PROJECT MANGEMENT PLAN EXAMPLES

Prepare Project Support Plans and

Documentation Project Risk Assessment Examples
Example 54
10.0 PROJECT RISK
This section outlines a methodology which will be used to qualitatively/subjectively assess the project risk. The approach is modeled
after project risk assessment processes outlined in standard project management texts and training courses but tailored to the
unique risks encountered in the DOE projects.
In the context of this section, project risk means risk to one of the project baselines (technical, cost, or schedule) and should not be
confused with health and safety risks. However, health and safety issues are considered to the extent that they impact the risk to
the project baselines.
10.1 RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS
The two primary tools that will be used to conduct the risk assessment are listed below.

The Risk Assessment Matrix given in Table 10-1 -- The Risk Assessment Matrix consists of two elements: risk factors and
risk ranking guidelines. The risk factors represent the topics that are considered to have the most influence on project
risk. The risk ranking guidelines are qualitative statements assigned to low, medium, and high-risk categories. The risk
ranking guidelines are used to determine the risk impact of each of the risk factors to the project baseline.

The Risk Assessment Data Sheet shown in Figure 10-1 -- The Risk Assessment Data Sheet is the tool that is used to
document the results of the risk assessment session. The data sheet is designed to be used in conjunction with the Risk
Assessment Matrix to obtain a structured, consistent, and rigorous assessment of risk.

The two tools discussed above can be used to manage the project risks by identifying the risks, assessing the risks, and reducing
the risks through mitigation and contingency planning.
10.2 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
The risk assessment tools (Risk Assessment Matrix and Risk Assessment Data Sheet) discussed in Section 10.1 may be applied at
the project level, the sub-project level, or the task level, as appropriate. Risk assessments will typically be performed by an
assessment team comprised of project managers, technical staff, operating/field staff, customers (RL, DOE-HQ, and FDH), and
selected stakeholders as appropriate based upon the project element and its position in the baseline hierarchy (i.e., project level,
sub-project level, or task/activity level). A team leader will be assigned or selected to schedule, lead, and document the results of
the risk assessment session. The results of all project risk assessments will be maintained in an appendix to this IPMP. An initial
assessment will be performed at the project level with follow-on assessments performed at other levels of the project baseline
hierarchy, based on the results of the initial assessment. Assessments will then be performed throughout the life of the project.
Typically, risk assessments will be performed to support the change request process, when baseline adjustments are necessary, or
to support the decision process for selection and implementation of technical alternatives.
10.3 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT PROJECT RISKS
A formal assessment of project risk has not been completed at this point in the project. This section will be developed as more
comprehensive project planning is completed using the Risk Assessment Process.

Figure 10-1. Risk Assessment Data Sheet.

RISK ASSESSMENT AREA (Cost, Schedule, Scope, Etc.)
RISK FACTOR

Technology
Interfaces

RISK

RISK

MITIGATION &

RANK

CONTRIBUTORS

CONTINGENCIES

Safety
Political Visibility and Stakeholder
Involvement
Funding
Time/Schedule
Site Characteristics
Labor
Quality Requirements
Number of Key Participants
Contractor Capabilities
Regulatory Involvement
Magnitude and Complexity of
Contamination
Table 10-1. Risk Assessment Matrix.
(3 Sheets)
RISK FACTOR

QUALITATIVE RISK RANKING GUIDELINES

LOW

TECHNOLOGY

- Conventional/off-theshelf
- Extensive previous
facility application
- Little or no testing
required

INTERFACES

SAFETY

MEDIUM
- Proven state of the
art

HIGH
- Unproven/new

- Little or no previous
- Some previous
facility or site application
facility or site application
- Extensive proof of
- Some proof of
principle testing required
application testing
required
- Complex/highly
engineered

- Little or no impact
- Potential impact from
from other site programs other site operations,
programs or contractors
operations or
contractors
- Some new interfaces
must be established and
managed
- Established and
mature interfaces and
working relationships
used

- Potential MAJOR impact

from other site operations,
or contractors

- Small project (fewer

than 50 FTEs)

- Moderate sized
projects (50-150 FTEs)

