f f NASA.
gz.rd t o plans for manned s a t e l l i t e s , would be of j u r t

What ha8 t o be done i 8 t o find a way by which 1W kY ba b u i l t up without p u t t i n g out of bueiavrr the rnierila rseucy of jurt oru rarviue I TO wreck the Huntsv f l l c work with its rplendid record while leaving tha A i r Porce a i d lrvy agencies i n t a c t ~3 no solutibn.

ST LOUIS GLOBE DLNOCIIAT ' b c t o b e r 18, 1958

WAPONS COME FIRST

Many Americans welcome t h e d e c i s i o n t o s e t up a c i v i l i a n agency t o undertake b a s i c r e s e a r c h i n t o t h e e x p l o r a t i o n and conquest of s p a c e . On paper i t seems t h a t none o f t h e branches of t h e Armed Forces c o u l d do t h i s job a s w e l l a s a new c i v i l i a n s c i e n c e and s p a c e group. Any r e s e a r c h t h a t t h e A i r Force, t h e Army, o r t h e Navy might do should be d i r e c t e d toward t h e development of m i l i t a r y weapons. The e x p l o r a t i o n of space, a s s u c h , p l a i n l y l a y o u t s i d e t h e i r a s s i g n e d d u t i e s . Thus, t h e r e secms a d e f i n i t e p l a c e i n t h e p i c t u r e f o r t h e new c i v i l i a n N a t i o n a l Aeronautics and Space A d m i n i s f r a t i o n . There a r e many v a l u a b l e f i e l d s of a e r o n a u t i c a l r e s e a r c h which would be h a r d t o j u s t i f y a s a m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e . No r e s p o n s i b l e p e r s o n was s u g g e s t i n g however, t h a t N A S A s p a c e s h i p o r moonrockets should have a h i g h e r p r i o r i t y t h a n a m i l i t a r y hardware t h a t t h i s n a t i o n needs f o r defense i n t h i s dangerous a g e . Now N A S A comes up w i t h a r e q u e s t t h a t t h e Army's h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l team of m i s s i l e and r o c k e t e x p e r t s a t Redstone Arsenal i n H u n t s v i l l e , Ala. be t u r n e d over t o i t l o c k , s t o c k and b a r r e l . The Army has about 4100 workers a t t h e Kedstone A r s e n a l , o f whom some 1200 a r e c i v i l i a n s . Redstone Arsenal s c i e n t i s t s produce t h e h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l 1500 m i l e JUPITER m i s s i l e and launched America's f i r s t e a r t h s a t e l l i t e s EXPWIXR I.
Dr. Wernher von Braun; D i r e c t o r o f t h c Army's b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e program t h e r e , is onc of t h e s c i e n t i s t s who has p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t t h e N A S A attempted r a i d . He s a i d ''I bcli-cve t h a t t h e m i s s i l e ' s development team o r g a n i z e d under t h e U. S. Army s p o m o r s h i p and d i r e c t i o n has won r e c o g n i t i o n as a n a t i o n a l a s s e t t h r u demonstrated c a l ~ n b i t i t i c s i n t h c weapons and s p a c c f i e l d . The o n l y q u e s t i o n t o be asked is how t e a n b c s t scrvc I:hc n a t i o n . Under t h e p r e s e n t Army management t h e team can 1.11i-s dcvc 1 o p ~ wc~lpons l s y s tcms f o r d e f e n s e and u t i l i z e d m i l i t a r y hardware t o conduct sc i c n t i I i t : spncc programs. I b c l i c v e t h e r c s u l t s speak f o r themselves

."

I'rc:.iclc.nt l'iscnhowcr s a y s t h a t NASA's bold a t t e m p t t o t a k e over t h e Army's e i ~ t i r cm i s s i l e b r a n c h has n o t bccn approved and won't be u n t i l he makes t h e d e c i s i o n p c r s n n a l l y . 'Ibis worlltl be n o t h i n g s h o r t of a n a t i o n a l c a l a m i t y t o t a k e t h e weapons te,m t h a t thc Army has s u c c c s s E u l l y assembled and t u r n i t over t o t h i s s p a c e s h i p

and Lunar marching s o c i c t y . If N A S A c a n ' t talcc close-up o f t h e man i n t h e Moon w i t h o u t s t r i p p i n g t h e tinny scientific cupboard b a r e i t Lould be b e t t e r i f N A S A closed shop. Weapons comc! f i r s t .
DISTR I1;IJT. ION :

/ /

/ /

missiles and rockets, October

27,

In M y Opinion . . .
. . . the nation's missile and space flight progress is in grave danger of being slowed down agaid. Once more the spirit and morale at Redstone is at a rock bottom low. Once more Wernher von Braun has been forced to tell his scientists to keep up the good work, to ignore the political footballing, to avoid any let-downin mite of the fact that the axe is again being lowered over their heads.
It will take weeks, and more probably months, for the Administration to finalize the decision to transfer the ABMA rocket science team to NASA, although the decision probably will be made before the end of the year. This is the statutory time limit and the only way the President can take such action without approval of Congress. But in the meantime-while the future of the nation's greatest rocket development team is being determined by election-minded Washington politicians -this same team is expected to advance successfully a major share of our most important missile and astronautics work. In addition to the accelerated Explorer program, which represents this country's only worthwhile satellite program so far, the ABMA team is preparing two lunar shoots which the entire world is awaiting anxiously-a series of Juno IV communications satellites, the Pershing ballistic missile, ballistic freight and manned rocket carriers, an anti-ballistic missile, and other highly secret and crucial projects -projects that play an important role in this nation's cold-war struggle with Russia. For many years, the Army missilemen have been given one blow after another -in fact, we cannot think of any other defense development group that has had better reason to become discouraged, disillusioned and distressed in their efforts. Yet this team, under the brilliant leadership of von Braun, has continued to pursue the goal of putting this natior. ahead. The progress of this team is unparalleled-ranging - - from development of the first IRBM to this country's first satellite. And there have been other important break-throughs-less publicized-such as the ballistic missile nose cone development for less than $4 million (other missile builders spent $400 million doing the same thing later). At the present time-since we do not know the details of the proposal to transfer the ABMA team to NASA-we cannot voice an opinion as to whether the proposal is good or bad. However, it can be stated that every effort must be made to back up the ABMA morale and spirit. This team must know that every man and woman in the Free World is thankful for the team's efforts. The ABMA scientists must be told that the nation will demand that only the very best decision is good enough for them. They should also be reminded that the current Administration has only a short time to g e a n d that in the end, free men and women will have the final voice in electing better people if the right decisions are not made. Finally, let us appeal to Army Secretary Brucker to show his old vigor in this battle! The ABMA team needs your support, Mr. Brucker. Why not show them that you are determined not to let Army technology go without a fight?

