Science, Knowledge, and Animal Minds Author(s): Dale Jamieson Reviewed work(s): Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,

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AND ANIMAL V*-SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, MINDS by Dale Jamieson

ABSTRACT

In recent years both philosophersand scientists have been sceptical aboutthe existence of animalminds.This is in distinctionto Hume who claimed that '...no truthappearsto me more evident, than that beasts are endow'd with thought and reason as well as men'. I argue that Hume is correct about the epistemological salience of our ordinarypracticesof ascribingmental states to animals.The reluctanceof contemporary philosophersand scientiststo embrace the view that animalshave minds is primarilya fact abouttheir philosophy and science rather than a fact about animals. The recognition of this fact is the beginningof any seriouseffortto develop a science of cognitive ethology.

D)avid Humeis rememberedby manyphilosophersas the great

sceptic who called into questioncausality,necessity,andeven the existence of the self. It is striking,then, thatHume writes that than beasts endow'd are ...notruth appears memore to evident, that withthought reason well as men.1 and as He goes on to ascribe to animals such idea-mediatedindirect passions as prideand love as well as such directpassionsas desire, contentment and fear. Hume also attributesanger, grief, and courageto animalsand writesthat 'Tis evident,thatsympathy,or the communication passions, of takesplaceamong no men.2 animals, less thanamong Since Humewritesthatthe objectof love mustbe a personandthat animalscan love theirconspecifics, he goes so far as to imply that animalsare persons.3
1. David Hume, A Treatiseof HumanNature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:At the ClarendonPress, 1888), 176. 2. Ibid., 398. 3. Ibid, 329, 397. For discussion of these passages and Hume's view of animalsgenerally, see AnnetteC. Baier's'KnowingOurPlaceintheAnimalWorld',EthicsandAnimals, Harlan B. Miller and WilliamH. Williams,eds. (CliftonNJ:The HumanaPress, 1983), 61-77. See also Denis Arnold, 'Hume on the MoralDifferenceBetween Humansand OtherAnimals', Historyof PhilosophyQuarterly12, 3 (July 1995), 303-316. *Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London, on Monday, 8th December, 1997 at 8.15 p.m.

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Hume's view of animals is dramaticallydifferentfrom that of some otherphilosophers.Descartesfamouslybelievedthatanimals do not have thoughtor 'real feeling'.4 In our own day R. G. Frey holds that animals do not have desires and Donald Davidson teaches that animals do not think.5While Peter Carruthers grants thatanimalshave experiences,he strangelyclaims thatall of these experiencesare nonconscious.6 Scepticism about animal minds is even more prominent in science than in philosophy. The ascription of mental states to animals by Darwin, Romanes and other early evolutionary biologists is commonly viewed these days as embarrassing anthropomorphism has no place in serious science. Donald that Griffin'sattemptsto resurrect some of theirideas andto formulate a cognitive ethology are frequentlyviewed as naive, and perhaps even a little crazy.7J. S. Kennedy,a leading animalbehaviourist, speaks for many when he writesthat we ...although cannot certain no animals conscious, be that are we cansaythatit is mostunlikely thananyof themare.8 Kennedyattackscontemporary advocatesof cognitiveethologyfor promotingwhat he calls the 'new anthropomorphism', which he regards as damaging science by turning back the clock to the prebehaviourist era.9Even many scientistswho are sympatheticto the idea of cognitive ethology are wary of ascribingmental states
4. On Descartes's view of animals see Daisie Radner and Michael Radner,Animal Consciousness (Buffalo NY: PrometheusBooks, 1989); and MargaretDauler Wilson, 'Animal Ideas', Proceedingsand Addressesof theAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation69, 2, November, 1995. 5. R. G. Frey, Interestsand Rights: The Case AgainstAnimals(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1980); Donald Davidson, 'Thoughtand Talk', reprintedin his Truthand Interpretation (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1984), 155-70. 6. Peter Carruthers, 'Brute Experience',Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989), 258-69; for a reply see Dale Jamieson and Marc Bekoff, 'Carruthers Nonconscious Experience', on Analysis 52,1 (January,1992), 23-7. 7. See N. K. Humphrey'sreview of Donald R. Griffin,The Questionof AnimalAwareness (New York:The RockefellerUniversityPress, 1976) which appearedin AnimalBehaviour 25, 2 (1977), 521-2. For a recentattemptto putcognitive ethology on a firmfoundationsee Dale Jamiesonand MarcBekoff, 'On Aims and Methodsof CognitiveEthology', reprinted in Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson,eds., Readingsin Animal Cognition(CambridgeMA: The MIT Press, 1995). 8. J. S. Kennedy,The New Anthropomorphism (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1992), 31. 9. For an alternativeperspectiveon anthropomorphism John A. Fisher, 'The Myth of see Anthropomorphism', reprintedin Bekoff and Jamieson, Readings in Animal Cognition 1995.

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to animals. They are happiertalking about animal 'minds' than animalminds. It is strikingthat what the (supposed) sceptic Hume considers evident is thoughtby many philosophersand scientists to be false or at least controversial. He himself provides a key to understandingthis dispute in the sentence succeedingthe one quoted at the beginning of this paper.
The argumentsare in this case so obvious, that they never escape the most stupidand ignorant.10

It is clear that when Hume says that 'beasts are endow'd with thought and reason' he means to be reporting common sense beliefs aboutanimals.He has a philosophicalpoint to make-that humans and animals are both part of the naturalorder-but here he is buttressinghis view by calling on beliefs that he thinks are held by even 'the most stupidand ignorant'.He sees no need for rolling out heavy philosophicalor scientific artilleryto prove that animalshave thoughtand reason. Hume is right in thinkingthatit is quite evident to most people 11 (in ourcultureanyway)thatanimalshave thoughtandreason. As in his own day it is typically philosophersand scientists who call this view into question. I will try to show that the reluctanceof some philosophersand scientiststo embracethe view thatanimals have minds is primarily a fact about these philosophers and scientists ratherthan a fact about animals.Our ordinarypractices of ascribingmental states to animalsare quite defensible. It is the failure to see this thatdamages science. II In this section I will remind us of some of these practices. But before going on those of us who are philosophers or scientists shouldtake a deep breathandrelaxsome of ourconcernsaboutthe use of mentallanguage-it's OK, sometimesanyway,to speakwith the vulgar.In particular shouldlightenup aboutthe use of some we
10. David Hume, loc. cit. There is some irony here since Hume was quite aware of the Cartesiandenial of animalminds. 11. For evidence that these views have been widely shared in Britainover the last half millennium, see Keith Thomas, Man and the NaturailWorld:A History of the Modern Sensibility(New York:Pantheon Books, 1983).Fordiscussionof how animalswere viewed in antiquitysee RichardSorabji,Animal Minds and HumanMorals (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