- Large projects (more than

150 FTEs)

- Little or no
construction

- Most elements of an "

integrated " worker
health and safety
approach exist but may
not be fully mature

- Multiple hazards - some

of which are not well
understood or there is a lack
of experience in dealing with

- Contractor
experienced on same
type of project
- Worker health and

- Multiple and/or complex

interfaces required which
may include competing
objectives

- Significant construction
- Contractor/facility has required

safety " integrated " with excellent safety record

job planning. Integrated
approach is fully
- Existing hazards are
implemented and
well understood
mature

- " integrated " worker

health and safety approach
not implemented

- Facility/contractor has
exemplary safety record
POLITICAL
VISIBILITY AND
STAKEHOLDER
INVOLVEMENT

- Little or no
stakeholder interest

- Some information
sharing and
communication
outreach required
- Stakeholders neutral
but interested in
progress updates

FUNDING

TIME/SCHEDULE

- Less than one year

duration

- Contractor/facility does
not have strong safety
record or a mature safety
program

- Two to three year

duration

- Potentially sensitive to
stakeholders
- Independent oversight or
significant outreach/input
required
- Involvement/coordination
with multiple regulatory
agencies
- Three or more years
duration

- Detailed and
- Detailed estimate but
validated estimate exists not yet validated

- Conceptual level estimate

- No known schedule
constraints

- Multiple schedule
constraints/compressed
schedule

- Predecessor and
successor actions are
simple and clearly
identified and
understood.
- Demonstrated ability
to perform activities
- No assumptions with
regard to performance

- Some schedule
constraints exist by
won't affect completion
date
- Assumptions have
been validated

- Activities developed only

to conceptual level (multiple
invalidated assumptions)

- Some resources
- Resources uncommitted
required outside of
or not identified
facility but high
confidence in availability
based on past
performance

- Resources identified,
committed and under
facility control
SITE
CHARACTERISTICS

- 1 site or facility

- 2-3 sites or facilities

- 4 or more sites or
facilities

- DOE property

- Government property

- Accessible

- Accessible

- No required
infrastructure

- Minor infrastructure

- Low to moderate skill

- Moderate/high skill

- Moderate/high skill

- Readily available

- Restricted availability

-Severely restricted
availability

- Gradual buildup

- Phased buildup

- Private property
- Restricted Access

LABOR

- Major Infrastructure

- Low productivity
requirement

- Moderate productivity - Rapid build-up

required
- High Productivity required

- Large tolerances

- Average QC
requirements

- High QC requirements

NUMBER OF KEY
- 1
PARTICIPANTS
(Internal and external)

- 2-3

- 3 or more

CONTRACTOR
CAPABILITIES

- Proven track record

and resources
immediately available

- Limited experience or - Newly acquired

resource availability
capabilities or resources
committed to other projects

REGULATORY
INVOLVEMENT

- Minimal permit
requirements (e.g.
NEPA CX)

- Routine permit
requirements with
multiple agencies (e.g.
NEPA EA)

QUALITY
REQUIREMENTS

- Low QC requirements

- No compliance issues
- Compliance issues
have precedent or
defined path forward.
Little negotiation
required
MAGNITUDE AND
COMPLEXITY OF
CONTAMINATION

- No potential for
chronic or acute
exposure to chemical or
radiological hazards
- High confidence in
the characterization of
industrial, chemical and
radiological hazards
- Exemplary
ALARA/HAZCOM/Rad
Con and Industrial
safety program
performance record

- Complex permit
requirements with multiple
agencies or branches of
government (e.g., NEPA
EIS)
- Precedent setting
compliance paths requires.
Significant negotiation

- Potential for chronic

- Potential for
or acute exposure to
overexposure to chemical or
well defined chemical or radiological hazards
radiological hazards
- Industrial, chemical and
- Excellent
radiological hazards not well
ALARA/HAZCOM/Rad
characterized/defined
Con and Industrial
safety program
- Less than excellent
performance record
ALARA/HAZCOM/Rad Con
and Industrial Safety
program performance record