DISTRIEXJTION: AEMA
A ' . , l . d t 0 n .

ltPIOm
* r . n . 1 . A I .

UNCLASSIFIED

I.

INTRODUCTION A.
Historical Background

The launching of SPUTNIK I on 4 October 1957 demonstrated clearly the Soviet capability in the field of long range rockets and orbital techniques. At the same time it was realized that the United States satellite capabilities, both from the standpoint of payload weight and schedule, were inadequate. With this in mind the Army Ballistic Misslle Agency now an element of the Army Ordnance Missile Command, in December 1957 submitted to the Department of Defense a "Proposal for a National Integrated Misslle and Space Vehicle Development Program.'' This proposal reviewed all United States missile prograns in the iight of known Soviet space flight capabilities and proposed an integrated national missile and space program that would insure maximum security through appropriate expenditure of manpower, facilities, and money. The proposal outlined a feasible plan whereby the United States could catch up and ultimately overtake the Soviets in the race for scientific and military space supremacy without upsetting the nation's economic stability, disrupting the manpower balance, and draining the national resources. Implementation of the program was based on the assumption that the immediate development of an orbital carrler employing a booster stage of at least 1.5 million pounds thrust would be initiated without delay. The realization of a need for this type of program led to the establishment by the National Advisory C m l t t e e on Aeronautics in early 1958 of a Special Committee on Space Technology whose several working groups were charged collectively wlth the responsibility of developing a plan for a national integrated missfle and space development program. In July 1958, the Working Group on Vehicular Program submitted a plan for "A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program," the third In a series of reports by that group. This plan was prepared by personnel of the Army Ordnance Missile Command. Once again, full implementation of the program was dependent upon the early development of a booster of 1.5 million pounds thrust.

B.

Statement of Mission

On 15 August 1958, by Order Nr 14-59, the Advanced Research Projects Agency directed the Army Ordnance Missile Command to initiate a development program to provide a large space vehicle booster of approximately 1.5 million pounds thrust based on a cluster of available rocket engines, with the immediate goal of demonstrating a full scale captive dynamic firing by the end of Calendar Year 1959. Further studies

E X C E R P T From D E V E L O P m N T AND FUNDING PLAN FO R THE JUNO V BOOSTER PROGRAM ( u ) ARPA ORDER 14-59
1 3 O c t o b e r 1958

of t h e e x t e n s i o n of t h e l a r g e b o o s t e r program p a s t t h e f e a s i b i l i t y d e m o n s t r a t i o n r e s u l t e d i n t h e s i g n i n g of a n ARPA-AOMC Memorandum of Agreement on 23 September 1958. T h i s memorandum p r o v l d e d f o r a n ext e n s i o n of t h e program t o i n c l u d e f o u r b o o s t e r t e s t f l i g h t s , t h e l a t t e r two of which would employ u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d second s t a g e s and have a l i m i t e d o r b i t a l c a p a b i l i t y . The f i r s t of t.he f o u r b o o s t e r t e s t f l i g h t s i s t o be accomplished a p p r o x i m a t e l y September 1960.
C.

S t a t e of t h e A r t v e r s u s Requirements

The p r e s e n t s t a t e of t h e a r t i n t h e f l e l d of o r b i t a l c a r r i e r s i n t h e United S t a t e s i s r e p r e s e n t e d by v e h i c l e s which r e q u i r e 1000 t o 2000 pounds of t a k e o f f weight p e r pound p l a c e d i n o r b i t . The s a t e l l i t e c a r r i e r s p r e s e n t l y b e i n g produced w i l l reduce t h i s f a c t o r g r a d u a l l y t o 100 pounds t a k e o f f weight p e r pound p l a c e d i n o r b i t . A v e h i c l e employing t h e JUNO V 1 . 5 m i l ~ l o npound t h r u s t Booster d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s p l a n w i l l reduce t h i s f a c t o r t o 50 i n i t i a l l y , t h e n t o 25, and u l t i m a t e l y 10 by t h e use of v a r i o u s h i g h performance upper s t a g e s . The maximum payload c a p a b i l i t y of t h e o r b l t a l c a r r l e r s now b e l n g produced, w i t h o u t t h e u s e of h i g h performance upper s t a g e s , w i l l be l i m l t e d t o 3000 pounds d u r i n g t h e n e x t two y e a r s . Use of h i g h performance upper s t a g e s w i l l e x t e n d t h e payload c a p a b l l i t y of t h e s e c a r r i e r s t o 10,000 pounds i n mid 1961. A Unlted S t a t e s satellite payload c a p a b l l i t y of a t l e a s t 20,000 pounds and a n e s c a p e p a y l o a d capability o f a t l e a s t 5000 pounds a r e u r g e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r space m i s s i o n s i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e , i f S o v i e t t e c h n o l o g i c a l advancements a r e t o be s u r p a s s e d A v e h i c l e employing t h e JUNO V 1 . 5 m i l l i o n pound t h r u s t Booster and a p p r o p r i a t e upper s t a g e s w i l l p r o v i d e t h e d e s i r e d c a p a b i l i t y by 1963.
D.