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highly-chargednouns. It is obvious that most of us believe in animalminds.This does not meanthatwe believe thatanimalshave Cartesiansouls or thattheirbodies are in some way 'occupied'by some unbreakable substancecalled 'consciousness'. Some people believe this, but strangeviews aboutthe mind are not the price of admissionfor supposingthatdogs miss theirpeople, cats like to be fed, and tigers hope to be freed from their cages. We often confidently say that animals have thoughts, beliefs, intentions, desires,attitudes,emotions,feelings, or sensations.Oftenwe claim to know what mental state obtains with respect to a particular creatureon a particular occasion. Sometimeswe don't even worry about 'content'. Call these practices 'ascribing or attributing mentalstates to animals'. We ascribe mental states to animals explicitly and implicitly. Grete (a dog) scratchesthe door after havingjust been out. What does she want?We mighthave a spiriteddiscussionaboutthis, with different views being put forward.Perhapswe reach agreement, in mentalstates perhapsnot. But we areco-conspirators attributing to Grete.Later,withoutcommentor explicit thought,I get Grete's ball out from under the bed because I know that she wants it. I a implicitlyattribute mentalstateto her.In additionto suchexplicit and implicit attributions, much of our behaviourtowardsanimals simply presupposesthatthey have minds.We take the intentional stancetowardsthem;morethanthat,we takethe 'affectivestance': we relate to them not only as intentionalcreatures,but also as beings who experiencepain and pleasure.Much of our behaviour presupposesthat what happensto animalsmattersto them. We have these practicesnot only with companionanimals,but also with farm animals and wild animals. Farmersand ranchers often pride themselves on understanding their animals and being able to identifytheirwantsandneeds.Whenwe go to zoos or watch naturefilms we sometimes try to think ourselves into the place of the creatures.Such thought experiments are often rewardedby predictive success or the feeling that some behaviour has been made intelligible. Even philosophers and scientists who are professionally sceptical about animal minds engage in these everydaypractices when interactingwith their animals and orally presenting their research.It is when publishingtheirofficial views thatthey purge

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mentalistic language from their vocabularies.It is reportedthat Descartes had a dog, MonsieurGrat,whom he treatedwith great Descartes'sphilosophydid not preventhim kindness.12 Apparently the from appreciating wants of his animalcompanion. The fact that we have these everyday practices of ascribing mental states to animals does not mean that every ascription is correct. If someone were to say that Grete is contemplatingthe concept of an imaginarynumberhe would be wrong. There is no reason to think that Grete has the conceptualequipmentfor such cogitation, nor that she would be interestedin imaginarynumbers even if she were able to thinkaboutthem. Beyond what seems obviously trueor false aboutanimalminds is a large domain of uncertainty,indecision, and indeterminacy. Deep questions about the mind and the application of mental predicates appear in our everyday discourse and reappear in philosophical discussion. Some of these involve large questions aboutwhetherthereare any such things as minds;and if thereare, Othersinvolve and how they shouldbe understood conceptualized. small questions about attributingparticular mental states on creatures.Is it a tennis ball that particularoccasions to particular Grete wants, any old ball, or just a roundobject that rolls? Does she have the second-order mentalstateof believingthatI miss Toby mentalstates?Such (a human)or is she capableof only first-order questions arise with languagelesshumansand in some cases even with linguistically competentcreatures.Debates aboutthe minds of infants can be eerily reminiscent of discussions of animal thought.Moreover,the mentalstatesof some humansremainquite opaquedespite our best efforts. I do not always know even what I think about various issues, much less what Newt Gingrichthinks aboutthem. I'm not even always surethatthe questionsthatI raise about the minds of myself and othersare sensible ones. mentalstatesare To a greatextent these difficultiesin attributing conceptual.They cannot be solved simply by attendingclosely to behaviour.13 Since thereis a diversityof views aboutthe mind and
12. Radnerand Radner,op. cit., 60. 1am not awareof any such storiesaboutMalebranche, however. 13. JohnDuprearguesa similarpointin 'The MentalLife of NonhumanAnimals', reprinted in Bekoff and Jamieson, 1996. LaterI shall arguethatwe often see mentalstatesexpressed in behaviour,but that it does not follow from this that attendingclosely to behaviourwill rationallycompel a confirmedsceptic to believe thatan animalis minded.

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how it should be conceptualized, it is not surprising that our practicesgive out at some stage andfail to determineclearanswers to difficult questions. This indeterminacyexplains why, within limits, questions about the attribution of mental states are irreduciblyopen. Thus far we have been discussing questionsaboutthe minds of mammals and other animals who are biologically close to us. Conundrums also ariseaboutwhere variouslines shouldbe drawn and aboutwhat we shouldsay concerninganimalswhom we think of as biologically remote. Most people would not hesitate in it denyingmentalityto an amoebaandattributing to a gorilla.14But what about insects? Our initial response might be that a minded bug is out of the question. However there is a literaturethat suggests that insects and spiders may sensibly be thought of as feeling pain.'5 We may dismiss this possibility as outlandish, change our behaviour,or simply come to thinkthat the world is a strangerplace than we had thought.All of these possibilities are open to us. The fact that we can be wrong in attributing mental states to animals and that we can face unanswerable questionsaboutthem shouldnot obscurethe fact thatwe arequitesurethatmanyanimals have minds and that on particular occasions we know what is in them. This raises the question of how we come to know what an animal is thinking.This is connectedto how we justify particular claims about particularanimals on particularoccasions, but it shouldnot be confusedwith the questionof how we canjustify the entire practiceof attributing mentalstates to animals.(This broad question about the justificationof our practiceswill be addressed in Section III.)
14. But would we be so confident if amoebae were the size of dogs or humans? H. S. Jennings writes 'that if Amoeba were a large animal, so as to come within the everyday experienceof humanbeings, its behaviorwouldat once call forththe attribution it of states to of pleasure and pain, of hunger, desire, and the like, on precisely the same basis as we attributethese things to the dog.' Behaviorof the LowerOrganisms(New York:Columbia University Press, 1906), 336. 15. See, for example, C. H. Eisemann,W. K. Jorgensen,D. J. Merritt,M. J. Rice, B. W. Cribb,P.D. WebbandM. P.Zalucki,'Do InsectsFeel Pain-A Biological View', Experienta 40 (1984), 164-7; V. B. Wigglesworth,'Do InsectsFeel Pain', Antenna4 (1980), 8-9; G. Fiorito, 'Is There "Pain"in Invertebrates?', Beluvioral Processes 12 (1986), 383-8; and Thomas Eisner and Scott Camazine, 'Spider Leg Autotomy Induced by Prey Venom Injection:An Adaptive Response to "Pain"?',Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 80 (1983), 3382-5.