Example 55
13.0 PROJECT RISK
The project risk is defined here as those conditions that will adversely impact the schedule and cost baseline of the 9206 Phase
Out/Deactivation Project. The conditions include organizational functional and resource dependencies. The 9206 Complex is not a
stand-alone facility. The inter- and intra- dependencies of greatest impact are described below:
13.1 INTERDEPENDENCIES
Readiness of 9212 HEU Chemical Recovery Operations
The " building 9212 transition plan in support of 9206 phase out ", Appendix A, describes the initial projected schedule for HEU
processing capability at Building 9212, which will occur in phases as individual 9212 chemical recovery operations are restarted
under PBR. Changes and/or delays to this schedule will significantly alter the schedule and cost baseline for 9206 deactivation.
Alternative material disposition paths are be identified and investigated to minimize this task.
9206 and 9212 Subprojects - Cost Relations
Appendix C, Integrated Funding Needs, includes subproject activities for 9212 that are necessary for movement and disposition of
material from 9206. As funding priorities change at the site level, this subproject dependency and integration will need to be
maintained and evaluated as a package for schedule and cost.

Training of Additional Deactivation Work Force

It is anticipated that at a minimum, an additional operating staff composed of a supervisor, STA, and IP operators, will be needed
to accomplish the deactivation project work. If trained and qualified staff cannot be found, then a six to nine month period will be
needed to train and qualify a new crew.
Availability: of SNM Material Storage Space, Sitewide
The Y-12 Plant is the primary DOE site for the processing and storage of HEU. It is anticipated that surplus inventories of HEU at
other DOE sites which will be shipped to the Y-12 Plant for processing and storing. Many of the 9206 HEU materials which require
interim or long-term storage while awaiting processing and/or off-site shipment will need to be given priority.
9206 Decontamination Pad
It is anticipated that the 9206 Decontamination Operations will be needed during the deactivation phase Clip as materials are
removed. It is important to preserve the decontamination operating crew capability at 9206 until deactivation is complete.
9212/9206 Recovery Furnace(s)
The DOE and LMES are currently reviewing options for the reduction of site HEU contaminated combustibles, including the future
scope of need for the 9206 and 9212 recovery furnace(s) operations and potential off-site shipment of a portion of the drums. The
ultimate decision will impact the IMP disposition schedule, 9206 staff resources, and deactivation schedule.
ENS Audibility Zone
Other facilities surrounding 9206 Complex, including Building 9710-2, are affected by power outages in Building 9206 as it applies
to the 200 ft. CAAS covered zone and the ENS audibility zone. The impact will be evaluated as a part of deactivation.
Y-12 and LMES Organization Support
The 9206 Complex will be dependent upon many other Y-12 organizations for the development and approval of its integrated safety
authorization basis.
Fire Protection Systems
It is anticipated that once deactivation is complete and the hazardous SNM and combustible materials have been removed, the
need for fire safety sprinkler systems will diminish and/or be eliminated. A dry system for S&M mode will be evaluated. Impact to
surrounding buildings will be evaluated as well as interdependent water feed systems that support sprinkler systems. The Plant Fire
Alarm System that supports facilities exterior to Building 9206 is expected to remain fully operational during the post deactivation
phase. Peripheral facilities such as 9767-2, 9720-17, 9409-17 and others must be maintained, with working fire alarm
communications. The fire alarm cable currently passes through or along the exterior surface of Building 9206. The rerouting of fire
alarm system cabling and the maintenance of fire alarms will be evaluated to determine the extent of operability during
deactivation and post deactivation. Specific fire alarm components that must be maintained after shut down will be defined.
Earthquake Monitors
The Y-12 Plant has two earthquake monitors installed inside Building 9206. They are active systems for which emergency access
must be maintained. The post deactivation access and location will need to be evaluated.
13.2 INTRA DEPENDENCIES
9206 Process Knowledge and Experience
The current 9206 operations crew collectively has many years of knowledge and experience regarding 9206 HEU chemical recovery
operations, known and potential hazards, and unique building processes. Several senior operators and supervisors have specific
system knowledge. The availability of funding to perform deactivation needs to be prioritized to capture this capability.
9206 MAA
Performing deactivation within an MAA requires careful planning of all resources, e.g. equipment and personnel, to maximize
working time and minimize additional security needs.
Internal Storage Space
The ability of 9206 to remove a significant portion of their chemical recovery process equipment is dependent upon available
storage space for nuclear material within the building and the Y-12 Plant. Interim measures are currently under consideration.
Diked Areas
The material will need to be removed from the tanks and associated lines within the diked areas before the diked areas can be
deactivated.