P o t e n E i a l Uses

The p o t e n t i a l u s e s of t h e JUNO V Space V e h i c l e employing t h e 1 . 5 m i l l i o n pound t h r u s t Booster f o r b o t h m i l i t a r y and s c i e n t i f i c missions a r e m a n i f o l d . Among t h o s e most prominent a r e t h e f o l l o w i n g : An o r b l t a l c a r r i e r v e h i c l e f o r space defense m i s s i o n s a g a i n s t o f f e n s i v e enemy s p a c e v e h i c l e s . An o r b i t a l c a r r l e r v e h i c l e f o r l a r g e communication, m e t e o r o l o g i c a l , r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , and navigation s a t e l l i t e s .

UNCLASSIFIED

A manned o r b l t a l c a r r i e r v e h i c l e I n support of the Man- i n Space Program. A c a r r i e r v e h i c l e f o r r e s e a r c h and development of o f f e n s ive and defensive space weypons

A l o g i s t i c s c a r r i e r f o r earthbound o p e r a t ions.

A n IRBM and ICBM f o r s p e c i a l missions with m u l t i p l e n u c l e a r , chemical, and conventional warheads and/or f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of propaganda m a t e r i a l . A n o r b i t a l c a r r i e r f o r s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h by means
o f l a r g e instrumented s a t e l l i t e s .

maintenance of

A n o r b i t a l c a r r i e r f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t and space s t a t i o n s .

A v e h i c l e f o r t h e preliminary e x p l o r a t i o n of space, by means of l a r g e space probes. A f l i g h t t e s t bed f o r advanced chemical engines, n u c l e a r engines, and o t h e r high performance upper s t a g e s .

The p o t e n t i a l uses o u t l i n e d above a r e not exhaustive but r a t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n h e r e n t i n a system t h a t employs the JUNO V 1.5 million-pound t h r u s t b o o s t e r .

INDEX

--

A-2 Rocket, 14 A-3 Rocket, 14 A-4 Rocket a s t a c t i c a l m i s s i l e , 17-18 development, 14, 16 experiments f o r e x t e n d i n g r a n g e , 19-20 maximum r a n g e , 19 p r o d u c t i o n , 16, 17 See a l s o V-2 Rocket. A-5 Rocket, 14 1 A-9 Rocket, 20-21, 34 A-10 Rocket, 20, 34 Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 24, 3 6 , 38 A d Hoc Advisory Group on S p e c i a l C a p a b i l i t i e s , 55-56 A d j u t a n t G e n e r a l , Department of t h e Army, 46 Advanced Research P r o j e c t s Agency, 71, 73-74 Aero-Hydrodynamic I n s t i t u t e , 8 , 8n A i r Force Cambridge Research C e n t e r , 67 A i r F o r c e , Department o f , 21, 3 0 , 56, 80 A i r U n i v e r s i t y E v a l u a t i o n S t a f f , 21n and f a i l u r e of THOR-ABLE M i s s i l e , 53 l u n a r probe, 75 m i s s i l e f u n d s , 47, 50n and O p e r a t i o n PAPERCLIP, 38-39 r e l a t i o n s w i t h Army on s a t e l l i t e program, 54n s a t e l l i t e program, 54n, 55, 73 A i r War C o l l e g e , Maxwell A i r Force Base, Alabama, 5n Alexander 11, Czar o f R u s s i a , 7 A l l i e d Armies, 17, 19, 28n A l l i e d E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force (AEF), 26 America. See United S t a t e s of America. American Army Ordnance. See Ordnance Department, United S t a t e s Army. American Rocket S o c i e t y , I n Antwerp, Belgium, 33 Armed F o r c e s , United S t a t e s , 30 Army A i r F o r c e , United S t a t e s , 23, 30 Army A i r S e r v i c e , United S t a t e s , 22 Army, American. See Army, Department o f , and United S t a t e s Army. Army B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Agency (ABMA), 52n, 66 c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h Navy on V A N C U A P D program, 58-59 DA r e f u s e s s a t e l l i t e program t o , 59-60 e s t a b l i s h e d , 49-52, 54 German s c i e n t i s t s p a r t o f , I n , 3 , 3n, 4 , 1511, 19n, 3 2 , 50 M i s s i l e F i r i n g Laboratory o f , 52-53, 53n s a t e l l i t e m i s s i o n g i v e n t o , 5 , 78 s a t e l l i t e s c h e d u l e , 73-74, 76

--

Army B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Agency (ABFlA)-continued s c i e n t i s t s t r a n s f e r t o NASA, 73 space f l i g h t r e s e a r c h a t , 21, 22, 57, 76, 80 Army, Department of ABMA e s t a b l i s h e d by, 49, 51 A d j u t a n t G e n e r a l , 46 advantages of s a t e l l i t e program under, 80-81 A s s i s t a n t Chief of S t a f f , R&D, 58 and B U M P E R M i s s i l e , 44 Chief of Research and Development, 2811, 58-59 h i s t o r y of World War 11, 30 and JUNO V Booster Program, 77 LACROSSE M i s s i l e t r a n s f e r r e d t o , 47 m i s s i l e f a m i l y , 49 m i s s i l e f u n d s , 47, 48, 50n and Operation PAPERCLIP, 15, 26, 281-1, 32, 38-39, 39n p l a n f o r s a t e l l i t e , 56, 60-61 p o l i c y of r e l e a s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , 73 P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n Off i c e , 73n r e a d i n e s s t o launch s a t e l l i t e , 59-60, 63-64 r e l a t i o n s w i t h A i r Force and Navy on s a t e l l i t e program, 54n r e l a t i o n s w i t h Navy on P r o j e c t ORBITER, 54-55, 57 r e l a t i o n s w i t h Navy on V A N G U A R D program, 61-62 Rocket Branch, 23 r o c k e t ' experiments, 22-24, 44, 45 s a t e l l i t e f u n d s , 61, 62, 77 s a t e l l i t e s u c c e s s , 65 schedule f o r launching s a t e l l i t e s , 62 s p a c e c a p a b i l i t y t h r e a t e n e d by NASA, 78, 80-82 Army, German. See Germany, Army o f . Army I n f o r m a t i o n D i g e s t , 9 , 22, 27n Army ~ n t e l l i g e n c eCorps. See I n t e l l i g e n c e Corps, United S t a t e s Army. Army Ordnance M i s s i l e Command, 5 , 78 Army Rocket and Guided M i s s i l e Agency, 78 Army, Russian. See Union of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t Republics. ARPA Order 14-59, 77 A s s i s t a n t Chief of S t a f f , Research and Development, Department of t h e Army, 58 A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of Defense f o r Research and Development, 55, 56, 58 A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of War f o r A i r , 26-27 Athodyd P r o p u l s i o n . See P r o p u l s i o n . Atmospheric D e n s i t y , 69 A u s t r i a n s p e c i a l i s t s , 38. See a l s o German s z i e n t i s t s . Avco C o r p o r a t i o n , 50n AZON Bomb, 23