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Some people thinkthatthe way we come to know whatan animal is thinking is quite differentfrom the way in which we come to know what a human is thinking. Call this the AsymmetryView (AV). Although the AV can take different forms, its adherents typically say that while humanstell us what is on theirminds we mustinferwhatis on the mindsof animals,andthattheformerroute to knowledge of other minds is much more reliable than the latter. First consider this view of how we know what is on the minds of animals:call it the Inferential View (IV).16The IV holds thatall knowledge-claimsabout animalminds are based on probabilistic inferencesto hiddenmentalstatesfromobservationsof behaviour. For example, on this view my claim thatGretewants to play is an inference about Grete's mental state drawn on the basis of her behaviour. Behaviouris whatis presentedto us; innermentalstates may be associatedwith behaviour,but whetheror not they are (in general or on a particular occasion) is a matterof inference. It is easy to see how the IV can leadnaturally scepticismabout to animal minds. If mental states float free of behaviourin this way, then we can never be sure that they exist. Grete could be emptyheadednow or always. She andall of herfriendscould be mindless Cartesianautomata. can speculateor inferthatthey arenot, but We the heavy-duty machinery of reliable knowledge production cannotbe broughtto bearon the issue. No wonderpeople who hold the IV use shudderquotes when they talk aboutanimalminds.17 The IV is based on the assumptionthatratherthanseeing Grete, a cheetah or an elephantwhat I see when I look at an animal is a in behavingbody.This body may or maynotbe animated some way or anotherby a mind.Whetherit is or not is whatis in question.But it may reasonablybe arguedthatthis is not a fair accountof what goes on when I look at animals. Grete, the real object of my
16. Many scientists hold the IV, including some who are friendly to the idea of animal minds.Forexample,bothDonaldR. Griffin,AnimalMinds(Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1992) and J. S. Kennedy,op. cit. appearto hold this view, as does Bertrand Russell in TheAnalysis of Mind (London:Unwin, HymanLimited, 1921), 27. 17. DavidSanfordhaspointedoutin conversation variousaspectsof the IV arelogically that distinct.Forexample,the view thatmentalstatesareinferredfrombehaviourdoes not imply thatthey are inneror hidden;the view thatmentalstates are innerdoes not imply thatthey are hiddenor inferred; so on. Despitethe logical independence these views, they tend and of to hang togetheras partof a broadlyCartesianpictureof mind. At any rate the view I am consideringinvolves the conjunctionof at least these threepropositions.

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perception,has been displaced by a philosophicalmonster-the idea of a behavingbody.18This is whatneedlessly 'problematizes' the question of animal minds. If mental states are hidden entities whose existence can only be inferredfrom behaviour,then we shouldbe quitemystifiedmuchof the time aboutwhatandwhether an animal is thinking.But it is mainly scientists and philosophers who are mystified,not 'the most stupidandignorant'.Unless there is a more compelling account available, the most plausible explanationis thatphilosophersand scientistshave been seduced by theirown ideology and concepts. It is the 'stupidand ignorant' who have it right. In addition to this epistemological point a furtherreason for rejectingthe IV, alreadyhinted at, is that it fails to be true to the phenomenologyof ourexperienceof animalminds.Sometimeswe are uncertain about what is on an animal's mind and on those occasions we may try out an inference. But in many cases our knowledge of what an animal is thinking seems immediate and noninferential. experiencean animal'sbehaviournot as a set of We premises that supportan inference,but as expressingthe animal's mentalstate.When my dog Ludwigwas runningin the woods and steppedinto a leghold trap,I heardin his howl thathe was in pain. The irritated meow of my (late) cat Sassafrasexpressedherhunger and displeasureat me for not feeding her sooner.When a caged gorilla in a zoo throwsfaeces at the gawkersthereis little question about what is on his mind-not because the behaviourimplies a particularmental state ascription, but because our seeing the behaviour in context as an expression of boredom and anger is virtuallyirresistible. It may be objected that our failure to have the phenomenology of inference means little. In recent years we have become increasingly sceptical of phenomenologyand gotten used to the idea that mental processes may involve lots of nonconscious inferring,computing,rule-followingand so on. 19Whateveris true of these claims it is useful to distinguishtwo senses of 'inference'.
18. This point is an extension of claims made by Douglas C. Long and John Cook that scepticism about other human minds often gets going by substitutingthe philosophical concept of a humanbody for the everydaynotion of a humanbeing. See Douglas C. Long, 'The PhilosophicalConceptof the HumanBody', PhilosophicalReview73, 3 (July, 1964); andJohnCook,'HumanBeings', in Studiesin thePhilosophyof Wittgenstein, Winch(ed.), P. (London:Routledgeand KeganPaul, 1969), 117-51.

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In the broad sense an inference may involve a wide range of transitionsbetween states. In the narrowsense an inference is a transitionthatis made on the basis of reasons.When I deny the IV I am denying that our knowledge-claimsabout animal minds are typically mattersof inferencein the narrowsense. One reasonfor hanging on to the IV is thatthe alternativemay be viewed as even less plausible. It might be thoughtthat if our knowledge of animal minds is not an inference from behaviour then it must be a matterof perception-and it is certainlynot that. I am not surethatperceptionandinferenceexhaustthe alternatives but, understoodin a certainway, I don't think that it is out of the question to suppose that some of our knowledge of human and animalminds is perceptual.20 It is very difficultto set firmlimits on whatcounts as perceptual knowledge.We can see starsnow even thoughthey may have gone out of existence millions of years before. We can see Susan even though she is a religious Muslim and her body is completely covered. We see Jake on his way to work, even though only the dust kicked up by his truckis visible. On the otherhandseeing the
19. For example David Marrwrites that 'the trueheartof visual perceptionis the inference from the structureof an image about the structureof the real world outside' (Vision [San Francisco:Freeman,1982],68). Foran argument transitions that betweenrepresentations in the visual system do not constituteinferencessee Tim Crane,'The NonconceptualContent of Experience', in Tim Crane(ed.), The Contentsof Experience(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1992), 136-157. 20. The following philosophershave endorsedsome version of the view that some of our knowledgeof otherhumanmindsis perceptual: FredDretske,Seeingand Knowing(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 183-9; Michael Luntley, Language, Logic and Experience(La Salle IL:Open Court, 1988), 222; JohnMcDowell, 'Criteria,Defeasibility, and Knowledge',Proceedingsof the BritishAcademy68 (1983), 455-79; MauriceMerleauPonty,Phenomenologyof Perception,trans.by C. Smith(London:Routledge& KeganPaul, 1962), 346-365; Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy,trans. by P. Heath (London: Routledgeand KeganPaul, 1954), 10,andLudwigWittgenstein, Remarks thePhilosophy on of Psychology,vol. 2, ed. by G. H. WrightandH. Nyman,trans.by C. G. Luckhardt M. and A. E. Aue (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1980), 100. Accordingto DagfinnFollesdal, Husserl also belongs in this camp (see Follesdal's 'Husserl's Notion of Intentionality',in John Macnamara GonzaloE. Reyes (eds.), TheLogical Foundationsof Cognition(New York: and OxfordUniversityPress),300-301). A similarview has also been defendedby the following psychologists:Simon Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness: Essay on Autismand the Theoryof An Mind (CambridgeMA: The MIT Press, 1995), and PeterHobson, 'ConcerningKnowledge of Mental States', British Journal of Medical Psychology 63 (1990), 205. The gestalt psychologist Hans Wernerclaimed that we perceive the 'inner life' of both humans and 'higher animals' in his ComparativePsychology of MentailDevelopment (Chicago IL: Follett, 1948), 69, 76; and the classical ethologist A. Kortlandtclaimed that we see the viciousnessor friendlinessof a dogjust as we see colour('Cosmologie derDierenEen Nieuw Veld van Onderzoek', Overdrukait Vakbladnoor Biologen, Vier-en-Dertigste,No. I (January1954), 1-14; unpublished English translation availablefromthe author).