Example 56

Chapter 12.0 outlines a methodology that will be used to qualitatively or subjectively assess project risk. The approach is modeled
after project risk assessment processes outlined in standard project management texts and training courses but tailored to the
unique risks encountered in DOE projects. An initial evaluation of project risk was prepared during the development of the BOE
sheets, and is provided as Appendix J.
In the context of this chapter, project risk means risk to one of the project baselines (technical, cost, or schedule) and should not
be confused with health and safety risks. However, health and safety issues are considered to the extent that they affect the risk to
the project baselines.
12.1 Risk Assessment Tools
The following two primary tools will be used to conduct risk assessments:

The Risk Assessment Matrix (Table 12-1). The Risk Assessment Matrix consists of two elements: risk factors and risk
ranking guidelines. The risk factors represent the topics considered to have the most influence on project risk. The risk
ranking guidelines are qualitative statements assigned to a low-, medium-, and high-risk category. The risk ranking
guidelines are used to determine the risk impact of each of the risk factors to the project baseline.

The Risk Assessment Data Sheet (Figure 12-1). The Risk Assessment Data Sheet is the tool used to document the results
of the risk assessment session, and is designed to be used in conjunction with the Risk Assessment Matrix to obtain a
structured, consistent, and rigorous assessment of risk.

The two tools can be used to manage the project risks by identifying, assessing, and reducing the risks through mitigation and
contingency planning.
12.2 Risk Assessment Process
The risk assessment tools (Risk Assessment Matrix and Risk Assessment Data Sheet), may be applied at the project level, the
subproject level, or the task level, as appropriate.
Risk assessments typically will be performed by an assessment team made up of project managers, technical staff, operating and
field staff members, customers (RL, DOE-HQ, and FDH) and selected stakeholders as appropriate. The make-up of the team will
vary, based on the project element and its position in the baseline hierarchy (i.e., project level, subproject level, or task/activity
level). A team leader may be assigned or selected to schedule, lead, and document the results of the risk assessment session. The
results of all project risk assessments will be maintained in project files. Assessments may be performed throughout the life of the
project. Typically, risk assessments will be performed to support the change request process, when baseline adjustments are
necessary, or to support the decision process for selection and implementation of technical alternatives.
The principles of this risk assessment guidance were used throughout the PMP development phase by the project management
team, enhanced with contractor technical support. The prescriptive assessment tool is to be used during the intensive risk reduction
and deactivation activities, when dedicated project management technical support is not readily available.
12.3 Issue Resolution and Decision Making
This section provides guidelines for the resolution of significant technical and program issues encountered during the project
involving risk assessments. A systematic issue resolution and decision making process provides an approach to resolving project
issues that is visible to internal and external stakeholders and enhances the confidence that decisions will be upheld.
Issue resolution and decision making will occur at all levels of the project organization, at all times, and with varying impact to the
project. Many technical issues are resolved at the work planning level and usually have low impact to the project direction. Other
major technical or program issues require resolution at a higher organizational level (project management and above) because of
their potential for significant project impact. The issue resolution and decision-making process outlined in subsequent sections is
intended to address the project decisions that significantly affect the project.
12.3.1 Issue Resolution Process
The issue resolution and decision-making process is summarized in Figure 12-1. The process begins when an issue is raised for
resolution within a subproject. The project manager or designated staff identifies a set of alternative solutions. If several likely
alternatives exist, the alternatives are systematically evaluated against a set of discriminating criteria (Section 12.3.2) used to
identify a preferred alternative. This evaluation is documented in an appropriate format before the results are presented to the
Project management team.
If applicable (major project impact to scope, schedule, or estimate), the Project Direction Foursome will review the results of the
evaluation and either confirm or reject the recommended course of action. If the recommendation is rejected, additional analysis
will be performed with the results presented back to the Project Direction Foursome. If the recommendation is accepted, the Project
Direction Foursome must determine if the recommendation requires confirmation by the project board of directors. If confirmation
by the board of directors is not required, the recommendation is finalized, documented, communicated and implemented. If the
board of directors must confirm the decision, the recommendation is presented and acted on in the same manner as with the
Project Direction Foursome (refer to Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2).
12.3.2 Decision Criteria
The following nine performance measures have been identified that can be used to evaluate alternatives in support of the issue
resolution and decision-making process:

Safety
Cost
Schedule
Operability
Maintainability
Environmental
Technical maturity
Complexity of interfaces
Risk.