B a r c l a y , BG John A . , 76. See a l s o Commanding G e n e r a l , Army B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Agency. Barnes, MG Gladeon M . , 28n, 40, 40n. See a l s o Chief of Research and Development, Depzrtment of t h e Army.

Barstow, ~aliornia,39 Beat-beat . See Tracking Methods. Becker, Prof. Karl, 12, 13, 13n. -See also Chief of Ballistics and Ammunition, German Ordnance Department. Bell Laboratories, 24 Berlin, Germany, 10, 11, 29 Bombs "buzz-bomb", 16, 22, 31. -See also V-1 Rocket. "flying bomb", 22 radar guided, 23 radio guided, 23 See also AZON and RAZON. -Briscoe, Vice Adm. Robert P., 56 British Intelligence Service, 16. See also Great Britain. Brucker, Wilber M., 52n, 60-61, 62. See also Secretary of the Army. BUMPER Missile, 43-44 Bureau of Aeronautics, United States Navy, 45n Bureau of Ordnance, Untited States Navy, 45n

1
I

I
I

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California, 23 California Institute of Technology (CIT), 39, 40. See also Project ORD-CIT. Camp Irwin Reservation, California, 39 Cape Canaveral, Florida, 43, 65, 66, 68, 70, 72-73, 77 Central Committee, Military Air Academy, 8 Chemical Corps, United States Army, 46n Chief of Ballistics and Ammunition, German Ordnance Department, 12 Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Department of the Navy, 45n Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, 26 Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army., 2811, 4511, 50, 51. See also Ordnance Corps and Ordnance Department. Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, 28n, 58-59 Chrysler Corporation, 64 Civil Service, 47 Clement, G. H., 55 Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS), 28n Commanding General, Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 51, 76, 78 Commanding General, Army Ordnance Missile Command, 78 Compressed air, 8 Congressional Investigating Committees: See United States Congress, United States Senate. Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories, 47 CORPORAL Missile, 41, 47, 48, 49 Corpuscular radiation. See Radiation. Cosmic radiation. See Radiation. Cosmic ray counter, 65, 67, 70 Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army, 32 Crude oil, 8 Crusade in Europe, 25

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Czar of R u s s i a .

See

Alexander 11.
e

"D-Day", 28n Department of t h e A i r F o r c e . See A i r F o r c e , Department o f . Department of t h e Army. See Army, Department o f . Department of Commerce, 3 8 Department of Defense d e c i s i o n on Army S a t e l l i t e , 56, 62 and JUNO V Booster program, 77 and s e p a r a t e space agency, 79, 80 s p e c i a l a u t h o r i t y g i v e n t o CG, ABMA, 5 1 Department of Defense R&D P o l i c y C o u n c i l , 56 Department of t h e Navy. See Navy, Department o f . Department of S t a t e , 25 D e t r o i t , Michigan, 76 D i s t i n g u i s h e d S e r v i c e s Cross (German), 18 Dornberger, D r . W a l t e r , 12, 13n, 21, 33-34 Douglas A i r c r a f t Company, 41, 44 DOVAP. See Tracking Methods. Dreams of t h e E a r t h and t h e Sky, 7-8 D u r r e n b e r g e r , COL W. J . , 39n E a r t h , 69 E c l i p s e P l a n , 25 Eisenhower, GEN ( P r e s . ) Dwight D . , 25, 29, 30, 66. See a l s o P r e s i d e n t of t h e United S t a t e s . "The E l e c t r i c Space Ship", 9 E l e c t r i c s p a t i a l propulsion. See P r o p u l s i o n . E l Paso, Texas, 44 England. See G r e a t B r i t a i n . E n g l i s h (language) , I n , 37 Enemy Equipment I n t e l l i g e n c e Corps, United S t a t e s Army, 28n E r o s i o n guage, 67 Europe, 2811, 76 European Advisory Commission, 29 European T h e a t e r (of O p e r a t i o n s ) , 27 E v a l u a t i o n S t a f f , A i r War C o l l e g e , Maxwell A i r Force Base, Alabama, 5n EXPLORER S a t e l l i t e Program, 5 , 70, 78, 82 EXPLORER I , 63, 65-66, 68, 71, 71n EXPLORER 11, 66-68 EXPLORER 1 1 1 , 68-69, 71, 71n EXPLORER I V , 69-71, 71n EXPLORER V, 70, 7 1

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Faraday, Michael, 53 Feodoroff, A. P., 7 1 s t Guided M i s s i l e B a t t a l i o n , 24, 41 F l o r i d a , 53, 66 F l o r i d a m i s s i l e t e s t i n g r a n g e . See Cape C a n a v e r a l , F l o r i d a F o r t B l i s s , Texas, 24, 3 6 , 3 9 , 39n, 46

I
.