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Auckland airportis not seeing New Zealand. Seeing someone's heart exposed for surgeryis not seeing his body. Seeing a fleariddendog doesn't count as seeing fleas. Contemplationof these examples and others should show how difficult it is to give an account of what is and what is not seen.21 Ditto for the other senses. In everyday life we often use perceptuallanguage in talking about our knowledge of other minds. I have alreadygiven some examples of this in the case of animals.In the case of humanswe say that we see when people are happy,sad, or disappointed.As Wittgenstein remind us, "'We see emotion."-As opposed to what?-We do not see facial contortionsandmakeinferencesfrom them'.22It seems thatthereis a primafacie case for supposingthat we can sometimes see that people and animals are in particular mentalstates.However,it mightbe objectedthatwe shouldnot take such languageat face-value.Ourknowledgeof othermindscannot be perceptual,it might be said, because mistakesin the ascription of mental states are not perceptualmistakes. I thoughtthat Toby was upset but she was only pretending.Grete looked hungrybut she wasjust being greedy.Inbothcases I ammistakenbutin neither case have my senses failed me. WhatI see is the samewhetherToby is upset or pretending,whetherGrete is hungryor greedy. Since Toby's and Grete's mental states are underdetermined what I by see, any knowledge I have of theirmental states is not perceptual knowledge. One response is to deny that such problematical cases can ever arise.23The story might go like this. What I see when Grete is hungryis not the same as whatI see when she is greedy.To believe otherwise is to assume that a visual experience that is a 'mere
21. Many of these examples are drawn from Paul Ziff, UnderstandingUnderstanding (IthacaNY: CornellUniversityPress, 1970), Chapter See also NorwoodRussell Hanson, 7. Patternsof Discovery(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1958),Chapter1;andPaul M. Churchland,'PerceptualPlasticityandTheoreticalNeutrality:A Reply to JerryFodor', reprintedin A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mindand the Structureof Science (CambridgeMA: The MIT Press, 1992), 255-79. 22. Zettel, Section 225. 23. This response is discussed sympatheticallyin John McDowell, op. cit. as part of an attemptto understand some remarks Wittgenstein's, it is not clearwhetherMcDowell of but himselfendorsesthis view. J. L. Austinwas also inclinedtowardsuch a response,butgranted that 'there may be cases in which "delusive and veridical experiences" really are "qualitativelyindistinguishable"'(Sense and Sensibilia [New York: Oxford University Press, 1962], 52). These issues are usefully discussed by Alan Millar in 'The Idea of Experience',Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety,96 (1996), 75-90.

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can appearance' be qualitativelyidenticalwith a visual experience that reveals a fact. But a visual experiencethatis fact-revealingis differentfromone thatis a 'mereappearance'. therebyqualitatively So we should rejectthe initial descriptionof the problemcases as ones in which we are presented with qualitatively identical
appearances.24

This line may be correct as a matter of metaphysics but it doesn't help with our epistemologicalproblem.Once I know that Toby is pretendingI may come to thinkof herbehaviouras having been quite different from what it is when she is upset. But this ability to 'retrofit'my judgementsdoesn't help me to sort out the cases upfront.When I'm looking at GreteandToby,it may appear to me that they behave in exactly the same way in cases in which I am right and cases in which I am wrong. It may seem that my senses have done theirjob butI've still madea mistake.Therefore, it may be thought,my mistakes in these cases are not perceptual ones. However, totting up the blame for mistakesis not as easy as it may seem. Different explanations can be given for the same mistakeat differenttimes, to differentaudiences,dependingon our purposes.I may say to my motherthatI see theNorthStar,butwhen grilled by an astronomer may be more discreetin reportingwhat I I saw.Generallyif the possibilityof errorbecomesmagnifiedin our minds we begin to think of perceptualclaims as inferentialones. Courtroomlawyers are often very good at forcing witnesses to recastclaims in this way (e.g. 'Did you actuallysee my client kick Rodney King or did you drawan inferencefrom the fact that you saw his foot move in the directionof King's head?').The problem with supposing that the retreat from claiming perceptual to inferentialgroundingfor our assertionsis a move towardsgreater truthandliteralnessis thatthereis no natural stoppingpointfor this retreatshort of sense-data(if thatis a naturalstoppingpoint), and most of us no longer believe that we really perceive only shapes and colours and everythingelse is built up by inference.A better way to look at our epistemic mistakes involves seeing our claims to knowledge as partof a networkof beliefs andcommitmentsthat
24. For discussion of some similar points regardingauthenticartworksand forgeries,see Nelson Goodman, The Languages of Art (IndianapolisIN: The Bobbs-MerrillCompany, Inc. 1968), Chapter3.