The project values need to be considered while evaluating alternatives, but do not necessarily directly relate to technical evaluation
of the alternatives. The recommended alternative should support the various values.
The performance measures represent a mixture of quantitative and qualitative factors. Some of the performance measures, such as
cost, directly represent measurable variables that qualitative factors influence because some assumptions are used to develop the
costs. Other performance measures, such as operability, depend much more on the experience and values of evaluators. Although
some decision makers tend to focus on tangible and immediately visible performance measures, such as cost and schedule, some of
the less tangible performance measures such as operability and safety, can carry heavy hidden cost penalties. These hidden costs
should be identified by means of sensitivity analyses. The performance measures are as follows:

Schedule. Implementing schedules and associated schedule risk will be assessed relative to implementation of a given
alternative. Schedule interface with Tri-Party Agreement and other internal (BWHC) or external (DOE, regulatory,
stakeholder) schedule requirements will be considered.

Cost. The equipment, system or component will be evaluated with respect to capital, operating (including waste
handling, analytical and preparatory paperwork), and life-cycle costs.

Operability. This criterion is used for equipment and systems to be used during deactivation or installed for long-term
S&M (i.e., emergency lighting). Operability of a system is mostly a qualitative measure of the inherent complexity of a
system that influences other aspects of operability, such as the following:

Startup and shutdown of the system

Process control
Troubleshooting and response to off-normal conditions
Operator interface.
Maintainability. This criterion is used for equipment and systems to be used during deactivation or installed
for long-term S&M (i.e., emergency lighting). Evaluating the complexity, reliability, and repair-ability can
determine the maintainability of a system of the associated equipment and components.

Safety. Alternatives should be compared on the bases of associated hazards and implications for onsite and
offsite safety, worker safety, and property protection.

Environmental. The environmental (regulatory) impacts of a system can be assessed by evaluating the
following factors: liquid effluent generation, gaseous effluent generation, secondary dangerous waste
generation, and permitting requirements.

Technical Maturity. The technical maturity of a deactivated process, system, or piece of equipment can be
assessed by direct application or demonstration in the DOE complex or nuclear industry. Other factors that
influence technical maturity or technology assurance include maximizing adaptability for new technologies or
mission change, design flexibility or adaptability for incorporating improved technology, and avoiding regulatory
uncertainty.

Complexity of Interfaces. The complexity of building and functional interfaces is assessed by evaluating
compatibility with existing systems and complexity introduced by needed changes, requirements for support
functions and facilities, and the number and diversity of organizations that must be involved in implementation.

Risk. The risk associated with a particular alternative can be examined by its sensitivity to cost and schedule
changes and the capability of the alternative to uphold project values.

HNF-IP-1289, Rev. 1

Table 12-1. Risk Assessment Matrix.

RISK FACTOR

QUALITATIVE RISK RANKING GUIDELINES

LOW

TECHNOLOGY

- Conventional/off-theshelf
- Extensive previous
building application
- Little or no testing
required

MEDIUM
- Proven state of the art

HIGH
- Unproven/new

- Some previous building - Little or no previous

or site application
building or site
application.
- Some proof of
application testing
- Extensive proof of
required
principle testing required.

- Complex/highly
engineered
INTERFACES

SAFETY

- Little or no impact from

other site programs,
operations or contractors

- Potential impact from

other site operations,
programs or contractors

- Potential MAJOR
impact from other site
operations, or contractors

- Established and
mature interfaces and
working relationships
used

- Some new interfaces

must be established and
managed

- Multiple and/or complex

interfaces required which
may include competing
objectives

- Small project (fewer

than 50 FTE)

- Moderate sized
projects (50-150 FTE)

- Large projects (more

than 150 FTE)

- Little or no construction - Most elements of an "

integrated " worker health
- Contractor experienced and safety approach exist
but may not be fully
on same type of project
mature
- Worker health and
safety " integrated " with
job planning. Integrated
approach is fully
implemented and mature