Fort Strong, New York, 36 Frau im Mond (Girl in the Moon), 10 --Friedrichshafen, Germany, 16, 17 Fuels Crude oil and compressed air, 8 Gasoline, 6 Liquid Oxygen (LDx), 67 UDMH-Deta, 65. See also Propellants and Propulsion. -Furnas, Dr. C. C., 55 "The Future of Ordnance in Jet-Propulsion", 38n Gardner, Trevor, 56 Gasoline, 6 Gavin, LTG James M., 81 General Electric Company, 23, 44, 47, 48, 50n German (language), 1 German Air Force. See Germany, Air Force of. German Army. See Germany, Army of. German High Command, 32 German Ministry of Armament, 32 German Ministry of Propaganda, 16 German Ordnance Department, 12, 13, 20 German Rockets A-2, 14 A-3, 14 A-4 development, 14, 16, 17, 20 tactical missile, 17-18> 19. See also V-2 Rocket. -A-5, 14 A-9, 20, 3 4 A-10, 20, 34. See also V-1 Rocket. -German scientists, 2311, 30, 56 at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 36, 38 at ABMA, 3, 3n, 4, 5, 1511, 22, 32, 50, 51, 82 at Fort Bliss, 36, 39, 39n and Operation PAPERCLIP, 24, 25-28, 2711, 31-33, 37-38 at Redstone Arsenal, 47 at White Sands Proving Ground, 36, 37, 38, 39 at Wright Field, 39 German Space Society. See Society for Space Travel Germany, 1 8 1 1 , 33, 35n Air Force of, 14, 15-16 allied control of scientific research in, 26-27, 28n, 29-30 Army of, Proving Grounds, 13 Storm Troops (SS) , 19, 1911, 21 surrender, 36 and interest in space travel, 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 1211, 20-21, 22 and rocket development, 2, 3 , 5, 9, 10, 12-18, 1211, 13n-1411, 21-22

Glennan, T. Keith, 78 Goddard, Robert H., 7n, 9 Army rocket experiments by, 22 correspondence with Oberth, 3n-4n early interest in rockets, 2 influence on German rocket program, 2-4 Gorochof, A., 8, 8n Government Issue ( G I ) , 32 Great Britain and Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee, 28n and Eclipse Plan, 25 and European Advisory Commission, 29 German raids on, 16, 17, 22 Grottrupp, Helmuth, 34-35, 35n Guided Missile Development Branch of the Technical and Engineering Division, Redstone Arsenal, 48n Guided Missile Development Division, Redstone Arsenal, 49 Hagen, Dr. John, 59 Hamill, MAJ James P., 28-29, 31 Harz Mountains, Germany, 16, 18, 19 Heidelberg, Germany, 4n Heinkel 112 Airplane, 14 Hermannstadt, Transylvania, 1 HERMES Missile, 23n, 47 GE work on, 23 H E W S A-1, 47, 4 8 H E M S A-2, 47, 4 8 RERMES A-3, 47, 48, 49 HERMES C-1, 48. See also MAJOR and REDSTONE Missiles HE@ES 11, 19 H E M S RV-A-10, 45 project terminated, 49 History of World War 11, 30 Hitler, Adolf, 14, 1511, 16, 32 Hoeppner , Helmut, 19n "How We Let the Missile Secrets Get Away", 29 Huntsville, Alabama, In, 66 Huntsville Arsenal, Alabama, 46, 46n Huntsville Times, 27n "In the Shadow of the Red Rocket", 35n Intelligence Corps, United States Army, 28n International Geophysical Year (IGY) , 60, 65, 67, 68, 76 Interplanetary Society, 8n Jet Assisted Take-Off (JATO) Unit, 14, 40 Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 24, 49 and BUMPER Missile project, 4 4 and instrumentation for EXPLORERS, 67, 70 as part of AONC, 78 missile study, 23

J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f , 3 0 , 47 J u a r e z , Mexico, 44 JUNO M i s s i l e , 75n JUNO I. See JUPITER-C M i s s i l e . JUNO 11. See JUPITER M i s s i l e . JUNO V Booster Program, 77, 77n Junger t , W i l h e l m , 3 6n JUPITER M i s s i l e , 53, 58, 61, 64, 75n JUPITER 11, 75 JUPITER 14, 75 JUPITER 1 6 , 76-77 JUPITER-C M i s s i l e , 75n a s backup f o r VANGUARD, 58-59 f i r i n g s , 60, 61-62, 72 JUPITER-C 24, 68 JUPITER-C 26, 66 JUPITER-C 29, 64-65 JUPITER-C 44, 69 JUPITER-C 47, 7 1 JUPITER-C 49, 71-72 See a l s o REDSTONE Missile.

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Kaplan, D r . J o s e p h , 55 K e f a w e r , Sen. E s t e s , 56, 60, 63-64 K i b a l t s c h i t s c h , Fedor, 7 K n e r r , MG H. J. , 26-27 Korean c o n f l i c t , 48 K o t e n l n i k o f , A . A . , 8n Kummer s d o r f , Germany, 13, 13n LACROSSE M i s s i l e , 47 Landshut, B a v a r i a , 37 Lange, E r n s t , 18n Lapirof-Skoblo, M. J . , 8 n L a t v i a , 17 L a u r i t s e n , D r . C . C . , 55 Ley, W i l l y , 10 L i q u i d Oxygen (LOX), 67 L i q u i d P r o p u l s i o n . See P r o p e l l a n t s . LOKI Rockets, 54n London, England, 19, 28n "Long Range P o l i c y on German S c i e n t i f i c and T e c h n i c a l Research", 26 L o v e t t , Hon. Robert A . , 26-27 See Germany, A i r Force o f . Luftwaffe. Lunar p r o b e s , 73-74, 76 C o n g r e s s i o n a l h e a r i n g on, 74 JUPITER 11, 75 JUPITER lL., 75

Macauley , Dr. J. B. , 56 MAJOR Missile, 48, 4811. -See also HERMES C-1 and REDSTONE Missiles. Man Into Space, 6 -Manned space flight, 74, 77 Marine Corps. See United States Marine Corps. Mars, 9, 35n - "Mars Project", 35n Marsh, Mr., 56 Martin, William H., 56 Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 5n Medaris, MG John B., 66, 78 and Congressional investigating committees, 53, 56-57, 59-60, 63-64, 80-82 See also Commanding General, ABMA, and Commanding General, AOMC. -"Men of the Missile Command", 27n Microlock transmitter, 65, 67, 72, 73 Military Air Academy, Moscow, Russia, 8 "The Minimum Satellite Vehicle Based Upon Components Available from Missile Development of the Army Ordnance Corps", 54 Ministry of Armament, German. See German Ministry of Armament. Ministry of Propaganda, German. See German Ministry of Propaganda. Minitrack transmitter, 65, 67 MIRAK I1 Rocket, 13 Missile Firing Laboratory, ABMA, 52-53, 53n Missiles . See BUMPER, CORPORAL, HERMES, JUNO , JUPITER, JUPITER-C, LACROSSE, MAJOR, PRIVATE, REDSTONE, VIKING, WAC CORPORAL. See also AZON, LOKI, RAZON. "Mister Rocket", 27. -See also Toftoy, MG H. N. Mitchell, Billy, 23n See also Lunar probes. Moon, 3511, 74, 75, 76. -Moscow, Russia, 8, 8n, 9 , 16 Munich, Germany, 19