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are informed by theories, attitudes and insights gained from particular experiences.Whensomethinggoes wrongthe blamecan be locatedat variouspointsin the network.Forcertainpurposeswe may hold everythingelse fixed and say that it was perceptionthat misfired. For other purposes we may fix other elements in our cognitive economy and blame inference, or other beliefs or commitments.Of course, not anythinggoes. Any bad arguments that I may give in this paper are probablynot due to perceptual failings. Still, whatI am suggestingis thatfor manymistakesabout or the minds of animalsit seems as natural unnatural, dependingon context or circumstance,to blame perception as inference. For example,I mightsay 'How stupidof me not to see thatthe elephant is feeling nasty today; you saw it immediately'.Or I may say 'I guess the elephantis feeling nasty today'. Anotherreasonfor objectingto the idea thatwe sometimeshave perceptualknowledge of animalminds is thatthis view may seem to fail to accountfor the importance behaviourin makingmental of attributions. Sydney Shoemakerclaims aboutthe humancase, As
..while we can be said to observeor perceivefacts aboutanother's mental states, we do this by observing his behavior (and the circumstances in which it occurs). It is from a man's behavior (includinghis facial expressions)thatI see thathe is angry.25

What Shoemaker says in this passage is true: behaviour is important mentalattributions. to Indeed,to say thatit is important understates the close linkages between behaviour and mental attributions. What is at issue, however,is not whetherbehaviouris importantto mental attributions ratherthe way in which it is but important. My claim is that the close connection between observationsof behaviourand the attribution mental states is of often perceptual rather than inferential. Behaviour does not typically provide premises for mental attributions; often we see mental states as expressed in behaviourand we see behaviouras confirmingourreadingof a creature's mind.The factthatbehaviour is importantto attributions mental states is indifferentbetween of the inferentialand perceptualviews. It is also important be clear aboutwhatconstitutesbehaviour. to One important strandof ourconceptionof humansandmanyother
25. Sydney Shoemaker,'The Problemof OtherMinds', in J. Feinberg(ed.), Reason and Responsibility,ThirdEdition(Encino CA: Dickenson PublishingCo., 1975), 216.

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animals is thatwe relateto them as animatedcreaturesratherthan disembodiedCartesiansouls.26If we see a creatureas mindedwe see it as behaving, even if it is sitting aroundnot doing much of anything.Gross movementsare not always needed for attributing mental states.A listless body will do in many cases.27 It may be thatourpracticesof seeing mentalstatesas expressed in behaviour have propertiesof both perceptualand inferential of knowledgeandperhapssome uniquecharacteristics theirown.28 What I insist is that the perceptualmodel is not so inferiorto the inferentialmodel thatwe shouldembracethe IV out of embarrassment at the alternative.If I am right about this, no case will yet have been made for the plausibilityof the IV as an accountof our knowledge of animal minds. The second part of the AV holds that language is key to our the understanding minds of humanbeings: they tell us what is on their minds. Call this the Linguistic Thesis (LT). On one interpretation LT is unobjectionable,perhapseven trivial: In the 'the normalcase' Toby'sutteredsentenceexpresseswhat is on her mind. But if the LT is takenas assertingthat linguistic expression is essential to knowing the minds of othersthen it is clearly false. The 'normalcase' may involve saying whatis on one's mindbut abnormalcases abound. Speakers lie and use tropes. I may not know what is on a speaker's mind by attendingto her use of language. I may even form false beliefs as a result.In othercases we possess knowledge of the mental states of others through language-independent modalities. When someone winces at something I say I know that they are displeased. Linguistic behaviouris neithernecessarynor sufficientfor knowing what is on someone's mind.
26. Here I echo P. F. Strawson:'We simply react to others as to otherpeople. They may puzzle us at times;butthatis partof so reacting'(Skepticism Naturalism: and Some Varieties (New York:Columbia University Press, 1985), 21). But, perhapscontraryto Strawson, I think that a similarpoint is also true of our reactionsto many nonhumananimalson many occasions, butthatthereare variousstrandsin ourpracticeswith respectto bothhumansand otheranimals,not all of which are obviously consistent. 27. JenniferHornsbymakes a similar point in her 'PhysicalistThinkingand Conceptions of Behaviour', in P. Pettitand J. McDowell, eds., Subject,Thoughtand Context(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1986), 95-115. 28. Sydney Shoemakerhas recently arguedthat althoughthere is a 'stereotype'of senseperception,not everythingwe count as sense perceptionconformsto it. Even so, some of ourknowledge of the mentalstatesof othersseems to conformto what Shoemakercalls 'the broad perceptual model'. For further discussion see his 'Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense"', Philosophyand PhenomenologicalResearch54, 2 (June, 1994), 249-314.

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For these reasons I reject both partsof the AV as it is typically developed. In my view thereis no good reasonto believe thatthere is a differencein kind as to how we come to know the mentalstates of humansand animals.Withrespectto bothhumansand animals, sometimes such knowledge is based on some form of inference, but often it comes from recognizing what is expressed in the behaviourof the organismin question.As I have alreadysuggested, many animalsexpress variousmentalstates througha wide range of behaviour.When dogs want to play they characteristically bow with their heads down and their tails up. When primates want something they often put their hands out and cock their heads to the side. Many animalsexpress surprisewith wide open eyes and droppedtails. Understanding both humansand animals involves placing theirbehaviourin broadinterpretive frameworks. aim We to fit theirbehaviourinto a pattern,linguisticor otherwise,to find the 'project'to which it belongs.29Different creaturesbehave in different ways, but the basic task of interpretation remains the
same.30

Success in interpretationrests on many factors including background knowledge, appreciation of context, specific informationabout the creaturein question,familiaritywith his or her way of life, and general knowledge about the relationship betweenmentalstatesandbehaviour.31 rather The blandfact is that knowing the mental states of others (whetherhuman or animal) requiresknowing what things are like aroundhere. Consider some examples of how interpretation works. Even thoughin most respectsshe appearsto be behavingnormally,I can see that Nina is still depressed after losing her job in the box factory.I know that Ivan, the gorilla who has lived in a shopping
29. In the wake of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh's work with bonabosand Lou Herman'swork with dolphins, the linguistic/non-linguisticdistinctionlooks increasinglydubious. At the very least the range and depth of non-linguisticexpressions looks richerall the time. See theiressays in Bekoff andJamieson 1995. 30. GarethEvans discusses the broad,interpretive projectinvolved in attributing psychological states to humans in his The Varietiesof Reference,John McDowell, ed. (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1982), 130. 31. See J. L. Austin's commentsaboutthe role of familiarityandexperiencein knowledge claims in his 'OtherMinds', in Philosophical Papers, second edition, J. 0. Urmsonand G. J. Wamock, eds. (New York:Oxford University Press, 1970). Dretske,op. cit., 179-190, makes similar points about specializationand its role in perception.John Searle discusses the importanceof what he calls 'the network' and 'the background'for understanding intentional states in his Intentionality:An Essay in Philosophy of Mind (New York: CambridgeUniversityPress).

