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SYST 100 Class 10 - Safety of Complex Systems: Homework Discussion Questions

The document discusses the roles and responsibilities of engineers in identifying and managing risk. It states that engineers play a significant role in establishing goals, mitigating consequences, considering system effects, and communicating with decision makers. However, engineers must also understand the political, cultural, organizational, and economic aspects of projects, as engineering projects can have wide-ranging impacts. The success of projects and organizations depends on understanding associated risks. Military organizations create high-reliability through rigid control, concern for safety, and continually improving risk management. Some aspects of military culture around reliability can transfer to civilian organizations like NASA, which has advanced systems engineering to reduce failures, though continual debate remains around reliability.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
40 views

SYST 100 Class 10 - Safety of Complex Systems: Homework Discussion Questions

The document discusses the roles and responsibilities of engineers in identifying and managing risk. It states that engineers play a significant role in establishing goals, mitigating consequences, considering system effects, and communicating with decision makers. However, engineers must also understand the political, cultural, organizational, and economic aspects of projects, as engineering projects can have wide-ranging impacts. The success of projects and organizations depends on understanding associated risks. Military organizations create high-reliability through rigid control, concern for safety, and continually improving risk management. Some aspects of military culture around reliability can transfer to civilian organizations like NASA, which has advanced systems engineering to reduce failures, though continual debate remains around reliability.

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Gulshan A. Amin
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SYST 100 Class 10 Safety of Complex Systems: Homework Discussion Questions Perrow, Normal Accidents 1.

. In the interaction /coupling chart on p. 97, Perrow defines universities as complexloosely coupled, and on the next page explains why. Do you agree or disagree with his conclusion? Explain with specific reasons. The concept of loosely coupled organizations is very widespread and diverse. Universities can be loosely coupled because of their different challenging goals, large group participation and communication gap. These characteristics actually require one to stop and think outside the bubble of closed, rational and bureaucratic model. I agree with the author that universities hold a loosely coupled system because norms and standards of higher education are generally quite ambiguous and due to several internal and external factors it often goes beyond the walls of the university. Through large participation of all groups and organizations of the universities, all are interacting with each other in various levels. Hence, it increases various levels of complexity. This complexity therefore, creates a huge amount of uncertainty within the institution. Each of the departmental group is focused on its own work and research and is barely integrated. When a large group is not co-ordinated systematically, internal fragmentation is bound to happen which weakens the virtual bond. Loose coupling allows the isolation of problems within an organization so that the most pressing problems sometimes do not affect other subgroups in the university. Each of its department has its own sets of goals and endeavors. They barely relate with the goals of other groups. They need to take care of their problems and challenges on their own which makes them quite independent and this fact plays an important role in loosening the socalled bond. On the other hand, within the university structure, the separation of faculty, administrators, staff, and board, departments, colleges and schools serves to promote the professional development of these subgroups independently of the rest of the organization. Those professional groups dont even communicate that often which leads to further separation and fragmentation of the broad context. These groups then become almost solely responsible for the actions and reactions in their own realm. The actors of this hidden world define the functions and changes of complex organizations which make their actions quite unpredictable and difficult to understand. It is not unknown to us that universities play a vital role in shaping the big national picture of any nation. The scope of responsibility, therefore, extends beyond the walls of a single institution and into the world. So, even though they are loosely coupled, in some way or the other, its their universal duty to maintain a general interconnection in order to live up to the high expectations of national, global and institutional perspectives.

References: Hensley, O. D. (1992). Strategic Planning for University Research. Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press. 2. What are the roles of the engineer in identifying and managing risk? Discuss in terms of an engineers cultural, political, organizational and economic responsibilities, and NOT just technical ones. (You may refer to the ValuJet 592 article to get a broader, you-arethere view of how risk is managed or not -- in a complex organization) Engineers are widely known as problem-solvers. They also play significant roles in identifying and managing risk which includes establishing goals, mitigating consequences, considering system effects, avoiding both too much and too little conservatism, maximizing the value of information, and communicating effectively to decision makers and the public. Risk management is undoubtedly an essential element in the work or practice of most professional engineers. Almost everyone has to go through this process since its a fundamental component of problem-solving. However, it is also necessary to say that there are several political, cultural, organizational and economical aspects associated with this process. Engineers need to understand these aspects while reviewing any of their given projects because it may result in a host of impacts with serious economic, social, and political ramifications. Any engineering project can successfully function if its political aspects are fully understood because otherwise the entire system will be in jeopardy if it doesnt attune with the ongoing political spectrum. Whether its international project, or domestic project, each of them has to go through the political norms. Since the projects are sponsored by a particular organization, it is the solemn duty of the engineer to make sure his project lives up to every norms and constraints of the organization. If its an international organization, the risks are even higher. Then, engineers have to take care of high risks. Such risks include war, civil war, terrorism, inability to transfer currency across borders, and trade credit defaults by foreign or domestic customers. Although risks such as civil unrest and economic stability are typically outside the scope of normal business, understanding and dealing with these risks are critical for engineers working in international projects. The global economy requires engineers to plan and work in many different cultural and economic settings. It requires engineers to focus on different cultures with a wide global perspective. The duties of engineers can be quite complex and may vary from region to region and project to project. However, the risks are almost the same in every case. The success of a specific project, and in some cases the viability of an organization, can depend on an understanding of the risks associated with such projects. References: Chapman, C., and Ward, S. 1997. Project Risk Management: Process, Techniques and Insights, John Wiley & Sons. Chapman, C., and Ward, S. 2002.Managing Project Risk and Uncertainty, John Wiley & Sons.