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 71 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 73, 78 National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) , 31 "A National Mission to Explore Outer Space", 79-80 National Socialist (Nazi) Party, 1211, 19, 31, 33 "National Space Establishment." See Space agency proposals. Navy, Department of, 46, 56, 80 Bureau of Aeronautics, 45n Bureau of Ordnance, 45n and LACROSSE Missile, 47 missile funds, 47 Naval Research Laboratories, 55, 70, 71 and Operat ion PAPERCLIP, 38 relations with Army on satellite program, 54, 54n V-2 tests, 44, 45n VANGUARD failure, 53 and VIKING Missile, 45 Nazi party. See Xational Socialist Party

Nebel, Rudolph, 10, 11, 13 Neubert, E r i c h W . , 36n New Mexico, 38 Newbury, Frank D . , 56 NIKE P r o j e c t , 24 N i t r o g e n , 72 Nordhausen, Germany, 1 6 , 29, 3 3 , 3 4 N o t t r o d t , CAPT Rudolph, 18n O b e r t h , P r o f . Hermann, 7n, 11, 22, 76 development of l i q u i d f u e l r o c k e t motor, 10 e a r l y i n t e r e s t i n space t r a v e l , 1-2, 5 e l e c t r i c s p a t i a l propulsion proposal, 9 Goddard's i n f l u e n c e on, 3 , 3n-4n gasoline propulsion proposal, 6 s o l a r mirror proposal, 6 O f f i c e of t h e A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of Defense, Research and Development, 58 O f f i c e of t h e Chief of Ordnance, 56. See a l s o Chief of Ordnance. O f f i c e of t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense, 81. See a l s o S e c r e t a r y of Defense. O f f i c e of t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e Navy, 45n "Old R e l i a b l e " , 71, 72. See a l s o JUPITER-C and REDSTONE M i s s i J e s . O'Meara, MG Andrew P . , 56, 59 O p e r a t i o n PAPERCLIP, 24-29, 38 ORBITER. See P r o j e c t ORBITER. ORD-CIT. See P r o j e c t ORD-CIT. Order 1067, J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f , 30 Order 14-59 (ARPA), 77 Ordnance Corps, United S t a t e s Army, 47, 54, 78. See a l s o Chief of Ordnance, Department of t h e Army. Ordnance Department, United S t a t e s Army and BUMPER M i s s i l e , 44 e a r l y r o c k e t e x p e r i m e n t s , 22 funds f o r m i s s i l e s , 47 and HERMES P r o j e c t , 23n i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g World War 11, 2811, 3 1 m i s s i l e s t u d y , 23 and O p e r a t i o n PAPERCLIP, 24 and P r o j e c t ORD-CIT, 40, 42 T e c h n i c a l I n t e l l i g e n c e , 28 V-2 t e s t s , 43. See a l s o Chief of Ordnance, Department of t h e Army. Ordnance Guided M i s s i l e Center (OGMC) a t Redstone A r s e n a l , 48n

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P a c i f i c T h e a t e r (of O p e r a t i o n s ) , 30 PAPERCLIP. See O p e r a t i o n PAPERCLIP. Peenemgnde, Germany, 3 , 3 n , 9 , 10, 35, 37 c a p t u r e d by Russian Army, 19 e v a c u a t i o n of p e r s o n n e l from, 18, 18n H i t l e r ' s involvement w i t h , 15n

-. .

- -

~eenemGnde, Germany-cont inued m i s s i l e p e r s o n n e l i n America, 39, 39n Planning Committee, 16 r o c k e t development a t , 5 , 12-16, 17, 20, 3 4 C e n t r a l P l a n t , 16, 17, 18 E a s t e r n P l a n t , 16- 17 Southern P l a n t , 16, 17 Royal A i r Force r a i d on, 16 space f l i g h t planning a t , 20 Pendray, G . Edward, Award, I n P o l i c y S t a f f of t h e War Department General S t a f f , 26 Pomerania, 32 Poppel, Theodor A . , 36n P o r t e r , D r . Richard R . , 55 Preparedness I n v e s t i g a t i n g Subcommittee of t h e United S t a t e s S e n a t e , 80 P r e s i d e n t of t h e German Space S o c i e t y . See P r e s i d e n t of t h e S o c i e t y f o r Space T r a v e l . P r e s i d e n t of t h e S o c i e t y f o r Space T r a v e l , 10 P r e s i d e n t of t h e United S t a t e s , 25, 62, 66 PRIVATE Rockets, 40, 47 PRIVATE A , 3 9 , 42 PRIVATE F , 3 9 40 , 42 P r o j e c t 416, 2 P r o j e c t HEmES. See HERMES M i s s i l e . P r o j e c t MAJOR. See MAJOR M i s s i l e . P r o j e c t ORBITER c o s t o f , 54n - - d e c i s i o n on, 54 , M i s s i l e 27, 57 replacement f o r , 56-57 t e r m i n a t e d , 54-55 t e s t i n g of r e - e n t r y nose cones w i t h m a t e r i a l from, 57 P r o j e c t ORD-CIT (Ordnance-California I n s t i t u t e o f Technology), 40, Lon, 41- See a l s o CORPORAL, PRIVATE, and WAC CORPORAL Rockets. P r o j e c t PAPERCLIP. O p e r a t i o n PAPERCLIP. P r o j e c t SAFEHAVEN, 25 Propellants l i q u i d , 3 , 4 , 8 , 10, 49 s o l i d , 49, 66. See a l s o F u e l s , p r o p u l s i o n . ---Propulsion athodyd (ramjet) , 20 electric spatial, 9 P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n O f f i c e , Department of t h e Army, 73n Putt, L T G Donald L., 56

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Q u a r l e s , Hon. Donald, 55. See a l s o A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of Defense f o r Research and Development.