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mall in Tacoma,Washingtonfor nearlythirtyyears, is desperately unhappyalthoughat the momenthe appearsto be coping. If I knew nothingabouthow depressedhumansandunhappygorillasbehave Nor would I would not be in a position to make such attributions. I be able to make them if I had no knowledge of the effects of unemploymenton humansand being caged in shoppingmalls on gorillas. We are better at readingthe minds of creatureswho we know well thanthose who are foreign to us. I can identifyToby's mental states more reliably than those of the Presidentof my College. I know Grete's mind better than that of a randomspaniel. I have more confidence about the mental states of a dog than of a koala. Most of us are more confidentof ourjudgementsaboutthe mental states of another human than we are about those of most nonhumans.But if we know the animalwell and the humannot at all, this may not be the case. Many people are betterat identifying the mental states of their animal companions than those of an animalcontrol officer. Culturaldifferencesamong humanscan makethe identification of mental states difficult. Often the inability to read the mental states of other humans is associated with racism. Caucasians sometimes claim to find Asians inscrutable or give highly improbableaccounts of what they think (e.g. 'They don't value humanlife like we do in the West.'). When the Spanisharrivedin the Americas they were very bad at readingthe behaviourof the indigenouspeople. Therewere scholarlyarguments aboutwhether the native peoples were degenerate humans, therefore rational animalswho could andshouldbe converted;or savage beasts,who could and should be enslaved.32 Mental attributionsare based on behaviour but they occur against a large and complex set of empirical and conceptual structures.Some of these structuresinvolve knowledge aboutthe naturalexpressionsof mentalstatesand othersinvolve knowledge about relevant conventions. Linguistic behaviouris importantin mental attributionsto humans because language use and interpretationis so conventionalizedthat it wrings out indeterminacy and reduces the ground available for supporting sceptical
32. For discussion see Lewis Hanke,Aristotleand the AmericanIndians.A Studyin Racce Prejudice in the Modern World(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress, 1959).

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challenges. Insofaras there are asymmetriesin our knowledge of humanand animalminds they are based on our lack of familiarity with animals and the paucity of shared conventions. There is nothing about human language use in itself that underwrites essential differences in our knowledge of human and animal minds. In this section I have been claiming thatwe have practicesthat involve seeing both human and nonhuman members of our communityas expressingmentalstates in theirbehaviour.This is not to say that our attributions mentalstates are always correct of or unproblematical,or that it is entirely clear what it is to be a memberof our community.What is clear is thatmost of us live in society with normal adult humans, languageless humans and nonhuman animals. In a great many cases we have no trouble identifying what is going on in the minds of others, whetherthey are humanor nonhuman. It might be wondered whether everyone in our community is partyto these practices.In orderto try to answerthis question we need to imagine what it would be like to find these practicesalien. It is not enough to imagine oneself as an animaltorturer. Someone who torturesanimals has no trouble reading their minds. What gives him pleasure is knowing that he is causing animalspain. A betterexample would be someone who is in a certainway autistic. Although it comes in varietiesand degrees, it is said thatthe heart of autismis the inabilityto readthe mindsof others.33 Interestingly, sometimes it is claimed that autistic people find the minds of
33. There is a huge literature autism.For a varietyof views and perspectivessee Simon on Baron-Cohen Helen Tager-Flusber, DonaldCohen(eds.), Understanding and OtherMinds: Perspectives FromAutism(New York:Oxford UniversityPress, 1993). Baron-Cohenhas suggested thatautistichumans'may have a purelybehavioural notionof the functionof the brain,and may even be completely unawareof the distinctionbetweenmentaland physical entities' ('Precursorsto a Theory of Mind:Understanding Attentionin Others',in Andrew Whiten (ed.), Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 233-234). See also his 'Are Autistic Children Behaviourists? An Examination of Their Mental-Physical and Appearance-RealityDistinctions', Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 19 (1989), 579-600, andhis previouslycited Mindblindness. further For discussionsof autism, see forexampleAlan M. Leslie, 'Pretence,Autismandthe Basis of "Theoryof Mind"',The Psychologist 3 (March 1990), 120-3, and R. PeterHobson, op. cit. For a popularaccount, see Oliver W. Sacks, An Anthropologiston Mars: Seven ParaidoxicalTailes(New York: Knopf, 1995). For what it is like to be autistic,see DonnaWilliams,NobodyNowhere:The Extraiordinary Autobiographyof an Autistic (New York:Avon Books, 1992); and Temple Grandin,Thinkingin Pictures: and Other ReportsFrom My Life withAutism(New York: Doubleday, 1995).

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than those of humans. But imagine a animals more transparent varietyof autismthatmakesopaquethe innerlives of animalswhile leaving those of humansopen to view. Dogs, cats, cows, spiders, mice and monkeys would all presentan overwhelmingchallenge to such a person.She mighteven havetroublewith cartoons,nature shows, and Beethoven, Part II. It is not easy to imagine what it would be like to be sucha person.It is especiallydifficultto imagine that her inabilityto read animalbehaviourwould not spill over to the behaviourof humansas well. Whatwould she make of infants, the infirm,those whose lives areprofoundlydifferentfrom hers?If there were such a person our differences with her would not primarilybe philosophical.Rather,they would be psychological: we would say that she is disorderedin an importantway. Normal people in our culture sometimes see mentality expressed in the behaviourof some animalswho areclose to them.This is a feature of our practices. A person with whom we do not share these practicesis, in an important way, not one of us. III Someone might agree with what I have said thus far but still want to know how our practicescan be justified.Perhapsas a matterof fact we do see at least some animal behaviour as expressing mentality. Perhaps someone who did not could be described as disordered.But that is mere name calling. No argumenthas been given for why we ought to see animal behaviour as expressing mentality rather than as mere bodily movements. Perhaps the correctview is one thatin these ignoranttimes we would describe as disordered. We should first appreciatejust how strong a demand is being made.Particular claims aboutthe mindsof animalscan be justified or not within the context of our presentpractices.Many questions are left open and there is a great deal of room for reformersof various persuasionsto build upon, revise, or try to revolutionize the practicesthatwe have. But what is now being askedis why we should have these practices at all. We are being asked to defend our whole form of life insofaras it involves ascribingmentalstates to animals. There is a questionaboutwho has the burdenof proof here.The sceptic aboutanimalminds may view himself as saying: 'We have

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minds. Do other animals?Prove it to me!'. But a trueraccountof what he is saying might be this: 'Granted,we believe that other animals have minds. But we could be wrong. Prove to me that we're not.' When the sceptic's challenge is framedin this way it is not clearwhatwouldcountas meetingit orthatwe areeven obliged to try.34 One responseto the demandforjustificationwouldbe to say that none can be given but none is required:our practiceswith regard to animals are an ineluctable fact about our form of life. J. S. Kennedy,oddly enough a sceptic about animalminds, appearsto thinkthat we cannothelp but believe in them. He writes that
...anthropomorphic thinking about animal behaviouris built into us. We could not abandonit even if we wished to. Besides, we do not wish to. It is dinnedinto us culturallyfrom earliestchildhood. It has presumablyalso been 'pre-programmed' our hereditary into make-upby naturalselection...35

'Anthropomorphicthinking'-Kennedy's term for attributing mental states to animals-is demandedboth by our genes and our culture.Yet Kennedywantsus to change our ways.
If the study of animal behaviour is to mature as a science, the processof liberationfromthe delusionsof anthropomorphism must go on.36

Kennedyis boundto be disappointed.If our practiceswith regard to attributing mentalstatesto animalsaredetermined our genes by and culture,then they are not going to change.And if this is true, no justification for these practices is needed. Demands for justificationare moot in the face of the inevitable. Let us suppose, however, thatin some way or another,at some cost however heavy, our practiceswith regardto animalscould be overthrown.What we would have to imagine is that the rightmindedsucceed in mountinga culturalrevolution,in consequence of which we come to see animals as (something like) Cartesian automata. While we would continue to view the behaviour of infants as expressing mindedness we would come to see the
34. This way of framingthe sceptic's challenge is suggested by Paul Ziff's accountof the 'other minds' sceptic in 'The Simplicity of Other Minds', reprintedin his Philosophzic Turnings(IthacaNY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1966). 35. J. Kennedy,op. cit., 4-5. 36. Loc. cit.