- Multiple hazards some of which are not

well understood or there is
a lack of experience in
dealing with

- Contractor/building has - Significant construction

excellent safety record
required
- Existing hazards are
well understood

- Building/contractor has
exemplary safety record

- Contractor/building
does not have strong
safety record or a mature
safety program
- " integrated " worker
health and safety
approach not
implemented

POLITICAL
VISIBILITY AND
STAKEHOLDER
INVOLVEMENT

- Little or no stakeholder
interest

- Some information
sharing and
communication outreach
required
- Stakeholders neutral
but interested in progress
updates

- Potentially sensitive to
stakeholders
- Independent oversight
or significant
outreach/input required
Involvement/coordinatio
n with multiple regulatory
agencies

FUNDING

TIME/SCHEDULE

- Less than one year

duration

- Two to three year

duration

- Three or more years

duration

- Detailed and validated

estimate exists

- Detailed estimate but

not yet validated

- Conceptual level
estimate

- No known schedule
constraints

- Some schedule
constraints exist by won't
affect completion date

- Multiple schedule
constraints/compressed
schedule

- Predecessor and
successor actions are
- Assumptions have
simple and clearly
been validated
identified and understood.
- Some resources
- Demonstrated ability to required outside of

- Activities developed
only to conceptual level
(multiple invalidated
assumptions)

perform activities

building but high

confidence in availability
based on past
performance

- Resources
uncommitted or not
identified

- 1 site or building

- 2-3 sites or facilities

- 4 or more sites or
facilities

- DOE property

- Government property

- No assumptions with
regard to performance
- Resources identified,
committed and under
building control
SITE
CHARACTERISTIC
S

- Private property
- Accessible

- Accessible

- No required
infrastructure

- Minor infrastructure

- Low to moderate skill

- Moderate/high skill

- Moderate/high skill

- Readily available

- Restricted availability

-Severely restricted
availability

- Gradual buildup

- Phased buildup

- Restricted Access

LABOR

- Major Infrastructure

- Rapid build-up

QUALITY
REQUIREMENTS

- Low productivity
requirement

- Moderate productivity
required

- Large tolerances

- Average QC
requirements

- High QC requirements

- High Productivity
required

- Low QC requirements
NUMBER OF KEY
PARTICIPANTS
(Internal and
external)

- 1

- 2-3

- 3 or more

CONTRACTOR
CAPABILITIES

- Proven track record

and resources
immediately available

- Limited experience or
resource availability

- Newly acquired
capabilities or resources
committed to other
projects

REGULATORY
INVOLVEMENT

- Minimal permit
requirements (e.g., NEPA
CX)

- Routine permit requirements with multiple agencies

(e.g., NEPA EA)

- No compliance issues

- Compliance issues have precedent or defined path

forward. Little negotiation required
- Complex permit requirements with multiple
agencies or branches of government (e.g., NEPA EIS)
- Precedent setting compliance paths requires.
Significant negotiation

MAGNITUDE AND
COMPLEXITY OF
CONTAMINATION

- No potential for chronic

or acute exposure to
chemical or radiological
hazards

- Potential for chronic or

acute exposure to well
defined chemical or
radiological hazards

- High confidence in the

characterization of

- Excellent
ALARA/HAZCOM/RadCo

- Potential for
overexposure to chemical
or radiological hazards
- Industrial, chemical and
radiological hazards not

industrial, chemical and

radiological hazards

n and Industrial safety

program performance
record

- Exemplary
ALARA/HAZCOM/RadCo
n and Industrial safety
program performance
record

well characterized/defined
- Less than excellent
ALARA/HAZCOM/RadCo
n and Industrial Safety
program performance
record

HNF-IP-1289, Rev 2

Figure 12-1. Risk Assessment Data

Sheet
RISK ASSESSMENT AREA (Cost, Schedule, Scope, Etc.)
RISK FACTOR

Technology
Interfaces
Safety
Political Visibility & Stakeholder
Involvement
Funding
Time/Schedule
Site Characteristics
Labor
Quality Requirements
Number of Key Participants
Contractor Capabilities
Regulatory Involvement
Magnitude and Complexity of
Contamination

RISK

RISK

MITIGATION &

RANK

CONTRIBUTORS

CONTINGENCIES