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R a d i a t i o n , 71, 71n c o r p u s c u l a r , 70 cosmic, 45, 6 9 , 75, 76 s o l a r , 76 R a k e t e n f l u g p l a t z ( r o c k e t a i r d r o m e ) , 10, 12 Ramjet p r o p u l s i o n . See P r o p u l s i o n . RAZON Bomb, 23 R e a c t i o n motor, 7 , 8 Redstone A r s e n a l , Alabama, 18n, 46n, 49 H E W S C - 1 t r a n s f e r r e d t o , 48 m i s s i l e team t r a n s f e r r e d t o , 47 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f , 48n, 49-50 REDSTONE M i s s i l e , 47, 49 A B M A g i v e n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , 50 a s b o o s t e r f o r s a t e l l i t e , 5411, 55, 5 7 , 58 Redstone A r s e n a l g i v e n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , 48 Rees, D r . E b e r h a r d , 3 n , 36n R i e d e l , K l a u s , 10 R i t c h i e , COL, 40n Riga, L a t v i a , 17 Rocket and S a t e l l i t e Research P a n e l , 79-80 "A Rocket i n t o t h e Cosmic Space", 8 Rockets. See A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-9, A-10, LOKI, MIRAK 11, TINY TIM, V-1, and V-2. See a l s o AZON, M i s s i l e s , and RAZON. Rosser, D r . John B . , 55 Royal A i r F o r c e , 16 Rumania, 11 R u s s i a , 4 , 7 , 7n, 8 . See a l s o Union of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s . Rynin, N. A . , 8 n

SAFEHAVEN. See P r o j e c t SAFEHAVEN. S t . Petersburg, Russia, 7 S a t e l l i t e s . See EXPLORER S a t e l l i t e Program, P r o j e c t ORBITER, SPUTNIK, VANGUARD Program. S a y l e r , BG Henry B. , 28n S c h u l t z e , August, 36n Schwidetzky, W a l t e r , 36n Science Survey, 8 S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Army, 46, 50, 51, 52n, 60 S e c r e t a r y of Defense and Army s a t e l l i t e m i s s i o n , 60, 61, 6 2 , 78 and O p e r a t i o n PAPERCLIP, 25 and s e p a r a t e s p a c e agency, 8 0 , 8 1 Seyliger, D. N . , 8n S i g n a l Corps, United S t a t e s Army, 41 Smith, James H., 56 S o c i e t y f o r Space T r a v e l , 4 , 9 , 10, 13n Solar mirror, 6 S o l a r r a d i a t i o n , 76 S o l i d p r o p u l s i o n . See P r o p e l l a n t s .

S o v i e t Union. See Union of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s . S p a a t z , LTG C a r l , 26 Space agency p r o p o s a l s , 79-80 Space and A s t r o n a u t i c s S p e c i a l Committee o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S e n a t e , 8 1 S p a c e s h i p T r a v e l Club, 1311- l 4 n S p a t i a l a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l , 66 S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t f o r Guided M i s s i l e s , O f f i c e o f S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e , 58 SPUTNIK I , 21n as i n c e n t i v e t o American s a t e l l i t e program, 5 , 60, 63, 6 4 , 65 i n f l u e n c e o f German m a t e r i a l s and men on, 3 4 S t a l i n g r a d , U . S . S . R . , 16 S t a t e Department. Department of S t a t e . S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o f Iowa, 67, 70 S t a v e r , M A J R . B . , 2311, 4.011 S t e w a r t , Homer J . , 55 S t e w a r t , Homer J . , Committee, 62 S t r a t e g i c A i r F o r c e s , 26. See a l s o Army A i r F o r c e . S t u h l i n g e r , D r . E r n s t , 79 Subcommittee o f t h e Committee o n A p p r o p r i a t i o n s , U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n g r e s s , 53n Supreme H e a d q u a r t e r s , A l l i e d E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e (SHAEF), 26 Technical U n i v e r s i t y of Leningrad, 8 T h e a t e r Ordnance O f f i c e r , U . S. Army, European T h e a t e r of O p e r a t i o n s , 28n Thermometer e x p e r i m e n t s , 6 5 , 6 7 , 70 The Hague, N e t h e r l a n d s , 19 THOR-ABLE M i s s i l e , 53 TINY TIM R o c k e t , 42 T o f t o y , MG H. N . , 81n, 22, 27-28, 27n, 39n T r a c k i n g Methods Beat-Beat, 67 DOVAP (Doppler V e l o c i t y and P o s i t i o n ) , 67 e l e c t r o n i c , 6 7 , 68 M i c r o l o c k d o p p l e r , 67, 72 O p t i c a l , 67 r a d a r , 45, 67 " T r u t h Campaign", 73n - T s c h i s c h e v s k y , A . L. , 8 n
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UDMH-Deta, 65 "Uncle Sam", 3 3 . See a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s Government. Union of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s Army o f , 1 8 , 1 9 , 29 and e a r l y s p a c e i n t e r e s t , 8 n and P a c i f i c i n t e r v e n t i o n i n World War 11, 3 0 and SPUTNIK program, 6 0 , 69 German men and m a t e r i a l u t i l i z e d b y , 29, 34-35, 3 5 n . See a l s o R u s s i a United S t a t e s A i r Force. & A i r F o r c e , Department o f .