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behaviour of birds and monkeys as akin to the movements of airplanesand wind-uptoys. Whatwould motivatethe abolitionof our practices of ascribing mental states to animals is some philosophical argument that showed that these practices were unjustified. What such an argument would be like is far fromclear, but let us supposethatone were available.37 would then face a We clash between the demandsof everyday life and the deliverances of philosophy.Which should win? It is far from obvious that philosophy should win. To suppose that it should reflects the view that the practicesof everyday life require philosophical justifications. But this is a controversial assumption. In fact it is a metaphysical assumption that itself requires justification. It is just as plausible to suppose that everyday practices that have their own internal resources for justifying claims and reforming behaviour require no further justification-that these practices are ultimately legitimated by '...showing their worthiness to survive on the testing ground of everyday life'.38 Fortunately, however, our everyday practices that involve attributing mentalstatesto animalscan be defended.Whetherwhat can be said constitutes a full-scale philosophicaljustificationfor them I will not try to say. Nevertheless it is clear to me that quite a lot more can be said on behalf of these practices than against them.HereI will brieflyreviewfourkindsof reasonsfor ourhaving practicesthat involve ascribingmentalstates to animals.
37. The philosophicalarguments that I have seen for such a conclusionfail. For discussion of some of them see Jamieson and Bekoff, 1992, and Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson, 'Reflective Ethology, Applied Philosophy,andthe MoralStatusof Animals', in P. Bateson and P. Klupfer (eds.), Perspectives in Ethology 9: Human Understandingand Animal Awareness(New York:PlenumPress, 1991), 1-47. 38. MarkJohnston,'ObjectivityRefigured:Pragmatism WithoutVerificationism', John in Haldane and Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation,and Projection (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 85. It would be a differentmatterif someone claimed to producean argumentthat showed that our everyday practicesare not only unjustifiedbut plain wrong. Although I am in great sympathy with a view that Mark Johnston calls 'minimalism',his conflationof this distinctionvitiateshis replyto Derek Parfitin 'Reasons andReductionism',ThePhilosophicalReview101,3(July,1992), 589-618. Herehe defends our everyday practices that involve views of personal identity against Parfit'sstrictures. Johnston conflates the claim that our everyday practices stand in need of philosophical justification with the claim that philosophical argumentshows that these practices are incorrect.Since I take Parfitas arguingthe latter,at least in part,Johnston'sinvocation of minimalism fails to defeat Parfit'sarguments.Somethingmore needs to be said to defend our everyday practicesagainstthe second sortof assault.

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The firstreason is that these practicesare useful.39Partof why even behaviourists find it natural to attributemental states to animals is that mentalistic language plays a role in anticipating, explaining, and modifying behaviour that could not easily be replaced by the language of learning theory, neuroscience, or anythingelse that is currentlyavailable.Thatthese practiceshave a payoff is clearly a reason to have them, althoughpeople may disagree aboutthe character strengthof this reason. and The second reasonfor supposingthatour practicesarejustified appealsto similaritiesbetween humansand manyotheranimals.40 Given that we behave in ways that are similar to many other animals and that there is remarkable continuityin the structure of variousnervous systems, it is plausibleto supposethat if we have mental states so do they. Given these facts about biological continuity and similarity,it would be quite surprisingif human psychology in all of its depthandrichnesswere completelyunique. Indeed, it would be the biological equivalent of the immaculate
conception.

The third reason for supposing that our practices are justified involves scientifictheory.4'Thathumanshavementallives is a fact that must ultimately yield to evolutionary explanation. Various accounts of the evolution of mind appeal to the sorts of environmentaland social problemsthatour ancestorswould have faced. These involve such mattersas the pressuresof group-living and the need to engage in cooperativehuntingand foraging. But the ancestors of many other animals faced similar problems as
39. This is a point that Dan Dennettand JerryFodorhave made in differentways over the years. For Dennett's view, see The IntentionalStance (CambridgeMA: The MIT Press, 1987); for Fodor's, see 'Special Sciences', reprinted his Representations: in Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science (Brighton:The HarvesterPress, 1981). Sydney Shoemaker'sInformedAgency condition(in his 1975) may providean explanation of why attributing mentalstates to animalsis useful. 40. This view goes back to CharlesDarwin,TheDescent of Man,and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: Murray, 1871), and The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication (New York: Appleton, 1896). For discussion of Darwin's views regarding animals see James Rachels, CreatedFromAnimals:TheMoral Implicationsof Darwinism (New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1990).On the similarityargument generallysee Roger Crisp, 'Evolution and Psychological Unity', reprintedin Bekoff and Jamieson 1995; and GarethMatthews,'Animalsandthe Unity of Psychology', Philosophy53 (1978), 437-454. 41. Alison Jolly and Nicholas Humphreyhave separatelygiven evolutionaryaccounts of how consciousness might have evolved that appeals particularly the social demandsof to life in primatecommunities.Theirearly papersare reprinted RichardByrneand Andrew in Whiten (eds.), MachiavellianIntelligence: SociailExpertiseand the Evolutionof lntellect in Monkeys,Apes, and Humans(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1988).