LaPorte, Aircraft Carriers as High-Reliability Organizations 1. What aspects of military culture create a high-reliability organization? specific examples.

Discuss using

The military culture creates a high-reliability organization because it reects long tradition, the intensity of death and battle, and rigid bureaucratic mode of control. For example, Modern military culture balances a host of other factors, including support equipment reliability, human error, and logistics support. Initially these it must determine the degree of information accuracy necessary to make these decisions and then prioritize all identified critical events or elements. We know for a fact that military organizations are concerned about the loss of expensive assets such as loss of life and injury as well as loss of the abilities of highly trained operator and maintainers. Readiness to protect our country is at the top of their charter; however, they must balance many factors when determining acceptable risks. Political reaction to a catastrophe, national confidence being shaken, or potential loss of project funding (e.g.V-22 Osprey) are just some of the impacts they must consider. As a result, military agencies place a very high reliability standard on their assets. They endeavor to make the most of the limited available funding. One drawback can be that quantitative numbers are more precise than the qualitative ones so there is a tendency to put more weight on them. For example, the QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) sometimes yields a very low probability of failure, but the analyst may not have considered all the failure modes, human error, or the operating environment in which the asset is used. Additionally, if the assessment is based on the fact that this failure has not happened in millions of flight hours and is not likely to happen, however the component is actually at the end of its useful life after fatiguing for many years, the results could be disastrous. Later, Government military agencies took care of this by considering the way the failure happens, its failure characteristics, whether there are clear indications of impending failure and whether there are adequate backup or safety systems in place. Since the civil war, the area of risk and hazard management is continually improving, making the military stronger day by day. Risk is generally a fact of life and it applies to all areas of endeavor. The keys to managing these risks are based on the frequency of a failure or event occurring, and the impact of its failure. Our military has gone through several ups and downs during the revolutionary war, civil war and cold war. However, its unrelenting struggle to reach perfection is still interminable. The failures made our military stronger than ever and thus it became one of the most highly-reliable organizations.

References: United States Air Force. (1991). Military Handbook; Reliability Predication of Electronic Equipment. MIL-HDBK-217F. Griffiss Air Force Base, Rome, New York.

2. Are these attributes transferable to civilian organizations, e.g., NASA? Discuss using specific examples. NASA has its own fair share of ups and downs. As a systems engineer, one cant deny NASAs contribution to systems engineering while Von Brauns experienced rocket team at Marshall Space Flight Center eschewed that remarkable discipline of engineering. History shows how NASA became a reliable organization by introducing Systems management and systems engineering which were created to reduce failures by fixing mission-ending faults. However, over the past few years, there had been some stormy brews of debates about the reliability of NASA. In the end of 2010, NASA experimenters found a bacterium that seems to be able to subsist on arsenic in place of phosphorus-an element until now deemed essential for life. Microbiologists, around the world, who have been suspicious of NASA ever since the agency announced that it had found fossils of microbes in a meteorite from Mars in 1996, began shooting back, saying the experimenters had failed to provide any solid evidence that arsenic had actually been incorporated into the bacteriums DNA. Things got nastier when NASA refused to respond to the criticism. Everyone wanted scientific evidence which was not provided by NASA. Doesnt it make us question ourselves? What kind of a science are we relying on which is void of explanation? Are we relying on some vague conclusions that were based on assumptions and not made with scientific evidences? After the disastrous demise of the space shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board criticized NASAs safety culture. Adopting the highreliability organization as a benchmark, the board concluded that NASA did not possess the organizational characteristics that could have prevented this disaster. The conclusion was made after discovering foam culture which had a long history in space shuttle program. Studies showed that despite of constant warnings from the NASA engineers, project managers reportedly failed to act upon it and made the disaster destined to happen. Under the discussion, it can be said that reliability-seeking organizations such as NASA sometimes cant live up to the required safety standards. In the end, reliability is a matter of organizational norms that help individual employees at all levels in the organization to make the right decision. It is also unhelpful to evaluate NASA by standards that it is in no position to reach. Such evaluations lead to inappropriate reforms and punishments. The irony is that these could transform NASA into the opposite of what is expected that is, a permanently failing organization. References: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/science/14arsenic.html Starbuck, William H., and Moshe Farjoun, 2005 .Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Accident.

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