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United States of America, 69 and Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcornittee, 28n contribution to IGY, 65 early missile interest in, 22, 24, 30-31 first satellite launched, 66 and Operation PAPERCLIP, 24-29, 28n, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37-38 and Project SAFEHAVEN, 25 relations with U.S.S.R., 29, 30 United States Armed Forces. See Armed Forces. United States Army, 19. See also Army, Department of. See Army Air Force. United States Army Air Force. United States Army Air Service. See Army Air Service. United States Congress, 53, 56, 66, 74 United States Government, 74, 79, 81 United States Marine Corps, 47 United States Navy. See Navy, Department of. United States Senate, 63, 80, 81 U.S.S. Midway, 44 United States Navy. See Navy, Department of. United States Strategic Air Forces. See Strategic Air Forces. University of Munich, 1

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V-1 Rocket, 16, 22 V-2 Rocket, 34 development, 14n, 16. See also A-4 Rocket. firing from U.S.S. Midway, 44 production, 18n testing at White Sands Missile Range, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42-43, 44-45, 46 U.S. interest in, 31, 32, 33 use in BUMPER Nissile, 44 Vance , Yx . Cyrus R. , 80 VANGUARD Program Army proposals concerning, 58-59, 61-62 missile failure, 53 satellite mission assigned to, 55, 56-57, 58, 59, 63 See Society for Space Travel. Verein fir Raumschiffahrt (VfR) . Vergeltungswaffe (Vengeance Weapon). See V-1 Rocket and V-2 Rocket. Verne, Jules, 1, 4 Versailles Treaty, 4, 12, 12n Vienna-Neustadt, Austria, 16 . VIKING Missile, 45 von Braun, Dr. Wernher, 3n, 15, 31, 64 appearance before congressional committee, 53n-5411, 66 Army satellite planned by, 54 and early rocket experiments in Berlin, 10, 11 and German World War I1 rockets, 13, 13n-14n - and "Mars Project", 35n and Operation PAPERCLIP, 32, 36n, 37 role in NASA establishment, 79 space flight planning at ~eenemGnde,20-21

von Braun, Magnus , 32 von H o r s t i g , Major, 12

WAC CORPORAL P l i s s i l e , 42n, 47 a s b o o s t e r f o r BUMPER M i s s i l e , 43-44 f i r i n g s , 41, 42, 44 War Department, United S t a t e s , 22, 25, 26-27 Warheads, 20, 48, 48n, 49 Washington, D. C . , 27, 66 Wege z u r R a v m s c h i f f a h r t , 9 , 10 Wehrmachi. See Germany, Army o f . West (United S t a t e s ) , 39 West (world), 3 2 , 52 Wetschinkin, P r o f . W. P . , 8 n White Sands M i s s i l e Range, New Mexico, 78. See a l s o White Sands Proving Ground. White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico, 36 Army-Navy c o o p e r a t i o n a t , 45n e s t a b l i s h e d , 24 PRIVATE r o c k e t f i r i n g s a t , 39-40 s c i e n t i s t s t r a n s f e r r e d t o Redstone A r s e n a l , 46 V-2 t e s t i n g a t , 3 7 , 3 9 , 42-43, 44-45, 45n WAC CORPORAL r o c k e t f i r i n g s a t , 4 1 See a l s o White Sands M i s s i l e Range. Wiesman, W a l t e r , 39n Wilson, C h a r l e s E . , 78. See a l s o S e c r e t a r y of Defense. Winant, Ambassador John G . , 29 "World Center of a l l I n v e n t o r s and S c i e n t i s t s " , 9 World War I1 American r o c k e t experiments d u r i n g , 22, 23 German s c i e n t i s t s came t o U.S. a f t e r , 24, 27, 5 1 Germans b u i l d r o c k e t s d u r i n g , 1511, 17 H u n t s v i l l e A r s e n a l ' s r o l e d u r i n g , 46n space e x p l o r a t i o n p r i o r t o , 4, 5 U.S. Army's h i s t o r y o f , 30 U.S. Army i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g , 28n U.S. Army's r o l e a f t e r , 51, 52 Wosduschny Put, 8 Wright F i e l d , Ohio, 39

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Zagut, T s c h i g i t a r , 8 n Zander, F r i e d r i c h A . , 8 , 8n Ziolkovsky, K . E . , 4 , 7-8, 7n-8n, 9

ILE NO. 655-11

8 OCT 58

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AIR-TRANSPORTABLE BOOSTER 3UNO Y

7
D

FILE NO. 6 5 5 - 4 8 OCT 5 8

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THIRD STAGE

FIRST STAGE SEPARATION SECOND STAGE

FIRST STAGE

CONVENTIONAL STAG1NG DESIGN FOR 3 U N O Y

P-

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L E NO. 6 5 5 - 3

8 OCT. 5 8

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PARALLEL

STAG I N G DES I G N FOR J U N O

3 r d STAGE

II

2nd STAGE SEPARATION

I L E NO. 655-2

0' OCT

'58

COMPARISON OF POSSIBLE JUNO 9 BOOSTER TANKAGE DESIGNS

FIG. 2

COMPARISON OF 1.5 MILLION LB THRUST CLUSTERED AND SINGLE GlNE DESIGNS

FIG.1

UNCLASSIFIE~

BLOW -OFF N O S E CONE

KICK MOTOR

L O W POWER BEACON

7 SQUl6
A C T U A T E D VALVE

PRE SSURlZ BOTTLE

BELLOWS

B A L L O O N PACKAGE

SEPARATION

4 rh STAGE MOTOR

JUNO I Missile 49 Payload

31 January 1956.

J white Sands, 1946.

HISTORICAL M O N O G R A P H

ARMY ORDNANCE SATELLITE PROGRAM

DISTRIBUTION LIST Addressee Chief of Ordnance Department of t h e Army Washington 25, D. C. ATTN: ORDGX-H O f f i c e , Chief of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y Department of t h e Army Second b R S t r e e t s , S, W. Washington 25, D, C, Commanding General Army Combat S u r v e i l l a n c e Agency 1124 North Highland S t r e e t A r l i n g t o n 1, V i r g i n i a Commanding General U, S, Army Ordnance M i s s i l e Command Redstone Arsenal, Alabama ATTN: ORDXM-AH
ORDAB-X ORDAB-C ORDAB-HT ORDAB-HAH

No.

of Copies