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well. Thus the same evolutionaryforces that might have selected minded human ancestors could be expected to have selected minded ancestorsof variousotheranimalsas well. is Finally,attributing mentalstatesto creatures partof an outlook thatrecognizes them as morallysignificant.The relationsbetween having a mind and being an object of moralconcern are logically quite complex, but they are psychologically very strong. While favourablemoralattitudestowardsanimalsmay not in themselves justify the ascriptionof mental states to animals,the existence of such feelings may lead us to see variousfacts about an animal as In constitutingor supportingsuch attributions. additionthere are all sorts of good reasons from the perspective of diverse moral theories for embracing a moral outlook that takes animals seriously.42Some philosophers may balk at the idea that our moralityshouldplay any role at all in shapingourview of the mind, but that view requiresjustificationand it seems to me to rest on dubiousfoundationalist views aboutthe relationsbetween various areas of philosophical inquiry, as well as on the possibility of clearly distinguishingthe descriptivefrom the normative.43 These reasons for attributingmental states to animals might constitute a justificationif one is needed. If we wanted to give a name to this justification we might call it 'inference to the best explanation'.Howeverit is important to confuse this inferential not defence of our practices taken as a whole with an inferential defence of particular claims about the mental states of particular animals on particular occasions. When I say that Grete is lonely I am not ordinarilymakingan inferenceon her bodily movements. WhatI am suggestinghere is thatourpracticesof ascribingmental states to animals, taken as a whole, serve to unify our moral sensibilities, our scientific understandings,and our practical
42. The literatureon this subject is now overwhelming.My 'Ethicsand Animals:A Brief Review', Journal of Agricultural and EnvironmentalEthics 6, Special Supplement I (1993), 15-20, is a concise introduction. Also for an overview see David DeGrazia,Taking AnimalsSeriously:MentalLifeand Morail Status(New York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996). 43. Ancestorsof this paragraph have producedquizzical looks and sceptical questions on every occasion on which I have presentedthis paper(PeterSingerand Michael Smith have been the most quizzical or sceptical). I hope this versionputsthese concems to restbut 'the induction is depressing'. See also David Papineau,Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 126-127.

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concerns. If a justificationfor our practicesis required,this ought to do it. Howeverthe voice of the sceptic is not so easily stilled.Couldn't we be wrongaboutanimalshavingminds?Yes, we could be wrong, but so what? We could be wrong about all sorts of things. The sceptic wants to seduce us into taking the epistemological stance towards animal minds.44But from here all sorts of things are in question-other human minds, causality, substance, personal identity,to name just a few. There may be philosophicalreasons for taking this stance on particular occasions, but it should not be allowed to cast doubt on our commitmentto animal minds. Nor should this kind of scepticism be permittedto infect science. For the purposes of everyday life and science we should rebuff the sceptic. He can takehis stanceandgo dancewith the philosophers.

IV
For reasons of space my concluding remarkswill be relatively brief.45I have already suggested that what I have called the AV inhibitsthe scientificstudyof animalminds.We arenow in a better position to see why. When scientistsassume thatwhat we observe is bodily movementsand then worryaboutwhetherany inference to internalmental states is justified, they wrap themselves in the garb of hard-headed empiricism. But really they are recommending a disorder as a methodological stance. The inferential view of animalminds is partof a normativeobjectifyingprogram thatdemandsthat we see animalsin a way thatis difficultfor us to fulfil and one that we ought to reject. It is strikingto comparethe successes of cognitive psychology with the sloganeeringof cognitive ethology.Manyethologists still work with behaviouristand reductionistassumptions.They feel that cognitive language is a temptation to resist rather than a theoretical vocabulary to deploy. Their preference is for evolutionary or neurophysiological explanations, which they typically view as replacing cognitive ones. But a cognitive
44. John Searle discusses the epistemological stance in his 'Animal Minds', P. French,T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein,eds., MidwestStudies in Philosophy Volume19: Philosophical Naturalism(Notre Dame IN: Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1994), 206-219. 45. Some of the themes in this section have been further elaborated JamiesonandBekoff, in 'On Aims and Methods...'.

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approachto animals divides up the world in differentways than It these otherapproaches. makesdifferentgeneralizations possible andprovidesdifferentkinds of explanations.I would even say that animalsfrom theirown cognitive approacheshelp us to appreciate
points of view.

Cognitive psychologists, on the otherhand,do not worryabout the problem of other minds. They take for grantedthat they are studying cognitive creaturesand design experimentsthat try to shed light on the cognitive capacities they presumeto exist. This is the paththatshouldbe followed by cognitive ethologists:Rather thangetting in a twist aboutwhetheranimalshave minds, instead design experiments that study the cognitive capacities of animals.46Ultimately the tenability of various scientific views aboutanimalminds will be demonstrated the fruitfulnessof the by research.It may be thatthe best cognitive vocabularyfor humans or other animals will depart from folk psychological concepts. Perhaps at the 'end of neuroscience' mentality will have been explainedaway.Oureverydaypracticesof attributing mentalstates to animals is where cognitive ethology shouldbegin, not where it should end. But whateverthe futuremay hold, a science of animal minds cannot get going withoutpresupposingthatit has an object of study. Having said this, it is important recognize thatthe tenability to of oureverydaypracticesof ascribingmentalstatesto animalsdoes not rest on the possibility of a science of animal minds. In the presentintellectualclimateit is temptingto supposethatwe should believe only in what can be vindicatedby scientificmethods.This may even be thoughtto follow from the role that science plays in our culture as the providerof reliable knowledge. But although science may be a high-classproducer qualitycognitiveproducts, of there is little reason to believe that it has a monopoly on them. In orderto supposethat,we would need to be convincedthatthe only form of knowledge is scientific knowledge. Not only is this unproven,but it seems to me to be false. Furthermore, I have as suggested, ascribingmental states to animals is an importantpart
46. Some of the best cognitive ethologists are beginningto do this. See the work collected in D. Cummins and C. Allen, eds., The Evolution of Mind, forthcoming from Oxford University Press.

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of our moral outlook. The persistenceof this moral outlook does not depend on the possibility of a science of animalminds. In this essay I have claimed that many of us know that many animalsare in variousmentalstates on variousoccasions and that therecan be a science thatstudiesthese states.Even if I am wrong aboutthe latterclaim, the formerclaim is not therebyundermined. The conception of animals as minded creatures, encoded and expressed in our everyday practices, is currently too well entrenchedfor scepticismto overcome.The recognitionof this fact is the beginningof any serious investigationof animalminds.47
Departmentof Philosophy Carleton College One North College Street,Northfield MN 55057, and Departmentof Philosophy Universityof Colorado Boulder CO 80309-0232 [email protected]

47. This essay began life as a contributionto the Cornell Workshopon Comparative Cognition. Subsequent versions were presentedat the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association,Duke University, Universityof Colorado,MonashUniversity, the La TrobeUniversity,and the Universityof Melbourne.I was helpedby those who took part in these discussions;especially ColinAllen, MarcBekoff,CarlGinet,Kristina MacRae,Paul Moriarity and Sydney Shoemaker.Comments by Elizabeth Fricker, Douglas C. Long, MargaretDauler Wilson and Steven Yalowitz on various versions of the manuscriptalso occasionedrevisions.My greatestdebtis to JohnA. Fisherwith whom I havediscussedthese issues for manyyears. I remainpainfullyawareof how muchmorethereis to say aboutthese mattersand how much betterit should be said.